CASE FACTS
Bustos v. Lucero " During the preliminary
investigation in a criminal case, Bustos moved
for complainant to present evidence so they
may be cross-examined. The prosecutor
objected, invoking R108-S11. The court
sustained and Bustos renounced his right to
present evidence.
Now bound for trial, Bustos
filed a motion for the record of the case be
remanded to the court of origin in order to
cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection w/ their testimony,
on the strength of w/c warrant was issued.
Court denied the motion to
return. Defendant can not, as a matter of
right, compel the complaint and his witnesses
to repeat in his presence what they had said at
the preliminary examination before the
issuance of the order of arrest. The
constitutional right of an accused to be
confronted by the witnesses against him does
not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an
infringement of his right to confront
witnesses."" It may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial.
DISSENT FERIA J. : Right to cross-
examine is substantive right because by
exercising it, an accused person may show,
even if he has no evidence in his favor, that
the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that
there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and he is guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused is entitled to be released
and not committed to prison. The court
construes S11 to do away w/ defendants righ
to cross-examine, hence it diminishes his
substantive right, w/c the court has no power
or authority to promulgate and therefore S11
is null and void.
Bustos filed a motion for
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
ISSUE HELD
"NO, it is a procedural law.
W/N R108-S11 is a substantive law. Substantive rights includes those rights which
one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which
declares what acts are crimes and prescribes
the punishment for committing them as
distinguished from the procedural law which
regulates the steps by which one who commits
a crime is to be punished. Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, R108-S11 is also
procedural. Evidence is identified with and
forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained,
and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is
punished. While R108-S11 denies to the
defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his
right to present his witnesses and his
constitutional right to be informed of the
charges against him is unchanged. In the
latter stage of the proceedings, he still enjoys
to the full extent the right to be confronted by
and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him.
The distinction between ""remedy"" and
""substantive right"" is incapable of exact
definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree. This being so, it is
inevitable that the Supreme Court in making
rules should step on substantive rights, and
the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate
if not to expect such incursion as does not
affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary
manner or deprive him of a defense, but
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 reconsideration."
Bernabe v. Alejo Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with
his secretary, plaintiff Alejo. The son was
named Adrian Bernabe and was born on
September 1981. Fiscal Bernabe and his wife
died on December 1993 leaving their daughter
Ernestina Bernabe as his sole surviving heir.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Whether or not Adrian's right to an Action for
recognition, which was granted under Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested
prior to the enactment of the Family Code
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial
manner to his disadvantage.
DISSENT FERIA J.
No person charged with the commission of a
crime shall be deprived of his liberty or
subjected to trial without prior preliminary
investigation that shall show that there are
reasonable grounds to believe him guilty,
there can be no doubt that the accused who is
deprived of his liberty, tried and sentenced
without the proper preliminary investigation
having been made in his regard, is convicted
without the process of law.
In case its power over procedure cannot pass
w/o touching on the substantial right, the
Court should abstain from promulgating such
rule of procedure which many increase,
diminish or modify substantive right in order
to avoid violating the constitutional
prohibition above referred to. It is not
empowered by the Constitution to legislate on
or abrogate substantive rights, but only to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure which ""shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
The testimony of a witness given in the
absence of the defendant and without an
opportunity on the part of the latter to cross-
examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it
should not be admitted against the defendant
in a preliminary investigation that is granted
to the latter as a protection against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions
"
Yes. Article 285 of the civil code is substantive
law and not procedural law. In determining
whether or not a rule or law is procedural or
substantive, test if the rule really regulates
procedure by being the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by
 Carolina filed a complaint praying that Adrian substantive law or if it takes away a vested
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son right or if it creates such a right. If the Rule
of Fiscal Bernabe and that he be given a share creates a right such as a right to appeal, then
of his estate, which is now being held by it may be classified as substantive. In this case
Ernestina as his sole living heir. RTC ordered the Civil Code gave Adrian the right to file for
the dismissal of the complaint alleging that recognition and thus may not be impaired by
the under the Family Code the action must be the Family Code
brought within the lifetime of the alleged
parent. On the other hand CA ruled that
Adrian was born in 1981 and thus his rights
are governed by the Civil Code which allows
an action for recognition to be filed within 4
years after the child attains the age of
majority and that the subsequent enactment
of the Family Code did not take that right.
The Family Code provides the caveat that
rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or
impaired. Respondent contends that the filing
of an action for recognition is procedural in
nature and that as a general rule, no vested
right may arise or attach to procedural law.
Sps. Bergonia v. Court of Petitioners were the plaintiffs in a civil case
where the RTC rendered a decision adverse to WON the dismissal of the petitioners appeal
Appeals the petitioners. The petitioners consequently for their failure to file the appellant brief
sought a reconsideration of the said decision within the reglementary period was correct.
but the same was denied. Petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal. Respondent Bravo filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal stating that the
petitioners failed to file their Appellants Brief
within the 45-day period granted to them by Yes.Petitioners excuse for their
the CA in the Resolution dated January 30, failure to file their brief was flimsy and
2009. Citing Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of discreditable and, thus, the propriety of the
Court, respondent prayed for the dismissal of dismissal of their appeal. The CA was guided
the petitioners appeal. by the Report of the Judicial Records Division
Petitioners allegation: The Motion to Dismiss of the CA and by the certification issued by
filed by the respondent had no basis the Postmaster of QC. The petitioners bare
considering that they or their counsel did not assertions could not overcome the
receive any resolution from the CA requiring presumption of regularity in the preparation
them to file their Appellants Brief within 45 of the records of the Post Office and that of
days. the CA.

Petitioners filed a Compliance and Motion The bare invocation of the interest
for Reconsideration praying that the of substantial justice is not a magic wand
dismissal for their appeal be set aside in the that will automatically compel the Court to
interest of justice and equity. Petitioner suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules

Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

BDGE
 asserted that their counsel has no employee in
the name of Ruel de Tomas. However, it was
later on explained that Ruel sometimes visits
their office and who may have accidentally
received the said Resolution of the CA. In
such a case, the same should not be
considered officially served upon them as the
latter was not connected with nor authorized
to perform any act for and in behalf of
counsel. CA denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Tan, Jr. v. Court of A parcel of land situated in Bunawan
,Davao City was in the name of Tan
Appeals Tan, for a consideration executed a deed
of absolute sale over the property in question
in favour of spouses Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed,
the same contracting parties entered into
another agreement whereunder Tan was
given one year within which to
redeem/repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities
and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan
failed to redeem the property until his death.
Tans heirs filed a suit for reformation of
instrument against the Magdangals before the
RTC. The heirs alleged that, while the
contract between Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of
absolute sale, their real intention was to
conclude an equitable mortgage.
RTC rendered a decision reforming the
Deed of Absolute Sale into an equitable
mortgage, in accordance with the true
intention of the parties. And ordered the heirs
to pay the Magdangals the repurchase price
within 120 days after finality of its decision.
The CA Special Division affirmed in toto
the decision of the lower court. Copy of which
was received by both parties on October 5,
1995.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of Court
(CA) entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment its Decision and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on
its face, stated that the said Decision has on
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Whether or Not the heirs can redeem the
property
date of its entry. The record shall contain the
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
Yes
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to
the case at bar, the rule that governs finality
of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final
resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the
clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The
date when the judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as the
dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or final
resolution has become final and executory.
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where
the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately
executory, the motion for its execution may
only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of
Appeals, its writ of execution shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the
entry of judgment or final resolution and
addressed to any appropriate officer for its
enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for
execution pending appeal is filed in the Court
of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of
the original record or the record on appeal,
the resolution granting such motion shall be
transmitted to the lower court from which the
 October 21, 1995 become final and executory
The Magdangals then filed in the lower
court (RTC) a Motion for Consolidation and
Writ of Possession. They alleged that the 120-
day period of redemption of the heirs has
expired. They reckoned that the said period
began 15 days after October 5, 1995, the date
when the finality of the judgment of the trial
court as affirmed by the appellate court
commenced to run.
On the other hand, the heirs filed on
March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the
appellate court praying that it direct the court
a quo to issue the corresponding writ of
execution. On April 17, 1996, the heirs
deposited with the clerk of court the
repurchase price of the lot plus interest as
ordered by the decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed
the heirs to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period
should be reckoned from the date of Entry of
Judgment in the appellate court or from
March 13, 1996. The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996.
The Court of Appeals set aside the ruling
of the trial court (allowing the heirs to
redeem).
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
case originated, together with a certified true
copy of the judgment or final order to be
executed, with a directive for such court of
origin to issue the proper writ for its
enforcement.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, amended the rule on
finality of judgment by providing in section 1,
Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final
orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order
that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and
finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or
orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in
the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution.
It is evident that if we apply the old rule
on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed
the subject property within the 120-day
period of redemption reckoned from the
appellate courts entry of judgment. The
appellate court, however, did not apply the
old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule
retroactively and the Supreme Court hold that
given the facts of the case at bar this is an
error.
There is no dispute that rules of
procedure can be given retroactive effect. This
general rule, however, has well-delineated
exceptions.
The rule does not apply where the
statute itself expressly or by necessary
implication provides that pending actions are
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

Bank of the Philippine 1. First Union Group Enterprises (First
Union) borrowed from BPI P5,000,000.00
Islands v. Court of and USD123,218.32, evidenced by separate
Appeals promissory notes.
2. As partial security for the loan obligations
of First Union, defendant Linda and her
spouse Eddy Tien executed a Real Estate
Mortgage Agreement covering 2 substantially complied with the rule requiring
condominium units. Linda executed a
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Whether or not BPI violated Rule 7, Sec. 5 of
Rules on Civil Procedure
(failure to attach to the complaint the
necessary board resolution to institute
collection case)
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
excepted from its operation, or where to apply
it to pending proceedings would impair vested
rights. Under appropriate circumstances,
courts may deny the retroactive application of
procedural laws in the event that to do so
would not be feasible or would work injustice.
Nor may procedural laws be applied
retroactively to pending actions if to do so
would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the
courts.
The Supreme Court hold that section 1,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive
effect in this case as it would result in great
injustice to the heirs.
Undoubtedly, the heirs have the right to
redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right.
The heirs followed the procedural rule
then existing as well as the decisions of this
Court governing the reckoning date of the
period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot.
Unfortunately for the heirs, the rule was
changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively
would result in his losing the right to redeem
the subject lot.
It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the
rule of fairness.
The heirs cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when they made the redemption.
YES.
BPI filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC. It contended that in Shipside v.
Court of Appeals (February 20, 2001, G.R.
No. 143377, 352 SCRA 334), the SC excused
Shipsides belated submission of its
Secretarys Certificate and held that it
the submission of a verification and certificate
 Comprehensive Surety Agreement where she
agreed to be solidarily liable with First Union
for its obligations to BPI.
3. Despite repeated demands upon maturity,
First Union failed to pay BPI the amounts
due.
4. On October 16, 2000, BPI initiated extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings against the
two (2) mortgaged condominium units to
satisfy First Union and Lindas solidary
obligations. After due notice and publication,
the properties were sold at public auction on
June 29, 2001 BPI was the highest bidder.
5. After so applying the proceeds, First Union
still owed BPI a balance P4,742,949.32,
inclusive of interests and penalty charges.
Additionally, First Unions foreign currency
loan obligation remained unpaid.
6. First Unions and Lindas continued failure
to settle their outstanding obligations
prompted BPI to file, on January 3, 2002, a
complaint for collection of sum of money with
the RTC of Makati City. The complaints
verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping were signed by Ma. Cristina F. Asis
(Asis) and Kristine L. Ong (Ong). However,
no Secretarys Certificate or Board Resolution
was attached to evidence Asis and Ongs
authority to file the complaint.
7. Instead of submitting a board resolution,
BPI attached a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) executed by Zosimo A. Kabigting
(Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI. The SPA
authorized Asis and Ong or any lawyer from
the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo and Burkley
Law Offices to initiate any legal action against
First Union and Linda.
8. First Union and Linda filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that BPI violated Rule
7, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
of non-forum shopping as it did, in fact, make
a submission.
In the present case, the SC did not see a
situation comparable to the cited Shipside.
BPI did not submit any proof of authority in
the first instance because it did not believe
that a board resolution evidencing such
authority was necessary. Instead of
immediately submitting an appropriate board
resolution after the First Union and Linda
filed their motion to dismiss BPI argued
that it was not required to submit one.
In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition
a special power of attorney issued by Mr.
Kabigting, a bank vice-president, granting
Asis and Ong the authority to file the
complaint. Thus, no direct authority to file a
complaint was initially ever given by BPI
the corporate entity in whose name and behalf
the complaint was filed.
The SC held that the dismissal of the case is
appropriate without prejudice to its refiling as
the Rules allow.
It bears mention that under the Corporation
Code, the corporate powers of all
corporations xxx shall be exercised, all
business conducted and all property of such
corporations controlled and held by the board
of directors xxx (Section 23). No corporate
officer can just execute an SPA to delegate
corporate authority.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 (Rules); BPI failed to attach to the complaint
the necessary board resolution authorizing
Asis and Ong to institute the collection action
against First Union and Linda.
RTC affirmed First Union and Linda's Motion
to Dismiss, CA affirmed
CMTC International Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair
Competition and/or Copyright Infringement
Marketing Corporation v. and Claim for Damages with Prayer for
Bhagis International Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against respondent
Trading Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint.
After receiving a copy of the trial courts
Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice
of Appeal before the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) on March 4, 2005.
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice
to File the Appellants Brief on May 20, 2005,
which was received by the law office
representing petitioner on May 30, 2005
(Rule 44 Sec.7 of 97RCP within 45 days 7
copies of appellants brief)
However, despite said notice, petitioner
failed to file its appellants brief timely.
Hence, on August 19, 2005, the appellate
court issued a Resolution dismissing the
appeal filed by petitioner. Upon receipt of the
order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellants Brief,9 which was filed forty-two
(42) days late from the date of its expiration
on July 15, 2005.
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court
denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellants Brief.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Issue: to be resolved is the propriety of the
dismissal of petitioners appeal for its failure
to file the appellants brief within the
reglementary period Not proper.
this Court has emphasized that procedural
rules should be treated with utmost respect
and due regard, since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. From time to time,
however, we have recognized exceptions to
the Rules, but only for the most compelling
reasons where stubborn obedience to the
Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends
of justice.
In Obut v. Court of Appeals, this Court
reiterated that it cannot look with favor on a
course of action which would place the
administration of justice in a straightjacket,
for then the result would be a poor kind of
justice if there would be justice at all. Verily,
judicial orders are issued to be obeyed,
nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt
with as the circumstances attending the case
may warrant. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant if to
be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint of defense rather
than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
where strong considerations of substantive
justice are manifest in the petition, the strict
application of the rules of procedure may be
relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

Madrian v. Madrian "1. Felipe Madrian ( petitioner) and Frnacisca
Madrian (respondent) were married on July 7
1993 in Paranaque City. They had three sons
and daughters.
2. Petitioner Felipe left their conjugal abode
and took his three sons with him to Albay and
subsequently to Laguna
3. Respondent Francisca filed a petitions for
habeas corpus of her three sons in the CA
alleging that her husbands act of leaving the
home and going to Albay and then laguna
disrupted the education of their children and
deprived them of their mothers care. She
prayed that her husband be ordered to appear
and produce their sons before the court and
explain why they should not be returned to
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
When petitioner filed its motion attaching
therewith its appellants brief, there was a
clear intention on the part of petitioner not to
abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were
it not for its counsels act of inadvertently
misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another
file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its
appellants brief as its counsel had already
prepared the same even way before the
receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
It bears stressing at this point then that the
rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
binds the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or
property, or where the interest of justice so
requires. In rendering justice, procedural
infirmities take a backseat against substantive
rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict
application of the rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, this
Court is not without power to exercise its
judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
procedure.
it must be stressed that petitioner had no
participatory negligence in the dismissal of its
appeal. Hence, the ensuing dismissal of its
appeal was completely attributable to the
gross negligence of its counsel.
WON the CA has jurisidiction over HABEAS
CORPUS proceedings where minors are
involved or not YES.
Citing Thornton v. Thornton:
"The CA should take cognizance of the case
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked it jurisdiction to issue writs of HC
involving the custody of minors.xxx We rule
therefore that RA 8369 DID NOT divest the
CA and the SC of their jurisdiction over HC
cases involving the custody of minors."
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest
intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and
the SC. It cannot be said that the provision fo
ra8369 are absolutely incompatible with
previous laws since RA 8369 does not
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 her custody.
4. September 17, 2002: HEARING. Could not
agree so Felipe filed a memorandum alleging
that respondent Fransisca was unfit to take
care of the children ( habituallly drunk, went
home late at night etc. He also questioned the
jurisdiction fo the CA claiming that under RA
8359 or the FAMILY COURTS ACT OF 1997)
family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide th petition for
HABEAS CORPUS filed by his wife.
5. October 21, 2002: CA asserted its
authority to take cognizance of the petition
and ruled that under article 213 of the family
code, the respondent (wife) was entitled to
the custody of her children.
6. Petitioner ( husband) moved for
reconsideration, was denied hence the case
was elevated to the SC."
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing such
writs. The provisions of RA 8369 must be
read in harmony with RA 7029 ( Act
expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP
129 ( Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
FAMILY COURTS HAVE CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION WITH THE CA AND THE SC
IN PETITIONS FOR HC WHERE THE
CUSTODY OF MINORS IS AT ISSUE
If family courts were given exclusive
jurisdiction over HC cases, this will result in
an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like the respondent without legal recourse in
obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts
of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from
family courts whose writs are enforceable only
in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one
place to another, which seems to be the case
here, the petitioner in a HC case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention f the
lawmakers when they passed RA 8369.
ADDITIONALLY, a careful reading of RA
8369 shows that family court have exclusive
original jurisdiction only over CUSTOY
CASES and NOT HC cases. Writs of HC which
may be issued exclusively by family courts
pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
avialed of in conjunction with a petition for
custoy of minors under Rule 99 of the ROC.
THE RULE THEREFORE IS: When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs processes and other
means neessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or office. ONce a
court acquires jurisidction voer the subject
matter of a case, it does so to the xclusion of
all other courts.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 Calleja v. Panday From 1985 up to the filing of the petition,
respondents had been members of the Board
of Directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Inc., but sometime in May 2005, petitioners,
who are among the incorporators and
stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and
with the aid of armed men usurped the
powers which supposedly belonged to the
BoD. The respondents filed a petition with the
RTC Br. 58 for quo warranto with Damages
and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction, Damages and Issuance of TRO
against petitioners.
RTC Br 58 issued an Order transferring the
case to the Naga RTC since an action for quo
warranto should be brought in the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
where the respondent/s reside/s. But Naga
RTC Br 23 refused to receive the case stating
that improper venue is not a ground for
transferring a quo warranto case to another
administrative jurisdiction.
RTC Br 58 proceeded to hear the case and
thereafter issued the assailed Order stating
that those cases which involve intra-corporate
relations are cognizable by the SEC but whose
jurisdiction is now transferred to the specially
designated trial courts, one of which is the
Naga RTC. The Order remanded the case to
Naga RTC.
Petitioners no longer moved for
reconsideration and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to the SC via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45
Subsequently, petitioners also filed an
Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante,
alleging that on January 12, 2006, respondent
Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men,
assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital,
taking away daily hospital collections
estimated at P400,000.00.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
W/N an RTC Branch w/o jurisdiction over a
case has the authority to remand the case to
another co-equal court to cure the defects on
venue and jurisdiction
W/N Admin Circular No. 8-01 which took
effect in March 2001 is applicable to the
present case which was filed on May 16, 2005
warranto against corporations, or against
Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the
transfer of the case to another branch. The
The petition for quo warranto was filed in
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
It is settled principle that Rule 45 governs
appeals from judgments or final orders. The
assailed order is only an interlocutory order.
But the SC gave due course to prevent greater
vileonce resulting from the unresolved issues.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799,
Section 1, Rule 66 is limited to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public
office, position or franchise; public officers
who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being
legally incorporated || while [a]ctions of quo
persons who usurp an office in a corporation,
fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and are governed
by its rules. However, R.A. No. 8799
permitted the SC to designate special
commercial courts which would be
responsible in hearing and deciding cases
which were previously cognizable by the SEC.
Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-
03-SC which designated RTC Br. 23 (Naga) as
a special commercial court.
Hence, Br. 23 has the ole jurisdiction to hear
this case; RTC-Br. 58 did not have the
requisite authority or power to order the
only action that RTC-Br. 58 could do was to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
2005. Respondents should have filed their
petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC having been in effect for four years and
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect
for almost two years by the time respondents
filed their petition, there is no cogent reason
why respondents were not aware of the
appropriate court where their petition should
be filed.
Petition is granted, the assailed order is set

Home Guaranty NHA and R-II Builders entered into a JVA
for the conversion of the Smokey Mountain
Corporation v. R-II Dumpsite into a habitable housing project.
Builders, Inc To back the project, the parties along with
HGC (guarantor of PNB) and PNB (trustee),
created an Asset Pool wherein participation
certificates were issued. The certificates
should be redeemed at maturity by PNB or, in
case of call on its guaranty, by HGC.
Subsequently, PNB was replaced by Planters
Development Bank (PDB) as trustee. On
maturity date, the certificates remained
unredeemed because of lack of liquid assets.
This prompted PDB to make a call on HGCs
guaranty and to execute in the latters favor a
Deed of Assignment and Conveyance(DAC) of
the entire Asset Pool.
R-II Builders filed a complaint (original
complaint) against HGC and NHA with
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC, a Special
Commercial Court. It asked the Court 1) to
rescind the DAC because PDB exceed its
authority in executing the same or 2) to be
appointed as new trustee in the event of the
resolution of the DAC, among others.
HGC filed its answer to the complaint. R-II
Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint which
deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC
initially asked for in the original complaint. In
lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes
of action for the conveyance of title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool.
Branch 24 issued a classificatory order that
R-II Builders complaint was an ordinary civil
action not an intra-corporate controversy.
Hence, it claimed that it did not have the
authority to hear the case. As a consequence,
the case was re-raffled to Branch 22 of the
Manila RTC.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
1. WON Branch 24 erred in ordering the
transfer of the case to Branch 22.
2. WON Branch 22 had jurisdiction over the
case despite non-payment of docket fees.
3. WON jurisdiction can be conferred by an
amendment.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
aside and the original petition is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
1. YES. Branch 24 is a Special Commercial
Court tasked to try and hear intra-corporate
controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil
actions. When the case was assigned to
Branch 24, it was classified as an intra-
corporate case. However, Branch 24 arrived at
the conclusion that there was no intra-
corporate controversy. Thus, the Court should
have declared that it did not have the
authority to hear the case it being an ordinary
civil action and should have ordered its
dismissal.
2. NO. Branch 22 did not acquire jurisdiction
because of R-II Builders failure to pay the
correct docket fees for its original complaint
or, for that matter, its Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. In the landmark
case of Manchester Development Corporation
v. CA, the rule is that a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
The rule, however, is not without exceptions.
A reading of the guidelines in Sun Insurance
shows us that the court may allow the
payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period.
The importance of filing fees cannot be
overemphasised for they are intended to take
care of court expenses in the handling of
cases. The general rule is that a court acquires
jurisdiction over the case upon filing of the
complaint and payment of the docket fees.
However, the court has ruled in many cases
that payment of the docket fees may be made
within a reasonable time. Such rulings were
premised on the willingness of the party to
pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of
intention to evade payment. This cannot be
said of R-II Builders which not only failed to
pay the correct docket fees for its original
complaint and Amended and Supplemental
 Having determined that the case is a real Complaint but also clearly evaded payment by
action, Branch 22 admitted the Amended and filing the Second Amended Complaint.
Supplemental Complaint subject to R-II
Builders payment of the correct and 3. NO. It is a policy in this jurisdiction that
appropriate docket fees. However, R-II amendments to pleadings are favored and
Builders filed a motion to admit its Second liberally allowed in the interest of justice.
Amended Complaint on the ground that its However, an amendment is not allowed where
previous Amended and Supplemental the court has no jurisdiction over the original
Complaint had not yet been admitted in view complaint and the purpose of the amendment
of the correct docket fees thereof. Such is to confer jurisdiction.
Second Amended Complaint resurrected the
cause of action for resolution of the DAC.

HGC filed its opposition to the admission of

the Second Amended Complaint on the
ground that the Branch 22 had no jurisdiction
to act on the case until payment of the correct
docket fees and that the pleading was merely
intended for delay and it was inconsistent
with its previous pleadings. HGC moved to
have the case dismissed since R-II Builders
defied Branch 22s order by refusing to pay
the docket fees.

Finding that jurisdiction over the case was

already acquired upon payment of the docket
fees for the original complaint and that the
Second Amended Complaint was neither
intended for delay nor inconsistent with R-II
Builders previous pleadings, Branch 22
denied HGCs motion to dismiss and granted
R-II Builders motion to admit the Second
Amended Complaint. HGC moved for
reconsideration but was denied.
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. filed a complaint WON RTC is correct in dismissing the Petition is meritorious
for sum of money under the Rules of petition Sec. 23 Decision (Small Claims
Mondejar Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the Procedure) After the hearing, the court shall
MTCC to collect from respondent the amount render descision x x x The decision shall be
of 23,111.71 PHP, representing unpaid water final and unappealable.
bills from June 1, 2002 to September 30, Although it is unappealable, and since
2005. appeal is not an available remedy, it does not
According to their agreed rates, preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
respondent is to pay 113 PHP for ever 10 cu. petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
m. of water plus 11.60 PHP for every the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
additional cu. m. The bill amounted to always available where there is no appeal or
28,580.09 PHP while respondent only paid any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy

Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

BDGE
 5,468.38 PHP.
According to petitioner, their agreement
was only for a flat rate of 75 PHP per month
and the same could only be adjusted upon
prior notice to homeowners. Hence, he claims
that petitioner unilaterally adjusted the fees.
MTCC Ruling: Since petitioner only
obtained a Certificate of Public Convenience
on August 7, 2003, it can only charge the 75
PHP rate prior thereto. Hence, respondent is
deemed fully paid already. Moreover,
petitioner failed to submit evidence showing
(a) the exact date when it actually began
imposing the new rates; and (b) the formal
agreement between the parties.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
RTC Ruling: The RTC dismissed the
petition for Certiorari on the ground that it
was only done to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of small claims cases (Sec.
23 Rules of Procedure on Small Claims). It
was dismissed on the ground of improper
remedy. MR was subsequently denied.
Tomawis v. Balindong Private Respondent Amna Pumbaya, Jalilah
Mangompia and Ramla Musor are the
daughters of the late Arcam Radia and they
filed with the Sharia District Court (SDC) an
action for quieting of title of a parcel of land
located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against
petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and
Mangoda Radia.
Tomawis debunked the sisters claim by
raising that the SDC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. Pursuant to BP
129 only the regular courts have exclusive
jurisdiction.
Judge Rasad Balindong denied petitioners
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
in the ordinary course of law.
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an
appeal, is an original action designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of
judgment. Hence, petitioner must prove and
establish jurisdictional errors that tainted the
MTCC decision. The RTC in turn could either
dismiss or grant the petition on the basis of
GAD.
MAIN TOPIC: The petitioner filed the
petition before the proper forum. The Court,
the CA, and the RTC have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such
concurrence of jurisdiction, does not give a
party unbridled freedom to choose the venue
of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. Instead, issuance of
writs of certiorari against first level courts
should be filed with the RTC, and those of the
RTC to the CA, before resort may be had to
this Court.
Hence, in this case, since the case falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first
level courts (MTC, MTCC, etc.), the petition
for certiorari must be filed with the RTC. Case
remanded to the RTC to resolve the issues.
Sec. 23 Decision (Small Claims Procedure)
After the hearing, the court shall render
descision x x x The decision shall be final
and unappealable.
W/N SDC can validly take cognizance of the SDC has jurisdiction over the case. PD 1083
case. created the Shari-a courts ie the SDC and the
Sharia circuit court, both of limited
jurisdiction. In republic v. Asuncion, the court
citing administrative code 1987, classified the
sharia courts as regular courts, meaning
they are part of the judicial department.
Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain
cases, with exclusive jurisdiction and with
concurrent original jurisdiction over certain
causes of action.
As the way things are prior to BP 129, the SDC
had original jurisdiction and concurrently
with RTCs and MTCs over all personal and
real actions outside of the purview of art
143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which parties
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

Villagracia v. Fifth Sharia
District Court
motion. He asserted that SDC has jurisdiction
is concurrent with the RTC by force of Art.
143, par 2(b) of PD 1083.
June 16, 2005 Tomawis filed an urgent
motion to dismiss with prayer to correct the
name of the defendants to read Sultan Yahya
Jerry Tomawis & Mangoda Radia. He
alleged that the regular courts had exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter
DENIED.
September 6, 2005, Tomawis interposed an
Urgent motion for reconsideration with
prayer to cancel and reset the continuation of
trial until after the resolution of the pending
incident DENIED.
Tomawis repaied to the CA Mindanao Station,
on a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition under rule 65 to nullify, on
jurisdictional grounds, the previous SDC
resolutions (two above) (Feb 8, 2006)
DISMISSED because CA was not empowered
to resolve decisions orders or final
judgements of the SDCs. The final decisions
of the SDC are reviewable by the yet to be
established Sharia Apellate Court, the CA
ruled that such intermediate appellate
jurisdiction rests with the SC.
Jan. 28, 2008, Tomawis filed before the SDC
another motion to dismiss on the same
grounds as his previous one DENIED.
Mala purchased a parcel of land and a
TCT was issued in his name. At the time of
purchase, Villagracia occupied the lot.
Mala filed an action to recover
possession of the parcel of land w/ 5th Sharia
District Court (SDC). He alleged that he is a
Muslim, registered owner of the lot, and
prayed that be Villagracia be ordered to
original jurisdiction of the MTC or RTC.
W/N SDC has jurisdiction over a real
action where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
W/N SDC may validly decide a real
action where one of the parties is a non-
Muslim if it applied the Civil Code
W/N SDC may validly decide a real
action filed by a Muslim against a non-
involved are Muslims, except those of
ejectment.
Judging from the averments in this case, it is
basically a suit for recovery of possession and
eventual reconveyance of real property which,
under BP 129, as amended, falls within the
A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows
that Sharia courts were not included in the
reorganization of courts that were fore merely
organized under RA 296. BP 129 was enacted
to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a
law of general application to the judiciary. In
contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only
applies to sharia courts.
A general law and a special law on the same
subject are statutes in pari materia and should
be read together and harmonized, if possible,
with a view to giving effect to both. Also, a
general law does not nullify a special law. The
general law will yield to the special law in the
specific and particular subject embraced in
the latter.
Also, it is noted that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is determined from
the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
While we recognize the concurrent
jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with
respect to cases involving only Muslims, the
SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over
all actions arising from contracts customarily
to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as
the exception under PD 1083, while both
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction
over all other personal actions.
NO. The
law conferring the jurisdiction of SDC is the
Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, SDC have concurrent original

Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

BDGE
 vacate his property.
Villagracia failed to file his answer
despite service of summons and Mala
presented evidence ex parte.
SDC ruled in favor of Mala, ordered
Villagracia to vacate the property, and issued
the notice of writ of execution.
Villagracia filed a petition for relief from
judgment w/ prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. He argued that SDC
had no jurisdiction since he is a Christian and
they may only hear proceedings if both parties
are Muslims, hence all proceedings and
decision are void.
SDC ruled that Villagracia waived his
right to defend himself and only went to court
only when he lost his right to assail the
decision via certiorari, that it had jurisdiction,
and his rights were not prejudiced since it
applied the Civil Code.
Republic v. Bantigue Bantigue Point Development Corporation
filed with the RTC of Batangas an application
Point Development for original registration over a parcel of land.
Corporation RTC issued an Order setting the case for
initial hearing. Petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration
while the records were still with the RTC. The
RTC clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio
the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan because the assessed value of the
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Muslim if the latter was served w/ summons
1. WON the Republic is estopped from raising
the issue of jurisdiction.
2. WON the MTC properly
jurisdiction over the case.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
jurisdiction with existing civil courts over
real actions not arising from customary
contracts wherein the parties involved are
Muslims. This concurrent jurisdiction is
applicable only when both are Muslims, if not,
action must be filed w/ the regular courts.
Since Villagracia is a Christian, SDC should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action based on the
pleadings or the evidence on record, the court
shall dismiss the claim; otherwise, all
proceedings are void.
NO. SDC necessarily applied the Civil
Code since the claim is a real action not
arising form contracts customary to Muslims,
hence no reason to apply Muslim Law.
However, since SDC had no jurisdiction,
proceedings remain void, regardless of the
fact that it applied the Civil Code.
NO. An action to recover title of a parcel
of land is an action in personam for it binds a
particular individual although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing. For such actions, the
defendant must have been duly served w/
summons to be considered impleaded.
Villagracia was served summons to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. However, since
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, w/ Villagracia being a
Christian, all the proceedings, including the
service of summons, are void.
1. No. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings.
acquired Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
The CA in its decision cited the case of Tijam,
wherein the party-litigant actively
 property was allegedly less than P100,000.
MTC eneted an Order of General Default and
commented with the reception of evidence.
After Bantigue presented its evidence, the
MTC awarded the land to respondent
corporation. Acting on appeal filed by the
Republic, the CA ruled that since the former
actively participated in the proceedings before
the lower court, but failed to raise the
jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court on appeal. Dissatisfied with
the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this
instant Rule 45 Petition.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
participated in the proceedings before the
lower and filed pleadings therein. Only 15
years after receiving an adverse Decision on
the merits from the appellate court did the
party-litigant questioned the lower courts
jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts of
the case, the Court in that case held that
estoppel by laches had already precluded the
party-litigant from raising the question of lack
of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v.
People, the Court cautioned that Tijam must
be construed as an exception to the general
rule and applied only in the most exceptional
cases whose factual milieu is similar to that
case.
In this case, petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration
when the records were still with the RTC. At
that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the
MTC, simply because the case was not yet
with that court. When the records were
transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither
filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief
from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question
in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine
of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the
instant appeal. Petitioner Republic has not
displayed such reasonable failure or neglect
that would lead the Court to conclude that is
has abandoned or declined to assert its right
to question the lower courts jurisdiction.
2. Yes. While the date set by the RTC was
beyond the 90-day period provided in Sec. 23
of the Property Registration Decree, this fact
did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The lapse of time between the issuance
of the Order setting the date of initial hearing
and the date of the initial hearing itself was
not fatal to the application. It would be the
height of injustice to penalize respondent
Corporation by dismissing its application for
registration on account of events beyond its
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

Dela Cruz v. Moya Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) received a
mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi,
Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of
verifying and apprehending persons who were
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
WON the civil courts have jurisdiction over
the subject matter on the criminal case filed
against Dela Cruz.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
control. Moreover, RTCs failure to issue the
Order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing within 5 days from the filing of the
application for registration, as provided in the
Property Registration Decree, did not affect
the courts jurisdiction. Observance of the 5-
day period was merely directory, and failure
to issue the Order within that period did not
deprive the RTC of itsjurisdiction over the
case.
With regard to petitioners second contention,
the value of the land should not be
determined with reference to its selling price.
Rather, Sec. 34 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act provides that the value of
the property sought to be registered may be
ascertained in 3 ways:
1. By the affidavit of the claimnant
2. By agreement of the respective claimants, if
there are more than one
3. From the corresponding tax declaration of
the real property
In this case, the value of the property cannot
be determined using the first method, because
the records are bereft of any affidavit executed
by respondent as to the value of the property.
Likewise, valuation cannot be done through
the second method, because this method finds
application only where there are multiple
claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property.
Here, only respondent Corporation claims the
property. Therefore, the value of the property
must be ascertained with reference to the
corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by
respondent Corporation.
From the records, the total assessed value of
the entire property is P14,920.
No. The infomation was filed on August 2,
1979. On Such date, by virute of General
Order No. 59, military tribunals created under
General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
 allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. Dela
Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, DAvao
and caught in flagrante the operators of said
illegal cockfigting, but said operators resisted
arrest. The soldiers left the place but they
brought with them to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). The operators of the
illegal cockfights followed the soldiers on
their way back to the PC Headquaters,
cayching up with them on the Tagum-Mati
National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the
scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. Dela Cruz was
charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance in DAvao, in an information filed by
the Provincial Fiscal.
While the case was pending trial, PD Nos.
1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the
President vesting in courts-martial
jurisdiction over crimes committed by
members of the AFP or of the PC in
performance of their duties. Claiming that the
crime for which he was charged was
committed in relation to the performance of
his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of
First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer
the case to the military authorities so he could
be tried by court martial. The motion was
denied. Hence, the present petition.
Boleyley v. Villanueva Petitioner filed with the RTC of Baguio
City, a complaint against private respondent
for collection of a sum of money
Private respondent filed with the RTC a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that petitioner did not comply with
the Revised Katarungan Pambarangay Law
requiring as a condition for the filing of a
complaint in court referral of the matter to
the barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat,
for conciliation or settlement.
Petitioner filed an opposition to motion
to dismiss on the ground that private
respondent was not a resident of Baguio City
so that the dispute involving the parties was
not within the authority of the lupon to bring
together for conciliation or settlement.
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
Whether or not the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
complaint for insufficiency of cause of action
or pre-maturity
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
military personnel of the AFP while in the
performance of their official duty or which
arose out of any act or omission done in the
performance of their official duty. Given that
there was no amendatory law was ever
published in the Official Gazette between the
time GO No.59 was published until the
infromation in the criminal case against Dela
Cruz was filed, then said GO No. 59 remained
in force on said date. In this case, it is not
disputed that at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense, Dela Cruz was a member
of the PC, and that the shooting of the
deceased Cabilto ws committed while Dela
Cruz was executing the Mission Order. In
addition even though there was no certificate
issued by the Secretary of National Defense
was presented in court, the record contains a
copy of Mission Order No.7 signed by a
certain Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela
Cruz, to proceed to Brgy. Pangi, Maco, Sto.
Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend
persons reportdely engaged in illegal
cockfighting. These undisputed facts
compelled the Court to declare that
respondent court was without jurisdiction to
try the case against Dela Cruz.
The petition is given due course
It is a basic rule of procedure that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be
made to depend upon the defense set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
Based from the complaint of the
petitioner, it is clearly implied that the parties
do not reside in the same city or municipality,
and hence, the dispute is exempted from the
 RTC issued an order dismissing the case
for being premature, for not having been
referred to the barangay lupon.
On his motion for reconsideration with
the RTC, petitioner argued that private
respondent could not invoke the Katarungan
Pambarangay Law because he was not a
resident of Baguio City.
RTC, however, resolved to deny the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,
notice of which denial was received by
petitioner.
Mendoza v. Germino 1. Petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza
(plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the MTC of
Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent
Narciso Germino for forcible entry. They
alleged that sometime in 1988, respondent
Narciso unlawfully entered the subject
property without their knowledge or consent.
Despite the plaintiffs repeated demands,
respondent Narciso refused to vacate the
subject property.
2. On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso
filed his answer, claiming that his brother,
respondent Benigno Germino, was the
plaintiffs agricultural lessee and he merely
helped the his brother in the cultivation as a
member of the immediate farm household.
3. After several postponements, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand the case to the
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
venue, which is petitioner's choice of either
Whether the MTC or the DARAB has
jurisdiction over the case.
determine whether it had jurisdiction to
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
requirement of referral to the barangay lupon
or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior
to filing with the court.
It is true that petitioners complaint
should have alleged respondents place of
actual residence, not his postal office address.
The allegation of respondent's actual
residence would have been ideal to determine
his place of residence or that of the
respondent.
In procedural law, however, specifically
for purposes of venue it has been held that the
residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
The venue of the action is not affected by
the filing of defendants (respondents)
motion to dismiss stating that he also resided
in Baguio City. That is not decisive to
determine the proper venue.
MTC has jurisdiction. It is a basic rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Based on these allegations and
reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the
MTC was for forcible entry.
Although respondent Narciso averred
tenancy as an affirmative and/or special
defense in his answer, this did not
automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction
over the complaint. It continued to have the
authority to hear the case precisely to
dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits.
After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by the defendant
in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication the defendant.
Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue
raised by respondent Narciso.

In the present case, instead of conducting a

preliminary conference, the MTC immediately
referred the case to the DARAB. This was
4. Without conducting a hearing, and despite
contrary to the rules.
respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC
issued an order remanding the case to the
DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further
proceedings.
Neither did the amendment of the complaint
confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. The
plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint
5. On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed
that the subject property was previously tilled
an amended complaint with the Provincial
by Efren Bernardo, and the respondents took
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),
possession by strategy and stealth, without
impleading respondent Benigno as additional
their knowledge and consent. In the absence
defendant.
of any allegation of a tenancy relationship
between the parties, the action was for
recovery of possession of real property that
6. The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo
was within the jurisdiction of the regular
was the agricultural lessee of the subject
courts.
property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully
entered the subject property in 1982 or 1983.
He withheld possession of the subject
property up to 1987, and appropriated for
himself its produce, despite repeated
demands from the plaintiffs for the return of
the property. In 1987, they discovered that
respondent Benigno had transferred
possession of the subject property to
respondent Narciso, who refused to return the
possession of the subject property to the
plaintiffs and appropriated the lands produce
for himself.

7. In a March 19, 1996 decision, PARAD

Romeo Bello found that the respondents were
mere usurpers of the subject property, noting
that they failed to prove that respondent
Benigno was the plaintiffs bona fide
agricultural lessee. The DARAB affirmed this
ruling.

Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1

BDGE
 8. The Court of Appeals found that the MTC
erred in transferring the case to the DARAB
since the material allegations of the complaint
and the relief sought show a case for forcible
entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that
the subsequent filing of the amended
complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon
the DARAB. Thus, the CA set aside the
DARAB decision and remanded the case to
the MTC for further proceedings.
The petitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies
with the DARAB since the nature of the action
and the allegations of the complaint show an
agrarian dispute.
Sante v. Hon. Claravall On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before
the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for
damages against petitioners. Respondent
alleged that while she was inside the Police
Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, petitioner
Irene Sante uttered words, "How many
rounds of sex did you have last night with
your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!" Bert refers
to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and
one (1) of her hired personal security guards
detained at the said station and who is a
suspect in the killing of petitioners close
relative. Petitioners also allegedly went
around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people
that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus,
respondent prayed that petitioners be held
liable to pay moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees;
P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of
suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that it was the (MTCC) and not the
RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the
case. They argued that the amount of the
claim for moral damages was not more than
the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00,
because the claim for exemplary damages
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the
case? and
2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the amendment of the
complaint?
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
(Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued
declaring that the first adjustment in
jurisdictional amount of first level courts
outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to
P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999.
Meanwhile, the second adjustment from
P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became
effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance
with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the
Office of the Court Administrator on May 13,
2004.
Based on the foregoing, there is no question
that at the time of the filing of the complaint
on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional
amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.)
Yes. In this regard, Administrative Circular
No. 09-94 is instructive: x x x x 2. The
exclusion of the term damages of whatever
kind in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33
(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
 should be excluded in computing the total
claim.
On June 24, 2004, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. Aggrieved, petitioners filed
on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, before the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and
her husband filed an Amended Complaint
increasing the claim for moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad
Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial
court denied their motion in an Order dated
September 17, 2004.
Petitioners again filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, claiming that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of the complaint to
increase the amount of moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
The Court of Appeals held that the case
clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the
MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff
was seeking to recover moral damages in the
amount of P300,000.00, which amount was
well within the jurisdictional amount of the
MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the
totality of claim rule used for determining
which court had jurisdiction could not be
applied to the instant case because plaintiffs
claim for exemplary damages was not a
separate and distinct cause of action from her
claim of moral damages, but merely
incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for
exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total amount of the claim.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals,
rendered a decision affirming the September
17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying
petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam.
In the said decision, the appellate court held
that the total or aggregate amount demanded
in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find
merit in petitioners posture that the claims
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondents main action is for damages.
Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or
consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint.
No. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred
by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondents main action is for damages.
Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or
consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 for exemplary damages and attorneys fees are
merely incidental to the main cause and
should not be included in the computation of
the total claim.
The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that
respondent can amend her complaint by
increasing the amount of moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the
ground that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the original complaint and respondent is
entitled to amend her complaint as a matter
of right under the Rules.
Julao v. Sps. de Jesus 1. In the 1960's Telesforo Juliao filed before
the DENR two tonsite applications. Upon his
death, his applications were transferred to his
heirs.
2. April 30,1979: Solito Julao executed a deed
of transfer of rights transferring his
hereditary share in the property covered by
TSA v-6667 to the respondent spouses
Alejandro and Morenita de Jesus.
3. 1983; Respondent Spouses constructed a
house on the property they acquired from
Solito. Not long after, Solito went missing.
4. March 15, 1996: DENR issued an order
REJECTING one of the TSA applications
originally filed by Telesforo. The rejected
application was TSA v-6667, the application
from which the spouses derived their rights to
the property.
5. March 2, 199: Petitioners Anida Sonia and
Roderick representing themselves as heirs of
Telesforo filed a complaint before the RTC of
Baguio for recovery of possession of real
property. They alleged that they are the true
and lawful owners of a parcel of land located
in Baguio and that the respondent spouses'
house encroached on 70 sqm of the subject
property. Respondent Spouses filed for a
motion to dismiss. RTC ruled in favor of the
heirs. Spouses were aggrieved and raised the
issue to the CA.
6. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC on the
grounds that
a. There was failure on the part of the
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
1. WON petitioners failed to prove the identity
of the property in question
2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case
1. YES, PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE
IDENTITY OF THE PROPERTY.
Art 434 of the CC states that in an action to
recover, the property must be identified.
The plaintiff is duty bound to clearly identify
the land sought to be recovered in
acocordance with the title on which he
nachors is right of ownership
In this case, the Ps failed to identify the
property. They failed to describe the location,
the area, as well as the boundaries thereof.
There was even no survey plan.
( SECOND ISSUE IS MORE IMPORTANT
FOR CIV PRO)
2. NO. RTC DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint which containts the concise
statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiff's
cause of action.
Section 19(2) of BP 129 provides the grounds
as to when the RTC may have jurisdiction
over a case.
" In all civil actions which involve the title to
or possession of real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds 20,000.00 or for
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1
 petitioners to identify the property sught to be
revocered
b. lack of jurisdiction
7. The CA noted that the petitioners failed to
pinpoint the exact property that was of
controversy. They further pointed out that the
complaint failed to show that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the cae as petitioners failed
to allege the assessed valueo of the subject
property.
8. Petitioners were aggrieved and elevated the
matter to the SC.
Tumpag vs. Tumpag
Bustos v. Lucero-Tumpag v. Tumpag
BDGE
civil actions in Metro Manila where such
values exceeds 50,000.00 xxx original
jurisdiction is conferred upon the MTCs
xxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that an
action for recovery of possession, the assessed
value of the property sought determines the
court's jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise
jurisdiction, the assessed value of the property
must exceed 20,000.00 Since the petitioners
ailed to allege in their complaint the assessed
value of the subject property, the CA correctly
dismissed the complaint as petitioners failed
to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over
it.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of
petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction
was raised by the respondents in their
appellants brief. The fact that it was raised
for the first time on appeal is of no moment.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, defenses
not pleaded in either in a motion to dismiss or
an ansswer are deemed waived except for:
a. lack of jurisdiction,
b.litis pendentia,
c. res judicata and
d. prescription
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings even for the first time on
appeal.
CIV PRO DIGESTS BATCH 1