Political nihilism spreads beyond the classroom it
empowers violent conservatives like Trump foresaking compromise is a dangerous, academic luxury Claudio 16, (assistant professor of development studies and southeast Asian studies at the Ateneo de Manila University, Intellectuals have ushered the world into a dangerous age of political nihilism, qz.com/721914/intellectuals-have-ushered-the-world-into-a-dangerous-age- of-political-nihilism/) On the surface, it would seem that intellectuals have nothing to do with the rise of global illiberalism. The movements powering Brexit, Donald Trump and Third-World strongmen like Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte all gleefully reject books, history and higher education in favor of railing against common enemies like outsiders and globalization. And youll find few Trump supporters among the largely left-wing American professoriate. Yet intellectuals are accountable for the rise of these movementsalbeit indirectly. Professors have offered stringent criticisms of neoliberal society. But they have failed to offer the public viable alternatives. In this way, they have promoted a political nihilism that has set the stage for new movements that reject liberal democratic principles of tolerance and institutional reform. Intellectuals have a long history of critiquing liberalism, which relies on a philosophy of individual rights and (relatively) free markets. Beginning in the 19th century, according to historian Francois Furet, left-wing thinkers began to arrive at a consensus that modern liberal democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred. For most of the 20th century, anti-liberal intellectuals were able to come up with alternatives. Jean-Paul Sartre famously defended the Soviet Union even when it became clear that Joseph Stalin was a mass murderer. French, American, Indian, and Filipino university radicals were hopelessly enamored of Mao Zedongs Cultural Some leftist intellectuals Revolution in the 1970s. The collapse of Communism changed all this. began to find hope in small revolutionary guerrillas in the Third World, like Mexicos Subcomandante Marcos. Others fell back on pure critique. Academics are now mostly gadflies who rarely offer strategies for political change. Those who do forward alternatives propose ones so vague or divorced from reality that they might as well be proposing nothing. (The Duke University professor of romance studies Michael Hardt, for example, thinks the evils of modern globalization are so pernicious that only worldwide Such thinking promotes political hopelessness. It rejects love is the answer.) gradual change as cosmetic, while patronizing those who think otherwise. This nihilism easily spreads from the classroom and academic journals to op-ed pages to Zuccotti Park, and eventually to the public at large. For academic nihilists, the shorthand for the worlds evils is neoliberalism. The term is used to refer to a free market ideology that forced globalization on people by reducing the power of governments. The more the term is used, however, the more it becomes a vague designation for all global drudgery. Democratic politics in the age of neoliberalism, according to Harvard anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, is something of a They argue that our belief that pyramid scheme: the more it is indulged, the more it is required. we can use laws and constitutional processes to defend our rights is a form of fetishism that is ultimately chimerical. For the University of Chicago literary theorist Lauren Berlant, the democratic pursuit of happiness amid neoliberalism is nothing but cruel optimism. The materialist things that people desire are actually an obstacle to your flourishing, she writes. According to this logic, we are trapped by our own ideologies. It is this logic that allows left-wing thinkers to implicitly side with British nativists in their condemnation of the EU. The radical website Counterpunch, for example, describes the EU as a neoliberal prison. It also views liberals seeking to reform the EU as coopted by the right wing and its goalsfrom the subversion of progressive economic ideals to neoliberalism, to the enthusiastic embrace of Trump supporters are singing a similar neoconservative doctrine. Across the Atlantic, tune. Speaking to a black, gay, college-educated Trump supporter, Samantha Bee was told: Weve had these disasters in neoconservatism and neoliberalism and I think that he [Trump] is an alternative to both those paths. The academic nihilists and the Trumpists are in agreement about a key issue: The system is fundamentally broken, and liberals who believe in working patiently toward change are weak. For the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, indifference is the the hallmark of political liberalism. Since liberals balance different interests and rights, Santos writes, they have no permanent friends or foes. He proposes that the world needs to revive the friend/foe dichotomy. And in a profane way, it has: modern political movements pit Americans against Muslims, academic anti- Britain against Europe, a dictatorial government against criminals. Unfortunately, liberalism is not confined to the West. The Cornell political scientist Benedict Anderson once described liberal democracy in the Philippines as a Cacique Democracy, dominated by feudal landlords and capitalist families. In this system, meaningful reform is difficult, since the countrys political system is Having a nihilist streak like a well-run casino, where tables are rigged in favor of oligarch bosses. myself, I once echoed Anderson when I chastised Filipino nationalists for projecting hope onto spaces within an elite democracy. Like Anderson, I offered no alternative. The alternative arrived recently in the guise of the Duterte, the new president of the Philippines. Like Anderson and me, Duterte complained about the impossibility of real change in a democracy dominated by elites and oligarchs. But unlike us, he proposed a way out: a strong political leader who was willing to kill to save the country from criminals and corrupt politicians. The spread of global illiberalism is unlikely to end soon. As this crisis unfolds, we will need intellectuals who use their intellects for more than simple negation professors like the late New York University historian Tony Judt, who argued that European-style social Failing that, we need academics who democracy could save global democracy. acknowledge that liberal democracy, though slow and imperfect, enables a bare minimum of tolerance in a world beset by xenophobia and hatred . For although academics have the luxury of imagining a completely different world, the rest of us have to figure out what to do with the one we have. read Exclusive focus on past injustice is bad there shouldnt be a forced choice Bevernage 15 (October 2015, Berber, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Ghent, The Past is Evil/Evil is Past: On Retrospective Politics, Philosophy of History, and Temporal Manichaeism, History and Theory Volume 54, Issue 3, pages 333352) Torpey is certainly not the only intellectual expressing these worries. According to historian Pieter Lagrou , our contemporary societies, for lack of future projects, shrink into a passeist culture. 12 In European public discourse, he argues, the focus on crimes of the distant past has become so strong that it tends to marginalize claims of victims of contemporary crimes and human rights violations. Therefore, Lagrou argues, a commemorative discourse of victimhood is very much the opposite of a constructive and dynamic engagement with the present, but rather a paralyzing regression of democratic debate.13 Lagrou's argument closely resembles many others that turn against retrospective politics and victim culture such as Ian Buruma's warning about the peril of minorities defining themselves exclusively as historical victims and engaging in an Olympics of suffering14 and Charles Maier's claims about a surfeit of memory.15 These warnings about the perils of a retrospective politics outweighing or even banning politics directed at contemporary injustices or striving for a more just future should be taken seriously. Yet the alternative of an exclusively present- or future-oriented politics disregarding all historical injustice is not desirable either. Contemporary injustice often manifests itself in the form of structural repetition or continuity of injustices with a long history. Moreover, totalitarian versions of progressivist politics have frequently abused the idea of a struggle for a more just future in order to justify past and present suffering. It could even be argued that the rise of dominant restrospective politics has been initiated partly on the basis of disillusionment with the exculpatory mechanisms of progressivist ideology.16 Some indeed claim that much of present-day retrospective politics and the setting straight of historical injustices would be unnecessary had totalitarian progressivist politics focused less exclusively on the bright future and shown more sensitivity to the contemporary suffering of its day. This claim certainly makes sense if one thinks of extreme examples such as Stalin's five-year plans and Mao's Great Leap Forward. Yet, as Matthias Frisch rightly argues, the risk of the justification of past and present suffering lurks around the corner wherever progressive logics of history or promises of bright and just futures are not counterbalanced by reflective forms of remembrance.17 Therefore, we should resist dualist thinking that forces us to choose between restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice in the present or the future . Rather, we should look for types of retrospective politics that do not oppose but complement or reinforce the emancipatory and utopian elements in present- and future-directed politics and the other way around: present- and future-oriented politics that do not forget about historical injustices . In this paper I want to contribute to this goal by focusing on the issue of retrospective politics and by analyzing how one can differentiate emancipatory or even utopian types of retrospective politics from retrospective politics that I classify here as anti-utopian. I argue that the currently dominant strands ofretrospective politics indeed do tend to be anti-utopian and have a very limited emancipatory potential . Moreover, I claim that currently dominant retrospective politics do not radically break with several of the exculpatory intellectual mechanisms that are typicallyassociated with progressivist politics but actually modify and sometimes even radicalize them . In that restricted sense, and only in this sense, it can be argued that currently dominant retrospective politics do not represent a fundamentally new way of dealing with historical evil and the ethics of responsibility.
Those oppressed by colonialism need policy solutions.
They depend on macropolitical feasibility of the postcolonial state Dussel, 11 [2011, Enrique Dussel is the Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, From Critical Theory to the Philosophy of Liberation: Some Themes for Dialogue, Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/59m869d2] We should proceed in politics in the very same manner that Marx proceeded in economics: working on the level of macro-institutional feasibility. The dissolution of the state should be defined as a political postulate. To seek to bring this about empirically leads to the anti-institutional fallacy, and the impossibility of a critical, transformative politics. To say that we need to transform the world without exercising power through institutions including the state (which we need to radically transform, but not The presently given institutions, eliminate) is the fallacy into which Negri and Holloway fall. and even the particular state as a political macro-institution, are never perfect and always require transformation. But there are moments in which institutions become diachronically repressive in the extreme, in their final entropic moment. Hegemony the consensus exercised over the obedient la Weber's legitimate domination91 gives rise to domination in the Gramscian sense. The state machinery, in the service of the economic interests of the dominant classes in the postcolonial metropolitan nations, become definitively repressive. The popular masses go on gaining consciousness in proportion to level of their oppression. This accumulation of power-to (potentia),93 which takes place partially in the exteriority of the structures of the particular state but within the bosom of the people (which is not without its contradictions), confronts the political It does so to trans-form them (not necessarily for reforms94, institutions currently in force. but only rarely for revolution95), not necessarily to destroy them (though it could if required by the postulates), but to use them and transform them according to its ends and according to the degree of correspondence to the permanence and extension of life and symmetrical The anti-institutionalist believes that the democratic participation of the oppressed people. destruction of the state represents an important victory on the path to revolution. This sort of destruction is irrational . They have confused the dissolution of the state as a postulate (empirically impossible, but functioning as a principle for strategic orientation) with its empirical negation. How are we to understand the postulate of the dissolution of the state ? Right-wing anarchism like that of Nozick proposes the dissolution of the state or something close to it under the guise of the minimal state. The unhindered market produces equilibrium, especially in Hayek's formulation; for this, the minimal state needs only to destroy the monopolies that impede the free movement of the market. A union seeking a wage increase is a monopoly, because it places demands on the market that do not emanate from free competition. The duty of the state is therefore to dissolve the union. In the service of this total market definition, the process of globalization as controlled by transnational industrial and financial capital (not with hegemony, because this was lost in the move to the last-instance use: the violent coercion of military power), equally proposes the dissolution or The postcolonial state weakening of the particular states in postcolonial peripheral nations. however much it may be dominated by the private bureaucracies of the transnational corporations which impose their own members onto the political bureaucracies of those states (and we see, for example, a Coca-Cola distributor as president96) still represents
the last possible resistance for oppressed peoples. To dissolve or
substantially weaken their states is to take away their only possible defense. The second Iraq War represents a war against a particular postcolonial state that, however corrupt and dictatorial, nevertheless had a certain degree of sovereignty and self-determination which interposed some resistance to the appropriation of its petroleum by foreign companies. For all of this, it is tragic that a sector of the left coincides with the North American Empire the home-state97 of the transnationals and the ultimate example of power based on its economic political-military complex in dissolving the particular peripheral state. If Europeans alongside Habermas seemed as though they were dissolving the old particular state, it is for the strategic fortification of a Confederation of States in the European Union. In Latin America, if it were possible to proceed to organize a Confederation of Latin American States98 without American or Spanish influence, such a weakening of the particular state would Any struggle for the real, be equally useful. But for the moment, this is not the situation. effective dissolution of a particular postcolonial state is a reactionary project. It is an entirely different thing to struggle to transform the particular postcolonial state in view of a political postulate of the dissolution of the state as such. This would mean that in the creation of any new institution, in every exercise of institutional power, or in the transformation of all of the institutions (the transformation of the state), one would have the dissolution of the state as an orienting principle. However, this cannot take the form of the objective, empirical negation of these institutions, but rather must take the form of a responsible, democratic, popular, social, and participatory subjectivization of institutional functions, in which representation proceeds by approaching (to use a Kantian word) the represented. In this situation, the symmetrical participation of all those affected would become flesh in all political actions to such a degree that the state will cease to weigh so heavily, becoming lighter, more transparent, and more public and democratic. This would not be a minimal state (which leaves everything to the market or to the impossibility of perfect citizens99), but more accurately a subjectivized state in which the citizens will participate to such a degree that the existing institutional sphere will shift toward transparency, the bureaucracy will be the minimum necessary, while its efficacy and instrumentality when it comes to the permanence and extension of human life will nevertheless be at a maximum. I do not believe that it makes sense to attempt to transform political institutions without the state, without exercising power which is communicative, democratic, legitimate, participatory, socialized, and popular. It is, however, possible to declare a postulate which could never be realized, but which functions like the North Star that helped the Chinese navigators to sail at night. Despite all that I have expounded, I think that the postulate of the dissolution of the state is a strategic orienting principle that functions as a regulative horizon.
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