(87) Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support
pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the
respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for
legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as
the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action
for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action
thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can
proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for
concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the
right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof
including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of the children, support and disqualifications from
inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where
no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be
availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always
file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/gandiongco-vs-
penaranda.html
Gandionco vs Pearanda
November 27, 1987Ponente: Reyes J.B.L., J.Topic:
The Law on Separation of Spouses; Concept of Legal
Separation; Grounds for Legal Separation; Sexual Infidelity
orPerversion
Facts:
May 29, 1986
Teresita Gandionco, wife of petitioner, filed with the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent judge, Judge
Senen Pearanda, a petition for legal separation on the ground
of concubinage.
October 13, 1986
Teresita filed a criminal case for concubinage against her
husband.
November 14, 1986
Teresita filed for a provisional remedy of support pendente lite.
December 10, 1986
Respondent Judge ordered the payment of Pendente Lite.
Petitioner contends the order of the judge, saying, that, the
course of the civil action, in this case, Legal Separation, is
tiedwith the criminal charge, in this case, concubinage. Thus any
action on the civil case should be postponed until the
criminalcase, on which it is based, is finalized.
Family Code - Art. 55.
A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure - Art. III. Sec. 3.
Other Civil action arising from offenses.
Whenever the offended partyshall have instituted the civil action
to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as
contemplated in the first Section 1hereof, the following rules shall
be observed:(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the
pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, inwhatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .
Pendente Lite
:
while the litigation is pending
Issues:
Whether or not Legal Separation on the grounds of concubinage
of requires the finding guilty of concubinage of the same?
Decision:
Petition Denied.
Held Ratio1.
Legal Separation on the grounds of Concubinage does
not require that the husband be found guilty of the same.A
decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, maybe
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in theaction for
legal separation.
No criminal proceeding orconviction is necessary.(Back when
absolute divorce was allowed in the country, Act.2710, the law
prescribes the grounds on which it can be availed.One of which
is that the husband be found guilty of concubinage.)
https://www.scribd.com/doc/77905832/Gandionco-vs-Penaranda
(88) Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance
of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.
Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved
to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death
of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners
counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in
an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the
same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as
a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could
be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by
either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/lapuz-sy-vs-
eufemio.html
(89) Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married
in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they
acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various
businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for
the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her
husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their
conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that
he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead
stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short
visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The
latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita
Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for
the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the
conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the
husband and WON there has been an abused of his authority as
administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital
obligations and support of the family. To be legally declared as to
have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and
with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation.
There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In
fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support
as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming
home to the conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the
husband paid short visits implying more than one visit.
Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses,
the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500
that was given personally by the defendant or the witness
himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or
failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist,
there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/dela-cruz-vs-dela-
cruz.html
(90) TITLE: ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner
vs. LUCITA ONG, respondent
DATE: October 2006
PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS: William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13,
1975. Union was blessed with 3 children. On March 21, 1996,
Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC
on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal
separation. CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the
couples drama was on December 14, 1995 when the respondent
asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod
which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the
respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and
ultimately pointing a gun at respondents head asking her to
leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs
decision granting legal separation to Lucita when she herself has
given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.
HELD: No.
RATIO: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be
granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation
(Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the
Familu Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due
to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said provision.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.
https://www.scribd.com/doc/62708159/Ong-vs-Ong-Sexual-
Infidelity-or-Perversion#download
(92) De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in
1938. They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions
that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations
with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila
in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one
year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife
finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the
act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a
petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes
the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other
than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is
a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through
a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent
of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be
based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively
on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based
on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
(93)
(94) brown v yambao, 102 phil 168 (1957)
(95) Bugayong vs Ginez
Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married
with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on
furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with
the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back
to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay
with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July
1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with
her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local
college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco,
(plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which
were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by
letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy
Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal
department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his
wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They
proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where
they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next
day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with
Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of
answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for
legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and
Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage.
http://hyperjetsetter.blogspot.com/2011/04/bugayong-vs-
ginez.html
100 Phil 616, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong was married to defendant
LeonilaGinez on August 27, 1949 at Asingan,
Pangasinan wherein they resided at the residence of
Bugayongs sister. After some time or about July 1951,
Leonila left and had gone to reside with her mother.
As early of July 1951, Benjamin began receiving letters
from his sister-in-law and some from anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
In August 1952, Benjamin went to Pangasinan and
sought for his wife whom he met in the house of
Leonilas godmother. They stayed in the house of
Benjamins cousin and lived as husband and wife for
two nights and one day.
The couple then went to Benjamins house where they
passed the night as husband and wife.On the second
day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
informationhe received but instead of answering,
Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin
concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity.
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of
First Instance a complaint for legal separation against
his wife LeonilaGinez..The case was dismissed on the
ground of alleged condonation.
ISSUE:
Did Benjamin Bugayong condone the infidelity of Leonila?
RULING:
Yes. There was condonation because the husband, Benjamin
Bugayong,actively searched for his wife in Pangasinan after she
left the conjugal home.The act of Benjamin in persuading
Leoniza to come along with him, and the fact that she went with
him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin and
together slept there as husband and wife and the further fact that
in the second night they slept together in their house as husband
and wife all these facts have no other meaning than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was
condonation of the wife by the husband.A single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
www.scribd.com/document/240382616/Bugayong-vs-Ginez-docx
(97) Socorro Matubis vs ZoiloPraxedes
G.R. No. L-11766
October 25, 1960
Paredes, J.
FACTS:
Matubis and Praxedes were married on January 10, 1943 at
Iriga, Camarines Sur. On May 30, 1944, for failure to agree on
how they should live as husband and wife, they agreed to live
separately from each other. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement on their legal separation.
Starting January 1955,Praxedes began cohabiting with Asuncion
Rebulado, deported themselves as husband and wife in the
community; and on September 1, 1955, Asuncion gave birth to
Praxedes child. On April 24, 1956, alleging abandonment and
concubinage, Matubis, filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur a
complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname against
Praxedes, who denied the allegations and contended that it was
Matubis who left the conjugal home. CFI dismissed the complaint
on ground that the action has prescribed, but acknowledged that
Praxedes acts constituted concubinage, which is a ground for
legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for filing the petition had already
prescribed.
RULING:
Yes, under Art. 102 of the Civil Code, an action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after
the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from and after the date when the cause
occurred. Matubis became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her
husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955, but the
complaint was filed only on April 24, 1956. The present action
was, therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is
barred.
Hence, the Supreme Courtdismissed the petition andaffirmed the
lower courts ruling.
www.scribd.com/doc/163631429/Matubis-vs-Praxedes
(98) PONENTE:DizonDATE:May 29, 1970
FACTS:
March 16, 1952: Elena Contreras married Cesar Macaraig
Cesar was employed at MICO Offset owned by Elenas
father,where he met Lily Ann Alcala
After elections of 1961, Cesar resigned at MICO to be aspecial
agent at Malacanang.He was rarely home thereafterdue to
series of confidential missions
September 1962: Avelino Lubos, the family driver, saw
Cesarliving with Lily Ann
October 1962: Elena refrained from verifying Lubos report inher
desire not to anger Cesar
April 1963: rumors that Cesar was seen with a woman
alreadyon the family way
May 1963: Elena again refrained from asking so as not
toprecipitate a quarrel and drive Cesar away
Elena received reports that Lily Ann had already given birth.To
verify the report Elena sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, herfathers
employee
Felicisima saw Cesar carrying a baby in his arms.She wentto
the parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar andLily
Ann
Lucilo Macaraig, Cesars father, interceded to convince Cesarto
go back to his wife, but to no avail.
Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, Cesars older sister, arranged a
meetingbetween Lily Ann and Elena, and Lily Ann said that she
waswilling to give up Cesar but Cesar did not want to give up
therelationship.
December 1963: Elena with her 2 children went to see
Cesarand to beg him to return to his legitimate family but Cesar
saidthat he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return.
December 14, 1963: Elena filed the petition for legalseparation
CFI: dismissed the petition because the 1 year period to
fileaction has already lapsedoAt the time Elena acquired
information, whichcan be reasonably relied upon as true, that her
husbandis living-in concubinage with another woman, the 1-
yearperiod should be deemed to have started even if the
wifeshall not then be in possession of proof sufficient toestablish
the concubinage before a court of law.
ISSUE:Whether the period of one year provide for in Article 102
ofthe Civil Code should be counted from September 1962 or from
December 1963
HELD/DECISION:From December 1963RATIO:
The only time Elena really became cognizant of the infidelity of
her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when she
went to see Cesar and beg for his return.
It is only on December 1963 that Cesar admitted that he was
living with Lily Ann and would not return to his legitimate family
www.coursehero.com
(99) to read
(100) DELA VINA v. VILLAREAL AND GEOPANO
FACTS:
1) The purpose of the action is to obtain an order
declaring:
a) That the respondent (Villareal) has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain
action for divorce instituted by Narcisa
Geopano against her husband
b) That the said respondent judge has exceeded
his power and authority in issuing a preliminary
injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting
him from alienating or encumbering any part of
the conjugal property during the pendency of
the action
c) That all proceedings theretofore had in said
court were null and void
2) Narcisa filed a complaint (sept 17, 1917) against
Dela Vina
Married in the year 1888 in negros oriental
Had nine children and lived together
They had acquired property, real and personal
(P300,000) all of which are under the administration of
Dela VIna
Since 1913 the defendant had been committing acts of
adultery with ANA CALOG, sustaining illicit relations with
her and having her as his concubine
Because of this she ejected defendant from the conjugal
home
The defendant had no means of support and was living
only at the expense of one of her daughters
3) She was praying for:
a) Decree of divorce
b) Partition of the conjugal property
c) Alimony pendent lite in the sum of P400 per
month
d) That a preliminary injunction be issued against
the defendant restraining and prohibiting him to
alienate or encumber the property which
belonged to the conjugal partnership
4) Petitioner opposed the said motiondemurred the
complaint upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, nor
over the person of the defendant
TC: overruled the defendants demurrer, and granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff
ISSUES:
1) May a married woman ever acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage?
2) In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her
husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property
is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband restraining and
prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part
of their conjugal property during the pendency of the
action
PETITIONER CONTENDS:
1) CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction: defendant was a
resident of Negros Oriental and plaintiff as wife of
defendant must also be considered resident of the
same provincedomicile of husband is domicile of
wife (according to law); plaintiff could not acquire a
residence in Iloilo before the marriage between her
and the defendant was legally dissolved
2) Claims art 1412 and 1413: husband is the manager
of the conjugal partnershipempowered t alienate
and encumber the conjugal property without the
consent of wifeno right of her was violated
DECISIONS OF SC: petition is DENIED
RATIO:
1) General principle, the domicile of husband is domicile of
wifetheoretic identity of person and of interestbut
not an absolute rule though a presumption
2) The wife may acquire another and separate domicile
from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of
husband and wife is dissolved as it is by the institution
of divorce proceedings or where the husband has given
cause for divorce; or where there is separation of the
parties by agreement or a permanent separation due to
desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to
cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where
there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of
the husbands domicile
3) The maxim that the domicile of the husband is the
domicile of the wife cannot be applied to oust the court
of its jurisdiction neither from parity of reasons can it
give jurisdiction
4) When the tacit consent of the husband and other
circumstances justify it, for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should
be considered as her domicile where her right may be
exercised in accordance with art 63.
5) Furthermore, in this case there is no longer an identity
of persons and of interest between the husband and the
wifetherefore, the law allowed her to acquire a
separate residence
6) Sec 164 of Act no 190: A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established that:
a) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded
b) The commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the plaintiff
c) Defendant is doing or threatenssome act
probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights
7) The husband should not injure but promote the interest
of the wifewhen the harmonious relationship ceases,
the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition
conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to
protect the interests of the wife that the husbands
power of administration be curtailed during the
pendency of the action
8) In this case the right the plaintiff is seeking after is not
the right to administer the conjugal property but the
RIGHT TO SHARE in the conjugal partnership
9) The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both
preventive and mandatory, is a logical and necessary
incident of the general powers conferred upon the CFIs
as courts of record of general and unlimited original
jurisdiction both legal and equitable
10) In an action for divorce brought by the wife against the
husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property
is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband prohibiting the latter from
alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
property during the pendency of the action
11) CFI judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine the
action for divorce and he did not exceed his power and
authority in issuing the preliminary injunction against the
defendant
Shorter
De la Vina v. Villareal
July 31, 1920, Johnson, J.
Facts:
Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of
divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC Iloilo
against her husband de la Vina on the
ground of concubinage (which was
allegedly occurring since 1913). When
she learned of the illicit relationship,
she was ejected from the conjugal
home. She prayed for a decree of
divorce, partition of conjugal property,
and alimony pendente. After filing the
complaint, she presented a motion for
preliminary injunction to restrain her
husband from alienating or
encumbering the conjugal property.
Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 34
Respondent Judge Villareal granted the
motion. Husband filed present case of
petition for certiorari on the ground
that judge had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action and exceeded
his power and authority in issuing
preliminary injunction.
Issue/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON a married woman may ever
acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband
during the existence of a subsisting
marriage.
Yes. The general rule of law that the
domicile of the wife follows that of the
husband is not an absolute rule. The
husband unlawfully ejected the wife
from the conjugal home to have illicit
relations with another woman.
Continued cohabitation would give the
impression of the wifes condonation. A
wife may acquire a separate residence
where the husband has given cause for
divorce.
(2) WON in an action for divorce,
where conjugal property is concerned,
a preliminary injunction may be issued
to restrain a spouse from
alienating/encumbering conjugal
property during the pendency of the
action.
Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is
granted power to alienate and
encumber the conjugal property
without the consent of the wife. This
only holds true as long as a
harmonious relationship exists. When
such relation ceases, the husbands
powers of administration should be
curtailed during the pendency of
action to protect the interests of the
wife.
(101) Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
February 28, 1979, Fernandez, J.
Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice
with the intent to kill. A complaint was
filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt
on March was prevented by her father
and the second attempt, wherein she
was already living separately from her
husband, was stopped only because of
her drivers intervention. She filed for
legal separation on that ground and
prayed for support pendente lite for
herself and her three children. The
husband opposed the application for
support on the ground that the wife
committed adultery with her physician.
The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of
the lower court granted the wife
pendente lite. The husband filed a
motion for reconsideration reiterating
that his wife is not entitled to receive
such support during the pendency of
the case, and that even if she is
entitled to it, the amount awarded was
excessive. The judge reduced the
amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.
Husband filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA to annul the order granting
alimony. CA dismissed the petition
which made the husband appeal to the
SC.
Issue:
WON adultery of the wife was a
defense in an action for support. WON
support can be administered during
the pendency of an action.
Held/Ratio:
Yes provided that adultery is
established by competent evidence.
Mere allegations will not bar her right
to receive support pendente lite.
Support can be administered during
the pendency of such cases. In
determining the amount, it is not
necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in
the record. [The SC on July, 1978
ordered the alimony to be
P1000/month from the period of June
to February 1979, after the trial, it was
reverted to P4000/month based on the
accepted findings of the trial court that
the husband could afford it because of
his affluence and because it wasnt
excessive.]
Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 35
(102) Banez v. Banez
January 23, 2003, Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
A decision granting legal separation to
Aida and Gabriel Banez was
subsequently followed by a motion to
modify the decision (by Aida) and a
notice of appeal by (Gabriel). In the
original decision, Aida was granted,
among other things, possession of a
residential unit and a vehicle. The
motion to modify the decision was
partly granted (commitment of fees,
execution pending appeal granted but
moral damages denied) but when it
was questioned in the CA, the trial
courts orders were set aside. Aida
appealed to the SC. Meanwhile the
notice of appeal given by Gabriel was granted by the CA. With
this decision, Aida also appealed to the SC. Both appeals were
consolidated as one petition in the SC. Though she no longer
questions the CAs decision of
the vehicle after Gabriel repossessed it: as to the residential
house, Aida claims that it being conjugal in nature, justice
requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy it since
during the proceedings before the trial court, she was did not
have a chance to stay there. She contends that an action for
legal separation is one where multiple appeals are allowed and
thus Gabriels appeal should have been dismissed for his failure
to file the record on appeal with the reglementary period.
Issue/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON execution of judgment
pending appeal is justified.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals,
execution pending appeal is allowed
when superior circumstances
demanding urgency outweigh the
damages that may result from the
issuance of the writ. Otherwise,
instead of being an instrument of
solicitude and justice, the writ may
well become a tool of oppression and
inequity.
In this case, considering the reasons
cited by petitioner, we are of the view
that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the
damage which respondent would
suffer if he were ordered to vacate the
house. We note that petitioner did not
refute respondents allegations that
she did not intend to use said house,
and that she has two (2) other houses
in the United States where she is a
permanent resident, while he had none
at all. Merely putting up a bond is not
sufficient reason to justify her plea for
execution pending appeal. To do so
would make execution routinary, the
rule rather than the exception.
(2) WON an action of legal separation
is one where multiple appeals are
allowed.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
186, 194 (1996), this Court held:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in
special proceedings, in actions for
recovery of property with accounting,
in actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions
of eminent domain and foreclosure of
mortgage. The rationale behind
allowing more than one appeal in the
same case is to enable the rest of the
case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved
by the court and held to be final.
The same holds true in an action for
legal separation. The issues involved
in the case will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between
the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation
of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of
legal separation. They are not separate
or distinct matters that may be
resolved by the court and become final
prior to or apart from the decree of
legal separation. Rather, they are
Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Persons Digests v1.0 Page No. 36
mere incidents of legal separation.
Thus, they may not be subject to
multiple appeals.
103 La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983, Miller, J.
Facts:
Married in 1950, traditional marriage
between a husband who handled
financial affairs and a wife who was a
homemaker. Divorce was granted in
1980. Wife was only awarded alimony
and allowance for health insurance and
not one-half of the marital assets.
Issue:
WON the wife was entitled to equitable
distribution of properties.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. A housewife contributes to the
economic well-being in the family. In
valuing this service, the length of the
marriage and quality of service are
important considerations. Her
contributions must be calculated
against the net marital assets.
Equitable distribution for a
homemakers services is not limited to
giving of a possessory interest in real
estate. The doctrine of equitable
distribution permits a spouse who has
made a material economic contribution
towards the acquisition of property to
claim an equitable interest in such
property. In determining the
appropriate amount for distribution, it
is necessary to consider the respective
economic contributions made by both
parties during the marriage as
weighed against the net assets that
are available at the time of the
divorce.
VELOSO
104 to read na lng
105 laperal v republic, 6 SCRA 357 (1962)
Facts: In 1958, petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed
legally separated from her husband Enrique R. Santamaria. In
1960, she filed a petition to be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name Elisea
Laperal. The City Attorney of Baguio opposed the petition on the
ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370
(should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion, however,
the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground
that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally
separated from her husband, to continue using her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the
State.
Issues:
Should petitioner be allowed to change her name or be permitted
to resume using her maiden name?
Held:
No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after
the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is
so because her married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the
policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name
indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all
concerned.
Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone
which is the only basis for the petition is, not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of Article 372.
The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without
basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of
legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal
partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been
dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
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