Art and Interaction

Author(s): Nol Carroll

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Autumn, 1986), pp.
57-68
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 NOEL CARROLL

Art and Interaction

IDEAS OF THE AESTHETIC figure largely in two of our responses to artworks and the thesis that
art is to be characterized exclusively in terms of
crucial areas of debate in the philosophy of art.
On the one hand, the aesthetic often plays thea promotion of aesthetic responses. It will be
definitive role in characterizations of our re- argued against the first thesis that many of our
sponses to or interactions with artworks. Thatentrenched forms of interaction with art-
is, what is thought to be distinctive about ourworks-what may be neutrally designated as
commerce with artworks is that these encoun- our art responses or art experiences-are not
ters are marked by aesthetic experiences, aes- aesthetic in nature nor are they reducible to
thetic judgments, aesthetic perceptions, and soaesthetic responses or experiences. The argu-
forth. Furthermore, the use of aesthetic termi-ment here proceeds by enumerating and de-
nology in such accounts of our interactions withscribing several of our nonaesthetic though
artworks is, most essentially, "experiential" oreminently characteristic responses to art ob-
"perceptual" where those terms are generally jects. That is, along with doing things like
understood by contrast to responses mediated attending to the brittleness of a piece of chore-
by the application of concepts or reasoning. ography-a paradigmatic aesthetic response-
Secondly, notions of the aesthetic are alsowe also contemplate artworks with an eye to
mobilized in theories of the nature of art ob- discerning latent meanings and structures, and
jects; the artwork, it is claimed, is an artifact to determining the significance of an artwork in
designed to bring about aesthetic experiences its art historical context. These art responses,
and aesthetic perceptions, or to engender aes- often interpretive in nature, are, it will be
thetic attitudes, or to engage aesthetic faculties,claimed, as central as, and certainly no less
et cetera. Thus, these two claims-that aes- privileged than, aesthetic responses in regard to
thetic responses distinguish our responses to our interactions with artworks. ' Moreover, if an
art, and that art objects can be defined in terms expanded view of the art response is defensible,
of the aesthetic-though ostensibly indepen- then our concept of art, especially when con-
dent, can, nevertheless, be connected by meansstrued functionally, must be broadened to coun-
of a neat, commonsensical approach that holdstenance as art objects that are designed to
that what an object is can be captured throughpromote characteristically appropriate art re-
an account of its function. The art object issponses or art experiences distinct from aes-
something designed to provoke a certain formthetic responses. And this, in turn, has conse-
of response, a certain type of interaction. Thequences for attempts by theorists, armed with
canonical interaction with art involves the aes- aesthetic definitions of art, who wish to exclude
thetic (however that is to be characterized). Sosuch objects as Duchamp's Fountain from the
the artwork is an object designed with theorder of art.
function of engendering aesthetic experiences, This paper is motivated by a recent develop-
perceptions, attitudes, and so forth. ment in the philosophy of art, viz., the popu-
The purpose of this paper is to dispute bothlarity of aesthetic definitions of art. As is well
the thesis that aesthetic responses are definitiveknown, the antidefinitional stance of post-
World War II philosophers of art provoked a
NOiL CARROLL is assistant professor of philosophyreaction formation called the Institutional The-
at Wesleyan University. ory of Art.2 Dissatisfaction with the Institu-

1986 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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58 CARROLL

tional Theory has, in turn, elicited

the status of art to such several
things as Edward T.
countermoves of which the aesthetic definition Cone's "Poeme symphonique"-a composi-
tion which involves one hundred metronomes
of art is one species. For though the Institutional
Theory has been judged wanting in numerousrunning down-and to Duchamp's Fountain. In
a similar gesture, Tolhurst thinks that
respects, it has re-established the respectability
of attempts to define art. Duchamp's L.H.O.O.Q. and L.H.O.O.Q.
Examples of this development include arti-Shaved are not art. With such cases, Beardsley
cles such as "An Aesthetic Definition of Art" and Tolhurst believe that the artists could not
by Monroe Beardsley and "Toward an Aes-
possibly have been motivated by the intention
thetic Account of the Nature of Art" by William
of promoting aesthetic experience.
Tolhurst.3 These writers attempt to construct For the purposes of this paper I shall put the
theories that discriminate between art and issue of the intentional component of the aes-
nonart by reference to aesthetic experience,thetic theory of art somewhat to one side. I am
which is taken as the canonical mode of our more interested in the job that the concept of
interaction with artworks. In this, I think aesthetic
that experience is supposed to perform in
these authors are symptomatic of the tendency the theories. It must be said that the common-
within much contemporary philosophy of art to approach of the aesthetic theory of art is
sense
equate the art experience with the aesthetic very attractive. It conceives of the artwork as an
object designed with a function, a function,
experience. Given this propensity, both articles
define an artwork as an object produced with moreover, that is connected with what a spec-
the intended function of fostering aesthetic tator can get out of an artwork in virtue of its
facilitating
experiences. Beardsley's statement of the theory is or promoting certain types of re-
"An artwork is something produced with sponses the or interactions. As a theory of art, it has
intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the
the strength of acknowledging the mutual im-
aesthetic interest."4 To have an aesthetic interest
portance of the artist, the object, and the audi-
ence; it does not emphasize one element of the
in an object, for Beardsley, is to have an interest
in the aesthetic character of experience that matrix
a of art over others in the manner of a
given object affords. Simply put, our aestheticCroce or a Collingwood with their preoccupa-
tions with
interest in an object is predicated on the possibility the artist and his expression of
of our deriving aesthetic experiences fromintuitions.
the
object. Also, this type of theory puts its proponent in
Tolhurst's statement of the aesthetic theory of a strong position to systematically tackle further
art is more complex. As a rough indication of questions in the philosophy of art, such as what
the way in which an aesthetic definition might is the value of art and why are we interested in
go, Tolhurst writes seeking out artworks? Clearly, the aesthetic
theorist of art can answer that the value of art
A thing, x, is a work of art if and only if, there is a and the interest we have in pursuing artworks
person, y, such that 1) y believed that x could serve as
reside in whatever positive benefit there is in
an object of (positive) aesthetic experiences, 2) y
wanted x to serve as an object of (positive) aesthetic having the types of experiences and responses
experiences, and 3) y's belief and desire caused y (in a that art objects are designed to promote.
certain characteristic way) to produce x, to create x, or On the other hand, the delimitation of the
to place x where x is, etc.5 relevant art experience to the aesthetic experi-
ence-the maneuver that gives the aesthetic
Both Beardsley and Tolhurst are involved in theory of art much of its exclusionary thrust-
the attempt to limit the range of things we shall appears to me to be a liability. The aesthetic
count as art. Broadly speaking, this attempt is definition of art privileges aesthetic experience
carried out by two maneuvers: invoking the to the exclusion of other nonaesthetic forms of
condition that the producer of a putative art- interaction that the art object can be designed to
work had an appropriate intention, which, in promote. I shall argue that there is no reason for
turn, is specified in terms of a plan to afford the aesthetic experience to be privileged in this
aesthetic experience. Given this twofold re- way insofar as it seems to me that we cannot
quirement, Beardsley believes that he can deny rule out other, nonaesthetic forms of response

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Art and Interaction 59

to art as illegitimate on the grounds that they areexperience through the analysis of its internal-
not aesthetic responses. Indeed, when discuss-feeling-structure, which we might call an af-
fect-oriented account of aesthetic experience. In
ing these other responses to works of art, I think
I will be able to show that denying the status ofrecent essays, Beardsley has placed more
art to such works as L.H.O.O.Q. and "Poeme weight than the previous quotation did on the
symphonique" is a mistake. affective features of aesthetic experience. In a
Before charting several forms of nonaesthetic formal statement of his criteria for aesthetic
experience, one mirrored informally in What is
responses to art, it will be helpful to clarify the
notion of an aesthetic response to art. One Art?, Beardsley says that an experience has an
problem here is that there are a number of aesthetic character if it has the first of the
different, ostensibly nonequivalent characteri-following features and at least three of the
others. For Beardsley, the five relevant features
zations available. Let a sample suffice to initiate
the discussion. Tolhurst intentionally refrainsof aesthetic experience are: object directedness,
from characterizing aesthetic experience,felt freedom, detached affect, active discovery,
though Beardsley, of course, has offered and a wholeness, i.e., a sense of integration as a
number of accounts. Writing on aesthetic en-person.8 Apart from "active discovery," these
joyment, which as I take it is nothing butcriteria allude to affective attributes of expe-
positive aesthetic experience, Beardsley hasrience. And even in the case of "active
claimed that discovery" the criterion is a case of both
content-oriented and affect-oriented consider-
Aesthetic enjoyment is (by definition) the kind ofations, for though said discoveries are achieved
enjoyment we obtain from the apprehension of athrough seeing connections between percepts
qualitatively diverse segment of the phenomenal field
insofar as the discriminable parts are unified into
and meanings, such insights are to be accom-
something of a whole that has a character (that is, panied by a sense of intelligibility.
regional qualities) of its own.6 There are many problems with this charac-
terization of aesthetic experience. First, it is
This account offers what might be thought of as possible that either there is no experience that
a content-oriented characterization of positivemeets this account or, if this account can be
aesthetic experience. It is "content-oriented"read in a way that grants that some experiences
because it stresses the properties of the object, meet it, then other-than-aesthetic experiences,
here "regional qualities," to which attention is e.g., solving theorems in nonapplied mathemat-
directed. This approach corresponds to J. 0. ics, may also meet it. But, most importantly, it
Urmson's notion that what marks an aesthetic is clear that many of our typical responses to art
reaction is its attention to how things look andwill, under a rigorous reading of Beardsley's
feel especially in terms of qualities such as formula, not stand up as aesthetic, with the
appearing spacious, swift, strong, mournful, consequence that objects which support only
cheerful, and so on.7 I will take it that onecertain typical but nonaesthetic interactions
major variation of the aesthetic response ap-with art will not count as art. Of course, the
proach-the content-oriented approach--desig- desiderata canvassed in what I've called the
nates a response as aesthetic when it takes as itscontent-approach and the predominantly affect-
focus the aesthetic or expressive or "quali-oriented approach do not reflect every belief
tative" appearances of the object. I will argue about aesthetic experience found in the tradi-
that this leaves us with a particularly impover-tion; other beliefs will be mentioned in the
ished view of our customary reaction to artensuing discussion of nonaesthetic responses to
which has extremely problematic consequencesart. However, frequent return to these two
for any theorist who would want to use aesthetic models of the aesthetic response will be useful
experience as definitive of the function, vis-a-in discussing typical nonaesthetic interactions
vis the spectators' reaction, which artworks arewith art.
designed to produce. A great many of our typical, nonaesthetic
Beardsley has not always characterized aes- responses to art can be grouped under the label
thetic experience primarily by reference to con-of interpretation. Artists often include, imply,
tent. Often he attempts to characterize aestheticor suggest meanings in their creations, mean-

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60 CARROLL

ings and themes that are oblique

believe that and that
our training the
in this matter supplies
audience works at discovering. Mallarme
dependable guidelines for appropriate art re-
wrote
sponses since our early training is reinforced by
the evident preoccupation with oblique mean-
ings found in discussions of art by critics,
To actually name an object is to suppress three-quarters
of the sense of enjoyment of a poem, which consists in
scholars, and connoisseurs in newspapers, jour-
the delight of guessing one stage at a time; to suggest
nals,
the object, that is the poet's dream .... There must and learned treatises. And clearly our
training
and behavior regarding the search for
always be a sense of the enigmatic in poetry, and that
is the aim of literature. hidden meanings are not beside the point since
artists, steeped in the same hermeneutical tra-
And in a similar vein, John Updike says "I ditions that spectators practice, have often put
think books should have secrets as a bonus for oblique meanings in their works precisely so
the sensitive reader ...." These statements that we, excited by the challenge, exercise our
are by writers but there are artists in every skill and ingenuity, our powers of observation,
artform who strive to incorporate oblique or
association, and synthesis in order to discover
hidden meanings or themes, and nonobvious
oblique themes and to trace their complex
adumbrations of the oblique themes inadumbrations.
their
work.9 In Peter Hutchinson's interpretation of certain forms of interpretation, the
With
Tonio Kroger, we find an example of an oblique
spectator's relation to the artwork is gamelike.
theme, that of the split personality, and The
of anspectator has a goal, to find a hidden or
adumbration thereof, the use of the character's
oblique theme (or an oblique adumbration of
name to convey, in a camouflaged way, extra
one), which goal the spectator pursues by using
inflection concerning the nature of the asplit
range of hermeneutical strategies, which, in
personality. Hutchinson writes turn, place certain epistemological constraints
on his activity. This interpretive play is some-
In Tonio Kroger, Mann's most famous early story, the we have been trained in
thing since grammar
eponymous hero bears features of two distinct qualities
school,
in his name: those of his artistic mother, and the more
and it is a practice that is amplified and
somber ones of his self-controlled father. It is his publicly endorsed by the criticism we read. The
mother from whom Tonio has inherited his creative obliqueness of the artist's presentation of his
powers-she comes from "the South," a land lacking theme confronts the audience with an obstacle
in self-discipline but rich in self-expression, and its
that the audience voluntarily elects to over-
qualities are symbolized in his Christian name (with its
come. How the artist plants his theme and how
clear Italian ring). His father, on the other hand, the
the audience goes about discovering it-in
upright Northerner, the practical man of common sense
and sound business acumen, bears a name suggestiveterms
of of distinctive forms of reasoning and
dullness and solidity (it derives from the Middle Low
observation-are primarily determined by pre-
German 'Kroger,' a publican). The very sound of each
cedent and tradition, though, of course, the
component reinforces those ideas and explains the split
in Tonio's character, the major theme of this
tradition allows for innovation both in the area
Novelle. ' of artmaking and of interpretation. Within this
gamelike practice, when we discover a hidden
The presence of such obliquely presented
theme we have achieved a success, and we are
themes and adumbrations occurs frequently
prone, all things being equal, to regard our
enough, especially in certain genres, that audi- activity as rewarding insofar as the artwork has
ences, customarily search for hidden meanings enabled us to apply our skills to a worthy, i.e.,
that are likely to have been implanted in the challenging, object. But this type of interpretive
artwork. Though Hutchinson's interpretation play, though characteristic of our interaction
might be thought of as "professional," I think with artworks, and rewarding, exemplifies nei-
that it is reflective of one central way in which ther the content-oriented form, nor the affect-
we, in general, have been trained to think, talk, oriented form of aesthetic response.
and in short, respond to art. This training began Though so far I have only spoken of the
when we were first initiated into the world of art interpretation of obliquely presented meanings,
in our earliest literature and art appreciation it should be noted that our interpretive,
classes. Moreover, we have every reason to nonaesthetic responses also include the discern-

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Art and Interaction 61

ment of latent structures. That is, when we artworks but rather revolves around epistemolog-
contemplate art, we often have as a goal, uponical problems, e.g., are artist's intentions admis-
which we may expend great effort, figuring outsible evidence; can interpretations be true or are
the way in which a given painting or musical they merely plausible; and so forth. This episte-
composition works. In the presence of an art-mological focus, moreover, tends to take critical
work, we characteristically set ourselves toargument as its subject matter. Thus, the fact that
finding out what its structure is as well as oftenphilosophers have such epistemological interests
asking the reason for its being structured thatin interpretation does not vitiate the point that
way. Or, if we sense that an artwork has ainterpretive play is an ingredient in our character-
certain effect, e.g., the impression of the reces-istic experience of artworks which philosophers,
sion of the central figure in Malevich's Black by privileging the aesthetic, have effectively
Quadrilateral, we examine the formal arrange-bracketed from the art experience proper. Indeed,
ment and principles that bring this effect within the philosophical tradition, the kind of
about. " Again, this is something we have been intellective responses I have cited under the rubric
trained to do and something that pervades theof interpretation are not part of the experience,
discussion of art in both informal and profes-proper, of art. Hume, for example, tells us that
sional conversation. Indeed, some radical for- though good sense is necessary for the correct
malists might hold that understanding how a functioning of taste, it is not part of taste.'2
work works is the only legitimate interest weRather, the picture he suggests is that the prior
should have in art and the only criterion of operation of the understanding, engaged in doing
whether our response to art is appropriate. Thisthings like identifying the purpose and related
seems an unduly narrow recommendation givenstructure of the artwork, puts us in a position to
art as we know it. My claim is only that undergo, subsequently, the central experience of
identifying the structure or structures of the a work, viz., for Hume, a feeling of pleasure.
work-seeing how it works-is, like the iden- This citation of Hume provides us with one
tification of a hidden meaning, one criterion of reason why philosophers are tempted to exclude
a successful interaction with art. Moreover, thisinterpretive play from the art experience proper.
form of interaction is not "aesthetic," as that isThe essential experience of art, for them, is a
normally construed, but it should not, for that matter of feeling pleasure either of the undiffer-
reason, be disregarded as a characteristic and entiated Humean sort or of the disinterested
appropriate mode of participating with artworks.Kantian variety. Interpretive activity, on the
So far two types of interpretive play have other hand, it might be said, has no obvious
been cited as examples of characteristic re-connection with pleasure. But I'm not so sure of
sponses to art which tend to be overlookedthis.
when philosophers of art accord a privileged I have asserted that art spectatorship is a
position to aesthetic responses as the canonicalpractice, a practice linked with other practices,
model of our interaction with art. And if inter-
such as artmaking, within the institution of the
pretation is ignored as an appropriate art re-
artworld. I follow Maclntyre when he writes
sponse while only aesthetic experience is sothat
countenanced, and if art is identified in relation
to the promotion of appropriate responses, then
By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and
objects devoted exclusively to engendering in- complex form of socially established cooperative hu-
terpretive play will be artistically disenfranchised. man activity through which goods internal to that form
But, of course, one may wonder whether it is of activity are realized in trying to achieve those
correct to claim, as I have, that the philosophers of standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
art tend to ignore the importance of interpretation. partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and
For much of the literature in the field concerns
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
issues of intepretation. This, admittedly, is true in systematically extended.'3
one sense. However, it must be added that the
attention lavished on interpretation in the literature
Within the practice of art spectatorship, among
is not focussed on interpretive play as a character- the goals of the enterprise, we find the making
istic form of the experience of interacting with
of interpretations of various sorts. Finding hid-

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62 CARROLL

den meanings and latent structures are goods

Beardsley's affect-oriented account might not
internal to the activity of differentiate aesthetic experience from the
art spectatorship.
Pursuit of these goals in our encounters
mathematician's with
experience of solving a prob-
artworks occupies large parts lem of
whichour experience
is divorced from practical applica-
of artworks. Our interpretations tion. So ifcan succeed
the argument or including inter-
against
fail. They can be mundane pretive or excellent. When
play in our account of the art experience
our interpretations succeed, iswe thatderive
interpretive
theplaysatis-
does not differentiate
faction that comes from the achievement of a that experience from other kinds whereas the
goal against an established standard of excel- notion of aesthetic experience does, then we
lence. That is, satisfaction is connected withcan say that neither of the putatively competing
success, within the practice of art spectatorship, accounts succeeds at the task of essentially
when we are able to detect a latent theme or differentiating the art experience. Thus, essen-
form in an artwork. Moreover, I see no reasontially differentiating the art experience from
others might not be a desideratum in our charac-
to deny that this type of satisfaction is a type of
terizations of it.
pleasure even though it differs from the type of
pleasurable sensation, or thrill, or beauteous I suspect that since art evolved over a long
rapture that theorists often appear to have in period of time and through the interactions of
mind when speaking of aesthetic experience. many different cultures, it may support a plural-
ity of interests such that the art experience is
The exercise of the skills of art spectatorship is
its own reward within our practice. This is not comprised of a plurality of activities of which
having aesthetic experiences of some sort is
to say that interpretive play is the only source of
one, while engaging in interpretive play is
pleasure, but only that it is a source of pleasure.
Thus, the worry that interpretive play is remoteanother. There are undoubtedly more activities
from pleasure should supply no grounds for than only these two. Furthermore, it may be the
excluding interpretive play from our characteri- case that none of the multiple types of interac-
zation of the art experience proper. tions that comprise the art experience is unique
Apart from the argument that interpretive to encounters with art. Of course, this might be
play is not connected with pleasure, there may granted at the same time that the proponent of
be other motives behind the tendency not tothe aesthetic theory urges that nevertheless
include interpretive play in the account of theaesthetic experience is a necessary component
art experience proper. One concern might be of any experience of art whereas other re-
sponses, like interpretive play, are not. At that
that interpretive play is not essential or funda-
mental to the art experience because it fails topoint, the aesthetic theorist will have to show
differentiate the interaction with art from other
that aesthetic experience is such a necessary
component. And, at least for those who hold an
experiences. In this context, the putative virtue
aesthetic definition of art, that will not be easy
of the notion of the aesthetic experience of art is
that it can say how our experiences of art differto do without begging the question. Suppose
from other types of experience. The proponent my counterexample to the notion that aesthetic
of the aesthetic experience approach might
experience is a necessary component of every
art experience is Duchamp's Fountain. I note
argue that the interpretive play I refer to regard-
that it is an object placed in a situation such that
ing the art response is not different in kind from
that activity in which a cryptographer indulges. it has an oblique significance which supports a
great deal of interpretive play. But it does not
Of course, it is not clear that aesthetic expe-
rience accounts can do the differentiating work appear to promote the kinds of response that
theorists call aesthetic. So it affords an art
they are supposed to do. First, those versions of
aesthetic experience that rely on notions of experience that is not an aesthetic one. More-
detachment and disinterest may just be implau- over, the interpretive play available in contem-
sible. Second, even an account as detailed asplating Fountain involves an art experience of a
Beardsley's affect-oriented one doesn't differ- very high degree of intensity for its kind. The
entiate the aesthetic experience of art from allaesthetic theorist can attempt to block this
other activities. For example, assuming that counterexample by saying that Fountain is not
there are acts of disinterested attention, an artwork and that an interpretive response to

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Art and Interaction 63

it, therefore, is not even an experience of art.the practice of art. But what could that be?
But he can only do this by asserting thatPerceiving aesthetic properties might be one
aesthetic experience is definitive of art and ofcandidate. However, in some cases interpretive
what can be experienced as art. Yet that begs play may, in fact, enhance the perception of
the question insofar as it presupposes that aesthetic
a qualities. Nor does this suggest that
work designed to provoke and promote inter-interpretive play is subservient to the goal of
pretive play cannot be art because interpretive perceiving qualities. For in some further in-
stances, perceiving qualities may be valuable
play is not a criterion of the kind of experience
appropriate to art. for the way in which it enables the discovery of
One might argue that interpretive play is not a richer interpretation, while in other cases the
fundamental to the art experience in the senseinterpretive play and the aesthetic response may
that it is not the original purpose for which the
remain independent of one another, supplying
works we call art were created. But this faces spectators with separate focii of interest in the
problems from two directions. First, her- work. Of course, the proponent of the aesthetic
meneutics has been around for a long time and approach may assert that his is the only proper
may even predate our notion of taste. Second,response
if to art, but that, as I have, I hope,
one makes this argument with aesthetic experi- shown, is only an assertion.
ence in mind, can we be so certain that promot-I think that it is obvious that the types of
ing aesthetic experience was the original pur- activities I have used, so far, to exemplify
pose for which many of the more historically interpretive play diverge from what was earlier
remote objects we call art were made? More- called the content-oriented version of the aes-
over, if it is claimed that many of the ancient thetic
or approach. There the notion was that an
medieval artifacts we call art at least had a aesthetic response to art was one that was
potentially aesthetic dimension, it must directed
be ac- at the qualitative features of the object,
knowledge that most of the self-same objects
such as its perceptible or expressive features.
also possessed a symbolizing dimension that
And though interpretation may, in different
invited interpretive play. ways, sometimes be involved with aesthetic
Perhaps it will be argued that interpretive
responses, it should be clear that interpretive
play is inappropriate to the art response proper.
play is not equivalent to aesthetic or expressive
This tack seems to me an implausible oneapprehension
since both because it is not evident that
all the evidence-our training in art apprecia-
interpretation is an element in all instances of
tion and the behavior of the majority ofaesthetic
our perception, and because the objects of
leading connoisseurs-points in the direction of
interpretive play extend beyond aesthetic and
suggesting that interpretative play is one expressive
of the qualities to themes and their adum-
central and esteemed modes of the practice of
brations, and to structures and their complications.
art spectatorship. Indeed, how would one But
gowhat about the affect-oriented variant of
about showing that a behavior as deeply theen-
aesthetic approach? First, it should be noted
trenched and as widely indulged in a practice
that asmany of the candidates in this area rely
centrally on a characterization of aesthetic ex-
interpretive play in art spectatorship is inappro-
priate to the practice? Practices are human perience which rests on notions such as disin-
activities constituted by traditionally evolved
terested pleasure or detachment from practical
purposes and ways of satisfying those purposes.
interest. But one may successfully engage in
The active traditions of such practices deter-
interpretive play without being devoid of prac-
mine what is appropriate to a practice both ticalininterest-one may be a critic whose repu-
terms of the ends and means of the practice.tation has been built on clever interpretations.
Thus, in art, the continuing tradition of Sointer-
interpretive play differs from aesthetic expe-
pretation establishes the appropriateness of the as the latter is typically explicated.
rience
kinds of hermeneutical responses that we have But the Beardsleyan affect-oriented account
been discussing. of aesthetic experience is more detailed than
One might try to show the inappropriateness
many of its predecessors and it seems to have
of interpretive play as an art response by room
argu- for interpretive play. That is, in later
ing that it interferes with some deeper goal of
versions of his account of aesthetic experience,

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64 CARROLL

What these
Beardsley includes a new feature toconsiderations
the charac- are meant to show
is that even with the inclusion
terization of aesthetic experience-viz., of active discov-
active
discovery-which is not included in previous
ery in Beardsley's formula, interpretive play
remains
accounts, either his own or, to my a mode of response to art that is
knowledge,
those of others. By the inclusion
independent of andof not active
subsumable under aes-
discovery, it may be felt that thetic experience. Often,
interpretive playinstances
has of interpre-
been successfully wedded to tive play will not
aesthetic amount to full-blown,
experience.
I disagree. For even inBeardsleyan-type
Beardsley's new
aesthetic experiences because
variant, a response still requires much
they will not score more
appreciably in terms of the
criteria heto
than active discovery to amount requires
an over and above active dis-
aesthetic
experience. It would also covery.
haveAnd toitbe
mayat
also least
be the case that
object-directed as well as meeting instances of interpretive
two of the play may not even
following three criteria: afford count as examples
a sense of Beardsleyan
of felt active dis-
freedom, detached affect, or covery because they
a sense will not result in the
of whole-
ness. But surely we could, via appropriate sense of intelligibility.
interpretive play,
engage in active discovery without But interpretive
felt play free-
nevertheless still re-
dom-i.e., the absence of antecedent con- mains a characteristic form of interaction with
cerns-and without detached affect-i.e., emo- artworks. And, pace aesthetic theorists of art, I
tional distance. Imagine a Marxist literary think that if we encounter an object designed to
critic, pressed by a deadline to finish his paper
support interpretive play, even though it affords
on the hidden reactionary meaning of a Balzac no aesthetic experience or aesthetic perception,
then we have a reason to believe it is an
novel. Nor does it seem likely that interpretive
artwork. Of course, an aesthetic theorist might
play often correlates with Beardsley's criterion
of wholeness, i.e., a sense of integration as trya to solve this problem by saying that inter
pretive play, sans any particular affect or per-
person. Indeed, I suspect that this is a rather
unusual concomittant to expect of many inter- ceptual focus, is a sufficient condition fo
actions with art. And, furthermore, many calling
in- a response "aesthetic." However, thi
stances of interpretive play may not meet the move involves abandoning not only the letter
requirement of object directedness. A work likebut also the spirit of the aesthetic approach, fo
Duchamp's Fountain surely supports a great the tradition has always used the idea of the
amount of interpretive play although most,"aesthetic"
if to single out a dimension of inter
not all, of this can be derived from attentionaction
to with objects which is bound up with
perceptual experience, affective experience, o
the art historical context in which it was placed
rather than to the object itself. a combination thereof. In short, to assimilate
Even Beardsley's account of the element of interpretive play as a mode of aesthetic experi
active discovery, as it is involved in the ence
art misses the point of what people wer
response, has an affective component. For un- trying to get at by use of the notion of th
der the rubric of active discovery, he not only"aesthetic."
has in mind that we actively make connectionsOne key feature of the notion of the aesthetic,
but that this be accompanied by a feelingmentioned
of by Beardsley and others,'4 is object
intelligibility. One is uncertain here whether directedness. In this light, having aesthetic
experiences
this feeling of intelligibility is simply seeing a or aesthetic perceptions is, in large
connection or whether it is something more.measure,
If a matter of focusing our attention on
the artwork that stands before us. The implicit
the former, then it is true of every interpretive
picture of spectatorship that this approach sug-
insight. But if it is the latter, which is a more
gests is of an audience consuming artworks
likely reading given Beardsley's overall pro-
atomistically, one at a time, going from one
gram, I am not sure that a sense of intelligibility
accompanies every interpretive insight. I may monadic art response to the next. But this
come to realize that The Turn of the Screw hardly
is squares with the way in which those who
attend to art with any regularity or dedication
structured to support at least two opposed inter-
pretations but that doesn't result in a senseeither
of respond to or have been trained to re-
intelligibility. spond to art. Art-both in the aspect of its

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Art and Interaction 65

creation and its appreciation-is a combinationinappropriate, but rather is a characteristic re-

of internally linked practices, which, to sim-sponse of an appreciator who has entered the
plify, we may refer to as a single practice. Like
practice of art. From one artwork to the next,
any practice,15 art involves not only a relation-
we consider the way in which a new work may
ship between present practitioners but a rela-expand upon the dialectic or problematic pres-
tionship with the past. Artmaking and artgoing ent in earlier works. Or, a later work may, for
are connected with traditions. As artgoers weexample, amplify the technical means at the
are not only interested in the artwork as disposal
a of a given artform for the pursuit of its
discrete object before us-the possible occasionalready established goals. So we may view a
for an aesthetic experience-but also as an film such as Griffith's The Birth of a Nation as
object that has a place in the tradition. Enteringthe perfection of primitive film's commitment
to narration. Such an interest in The Birth of a
the practice of art, even as an artgoer, is to enter
a tradition, to become apprised of it, to beNation is neither the viewpoint of an antiquar-
concerned about it, and to become interested in ian, a filmmaker, or a film specialist. It is rather
its history and its ongoing development. Thus,the response of any film appreciator who has
a characteristic response to art, predictably entered the practice of film spectatorship.
enough, is, given an artwork or a series of Confronted with a new artwork, we may
artworks, to strive to figure out and to situate
scrutinize it with an eye to isolating the ways in
their place within the tradition, or within thewhich it expands upon an existing artworld
historical development and/or tradition ofdialectic,
a solves a problem that vexed previous
specific art form or genre. This implies that artists, seizes upon a hitherto unexpected pos-
important aspects of our interaction with art- sibility of the tradition, or amplifies the formal
means of an artform in terms of the artform's
works are not, strictly speaking, object di-
rected, but are devoted to concerns with issuesalready established pursuits. But a new artwork
outside the object. We don't concentrate on the may also stand to the tradition by way of
object in splendid isolation; our attention fans making a revolutionary break with the past. A
out to enable us to see the place of the art objectnew artwork may emphasize possibilities not
within a larger, historical constellation of ob- only present in, but actually repressed by,
jects. Nor is this attending to the historical preceding styles; it may introduce a new prob-
context of the object undertaken to enhance lematic; it may repudiate the forms or values of
what would be traditionally construed as our previous art. When Tristan Tzara composed
aesthetic experience. Rather, our wider ambitpoems by randomly drawing snippets of words
of attention is motivated by the art appreciator's from a hat, he was repudiating the Romantic
poet's valorization of expression, just as the
interest in the tradition at large. Yet this deflec-
tion of attention from the object is not an Romantic poet had repudiated earlier poets'
aesthetic aberration. It is part of what is in- valorization of the representation of the external
volved with entering a practice with a living world in favor of a new emphasis on the
tradition. internal, subjective world. Tzara's act wasn't
To be interested in the tradition at large is to
random; it made perfect sense in the ongoing
be interested in its development and in the dialogue of art history. Concerned with the
various moves and countermoves which com- tradition at large, we as spectators review art-
prise that development. For example, encoun- works in order to detect the tensions or conflicts
tering one of Morris Louis's Unfurleds, we between may artistic generations, styles, and pro-
remark upon the way in which it works out a We interpret stylistic choices and gam-
grams.
problematic of the practice of painting initiated
bits as repudiations and gestures of rejection by
later artworks of earlier ones. This is often
by the concern of Fauvists and Cubists with
flatness. The painting interests us not onlymuch
for like the interpretation of a hidden mean-
whatever aesthetic perceptions it might pro-ing; however, it requires attention outside the
mote, but also for the way in which it intervenes
work to its art historical context. The signifi-
in an ongoing painterly dialectic about flatness.
cance we identify is not so much one hidden in
To be concerned with the significance of thethe work as one that emerges when we consider
painting within the tradition of moder art isthe
not work against the backdrop of contesting

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66 CARROLL

styles and movements. Call George it the Dickie dramatic analysed, of the instit
meaning of the artwork. But as artworld. And so on.
participants in a
tradition, we are legitimately interested
Now my point against in its aesthetic theorists of
historical development and art especially
is that even if in its does not promote an
Fountain
dramatic unfolding. Recognizing the
aesthetic dramatic
interaction, it does promote an inter-
significance of an artwork as it plays
pretive the role
interaction. of
Moreover, an interpretive
antagonist or protagonist on interaction,
the stage of art
including one of identifying the
history is not incidental to our dialectical
interest in art but
significance of a work in the evolu-
is an essential element of immersing ourselves
tion of art history, is as appropriate and as
in the tradition. Following the conflicts
characteristic and
a response to art as an aesthetic
tensions within the development of art
response. Thus,history is
since Fountain encourages an
as central a component of the practice
appropriate and of art
characteristic art response, we
spectatorship as is having aesthetic experiences.
have an important reason to consider it to be a
The "other directed," as opposed
work of art even to the
if it promotes no aesthetic
"object directed," interpretive play we charac-
experience.
teristically mobilize when interacting with
Aesthetic theorists holdart
that something is art
takes other appropriate forms
if it hasthan those
been designed of in such a way
to function
detecting stylistic amplifications and
as to bring aboutrepudia-
certain appropriate responses
tions. For example, we may towish art. Thisto
seems contem-
to be a reasonable strategy.
plate lines of influence or to consider
However, suchchanges of
theorists countenance only aes-
direction in the careers of major artists.
thetic responses These Yet there are
as appropriate.
concerns as well are groundedotherin characteristic
our interests, and appropriate responses to
as participants, in an evolving art.tradition. How-
And if an object supports such responses to
ever, rather than dwell on these, I would
an appreciable degree,rather
then I think that gives us
turn to a proposal of the way incallwhich
reason to the
the object art.
detection of a repudiation-insofar asto it
One objection is an of Fountain
my reclamation
important and characteristic might
interpretive
be that my model of re-the standard artgoer
sponse to art-can enable us to isshort-circuit
unacceptable. It might the
be said that someone
dismissal, by aesthetic theorists ofinart,
involved tryingof suchthe moves and
to decipher
works as Duchamp's Fountain. countermoves of artists within the historically
Let us grant that Duchamp's constituted
Fountain arena does
of the artworld is not the
not afford an occasion for aesthetic experiences
standard spectator but a specialist or an art
or aesthetic perceptions as those are
historian. Mytypically
response to this is to deny that I
and narrowly construed. Nevertheless, it does
am speaking of specialists and to urge that I take
as my model someone
propose a rich forum for interpretive play. Its who attends to art on
placement in a certain artworld context
some regular was
basis, and who is an informed
designed to be infuriating, on viewer,
the one hand,
one who "keepsand
up" with art without
enigmatic and puzzling on being thea professional
other. Con- critic or a professor of art.
fronted by Fountain, or by reports aboutofits
It is the responses such spectators which
placement in a gallery, one asks
shouldwhat
provide it
the means
data for philosophers of art
to put such an object on display atdiscuss
concerned to an the
artexperience of art.
exhibition. What is the significance of Ithe
On the other hand, am disquieted by the
object in its particular social implicit
setting? pictureAnd, of theories project of
that aesthetic
course, if we contemplate Fountain against
the standard the
artgoer. For them, it would appear,
backdrop of art history, we come to realize
the spectator is one whothat
goes from one encoun-
it is being used to symbolize
ter withaartwealth
to the next of
without attempting to
concerns. We see it to be aconnect
contemptuous
them. Such a person, for example,
repudiation of that aspect of fine art athat
might read em- year or so, hear a
novel every
phasizes craftsmanship in favor ofoccasionally,
concert a re-empha- and go to an art exhibition
sis of the importance of ideas to fine
whenever art.
he visits One
New York. But why should
thethat
might also gloss it as a gesture casual reveals
viewer of artthebe our source for
importance of the nominating process, the
characterizing which
art experience? If we want to

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Art and Interaction 67

characterize what it is to respond to baseballreworked in such a way that the result would be
appropriately, would we look to the spectator an adequate theory of art. The theory might
who watches one game every five years? Of
look like this: "A work of art is an object
course, this is an ad hominem attack. Aestheticdesigned to promote, in some appreciable mag-
theorists don't say that we should use suchnitude, the having of aesthetic perceptions, or
casual artgoers as our model of the standardthe making of various types of interpretations,
spectator. Nevertheless, there is somethingor the undertaking of whatever other appropri-
strange about their standard viewer, viz., thatate responses are available to spectators."
he or she responds to each work of art Attractive as this maneuver is, I doubt it will
monadically, savoring each aesthetic experi- work. It does not seem to me that any given
ence as a unitary event and not linking thattype of response is necessary to having an
event to a history of previous interactions with appropriate interaction with the artwork. With
artworks. As a matter of fact, I think this picturesome artworks, we may only be able to respond
is inaccurate. Such an artgoer would be as in terms of aesthetic perceptions while with
curious as the dedicated baseball spectator who others only interpretive responses are possible.
attends games for whatever excitement he canNor, by the way, does any particular response
derive from the contest before him and who supply us with sufficient grounds for saying
does not contemplate the significance of thissomething is a work of art. Cars are designed to
game in terms of the past and future of the impart aesthetic perceptions but they are not
practice of baseball. typically artworks, while we might interpret
The aesthetic theorist may, of course, admit one artist throwing soup in another artist's face
that interpretive responses to the hidden mean- as the repudiation of a tradition without count-
ing the insult as art. Likewise an encoded
ings, dramatic significance and latent structures
are appropriate within the practice of military document with a hidden message is not
spectatorship. But he might add that they are art despite the interpretive play it might engender.
not basic because the practice of art spectator- At the same time, if we are trying to convince
ship would never have gotten off the ground nor
someone that something is an artwork, showing
would it continue to keep going if artworks did that it is designed to promote one or more
not give rise to aesthetic experiences. Ourcharacteristic art interactions-whether aes-
desire for aesthetic pleasure is the motor that thetic or interpretive-supplies a reason to re-
drives the art institution. These are, of course,
gard the object as art. Suppose we are arguing
empirical claims. Possibly aesthetic pleasure isabout whether comic book serials like The
what started it all, although it is equally plau-
Incredible Hulk, Spider-man, and the Fantastic
sible to think that the pleasure of interpretation
Four are art. And suppose we agree that such
could have motivated and does motivate exercises do not afford aesthetic experiences of
spectatorship. But, in any case, this debate is
any appreciable magnitude. But, nevertheless,
probably beside the point. For it is likely thatI argue that these comic books contain
suppose
both the possibility of aesthetic pleasurehidden and the allegories of the anxieties of adoles-
pleasure of interpretation motivate art-going, cence, such that those allegories are of a com-
and that interacting with artworks byplexity way of worthy of decipherment. At that point,
having aesthetic perceptions and makingwe inter-
have a reason to regard the comics as art,
pretations are both appropriate and and equally
the burden of proof is on the skeptic who
basic responses to art. must show that the alleged allegories are either
My dominant thesis has been that there merelyarefanciful concoctions of mine or are so
more responses, appropriate to artworks, than
transparent that it is outlandish to suppose that
aesthetic responses. I have not given an they exhaus-
warrant a response sophisticated enough to
tive catalogue of these but have focussed upon
be counted as an interpretation.
various types of interpretive responses. This
' Though throughout this essay I maintain that there is
raises the question of whether or not something
a strong tendency among philosophers of art to deploy
like the aesthetic definition of art, amplified to
notions of the aesthetic as definitive of our interactions with
incorporate a more catholic view of the appro-
art, not all philosophers find the aesthetic to be a congenial
priate experiences art avails us, couldn't be
idea. George Dickie, for example, challenges its use in his

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68 CARROLL

classic "The Myth of Aesthetic ence.

Attitude," in American
Philosophical Quarterly I no. I (Jan., 1964).
4 Beardsley, 21.Dickie
5 Tolhurst,
challenges proponents of the aesthetic to find265.
a plausible
differentia between this concept as a6prefix Monroe for experiences
Beardsley, "The Discrimination of Ae
of art versus ordinary experiences. Enjoyment,"
I am sympathetic in The Aesthetic with Point of View, ed
Dickie's reservations as well as with
Wreenobjections
and Donald that worry
Callen (Cornell University Pre
p. 42.
about whether the usage of such notions as disinterest and
freedom in characterizations of the 7aesthetic
J. O. Urmson, "What
is Makes a Situation Aesthetic,"
ultimately
coherent. However, for the purposes Art and Philosophy,
of this ed. W. E. Kennick (New
paper, York, 1979),
I have
not dwelt on these problems withpp. 395-97.
aesthetic theories of art
but rather, in a manner of speaking, 8 haveMonroe Beardsley,
attempted "AesthetictoExperience,"
give The
Aesthetic Point as
the devil his due by generally proceeding of View,
if pp. 288-89. notions
such
as disinterest could be rendered intelligibly
9 The practice of planting while alsoand
oblique meanings
wondering whether even with this themes inconcession
artworks which the audience is meant to discover
aesthetic
theories of art are acceptable. I am
occurs inprone,
varying degreesespecially inperhaps
in different artforms,
regard to what I later call "affect-oriented" characteriza-
most frequently in literature and least frequently in orches-
tions, to think that the notion of the aesthetic
tral music. is mythic.
But it has examples On
in every artform.
the other hand, where the notion of '0aesthetic
Peter Hutchinson,experiences is
Games Authors Play (London,
what I label above as "content-oriented,"
1983), p. 80.I think there is no
problem in speaking of aesthetic experience, i.e.,
" For a reproduction of of the see The
Black Quadrilateral
experience of aesthetic and/or expressive qualities.
Russian Avant-Garde: The George Costakis Collection, ed.
2 For an example of the anti-definitionalist stance, see
Angelica Zander Rudenstine (New York, 1981), p. 256.
Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,"
12 David Hume, "Of the Standard The
of Taste," Art and
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15 no. I (Fall,
Philosophy, p. 495. This view of Hume in regard to
1956). For an example of an Institutional Theory, see
intellection is discussed in my "Hume's Standard of
George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: an Institutional
Taste," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43 no.
Analysis (Corell University Press, 1974).
2 (Winter, 1984).
3 Monroe Beardsley, "An Aesthetic Definition of
13 Alasdair
Art," in What is Art?, ed. Hugh Curtler Maclntyre,
(New After Virtue
York, 1983);(University of
W. Tolhurst, "Toward An Aesthetic Notre Dame Press, 1981),
Account of p. 175. Nature
the
of Art," The Journal of Aesthetics and14 Jerome
ArtStolnitz, "The Aesthetic
Criticism 42Attitude,"
no. Intro-
ductory Readings
3 (Spring, 1984). Also, Harold Osbore's "Whatin Aesthetics,
is aed.Work
John Hospers (New
York, 1969),
of Art?" British Journal of Aesthetics 21pp. 17-27. 1) represents
(198
another attempt at defining art in terms'5 Maclntyre, 181.
of aesthetic experi-

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