EDCA Issue on Absence of Senate Concurrence Not a Political Question (Saguisag vs

Exec, 2016 Brion DISSENT)

Brion Dissent Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Case Digest GR 212426 Jan 12 2016

Dissent Opinion by Justice Brion

Full Text

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC

the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an
agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on
June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following
types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint
and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and
such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of

agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since
the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate,
through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs
congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the SC may exercise its power of judicial review over the case

Yes. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a
public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of
discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the
Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but
because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded
jurisdiction.

Issue 2: W/N the issue on the invalidity of EDCA for lacking Senate concurrence falls
under the political question doctrine

No. The constitutional status of the EDCA as an executive agreement in light of the
mandate of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution is not a political question
outside the judiciarys competence and authority to resolve. This is because there is
a standard set by the Constitution in delineating when an international agreement
should be a treaty subject to Senate concurrence an issue which is within the
Courts authority to settle in their role as the guardians of the Constitution.

Issue 3: W/N the EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
No. The EDCA, as a mere executive agreement entered by the President with the
US, is constitutionally deficient. The EDCA should be in the form of a treaty as it
brings back to the Philippines the modern equivalent of the foreign military bases
whose term expired in 1991 and which Art XVIII, Sec 25 of the Constitution directly
addresses; foreign troops under arrangements outside of the contemplation of the
visiting forces that the 1998 VFA allows; and military facilities that, under modern
military strategy, likewise can be brought in only through a treaty. ##

EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Requiring Senate Concurrence (Saguisag vs Executive

Secretary, 2016 De Castro DISSENT)
De Castro Dissent Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Case Digest GR 212426 Jan 12 2016

Dissent Opinion by Justice Leonardo De Castro

Full Text

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC

the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an
agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on
June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following
types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint
and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and
such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of

agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since
the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops or facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate,
through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs
congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President

No. EDCA is not a valid executive agreement entered into by the President because
it falls under those treaties and international agreements which need the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate.

Article XVIII, Sec 25 of the 1987 Constitution is a special provision that prohibits the
entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. As an
exception, such would be allowed only if: first, the stay of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities is allowed by a treaty; second, such treaty is with the
concurrence of the Senate, and when Congress so requires, such treaty should be
ratified by majority of the votes cast by the Filipino people in a national referendum
held for the purpose; and third, such treaty is recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting party.

Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is
immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. In the case of EDCA, it
clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country.
Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid
treaty.

Issue 2: W/N the EDCA is merely an implementation of the VFA and the MDT

No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the
MDT.

First, while the VFA allows only the presence of US military troops, the EDCA on the
other hand contemplates the presence of not just the troops but also military bases
and facilities in the so-called Agreed Locations.

Second, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against
either of the parties territories or armed forces but there is nothing in the MDT that
specifically authorizes the presence, whether temporary or permanent, of a partys
bases, troops, or facilities in the other partys territory even during peace time or in
mere anticipation of an armed attack. The presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities provided under the EDCA cannot be traced to the MDT.
Moreover, the general provisions of the MDT cannot prevail over the categorical and
specific provision of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

Hence, the EDCA as an agreement creating new rights and obligations must satisfy
the requirements under Sec 25, Art XIII of the Constitution.

EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Requiring Senate Concurrence (Saguisag vs Executive Secretary, 2016 De
Castro DISSENT)
De Castro Dissent Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Case Digest GR 212426 Jan 12 2016

Dissent Opinion by Justice Leonardo De Castro

Full Text

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of
EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive
department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces
the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to
access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and
disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops or
facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.

Issue 1: W/N EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President

No. EDCA is not a valid executive agreement entered into by the President because it falls under those
treaties and international agreements which need the concurrence of the Philippine Senate.

Article XVIII, Sec 25 of the 1987 Constitution is a special provision that prohibits the entry of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. As an exception, such would be allowed only if: first, the stay of
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is allowed by a treaty; second, such treaty is with the concurrence
of the Senate, and when Congress so requires, such treaty should be ratified by majority of the votes cast
by the Filipino people in a national referendum held for the purpose; and third, such treaty is recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting party.

Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the
Constitution does not distinguish. In the case of EDCA, it clearly involves the entry of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement
makes it an invalid treaty.

Issue 2: W/N the EDCA is merely an implementation of the VFA and the MDT

No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.

First, while the VFA allows only the presence of US military troops, the EDCA on the other hand
contemplates the presence of not just the troops but also military bases and facilities in the so-called
Agreed Locations.

Second, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against either of the parties
territories or armed forces but there is nothing in the MDT that specifically authorizes the presence, whether
temporary or permanent, of a partys bases, troops, or facilities in the other partys territory even during
peace time or in mere anticipation of an armed attack. The presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities provided under the EDCA cannot be traced to the MDT. Moreover, the general provisions of the
MDT cannot prevail over the categorical and specific provision of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution.

Hence, the EDCA as an agreement creating new rights and obligations must satisfy the requirements under
Sec 25, Art XIII of the Constitution.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs Comelec, 2016
Carpio DISSENT)
Grace Poe vs COMELEC Carpio Dissent Full Text

Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary)

Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016

Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the
express language of the Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the
Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino
citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for
President. The natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to
qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise
amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution.

A Mockery of National Election Process

There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born
Filipino citizen since 7 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the
three others withheld their opinion.

Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially

elected to the Office of the President, an office expressly reserved by the
Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd results.
This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship
status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections,
despite petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence
she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status.
If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as PET)
for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of the President that of being
a natural-born Filipino citizen those who voted for petitioner would have utterly
wasted their votes.
On Comelecs All-Encompassing Jurisdiction

The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly
falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections. The power to decide all questions
affecting elections necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate
possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to
avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal
remedy.
If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold
Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until
after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance
candidates.
It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a
certificate of candidacy for President puts the election process in mockery and is
therefore a nuisance candidate. Such persons certificate of candidacy can motu
proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers
the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election
process in mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015)

Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens

The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are Filipino citizens and
were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those

born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect. (Co
vs HRET, 1991)
The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under
earlier laws, if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born.

Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born
Filipino citizens. If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire
Philippine citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution which
refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution

There is no silence of the Constitution on foundlings because the majority of the

delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the proposed
amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as Filipino
citizens.

1. Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafolss amendment, namely

Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas. Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the
subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, which meant that Congress
would decide whether to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of
unknown parentage / foundlings.

If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as
natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would
then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens.
 Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship in
accordance with law under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5
Constitution.

Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate
Buslons opinion.

2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born
in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only
those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still
required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
Filipino citizens.

If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino

citizens, this would have created an absurd situation where a child with unknown
parentage would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is
actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could
not have intended to create such an absurdity.

3. Delegate Rafolss amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the
majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.

The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the
text of the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage are
Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or
proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens.
While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate Rafolss
amendment, they not only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested
that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of
Filipino fathers.

4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of
foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. The 1930
Hague Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth.
Therefore, there was no prevailing customary international law at that time, as there
is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.

International Laws Applicable to Foundlings

There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring

nationality to foundlings at birth
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings.
First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is
found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a
nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of
origin which is the country in which the foundling is found.
 Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the
country where the foundling is found. These two general principles of international
law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.

There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and citizenship
at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under
Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution but
the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that
of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which
requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law
principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to our
Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens

If a childs parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be
considered a Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance
with statutory law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution.

If a childs parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to

consider the child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either
the childs father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling
can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in
accordance with law.

On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen

There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born

citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability.

On Adoption Laws

Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of

natural-born citizenship.

On Burden of Proof

Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The burden
of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no
known biological parents. At that moment, it became her duty to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen

1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling
being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether

natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and
any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.

3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings
from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus
sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her
father or mother is a Filipino citizen.

4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of

international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best,
there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country
where the foundling is found.

5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that
a foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to
parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail
over our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to
the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino
citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then petitioner
must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes
the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course be rejected.

6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her
biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father
or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioners biological
father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a
foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing
the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary
international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the
States obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of
foundlings.
COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a Candidates
Eligibility (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016 Brion DISSENT)
Grace Poe vs COMELEC Brion Dissent Full Text

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016

Summary

On COMELECs Jurisdiction

COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the

determination of whether a candidate has made a false material representation in
his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is
true.

1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a

Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate.

2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the
course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded the
cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was
published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as
part of determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.

In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation of

Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither
a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.

The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own
rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not
been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.

In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC
and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is
considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned
through a Section 78 proceeding.

2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.

Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the

constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.
If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate.
A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.

3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs
jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a
Section 78 proceeding.

The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78

cancellation proceeding and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the
muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide
that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in
Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification.

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for
quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated
within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results.

Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to

office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to

determine Poes eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the
logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poes citizenship
and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling;
any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.

The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited
jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and
would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case
before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or
even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a
candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if
still necessary at that point.

On the Citizenship of Foundlings

It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that
foundlings are natural born citizens.

1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the

deliberations even reinforces the position that the framers never intended to include
foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitutions parentage provisions.
 Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation.

2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship
based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads
what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage,
must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy
similar roots.

On Burden of Proof

Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof

1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present
petitions) from the perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section
78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material
representations.

2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine
citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their
position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC
considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.

3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe
to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-
born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by
legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a
natural-born citizen.

Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed

4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to
determine who its citizens are.

5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and
exhaustive.

In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person
who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not
proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.

6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship,

and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to
Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.

8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at

the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and
substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the
legal requirements. Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave
abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioners own burden of proof in the
present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail. ##

HRETs Jurisdiction is Limited Only to Election Protests and Quo Warranto Cases
(Wigberto Tanada vs HRET, 2016 Perez CONCURRING)
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET Justice Perez Concurring Opinion

Wigberto Tanada vs HRET

Perez Concurring: GR 217012 March 1, 2016

Full Text

Summary of Justice Perez Concurring Opinion

1. HRET lacks the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance

candidate.

2. Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over two types
of election contests: election protests and quo warranto cases.

3. An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions constituting

electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling precincts, and for the revision of
ballots.

4. On the other hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned in a

quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural guidelines on
how the COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he or she is
a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

5. HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on cancellation cases
promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the
power to review such rulings from the Commission.

6. The the jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI, Section 1 7 of
the Constitution, is limited to the election, returns, and qualification of the members
of the House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest
involving a non-member.
7. To be considered a member of the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office. ##

HRET has No Jurisdiction over Disqualification Issues Involving a Non-Member

Candidate (Wigberto Tanada vs HRET, 2016)
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET Full Text

Wigberto Tanada vs HRET

Case Digest: GR 217012 March 1, 2016

Facts:

Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin
John Tanada for false representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate.
They were both candidates for the position of Congress Representative. A COMELEC
division denied both his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on
April 13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for false representations.
The petition to declare him as nuisance candidate however was denied. Wigberto
again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a newly
discovered evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in
the ballots, whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only
second.

Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest mistakes concerning
the cancelled candidacy of Alvin John and a motion to consolidate Alvin Johns votes
with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to consolidate the votes
because Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica
as the winner.

On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC to
annul the proclamation of Tan, which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en
banc. However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon
time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation
moot.

On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25,
2013 COMELEC en bancs ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and
an election protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that
the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, dismissed the election
protest and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is
the HRET. The certiorari was also dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period.

Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form
and substance and for lack of jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a member of
the House of Representatives.
Issue 1: W/N the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor of Wigberto as a
result of the cancellation of Alvin Johns candidacy

Held:

No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was cancelled are stray votes only. A
COC cancelled on ground of false representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, unlike in being a nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not have the
effect of crediting the votes in favor of another candidate.

Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en bancs
ruling is proper

Held:

No, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases. Consequently, when a COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
executory, it precludes a party from raising again in any other forum the nuisance
candidacy as an issue.

Issue 3: W/N Wigbertos petition for certiorari of the COMELEC en bancs ruling was
timely

Held:

No, the petition assailing the COMELECs en banc ruling was filed beyond the 5-day
period provided by COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 37, Sec 3 thereof provides
that decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or
cancel COC, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory
after the lapse of 5 days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the SC.

The COMELEC en banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin Johns alleged nuisance
candidacy on April 25 2013. When Wigberto filed his petition for certiorari before
the SC on May 27,2013, the COMELEC en bancs resolution was already final and
executory.

Issue 4: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct of canvassing
after the proclamation of a winning candidate

Held:

No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions involving the elections, returns
and qualifications of candidates who have already assumed their office as members
of House of Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting proclamation of candidates are matters which fall under the scope of the
terms election and returns and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole
jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the HRET has jurisdiction over the election protest filed by Wigberto
regarding the cancelled candidacy of John Alvin

Held:

No. Article VI, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011 HRET Rules
declare that HRETs power to judge election contests is limited to Members of the
House of Representatives. Alvin John is not a Member of the House of
Representatives.

Implementation of the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) or Issuance of Vote
Receipts is Mandatory (Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, 2016)
Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC

Full Text

Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC
GR 222731, March 8 2016

Facts:

Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator Gordon filed before the SC a petition for
mandamus to compel COMELEC to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) which is a security feature provided under RA 8346, as amended by RA
9369, to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. The VVPAT functionality is in the form of a
printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting
machine. For the 2016 elections, the COMELEC opted to use vote-counting
machines instead of PCOS. The vote-counting machines are capable of providing
the VVPAT functionality, and for that the COMELEC is now being petitioned to have
the vote-counting machines issue receipts once the person has voted. The
COMELEC, however, refused to enable this feature for reasons that the receipts
might be used by candidates in vote-buying and that it might increase the voting
time in election precincts.

Issue: W/N the COMELEC must activate the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting
machines

Held:

Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic

Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory.

The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail requires the following:
(a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their
votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a VVPAT. The COMELECs act of not enabling this feature
runs contrary to why the law requires this feature in the first place.

Foundlings are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016)

grace poe vs comelec

Full Text

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is
a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before
9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the
PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in
Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the
natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of
the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is
not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have
sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en
banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions,
the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining
the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be
supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the
qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her
COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may
run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not
the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is

supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July
18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs
reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be
counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this
case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe
returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC

Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented
facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when
there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or
cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.

Endangered Species May Be Impleaded as the Real Parties-In-Interest in a Citizens

Suit (Resident vs DOE, 2015)
Carpio Dissent GR 221697

Full Text

Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy

Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015

Facts:

In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and

Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later
converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration, development
and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon
Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such contract
was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of
marine life and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its
seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed assailing
the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for its ecological
impact was in the name of Resident Marine Mammals which are literally toothed
whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as Stewards,
in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded
as an unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and
undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other environmental
concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area,

also questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void
because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards that
the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan case.

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have standing
as the real party-in-interests in this suit

Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit.
A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It
is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in
interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.

Dissent
Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an
unwilling co-plaintiff is proper

No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition
should be stricken from the title of the case.

First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be
joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant.
This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the court, which may
properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling partys name
cannot be simply included in the petition without her knowledge or consent, as this
would be a denial of due process.

Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the
functions of her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling Presidents
in suits.

Political Law

Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution
No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts in
the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in
deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term service
contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or financial assistance.

Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid

No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of the
Constitution. First, it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that provides
standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the President for and
on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not reported by the
President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.

Article XII National Economy and Patrimony

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

*** The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution.

La Bugal Blaan vs Ramos:

Service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, subject to three important safeguards:

The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country
The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted
several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

Illegally-Procured Government Projects Subject to A Taxpayers Suit (Jacomille vs

DOTC, 2015)
Jacomille vs DOTC

Full Text

Jacomille vs Secretary of DOTC

Case Digest: GR 212381 Apr 22 2015

Facts:

The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program
(MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants.
The DOTC, in its invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to
apply the sum of 3.8 billion for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power
Plates on July 22, 2013. The contract signing, however, was halted. It was made
only on February 2014 when sufficient funds from the GAA 2014 were already made
available for the project.

Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on the

ground that it did not comply with the requirements of RA 9184 and its
implementing laws, and that when DOTC commenced the MVPSP, there was no
sufficient funding as reflected in the GAA 2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear
misrepresentation or even a deception by the said DOTC against the government
and the general public as a whole.

JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit
because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the
plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would
pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every
motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate
would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from
every pair of plate.
Issue: W/N Jacomillo has legal standing to maintain the suit

Held:

Yes. Jacomillo as a taxpaying citzen is a proper party because the MVPSP involves
the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the
license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the
government shall bear the burden of paying for the project.

As a rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Jacomillo satisfies this requirement when he alleges that public funds in the amount
of P3 .851 billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper
procurement process. ##

Note:

Because of irregularities in the procurement, the MVPSP was rendered null and void,
but was also made moot and academic by the appropriation for the full amount of
the project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation cured whatever defect the process
had.

Prohibition on Making Midnight Appointments Not Applicable to Local Executives

(Province vs Marco, 2015)
Province of Aurora vs Marco

Province of Aurora vs Marco

Case Digest: GR 202331 Apr 22 2015

Facts:

Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov.

Ong 5 days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along
with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds
were available for the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments
made by Gov Ong were revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer
regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration
from the CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a
resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the appointment on the ground that it
complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its
validity because evidence was not presented.

Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the
CSC because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to
implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of
the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-
day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14
resolution, invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision.

Political Law

Issue: W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made

by local executives

No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential
appointments, and not to those made by local executives. In this case, the
appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

Remedial Law

Issue: W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case

No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal may
be taken over an order of execution.

Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an appeal
where the order appealed from is not appealable. This rule is based on the doctrine
of immutability of judgment, which states that a final and executory removes from
the court which renders it the power and jurisdiction to further alter or amend it,
much less revoked it. Thus, even if a judgment is later on discovered to be
erroneous, it remains immutable.

Article VII, Sec 15 of the Constitution

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court

RULE 50: Dismissal of Appeal

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by

the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:

(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken
within the period fixed by these Rules;

(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period
prescribed by these Rules;
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in
section 5, Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41; (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)

(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on

appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44;

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page

references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of
Rule 44;

(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order;

(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule
48 or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause; and

(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a)

Despite Lack of Proceedings, Compensation-Determined-at-the-Time-of-Taking Rule

Remains (DPWH vs Heracleo, 2015)
dpwh vs heracleo

Full Text

Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

Facts:

Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private
properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project
undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite
expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70
centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500
per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment.
The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based
at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of
the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental
importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings
prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the States exercise of its eminent
domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation
in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the
States inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater
good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the
time of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated
valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should
be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because
the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken
but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only
for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at
the time it is taken.

Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and
jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies a matter
which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

Velasco Dissent:

The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should
lead to failure of taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was
already taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss
thereof.

For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined
from the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation
in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment
on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
Just Compensation Should be Determined at the Time of Judicial Demand When
Property Was Illegally Taken (DPWH vs Heracleo, 2015 Velasco DISSENT)
dpwh vs heracleo velasco dissent

Full Text of Dissent Opinon

Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

Velasco Dissent GR 179334 Apr 21 2015

Summary

The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should
lead to failure of taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was
already taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss
thereof.

For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined
from the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation
in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment
on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.

COMELEC Cannot Regulate Acts of Ownership Exercised by PUVs and Transport

Terminal Owners (1 UTAK vs COMELEC, 2015)
1 UTAK vs COMELEC

1 Utak vs CoMELEC
Case Digest: GR 206020 April 14 2015
Full Text

Facts:

In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would
implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the
Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during
the campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within
the premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization,
questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public
transport terminals during the election pursuant to its regulatory powers delegated
under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution

No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing
to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Hide
A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations
affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or
zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and
other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality. Thus, a government issuance, which
purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the
considerations affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation
or supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership
of the vehicle used for public transport.

The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of

election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent
to the operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain
candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as
such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of
an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit
to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.

Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience doctrine

No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be

justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they
incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
Read more
Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech

Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of

speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners
of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to
agree with them.

Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation

No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails
to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.

The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not
necessary to a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was
promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the
prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport
terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there are more than sufficient
provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid
content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
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Requisites of a Valid Content-Neutral Regulation

A content-neutral regulation, for example, that which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the
government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth,
the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.

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Art IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution:

The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any GOCC or its subsidiary.

Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Sec 9 of RA 9006 Fair Elections Act:

Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. The COMELEC may authorize political

parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in
not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and
the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda:

Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen
(16) feet or its equivalent.

Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect

common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall
not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.

Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the
consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be
allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.
Distinction Between the Supreme Courts Expanded Jurisdiction and Power of
General Supervision Over the JBC (Villanueva vs JBC, 2015)
villanueva vs jbcVillanueva vs JBC
GR 211833 April 7, 2015
Full Text

Facts:

After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied
for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-
level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC,
he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction
the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for
lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published
because it will affect all applying judges.

On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional

Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend

appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in
the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued
with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial
bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of
the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy

No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending nominees
for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow
in determining applicants qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC
has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities
necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit
among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by
the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.

Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year
experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and
the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a
direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium
on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven
competence. In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.

Civil Law

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR

No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under
the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the
supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements
of the Administrative Code.

Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published

Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,

including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, and the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification
standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is
not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to
lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that
potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so
that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus,
by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it
seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from
members of the judiciary.
Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to JBC
(Remedial)

Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to
set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Consequently, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.

Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.
However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria is necessary and incidental
to the exercise of the JBCs constitutional mandate, a determination must be made
on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC

No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly

compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion
by the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that
grants him the right of promotion to second-level courts.

Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper

No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy.
Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has
the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBCs five-
year requirement policy. Again, no person possesses a legal right under the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the
list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right
either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by
the assailed policy.

Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC
pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Courts
supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power.
But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed. ##

Issue 4: W/N the Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC
separate from the exercise of its expanded jurisdiction over acts of grave abuse of
discretion of government agencies

Clerk Shall Determine Finality of Decision by Counting 60 Calendar Days After

Mailing If Delayed (Smart vs Solidum, 2015)
GR 204646 SmartSmart vs Solidum
Case Digest GR 204646 April 15 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Solidum was dismissed for dishonesty-related offenses. The Labor Arbiter ruled that
he was illegally dismissed and thereby entitled to reinstatement and full back
wages. Solidum received the copy of LAs decision on July 13, 2006. Smart appealed
before the NLRC. While appeal was pending, the LA issued writs of execution
covering the period of July 21, 2006 to January 22, 2009 for the collection of
Solidums the accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.

In January 26, 2009, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision. Solidum filed a motion for
reconsideration.

While waiting for the NLRC resolution, on May 4, 2009, Solidum filed before the LA
an ex parte motion for a writ of execution to be issued ordering the sheriff to collect
from Smart his salaries, etc. which accrued from January 21, 2009 to April 20, 2009.
The LA, however, denied the issuance of writ of execution on the ground that the
NLRC has reversed its decision, so that Solidum is no longer entitled to his claim of
reinstatement when the NLRC decision was rendered.

In May 29, 2009, the NLRC denied Solidums motion for reconsideration. Copy of the
decision was mailed to Solidum on July 11, 2009. In its entry of judgment, it was
confirmed that the NLRC May 29, 2009 resolution has become final and executory
on August 10, 2009.

Issue 1: W/N the Labor Arbiter is correct in denying the issuance of writ of execution

No. The Labor Arbiter should have issued the writ of execution because its
reinstatement order was still enforceable for the period of January 21 to April 20,
2009.

It is a well-settled jurisprudential rule that employees are entitled to their accrued

salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the NLRCs reversal
of the labor arbiters order of reinstatement becomes final and executory.
Here, the NLRCs May 29, 2009 resolution on Solidums motion for reconsideration
became final on August 10, 2009, as shown in the entry of judgment. Hence,
Solidum is entitled to his reinstatement salaries and benefits which started from July
13, 2006 and until August 10, 2009.

Issue 2: W/N August 10, 2009 is the true date of finality of the May 29, 2009
decision

Yes. Since the Entry of Judgment confirms that August 10, 2009 is the date of
finality of the NLRC decision promulgated on May 29, 2009, then it is so.

As a general rule under Sec 14 of the 2002 New Rules of NLRC Procedure, decisions
of the NLRC shall become final after 10 days from the receipt of the decision by the
parties. But when there is delay as shown by the absence of return card or
certification from the post office, the finality of the decision shall be determined by
the Clerk of Court by giving 60 calendar days from the mailing of the decision.

Here, it appears that there was no return card or certification or it was delayed after
the copy of the decision was mailed on June 11, 2009. Hence, an allowance of 60
calendar days was given for the delay making it final and executory only on August
10, 2009. #

Relevant Laws

Hide
Garcia vs PAL, 2009

Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is

obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.

Hide
Section 14: Finality of the Decision of the Commission and Entry of Judgment (2002
New Rules of NLRC Procedure)

(a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission.

Except as provided in Rule XI, Section 9, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the
Commission/Division shall become executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the same.

(b) Entry of Judgment.

Upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period provided in paragraph
(a)of this section, the decision/resolution/order shall, as far as practicable, be
entered in a book of entries of judgment.

(c) Allowance for Delay of Mail in the Issuance of Entries of Judgment.

In issuing entries of judgment, the Executive Clerk of Court or the Deputy Executive
Clerk, in the absence of a return card or certification from the post office concerned,
shall determine the finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of mail,
computed sixty (60)calendar days from the date of mailing of the decision,
resolution or order.

Hide
Section 6: Effect of Filing of Petition for Certiorari on Execution

A petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not
stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a temporary restraining order is
issued by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Illegal Termination is Inconsistent with Resignation (Fonterra vs Largado, 2015)

Fonterra Brand Phils, Inc. vs Largado and Estrellado

Case Digest GR 205300 March 18 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Fonterra contracted the services of Zytron to provide for trade merchandising

representatives (TMRs) in the marketing and promotion of its milk and dairy
products. Among those TMRs whose services were engaged are Largado and
Estrellado, who are the respondents in this case. After 4 years, Fonterra terminated
its contract with Zytron and entered into an agreement for manpower supply with
AC Sicat. Desirous of continuing their work as TMRs in Fonterra, Largado and
Estrellado submitted their job application with AC Sicat, a legitimate job contracting
company. AC Sicat hired their services as TMRs for a term of 5 months.

When their 5-month contract with AC Sicat were about to expire, they allegedly
sought renewal thereof, which was allegedly refused. This prompted them to file for
complaints of illegal dismissal, regularization, nonpayment of service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, and actual and moral damages against Fonterra, Zytron and
AC Sicat.

Issue 1: W/N Largado and Estrellado were illegally terminated by Zytron

No. When Largado and Estrella refused to renew their contract with Zytron by
applying with AC Sicat, they effectively resigned from Zytron. Hence, they were not
illegally dismissed because they voluntary terminated their employment with the
latter.

Issue 2: W/N Largado and Estrellado were illegally terminated by AC Sicat

No. There is no illegal dismissal to speak of since AC Sicat is a legitimate job

contractor and their termination is merely brought about by the expiration of their
employment contracts with AC Sicat.
First, Largado and Estrellado were hired as fixed-term or project employees of AC
Sicat. The determining factor of such employment is not the duty of the employee
but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and
termination of the employment relationship. Second, the non-renewal of their
contracts by AC Sicat is a management prerogative, and failure of respondents to
prove that such was done in bad faith militates against their contention that they
were illegally dismissed.

Hence, the expiration of their contract with AC Sicat simply caused the natural
cessation of their fixed-term employment thereat.

Contracts of Adhesion are Just As Binding as Ordinary Contracts (Cabanting vs BPI,

2016)
cabanting vs bpi Full Text

Cabanting vs BPI
(GR 201927 February 17, 2016 Case Digest)

Facts:

Cabanting bought from Diamond Motors / BPI a car on installment basis for which a
promissory note with chattel mortgage was executed. One of the stipulations was
that any failure to pay an amount on schedule will make the entire outstanding sum
to become due and payable without prior notice and demand. When the two
Cabantings failed to pay some monthly amortizations, BPI sued them for replevin
and damages. Decision was rendered ordering them to pay the cars unpaid value
with damages. The respondents appealed the decision claiming that there has been
no proof of prior demand and that the stipulation on its waiver must be deemed
invalid for being a contract of adhesion.

Issue 1: W/N a stipulation waiving the necessity of notice and demand is valid

Held:

Yes. Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides that one incurs in delay or is in default
from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee.
However, Article 1169 (1) also expressly provides that demand is not necessary
under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties
expressly waive demand.

Issue 2: W/N a contract of adhesion such as in this case is valid

Held:

Yes. A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. Such are not
invalid per se and are not entirely prohibited because the one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. If the other party adheres, he gives his
consent.
The court may strike down such contracts as void when the weaker party is
deprived of the opportunity to bargain at an equal footing. Here, there is no proof
that petitioners were disadvantaged, uneducated or utterly inexperienced in dealing
with financial institutions; thus, there is no reason for the court to step in and
protect the interest of the supposed weaker party.

Issue 3: W/N a prior demand is required in actions for replevin

Held:

No. Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin,
since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the
applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a
writ of replevin could be filed.

Payments for Interest-Producing Debts Presumed Applied First to the Interests

Before the Principal (Marquez vs Elisan, 2015)
Marquez vs Elisan

Marquez vs Elisan Credit Corporation

Case Digest GR 194642 Apr 6 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Marquez obtained from Elisan Credit Corporation a loan payable in weekly

installments and subject to annual interest with monthly penalties and attorneys in
case of nonpayment. A chattel mortgage was also executed stipulating that the
motor vehicle shall stand as a security for all other obligations of every kind already
incurred or which hereafter may be incurred. The payment of that loan was
acknowledged by both parties.

Subsequently, Marquez obtained another loan evidenced by a promissory note with

the same terms and conditions as the first loan. When the second loan matured,
there still remained an unpaid balance. Marquez requested the creditor to pay the
unpaid balance by daily installments until the loan is paid; the creditor agreed.
Thus, several months after the maturity of the loan, Marquez had already paid a
total amount which is greater than the amount of the principal.

Despite such, the creditor filed a complaint for foreclosure of the CM on the ground
that Marquez allegedly failed to pay the principal of the second loan despite
demand. It was also prayed that the unpaid balance plus accrued penalties and
interests be paid because, allegedly, Marquez failure to pay upon maturity
triggered the imposition of monthly penalties and attorneys fees.

Marquez, citing Art 1176 and 1235 of the Civil Code, insists that his daily payments
should be deemed to have been credited against the principal, as the official
receipts issued by the creditor were silent with respect to the payment of interest
and penalties.
Issue 1: W/N the creditor waived the payment of the interest

No. The fact that the official receipts did not indicate whether the payments were
made for the principal or the interest does not prove that the creditor waived the
interest. There is no presumption of waiver of interest without any evidence
showing that the creditor accepted the daily instruments as payments for the
principal.

Issue 2: W/N the daily payments made by the debtor be applied to the interest

Yes. Notwithstanding the fact it was not indicated in the receipts whether the
payments were applied to the principal or the interest, such failure should not be
taken against the creditor. Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if the debt
produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have been made
until the interests have been covered. Thus, the creditor in this case has a right to
credit the payments to the interest first.
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Proper Application of Art 1176 vs Art 1253

Article 1253 is viewed as having an obligatory character and not merely suppletory.
It cannot be dispensed with except by mutual agreement.

Article 1176 falls under Chapter I (Nature and Effect of Obligations) while Article
1253 falls under Subsection I (Application of Payments),Chapter IV (Extinguishment
of Obligations) of Book IV (Obligations and Contracts) of the Civil Code.

The structuring of these provisions, properly taken into account, means that Article
1176 should be treated as a general presumption subject to the more specific
presumption under Article 1253. Article 1176 is relevant on questions pertaining to
the effects and nature of obligations in general, while Article 1253 is specifically
pertinent on questions involving application of payments and extinguishment of
obligations.

The presumption under Article 1176 does not resolve the question of whether the
amount received by the creditor is a payment for the principal or interest. Under
this article the amount received by the creditor is the payment for the principal, but
a doubt arises on whether or not the interest is waived because the creditor accepts
the payment for the principal without reservation with respect to the interest.
Article 1176 resolves this doubt by presuming that the creditor waives the payment
of interest because he accepts payment for the principal without any reservation.

On the other hand, the presumption under Article 1253 resolves doubts involving
payment of interest-bearing debts. It is a given under this Article that the debt
produces interest. The doubt pertains to the application of payment; the
uncertainty is on whether the amount received by the creditor is payment for the
principal or the interest. Article 1253 resolves this doubt by providing a hierarchy:
payments shall first be applied to the interest; payment shall then be applied to the
principal only after the interest has been fully-paid.
Correlating the two provisions, the rule under Article 1253 that payments shall first
be applied to the interest and not to the principal shall govern if two facts exist: (1)
the debt produces interest (e.g., the payment of interest is expressly stipulated) and
(2) the principal remains unpaid.

The exception is a situation covered under Article 1176, i.e., when the creditor
waives payment of the interest despite the presence of (1) and (2) above. In such
case, the payments shall obviously be credited to the principal.

Since the doubt in the present case pertains to the application of the daily
payments, Article 1253 shall apply. Only when there is a waiver of interest shall
Article 1176 become relevant.

Issue 3: W/N an order for foreclosure is proper

No. Foreclosure in this case is without legal and factual basis because the chattel
mortgage was already extinguished when the obligation under the first loan was
duly paid.

A CM can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted.
For a CM to cover debts yet to be contracted, a fresh chattel mortgage may be
executed or the old contract be amended conformably to the form prescribed by the
CM Law. Here, since there was no showing that a new agreement was executed, the
security can no longer apply to the second loan. The chattel mortgage was already
extinguished because being merely an accessory in nature, it cannot exist
independently of the principal obligation.

Hide
Although a promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are yet to
be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the
security itself, however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel
mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by
concluding a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract conformably
with the form prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage Law.

Refusal on the part of the borrower to execute the agreement so as to cover the
after-incurred obligation can constitute an act of default on the part of the borrower
of the financing agreement whereon the promise is written, but the remedy of
foreclosure can only cover the debts extant at the time of constitution and during
the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed.

The Chattel Mortgage Law requires the parties to the contract to attach an affidavit
of good faith and execute an oath that

the mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation specified in the
conditions thereof, and for no other purposes, and that the same is a just and valid
obligation, and one not entered into for the purposes of fraud.

It is obvious therefore that the debt referred in the law is a current, not an obligation
that is yet merely contemplated.
The only obligation specified in the chattel mortgage contract was the first loan
which the petitioner later fully paid. By virtue of Section 3 of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, the payment of the obligation automatically rendered the chattel mortgage
terminated; the chattel mortgage had ceased to exist upon full payment of the first
loan. Being merely an accessory in nature, it cannot exist independently of the
principal obligation.

The parties did not execute a fresh chattel mortgage nor did they amend the chattel
mortgage to comply with the Chattel Mortgage Law which requires that the
obligation must be specified in the affidavit of good faith. Simply put, there no
longer was any chattel mortgage that could cover the second loan upon full
payment of the first loan. The order to foreclose the motor vehicle therefore had no
legal basis.

Hide
Relevant Laws

Article 1176, Civil Code:

The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that said interest has been paid.

Article 1235, Civil Code:

When the obligee accepts the performance of an obligation, knowing its

incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection, the
obligation is deemed fully complied with.

Article 1253, Civil Code:

If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have
been made until the interests have been covered.

Only the Legal Spouse Beneficiary of a Deceased Member is Entitled to the SSS
Benefits (SSS vs Azeto, 2015)
SSS vs Azote

SSS vs Azote
Case Digest GR 209741 April 15, 2015
Full Text

Facts:

In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children
as beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as
the wife of a deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records
that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife
Rosemarie and their child were designated as beneficiaries. Edna did not know that
Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She then filed for a petition
before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The
SSC dismissed Ednas petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be
the legal wife as Edna could not proved that Edgardos previous marriage was
annulled or divorced.

Issue: W/N Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member

Held:

No. The law in force at the time of Edgardos death was RA 8282. Applying Section
8(e) and (k) thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to
be the beneficiary of the latters SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that
Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by
their marriage contract.

Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family
Code was already in force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to
establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already
removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not
adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled
or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death
before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife
of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal
spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the
beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.

Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of

marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available
statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful
beneficiaries.

Government May be Estopped When Injustice is Perpetrated As a Result of Its Own

Acts (SM Land vs BCDA, 2015)
SM Land vs BCDASM Land vs BCDA
GR 203655 March 18, 2015 En Banc
GR 203655 August 13, 2014
Full Text

Facts:

When BCDA opened for disposition its Bonifacio South Property pursuant to RA
7227, SMLI offered to undertake the development of said property by submitting a
succession of unsolicited proposals to BCDA. BCDA then entered into negotiations
with SMLI until the BCDA finally accepted the terms of the final unsolicited proposal.
Their agreement was thereafter reduced into writing through the issuance of the
Certification of Successful Negotiations in 2010.
It was agreed that BCDA accepted SMLIs unsolicited proposal and declared SMLI
eligible to enter into the proposed Joint Venture activity. It also agreed to subject
SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge pursuant to NEDA Joint Venture
Guidelines, which competitive challenge process shall be immediately implemented
following the Terms of Reference. Moreover, said Certification provides that the
BCDA shall commence the activities for the solicitation for comparative proposals.
Years later however, the BCDA through the issuance of Supplemental Notice No. 5
terminated the competitive challenge for the selection of BCDAs joint venture
partner for the development of a portion of Fort Bonifacio.

SMLI, through a petition for CPM, argued that BCDAs unilateral termination of the
competitive challenge is a violation of SMLIs rights as an original proponent and
constitutes abandonment of BCDAs contractual obligations. BCDA, on the other
hand, responded that it is justifiable since NEDA JV Guidelines is a mere guideline
and not a law, and that the Government has a right to terminate the competitive
challenge when the terms are disadvantageous to public interest.

Issue 1: W/N the NEDA JV Guidelines has the binding effect and force of law

Yes. Administrative issuances, such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated

pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute, have the force and effect of
law. Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV
Guidelines has the same binding effect as if it were issued by the President himself,
who parenthetically is a member of NEDA. As such, no agency or instrumentality
covered by the JV Guidelines can validly deviate from the mandatory procedures set
forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.

Hide
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in Executive Orders. It is through these
orders that the President ensures that laws are faithfully executed, by handing out
instructions to subordinate executive officials and the public, in the form of
implementing rules and regulations, on how the law should be executed by
subordinate officials and complied with by the public.

For government contracts and procurement in the Philippines, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, adopting the recommendation of the NEDA, issued EO 10918 on
May 27, 2002. As its title indicates, EO 109 streamlined the rules and procedures
on the review and approval of all contracts of departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the government, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries. This executive
issuance was, however, later amended by EO 109-A, to conform to RA 9184 which
was enacted barely two months after the issuance of EO 109. Two years later, or on
April 30, 2005, EO 42321 was issued, repealing EO 109-A and simplifying the
procurement process. Section 4 of EO 423 was later amended by EO 645.

Amidst the changes effected on procurement rules, the NEDAs duty to issue a JV
Guidelines under the said executive orders remained unaffected. Through Section 5
of EO 109, Section 8 of EO 109-A and now Section 8 of EO 423, the President
effectively delegated her inherent executive power to issue rules and regulations on
procurement to her subordinate executive officials, her alter egos. Pursuant to said
repeated directives from no less than the Chief Executive, the NEDA issued the JV
Guidelines providing the procedures for the coagulation of joint ventures between
the government and a private entity.

Issue 2: W/N BCDA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Supplemental

Notice No. 5

Yes. Being an instrumentality of the government, it is incumbent upon the BCDA to

abide by the laws, rules and regulations, and perform its obligations with utmost
good faith. It cannot, under the guise of protecting the public interest, disregard the
clear mandate of the NEDA JV Guidelines and unceremoniously disregard the very
commitments it made to the prejudice of the SMLI that innocently relied on such
promises.

It is in instances such as thiswhere an agency, instrumentality or officer of the

government evades the performance of a positive duty enjoined by lawwherein the
exercise of judicial power is warranted. Consistent with the Courts solemn
obligation to afford protection by ensuring that grave abuses of discretion on the
part of a branch or instrumentality of the government do not go unchecked, the
Petition for Certiorari must be granted and the corresponding injunctive relief be
made permanent.

Issue 3: W/N the BCDA is in estoppel

Yes. Although as a general rule, the government cannot be estopped by the

mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, such will not apply if injustice is
perpetrated.

To allow BCDA to renege on its statutory and contractual obligations would cause
grave prejudice to petitioner, who already invested time, effort, and resources in the
study and formulation of the proposal, in the adjustment thereof, as well as in the
negotiations. To permit BCDA to suddenly cancel the procurement process and strip
SMLI of its earlier-enumerated rights as an Original Proponent at this pointafter
the former has already benefited from SMLIs proposal through the acquisition of
information and ideas for the development of the subject propertywould unjustly
enrich the agency through the efforts of petitioner. What is worse, to do so would be
contrary to BCDAs representations and assurances that it will respect SMLIs earlier
acquired rights, which statements SMLI reasonably and innocently believed. All
told, the BCDAs acceptance of the unsolicited proposal and the successful in-depth
negotiation cannot be written off as mere mistake or error that respondents claim to
be reversible and not susceptible to the legal bar of estoppel. The subsequent
cancellation of the Competitive Challenge on grounds that infringe the contractual
rights of SMLI and violate the NEDA JV Guidelines cannot be shrouded with
legitimacy by invoking the estoppel rule.

Mere Similarity in Classification Not Equate with Relatedness of Goods or Services

(Taiwan vs Kolin Electronics, 2015)
GR 209843 Taiwan Kolin vs Kolin Electronics
Taiwan Kolin vs Kolin Electronics
Case Digest GR 209843 March 25 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Taiwan Kolin Corp sought to register the trademark KOLIN in Class 9 on the
following combination of goods: television sets, cassette recorder, VCD Amplifiers,
camcorders and other audio/video electronic equipment, flat iron, vacuum cleaners,
cordless handsets, videophones, facsimile machines, teleprinters, cellular phones
and automatic goods vending machine.

Kolin Electronics opposed the application on the ground that the trademark KOLIN
is identical, if not confusingly similar, with its registered trademark KOLIN which
covers the following products under Class 9 of the Nice Classification (NCL):
automatic voltage regulator, converter, recharger, stereo booster, AC-DC regulated
power supply, step-down transformer, and PA amplified AC-DC. Kolin Electronics
argued that the products are not only closely-related because they fall under the
same classification, but also because they are inherently similar for being electronic
products and are plugged into electric sockets and perform a useful function.

Issue: W/N the products are closely-related

Held:

No, the products are not related and the use of the trademark KOLIN on them would
not likely cause confusion. To confer exclusive use of a trademark, emphasis should
be on the similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services involved and not on
the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or
characteristics.

First, products classified under Class 9 can be further classified into five categories.
Accordingly, the goods covered by the competing marks between Taiwan Kolin and
Kolin Electronics fall under different categories. Taiwan Kolins goods are
categorized as audio visual equipments, while Kolin Electronics goods fall under
devices for controlling the distribution and use of electricity. Thus, it is erroneous to
assume that all electronic products are closely related and that the coverage of one
electronic product necessarily precludes the registration of a similar mark over
another.

Second, the ordinarily intelligent buyer is not likely to be confused. The distinct
visual and aural differences between the two trademarks KOLIN, although appear
to be minimal, are sufficient to distinguish between one brand or another. The
casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious, discriminating, and would prefer to
mull over his purchase because the products involved are various kind of electronic
products which are relatively luxury items and not considered affordable. They are
not ordinarily consumable items such as soy sauce, ketsup or soap which are of
minimal cost. Hence, confusion is less likely. ##
Republic vs Jose Sarenogon
Case Digest GR 199194 Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his
wife Netchie. He testified that they got married and lived together as husband and
wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to
Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchies parents, but failed. He returned home after his
contract expired, then inquired from Netchies relatives and friends about her
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to
presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the
RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Joses testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchies
aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding
Netchies location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four
years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTCs error in
its misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and
further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of
presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

Issue 1: W/N Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling

Held:

Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the
RTCs decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death.

Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTCs decision on a petition pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has
no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.
However, an aggrieved party may file a certiorari under Rule 65 to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA
in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to SC via a petition for review under
Rule 45.

Issue 2: W/N the well-founded belief requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied
with (CIVIL LAW)

Held:
No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required well-founded belief
standard.

Sarenogons pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches
below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For,
aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as
to Netchies whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals
or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for
the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of
the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he
undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at
least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and
identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
search.

Grandfather Rule may be Applied Jointly with the Control Test to Determine
Corporate Ownership (Narra vs Redmont, 2015)
Commercial LawNarra Nickel Mining vs Redmont
G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Narra and its co-petitioner corporations Tesoro and MacArthur, filed a motion
before the SC to reconsider its April 21, 2014 Decision which upheld the denial of
their MPSA applications. The SC affirmed the CA ruling that there is a doubt to their
nationality, and that in applying the Grandfather Rule, the finding is that MBMI, a
100% Canadian-owned corporation, effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of
petitioners by owning equity interests of the petitioners other majority corporate
shareholders. Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur argued that the application of the
Grandfather Rule to determine their nationality is erroneous and allegedly without
basis in the Constitution, the FIA, the Philippine Mining Act, and the Rules issued by
the SEC. These laws and rules supposedly espouse the application of the Control
Test in verifying the Philippine nationality of corporate entities for purposes of
determining compliance with Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution that only
corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such Filipino
citizens may enjoy certain rights and privileges, like the exploration and
development of natural resources.

Issue: W/N the application by the SC of the grandfather resulted to the

abandonment of the control test

Held:
No. The control test can be applied jointly with the Grandfather Rule to determine
the observance of foreign ownership restriction in nationalized economic activities.
The Control Test and the Grandfather Rule are not incompatible ownership-
determinant methods that can only be applied alternative to each other. Rather,
these methods can, if appropriate, be used cumulatively in the determination of the
ownership and control of corporations engaged in fully or partly nationalized
activities, as the mining operation involved in this case or the operation of public
utilities.

The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino
ownership and control in a corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign
corporation rendered qualified to perform nationalized or partly nationalized
activities. Hence, it is only when the Control Test is first complied with that the
Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject
corporations Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is
immediately considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the
Grandfather Rule disappears.

In this case, using the control test, Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur appear to have
satisfied the 60-40 equity requirement. But the nationality of these corporations
and the foreign-owned common investor that funds them was in doubt, hence, the
need to apply the Grandfather Rule. ##

Grandfather Rule Rules When the Required 60-40 Filipino-foreign Equity Ownership
is In Doubt (Narra vs Redmont, 2014)
gr 195580 case digest

Full Text

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont

Case Digest GR 185590, Apr 21 2014

Facts:

Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some

areas in Palawan. Upon learning that those areas were covered by MPSA
applications of other three (allegedly Filipino) corporations Narra, Tesoro, and
MacArthur, it filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of DENR seeking to deny
their permits on the ground that these corporations are in reality foreign-owned.
MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns
5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of
McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of
Tesoro).

Aside from the MPSA, the three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of
the President. In their answer, they countered that (1) the liberal Control Test must
be used in determining the nationality of a corporation as based on Sec 3 of the
Foreign Investment Act which as they claimed admits of corporate layering
schemes, and that (2) the nationality question is no longer material because of their
subsequent application for FTAA.
Commercial / Political Law

Hide
Issue 1: W/N the Grandfather Rule must be applied in this case

Yes. It is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the Grandfather
Rule in cases where corporate layering is present.

First, as a rule in statutory construction, when there is conflict between the

Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this instance, specifically
pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy
and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. Corporate
layering is admittedly allowed by the FIA, but if it is used to circumvent the
Constitution and other pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.

Second, under the SEC Rule1 and DOJ Opinion2 , the Grandfather Rule must be
applied when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt. Doubt is
present in the Filipino equity ownership of Narra, Tesoro, and MacArthur since their
common investor, the 100% Canadian-owned corporation MBMI, funded them.

Under the Grandfather Rule, it is not enough that the corporation does have the
required 60% Filipino stockholdings at face value. To determine the percentage of
the ultimate Filipino ownership, it must first be traced to the level of the investing
corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the investee corporation.
Applying this rule, it turns out that the Canadian corporation owns more than 60%
of the equity interests of Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur. Hence, the latter are
disqualified to participate in the exploration, development and utilization of the
Philippines natural resources.

1 DOJ Opinion No. 020 Series of 2005 (paragraph 7)

2 SEC Opinion May 13, 1990

Remedial Law

Hide
Issue 2: W/N the case has become moot as a result of the MPSA conversion to FTAA

No. There are certain exceptions to mootness principle and the mere raising of an
issue of mootness will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a
valid reason to do so.

The SC noted that a grave violation of the Constitution is being committed by a

foreign corporation through a myriad of corporate layering under different,
allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the
Canadian company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount
public interest since it undeniably affects the exploitation of our Countrys natural
resources. The corresponding actions of petitioners during the lifetime and
existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied to
cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced
by the Court; hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will
serve as a guide to the bench, the bar and the public. Finally, the instant case is
capable of repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can
keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate
layering and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against
foreign mining in Philippine soil. ##

RTC Decision on Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death

Reviewable Only via Rule 65 (Rep vs Sarenogon, 2016)
Republic vs Sarenogon Full Text

Republic vs Jose Sarenogon

Case Digest GR 199194 Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his
wife Netchie. He testified that they got married and lived together as husband and
wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to
Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchies parents, but failed. He returned home after his
contract expired, then inquired from Netchies relatives and friends about her
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to
presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the
RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Joses testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchies
aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding
Netchies location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four
years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTCs error in
its misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and
further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of
presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

Issue 1: W/N Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling

Held:

Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the
RTCs decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death.

Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTCs decision on a petition pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has
no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.
However, an aggrieved party may file a certiorari under Rule 65 to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA
in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. From the decision of the CA,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to SC via a petition for review under
Rule 45.

Issue 2: W/N the well-founded belief requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied
with (CIVIL LAW)

Held:

No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required well-founded belief
standard.

Sarenogons pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches
below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For,
aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as
to Netchies whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals
or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for
the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of
the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he
undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at
least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and
identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
search. ##

RTC Designated as a Special Commercial Court is Still a Court of General Jurisdiction

(Concorder vs Baculio, 2016)
concorde condominium vs baculio

Concorde Condominium vs Baculio

Case Digest: GR 203678 Feb 17, 2016
Full Text

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the RTC Makati a petition for injunction (with damages with
prayer for issuance of a TRO, writ of preliminary injunction, and writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction) against the respondents seeking to enjoin them from
misrepresenting to the public that they are the owners of the Concorde
condominium building, and to prevent other certain individuals and government
officials from doing particular acts. The case was docketed as a civil case and
raffled to a Makati RTC branch which was designated as a special commercial court.
The respondents moved to dismiss claiming that the said RTC branch, as a special
commercial court, has no jurisdiction over the case because it is merely an ordinary
civil action and not those cases such as intracorporate disputes over which special
commercial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed the
case.

Issue: W/N the RTC branch erred in dismissing the case

Held:

Yes. The designation of the said branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means
diminished its power as a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings. The matter of whether the
RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction.

The petition for injunction with damages is clearly an ordinary civil case. As a court
of general jurisdiction, the RTC branch still has jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.

Habeas Corpus is the Remedy for a Person Deprived of Liberty Due to Mistaken
Identity (Sabilo vs Warden, 2015)
GR 197597 Datukan Malang SabiloDatukan Malang Salibo vs Warden, Quezon City
Jail Annex
Case Digest GR 197597 April 8 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a

pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al.
When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented
himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The
authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He questioned the legality of
his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that
he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it
returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according
to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC
decision before the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the
authority to hear the Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA
ruling, and hence, it should have been appealed directly before the SC.

Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper
remedy in cases where a person with a mistaken identity is detained
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the
CA

Notes:

Hide
Distinction Between the Writ vs the Final Decision on Petition for the Issuance of the
Writ

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the
issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the
person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final
decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.

Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets
in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty.
Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance
on its face is devoid of merit. Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires
it, the writ itself may not be suspended.

Circumstantial Evidence Must Show Culpability Belongs Only to the Accused to the
Exclusion of Others (Zabala vs People, 2015)
gr 210760 zabala

Kyle Zabala vs People

Case Digest GR 210670 Jan 26 2015
Full Text

Facts:

Alas accused Zabala of theft. During the trial, Alas testified that he and Zabala were
not only neighbors, but kumpares as well, and would often invite the latter to
drinking sessions inside his house. At times, he would also call Zabala to repair his
vehicle and allow Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare
parts are to be bought for the repair of his vehicle. One day when he returned from
work, he found that his P68k which he kept in an envelope inside his closet was
missing. There were only five persons living in the house that time, he together with
his parents, his 9-year old son, and his aunt.
Witness Pinon also testified that, being Zabalas girlfriend, she were with him at the
store which was near Alas house at that time. She saw Zabala climb the fence,
scale and enter Alas house, and noticed that when he returned, he had a bulge in
his pocket. Day after that, they went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia
phones worth about P8,500.

Issue 1: W/N the corpus delicti of the crime was established in this case

No. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost
by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.

First, nobody saw Zabala entered the room of Alas where the money was hidden.
Pinon merely saw that Zabala scaled the fence of Alas house and entered it. Second,
all that Pinon saw was the bulge in Zabalas pocket; her testimony does not show
that the bulge was the P68k which was supposedly stolen. These testimonies failed
to prove the fact that the P68k was lost and that Zabala unlawfully took it. Hence,
the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove the fact of the crime of theft.

Issue 2: W/N the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to prove Zabalas

guilt beyond reasonable doubt

No. The rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person committed the crime.

In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft
was committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or that no other
person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. They failed to prove
that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to some other person. Hence,
Zabala must be acquitted in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Tubbataha Incident: UNCLOS Non-Member US Govt Still Bound By The Customary

Laws of Navigation (Arigo vs Swift, 2014)
GR 206510Arigo vs Swift
Case Digest GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014
Full Text

Facts:

In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the
Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are
prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident
prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from
the SC.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of

the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a
waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology since these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside
from damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental
laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for
the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.

Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA

No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.

First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim, the US government could not be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding

officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would
require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the
suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity
from suit bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reefs

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident
under the customary laws of navigation.

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters
internal waters and the territorial sea.

Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing
policy, the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.

As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary
international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31
in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. ##

Other Issues

Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed

Separately

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and
crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the
respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which resulted
from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.

In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a
person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
Hence, a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of
Kalikasan is Not Proper

The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as
a treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of
the US government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A
petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.

Relevant Laws and Jurisprudence

Hide
On States Immunity From Suit

States Immunity from Suit Extends to its Officials (Garcia vs Chief of Staff, 1966)

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may
move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.

Hide
Exception to the Doctrine of States Immunity from Suit (Shauf vs CA, 1990)

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff.

Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State. An action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the ambit of the
doctrine of States immunity from suit.

The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Hide
UNCLOS Provisions

Article 30, UNCLOS: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately.

Hide
Article 31, UNCLOS: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions
of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Facts:

EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and placed it
under the Philippine Ports Authority for administrative jurisdiction of its proper
zoning, planning, development, and utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted
a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC. Owned by some 231
individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 sqm, were
intended for the development of Phase II of the BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per
evaluation of the Land Acquisition Committee for Phase II of the BPZ project, the
lots had a fair market value of P 336.83 per sqm. Prior to the filing of the complaint,
PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm as just compensation, but the lot owners rejected
the offer. PPA prayed to be placed in possession upon its deposit of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value for real estate taxation of the lots in question.

After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay the lot
owners the amount of P 5,500 per sqm as just compensation. Upon motion, the RTC
granted the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal and issued the writ of
execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served the Notice of Garnishment to
the LBP Batangas City Branch.

Issue 1: W/N execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings

No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39
simply does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities
and assets are government properties, they are exempt from execution whether by
virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimants action only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public
Highways vs San Diego, 1970)

Issue 2: W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied retroactively

Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of

payment thereof and the initial compensation to the lot owners is a substantive, not
merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a
proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically prescribes the new standards in
determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the
provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession, is a
substantive law.

Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have
retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in
any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this
case.

Note:

RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to the
expropriation of right-of-way sites and locations for national government
infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of
right-of-way sites or locations for national government infrastructure projects, the
provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall still govern.

Due Process is Demandable as a Matter of Right in JBC Proceedings (Jardeleza vs

Sereno, 2014)
Jardeleza vs Sereno

Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014

Full Text

Facts:

Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application
or recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the
incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he
was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice
herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called
unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in
the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the
members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked
because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required.
Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the
JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.

Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and
direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written
statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow
CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed
a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying
her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has
yet to decide in his letter-petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of
4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it
to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation
of the unanimity rule..

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC
and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Political Law

Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC
proceedings

Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that
an applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain
ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs
duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports
and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding
the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information
brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in
its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side
of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only
test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court
intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
the minimum requirements of due process. ##

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case

Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts
supervisory authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC
shall function under the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory
authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or
not.

Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC

No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do
something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
available against the JBC (which is not exercising quasi-judicial functions)

Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to
the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. ##

Prohibition Against Holding of Dual or Multiple Offices Apply As Well To Temporary

Designations (Funa vs Agra, 2013)
GR 191644 Funa vs AgraFuna vs Agra
Case Digest GR 191644 Feb 19 2013

Facts:

Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him
as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has
been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the
Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra
then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the
duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that
he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol
Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and
emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting
Secretary of Justice.

Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid

No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under
Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.

Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as
holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned.
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-
President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over
principle

No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio
capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the
two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the
other.

Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot
liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of
the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for
Agra to show that his holding of the other office was allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position. To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations
from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to
establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex
officio capacity in relation to the other

No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the
primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG,
while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous.
With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet
rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives,
allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of
Appeals. #

Relevant Provisions

Hide
Article VII, Sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
Hide
Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the 1987 Constitution

Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Notes
Hide
Distinction between Art VII, Sec 13 vs Art IX-B, Sec 7 (2)

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in
the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read
with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory
so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation
of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

Wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood

as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:

the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,

par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section
7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
and,
the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Hide
Exceptions from Prohibition against the Holding of Multiple Offices

The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the
Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the officials offices. (Public Interest Center, Inc. vs Elma, 2006)
Distinction between Union Officers and Union Members in Losing their Employment
Status With their Participation in Illegal Strike and Illegal Acts (VCMC vs Yballe,
2014)
Visayas Community Case Digest Full Text

Visayas Community Medical Center vs Yballe

Case Digest: GR 196156 Jan 15, 2014

Facts:

The NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of

MCCH (now VCMC). NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a local affiliate whose union leaders
proceeded to strike despite the fact that it is not a legitimate labor organization.
The respondents in this case are staff nurses and midwives of MCCH who actively
joined and were believed to have took part in committing illegal acts during the
strike. Consequently, MCCH terminated the union leaders of NAMA-MCCH-NFL as
well as the respondents. The CA, however, found that respondents cannot be
considered to have committed illegal acts since their participation was limited to the
wearing of arm bands.

Issue 1: W/N the dismissal of the respondents is valid

Held:

No. Article 263 (a)(par 3) provides that any union officer who knowingly
participated in an illegal strike and any union officer or union member who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status. Here, the respondents merely
participated in the illegal strike but did not commit any of the illegal acts. Hence,
their termination is not valid.

Issue 2: W/N the respondents are entitled to backwages

No. The principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor remains as the basic
factor in determining the award of backwages. If there is no work performed by
the employee there can be no wage or pay unless the laborer was able, willing and
ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. For this exception to apply, it is required that the
strike be legal. Since the strike in this case was illegal, the respondents cannot be
awarded with backwages.

Issue 3: W/N the respondents are entitled to reinstatement

No. Considering that strained relations ensued, the grant of separation pay to
respondents is the alternative in lieu of reinstatement.

Jurisprudence states that the alternative relief for union members who were
dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of
time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the
employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does
not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced
by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and
employee.

Options of Landowner Under Art 449-450 If the Builder and Third Party Purchasers
Were In Bad Faith (BPI vs Sanchez, 2014)
GR 179518BPI vs Sanchez
Case Digest GR 179518 Nov 19 2014
Full Text

Facts:

The Sanchezes entered into an agreement with Garcia (doing business in the name
of TSEI) to sell for P 1.850 million their parcel of land, with an earnest money of 50k.
They agreed that Garcia shall pay the purchase price in cash once the property is
vacated. The Sanchezes entrusted to Garcia the owners copy of TCT because it was
agreed that he shall take care of all the documentations necessary for the
transaction.

Immediately after the property was vacated, Garcia took possession and began
constructing townhouses thereon without the Sanchezes knowledge and consent.
While these developments were ongoing, Garcia failed to pay the purchase price.
Subsequently, the Sanchezes were given six checks representing the amount of the
purchase price. Four of these checks were postdated, thus further delaying their
overdue payment. To properly document the check payments, they made an
agreement stipulating that if one of the checks were dishonored, the Sanchezes
may rescind the contract.

The last two checks were dishonored, so the Sanchezes rescinded the contract and
demanded from Garcia the return of the TCT. However, Garcia refused to return the
documents and vacate the property.

Meanwhile, the Sanchezes found out that Garcia/TSEI were selling townhouses
situated in the property. So they informed the HLURB, the City Building Official and
the RD in Quezon City, of the illegal constructions being made thereon. The HLURB
issued a Cease and Decease Order enjoining Garcia / TSEI from further developing
and selling the townhouses. Such orders were left unheeded. In fact, Garcia were
already able to sell many of the units to different individuals and entities, and even
mortgaged the property. Consequently, the Sanchezes filed before the RTC a
complaint for rescission, restitution and damages with TRO.

The purchasers and mortgagee who are the intervenors in this case were found by
the court to be in bad faith. On the other hand, the Sanchezes were held to be in
good faith and not negligent.
Issue 1: W/N rescission of the contract was barred by the subsequent transfer of the
property

No. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, rescission is available to a party in a
reciprocal obligation where one party fails to comply with it. As an exception to this
rule, Article 1385 provides that rescission shall not take place if the subject matter
of the prior agreement is already in the hands of a third party who did not act in bad
faith.

Here, the failure of Garcia/TSEI to pay the consideration for the sale of the property
entitled the Sanchezes to rescind the Agreement. And in view of the finding that the
intervenors acted in bad faith in purchasing the property from Garcia, the
subsequent transfer in their favor did not and cannot bar rescission.

Issue 2: W/N Article 449 450 of the Civil Code is applicable to the Sanchezes

Yes. Bad faith on the part of the purchasers leads to the application of Art 449-450.

Consequently, the Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property
with the townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon
without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the
intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property at the expense of TSEI
or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the land.

As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within 30 days from
finality of the decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the
value of the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of
determining the fair market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from
the Sanchezes. If the Sanchezes decide to appropriate the townhouses, other
structures and improvements as their own pursuant to Art 449, then the
intervenors-purchasers shall be ordered to vacate said premises within a reasonable
time from notice of the finality of the decision by the Sanchezes. They have a right
to recover their investment in the townhouses from Garcia and TSEI. If the
Sanchezes do not want to make use of the townhouses and improvements on the
subject lot, then the purchasers can be ordered to demolish said townhouses or if
they dont demolish the same within a reasonable time, then it can be demolished
at their expense. On the 3rd option, if the Sanchezes do not want to appropriate the
townhouses or have the same demolished, then they can ask that the townhouse
purchasers pay to them the fair market value of the respective areas allotted to
their respective townhouses subject of their deeds of sale. ##

Relevant Provisions

Hide
Rescission and Exceptions

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have
acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage
Law.

Article 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the
object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest;
consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be obliged to restore.

Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the
contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.

In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person causing the
loss.

Hide
Builders in Bad Faith

Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or
planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Existence of a Priorly-Issued Title Must be Established in Order to Grant

Reconstitution under RA 26 (Rep vs Sanchez, 2014)
GR 212388 RepublicRepublic vs Heirs of Donato Sanchez
Case Digest GR 212388 Dec 10 2014
Full Text

Facts:

When Spouses Sanchez died intestate, their Heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition over a lot of which owners copy of the OCT is missing. Since they cannot
register the Deed without the OCT, they sought for the reconstitution, pursuant to
RA 26, of the said OCT. They alleged in their petition that OCT 45361 covers a lot
that was issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest Spouses Sanchez
pursuant to Decree 418121 which was in relation to a court decision in 1930.
Among the evidences presented are: (1) a certification from the RD that the copies
of the OCT and the decree which issued it cannot be found among its records, (2)
the court decision in 1930 adjudicating the lot in the name of spouses Sanchez, and
(3) certified true copy of the Registrars Index Card containing the notation that the
OTC was listed under the name of one of the spouse Sanchez. Since there is no copy
of the OCT in the RD records, there was no certification from the RD that the OCT
was either lost or destroyed.

Issue 1: W/N reconstitution of OCT 45361 should be granted

No. Under RA 26, a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed title requires, as a
condition precedent, that a certificate of title has indeed been issued. Here, the
court decision and the Registrars Index Card containing the notation on OCT No.
45361 do not cite nor mention that Decree No. 418121 was issued to support the
issuance of the said OCT. Since there was no clear and convincing evidence
adduced to prove the existence of the OTC, RA 26 cannot apply.

For obvious reasons, reconstitution cannot be made on a title that never existed in
the first place.

Issue 2: W/N reconstitution of OCT is proper when the only evidences presented to
support its existence are derivative titles

No. Assuming that there was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the OCT
considering the totality of evidence presented, still, reconstitution of the OCT is not
warranted. Under Sec 15 of RA 26, before a certificate of title which has been lost or
destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved by the claimants that the
certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among
others.

First, the mere existence of the derivative titles which contain the notations that
the name of the registered owner of OCT 45361 is not available as per certification
of the RD clearly shows that the OCT which the Heirs seek to be reconstituted is no
longer in force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a mere superfluity

Second, the necessary certification from the RD that said OCT was in force at the
time it was lost or destroyed is lacking. The presentation of alleged derivative titles
will not suffice to replace this certification because the titles do not authenticate the
issuance of OCT No. 45361 having been issued by the RD without any basis from its
official records. Hence, the OCT cannot be reconstituted because clearly it was no
longer in force.

Notes:

The proper procedure when seeking the reconstitution of an Original Certificate of

Title is to file a petition for the cancellation of the decree, re-issuance of the decree
and issuance of OCT pursuant to the re-issued decree.

Hide
Within the premise that a decree has been validly issued, the proper procedure is to
file a petition for the cancellation of the Old decree, reissuance of the decree and
issuance of OCT pursuant to the reissued decree.
Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the same is valid and intact?
Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute that a decree has been
validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy of such decree is intact. What
is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued pursuant to that decree. If such
decree is valid, why is there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?

This is because Section 39 of PD 1529 states that: The original certificate of title
shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. This provision is significant
because it contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old
decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the corresponding OCT
issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while the decree
upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past Administrator. This is
not consistent with the clear intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be
true copy of the decree of registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the
old decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.

As long as the decree issued in an ordinary or cadastral registration case has not
yet been entered, meaning, it has not yet been transcribed in the Registration Book
of the concerned Registrar of Deeds, such decree has not yet attained finality and
therefore may still be subject to cancellation in the same land registration case.
Upon cancellation of such decree, the decree owner (adjudicatee or his heirs) may
then pray for the issuance of a new decree number and, consequently, pray for the
issuance of an original certificate of title based on the newly issued decree of
registration.

For as long as a decree has not yet been transcribed (entered in registration book of
the RD), the court which adjudicated and ordered for the issuance of such decree
continues to be clothed with jurisdiction. The reason for this is that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced
against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court
or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been
filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be
registered. (Sta Ana vs Menla)

Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land

registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility,
until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and
the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it. (Gomez vs CA, 1988)

Prematurely Filed Judicial Claims Allowed Only For Cases Filed On Dec 3 2003 Until
Oct 6 2010 (Team Energy vs CIR, 2014)
GR 197760 Team Energy Corp vs CIR
Case Digest GR 197760 Jan 13 2014
Full Text

Facts:

Team Energy, formerly Mirant Pagbilao, is a registered VAT taxpayer, filed on

December 20 2006, an administrative claim for cash refund or issuance of tax credit
certificate for the input VAT it paid for the first three quarters of 2005. TEC appealed
the CIRs inaction before the CTA on April 18, 2007. (The CTA Division took
cognizance of the judicial claim even if it was filed within the 120-day period,
pursuant to DA-489-03 which states that the taxpayer-claimant need not wait for
the lapse of 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA. During
that time, it was the rule applicable from its issuance on December 3, 2003 before
the promulgation of the Aichi case on October 6, 2010.)

However, on Nov 26, 2010, the CTA Division reversed its earlier decision on the
ground that the CTA has no jurisdiction over the case for being prematurely filed. It
based its ruling on the Aichi case which held that the 120-30 day rule in case of
inaction under Section 112 (C) of the NIRC is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Issue 1: W/N the CTA has jurisdiction over the claim even if it was prematurely filed

Yes. As a rule laid down by the SC in the San Roque case, the CTA may take
cognizance of judicial claims filed during the interim period from the promulgation
of the BIR RR DA-489-03 on Dec 3 2003 until the adoption of the Aichi case on Oct 6
2010.

Since the Commissioner has exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret tax laws,
taxpayers acting in good faith should not be made to suffer for adhering to general
interpretative rules of the Commissioner interpreting tax laws, should such
interpretation later turn out to be erroneous and be reversed by the Commissioner
or by the SC. Section 246 of the Tax Code expressly provides that a reversal of a
BIR regulation or ruling cannot adversely prejudice a taxpayer who, in good faith,
relied on the BIR regulation or ruling prior to its reversal.

Here, TEC filed its judicial claim on April 18, 2007 or after the issuance of BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 but before October 6, 2010, the date when
the Aichi case was promulgated. Thus, even though TECs judicial claim was
prematurely filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory
period, the CTA may still take cognizance of case as it was filed within the period
exempted from the 120-30-day mandatory period.

Issue 2: W/N DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule applicable to all taxpayers

Yes. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it is a

response to a query made, not by a particular taxpayer, but by a government
agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. This
government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded to, in BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03. Thus, while this government agency mentions in its query to the
Commissioner the administrative claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc.,
the agency was, in fact, asking the Commissioner what to do in cases like the tax
claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc., where the taxpayer did not wait for
the lapse of the 120-day period.

Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all
taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10
December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where
this Court held that the 120-130 day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. ##

Notes

Hide
Exceptions to the Mandatory 120-30-Day Rule (CIR vs San Roque, 2013)

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 does provide a valid claim for equitable estoppel under
Section 246 of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 expressly states that the
taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could
seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review. Prior to this ruling,
the BIR held, as shown by its position in the CA, that the expiration of the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional before a judicial claim can be filed.

There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that
the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a judicial claim that is filed before the
expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule.

If the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular taxpayer to

prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is applicable only
to such particular taxpayer.
The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative
rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing
prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot
be allowed to later on question the CTAs assumption of jurisdiction over such claim
since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly authorized under Section 246 of the
Tax Code.
Hide
Section 246: Non-retroactivity of Rulings

Any modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in

accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the
revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in
the following cases:

(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his
return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are
materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or
(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

Administrative Claim, Not Judicial Claim, Must Be Filed Within the 2-Year Prescriptive
Period (CIR vs Mindanao, 2014)
GR 191498 CIR vs Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership
Case Digest GR 191498 Jan 15 2014
Full Text

Facts:

Mindanao II is a registered taxpayer whose sales to NAPOCOR are all zero-rated

pursuant to the EPIRA Law. On Oct 6 2005, it filed with the BIR an application for
the refund or credit of accumulated unutilized creditable input taxes for the second,
third, and fourth taxable quarters of the taxable year 2004. The administrative
claim was not acted upon until Feb 3 2006, or 120 days after Oct 6 2005. Believing
that a judicial claim must be filed within the 2-year prescriptive period provided
under Sec 112 (A) and that it must be reckoned from the date of filing of its VAT
returns, Mindanao filed on July 26 2006 a petition for review before the CTA claiming
inaction on the part of the CIR.

On Aug 12 2008, the CTA Division granted Mindanao IIs claim for refund/credit and
held that its judicial claim was timely filed within the 2-year prescriptive period. The
CIR opposed the rulings claiming that prescription had already set in when
Mindanao II filed its judicial claim beyond the 30-day period fixed in Section 112 (C).

CTA En Banc's Contentions

Issue 1: W/N Mindanao IIs administrative claim for refund/credit was timely filed

Yes. Pursuant to Section 112 (A) of the 1997 Tax Code, it is only the administrative
claim which is to be filed within the two-year prescriptive period, and the two-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made. Here, Mindanao II filed its claim for refund/credit for the second,
third, and fourth quarters of 2004 on Oct 6 2005. Such date is well within the two-
year prescriptive period which runs from June 30 2004 (2nd Quarter), Sept 30 2004
(3rd Quarter) and Dec 31 2004 (4th Quarter).

[The Atlas and Mirant rulings are simply not applicable in this case because
Mindanao IIs application for refund/credit on Oct 6 2005 was filed before their
promulgation. The Atlas ruling is held to be applicable only on cases filed from June
8 2007, the date of its promulgation, and up to Sept 12 2008, the date when the
Mirant case was promulgated.

In Atlas, the court laid down a rule that the 2-year prescriptive period is reckoned
from the date of filing of the return and payment of taxes. In Mirant, such rule was
abandoned. Following the verba legis doctrine, Mirant held that in administrative
claims for refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the 2-year prescriptive period begins
to run from the close of taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made. This
rule, which is obviously consistent with the plain wordings of Section 112 (A), was
also affirmed in the recent case of San Roque.]

Issue 2: W/N Mindanao IIs judicial claim for refund/credit was timely filed

No. Under Section 112 (C), the judicial claim must be filed by the taxpayer within 30
days after the 120-day waiting period if its administrative claim was not acted upon
by CIR. Here, Mindanao II filed its application for refund on Oct 6 2005. When it was
not acted upon, it filed a judicial claim but only on July 21 2006, or 138 days after
the lapse of the 30-day period on 5 March 2006. Its petition for review before the
CTA was therefore filed late.

Contrary to the erroneous contentions of the CTA En Banc, the correct interpretation
of Section 112, as held in San Roque, is that the 30-day period applies not only to
instances of actual denial by the CIR of the claim for refund or tax credit, but to
cases of inaction by the CIR as well. Also, following the verba legis doctrine, the 30-
day period to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 112 (C) is clear,
plain and unequivocal in expressly providing that the taxpayer has a 30-day period
to appeal the decision or inaction of the Commissioner. ##

***When reading the full text of this case, please note the difference in letterings of
Section 112 particularly Section 112 (C) and (D) of the NIRC as amended by RA
9337 of 2005. In this digested version, Section 112 (C) is used to refer to Section
112 (D) of the old NIRC. ***

Summary of Rules on Prescriptive Periods for Claiming Refund or Credit of Input Tax

Two-Year Prescriptive Period

It is only the administrative claim that must be filed within the two-year prescriptive
period. (Aichi)
The proper reckoning date for the two-year prescriptive period is the close of the
taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made. (San Roque)
The only other rule is the Atlas ruling, which applied only from 8 June 2007 to12
September 2008. Atlas states that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim
for tax refund or credit of unutilized input VAT payments should be counted from the
date of filing of the VAT return and payment of the tax. (San Roque)
120 + 30 Day Period

The taxpayer can file an appeal in one of two ways:

(1) file the judicial claim within thirty days after the Commissioner denies the claim
within the 120-day period, or
(2) file the judicial claim within thirty days from the expiration of the 120-day period
if the Commissioner does not act within the 120-day period.

The 30-day period always applies, whether there is a denial or inaction on the part
of the CIR.
As a general rule, the 30-day period to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
(Aichi and San Roque)
As an exception to the general rule, premature filing is allowed only if filed between
10 December 2003 and 5 October 2010, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was still in
force. (San Roque)
Late filing is absolutely prohibited, even during the time when BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 was in force. (San Roque)
*** See also: BIR Revenue Regulation 54-2014 (RR 54-2014) ***

Notes

Hide
Only the Administrative Claim Under Section 112 May Be Filed Within the 2-Year
Prescriptive Period (CIR vs Aichi, 2010)

Subsection (A) of the Section 112 states that any VAT-registered person, whose
sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close
of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and
not to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection
(D) of the same provision, which states that the CIR has 120 days from the
submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance
with Subsections (A) and (B) within which to decide on the claim.

In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory
Section 112 (D) of the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within
which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second
paragraph of Section 112 (D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios:

(1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and

(2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period.

In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the
CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.

When to Reckon the 2-Year Prescriptive Period for Administrative Claim of Refund or
Credit of Unutilized Input VAT under the 1997 Tax Code (CIR vs San Roque, 2013)

The Atlas doctrine, which held that claims for refund or credit of input VAT must
comply with the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229, should be effective
only from its promulgation on 8 June 2007 until its abandonment on 12 September
2008 in Mirant. The Atlas doctrine was limited to the reckoning of the two-year
prescriptive period from the date of payment of the output VAT. Prior to the Atlas
doctrine, the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund or credit of input VAT
should be governed by Section 112(A) following the verba legis rule. The Mirant
ruling, which abandoned the Atlas doctrine, adopted the verba legis rule, thus
applying Section 112(A) in computing the two-year prescriptive period in claiming
refund or credit of input VAT.
Hide
Distinctions Between Section 229 and Section 112 of the Tax Code (CIR vs San
Roque, 2013)

Two things are clear from San Roque disquisitions. First, when it comes to recovery
of unutilized input VAT, Section 112, and not Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code, is
the governing law. Second, prior to June 8 2007, the applicable rule is neither Atlas
nor Mirant, but Section 112(A).

Section 112 Does Not Prohibit Cash Refund or Tax Credit of Transitional Input Tax
(Fort Bonifacio vs CIR, 2013)
GR 173425 Fort Bonifacio vs CIR
Case Digest GR 173425 Jan 22 2013
Full Text

Facts:

In 1995, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation purchased from the national

government a portion of the Fort Bonifacio reservation. On January 1, 1996, the
enactment of RA 7716 extended the coverage of VAT to real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business. Thus, FBDC sought to register by submitting to BIR an inventory of all its
real properties, the book value of which aggregated to about P71 B.

In October 1996, FBDC started selling Global City lots to interested buyers. For the
first quarter of 1997, it paid the output VAT by making cash payments to the BIR
and credited its unutilized input tax credit on purchases of goods and services.
Realizing that its 8% transitional input tax credit was not applied in computing its
output VAT for the first quarter of 1997, FBDC filed with the BIR a claim for refund of
the amount erroneously paid as output VAT for the said period.

The CTA denied refund on the ground that the benefit of transitional input tax
credit comes with the condition that business taxes should have been paid first. It
contends that since FBDC acquired the Global City property under a VAT-free sale
transaction, it cannot avail of the transitional input tax credit. The CTA likewise
pointed out that under RR 7-95, implementing Section 105 of the old NIRC, the 8%
transitional input tax credit should be based on the value of the improvements on
land such as buildings, roads, drainage system and other similar structures,
constructed on or after January 1, 1998, and not on the book value of the real
property.

Issue 1: W/N prior payment of taxes is required in availing of the transitional input
tax credit

No. First, nothing in Sec 105 of the NIRC indicates that prior payment of taxes is
necessary to avail of the transitional input tax credit. Clearly, all it requires is for the
taxpayer to file a beginning inventory with the BIR. Courts cannot limit the
application or coverage of a law nor can it impose conditions not provided therein
because to do so constitutes judicial legislation.
Second, prior payment of taxes is not required to avail of the transitional input tax
credit because it is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Tax credit is not
synonymous to tax refund. Tax refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer
overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority. Tax credit, on the other hand,
is an amount subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. It is any amount given
to a taxpayer as a subsidy, a refund, or an incentive to encourage investment. Thus,
unlike a tax refund, prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a tax
credit.

Lastly, the fact that FBDC acquired the Global City property under a tax-free
transaction makes no difference as prior payment of taxes is not a pre-requisite.

Issue 2: W/N the transitional input tax credit applies only to the value of
improvements

No. Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95, insofar as it limits the transitional input tax credit to
the value of the improvement of the real properties, is a nullity. The 8% transitional
input tax credit should not be limited to the value of the improvements on the real
properties but should include the value of the real properties as well.

Hence, since FBDC is entitled to the 8% transitional input tax credit which is more
than sufficient to cover its output tax for the first taxable quarter, the amount of
VAT output taxes erroneously paid must be refunded.

Issue 3: W/N the Tax Code allows either a cash refund or a tax credit for input VAT

Yes. First, a careful reading of Section 112 of the Tax Code shows that it does not
prohibit cash refund or tax credit of transitional input tax in the case of zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated VAT registered taxpayers, who do not have any output VAT.

The phrase except transitional input tax in Section 112 of the Tax Code was
inserted to distinguish creditable input tax from transitional input tax credit.
Transitional input tax credits are input taxes on a taxpayers beginning inventory of
goods, materials, and supplies equivalent to 8% (then 2%) or the actual VAT paid on
such goods, materials and supplies, whichever is higher. It may only be availed of
once by first-time VAT taxpayers. Creditable input taxes, on the other hand, are
input taxes of VAT taxpayers in the course of their trade or business, which should
be applied within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made.

As regards Section 110, while the law only provides for a tax credit, a taxpayer who
erroneously or excessively pays his output tax is still entitled to recover the
payments he made either as a tax credit or a tax refund.

Here, since FBDC still has available transitional input tax credit, it filed a claim for
refund to recover the output VAT it erroneously or excessively paid for the 1st
quarter of 1997. Thus, there is no reason for denying its claim for tax refund/credit.

Notes
Hide
Prior Payment of Taxes Not Required In Availing Tax Credit (CIR vs Central Luzon
Drug Corp, 2005)

While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of any tax credit, prior tax
payments are not. On the contrary, for the existence or grant solely of such credit,
neither a tax liability nor a prior tax payment is needed. The Tax Code is in fact
replete with provisions granting or allowing tax credits, even though no taxes have
been previously paid.

For example, in computing the estate tax due, Section 86(E) allows a tax credit
subject to certain limitationsfor estate taxes paid to a foreign country. Also found in
Section 101(C) is a similar provision for donors taxesagain when paid to a foreign
countryin computing for the donors tax due. The tax credits in both instances
allude to the prior payment of taxes, even if not made to our government.

Under Section 110, a VAT (Value-Added Tax)-registered person engaging in

transactionswhether or not subject to the VATis also allowed a tax credit that
includes a ratable portion of any input tax not directly attributable to either activity.
This input tax may either be the VAT on the purchase or importation of goods or
services that is merely due fromnot necessarily paid bysuch VAT-registered person
in the course of trade or business; or the transitional input tax determined in
accordance with Section 111(A). The latter type may in fact be an amount
equivalent to only eight percent of the value of a VAT-registered persons beginning
inventory of goods, materials and supplies, when such amountas computedis
higher than the actual VAT paid on the said items. Clearly from this provision, the
tax credit refers to an input tax that is either due only or given a value by mere
comparison with the VAT actually paidthen later prorated. No tax is actually paid
prior to the availment of such credit.

In Section 111(B), a one and a half percent input tax credit that is merely
presumptive is allowed. For the purchase of primary agricultural products used as
inputseither in the processing of sardines, mackerel and milk, or in the
manufacture of refined sugar and cooking oiland for the contract price of public
work[s] contracts entered into with the government, again, no prior tax payments
are needed for the use of the tax credit.

More important, a VAT-registered person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively

zero-rated may, under Section 112(A), apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate for the amount of creditable input taxes merely dueagain not
necessarily paid tothe government and attributable to such sales, to the extent
that the input taxes have not been applied against output taxes. Where a taxpayer
is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales and also in taxable or
exempt sales, the amount of creditable input taxes due that are not directly and
entirely attributable to any one of these transactions shall be proportionately
allocated on the basis of the volume of sales. Indeed, in availing of such tax credit
for VAT purposes, this provisionas well as the one earlier mentioned shows that
the prior payment of taxes is not a requisite.
It may be argued that Section 28(B)(5)(b) of the Tax Code is another illustration of a
tax credit allowed, even though no prior tax payments are not required. Specifically,
in this provision, the imposition of a final withholding tax rate on cash and/or
property dividends received by a nonresident foreign corporation from a domestic
corporation is subjected to the condition that a foreign tax credit will be given by
the domiciliary country in an amount equivalent to taxes that are merely deemed
paid. Although true, this provision actually refers to the tax credit as a condition
only for the imposition of a lower tax rate, not as a deduction from the
corresponding tax liability. Besides, it is not our government but the domiciliary
country that credits against the income tax payable to the latter by the foreign
corporation, the tax to be foregone or spared.

In contrast, Section 34(C)(3), in relation to Section 34(C)(7)(b), categorically allows

as credits, against the income tax imposable under Title II, the amount of income
taxes merely incurrednot necessarily paidby a domestic corporation during a
taxable year in any foreign country. Moreover, Section 34(C)(5) provides that for
such taxes incurred but not paid, a tax credit may be allowed, subject to the
condition precedent that the taxpayer shall simply give a bond with sureties
satisfactory to and approved by petitioner, in such sum as may be required; and
further conditioned upon payment by the taxpayer of any tax found due, upon
petitioners redetermination of it.

In addition to the above-cited provisions in the Tax Code, there are also tax treaties
and special laws that grant or allow tax credits, even though no prior tax payments
have been made.

Under the treaties in which the tax credit method is used as a relief to avoid double
taxation, income that is taxed in the state of source is also taxable in the state of
residence, but the tax paid in the former is merely allowed as a credit against the
tax levied in the latter. Apparently, payment is made to the state of source, not the
state of residence. No tax, therefore, has been previously paid to the latter.

Under special laws that particularly affect businesses, there can also be tax credit
incentives. To illustrate, the incentives provided for in Article 48 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1789, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 391, include tax
credits equivalent to either five percent of the net value earned, or five or ten
percent of the net local content of export. In order to avail of such credits under the
said law and still achieve its objectives, no prior tax payments are necessary.

From all the foregoing instances, it is evident that prior tax payments are not
indispensable to the availment of a tax credit. Thus, the CA correctly held that the
availment under RA 7432 did not require prior tax payments by private
establishments concerned. However, we do not agree with its finding that the carry-
over of tax credits under the said special law to succeeding taxable periods, and
even their application against internal revenue taxes, did not necessitate the
existence of a tax liability.

The examples above show that a tax liability is certainly important in the availment
or use, not the existence or grant, of a tax credit. Regarding this matter, a private
establishment reporting a net lossin its financial statements is no different from
another that presents a net income. Both are entitled to the tax credit provided for
under RA 7432, since the law itself accords that unconditional benefit. However, for
the losing establishment to immediately apply such credit, where no tax is due, will
be an improvident usance.

Relevant Provisions

Hide
Section 105, old NIRC: Transitional Input Tax Credits

SEC. 105. Transitional input tax credits. A person who becomes liable to value-
added tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to
the filing of an inventory as prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his
beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value
of such inventory or the actual value-added tax paid on such goods, materials and
supplies, whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax.

Hide
Section 112: Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person,

whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for
the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent
that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x

Grandfather Rule Rules When the Required 60-40 Filipino-foreign Equity Ownership
is In Doubt (Narra vs Redmont, 2014)
gr 195580 case digest

Full Text

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont

Case Digest GR 185590, Apr 21 2014

Facts:

Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some

areas in Palawan. Upon learning that those areas were covered by MPSA
applications of other three (allegedly Filipino) corporations Narra, Tesoro, and
MacArthur, it filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of DENR seeking to deny
their permits on the ground that these corporations are in reality foreign-owned.
MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns
5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of
McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of
Tesoro).
Aside from the MPSA, the three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of
the President. In their answer, they countered that (1) the liberal Control Test must
be used in determining the nationality of a corporation as based on Sec 3 of the
Foreign Investment Act which as they claimed admits of corporate layering
schemes, and that (2) the nationality question is no longer material because of their
subsequent application for FTAA.

Commercial / Political Law

Hide
Issue 1: W/N the Grandfather Rule must be applied in this case

Yes. It is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the Grandfather
Rule in cases where corporate layering is present.

First, as a rule in statutory construction, when there is conflict between the

Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this instance, specifically
pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy
and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. Corporate
layering is admittedly allowed by the FIA, but if it is used to circumvent the
Constitution and other pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.

Second, under the SEC Rule1 and DOJ Opinion2 , the Grandfather Rule must be
applied when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt. Doubt is
present in the Filipino equity ownership of Narra, Tesoro, and MacArthur since their
common investor, the 100% Canadian-owned corporation MBMI, funded them.

Under the Grandfather Rule, it is not enough that the corporation does have the
required 60% Filipino stockholdings at face value. To determine the percentage of
the ultimate Filipino ownership, it must first be traced to the level of the investing
corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the investee corporation.
Applying this rule, it turns out that the Canadian corporation owns more than 60%
of the equity interests of Narra, Tesoro and MacArthur. Hence, the latter are
disqualified to participate in the exploration, development and utilization of the
Philippines natural resources.

1 DOJ Opinion No. 020 Series of 2005 (paragraph 7)

2 SEC Opinion May 13, 1990

Remedial Law

Hide
Issue 2: W/N the case has become moot as a result of the MPSA conversion to FTAA

No. There are certain exceptions to mootness principle and the mere raising of an
issue of mootness will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a
valid reason to do so.
The SC noted that a grave violation of the Constitution is being committed by a
foreign corporation through a myriad of corporate layering under different,
allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the
Canadian company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount
public interest since it undeniably affects the exploitation of our Countrys natural
resources. The corresponding actions of petitioners during the lifetime and
existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied to
cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced
by the Court; hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will
serve as a guide to the bench, the bar and the public. Finally, the instant case is
capable of repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can
keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate
layering and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against
foreign mining in Philippine soil. ##

Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 is a Wrong Remedy Against a Courts Final and
Appealable Order (Cajipe vs People, 2014)
gr 203605

Cajipe vs People
Case Digest GR 203605 April 23 2014
Full Text

Criminal Procedure

Facts:

Before the DOJ, Lilian filed a complaint charging multiple murder against certain
police officers from the PNP-HPG and PNP-SAF who were involved in the police
action that led to the shooting of her husband and their daughter. After preliminary
investigation, the DOJ filed the Information before the RTC indicting all the police
officers charged in the complaint.

On the following day, the HPG group of accused police officers filed an omnibus
motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants for their arrest. The RTC issued warrants of arrest
against the SAF officers but dismissed the case against the HPG officers for lack of
probable cause. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal but it was denied.

For a period of 112 days after receipt of the order of dismissal by the public
prosecutor, the OSG via Rule 65 filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA granted the petition, ruling
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion and thus ordered the issuance of warrants
of arrest against the HPG officers.

Issue 1: W/N the CA is correct in granting the OSGs petition for certiorari via Rule
65

No. Considering that the RTC order of dismissal is final and appealable, the CA erred
when it granted the special civil action for certiorari filed by the OSG via Rule 65.
The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. The CA should have denied the Peoples petition that
assails the correctness of the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides
that such action is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Section 1 of Rule 122 provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action
from a judgment or final order like the RTCs order dismissing the case against
petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes
of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further
to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. Of course, the People
may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation
will support the filing of a new information against them. But that is another matter.
For now, the CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.

Issue 2: Assuming the propriety of filing the special civil action for certiorari against
the RTCs order of dismissal, whether or not should the reckoning point of filing the
action be from the date the DOJ or the court give notice of the order of dismissal to
the OSG (The OSG based its contention on the well-established rule that only the
OSG has the authority to represent the People before the CA)

No. The contention of the OSG is not correct. There is no reason for the RTC to serve
copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG since the OSG does not enter its
appearance in criminal cases before the trial courts.

In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public
prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a
copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the
appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only
the OSG, however, may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required
appellants brief or withdraw the same.

In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public
prosecutors duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil
action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action.
There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given 60 days
from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the
CA or the SC.

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People
112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque,
the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate
review. ##

Notes:
Hide
Two Grounds on Which a Special Civil Action for Certiorari May Prosper:

Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

the body, court, tribunal or govt agency, and
There is no other appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Dismissal of Small Claims Cases for Lack of Cause of Action Are Necessarily With
Prejudice (Lourdes vs Binaro, 2014)
GR 2047129

Lourdes Suites vs Binaro

Case Digest GR 2047129 Aug 6 2014
Full Text

Facts:

Lourdes Suites filed before the MeTC a small-claims complaint against Binaro for
nonpayment of penalty charges on its rented rooms. Binaro responded with a
counterclaim. Lourdes Suites impugned the validity of Binaros pleading stating that
it did not comply with the form of an Answer as required in Rule 11, Sec 1 of the
Rules of Court.

The MeTC, after evaluating the evidence, dismissed the complaint with prejudice for
lack of cause of action. Lourdes Suites filed a certiorari before the RTC arguing that
lack of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal of cases, much more a
dismissal with prejudice. It contends that a complaint even after the presentation of
evidence cannot be dismissed on ground of lack of cause of action because it is not
expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases and the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only
available remedy would be a demurrer filed by the defendant.

The RTC ruled that there was no grave of abuse of discretion on the part of the
MeTC. The MR was also denied. Hence, Lourdes Suites brought the issue to the SC
via petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue: W/N dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action is proper under the
Rules of Court

Yes. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action
such as insufficiency of evidence. In civil cases, courts must determine if the
plaintiff was able to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence.

The basis of the MeTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the
failure of plaintiff to preponderantly establish its claim by clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the Complaint for lack of cause of action, as it referred to the evidence presented
and not to the allegations in the Complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton
or palpable discretion. This case is an action for small claims where decisions are
rendered final and unappealable; hence, a decision dismissing it is necessarily with
prejudice. ##

Notes

Hide
Failure to State a Cause of Action vs Lack of Cause of Action (Macaslang vs Zamora,
2011)

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from
each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause of action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice
Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:

What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is

provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading.
Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to
the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of
action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence.

The remedy in the failure to state a cause of action is to move for dismissal of the
pleading, while the remedy in the lack of cause of action is to demur to the
evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section.
The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to
evidence, if such motion is warranted.

Hide
Rule 16 Motion to Dismiss

Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the
provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

Hide
Rule 33 Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the

presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.

Lower Courts Must Observe Judicial Courtesy When Issue is Pending Resolution By A
Higher Court (Nicart vs Titong, 2014)
GR 207682 Conrado Nicart Conrado Nicart, as Gov of Eastern Samar vs Titong and
Abrugar
Case Digest GR 207682 Dec 10 2014
Full Text

Facts:

Titong and Abrugar, together with 93 others, were appointed as department heads
by the then Governor Evardone of Samar a few days before the end of his
term.Their appointments were disapproved by the CSC Regional Office for violation
of CSC rules and for not having met the requirements laid down in Nazareno vs City
of Dumaguete case. Titong and Abrugar filed a petition for review before the CSC
Main, which granted and declared their appointments as valid. The new Governor
Nicart sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. Before the CA, he appealed
arguing that their appointments cannot be valid since there was no need to fill up
the positions and that their appointments were en masse.

Meanwhile, the CSC Main issued a writ of execution ordering Gov Nicart and the
provincial government to pay the salaries and emoluments of Titong and Abrugar.
Gov Nicart refused, so they filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC even while
the case before the CA was still pending.

The RTC decided the petition on the basis of the CSC memo circular 82 which states
that the non-issuance of a restraining order or injunction would make the CSC
resolution executory pending appeal. Since there was no TRO or injunction, and its
opinion that the CA decision would not constitute res judicata or in any way affect
the petition for mandamus, the RTC issued a writ of mandamus and went even
further in deciding that the appointments were valid.

Issue: W/N it is proper for the RTC to take cognizance of the petition for mandamus
even while the issues involved is still pending resolution before the CA

Held:
No. First, it is erroneous for the RTC to opine that the CA decision would not affect
the petition before it because clearly, the mandamus petition heavily relies on the
validity or invalidity of the appointments which issue is yet to be resolved by the CA.
Second, even while there is no preliminary injunction or TRO issued by the higher
court, ordinarily it would be proper for a lower court or a court of origin to suspend
the proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. Hence, the RTC erred when it
decided on the mandamus petition for disregarding such principle.

Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 is a Wrong Remedy Against a Courts Final and
Appealable Order (Cajipe vs People, 2014)
gr 203605

Cajipe vs People
Case Digest GR 203605 April 23 2014
Full Text

Criminal Procedure

Facts:

Before the DOJ, Lilian filed a complaint charging multiple murder against certain
police officers from the PNP-HPG and PNP-SAF who were involved in the police
action that led to the shooting of her husband and their daughter. After preliminary
investigation, the DOJ filed the Information before the RTC indicting all the police
officers charged in the complaint.

On the following day, the HPG group of accused police officers filed an omnibus
motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants for their arrest. The RTC issued warrants of arrest
against the SAF officers but dismissed the case against the HPG officers for lack of
probable cause. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal but it was denied.

For a period of 112 days after receipt of the order of dismissal by the public
prosecutor, the OSG via Rule 65 filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA granted the petition, ruling
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion and thus ordered the issuance of warrants
of arrest against the HPG officers.

Issue 1: W/N the CA is correct in granting the OSGs petition for certiorari via Rule
65

No. Considering that the RTC order of dismissal is final and appealable, the CA erred
when it granted the special civil action for certiorari filed by the OSG via Rule 65.

The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG
officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. The CA should have denied the Peoples petition that
assails the correctness of the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides
that such action is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Section 1 of Rule 122 provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action
from a judgment or final order like the RTCs order dismissing the case against
petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes
of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further
to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. Of course, the People
may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation
will support the filing of a new information against them. But that is another matter.
For now, the CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.

Issue 2: Assuming the propriety of filing the special civil action for certiorari against
the RTCs order of dismissal, whether or not should the reckoning point of filing the
action be from the date the DOJ or the court give notice of the order of dismissal to
the OSG (The OSG based its contention on the well-established rule that only the
OSG has the authority to represent the People before the CA)

No. The contention of the OSG is not correct. There is no reason for the RTC to serve
copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG since the OSG does not enter its
appearance in criminal cases before the trial courts.

In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public
prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a
copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the
appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only
the OSG, however, may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required
appellants brief or withdraw the same.

In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public
prosecutors duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil
action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action.
There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given 60 days
from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the
CA or the SC.

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People
112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque,
the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate
review. ##

Notes:

Hide
Two Grounds on Which a Special Civil Action for Certiorari May Prosper:

Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

the body, court, tribunal or govt agency, and
There is no other appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Dismissal of Small Claims Cases for Lack of Cause of Action Are Necessarily With
Prejudice (Lourdes vs Binaro, 2014)
GR 2047129

Lourdes Suites vs Binaro

Case Digest GR 2047129 Aug 6 2014
Full Text

Facts:

Lourdes Suites filed before the MeTC a small-claims complaint against Binaro for
nonpayment of penalty charges on its rented rooms. Binaro responded with a
counterclaim. Lourdes Suites impugned the validity of Binaros pleading stating that
it did not comply with the form of an Answer as required in Rule 11, Sec 1 of the
Rules of Court.

The MeTC, after evaluating the evidence, dismissed the complaint with prejudice for
lack of cause of action. Lourdes Suites filed a certiorari before the RTC arguing that
lack of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal of cases, much more a
dismissal with prejudice. It contends that a complaint even after the presentation of
evidence cannot be dismissed on ground of lack of cause of action because it is not
expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases and the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only
available remedy would be a demurrer filed by the defendant.

The RTC ruled that there was no grave of abuse of discretion on the part of the
MeTC. The MR was also denied. Hence, Lourdes Suites brought the issue to the SC
via petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue: W/N dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action is proper under the
Rules of Court

Yes. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action
such as insufficiency of evidence. In civil cases, courts must determine if the
plaintiff was able to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence.

The basis of the MeTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the
failure of plaintiff to preponderantly establish its claim by clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the Complaint for lack of cause of action, as it referred to the evidence presented
and not to the allegations in the Complaint.

The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton
or palpable discretion. This case is an action for small claims where decisions are
rendered final and unappealable; hence, a decision dismissing it is necessarily with
prejudice. ##
Notes

Hide
Failure to State a Cause of Action vs Lack of Cause of Action (Macaslang vs Zamora,
2011)

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from
each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause of action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice
Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:

What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is

provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading.
Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to
the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of
action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence.

The remedy in the failure to state a cause of action is to move for dismissal of the
pleading, while the remedy in the lack of cause of action is to demur to the
evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section.
The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to
evidence, if such motion is warranted.

Hide
Rule 16 Motion to Dismiss

Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the
provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

Hide
Rule 33 Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the

presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.