Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Concept
of Representation
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
in Contemporary
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Democratic Theory
Nadia Urbinati1 and Mark E. Warren2
1
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;
email: nu15@columbia.edu
2
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver,
British Columbia V6N 2H7, Canada; email: warren@politics.ubc.ca
387
ANRV344-PL11-17 ARI 17 April 2008 13:12
ralized, and increasingly dependent on infor- see also Urbinati 2000). In addition, demo-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
mal negotiation and deliberation to generate cratic theorists are increasingly appreciating
political legitimacy. These developments are the contributions of representation to the
driving renewed interest in the impact of elec- formation of public opinion and judgment,
toral representation on broad patterns of in- as well at its role in constituting multiple
clusion and exclusion (Lijphart 1999; Powell pathways of social inuence within and often
2000, 2004), as well as in the new forms of rep- against the state. (Habermas 1989 [1962],
resentation that are rapidly evolving in non- 1996; Ankersmit 2002; Urbinati 2005, 2006).
electoral domains such as administrative pol- Importantly, these reassessments are leading
icy development (Stephan 2004, Brown 2006, an increasing number of democratic theorists
Fung 2006a), civil society advocacy (Alcoff both to reengage problems of electoral design
1991, Warren 2001, Strolovitch 2006), and (Beitz 1989, James 2004, Thompson 2004,
global civil society (Keck & Sikkink 1998, Rehfeld 2005) and to think about democratic
Anheier et al. 2004, Grant & Keohane 2005, representation beyond the ballot (Saward
Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005). Here we 2006a,b; Warren 2008).
limit our attention to recent developments in We review the concept of representation
democratic theory, which has been as much from the perspective of recent democratic the-
affected by these developments as other areas ory. In the rst section, we list the political and
of political science. social reasons for rethinking democratic rep-
The second reason is indigenous to demo- resentation. In the second section, we review
cratic theory, which has tended to follow Jean- the background in democratic theory. In the
Jacques Rousseau in assuming that represen- third section, we comment on the develop-
tative democracy is, at best, an instrumental ments that are sending democratic theorists
substitute for stronger forms of democracy back to rst thingsthe nature of political
(Pateman 1976, Barber 1984). Until recently, representation itself. Next, we argue that con-
participatory and deliberative democrats paid stituency denition, long ignored in theories
little attention to political representation, of representation, is among the most funda-
leaving the topic to neo-Schumpeterian mental of rst things because it establishes
theorists who viewed democracy as primarily the framethe inclusions and exclusions
about the selection and organization of within which issues are decided. From this
political elites (Sartori 1987, Manin 1997; cf. perspective, we can appreciate the renewed
Kateb 1992). This consensus division of labor interest in representative institutions within
began to unravel about 15 years ago at the democratic theory, discussed in the fth sec-
hands of those interested in broad patterns tion. Last, we consider emerging nonelectoral
of inclusions and exclusions in political forms of representation: new citizen forums
representation, particularly of minorities and and decision-making bodies, representative
women (Phillips 1995, 1998; Williams 1998; claims by civil society and advocacy groups,
and other voice entrepreneurs, for example. The complexities of the principal-agent
Nonelectoral forms of representation, we be- relationship at the core of the standard ac-
lieve, are increasingly important to expand- count are well recognized (Pitkin 1967). The
ing and deepening democracy. But these de- translation of votes into representation, for
velopments challenge the existing conceptual example, is mediated by varying electoral sys-
and normative resources of democratic the- tems with more or less exclusionary charac-
ory. Democratic theorists need to develop new teristics. Parties, interest groups, and corpo-
tools and critical analyses that are sensitive to ratist organizations set agendas, while public
these new forms of political inuence and in- spheres, civil society advocacy, and the me-
direct forms of power. dia form preferences and mold public opinion,
as do debate and leadership within legislative
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
individuals are involved in, or affected by, col- at channeling market forces and incentives, as
lective structures and decisions. Issues such as are civil society organizations. In many cases,
migration, global trade, and environment, for these developments dramatically shift the lo-
example, are extraterritorial; they are not con- cus of collective decisions away from state-
tained by any existing territorially organized centric models of planningthose that can
polity (Benhabib 2004, Gould 2004, Held gather, as it were, sovereignty from the peo-
& Koenig-Archibugi 2005, Bohman 2007). ple in order to act in their nameand toward
Other issues are nonterritorial, particularly governance models. These issue-based and
those involving identity, such as religion, policy-driven networks of government actors
ethnicity, nationalism, professional identity, and stakeholders are often more effective than
recreation, gender identity, and many social bureaucracies accountable to legislatures, but
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
movements. Such nonterritorial interests are they lack formal legitimacy and clear repre-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
not new to democratic theorists. The main sentative accountability to those affected by
object of disagreement in making and inter- decisions.
preting the democratic constitution of the The landscape of democratic representa-
Weimar Republic, for example, was whether tion is also clouded by the growing complexity
representation should represent individuals or of issues, which increasingly strains the pow-
corporate interests. In modern constitutional ers of representative agents, and thus their ca-
democracies, however, the older corporatist pacities to stand for and act on the interests
views of parliaments and representation have of those they represent. There is the familiar
given way to the representation of individ- technical and scientic complexity that comes
uals whose only commonality is residence. with the vast amounts of information and high
Thus, legislatures attend to nonresidential levels of technology involved in most pub-
constituencies only indirectlynot because lic decisions (Zolo 1992, Brown 2006, Beck
citizens have equal shares of power assigned 1997), which is often compounded by the
by territory, but rather because pressure and political complexity that comes with multi-
advocacy groups can organize territory-based ple and overlapping constituencies (Andeweg
votes along nonterritorial lines (Dahl 1956, 2003).
1971; cf. Mansbridge 2003). Other venues As a consequence of these developments,
have emerged to represent other kinds of con- the standard account has been stretched to the
stituencies. The world is now populated with a breaking point. Among the most fundamen-
very large number of transnational, extraterri- tal of problems, ironically, is the very element
torial, and nonterritorial actors, ranging from that ushered in democratic representation
relatively formalized institutions built out residency-based electoral representation. The
of territorial units (such as the United Na- claim of any state to represent its citizens
tions, the World Bank, the European Union, its claim to sovereignty on behalf of the
and numerous treaty organizations), to a peopleis contestable, not because states do
multitude of nongovernmental organizations, not encompass peoples, but because collective
transnational movements, associations, and issues only partially admit of this kind of con-
social networks (Anheier et al. 2004, Saward stituency denition. Electoral representation
2006a), each making representative claims and continues to provide an ultimate reference
serving representative functions. for state power. But whereas Burke (1968, cf.
Closely related, the sites of collective de- Manin 1997) imagined that representatives
cision making are increasingly differentiated. could monopolize considered opinion about
In the developed democracies, markets and public purpose through the use of delibera-
market-oriented entities are likely to con- tive judgment, representative assemblies to-
tinue to function as the dynamic sources of day must reach ever further to gather politi-
change. Governments are increasingly agile cal legitimacy for their decisions. Judging by
the declining trust in governments generally clude anything denitively (Rousseau 1978
and legislative bodies in particular, represen- [1762] p. 198). Rousseau thus conned repre-
tative claims based on territorial constituen- sentation to the terms of principal-agent del-
cies (under the standard model) continue to egation while stripping the delegate of any
weaken (Pharr & Putnam 2000, Dalton 2004). role in forming the political will of the people.
Electoral representation remains crucial in In legal usage, Rousseau understood political
constituting the will of the people, but the representation in terms of imperative man-
claims of elected ofcials to act in the name date: the delegate operates under a duciary
of the people are increasingly segmented by contract that allows the principal (the citizens)
issues and subject to broader contestation to temporarily grant an agent their power to
and deliberation by actors and entities that take specied actions but does not delegate
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
likewise make representative claims. Politi- the will to make decisions, which is retained
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
(will) into political inuence (political in addition to voting, owing to the porous
judgment). And importantly, political repre- design of liberal democracies. Participatory
sentation can confer on politics an idealizing democratic theorists writing in the 1960s and
dimension that can overcome the limits 1970s pointed out that the many channels of
of territoriality and formal citizenship on representation in pluralist democracies were,
political deliberation. in fact, lled by those with the most re-
Rousseaus formulations, however, failed sources, particularly education and wealth.
to shed light on these transformative poten- Pulling ideals from Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx,
tials of political representation. Although he J.S. Mill, and Dewey, participatory democrats
believed representatives to be necessary, he focused instead on those features of democ-
held to electoral selection rather than lottery racy most immediately connected with self-
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
ciated with democracy. Whatever his inno- accepting Rousseaus view of representation
vations in other areas of democratic theory, as essentially nondemocratic (Pateman 1976,
with respect to representation he restated Macpherson 1977, Barber 1984; cf. Young
Montesquieus idea that lottery is democratic 2000, Urbinati 2006).
whereas election is aristocratic. He concluded, Communitarians within democratic the-
with Aristotle, that whereas all positions re- ory, borrowing from classical republicanism,
quiring only good sense and the basic senti- have sometimes overlapped with participa-
ment of justice should be open to all citizens, tory democrats owing to their focus on active
positions requiring special talents should be citizenship. Although classical republicanism
lled by election or performed by the few focused on institutional designparticularly
(Rousseau 1978, see Urbinati 2006). checks and balancesthese strains were ab-
The contemporary view that representa- sorbed by the standard account of represen-
tive government is a mix of aristocracy and tation, leaving contemporary communitarians
democratic authorization is the late child to focus on closeness rather than distance, and
of Rousseaus model. Realist and elite direct engagement rather than indirectness
democrats in the mold of Schumpeter (1976), (Arendt 2006; Wolin 2004; Held 1996, ch. 2).
Sartori (1965), and Luhmann (1990) repli- Deliberative democratic theory, the third
cated Rousseaus view that representation is and most recent wave of contemporary demo-
essentially aristocratic, while viewing demo- cratic theory, is centered on inclusive politi-
cratic participation in political judgment as cal judgment. From this perspective, the stan-
utopian. Modern societieswith their bu- dard account of representative democracy is
reaucratic concentrations of power, their suspect for its thin understanding of political
scale, and their complexitydictate that cit- will formation. The standard account, with
izens are mostly passive, mobilized period- its emphasis on elections, pressure groups,
ically by elections (see also Bobbio 1987, and political parties, suggested that politi-
Sartori 1987, Zolo 1992; cf. Manin 1997). cal judgments are, in effect, aggregated pref-
Although elite and realist democratic theo- erences. Deliberative theories of democracy
rists have been widely criticized within demo- were spearheaded by Habermas in the mid-
cratic theory, it has not been for their account 1980s and rapidly followed by parallel theories
of representation as periodic selection, but focused on judgment: Gutmann & Thompson
rather for their portrayal of citizens as pas- (1996), Pettit (1999a), the later Rawls (2005),
sive. Pluralist democratic theory, originated Richardson (2003), and others turned their at-
by Truman (1951) and Dahl (1956) in the tention to the formation of public opinion and
1950s, emphasized the many ways in which judgment, the institutionalization of deliber-
citizens of contemporary democracies can ation, and the relationship between inclusion
push their interests onto the political agenda and deliberation. Problems of representation,
Between Facts and Norms (1996), Habermas tions. Although Pitkin understood these fea-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
cast representative institutions as mediating tures within the context of electoral democ-
between state and society via public spheres of racy, they can in fact vary over a wide range of
judgment, such that representation is incom- contexts and meanings, as we suggest below
plete without the deliberative attentiveness of (D. Castiglione & M.E. Warren, unpublished
citizens mediated by public spheres, and the manuscript).
reective transmission of public deliberations Pitkin did not, however, inquire more
into the domain of representative institutions. broadly into the kind of political participa-
Habermas was interested not only in the tion that representation brings about in a
correlation between judgments emanating democratic society. Nor were her initial for-
from the public sphere and institutionalized mulations further debated or developed. In-
representation, but also in those moments of stead, they stood as the last word on repre-
disjunction that generate extraparliamentary sentation within democratic theory for three
forms of representation, particularly through decades, until the appearance of Manins The
new social movements and other kinds of Principles of Representative Government (1997).
civil society associations. Importantly, these Manin combined an elitist-realist approach
creative disjunctions are intrinsic to the to democracy with a deliberative approach,
functioning of representative democracy. In arguing that representative government is a
this way, Habermas opened a window on unique form of government owing to the con-
representation beyond the standard account. stitution of deliberative politics through elec-
Direct attention to representation within tion. Manins work departed from the stan-
contemporary democratic theory has come dard model by focusing on the deliberative
from three other sources as well. The most qualities of representative institutions. But in
broadly recognized of these, Pitkins now clas- other respects, he replicated the standard divi-
sic The Concept of Representation (1967), came sion between democracy and representation.
from within the standard account itself. Pitkin In the spirit of Montesquieu, Manin viewed
provided a comprehensive theory of represen- elections as a means of judging the charac-
tation, primarily within electoral contexts, just ters of rulers. The value of democratic elec-
when participatory democracy had captured tion is that the many are better than the few
the imaginations of progressive democrats. at recognizing competent individuals, though
Indeed, Pitkin herself turned to the partici- worse than the few at acting competently
patory paradigm shortly after publication, re- (Manin 1997, ch. 4). But electoral suffrage in
turning to the topic only to note that the al- itself, in Manins view, produced no change in
liance between democracy and representation the practice and institution of representation,
is uneasy owing to their distinct genealo- which are substantially the same today as they
gies (Pitkin 1967, p. 2; Pitkin 2004; Williams were when few citizens had the right to vote.
2000). If democracy is based on the presence Representative government is inevitably an
elected form of aristocracy because it discrim- perspectives into political institutions (see also
inates among citizens and excludes some from Guinier 1994, Gould 1996, Mansbridge 1999,
the decision-making process. As de Malberg Young 2000, Dovi 2002).
(1920, p. 208) put it, the very purpose of rep- Within this literature, Williams (1998)
resentative selection is to form an aristocratic Voice, Trust, and Memory most directly en-
regime. On this line of thinking, it follows that gaged the issue of marginalized groups in
discourses that implicate representative insti- the language of representation, framing all
tutions as exclusionary are simply incoherent. of the classic issues of representation within
Such institutions cannot be something other the terms of the contemporary debate. Lib-
than they are, namely, aristocratic entities that eral representation of the kind descended
are at best constituted and contained by demo- from Locke, though promising formal equal-
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
cratic elections. Thus, in this account, parlia- ity, systematically underrepresents the histor-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
all individuals have an equal claim to represen- direction, conceiving democracy as any set of
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
tation, their representatives should have pres- arrangements that instantiates the principle
ence in representative institutions in propor- that all affected by collective decisions should
tion to the numbers of individuals who hold have an opportunity to inuence the outcome
interests they wish to be represented. Indeed, (see, e.g., Habermas 1996, p. 107; Dahl 1998,
as Mill argued, nonproportional counting as pp. 3738; Held 1996, p. 324; Young 2000,
occurs in majoritarian systems is a violation p. 23; Gould 2004, pp. 17578). Although
of quantitative fairness, whereas proportional there are important variations in the norma-
representation secures a representation, in tive presuppositions embedded in this prin-
proportion to numbers, of every division of ciple, most democratic theorists hold that
the electoral body: not two great parties (a) individuals are morally and legally equal
alone (Mill 1991, p. 310). Altering represen- and (b) individuals are equally capable of
tative systems to increase their sensitivity to autonomy with respect to citizenshipthat
historical group disadvantage may trade off is, conscious self-determinationall other
against the fairness embodied in quantitative things begin equal. It follows that collective
proportionality, a tension that continues to decisions affecting self-determination should
deserve the attention of democratic theorists. include those affected.
Although Williams argument was fo- The advantage of such a normcall it
cused on representing historically disadvan- democratic autonomy or simply collective
taged groups, she built on the emerging self-governmentis that it enables us to avoid
discourse of group representation to cast po- reduction of democracy to any particular
litical representation as fundamentally about kind of institution or decision-making mech-
inclusion and exclusionthat is, about the anism. It allows us to assess emerging in-
basic problems of democratic theory and stitutions and imagine new ones by asking
practice (cf. Phillips 1995, ch. 7). At the whether they fulll the norm of democratic
same time, the strain of thinking origi- autonomya question we need to be able to
nated by Maninthat focusing on the rela- ask, for example, of the many transnational
tionship between representation and politi- regimes that increasingly affect the lives of
cal judgmentincreasingly intersected with individuals in ways the standard account of
deliberative democracy, drawing the aristo- representative democracy cannot encompass,
cratic approach to representation closer to nor even conceive.
democratic problems of discursive inclusion At the same time, without the relatively
(Plotke 1997, Young 2000, Ankersmit 2002, straightforward conceptual apparatus of the
Urbinati 2005, cf. Williams 2000). Together, standard account, we need to formulate the
these lineages are now producing a new wave concept of democratic representation with a
of democratic theory. rigor sufcient to identify and assess what
who would be represented, and (b) account- merous kinds of representative relationships
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
ability of the representative to those repre- that inhabit contemporary democracies. Each
sented. Building on Pitkin, D. Castiglione & should be parsed out and specied both in its
M.E. Warren (unpublished manuscript; see own terms and in terms of its role within the
also Rehfeld 2006) characterize these rela- broader political ecology.
tionships as follows:
1. Political representation involves repre- CONSTITUENCY DEFINITION
sentative X being authorized by con-
Because it denes the initial terms of au-
stituency Y to act with regard to good
thorization and thus the nature of inclusion
Z. Authorization means that there are
in representative relationships, the concept
procedures through which Y selects or
of constituency is receiving new attention.
directs X with respect to Z. Ultimate re-
As Rehfeld (2005; see also Burnheim 1989,
sponsibility for the actions or decisions
Pogge 2002) points out, the idea that con-
of X rests with Y.
stituencies should be dened by territorial dis-
2. Political representation involves repre-
tricts has been all but unquestioned until very
sentative X being held accountable to
recently, although it has long been recognized
constituency Y with regard to good Z.
that initial decisions about who is included in
Accountability means that X provides,
(or excluded from) the people constituted
or could provide, an account of his or
the domain of democracy (Dahl 1989, Held
her decisions or actions to Y with re-
1996).
spect to Z, and that Y has a sanction
But there is an even more fundamental
over X with regard to Z.
issue. For the most part, the project of
These elements are generic; they specify democratizing democracies has been con-
only that a democratic relationship of rep- ceived as a matter of progressively including
resentation is one of empowered inclusion more classes of individuals within territorial
of Y in the representations of X with re- communities. But no matter how universal
spect to Z. Under this formula, the individuals these inclusions, when represented geograph-
or groups who are represented are not pas- ically, the people are only a demos insofar
sive. There are points at which they assent to as their primary interests and identities are
be represented, and the practices of assent geographical in nature. Nongeographical
including communicationtypically require constituenciesthose emerging from race,
multiple kinds of participation. For their part, ethnicity, class, gender, environment, global
if representatives are democratic, they are re- trade, and so onare represented only inso-
sponsive to those they would represent, with far as they intersect with the circumstances
respect to particular goods. A wide variety of location, producing only an accidental
of actors may potentially t these criteria: relationship between democratic autonomy
(particularly the distributions of opportunities tion are highest for disadvantaged groups, as
necessary for self-determination) and forms suggested above, the theoretical point cuts
of representation (Bohman 2007; cf. Gould even more broadly and deeply, as suggested
2004, Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005). by Frasers formulation: Representation is a
More generally, issues of justice raised by dimension of justice.
representation are issues of isegoria, or the But territory is not entirely destiny, even
equal chance each citizen should have to when it is the starting point for constituency
have his or her voice heard (Dworkin 2000, denition as well as the residence-based
pp. 19498). Democratic representation is distribution of one vote to every citizen. The
fair or just representation insofar as it involves history of race-based districting in the United
issues of advocacy and representativity; is- States can be understood as attempts to mold
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
sues of a meaningful presence, not simply geographical constituencies in ways that en-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
presence alone, in the game of discord and compass nongeographical issues, and to do so
agreement that is democracy (Urbinati 2006, through the inclusion of racial minorities in
p. 42). Fraser (2007, pp. 31314) has formu- decision-making bodies. Quotas and reserved
lated the relationship between representation seats also compensate for the inexibilities
and justice quite precisely (see also Williams of geography, although each arrangement
1998, Fraser 2005, Rehfeld 2005, Saward comes with costs to other dimensions of
2006a): representation (Guinier 1994; Williams
1998, chs. 3, 7; James 2004). Functional role
[R]epresentation furnishes the stage on adjustments, even if ad hoc, may sometime
which struggles over distribution and recog- compensate. Mansbridge (2003) notes that
nition are played out. Establishing criteria empirical political scientists increasingly
of political membership, it tells us who is identify forms of representation that are not
included, and who excluded, from the cir- based on standard promissory mechanisms,
cle of those entitled to a just distribution whereby candidates make promises to voters
and reciprocal recognition. . . . Representa- and are then judged in subsequent elections
tion, accordingly, constitutes a third, politi- by the results. In surrogate representa-
cal dimension of justice, alongside the (eco- tion, for example, a representative claims
nomic) dimension of redistribution and the a constituency beyond his or her electoral
(cultural) dimension of recognition. district, as when Barney Frank (a member
of the US House of Representatives from
From this perspective, the equality en- Massachusetts) represents gays beyond his
sured by universal suffrage within nations is, district, or Bill Richardson (Governor of New
simply, equality with respect to one of the Mexico) represents Latinos beyond his state.
very many dimensions that constitute the These functional adjustments testify not just
people. Thus, from a normative perspec- to the inadequacies of territorial constituency,
tive, geography-based constituency denition but also to its malleability. A key challenge
introduces an arbitrary criterion of inclu- for democratic theorists is to imagine how
sion/exclusion right at the start. Exclusions this malleability might be harnessed beyond
work not on people, who are, after all, univer- the borders of nation-states.
sally included through residency-based fran-
chise, but rather on issues, since residency-
based constituencies dene residency-based RETHINKING ELECTORAL
interests as most worthy of political conver- REPRESENTATION
sation and decisionan effect that is arbi- Electoral democracy is that subset of rep-
trary from the perspective of justice. Although resentative relationships in which represen-
the costs of territorial constituency deni- tatives are authorized through election to
represent the citizens of a constituency to act plains why many states seek to increase judges
on behalf of their interests, and then are held independence by declaring elections to be
accountable in subsequent elections. These nonpartisan (Thompson 1987), and certainly
relationships have been examined and reex- explains why higher courts are insulated from
amined by political scientists during the post- direct representative accountability. In the
war period (e.g., Eulau & Karps 1977). What European case, however, the democratic le-
is new is the reemergence of electoral repre- gitimacy of judges is borrowed entirely from
sentation as a topic within democratic theory. representative bodies that create the law, and
judgment is viewed as limited to the applica-
tion of law. In this way, European constitu-
Constitutional Design tions preserve the democratic element of rep-
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Most fundamentally, electoral representation resentation within the judiciary, but at the cost
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
(PR) through multi-member districts (Farrell accountability (Dahl 2003). In contrast, par-
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
2001, Przeworski et al. 1999, Powell 2004). liamentary arrangements based on SMP tend
From the perspective of representing res- to provide citizens with stronger ex post ac-
idence, it is worth noting that PR systems countability. These systems authorize govern-
are inherently less geographical than SMP. ing majorities, which are then clearly respon-
Within the boundaries of a district (which may sible for governing as long as they retain the
be the size of the entire state, as in the cases condence of majority party members of the
of Israel and the Netherlands), voters deter- legislature.
mine their constituency at the time of the vote It is not clear, however, that inclusiveness
(Duverger & Sartori 1988, Rehfeld 2005). In and accountability necessarily trade off against
addition, because PR enables representation one another, given the variety of possible
at lower thresholds (depending on the num- accountability mechanisms (Warren 2008).
ber of representatives within each district), PR Some of these other forms of accountabil-
systems tend to include a broader range of in- ity are deliberative in nature, and depend on
terests and identities than SMP systems. It is publics demanding that representatives pro-
because of their greater inclusiveness and fair- vide accounts of their positions and deci-
ness that democratic theorists at least since sions, even as they change (Mansbridge 2004,
Mill have favored PR over SMP systems. A Urbinati 2006). This increasing attention to
government should reach decisions on the ba- discursive accountability is yet another rea-
sis of debates among representatives of every son democratic theorists have paid more at-
opinion which exists in the constituencies in tention to the impact of constitutional design
a body that reects its fair share of voices on deliberative judgment (Habermas 1996,
(Mill 1991 [1861], pp. 44850; see also Kelsen Manin 1997, Elster 1998, Sunstein 2002,
1929, Friedrich 1968, Fishkin 1995). Demo- James 2004). These issues have returned also
cratic theorists concerned with the represen- in contemporary debates over fair representa-
tation of disadvantaged groups also prefer PR, tion (Beitz 1989, Williams 1998, Thompson
simply because its more inclusive logic in- 2002). At this time, however, theories relat-
creases the chances that disadvantaged groups ing constitutional forms and electoral systems
will have representation (Amy 1996, Barber to new accounts of democratic representation
2001). In addition, PR may result in more de- remain underdeveloped.
liberative legislative bodies: Because the elec- Because of the normative importance of
toral system is less likely to produce governing proportionality to the democracy-justice rela-
majority parties, parliaments operating un- tionship, a small but growing number of the-
der PR are more likely to develop consensus orists are becoming interested in represen-
forms of government (Sartori 1976, Lijphart tative bodies that are randomly constituted.
1999, Powell 2000, Steiner et al. 2005). For Randomness would, on average, ensure that
similar reasons, the design of local electoral such assemblies would represent whatever
issues are salient to the public at the moment back onto the agenda of democratic theory
of selection, not only in proportion to the (see Beitz 1989). Such integration, however,
numbers of individuals with interests in par- will require that we understand partisanship
ticular issues, but also in proportion to the in- as an essential feature of deliberation. Parties
tensity with which interests and opinions are as organizations are not to be confused with
held (Burnheim 1989, Fishkin 1995, Pogge factions since they can and should transform
2002, Rehfeld 2005; cf. Dahl 1989, Warren & particular forms of advocacy into more com-
Pearse 2008). Closely related is the concept of peting accounts of common goods and inter-
randomly selected citizen representative bod- ests, and in this way structure public discourse
ies, discussed below. (Urbinati 2006, pp. 3738; Rosenblum 2008).
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
should be represented) and in part because ture (cf. Dovi 2007; E. Beerbohm, unpub-
their jobs include making collective decisions lished manuscript).
that accord with democratic institutions. In-
stead, Pitkin argued, we should understand
representatives as having the ethical obliga- Deliberation and Judgment
tion to be responsive to their constituents in- As we suggested above, one of the most im-
terests. This formulation had the advantage of portant inspirations for rethinking political
covering the complexities of the relationship, representation within electoral democracy has
although it did not provide much more. been the increasingly sophisticated empha-
Ironically, perhaps, early incarnations of sis on deliberation within democracy. From
group representation arguments fell on the this perspective, representation induces and
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
trustee side of the dichotomy, with its eli- forms relationships of judgment that enable
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
and identities. And at their best, they tend provides a transparent and practical basis for
toward transcendence of the here and now the distribution of votes to persons. But some
in a process that is animated by a dialectic of the primary virtues of electoral democracy
between what is and what can be or ought to are also limitations. Elections, for example,
be (Przeworski 1991, p. 19; cf. Hegel 1967). can and should be institutionalized in such
Finally, of course, representation also enables a way that the rules are knowable and pre-
citizens to survey and discipline power hold- dictable, and accountability can be achieved
ers, not only through the direct mechanisms over long periods of time (Thompson 2004).
of voting but also through the gathering and Yet the very stability of elected representatives
exposure of information by groups and the and electoral institutions means that they are
media who claim (not always credibly) to act slow to respond to emerging or marginalized
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
affecting the exercise of state power, mean- lective decision-making bodies. Second, gov-
ing that they are poor venues for representing ernments and other entities are increasingly
emerging agendas, which do much better in designing citizen representatives: new, non-
the less restricted give and take of deliberation elected forms of representative bodies such as
in the public sphere (Habermas 1996). citizen panels, polls, and deliberative forums
In addition, these features of electoral (Warren 2008).
representationtheir inability to refract ne-
grained representation into political insti-
tutions and their dampening effects on Self-Authorized Representatives
deliberationt poorly with the norms of Self-authorized representatives are not new.
citizenship evolving in the developed democ- Individuals and groups have always petitioned
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
racies. Dalton (2007) argues that new gener- government and made representative claims
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
ations of citizens are voting less but engag- on behalf of interests and values they believe
ing more. They want more choice; they want should have an impact. Interest group lib-
more direct impact. These are goods that elec- eralism and pluralism assume that this kind
toral representation cannot provide. This fact of representation does much, if not most, of
alone should spur us to think about repre- the work of conveying substance (Dahl 1971;
sentation more broadly, including nonelec- Held 1996, ch. 6). Moreover, history is replete
toral venuesnot necessarily as competing with unelected leaders and groups making
forms of representation (though they can be), representative claims in the name of groups,
but possibly as complementary forms (Saward peoples, or nations precisely because they are
2006a,b). not formally represented. The constitutional
Finally, as we noted above (When is Rep- revolutions of the seventeenth century were
resentation Democratic?), the globalization induced by groups such as the Levellers. In the
of democratic norms and expectations simply French Revolution, Sieyes declared the exis-
does not t with any electorally based con- tence of a third class that was the nation,
stituencies at allnot only within the inter- and they proposed themselves as the speakers
national domain but also in contexts that have or representatives of this class, and thus for
weak or nonexistent electoral democracies. the nation.
Owing to these functional limitations of It is not the existence of self-authorized
electoral representation, practices of demo- representatives that is new, but rather their
cratic representation increasingly go beyond large number and diversity (Warren 2001).
electoral venues, a phenomenon that testies Collectively, self-authorized representatives
to the expansion and pluralization of spaces organize what might be called the nega-
of political judgment in todays democracies. tive power of the people (Urbinati 2006)
One of the most remarkable developments has and can function as a counter-politics when
been the proliferation of representative claims institutionalized politics fails its representa-
that cannot be tested by election. These claims tive purposes (Rosanvallon 2006). Groups
come from at least two classes of representa- claim to represent women, a particular eth-
tives, discussed below. First, there are innu- nic group, victims of landmines, the im-
merable agents who, in effect, self-authorize: poverished and marginalized, parents, and
Advocacy organizations, interest groups, civil children (Strolovitch 2006). They claim to
society groups, international nongovernmen- represent a wide variety of goods: human
tal organizations, philanthropic foundations, rights and security, health, education, an-
journalists, and other individuals, including imals, rainforests, community, spirituality,
elected ofcials functioning as surrogate rep- safety, peace, economic development, and so
resentatives, claim to represent constituen- on. They often claim to represent positions
cies within public discourse and within col- and arguments, functioning as discursive
representatives (Keck 2003; cf. Alcoff 1991, name they act? (b) How are they held ac-
Dryzek 2000, ch. 4). So representation of countable by those they claim to represent?
this kind can be targeted and issue-specic; With respect to authorization, the nature of
it can be exible and respond to emerg- the representative agent will make a differ-
ing issues, and particularly to constituencies ence. Many self-authorized representatives
that are not territorially anchored. The col- are voluntary organizations with followings
lectivities representatives seek to inuence and memberships. In such cases, authoriza-
are increasingly diverse: not only govern- tion might work through members votes and
ments and power holders but also public voices. Other kinds of self-authorized repre-
discourse and culture, as well as powerful sentatives make claims on behalf of ascriptive,
market actors such as corporations. These involuntary constituencies, such as racial or
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
kinds of representatives can and do func- ethnic groups (Alcoff 1991, Strolovitch 2006).
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
tion beyond borders. Not only do they have Then there are agents who claim to represent
the potential to compensate for electoral those with little or no voice, such as interna-
inexibilitiesproviding high levels of tar- tional human rights organizations, or organi-
geted, information-rich representationbut zations representing the interests of children
they also function in areas where no elec- or animals. Finally, there are many agents
toral democracy exists: in the global arena, nongovernmental organizations and founda-
and in authoritarian contexts (Dryzek 2000, tions, for examplewho claim missions on
ch. 5; Grant & Keohane 2005; Saward 2006b; behalf of others, more or less formally (Grant
Bohman 2007; Rubenstein 2007). Indeed, & Keohane 2005, Saward 2006b). In these
these representative functions are increasingly kinds of cases, initial authorization is inher-
recognized by international organizations. ently problematic; agents claim representative
For instance, the United Nations has begun status and it is up to those who are claimed
recognizing civil society organizations within as represented to say yes or no or to of-
its programs as representative of groups that fer alternative accounts. Authorization is, as
are not well represented by its member states. it were, reexive and retrospective at best.
The challenges for democratic theory are to Where those who are represented are silent
understand the nature of these representa- because of their contextor absent, as in
tive claims and to assess which of them count the case of future generationsthe analogy
as contributions to democracy and in what to electoral authorization breaks down alto-
ways. It is now clear, for example, that self- gether, and we are better off to look at generic
authorized representation is not necessarily a norms and functions of democratic represen-
precursor to formal, electoral inclusion but tation, and then to imagine nonelectoral de-
rather a representative phenomenon in its vices that might serve these norms and func-
own right, which may contribute to democ- tions (Rubenstein 2007).
racy in ways that electoral representation can- No doubt because of the absence of for-
not. But unlike electoral mechanisms, the mal authorization in most cases, the work
arena of self-authorized representatives of- relevant to these new forms of representa-
fers no discrete domain of institutional pro- tion has focused primarily on accountabil-
cesses, and so identifying and assessing their ity (Ebrahim 2003, Kuper 2004, Held &
democratic contributions will take imagina- Koenig-Archibugi 2005, Castiglione 2006).
tion (D. Castiglione & M.E. Warren, unpub- There are several potential mechanisms of
lished manuscript). accountability. When membership-based vol-
One way to begin would be to ask the same untary organizations claim to represent their
generic questions asked of electoral represen- members, for example, members can either
tation, as suggested above: (a) How are the lend their names to the organization, or they
representatives authorized by those in whose can exit, producing market-like accountability
(Goodin 2003). Groups without power may room jury, which represents the considered
go public, gaining inuence precisely because judgment of peers. We can now add more
they can justify their representations (Warren recent experiments with citizen juries and
2001, ch. 4). A group may be held to ac- panels, advisory councils, stakeholder meet-
count indirectly through horizontal polic- ings, lay members of professional review
ing by other groups, by boards, or by the boards, representations at public hearings,
media, often through comparisons between public submissions, citizen surveys, deliber-
the groups representative claims (e.g., in its ative polling, deliberative forums, and focus
mission statement) and its actions (Grant & groups (Pettit 1999b, Fung 2006b). Citizen
Keohane 2005). Devices such as performance representatives typically function not as alter-
indicators, audits, and surveys can add ele- natives but rather as supplements to elected
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Of course, this list of possible ways and ies in areas of functional weakness, usually
means of authorization and accountability related to communication, deliberation, legit-
only tells us that, in principle, we could de- imacy, governability, or attentiveness to pub-
velop theories that would stretch to the do- lic norms and common goods (Brown 2006,
main of self-authorized representatives. It is Warren 2008).
neither a theory in itself, nor a judgment Although these representative forms are
as to whether or how this emerging do- typically categorized as participatory democ-
main contributes to democratic representa- racy, direct democracy, or citizen engage-
tion (cf. Warren 2001, ch. 7; 2003). But one ment, these terms are misleading because only
key issue for democratic theory is increas- a tiny percentage of citizens are actively in-
ingly clear, even in advance of well-developed volved in any given venue. The more im-
theories. In the case of electoral representa- portant properties of these forms of citizen
tion, an abstract equality is achieved through participation, we think, are representative. A
the universal franchise. There is no equiva- few citizens actively serve as representatives of
lent equality of inuence or voice in the non- other citizens. What is most interesting about
electoral domain, where the advantages of these new forms is that they have the poten-
education, income, and other unequally dis- tial to represent discursively considered opin-
tributed resources are more likely to trans- ions and voices that are not necessarily rep-
late into patterns of over- and underrepre- resented either through electoral democracy
sentation (Warren 2001, Cain et al. 2003, or through the aggregate of self-authorized
Strolovitch 2006). The many advantages of representatives in the public sphere. Fung
self-authorized representationand they are (2003) highlights this unique representative
considerablemay also result in increasingly function by referring to these new forms as
unequal representation. minipublics. They have the potential to cap-
ture opinions and voices that are not heard,
not necessarily because of group-based dis-
Citizen Representatives advantage, but because the sum total of ad-
Self-authorized representation provides a vocacy will often fail to represent unorga-
possible frame for understanding the rapid nized interests and values. Minipublics can
evolution of what we call, following Warren also represent considered public opinion, par-
(2008), citizen representatives (Rowe & ticularly opinions representing compromises
Frewer 2000, Brown 2006). These forms in- and trade-offs in complex or fractious issue
volve nonelected, formally designed venues areas. Under the standard model, the work
into which citizens are selected or self- of deliberatively crafting policies belongs to
selected for representative purposes. The old- the formal political institutionsand these
est form of citizen representative is the court- institutions nd it increasingly difcult to
represent considered, legitimate solutions be- balance to both electoral representation and
fore the public. Under the citizen representa- self-authorized representation. Its democratic
tive model, venues are designed, as it were, credentials stemmed from its initial constitu-
to generate considered opinion. Deliberative tion by elected representatives, its statistically
polls, for example, involve a random selec- representative makeup (so as to look like the
tion of citizens who are convened for a week- people of BC), and its submission of its nal
end to discuss an issue such as health care recommendation directly to the people.
policy. During this time, participants learn Randomly selected bodies represent a
about the issue, deliberate, and then regis- novel and potentially important new form of
ter their opinions (Fishkin 1995). The re- representativeor, more precisely, the redis-
sults should represent what informed pub- covery of an ancient form (Fishkin 1991, Lieb
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
lic opinion would look like, were citizens to 2004). Should these forms grow, they will
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
organize, become informed, and deliberate. bring new challenges. Because any randomly
Presumably, the results are not simply coun- selected deliberative body will inevitably gen-
terfactual; they represent a statistically rep- erate opinions that differ from public opin-
resentative snapshot of the existing but la- ion, for example, connecting them to broader
tent preferences of citizenspreferences that publics will require new institutions, yet to
power holders seeking to represent the peo- be devised (cf. Fung 2003, Warren & Pearse
ple should need to know. 2008). At worst, randomly selected bodies
For similar reasons, governments increas- might become tools that elites use to le-
ingly constitute citizen juries and panels gitimate policies while bypassing electoral
charged with representing the views of citi- accountability, or they might substitute for
zens more generally, on a given issue (Brown broader citizen judgment and participation
2006). In an unusual experiment in non- (Ackerman 1991, p. 181). At best, however,
electoral representation, the government of such bodies might function as an important
British Columbia (BC) sought to assess the supplement to existing forms of representa-
provinces electoral system and recommend tion. They have the potential to link the judg-
an alternative in the form of a referen- ments of political elites much more closely
dum question. Rather than leaving the job to public opinion, while correcting for the
to the legislature or an expert commission, inequalities introduced by the rise of self-
the government constituted a citizens as- authorized representatives.
sembly composed of 160 members, selected
from voter rolls though a near-random pro-
cess. The assembly met over a period of THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
nine months, which included learning, pub- If elections alone qualify as representative
lic hearings, and deliberations. Professional democracy, then it is hard to nd good ar-
representativesin particular, organized ad- guments against the critics of contemporary
vocates and professional politicianswere ex- democracy who seek to unmask the role of
cluded. They were invited to speak with the the people as a mere myth, and point to
assembly, but the designers assumed that the the oligarchic degeneration and corruption
public interest would be represented only of electoral democracy. Such criticism de-
if stakeholder advocacy were separated from pends on an institutional history of repre-
learning, listening, and deliberation (Warren sentative government that has not been sub-
& Pearse 2008). In short, because it combined stantively edited since the eighteenth cen-
authorization by an elected government, ran- tury. Moreover, the suggestion that we extend
dom selection, a deliberative format, and ac- the meaning of democratic representation
countability through a referendum, the BC to include the informal, discursive character
Citizens Assembly was designed as a counter- of a pluralistic public sphere of associations,
political movements, and opinions risks look- point. Even if some of the Framers leaned
ing like an ideological refurbishment, func- more toward the idea of an aristocratic re-
tional to the new legitimation strategies of public than a democratic republic, they soon
political elites. Indeed, almost without ex- discovered that under the leadership of James
ception, it remains the case that only an Madison, among others, Americans would
elected political elite has both deliberative and rapidly undertake to create a more demo-
decision-making power, unlike the citizens, cratic republic (pp. 56). Given the complex
whose formal freedom to discuss and criticize and evolving landscape of democracy, how-
proposals and policies does not ensure that ever, neither the standard model of represen-
their opinions will affect legislation and pol- tation nor the participatory ideal can encom-
icy making. pass the democratic ideal of inclusion of all
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
important changes in representative institu- closer to this ideal, we shall need com-
tions. These changes began with the adop- plex forms of representationelectoral rep-
tion and extension of universal suffrage, which resentation and its various territorially based
generated new forms of political life within so- cousins, self-authorized representation, and
ciety, in turn altering the nature and functions new forms of representation that are capable
of representative institutions. Dahls (2003) of representing latent interests, transnational
comment on the US case goes precisely to this issues, broad values, and discursive positions.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of
this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Dario Castiglione and Nancy Rosenblum for their comments on previous drafts of
this article.
LITERATURE CITED
Ackerman B. 1991. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Alcoff L. 1991. The problem of speaking for others. Cult. Crit. 20:532
Amy D. 1996. Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Elections in the United States.
New York: Columbia Univ. Press
Andeweg RB. 2003. Beyond representativeness? Trends in political representation. Eur. Rev.
11(2):14761
Anheier HK, Kaldor MH, Glasisu M, eds. 2004. Global Civil Society 2004/5. London: Sage
Ankersmit F. 2002. Political Representation. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
Arendt H. 1989. Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy, ed. R Beiner. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
Press
Arendt H. 2006. On Revolution. London: Penguin
Barber B. 1984. Strong Democracy. Los Angeles: Univ. Calif. Press
Barber K. 2001. A Right to Representation: Proportional Election Systems for the 21st Century.
Columbia: Ohio Univ. Press
Beck U. 1997. The Reinvention of Politics. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Beerbohm E. The ethics of democratic representation. See Castiglione et al., unpublished
manuscript
Benhabib S. 2004. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge Univ. Press
Beitz CR. 1989. Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press
Bobbio N. 1987. The Future of Democracy. Transl. R Griffen. Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press
(from Italian)
Bohman J. 2007. Democracy across Borders: From Demos to Demoi. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Brown MB. 2006. Survey article: citizen panels and the concept of representation. J. Polit.
Philos. 14(2):20325
Burke E. 1968 (1790). Reections on the Revolution in France. London: Penguin Books
Burnheim J. 1989. Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics. Berkeley: Univ.
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Calif. Press
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Bybee KJ. 1998. Mistaken Identity: The Supreme Court and the Politics of Minority Representation.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Cain B, Dalton R, Scarrow S. 2003. Democratic publics and democratic institutions. In Democ-
racy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed.
B Cain, R Dalton, S Scarrow, pp. 25175. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Carre de Malberg R. 1920. Contribution a` la Theorie generale de lEtat. 2 vols. Paris: Sirey
Castiglione D. 2006. Accountability. In Encyclopedia of Governance, ed. M Bevir, pp. 17.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Castiglione D, Warren ME. Rethinking democratic representation: eight theoretical issues.
See Castiglione et al., unpublished manuscript
Castiglione D, Rehfeld A, Warren ME, eds. Rethinking Democratic Representation. Unpublished
manuscript
Chambers S. 2004. Behind closed doors: publicity, secrecy, and the quality of deliberation.
J. Polit. Philos. 12:389410
Cohen J. 1996. Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy. In Democracy and Differ-
ence: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. S Benhabib, pp. 95119. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press
Dahl R. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Dahl R. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
Dahl R. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
Dahl R. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
Dahl R. 2003. How Democratic is the American Constitution? New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
2nd ed.
Dalton R. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in the
Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Dalton R. 2007. The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics.
Washington, DC: Congr. Q. Press
De la Bigne de Villeneuve M. 19291931. Traite generale de lEtat, Vol. 2. Paris: Sirey
Dunn J. 1999. Situating democratic political accountability. See Przeworski et al. 1999,
pp. 32944
Duverger M, Sartori G. 1988. Los sistemas electorales. San Jose, Costa Rica: Inst. Interamericano
de Derechos Humanos, Cent. Interamericano de Asesora y Promocion Electoral
Dovi S. 2002. Preferable descriptive representatives: or will just any woman, black, or Latino
do? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 96:74554
Dovi S. 2007. The Good Representative. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Dryzek JS. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford, UK:
Oxford Univ. Press
Dworkin R. 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press
Ebrahim A. 2003. NGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Eulau H, Karps PD. 1977. The puzzle of representation: specifying components of respon-
siveness. Legis. Stud. Q. 2:23354
Elster J. 1998. Deliberation and constitution-making. In Deliberative Democracy, ed. J Elster,
pp. 97122. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Farrell DM. 2001. Electoral Systems. New York: Palgrave
Fishkin J. 1991. Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. New Haven,
CT: Yale Univ. Press
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Fishkin J. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Univ. Press
Fraser N. 2005. Reframing Justice: The 2004 Spinoza Lectures. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum
Fraser N. 2007. Identity, exclusion, and critique: a response to four critics. Eur. J. Polit. Theor.
6:30538
Friedrich CJ. 1963. Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics. New York: McGraw
Friedrich CJ. 1968. Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and
America. Waltham, MA: Blaisdell. 4th ed.
Fung A. 2003. Recipes for public spheres: eight institutional design choices and their conse-
quences. J. Polit. Philos. 11:33867
Fung A. 2006a. Democratizing the policy process. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed.
R Goodin, M Moran, M Rein, pp. 66985. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Fung A. 2006b. Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Admin. Rev. 66:6675
Gargarella R. 1998. Full representation, deliberation, and impartiality. In Deliberative Democ-
racy, ed. J Elster, pp. 26080. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Goodin R. 2003. Democratic accountability: the third sector and all. Work. Pap. No. 19, The Hauser
Center, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA
Gould C. 1996. Diversity and democracy: representing differences. In Democracy and Differ-
ence: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. S Benhabib, pp. 17186. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ.
Gould C. 2004. Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
Press
Grant R, Keohane RO. 2005. Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. Am. Polit.
Sci. Rev. 99:2944
Guinier L. 1994. The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy.
New York: Free Press
Gutmann A, Thompson D. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conict Cannot Be
Avoided in Politics and What Should Be Done About It. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
Habermas J. 1989 (1962). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Transl. T Berger.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (from German)
Habermas J. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy. Transl. W Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (from German)
Hansen MH. 1993. The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Transl. JA Crook. Oxford:
Blackwell (from Danish)
Hegel GWF. 1967 (1821). Philosophy of Right. Transl. TM Knox. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ.
Press (from German)
Held D. 1996. Models of Democracy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
Held D, Koenig-Archibugi M. 2005. Global Governance and Public Accountability. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell
James M. 2004. Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity. Lawrence: Univ. Press Kansas
Kateb G. 1992. The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press
Keck ME. 2003. Governance regimes and the politics of discursive representation. In Transna-
tional Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy, ed. N Piper, A Uhlin, pp. 4360.
London: Routledge
Keck ME, Sikkink K. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
Kelsen H. 1929. Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie. Tubingen, Ger.: Mohr
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Kelsen H. 1992 (1934). Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. Transl. B Litschewski
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Pitkin HF. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Pitkin HF. 2004. Representation and democracy: uneasy alliance. Scand. Polit. Stud. 27:33542
Plotke D. 1997. Representation is democracy. Constellations 4:1934
Pogge T. 2002. Self-constituting constituencies to enhance freedom, equality and participation
in democratic procedures. Theoria 49:2654
Powell GB Jr. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions.
New Haven/London: Yale Univ. Press
Powell GB Jr. 2004. Political representation in comparative politics. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.
7:27396
Przeworski A. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe
and Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Przeworski A, Stokes SC, Manin B, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation.
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Thompson DF. 1987. Political Ethics and Public Ofce. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
Thompson DF. 1995. Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption. Washington,
DC: Brookings Inst.
Thompson DF. 2002. Just Elections. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Thompson DF. 2004. Election time: normative implications of temporal properties of the
electoral process in the United States. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98(1):5163
Truman DB. 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York:
Knopf
Urbinati N. 2000. Representation as advocacy: a study of democratic deliberation. Polit. Theory
28(6):75886
Urbinati N. 2005. Continuity and rupture: the power of judgment in democratic representation.
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Constellations 12:194222
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Urbinati N. 2006. Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
Press
Warren ME. 2001. Democracy and Association. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Warren ME. 2003. What is the role of nonprots in a democracy? Society 40:4651
Warren ME. 2006. Democracy and deceit: regulating appearances of corruption. Am. J. Polit.
Sci. 50:16074
Warren ME. 2008. Citizen representatives. See Warren & Pearse 2008, pp. 5069
Warren ME, Pearse H, eds. 2008. Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citi-
zens Assembly. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
Williams MS. 1998. Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal
Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Williams MS. 2000. The uneasy alliance of group representation and deliberative democracy.
In Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies, ed. W Kymlicka, W Norman, pp. 12453.
Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Wolin S. 2004. Politics and Visions: Expanded Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Young IM. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
Zolo D. 1992. Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach. University Park: Penn. State Press
Annual Review of
Political Science
State Failure
Access provided by CONRICYT EBVC and Econ Trial on 09/23/15. For personal use only.
Robert H. Bates p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p1
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11:387-412. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
v
AR344-FM ARI 8 April 2008 18:44
Indexes
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Political Science articles may be found
at http://polisci.annualreviews.org/
vi Contents