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J decidi: Vou fazer uma tese com base no Japo. No me posso enganar 2 vezes consecutivas.

Tenho todos os motivos e mais alguns para elaborar uma tese relativa ao Japo. Vou listar aqui os
motivos, pois isto da mais primria importncia para mim. Se eu souber os motivos exatos
pelos quais tenho de escolher a rea do tema, nesse caso conseguirei levar esta dissertao em
frente sem qualquer tipo de hesitao, porque quem sabe o que quer e vai em direco a isso no
olha para trs por no ter ressentimento, e no olha para o lado por no ter hesitao. Ento, os
motivos pelos quais tenho mesmo de escolher uma tese cujo tema principal o Japo so os
seguintes:

(1) Famlia Japonesa - Sou casado com uma Japonesa, vou ter um filho meio Japons, e os meus
fantsticos sogros so ambos Japoneses de gema. (2) Mulher Diplomata - A minha mulher
Japonesa diplomata, inserida no seio do Ministrio dos Negcios Estrangeiros do Japo, sendo
simultaneamente uma grande motivao e uma potencial fonte de informao para mim. Eu at
ando com um carro diplomtico Japons com matrcula CD, o que me ajuda a inserir no meio.
(3) Viver no Japo - possvel que um dia no futuro eu irei para o Japo viver, mesmo que
provavelmente no definitivamente, com um elevado grau de probabilidade eu terei de viver l
durante algum tempo. E mesmo que no viva, no mnimo dos mnimos, as visitas ao Japo sero
uma constante. (4) Adoro Japo - O Japo interessante e fascinante, significando muito mais
para mim do que a China ou os EUA, outros actores regionais naquela parte do globo. China e
EUA so uma banalidade, despertando os interesses de investigao por parte de uma panplia
muito mais alargada de pessoas. O Japo exclusividade, e ao contrrio das outras 2 opes, tem
algo a haver comigo. (5) Japo Antigo - O Japo na minha vida no uma moda nem uma febre
do momento, sim um interesse j com mais de 1 dcada de existncia, ao contrrio de outros
eventuais temas e pases que pudesses surgir por entusiasmo momentneo. (6) Falar Japons -
Tenho no s o plano mas tambm a extrema necessidade de aprender a lngua japonesa, uma
vez que o meu nvel ainda muito inicial. Isto fundamental para mim para falar com a minha
famlia (sogros, mulher e filho/filha), para ter acesso a todo um novo mundo de informaes
acadmicas e de vivncia e explorao, e tambm para fazer figura aos meus amigos que
acreditam todos eles que neste momento eu falo Japons com elevada fluncia. Falar
fluentemente Japons, por todo o tempo que a isso dediquei na minha vida, algo que eu devo a
mim prprio e tem de ser alcanado. (7) Arrependimento Passado - Arrependi-me de no ter
elaborado no seminrio da licenciatura em Geografia o tema da demografia no Japo, que teria
sido muito mais enriquecedor do que o tema da reabilitao urbana numa freguesia de Lisboa.
Devo seguir-me a mim e no ao que os outros minha volta andam a fazer. (8) Tema Pertinente -
A poltica de segurana do Japo em si prpria um tema ainda mais interessante do que a da
China e dos EUA, e ainda por cima posso falar destes 2 casos, uma vez que h sobreposio.
um tema riqussimo e interessantssimo. Atravs do prisma do Japo, eu posso referir os EUA, a
China e a Coreia do Norte em detalhe, posso referir a histria do ps-guerra at actualidade
atravs do Tratado de Cooperao Mtua e Segurana Entre os Estados Unidos e o Japo e a
muito extensa presena de bases militares norte-americanas em territrio Japons, e ainda por
cima apanho as muito actuais alteraes polticas que esto a ocorrer, como so a tentativa de
alterao constitucional do artigo 9, o auto-desembargo Japons ao comrcio de armas, a
situao nas Ilhas Senkaku, a importncia da importao de matrias-primas, a relao com a
nova administrao Trump, entre outros aspectos.

Sugesto de tema, conciliando a componente do Japo com o mestrado em cincia poltica e


relaes internacionais: segurana e defesa: Poltica e estratgia de segurana do Japo.

Na minha tese a China e os EUA que vo andar na rbita do Japo, e no o contrrio. Portanto,
mos obra e toca a trabalhar!!

Estrutura:

Doutrina Fukuda

Nippon Kaigi

Final do embargo auto-imposto exportao de armas

Alterao constitucional do artigo 9

Novas caractersticas da Official Development Assistance

Disputas territoriais com a China no Mar da China Meridional e na Mar da China Oriental

Ameaa dos msseis balsticos da Coreia do Norte

Tratado de Cooperao Mtua e Segurana Entre os Estados Unidos e o Japo

United States Forces Japan


Multilateralismo americano na regio essencial para o equilbrio Tquio-Pequim

Dependncia da importao de recursos naturais

Estratgia do Japo Quase-Nuclear

Trs princpios no nucleares de Eisaku Sato

Fontes Bibliogrficas da Geopoltica sia-Pacfico

East Asia Forum O East Asia Forum uma plataforma de anlise e pesquisa sobre poltica,
economia, negcios, direito, segurana, relaes internacionais e sociedade relevante para a
poltica pblica centrada na regio sia-Pacfico. Consiste em publicaes online e uma revista
trimestral, denominada East Asia Forum Quarterly, que visa fornecer uma anlise clara e original
dos principais analistas da regio.

Esta pgina dirigida pelo Professor Emrito Peter Drysdale da Escola de Polticas Pblicas de
Crawford, da Australian National University

The Diplomat O The Diplomat uma revista internacional de notcias online com sede em
Tquio, que faz a cobertura da poltica, sociedade e cultura na regio sia-Pacfico. Desde seu
lanamento em 2002, o Diplomat tem se dedicado anlise e comentrios sobre eventos
ocorridos em particular na sia. O The Diplomat chega a uma influente audincia de
comentadores, polticos e acadmicos, com o seu aprofundado tratamento de assuntos regionais.

O The Diplomat fornece cobertura especializada sobre:

Tendncias geopolticas em toda a regio da sia

Defesa e intelligence

Ambiente, segurana e desenvolvimento

Arte, tendncias sociais e cultura popular

UM

Japo como um dos principais doadores a nvel mundial - Foreign aid is a key instrument of
international engagement in Japans foreign policy toolkit. Although Tokyo is no longer the
worlds top aid donor that it once was in the 1990s, it still was the worlds number four aid donor
in 2015 with close to a US$10 billion annual budget.1

Japo j utiliza o seu apoio financeiro para o desenvolvimento de actividades que so


notoriamente militares por natureza, por forma a auxiliary os seus interesses
geoestratgicos - In the 1980s, when Japan became an aid superpower, criticisms mounted both
internationally and domestically over the mercantile nature of its aid. Money often flowed into
the private accounts of corrupt political leaders in Asia and into projects that created severe
environmental damage. Japan responded with alacrity, issuing its first ODA charter in 1992 and
revising it again in 2003. A new approach to aid can be read in Japans current Development
Cooperation Charter, released in 2015. Although the new charter maintains some of the key
aspects of the previous charters, such as human security, poverty alleviation, health, and
womens welfare, it has introduced some new and controversial agendas as part of its aid
program. While previous charters clearly kept military or defence-related activity outside the aid
zone, the Abe governments enthusiasm for the proactive contribution to peace concept opened
new possibilities, including the use of the aid budget for non-combat military purposes. Japan
has recently provided surveillance ships to Vietnams coast guard, along with a similar package
to the Philippines. The strategic orientation of such aid packages is clear: both Vietnam and the
Philippines have maritime disputes with China and are worried about Chinas flexing of its
military muscle in the South China Sea. Using its aid budget, Japan now also offers educational
opportunities for military personnel from Southeast Asian nations through Japanese educational
institutions. These mid-career military personnel spend an extended period in designated
Japanese institutions learning history, politics, diplomacy and international relations. The
rationale behind providing education in liberal arts is based on the premise that a good
understanding of history and international relations will make these military personnel appreciate
the benefits of peace and the disastrous consequences of war. Japans renewed focus on
Southeast Asian countries can also be noted through the latest ODA white paper, released in
April 2016. In view of Japans standoff with China in the East China Sea and Beijings relentless
and assertive claims in the South China Sea, Japan actively promotes the notion of freedom of
navigation of sea lanes and aims to develop a network of like-minded nations in the region. To

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japan/
achieve Japans objectives of the rule of law, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace-building
measures, the white paper notes the importance of Southeast Asian nations as partners. Although
building networks of like-minded nations is nothing unusual in Japans postwar foreign policy
history, what is rather remarkable is the use of its aid budget for activities that are broadly
military in nature, even though they are not directly for combat purposes.2

O apoio Japons est cada vez mais vocacionado para a propsperidade do povo Japons,
servindo-se os interesses comerciais das empresas Japonesas - Japans aid money is thus not
just linked to the contribution of global peace but is now increasingly tied to the notion of the
prosperity of the Japanese people. One means of creating prosperity is through linking Japanese
business and contractors to the nations aid projects. Commercial interest has clearly returned to
its original salience in aid policy objectives in response to Japans long-term economic downturn,
while Japanese companies are seeking profitable business opportunities overseas. With Japans
new emphasis on quality infrastructure, quality growth and quality partnership, aid money is
now increasingly linked to Japanese technology, design and construction. Although the details
are not yet in the public arena, the Abe government has made a new commitment to India to
construct a bullet train to run from Indias financial heart, Mumbai, to its commercial and port
city of Ahmedabad, in Prime Minister Narendra Modis home state of Gujarat. This mega
project, initially estimated to cost close to US$15 billion, is to be funded largely through Japans
ODA budget. Large ODA commitments in recent years to countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and
India present significant business opportunities for Japanese companies. Within the top five
recipients of Japans gross aid, these nations account for roughly one-third of the total ODA
budget. As in the early years of Japans aid program, large aid projects offer Japanese companies
an entry to these emerging markets where the prospects for economic growth and market
expansion are immense.3

No entanto, apesar das caractersticas crescentemente militaristas e mercantilistas do apoio


financeiro Japons, continua a haver um foco humanitrio na sua ajuda - While Japan has

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japan/

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japan/
redefined its aid orientation to serve its geostrategic and national interests, largely due to the
changes in the global geostrategic environment in the wake of Chinas rise, Tokyo also remains
strongly committed to the conventional aid philosophy. It still puts significant financial and
human resources into social and humanitarian issues confronting developing societies in Asia,
Africa and elsewhere. To this end, it has wholeheartedly participated in the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals program and proudly boasts of its role in reducing poverty and
improving health standards in developing countries. Tokyo has now also given its full support to
the new UN 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goals, which has much bigger and wider
coverage of global issues than the Millennium Development Goals did.4

Alterao das polticas de ODA: harmonizao da politica de apoio com a recentemente


adoptada estratgia de segurana regional - The usage of aid solely to support economic
development and not for strategic reasons has been the bedrock principle of Japans aid policy
since the country first began providing foreign aid to developing countries in 1954. Japans
Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter unequivocally declared a total prohibition of
any use of ODA for military purpose. But the ODAs replacement, the Development
Cooperation Charter introduced in February 2015, emphasises balancing security and
development. The new aid guidelines have broken a policy taboo under which Japan avoided
providing ODA to foreign armed forces. These changes came at a time when Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe has comprehensively reformulated Japans security policy. Japans new National
Defence Strategy (NDS) was approved by the cabinet at the end of 2013. This marked a serious
transformation of Japans security policy from its previous exclusively defence-oriented
approach (senshu boei) to one that focuses on making a proactive contribution to peace
(sekkyoku teki heiwa shugi). In this context Japans aid policy reform should be understood as a
well-calculated political manoeuvre aimed to harmonise aid policy with the newly adopted
national security strategy.5

Caminho para a nova poltica de apoio: acabar com a restrio da exportao de


equipamento de defesa, e alterar o artigo 9 da constituio Japonesa - First, Abes new

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japan/

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defence strategy paved a path for Japan to participate in the international joint development and
production of defence equipment. On 1 April 2014, Abe overturned the countrys self-imposed
ban on arms exports that had been introduced in 1967 by his great-uncle, former prime minister
Eisaku Sato. Japanese arms makers like Mitsubishi and Kawasaki are cautiously but steadily re-
entering the international military hardware market. Second, Abe has reinterpreted the Article 9
peace clause proclaimed in the Japanese constitution by widening the meaning of self-
defence. On 1 July 2014 the cabinet approved a new interpretation of the constitution that
permitted the exercise of the right of collective self-defence under certain limitations. Despite
widespread protests, the Diet approved the new Legislation for Peace and Security in
September 2015. Japans pacifist party Komeito, a minority partner in the ruling coalition, failed
to prevent the enactment of the new security laws.6

Fronteira muito tenue e ambigua entre apoio military e no-militar - The Japanese
government asserts that there is no contradiction between the strategic utilisation of foreign aid
and the pledge to not provide military assistance. Its explanation is that Japans foreign aid is to
be provided to foreign armed forces only when they are involved in development cooperation
for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes. But critics argue
that is often difficult to clearly demarcate military and non-military purposes. Leaders and mass
media in developing countries have expressed serious concerns about Japans aid reform. Of
particular concern is the fact that there are no clear guidelines that differentiate between military
and non-military missions, leaving this to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The ambiguity
of the new aid guidelines leave room for potential loopholes that could allow for the provision of
Japans aid to foreign armed forces to be decided on an arbitrary basis. The NDS states that the
Japanese government can provide foreign aid for activities aimed at promoting international
peace cooperation and it encourages the strategic utilisation of foreign aid to deal with global
issues that are considered a hindrance to world peace and security. The new Development
Cooperation Charter seeks to justify the change in policy. It broadens the definition of
development and recognises peacekeeping operations as well as the promotion of good
governance and human rights as legitimate development cooperation activities. It also positions
peace and security as prerequisites for development. Based on these principles Japans foreign

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aid can now be given at various stages of peace-building activities, such as to prevent conflict, as
humanitarian assistance in the midst of conflict, as an aid to help end conflict and to support
post-conflict reconstruction.7

DOIS
Alteraes legislativas que possibilitam ao Japo converter-se num exportador de armas -
After decades of a self-imposed ban on arms exports, the Abe government in 2014 began to
allow the countrys producers to export arms and military equipment. This is a significant
development, albeit part of an evolutionary and incremental process. Still, it will be a while
before Japan appears on the list of major global arms suppliers. The 2014 three principles on
transfer of defence equipment and technology replaces the 1967 three principles which
virtually banned arms exports. While allowing exports of weapons in support of its proactive
contribution to peace policy and to serve Japans national interest, the new principles still
maintain restrictions on arms exports to those states that are either under UN embargoes or
currently involved in a military conflict. The new rules also seek greater transparency to ensure
that weapons exported from Japan are not sold to third parties without Japans knowledge. Even
before the new principles, Japan had made small changes in its defence cooperation and military
technology transfer, allowing cooperation with the United States and joint research on ballistic
missiles and missile defence. The then-ruling Democratic Party of Japan under Prime Minister
Yoshihiko Noda in 2011 also allowed Japanese arms manufacturers to forge joint development
projects with foreign weapons manufacturers and export defence-related equipment for
humanitarian purposes. While not strictly military, Tokyo has controversially donated patrol
vessels to some Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, using its foreign
aid budget. Again, this was ostensibly in support of maintaining peace. It has also leased a TC-90
training plane to the Philippines and even provided training to Philippine naval pilots to fly the
aircraft. The 2014 revised principles certainly unburden Japanese arms producers and empowers
them to seek markets around the world far more freely than before. But the road ahead for Japan
will be long and winding. Japan has not yet succeeded in any of its major proposed deals in the

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Indo-Pacific region, where some of the largest importers of heavy weapons reside: India, China,
Vietnam and Australia, to name just a few.8

Mltiplas negociaes de exportao de armas falhadas pelo Japo - Japans bid for supply
of a fleet of submarines to Australia ended in a dismal failure last year, even though it appeared
like a done deal when negotiations began. This was a major setback to Japans first ever attempt
at a much publicised multi-billion dollar defence contract. The negative outcome did not hugely
impact the bilateral relationship, but it certainly left a deep scar in the minds of Tokyos
policymakers and political leaders who had almost expected the decision to be in Japans favour.
Japan has also been in negotiation with India for some time regarding the possible sale of US-2
amphibious search and rescue aircraft, currently used by the Japanese Maritime Self Defence
Force. The prospect for the deal to go ahead looked extremely bright in 2014. But it remains
elusive even today as cost and technology transfer issues between the parties stand unresolved.
The deal remains in suspended animation. Some media commentaries even suggest it is as good
as almost dead. More recently, Japan has opened talks with New Zealand seeking to sell patrol
and transport aircraft. The negotiations are still at the early stages and Wellington will go for a
competitive evaluation process with American and European suppliers in the mix. Its worth
remembering that Japan lost out to the United States for a similar deal with the United Kingdom
in 2015. Today Thailand is another target country for Japan. Discussions are on for P-1 patrol
aircraft and US-2 amphibious aircraft.To date Japan has not secured any deal in Southeast Asia
except for what Tokyo has donated to Vietnam and the Philippines. 9

Porque o Japo no consegue fechar estes contratos - Cost could be a factor, as well as
Japans inexperience in the arms market. Buyers may also be hesitant because Japanese weapons
are not battle-tested. For Japanese arms-producing companies, defence production has not been
part of their core business. They focus mainly on consumer and civilian products. For example,
the share of arms production for Japans top two defence manufacturers Kawasaki Heavy
Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is only about 15 and 11 per cent respectively. For
others, it is less than 1 per cent. While Japan renounced war under its postwar constitution, a
relatively large defence industry flourished, producing sophisticated arms and equipment, but
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only for domestic consumption by the SDF. As a result, Japanese companies have operated in a
non-competitive environment. Getting out of their comfort zone and bidding against big and
experienced global players is not easy for them. Some Japanese companies only reluctantly
participate in the bidding process, just to support the governments policy. Others dont want to
be seen as merchants of death. Japans inability to compete in Australia, and the stagnation of
negotiations with India the worlds largest prospective market for weapons in the next two
decades show Tokyos inexperience and lack of solid marketing strategies, attractive costing
and negotiating skills in this field. Japan still has a long way to go.10

Sada dos EUA de acordos multilaterais de comrcio tem influncia tremenda na


capacidade que o Japo e os prprios EUA tm para moldarem a ordem econmica
regional, que decresce com a priorizao de acordos bilaterais em vez de multilaterais,
como a nova administrao Trump pretende. Como consequncia de uma dicotomia entre
interesses econmicos e de segurana, os pases da regio equilibraro mais a sua
proximidade China, no se aproximando demais de Tquio como parceiro de segurana -
On January 20, the day President Donald Trump took the oath of office, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe delivered his annual policy speech to the Diet. Abe pledged to strengthen the U.S.-
Japan alliance, which he insisted remains the cornerstone of Japans foreign policy and national
security. Abe is expected to meet with Trump in Washington on February 10 to persuade the new
president of the indispensable role of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship in upholding the U.S.-
led rules-based order in Asia. He will also lobby Trump on the imperatives of free trade and the
strategic logic of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) from which Trump has withdrawn the
United States. However, Washingtons categorical rejection of the TPP and single-minded
emphasis on bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) means that any regional multilateral trade
deals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will include
China as a rule-maker. In this respect, even if Washington and Tokyo are able to negotiate an
FTA, it would have little restraint on Beijings push to shape the regional economic order. Such
an outcome would indirectly undermine Japans efforts to build an informal regional security
network to safeguard its southern approaches. Indeed, while most Southeast Asian nations look
to the U.S. security alliance as a counterweight to Beijings hegemonic ambitions, most of these

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same countries have extensive and growing economic ties to China. As a result of this dichotomy
between economic and security interests, most regional states (including Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam) are pursuing hedging strategies aimed at balancing their relations with
the United States and China and are therefore unlikely to align too closely with Tokyo as a
security partner. A Japan and its JSDF closely linked to and coordinated with the United States
and U.S. forces, along with their combined resources and joint efforts, is a powerful and effective
check and Chinese strategists know this. A Japan abandoned or neglected by the United States
and left adrift to create a regional coalition to serve as a counterweight to China will ultimately
come up short and Japanese strategists know this. The question is whether the new and
untested leadership in Washington understands the enduring strategic value of the U.S.-Japan
security alliance and what is at stake if that alliance falters the probable displacement of the
regional U.S.-led rules-based order by an encroaching Sino-centric sphere of influence. The
JSDF is already hard pressed to handle existing requirements, much less start asserting itself in
Southeast Asia. Under current conditions, JSDF (and the Japan Coast Guard) cannot establish a
sufficient regional footprint to deter China, or give Japans neighbors to the south wherewithal
to fend off Chinese coercion or the confidence to think that linking up with Japan will enable
them do so. Ultimately the United States is the glue that holds together whatever informal
security arrangements Japan aspires to develop.11

Para compensar, iniciativas de Shinzo Abe no Sudeste Asitico como contrapesos contra a
crescente agressividade Chinesa no Mar da China Meridional por onde passam as linhas de
comunicao martimas indipensveis para o Japo - Abes address follows his six-day
regional tour to the Philippines and Australia two U.S. treaty allies as well Indonesia and
Vietnam in an effort to strengthen economic and security ties with its southern neighbors.
Tokyos outreach is driven by uncertainties about Trumps policies toward Japan and seemingly
transactional approach to the U.S.-Japan security alliance on the one hand, and a resurgent and
aggressive Peoples Republic of China (PRC) that is challenging the regional status quo and
destabilizing regional security on the other. Abes recent trip focused on two security objectives
aimed at countering the PRCs attempts to dominate the South China Sea, through which Japans
vital Seal Lines of Communication (SLOC) pass. First and foremost, he seeks to shore up

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relations and demonstrate solidarity with the Philippines and Australia in effect reaffirming a
commitment in the U.S. hub-and-spoke security alliance system. Secondly, Abe aims to boost
the maritime security capabilities and maritime domain awareness of Indonesia, Philippines, and
Vietnam. On the economic front, Abes two basic objectives are aimed at preventing Chinas
growing economic dominance in Southeast Asia from displacing Japans regional business
networks and supply chains, thereby threatening Japans national economic security. To this end,
Abe offered a substantial 1 trillion yen ($8.66 billion) package of in aid and investment to the
Philippines (See: How Japan Plans to Counter China in Southeast Asia). Japan is also looking
to expand investment in major infrastructure and energy projects in Indonesia as well as in the
manufacturing and high-tech sectors in Vietnam. Secondly, in the wake of the TPPs apparent
demise, Abe jointly promoted free trade with his counterparts in Australia and Vietnam, which
are TPP member states.12

NADA

A Constituio do Japo a constituio do mundo h mais tempo sem alteraes - On 3


November 2016 Japan celebrated the 70th anniversary of its postwar constitution, which has
survived unchanged for longer than any other existing written constitution in the world.13

Shinzo Abe desenvolveu as condies ideais para alterar a constituio - The July 2016
elections for the first time gave the current administration and its political allies the majority in
both houses of parliament needed to alter the constitution. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself
has long dreamed of constitutional overhaul as part of his broader objective of erasing the traces
of what he calls the postwar regime. Earlier this year he voiced his hopes of accomplishing
constitutional revision while he is in power. Impending changes within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) will allow the partys leader to remain in power for three terms rather
than the current two, opening the way for Abe to remain prime minister into the 2020s. So the
time-frame for him to achieve this long-cherished dream is now likely to be expanded.14

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13 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/12/29/the-end-of-japans-very-long-postwar-
era/
A perptua fase do ps-guerra - The Japanese governments 1955 White Paper on the
Economy famously pronounced the end of the postwar era. But in political terms, core elements
of the postwar enshrined above all in the constitution survived. Following the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, many observers spoke of the end of
Japans long postwar. 2016 has surely become the year that marks the end of the 70-year very
long postwar. East Asia has entered a new age of political instability, where the risks of
competitive military expansion and diplomatic frictions are greater than they have been for
decades.15

Decrscimo demogrfico e econmico do Japo - In 2008, the Japanese population peaked at


128 million. Already Japan has a million fewer people today than it did then. With the workforce
shrinking even faster almost 10 million lower than at its peak in 1997 and the proportion of
the population over 60 years old now at more than one-third of the total population, per capita
income growth has stagnated. Japans economic size is on the way to maxing out. Relative to its
faster growing neighbours, its share of regional GDP is declining, as too is its share of global
income.16

Japo como um mdio poder: Constituio Japonesa e Tratado de Segurana e Cooperao


Mtua com os EUA que moldam as polticas de segurana do Japo - For many years,
Yoshihide Soeya has sought to reinvent his country as a middle power. Soeya was surely
prescient, although his starting point was from the postwar constraints on Japanese security
policy: the Constitution (and its pacifist Article 9) and the USJapan Security Treaty. Both have
fundamentally constrained Japans freedom of action in international security and limited Japans
foreign policy options to those of a middle power, Soeya suggests. This diplomatic style
allowed Japan to focus on postwar economic recovery, which eventually proved to be the key to

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era/

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era/

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the nations rise as an economic power. Whatever Prime Minister Shinzo Abes ambitions for
Japans security policy may have been, recent changes in Japanese security policy are modest
adaptations that permit Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence and satisfy its
alliance partner, but within constraints that protect the thrust and credibility of its peace
constitution. While the alliance with the United States remains the anchor of Japanese security
policy, its diplomacy and foreign policy in years to come has to be welded into Asian
coalitions.17

Importncia do multilateralismo no desenvolvimento da poltica regional do Japo - In this


conception of Japans capacities and its reach, there would be more active engagement in
coalitions for cooperation not only in hard security affairs with partners like Australia but also
with China and the rest of Asia in economic and energy cooperation through the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership and other big political initiatives. This multifaceted
strategy of underpinning the US forward military presence in Asia, engaging politically and
economically in China, and supporting regional multilateralism would signify a return to Japans
critical role in managing Chinas peaceful rise in the region. 18

Quantidade de parcerias estratgicas na sia - Strategic partnerships are becoming central to


the management of international security in the Asia-Pacific region. All the major powers and
many of the minor ones have entered into multiple partnerships with both friends and potential
strategic rivals. China, for instance, has cultivated close to 50 strategic partnerships across the
region and beyond, with nations as diverse as Afghanistan, Australia and India. By contrast, India
has about 20 or so partnerships and Japan around 10.19

Tipos de parcerias estratgicas e o que elas envolvem - Today, there are two different kinds of
strategic partnerships in the region. There are partnerships for mutual benefit, based on shared
values and interests. And there are partnerships for mutual management, driven by a desire to put
in place arrangements to help manage rivalry over values or interests, or indeed both. These

17 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/16/size-and-japanese-power/

18 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/16/size-and-japanese-power/

19 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-or-
hindering-security/
partnerships are formalised in bilateral agreements. They can involve government-to-government
dialogue and policy coordination, or institutionalised Track 1.5 or Track 2 processes non-
government discussions aimed at building bilateral relationships. They can encompass regular
summit or ministerial meetings as well as specific commitments to build economic relations,
make investments or transfer technology. Undertakings to improve people-to-people ties through
cultural diplomacy form another important feature of strategic partnerships. Strategic
partnerships are flexible and open to being structured in different ways, according to the
underlying condition of a bilateral relationship. They are far less formal than regional institutions
and at least in principle more straightforward to manage than multilateral diplomatic
arrangements. They do not destabilise regional balances in the ways that formal alliances might.
But whether the proliferation of strategic partnerships is helping to improve regional security
remains in question. Because they are flexible, their capacity to provide reassurance and build
trust tends to be lower than that of an institution or alliance.20

Parceria Japo Austrlia - The regions most developed strategic partnership is that between
Japan and Australia. It builds on a long postwar economic relationship as well as significant
attempts, as far back as the 1970s, to develop a deeper political relationship. The two share a set
of values (such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law) and a set of interests. Over time,
Australia and Japan have developed policy coordination mechanisms on regional and
international security matters, including counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, intelligence-
sharing and humanitarian operations. The two countries have also maintained extensive defence
cooperation and military-to-military ties. This process peaked in 2014 with the declaration,
during then Australian prime minister Tony Abbotts visit to Tokyo, of the relationships
elevation to a Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century.21

Parceria China ndia - By contrast, the ChinaIndia strategic partnership has evolved as a
means of managing rivalry, rather than facilitating coordination in pursuing shared values and
interests. That partnership has barely moved beyond the establishment of high-level dialogue,

20 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-or-
hindering-security/

21 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-or-
hindering-security/
attempts to boost trade and investment from historically low levels and the initiation of cultural
diplomacy. These mechanisms allow regular contact to be maintained, but at the cost of
quarantining contentious issues, such as, in this case, the SinoIndian border.22

Parceria Austrlia China - The AustraliaChina partnership, for example, is minimalistic,


trade-focused and entails quarantining areas of potential conflict areas where, in a wonderful
diplomatic euphemism contained in the 2009 Joint Statement, the two countries different
national conditions may lead to differences of one type or another.23

22 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-or-
hindering-security/

23 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/06/15/strategic-partnerships-helping-or-
hindering-security/