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SYNOPSIS
The Bolte Bridge and the Western Link Elevated Road are part of Melbournes
CityLink tollway, and provide vital connections in the transport system west of the
Melbourne CBD.
In September 2003 a light pole on the Western Link Elevated Road failed due to
fracture of two anchor bolts (herein referred to as bolt-failure). The light pole fell
across the northbound carriageway (Figure 1). In June 2004 a light pole near the
crest of the Bolte Bridge failed due to fracture of the mast near the base (herein
referred to as mast-failure). The light pole again fell across the northbound
carriageway (Figure 2). No one was injured in either of these incidents, however
extensive traffic disruption occurred.
CityLink Melbourne Limited (CML) requested that Maunsell Australia Pty Ltd
(Maunsell) investigate the failures, and report on the cause and any recommended
remedial measures. CML committed significant resources to obtaining an
understanding of the underlying cause of these failures so that all reasonable
precautions could be taken to avoid any further failures. The investigation
undertaken by Maunsell on behalf of CML involved original research, leading to
recommendations for remedial work, and recommendations for design procedures to
improve the whole of life performance of light poles. These recommendations are
reported in this paper.
1.1 Bolt-failure
This light pole, erected in 1999, comprised a vertical tapered steel mast of octagonal
cross section, with outreach mast arms of 4.5 metres and 1.5 metres. The overall
height of mast and mast arm was approximately 17.5 metres. The mast was butted
and fillet welded to a 32 mm thick steel baseplate. The baseplate had four 36 mm
diameter anchor bolts. Figure 1 is a photograph of the fallen light pole, and a detail
at the base of an intact light pole. In September 2003 failure of the light pole
occurred due to fatigue fracture of two of the anchor bolts. Figure 1 shows a
fractured anchor bolt.
1.2 Mast-failure
This light pole, erected in 1999, comprised a vertical tapered steel mast of circular
cross section with a height of 18.0 metres. The bottom five metres approximately of
the mast was constructed from 4.0 mm thick grade 300 steel. At a height of 15.0
metres the mast had a double outreach mast arm, with lengths of 2.8 metres each
side. The mast was socketed and fillet welded into a 25 mm thick steel baseplate.
The baseplate had four 30 mm diameter anchor bolts. Figure 2 is a photograph of
the fallen light pole and a detail at the base of an intact light pole. This light pole was
also supported on a double-nut baseplate.
In June 2004 the mast fractured at the toe of the circumferential weld where the mast
was attached to the baseplate (Figure 2). Examination of the fracture surface
revealed two distinct fatigue crack zones, each initiated from the weld toe, with the
total crack length extending over approximately 85% of the circumference. Corrosion
on part of the crack surface indicated a relatively long term fatigue failure.
Figure 2 Mast-failure light pole - Light pole base detail Fracture surface of the mast
There are two common types of base supports for light poles grouted baseplates
that rest directly on concrete or grout, and double-nut baseplates that stand off from
AASHTO (2001), NCHRP (2002), and Cook (2000) make the following points about
grouted baseplates:
Compressive load from the baseplate should be supported directly by the
anchor bolt levelling nuts neglecting bearing of the baseplate on grout.
Experience has indicated that anchor bolts may experience corrosion if
cracking occurs in the grout, or if adequate drainage is not provided.
Under dynamic loading, pretension against the grout may be quickly lost due
to wear of the grout from movement, so no benefit can be accrued for fatigue.
Grout, when specified under baseplates, should be nonshrink and should not
contain any chlorides or other harmful additives that could cause corrosion of
the anchor bolts.
Failure of both the bolt-failure and mast-failure light poles was due to metal fatigue.
Possible causes of the fatigue loading considered were oscillation of the light poles
caused by deflection of the bridge structure, oscillation of the light poles caused by
truck-induced gusts, and oscillation of the light poles due to wind loading.
Fatigue failure of light poles caused by deflection of the bridge structure is known to
have occurred in Japan, however it is understood that the bridge was a relatively
flexible steel structure. The Bolte Bridge in particular is a very rigid structure, and the
energy imparted to the light poles as a result of bridge deflection is extremely low.
Oscillation of overhead cantilever mast arms supporting traffic signals, signs and
variable message signs due to the air movement caused by passing traffic is known
to have caused fatigue failures of mast arms in the USA. However no failures of light
poles have been attributed to this cause, presumably because of the lower wind area
and the greater distance from the traffic.
Oscillation of light poles due to wind loading is known to have caused fatigue failures,
and was considered the most likely cause of the failures reported here. The natural
gusting of the wind can cause vibration of the light pole in the same direction as the
wind is blowing (along wind response) or, due to the phenomenon of vortex
shedding, the wind can cause vibration of the light pole in a direction transverse to
the direction that the wind is blowing (cross wind response).
25
20
wind speed m/s
15
10
0
1-Sep-03 6-Sep-03 11-Sep-03 16-Sep-03 21-Sep-03 26-Sep-03 1-Oct-03
date and time
Figure 3 Three second gust wind speeds September 2003 (dashed line is failure date)
The propensity for the light poles to undergo vortex shedding was assessed against
the provisions of AASHTO (2001). The wind speed at which vortex shedding would
occur at the first natural frequency is 0.9 m/s for the bolt-failure light pole and 0.8 m/s
for the mast-failure light pole. Even at the second mode of vibration the wind speeds
are still low at 2.4 m/s and 3.1 m/s respectively. Therefore it was concluded that
vortex shedding would generate very low stress ranges, and certainly less than the
stress ranges due to natural wind gusts. This left natural wind gusts as the likely
source of the fatigue loading.
4. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
AS5100 (Standards Australia 2004) requires that light poles be designed to prevent
excessive vibration leading to fatigue. AS/NZS4676 (Standard Australia 2000)
requires that oscillations due to dynamic wind which may induce fatigue should be
In his textbook Holmes (2003) presents a method specifically developed for the
fatigue assessment of light poles. This method predicts a fatigue life for fluctuating
stress due to natural wind gusts. The results of this method (assuming a rigid
baseplate), and using the fatigue life curves from AS4100 (Standard Australia 1998),
are shown in Table 1. According to the Holmes method, the bolt-failure light poles
have a marginally acceptable fatigue life, but the mast-failure light poles do not.
Table 1 Fatigue assessment assuming rigid baseplate
Figure 4 shows isometric and side views of the bolt-failure light pole bending under
the AASHTO (2001) fatigue design wind speed. The different colours represent
different steel plate bending elements. The displacements are magnified 300 times.
The bending of the baseplate can be clearly seen.
Fatigue failure of light poles Taplin Page 5 of 12
mast
baseplate
bracket
The baseplate bends upward on the windward side of the light pole, and downward
on the leeward side. This bending causes the anchor bolts on the windward side to
bend outwards, and causes the anchor bolts on the leeward side to bend inwards.
Note that this bending in the anchor bolts is at right angles to the wind direction
(transverse bending). Transverse bending of the baseplate causes stresses in the
bolts which are far greater than the stresses calculated in the bolts if the baseplate is
assumed to be rigid. Bending of the baseplate is the action which leads to bolt
fatigue failure
Although not so easily seen in the Figures, the bending of the baseplate also causes
high local stresses in the mast near the base, because the wall of the mast bends
locally as the baseplate bends. As is the case for the bolts, the bending of the
baseplate causes stresses in the mast which are far greater than the stresses
calculated in the mast if the baseplate is assumed to be rigid. Bending of the
baseplate is the action which leads to mast fatigue failure.
The finite element analysis predicts much higher stresses, and therefore much worse
fatigue performance, than the simplified analysis assuming a rigid baseplate that was
presented above (Table 2). The stresses in the anchor bolts are particularly high,
and can be considered to be an overestimate of the actual stresses. This is because
the analysis model assumes that there is no relative rotation between the anchor bolt
and the baseplate. Even with fully tightened bolts there will be some relative
movement.
Table 2 Fatigue assessment - based upon finite element analysis
Non-linear finite element modelling was used to assess the effect of grouting under
the baseplate, which is effective only in compression (Table 3). On the side of the
baseplate that is lifting up, the stress in the mast near the base is virtually unchanged
by grouting (because grout is considered ineffective when the baseplate lifts off).
However the stress range that the mast goes through is approximately halved. This
leads to an improved fatigue performance. On the side that is lifting up the grout
provides some benefit to the anchor bolts because it stiffens them and reduces the
bending. This effect is not able to be modelled realistically, and therefore the benefit
cannot be quantified.
Table 3 Fatigue assessment according to AASHTO (2001) non-linear fe analysis with grout
Grouting may therefore increase the fatigue life of the mast at the base by a factor of
approximately 30 times in the case of the mast-failure light poles. The increase in
the fatigue life of the bolts cannot be estimated, but it would likely be of a similar
order of magnitude.
5. FIELD MEASUREMENTS
150
1-PNL
100
50
microstrain
-50
-100
-150
13:19:12 13:26:24 13:33:36 13:40:48 13:48:00 13:55:12 14:02:24
time
Figure 5 Strain versus time on the original light pole. 30 minute time frame
2500
2000
Frequency
1500
1000
500
0
5
3
.7
.1
8.
1.
5.
8.
2.
5.
8.
2.
21
65
10
15
19
23
28
32
36
41
From the histogram, maximum stress ranges were obtained for each measurement
position, for each time period. Also from the histogram the fatigue damage at each
position was calculated, for each time frame. The fatigue damage was calculated
using the Palmgren-Miner rule for cumulative damage (Fisher 1997), assuming that
the mast to baseplate weld detail was Fatigue Category 40 in accordance with
AS4100 (Standards Australia 1998). Knowing the cumulative damage within the time
20 100
18 90
16 80
12 60
10 50
8 40
6 30
Fawkner Beacon
4 Laverton 20
Melbourne Airport
2 10
max stress range
0 0
8:24 AM 9:36 AM 10:48 AM 12:00 PM 1:12 PM 2:24 PM 3:36 PM 4:48 PM
time
On 3 April 2005 the maximum stress range measured in the original pole was 87
MPa, and the maximum stress range measured in the adjacent grouted baseplate
pole was 65 MPa. On 24 May 2005 the maximum stress range measured in the
original pole was 58 MPa, and the maximum stress range measured in the adjacent
grouted-and-thickened baseplate pole was 38 MPa. The constant amplitude fatigue
limit was 29 MPa for the weld detail used, therefore, based upon the maximum
recorded stress ranges, the light poles would not have an infinite fatigue life.
50
40
30
20
10
5:31:12 6:00:00 6:28:48 6:57:36 7:26:24 7:55:12 8:24:00 8:52:48 9:21:36
AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM
time
Figure 8 Maximum stress range at each time frame lower measurement positions grouted-
and-thickened baseplate versus original
Figure 9 plots the estimated fatigue life based upon each time frame of measured
stress. The fatigue life is extremely sensitive to wind speed, decreasing rapidly for
the time frames corresponding to higher wind speeds. Estimated fatigue lives in
excess of 50 years are not plotted. The fatigue life is calculated separately for each
time frame, and assumes that the prevailing wind conditions will be maintained for
the life of the structure. This is conservative when measurements are taken in high
wind conditions, as here. The usefulness of the plot is in comparing the original light
pole (solid lines) to the grouted-and-thickened baseplate light pole (dashed lines).
The modified light pole has significantly greater fatigue life.
50
45
40
35 originalLNE
fatigue life (years)
grout&bpLNE
30
originalLNW
25
grout&bpLNW
20 originalLSE
15 grout&bpLSE
originalLSW
10
grout&bpLSW
5
0
5:31:12 6:00:00 6:28:48 6:57:36 7:26:24 7:55:12 8:24:00 8:52:48 9:21:36
AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM
time
Data - 3 April 2005 9:22AM to 3:30PM Data - 24 May 2005 5:51AM to 9:03AM
position original grouted grouted position original grouted-and- g-and-t
on pole baseplate on pole thickened
original baseplate original
N 2 years 13 years 6.5 NE 3 years 26 years 8.7
W 7 years 28 years 4 NW 2 years 40 years 20
S 3 years 3 years 1 SE 1 years 16 years 16
SW 2 years 15 years 7.5
6. REMEDIAL MEASURES
As a result of the findings from the finite element analysis and field measurements,
CML replaced all light poles similar to the mast-failure pole. The replacement poles
had increased mast wall thickness in the lower section (6mm vs 4mm), thicker
baseplates (40mm vs 25mm) and the baseplates were grouted. The baseplates of
all light poles similar to the bolt-failure pole were grouted. A program of regular
inspection and ultrasonic testing has been implemented.
7. CONCLUSIONS