Qualification Of Local Elective Officials

Torayno v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137329 (August 9, 2000)
FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the
ground that he was not able to fulfill the requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City
when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3
consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran
for mayor.

HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a
mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided
there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

Villarosa vs. HRET

G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000

FACTS:
Quintos contested the proclamation of Amelita Villarosa. Issue: whether JTV votes should be
counted in favor of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosas husband, who is the incumbent
representative of Occidental Mindoro.

HELD:
Villarosas use of JTV as her nickname was a clever ploy to make a mockery of the election
process. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its
determination was whether "JTV" votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of
VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Maruhom v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 139397 (May 5, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor. Because of several
irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as the
winner. Petitioner filed a case with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation, but later withdrew
it. He also filed an election protest with the RTC. Petitioner orally moved for dismissal of the
protest, but it was denied. The court ordered the Revision Committee to convene and start the
revision of the ballots. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petition.

HELD: The SC held that the summary dismissal of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was not a
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears
to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings as evidenced
by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the
revision ballots. Also, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading in an election contest filed
before the regular courts.
 Maruhom vs COMELEC

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in

declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article
IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or
deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189,
or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the MTCs and
MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and
exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.

ISSUE:

Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and

thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction?

HELD:

The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a
voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC,
which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office,
but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration
in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be
barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still
exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the COC.
Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET

G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the
candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the
canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern
Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District.

Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the
ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were
spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate
or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.

Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.

Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it
bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid
down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of
these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or
thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and
subject to rejection.

Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of the
Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed
an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant
died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital. Now, the widow of
FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latters protest case.

Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a public office is
personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal
and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would
oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution
and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any
claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we
can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to this election
protest.

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., protestant, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO, protestee. P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

FACTS:

On June 24, 2004, Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed as the
duly elected President of the Philippines and movie-actor Fernando Poe, Jr was
the second-placer.

Mr. FPJ filed an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal and Mrs. GMA
filed her Answer with Counter Protest. Mr. FPJ died on December 14, 2004. Mr.
FPJs counsel submitted to the Tribunal a Manifestation with Urgent
Petition/Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ BY
THE WIDOW, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces.

As movant/intervenor, Mrs. Poe claims that there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine
will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.
Mrs. GMA contends that under the Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest
votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president.

Mrs. GMA also stresses that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over actions of
surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the electorate as the Tribunal has
jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases. Mrs. GMA,
further asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party
to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a
property that passes on to the heirs. She points out that the widow has no
legal right to substitute for her husband in an election protest. Since no such
right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election protest
is personal and non-transmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a widow is allowed to substitute/intervene during the pending

protest case.

RULING:

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules
of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental importance of
the electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out
of the question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to
prevent popular unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the
highest level.

Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules provides:

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of
the winner.

Stated above, the Rule effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate.
PET Rules, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention
but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of
Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral
tribunals. Hence Rule 19, section 1 of Rules of Court A person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties
or an interest against both

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal

representative. This rule to an election contest, the Court ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the
heirs upon death. Thus, the Court consistently rejected substitution by the
widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pending protest case.

However, this rule is not purely personal and exclusive. Hence, we have allowed
substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and
the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case, Mrs. Poe herself
denies any claim to the office of the President and will not directly benefit from
the outcome. Thus, given the circumstances of the case, the protestants widow
is not a real party in interest to this election protest. Mrs. Poe a.k.a. Susan
Roces to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SAQUILAYAN V. COMELEC 416 SCRA 658 (DINO)

FACTS:

1. SAQUILAYAN and JARO were candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of
Imus, Cavite.

2. SAQUILAYAN was proclaimed winner.

3. JARO instituted an Election Protest Case before the RTC, contesting the
results of all 453 election precincts. He alleges the ff:

a. Votes in favor of JARO were considered stray

b. Ballots and votes were misappreciated (considered null and void,

or counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN)

c. Votes that were void (containing stickers or markings) were

counted in favor of SAQUILAYAN, etc..

4. SAQUILAYAN filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the RTC.

5. Questioning the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, the COMELEC (Division)

ruled in favor of SAQUILAYAN and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.
It ruled that JAROs allegations failed to state a cause of action, on the basis of
Pena v. HRET.

* Pena v. HRET held that the bare allegations of massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism, without specification and substantiation of where
and how these occurrences took place, render the protest fatally defective.

6. Upon reconsideration sought by JARO, the COMELEC En Banc,

SAQUILAYANs Motion to Dismiss was again dismissed, and the Election
Protest Case was ordered to proceed.

HELD:

1. The present case is similar to Miguel v. COMELEC, which the COMELEC En

Banc used as basis in ordering the Election Protest Case to proceed.
2. IN both cases, the protestants questioned all the precincts in their respective
municipalities.

3. As Miguel v. COMELEC is more recent than Pena v. HRET (as used by the
COMELEC Division), then the former should prevail in case of a conflict.

4. Furthermore, election contests involve public interest. Technicalities and

procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constituted an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate.

5. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections.

6. Allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way of removing
any doubt as to who was the real candidate chosen by the electorate.

7. Decision of COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)

Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs decision

to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the
campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at
the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the
start of the campaign period.

Issue:

Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature

campaigning should be reconsidered.

Holding:

Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held
that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be
disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said

(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate
even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent
and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a
person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate
at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.

Thus, applying said law:

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for

acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot
be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply
it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial
measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended,
does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of
the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts
done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law
as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails
freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful
unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not
declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is
no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is
sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The
only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the
start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC
(G.R.No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that
one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators
who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under
R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots,
and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who
files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate. When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the
provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of
candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system
would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the
start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision,
however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the
assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision
was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the said provision.