Republic of the Philippines of the witnesses against him.
of the witnesses against him. With the assistance of counsel, he filed on May 28, 1974 a motion
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977
FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,
vs.
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTIN
CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, as Members of the Panel of Investigators, Members of the
Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
LABOR, respondents.
E. B. Garcia & Associates for petitioner.
Marcelo C. Amiana for private respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Jesus V. Diaz respondent Secretary of Labor.
FERNANDO, J.:
The protection to labor mandate is more of a reality with the present Constitution expressly
providing for security, of tenure. 1 Moreover, for a university professor, aptly referred to as a
tiller in the vineyard of the mind, there is the guarantee of academic freedom. 2 Nonetheless, for
cause duly shown there may be a forced termination of his services. It is essential though that
prior to his removal, procedural due process be observed. The grievance alleged by petitioner in
this case, a university professor, was that there was a failure to comply with such a requisite.
When therefore respondent Secretary of Labor granted a clearance to the private respondent,
the Araneta University Foundation,3 for his dismissal for immorality he instituted this certiorari
proceeding. A thorough and exhaustive comment, considered as the answer, filed by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza 4 with full support from the record, negates such a contention.
There is no basis for a reversal. certiorari does not lie.
It is undisputed that petitioner Felix Montemayor was a fulltime professor of respondent Araneta
University Foundation, serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department,
Previously, he was on the faculty of other educational institutions. There was, on April 17, 1974,
a complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the Araneta University
Foundation for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee
to investigate such charge. The first hearing, which took place on April 24, 1974, was attended
by petitioner as well as complainant with his two witnesses. One of them. Leonardo de Lara,
submitted an affidavit. Petitioner sought the postponement of the investigation to May 3, 1974.
It was granted. On that occasion, he was furnished a copy of the affidavit of the other witness,
Macario Lacanilao. The accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances
committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. There was cross-examination by petitioner
to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance. He likewise filed an affidavit to sustain his
defense on June 17, 1974. The report and recommendation of the investigating committee came
on July 8, 1974. It was adverse to petitioner, who was found morally responsible for the act
complained of. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. The then
President Juan Salcedo, Jr., on August 5, 1974, adopted such recommendation and thereafter
referred the same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for appropriate action.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1974, with new charges being filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan,
one Jaime Castaneda, and Jesus Martinez against petitioner for conduct unbecoming of a faculty
member, another committee was appointed. Then came his preventive suspension, ordered to
last until the administrative investigation was concluded. There was a motion by petitioner for
the postponement of the hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974, but the same was denied.
The hearing proceeded in his absence. There was testimony by Professor Luis Almazan and
Jaime Castaneda. Thereafter, on December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding
the charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the
President and the Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from
the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the
University. The Committee found as established: "1. That immoral advances on several
occasions have been made by respondent [herein petitioner] on Prof. Luis Almazan 2. That
immoral advances have also been made by respondent on Jaime Castaneda, a student-
employee of the university on several occasions; 3. That said immoral advances were frustrated
because both Professor Almazan and Mr. Castaneda had refused to accept them; 4. That both
witnesses and victims of said immoral advances have declared that the behavior of respondent
was detrimental [and] prejudicial to the moral and educational standards of the Araneta
University Foundation; 5. That because of said behavior, respondent should not continue as
Professor in the University; and 6. That the acts of respondent complained of are offensive to
good morals [and] inimical to the welfare of students and greatly prejudicial to [the] interest
and educational objectives of University, hence the same are highly reprehensible." 5 His
dismissal was then ordered on December 10, 1974, effective November 15, 1974, the date of
his preventive suspension. The University, on December 12, 1974, filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission a report of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his
employment. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1974, petitioner in turn lodged a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and
payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant
thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission found in favor of petitioner. He was ordered reinstated to
his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Petitioner's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. Private respondents
appealed to respondent Secretary of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set aside the Commission's
order for his reinstatement. He found petitioner's dismissal justified, Nor was he persuaded by
the plea that there was denial of due process. He was satisfied with the procedure followed by
private respondent. Moreover, he could not have ignored the fact that the controversy between
the parties was passed upon and the parties heard on their respective contentions in the
proceedings before the labor agencies. Respondent University was, however, required to pay
complainant the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the
former voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, petitioner
filed this instant petition for certiorari.
1. The present Constitution, as noted, expanded the scope of the protection to labor mandate
by specifying that the State shall assure the right of workers to security of tenure. This Court, as
stressed in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Associations 6 is called
upon to manifest realty to a constitutional command." 7Subsequently, in Almira v. B. F.
Goodrich Philippines, 8 it was the ruling of this Tribunal that even where disciplinary action
against an employee is warranted, "where a penalty less punitive [than dismissal] would suffice, President and the Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from
whatever missteps may be committed ought not to be visited with a consequence so the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the
severe." 9 An instructor or member of a teaching staff of a university was held, in the leading University." 20 It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee failed
case of Feati University v. Bautista, 10 to be an employee. As such, he is entitled to that security to show full awareness of the demands of procedural due process. A motion by petitioner for
of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. The explicit pronouncement in Feati University v. postponement of the hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied. What is worse, in his
Bautista was foreshadowed by Far Eastern University v. Court of Industrial Relations, 11 a 1962 absence the matter was heard with the committee losing no time in submitting its report finding
decision. While a faculty member such as petitioner may be dismissed, it must be for cause. the charges against petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending his
What is more, there must be clearance from the Secretary of Labor. So it is provided in the removal. If that were all, respondent Secretary of Labor cannot be sustained. certiorari would
Labor Code.12 lie. But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed out in the same comment of the Solicitor
General, by the fact "that petitioner was able to present his case before the Labor
Commission ." 21 Then he continued: "Thus, the record discloses that at a mediation conference
2. The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the
held on December 9, 1974, the parties appeared and, after all efforts at conciliation had failed,
provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. While reference
they agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory arbitration. Several hearings were conducted
therein is to institutions of higher learning, it was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty
by Labor Arbiter Atty. Daniel Lucas, Jr., wherein petitioner submitted his evidence supported by
Admission, Committee 13 that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a
his affidavit impugning the regularity of the proceedings before the investigating committees
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
and assailing the legality of his removal. The entire record of the administrative proceedings,
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
including the transcript of the stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether
Commission for review. Petitioner herein, thru counsel, moved for reinstatement during the
in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is
pendency of the case. In another motion, he prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing of
'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his
his complaint for unfair labor practice against herein private respondents (NLRC Case No. R-IV-
findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference,
1060-74) with that of the application for clearance filed by the University to terminate
molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted
Montemayor's employment. On the other hand, the University moved to dismiss the complaint
authority within or beyond the institution.'" 14 Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of
for unfair labor practice against its officials on the ground that they were not complainant's
such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or
employers and that their participation in the administrative case against the latter was official in
professional penalization on grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in
nature. Respondent University also presented the affidavit of Thomas P. G. Neill Dean of the
the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academic
Institute of Agricultural Business Administration and Chairman of the Committee created to
right becomes non-existent, 15 Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief
investigate the charges of immorality against petitioner attesting to the regularity of the
practical requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor. 16 As with Maclver, he did not
proceedings and the validity of the dismissal." 22 The legal aspect as to the procedural due
rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "proved incompetence or
process having been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: "All the
moral delinquency." 17
foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and more
significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the proceeding had before
3. The charge leveled against petitioner, that of making homosexual advances to certain the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein, as shown
individuals, if proved, did amount to a sufficient cause for removal. The crucial question heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case." 23
therefore is whether it was shown that he was guilty of such immoral conduct. He is thus
entitled to the protection of procedural due process. To paraphrase Webster, there must be a
5. The comment of the Solicitor General was submitted on January 4, 1977. The memorandum
hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and
for petitioner was submitted on April 25. What immediately calls attention is that no attempt
judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. As far back as 1915, the American Association
was made to refute specifically such recital of the Solicitor General, of decisive significance as
of University Professors adopted the principle that "every university or college teacher should be
far as the due process issue is concerned. Instead, the emphasis was on the alleged commission
entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in
of an unfair labor practice by private respondent. Inasmuch as the Arbiter as well as the
specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent judicial
National Labor Relations Commission absolved private respondent from the charge of unfair
committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should have
labor practice, it would appear that the emphasis of counsel for petitioner was misplaced.
full opportunity to present evidence." 18 Thus the phrase, academic due process, hag gained
Accordingly, there is nothing in the record that would militate against the contention of the
currency, Joughin referred to it as a system of procedure designed to yield the beat possible
Solicitor General that there was an observance of procedural due process.
judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on
the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a conclusion. 19
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed No. costs.

4. The procedure followed in the first investigation of petitioner, conducted in June of 1974, did
satisfy the procedural due process requisite. The same cannot be said of the November, 1974 Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.
inquiry when the petitioner had to face anew a similar charge of making homosexual advances.
As admitted in the exhaustive comment of the Solicitor General: "On November 16, 1974,
Concepcion, Jr., J, is on leave.
Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the postponement of the hearing set for November 18
and 19, 1974 but the same was rejected by the committee. The hearing proceeded as scheduled
in the absence of Professor Montemayor and his counsel. In said hearing, Prof. Luis Almazan and
Jaime Castaneda testified. On December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding
the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56180 October 16, 1986
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ROMEO G. GUANZON and TERESITA
REGALADO, respondents.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Mirano, Mirano & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh S.J., Dean of
Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside
the university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon, son of private respondents Romeo
Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year student of the university with
unbecoming conduct committed on December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the
Cervini Hall's cafeteria, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini who I think comes from Bacolod, was
asking for "siopao." I was at the counter and I told him that the "siopao"
had still to be heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr. Guanzon
started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing presence of
other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he told me that was none
of my business. Since he seemed impatient, I was going to give back his
money without any contempt. (sic) He retorted that he did not like to
accept the money. He got madder and started to curse again. Then he
threatened to strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then he
actually struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his fellow
boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to stop; I got hold of
a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that Fr. Campbell arrived. The
incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell by the boarders. I could not tell him
myself as I had gone into the kitchen crying because I was hurt.
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the
investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.
The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents
against the university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City.
The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in
violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of
Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the
dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good
morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the
university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole
prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable
in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as
an institution of learning.
After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them
P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to
pay the costs of the suit.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially
reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its
decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution issued by the
appellate court, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to
be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution
of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks us to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five on the
following grounds:
ONE
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS IN THE DISCIPLINE CASE AGAINST THEIR
SON, JUAN RAMON GUANZON.
TWO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT
THE RESORT TO JUDICIAL REMEDY BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT
VIOLATE THE RULE ON FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION OR
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
THREE
THE FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE DIVISION
OF FIVE ARE TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR ARE
CONFLICTING, OR CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
In reversing its own decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the findings of the Director of
Private Schools affirmed by the Minister of Education and the findings of the lower Court to the
effect that due process of law was not observed by the petitioner when it dismissed the private
respondents' son Juan Ramon. The resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by
administrative officers in matters falling within their competence will not generally be reviewed
by the courts, as well as the principle that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its split decision are not sustained by the facts on
record.
The statement regarding the finality given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative
tribunals is correct if treated as a general principle. The general principle, however, is subject to
well established exceptions.
We disregard the factual findings of trial courts when-(l) the conclusion is a finding grounded on
speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension
of facts; and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented. (Gomez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514;
Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734; and Bacayo v. Genato,
135 SCRA 668).
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies.
By reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, we ordinarily accord respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power
asserts itself whenever the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings
are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. (International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the
Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco v. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61;
and Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
The Court of Appeals ruled that Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process. We fail to
see what, in the records, made the respondent court reverse its earlier and correct finding that
there was due process.
The original decision, penned by then Associate and now Presiding Justice Emilio A. Gancayco
reviews the facts on record to show that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate.
The decision states:
First, after the slapping incident which happened on December 12, 1967, Fr.
Welsh in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Discipline upon receipt of
the letter-complaint (Exh. 2) of Carmelita Mateo conducted a preliminary
inquiry by interviewing the companions and friends of Juan Ramon Guanzon
who were also at the cafeteria. They confirmed the incident in question.
(Exhs. 5, 6, 7 and 9).
Second, Fr. Welsh, finding that there was probable cause against Mr.
Guanzon, prepared a memorandum to the members of the Board of
Discipline dated December 16, 1967 (Exh. 8) and delivered a copy each to
Fr. Francisco Perez, Dr. Amada Capawan, Mr. Piccio and Dr. Reyes.
Third, on December 14, 1967, Mr. Guanzon was fully informed of the
accusation against him when Fr. Welsh read the letter-complaint of
Carmelita Mateo and he admitted the truth of the charge. (tsn., pp. 38-39,
May 9, 1970; Exh. 4).
Fourth, Fr. Welsh also sent separate letters to Rev. Antonio Cuna, Student
Counselor of the College of Arts and Sciences dated December 18, 1967
and Rev. James Culligan, Director of Guidance of the College of Arts and
Sciences dated December 18, 1967 seeking any information for guidance in
the action of the Board of Discipline regarding the case of Mr. Guanzon.
(Exhs. 10-11)
Fifth, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline set on December 19,
1967 was posted at the Bulletin Board of the College of Arts and Sciences
and also at Dormitory Halls (tsn., pp. 21-22, July 21, 1970) The Secretary
of the Dean of Discipline personally notified Mr. Guanzon of the meeting of
the Board on December 19, 1967, he was told to seek the help of his
guardians, parents and friends including the student counsellors in the
residence halls and College of Arts and Sciences. (tsn., p. 18, July 21,
1970)
Sixth, despite notice of the Board of Discipline on December 19, 1967, Mr.
Guanzon did not care to inform his parents or guardian knowing fully well
the seriousness of the offense he had committed and instead he spoke for
himself and admitted to have slapped Carmelita Mateo. He then asked that
he be excused as he wanted to catch the boat for Bacolod City for the
Christmas vacation.
Seventh, the decision of the Board of Discipline was unanimous in dropping
from the rolls of students Mr. Guanzon (Exh. 12) which was elevated to the
office of the Dean of Arts and Sciences, Rev. Joseph A. Galdon, who after a
review of the case found no ground to reverse the decision of the Board of
Discipline. (Exh. 13) The case was finally elevated to the President of the
Ateneo University who sustained the decision of the Board of Discipline
(Exh. 21-A, p. 6) A motion for reconsideration was filed by the President of
the Student Council in behalf of Mr. Guanzon (Exh. 15) but the same was
denied by the President of the University.
Eighth, when the decision of the Board of Discipline was about to be carried
out, Mr. Guanzon voluntarily applied for honorable dismissal. He went
around to the officials of the university to obtain his clearance and this was
approved on January 8, 1968. (Exh. 3, tsn., p. 58, May 6, 1970)
Ninth, Mr. Romeo Guanzon, father of Juan Ramon Guanzon arranged for full
and complete refund of his tuition fee for the entire second semester of the
school year 1967-68. Juan Ramon was never out of school. He was
admitted at the De la Salle College of Bacolod City and later transferred to
another Jesuit School.
From the above proceedings that transpired it can not be said that Juan
Ramon Guanzon was denied due proems of law. On the contrary, we find
that he was given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully informed of
the charge against him and to be confronted of the witnesses face to face.
And since he chose to remain silent and did not bother to inform his parents
or guardian about the disciplinary action taken against him by the
defendant university, neither he nor his parents should find reason to
complain.
xxx xxx xxx
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted the altercation with the
waitress and his slapping her on the face. Rev. Welsh did not stop with the admission. He
interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who
were present during the incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty-Fr. Francisco
Perez, Biology Department Chairman; Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant
Dean Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There is nothing in the records to
cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is
concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping incident,
then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore,
was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating
board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met.
We do not share the appellate court's view that there was no due process because the private
respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings.
Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and
mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact, in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even
asked if he would be expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of
the offense he committed. When informed about the December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board
of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and/or parents.
In the natural course of things, Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious matter to
his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not
even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the
petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private respondents, the university, as
stated earlier, undertook a fair and objective investigation of the slapping incident.
Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented
and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136
SCRA 112).
While it may be true that Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to her
because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him with a cardboard box top, this did
not justify Juan Ramon's slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the
altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive language "bilat ni bay," an
Ilongo phrase which means sex organ of a woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to
react to the nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon who was present
during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made
threatening gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top which she threw at
Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appellate court's resolution dated
was "unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline and Code of Ethics of the January 26, 1981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellate court's decision dated March 15,
university, specifically under the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic 1979 is REINSTATED.
regulations (Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from the college. The
action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for
SO ORDERED.
Private Schools recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground for refusing re-
enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245).

Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the College of Arts and Sciences
Handbook containing the general regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the
College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and academic regulations and (2) a
copy of the Rules and Regulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of
the provisions of which is as follows: under the title "Dining Room"-"The kitchen help and server
should always be treated with civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely
because of her service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she deserved more respect and
gracious treatment.

The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of law in the appellate court's
ruling on due process.

The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its pending
appeal from the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It
argues that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court
was premature.

The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a
result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question
and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be done. (Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA Republic of the Philippines
230; Tapales v. University of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 553; Limoico v. Board of Administrators, SUPREME COURT
(PVA), 133 SCRA 43; Malabanan v. Ramonte, 129 SCRA 359). The case was brought pursuant to Manila
the law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the
civil courts.
SECOND DIVISION

There was no need to await action from Malacaang.

G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988

This brings us to the final issue which is whether or not the private respondents are entitled to
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA,
damages. There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was afforded due process
REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIOSO,
of law. The penalty is based on reasonable rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty
RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners,
of the same offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could be implemented,
vs.
Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA),
Salle University of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school Moreover, his full
DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of
and complete tuition fees for the second semester were refunded through the representation of
PSBA, ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents.
Mr. Romeo Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.

Rosalinda L. Santos for petitioners.

It is unfortunate of the parents suffered some embarrassment because of the incident. However,
their predicament arose from the misconduct of their own son who, in the exuberance of youth
and unfortunate loss of self control, did something which he must have, later, regretted. There Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.
was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the college authorities deferred any undue
action until a definitive decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the disciplinary Merly Basco-Olano for Intervenor Union.
process was set up to protect the privacy of the student involved. There is absolutely no
indication ot malice,. fraud, and improper or willful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo
de Manila University in this case. Camilo Flores for Intervenor

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction seeking to nullify the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Branch, in violation of petitioners' constitutional rights.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon
City, while respondents, are the Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter
referred to as PSBA) Quezon City Branch, a 'non-stock institution of higher learning organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the
Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice President for Admission and Registration of PSBA,
Q.C.; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-Charge; and Ramon Agapay, Director of the Office of Student
Affairs of PSBA, Q.C. and Romeo Rafer, Chief Security of PSBA, Q.C.
As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA,
Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school
(Rollo, p. 75). Among the agreements reached at that time were:
On The exercise of student's democratic rights, it has been agreed that
protest actions can be conducted any day as long as they meet the
following requirements:
a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.
only;
b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will
exceed the 1:00 time limit;
c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30
p.m.
d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action
should secure a permit 6 days before, or if on the same day, it still be under
the "first-come-first-serve served" basis in the use of facilities, volume of
sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.
It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the
students to directly participate in the policy-making body of the school, as
this is provided by law. However, the administration will be open to
suggestions and questions, especially those regarding tuition fee increases
and other policies that directly affect us.
In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among
others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by
the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances (Rollo. p. 20; 347-
348). "Subsequently dialogues proved futile." Finally, petitioners received uniform letters from
respondents dated October 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 23) giving them 3 days to explain why the school
should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or
conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on Thursday (Oct. 2),
Friday (Oct. 3) and Tuesday (Oct. 7).<re||an1w> The aforestated letter was answered by
the counsel for the students in a reply letter dated October 22, 1982 Annex "E" (Rollo, P. 26).
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were
allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987.
On October 28,1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of
the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and
student leaders. (Annex "F" Rollo, p. 30). Simultaneously on the same date, the student council
wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school's
decision regarding their enrollment (Rollo, p. 31). Another demand letter was made by Counsel
for the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his
clients within forty-eight (48) hours (Rollo. p. 33). All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared
to be forthcoming, hence this petition.
In the resolution of November 7,1986, the Second Division of this Court without giving due
course to the petition required respondents to comment thereon and set the hearing for
preliminary mandatory injunction on November 10, 1986 (Rollo, p. 35). In compliance therewith
on November 9, 1986, respondents filed their comment and opposition to the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the petition for the issuance
of a writ be denied not only for lack of merit but also for being barred by res judicata (Rollo, p.
67).
Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on November 10, 1986, by the Philippine School
of Business Administration, Quezon City Faculty Union, (PSBA, QC-FU for brevity) representing
the faculty members hereinafter referred to as intervenors, on the ground of commonality of
issues and cause of action with that of the petitioners (Rollo, p. 36).
At the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, where counsel for all the
parties appeared and argued their causes, the Court Resolved to grant the motion for
intervention and to require the intervenors to comment on the petition and the petitioners to file
a reply thereto (Rollo, p. 66, copy corrected, p. 167). On the same day respondents filed their
comment and opposition to the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction (Rollo, pp. 67-74).
On November 12, 1986, this Court resolved to issue a temporary mandatory order directing the
respondents herein (a) to re-enroll the petitioners herein and (b) to re-admit the intervenors to
their former positions without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the school
authorities (Rollo, p. 141). Said Order was issued on November 14, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 142-143).
A supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction dated November 11, 1986 was filed by herein respondents (Rollo, p. 150), while an
urgent motion to reiterate prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction dated
November 13, 1986 was filed by herein petitioners (Rollo, pp. 162-163).
Instead of complying with tile resolution of November 12, 1986 an urgent motion for
reconsideration was filed by herein respondents on November 15, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194) praying
that this Court reconsider the aforesaid resolution.
On November 18, 1986 petitioners and intervenors filed a joint urgent motin to cite respondents
in contempt (Rollo, p. 199), while respondents filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration,
also on the same date (Rollo, p. 205).
In the resolution of November 19,1986, respondents' motion for reconsideration and
sumplemental motion for reconsideration were denied for lack of merit, and the denial was
dedlared FINAL. The urgent motion of counsel for petitioners and intervanorts to cite
respondents in contempt of court was NOTED (Rollo, p. 225).
An urgent motion for intervention and answer in intervention was filed by Nelia M. Lat, Annalisa
T. Geronimo, Leonora Q. Bueniraje, Maria L. Araas, Eduerijes Llanto, Charita, R. Chong, Marilou
Garcia, Amelita R. Sia, Loida O. Ladines, Dominic P. Santos, Noly R. Chong, and Arthur R.
Cacdac for themselves and on behalf of other students of the PSBA, Quezon City, who are
similarly situated, to allolw them to intervene as respondents dated November 11, 1986 (Rollo,
p. 227) which was granted by this Court in a resoulution dated December 3, 1986 (Rollo, p.
240)
On November 20, 1986, the respondents filed their compliance with the temporary mandatory
order; Issued by this Court pursuant to its resolution dated November 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 237).
On November 29, 1986, respondents filed their comment on the motion for intervention of the
PSBA Quezon City Faculty Union (Rollo, p. 252).
A consolidated reply to respondents' supplemental comment and opposition to application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, urgent motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration was filed by herein in intervenors on December 2,1986 (Rollo. p.
242).
In the resolution of January 21, 1987, the petition was given due course and parties parties
were required to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 266). Accordingly, respondents filed
their memorandum on February 23, 1987, (Rollo, p. 269) while the intervenor Union filed its
memorandum on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 296). Respondents filed their reply memorandum on
April 13, 1987 praying that the intervention of the intervening teachers be dismissed (Rollo, p.
328).
Respondents filed their manifestation and motion dated April 27, 1987 stating that pursuant to
this court's order dated November 12, 1986, the school authorities created a special
investigating committee to conduct an investigation, which submitted a report with
recommendations (Rollo, p. 335), the report reading as follows:
After due deliberation, the Committee hereby submits the following
recommendation:
STUDENT-RESPONDENTS
A. RENATO PALMA, BERNADETTE ANG, ROGELIO TAGANAS are hereby
recommended to be EXONERATED of all charges.
B. SOPHIA ALCUAZ (up to No. 19) are hereby recommended to be
HONORABLY DISMISSED from PSBA Q.C. roll of students without prejudice
to reenrollment on a case to case basis if found suitable and justified.
FACULTY-RESPONDENTS
A. To be EXONERATED of all charges JOSE C. ANTONIO, DONALLY BRINGAS,
DANTE CAJUCOM, LEO LOQUELLANO SOLITA A. CRUZ, and N TOLENTINO.
B. To be reprimanded with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely FLORANTE BAGSIC and
ATENOGENES BONDOC.
C. MR. SEVERINO CORTES, JR. is hereby recommended for non-renewal of
his semester to semester appointment.
D. MESSRS. ASSER (BONG) TAMAYO and RENE Q. ENCARNACION are
hereby recommended for termination of their services as faculty members.
Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the
case be dismissed for having become moot (Rollo, p. 341). On April 30, a second urgent
manifestation and motion was filed by respondent praying that the recommendation of special
Committee as implemented by its President be made effective by the discontinuance of the
summer enrollment of petitioners Anna Shiela A. Dinoso, Zeny Gudito and Ma. Shalina Pitoy
upon the refund to them of all the fees they have paid to the school (Rollo, p. 397).
An urgent motion to cite for contempt herein respondents was filed on May 5, 1987 for violating
this court's temporary mandatory order on November 12, 1986, by discharging and striking off
from the roll of students petitioners Dinoso, Gudito and Pitoy (Rollo, p. 400) while an opposition
to urgent motion to cite for contempt was filed by herein respoddents on May 20, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 413).
On May 20, 1987, Intervenor Union filed their Intervenor's Comment on Respondents' reply
memorandum and manifestation and motion with motion to cite respondent in contempt (Rollo,
p. 417).
On June 8, 1987, petitioners filed their very urgent motion for an order to re-enroll (Rollo, p.
620) followed by an urgent supplemental motion and Reply to opposition dated June 9, 1987
(Rollo, p. 623).
Later on, an Opposition to "very urgent motion for order to re-enroll was filed by herein
respondents on June 11, 1987 (Rollo, p. 625) while on June 15,1987, herein intervenor Union
filed its manifestation and motion with urgent motion reiterating intervenor's motion to cite
respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 629).
On June 16,1987 respondents filed their opposition to urgent motion to oppose petitioners'
urgent motion dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. 795)'. Petitioners filed their memorandum on June
17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 799).
On June 18, 1987, respondents filed their counter-comment and opposition to motion to cite
respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 815). Subsequently, on June 25,1987, respondents filed their
Reply Memorandum on the petitioners' memorandum (Rollo, p. 820.).
In the resolution of June 29, 1 987 the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit
or re-enroll herein petitioners was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners
cleared by the investigating committee and who had been recommended to be readmitted or re-
enrolled. This court further stated that the reason for the non-enrollment of the others is that
the results of the investigation conducted indicate prima facie the violation by the majority of
the petitioners of the rules and regulations of respondent school (Rollo, p. 793). The Court
further resolved to require respondent school to show cause why it should not be adjudged in
contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-faculty members in the interim.
Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without
allegation of termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due
process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be
summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum
standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]).

Tested under said standards, the records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the
Respondents filed the manifestation on July 3, 1987 informing this Court that they did not
outset satisfied conditions No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had
refuse to reinstate the intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in
evidently not been completed with.
compliance with the Court's temporary mandatory order (Rollo, p. 829). Hence, the motion for
contempt should be dismissed.
It is not disputed that printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. are distributed at the
beginning of each school year to the students including petitioners. The Rules, among other
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for
things, provide:
petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers
whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in
the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the
their constitutional rights of expression and assembly. School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all
rules/regulations promulgated by t he Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from
Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that
the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the
there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the
School Administration.
person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or
prejudice. They claim that barring them from enrollment for the second semester is equivalent
to expulsion which cannot be valid and effective without the required MEC's approval (Rollo, pp. As previously stated, in violation of aforesaid Rules and Regulations, sore students staged noisy
12-13). demonstrations in the premises of the school. For the settlement thereof, an agreement was
reached providing among otliers the regulations for the conduct of protest actions. Despite said
agreement, it was alleged that petitioners, acting as the core group of a noisy minoritv,
Furthermore, petitioners point out that the acts of respondents constitute a wanton and
committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the
deliberate disregard of petitioners' freedom of expression (ibid).
cooperation of the intervening teachers, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the
majority of the students including the intervening ones; which acts now constitute the subject of
In the same manner, intervenors-teachers claim that their constitutional right to due process this controversy (Rollo, p. 217 ).
has been violated when they were summarily dismissed without affording them the opportunity
to be heard (Rollo, p. 301).
Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to
explain in writing why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one them in view of their participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a dates stated.
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester.
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers
Respondents alleged that none of the students ever filed a reply thereto. The records show
are for 'one semester." It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC
however that a letter was sent by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students to the
no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers.
President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said students are not guilty of the
Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored
charges filed against them (Rollo, pp- 26-28). Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as
principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs.
answer in a letter to the same President of the school, where he denied the charges against him
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court
(Rollo, p. 52). It therefore becomes readily apparent that while the students and the teachers
of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 1 00 SCRA 197).<re||an1w> The
have been informed in writing of the charges filed against them and they in turn filed their
contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be
answers thereto, no investigating committee or official was designated by the school authorities
compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they
to hear and decide the case upon the presentation of evidence of both parties. Presumably, the
the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties."
(Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).
schools banking on the theory that the contracts have already expired, said procedural steps are A careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee
no longer necessary. shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent
that the investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate.

At any rate, this Court obviously to insure that full justice is done both to the students and
teachers on the one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted Accordingly, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the finding of said committee and
by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986. as manifested by the respondents, the report of said committee has virtually rendered this
petition moot and academic.

The investigating committee found among others that: there were concerted mass assemblies
conducted on October 2, 3, 7 and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is
students and teachers, and which disrupted classes. The disruption of classes and the barricades likewise untenable.
in the school entrances constitute violations of existing MECS and PSBA rules and regulations
(Rollo, pp. 348-349). It is ironic that many of those who claim that their human rights have
Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
been violated are the very ones who emasculate the human rights of the innocent majority.
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. (Hahn vs.
Moreover, petitioners named in the report were found to be academically deficient (Rollo, p. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]).
273) while the intervening teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the
school were found to have committed various acts of misconduct (Rollo. p. 275). Accordingly,
In the case at bar, there appears to be no defiance of authority by the mere filing by
three students were recommended for exoneration from all charges, and some to be honorably
respondents of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 12, 1986. In fact
dismissed. Of the faculty members eight were recommended to be exonerated of all charges,
respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty
two to be reprimanded, one for non-renewal of his semester to semester appointment and two
members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction. Thus, in the compliance
to be terminated (Rollo, pp. 359-360).
submitted by said school on November 20, 1 986, it ma manifested that 'without prejudice to
the investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, ... and in order that dislocations
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and may not result with respect to the academic activities of the students and the distribution of
violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. teaching loads among the teachers, the respondent school has created new classes for the
Paflo, 137 SCRA 246 [1985]; Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, petitioners and the intervening teachers" beginning November 20, 1986.
the Court has ruled that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty
regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would
members were teaching and it was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the
do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for
Constitution. More specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court as follows:
having become moot and academic. Otherwise stated, respondent school has fully complied with
its duties under the temporary mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp. 830- 832).
This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of
professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, but in the light of compassionate
truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or
equity, students Who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are
graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and
sought and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the school
to graduate in due time. No pronouncement as to costs.
or college to decide for itself, its ms and objectives, and how best to attain
them the grant being to institutions of higher learning-free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare SO ORDERED.
calls for some restraint. (Tangonan vs. Pao, supra).

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily
accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual
findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. (Ateneo de Manila University vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 106 (1986); citing:
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leonardo, 11 7 SCRA 967; Baguio
Country Club Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61 and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16
SCRA 569).
 president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTO
LUKBAN, respondents.

Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners

Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et
al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161
SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled
only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as
the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were
not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject
of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in

the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this case but the
authority of the school regarding admission of students, save as a matter of
compassionate equity when any of the petitioners would, at the least,
qualify for re-enrollment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24,
1989 in this wise:

EN BANC
G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON,
LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO,
GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL
TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial
Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas
S.J., and that really there must be a better way of treating students and
teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme Court, the
Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.
But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in
the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2,
1988; that of the termination at the end of the semester, reason for the
critical comments of Joaquin G. Bernas and Doods Santos, who both do not
agree with the ruling.
Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their
failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses that "they
were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16,
and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were
represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the
date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued
their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically
coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right
to be present in their classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89. Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission
of students whose scholarship and attendance are
unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students
whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students, therefore, are
required to behave in accord with the Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline.
In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which
among others uniformly reads:
In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College
and of my privileges as student of this institution, I
hereby pledge/ promise under oath to abide and
comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the College Department or
School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:
xxx xxx xxx
3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College,
which I represent and see to it that I conduct myself in
such a manner that the college wig not be put to a bad
light;
xxx xxx xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized
announcement which tend to cause confusion or disrupt
the normal appreciation of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for
mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a mere privilege and not a
legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in
view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the
Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission
Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and Tangonon vs. Pano,
et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit,
the motion for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8,
1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo pp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the Court, which resolved on April 10,
1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The
Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition and set the application for
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing. After considering the
comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court of Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989
to certify the case back to the Supreme Court considering that only pure questions of law were
raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the
Court en banc on August 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On
September 14, 1989, the Court en banc accepted the case and required respondents to
comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to reply. As
reply, they filed a pleading entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents filed a rejoinder
entitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To this petitioners filed a "Rejoinder to Reply."
The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts"
required for college teachers are for "one semester." It is thus evident that
after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers.
Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is
a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between
the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99
SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract
having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school
cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and
 teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court,
have no power to make contracts for the parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., supra). [At 161 SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who
were barred from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it
added that "in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of
academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was filed,
should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time." [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice
Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers in Alcuaz. The students did not
move for reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had been transferred, denied
the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as
an obiter dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students
to complete their education in the school or university of their choice, and
while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for
the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom of speech and
their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies
must always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation,
coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full
display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into
degenerate license.
The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of contract" doctrine enunciated in
the decision provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the
Court * disagreed with the Second Division's dismissal of the students petition, a definitive
ruling on the issue could not have been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was
filed by the students. (As stated above, the motion for reconsideration was filed by the
dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar as it allowed
schools to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of
contract, shall be made in this case where the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p.
4; Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a
school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that
the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school
authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are
students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in student protests, were
denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the
right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to
discipline them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated
August 8, 1988; Rollo, pp. 1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students'
rights and the school's power to discipline them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to
education, and there is such denial when students are expelled or barred
from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and peaceable
assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the
requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders
to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school
authorities during a student rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . [Order of
February 24, 1989; Rollo, p. 13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the
rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the
1973 Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III,
sec. 81, the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of
1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422,
upheld the right to speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order
to attain by force or outside of legal methods any of the
following objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial
or municipal government or any public official, from
freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution
of any judicial or administrative order.
But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of
speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances" guaranteed by the express
provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine Bill."
xxx xxx xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the
 feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a
delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous
occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who
took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercise in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading
case of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en banc decision, declared:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.
They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the
freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not,
to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While therefore, the
authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass
actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent
[Gregorio Araneta] University. They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
(VMAS) the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as
therein stated but at the respond floor lobby. At such gathering they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life
Science building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered
by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the
classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked
to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding
an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed
through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for
their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life
Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with
damages against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director
of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of
having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by
the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes
and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic
year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-week
suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of
the Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA
706, the Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for
barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of surveillance,
blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-enrollment of
students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency, with the following caveat:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher learning"
includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what
circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it
has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It
cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so,
then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their
right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. [At p. 711.]
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA
94, a case arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected "the
infliction of the highly- disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent
failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them. [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent
school was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their
respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in
connection with their participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to
discipline students. This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 514: "But conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for
the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of
the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the
second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the (VMAS) building
of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed.
According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity
[referring to such assembly went on until 5:30 p.m." Private respondents
could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At pp. 370-371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated
in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes." [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated
not only because of political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging
controversy over increases in tuition fees. But the over-eager hands of some school authorities
were not effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling
student leaders who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same
stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on
grounds not related to, their alleged misconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating
in student mass actions directed against the school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions
due to "academic deficiency."
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must
be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses," which the
Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the
ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.
The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect
schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and
payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus,
even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on
for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester
before he is given his credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed
under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses,
and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers
or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of
classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees
in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten
per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first
week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes,
regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student
may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the
second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a
justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to
and including the last month of attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled
for only one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely
on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the
student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus,
Paragraph 107 states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university
upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided,
that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the
entire period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his
right to transfer.
This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education
Act of 1982." Section 9 of this act provides:
 Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded
subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and procedural due process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court
pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights: stated:

xxx xxx xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject
to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they
were deprived of due process of law and that the investigation conducted
was far from impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appear from the
record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately established
in an appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not
supported by the record. . . .

Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract" theory in Alcuaz, impliedly
xxx xxx xxx
rejected it, to wit:

5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their
education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini College academic freedom and in the process has the concommitant right to see to
is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
enjoyed by the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia
v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
245, where the Court emphasized the institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to
students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher
maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right;
learning.
and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.
(Emphasis supplied.)
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a female lay
student has a clear legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for
7. The Instant Case.
theological studies leading to a degree. In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing student,
who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her
school to readmit her for enrollment. To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting
from their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8)
have incurred failing grades, to wit:
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that the
right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause
for otherwise there win be a violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711] the submission of Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to his re- enrollment
and to his continuing as a student of Mabini;

6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.

In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent cases
of Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989,
and Licup v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both decided by the
First Division of the Court.
b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has
incomplete grades in four (4) subjects as well as no grades in two (2)
subjects;
c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete
grades;

We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in the
present case. d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT
1 1 to 22. He is already enrolled at Ago Foundation;

In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down
the school because of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;
faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no clear legal right to demand the reopening of
the school.
f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
 g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the
incomplete grade in one (1) subject;
h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete
grades in five (5) more objects and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo,
p. 79.]
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)
b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non- readmission.
(The Answer indicates only 8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)
c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
d) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the
cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a
February 1988 student rally. (The crux of the matter, as shown even in the
Answer.)
e) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary
action. (In effect, admitted in the Answer; even Alcuaz required due
process.)
f) Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies a clear case of
discrimination against petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An
equal protection question.)
g) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of
residence which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they
have already lost one-and-a-half school-years in itself punishment
enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano,
Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-
enrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the
manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear
from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was
a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by
petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of
due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two failures,
namely, Rex Magana, Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures
cannot be considered marked academic deficiency within the context of the Court's decision
in Villar.
Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon,
George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration
whether the failures were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several
semesters of study in the school. Neither are the academic standards of respondent school,
from which we can gauge whether or not these students are academically deficient, alleged by
respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we
cannot affirm respondent school's action as to petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres
because of insufficient information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago
Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent
school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken
against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's
ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in
connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed
must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be
imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is
explicit from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145
that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual
and/or in the school's rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation
shall have been conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment
and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have
already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have
committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents,
resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve
no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners
and the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle
here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988
and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to
readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without
prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George
(Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have
failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988,
of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only
question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself
does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself,
the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject
to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there
is a clear misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly
with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter
of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances)
and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The
Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in
this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court.
Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the
courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is
implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief
Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them
enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no
gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department
Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be
noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that
prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of
the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for
their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the
welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by
A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the
Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A
and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract
and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on
such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority
groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women,
and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element
of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their
needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would
be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the
assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot
been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and
workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of
Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other
senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps
and duly accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
 7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--
Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be
allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are
returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served
employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new
employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these
guidelines.
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has
evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its
xxx xxx xxx authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain
countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has
never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The
Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
SO ORDERED.
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned,
the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in
the enforcement whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by Defendant Appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26,
1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had
been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in said
resolution, the same was due mainly to these circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The
prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed,
may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the
other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had not been previously settled
squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion thereon, it was
deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of action taken by the lower court,
which denied bail to the movant. After mature deliberation, our considered opinion on said issue
is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case
read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias
AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G.
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo
Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6)
Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8)
Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William,
(10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias
Manue, of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well
as with the thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270,
14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with
others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-
conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress
of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO),
an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other
mass organizations in different places in the Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities
of the Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the
complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines,
as the herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of the
CLO with the rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and instrumentalities of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise master- minded or promoted the
cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalities
of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being
then also high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist
Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be further
committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of which party the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), is the
armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote,
maintain, cause, direct and/or command the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the
Hukbalahaps (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of
the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or Hukbalahaps have risen publicly and taken arms to attain
the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against
police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear
so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the
accused as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the commission of
two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives.
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code any person, merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for any person who
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office
or employment, takes part therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. engaging in war against the forces of the government,
2. destroying property, or
3. committing serious violence,
two or more offense, but only one crime that of rebellion plain and simple. Thus, for instance,
it has been held that the crime of treason may be committed by executing either a single or
similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be
considered one single continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)
(People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it
follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which
requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the
past, convicted any person of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. What is more, it
appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports,
the Defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons,
sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 472; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLeague vs. People,
73 Phil., 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting from
collaboration with the Japanese during the war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further
than the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the prosecution to the effect
that the accused in said treason cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder
and other crimes was expressly and repeatedly rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the
decision of the Peoples Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off.
Gaz., 3329) guilty of cralawthe crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries
and sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto had
committed the complex crime of treason with homicide, this court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Tuason, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason
law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former was
patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.
One without the other does not make treason.

4. exacting contributions or
5. diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one
offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by turning
over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his custody, could
neither be prosecuted for malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and
convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with malversation of public funds. The reason is that
such malversation is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not
be guilty of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the imposition, upon said
public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even be improper to consider the aggravating
circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of his public position, this being an essential
element of the crime he had perpetrated. Now, then, if the office held by said offender and the
nature of the funds malversed by him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear
that neither may it worsen the very crime committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an
independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a mere participant in the rebellion,
who is not a public officer, should not be placed at a more disadvantageous position than the
promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the public officers who join the same,
insofar as the application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing serious violence in the
prosecution of said war. These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryresort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake except that, very often, it is
worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between
brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between
strangers. Being within the purview of engaging in war and committing serious violence, said
resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes, of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a Defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason cralaw . Where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason cralaw they cannot be regarded separately under
their general denomination. (Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following
language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of treason, but of murder, for the killing of
Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code sentenced
him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas Abella. The arrest and
killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the information, as one of the
elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is prosecuted. Such element constitute a
part of the legal basis upon which Appellant stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing
of Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicting Appellant of any crime
other than treason. The essential elements of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different
parts, each one stand as a separate ground to convict the accused of a different crime or
criminal offense. The elements constituting a given crime are integral and inseparable parts of a
whole. In the contemplation of the law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes.
They can only be used for the sole purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which
they form part. The factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the
functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will
have to face as many prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in the crime of
treason, in open violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. (Italics
supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005,
despite the direct participation of the Defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of
several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Peoples Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder. The killing
of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore
becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46
Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We
stated therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with
murders, with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be
imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying
circumstances, the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killings were
murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation,
superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.
We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the information are merged in and
formed part of the treason. They were in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous
intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been convicted by the
Peoples Court of the crime of treason complexed with the crime of murder and sentenced to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court
the extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we expressed
ourselves as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese forces of
occupation and giving them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man,
investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender
their firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His
manner of investigation and maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and
Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can
commit and practice such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war,
confusion and opportunism can and do produce characters and monster unknown during peace
and normal times.
The Peoples Court found the Appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The Solicitor
General, however, maintains that the offense committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine
laid down by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) but
accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised
Penal Code, and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the
imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the basis of the
ruling of this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the Appellant may be convicted only a
treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries committed by him may not be
separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts performed in the
commission of treason, although, as stated in said case, the brutality with which the killing or
physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. (Italics
supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off.
Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw we find merit in the contention that Appellant should have not been convicted of the so
called Complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape. The killings, robbery, and
raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere
elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in
and identified with the general charged they cannot be used in combination with the treason to
increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399,
January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason
only. (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used
was:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw But the Peoples Court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of
treason with murder, because murder was an ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have
heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p.
252:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of
treason with murder. We have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the
killing is charged as an element of treason, it becomes identified with the latter crime and
cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (94
Phil., 477), decided on February 26, 1954. The facts and the rule therein laid down are set forth
in our unanimous decision in said case, from which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and at the
time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in an information filed in the Peoples Court. But before the accused could be brought
under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of
created by authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of
which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the
enemy leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese
reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy,
while the second was that of having certain civilians filled in time of war. Found innocent of the
first and third charges but guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the
military court to life imprisonment.
With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the Peoples Court, the
criminal case in that court against the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act,
transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were
amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, Petitioner presented a motion
to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and,
after Petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding
with the trial and dismiss the case.
It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that
charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical the military court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the Peoples Court had previously
acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was
void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military
court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the
Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits
it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt act he has
done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44.
Off. Gaz., 909; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 31,
1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an
enumeration of additional ovart acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment before the
military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a
new and distinct offense from that of treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a person
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts specified in the
information for treason even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law,
for the simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from that of
treason but constitute ingredients thereof. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the question whether said
crime may be complexed with murder, when the former was committed through the latter, and it
is so alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the negative as
early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the
dispositive part of which partly reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised
Penal Code are applicable to the offense of treason with murder. However for lack of sufficient
votes to impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment cralaw ..
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the offense of treason
with murder, it should be noted that we affirmed therein the action of the Peoples Court, which,
according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of treason aggravated with
murder. Besides, the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said decision. It is
obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such
question. Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not follow the rule laid down in the
previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan
(supra), in which the issue was explicitly examined and decided in the negative. Our continued
adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo,
without even a passing reference to the second Labra case, shows that we did not consider the
same as reflecting the opinion of the court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests
otherwise, the position taken in the second Labra case must be deemed reversed by our
decisions in said cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This does not
detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or
by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to apply
said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article
135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing
serious violence among its essential elements thus clearly indicating that everything done in
the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein unlike the
provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority may be committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide
(People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated with
physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed
with murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war, serious
violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but not
in assault upon persons in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word
rebellion evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on
a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon
persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either physical injuries, or murder.
1 insurrection are independent therefrom was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the insurrection is guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murder, our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old
Penal Code of the Philippines, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran
castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este Codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes principales de la
rebelion o sedicion.
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in relation
thereto:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete otros delitos
(v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o
sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion
de los delitos independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto
alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que
estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la rebelion o sedicion cuya criminalidad
queda embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente los
hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones
graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion.
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines has
not been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was
determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter would be
indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish
Penal Code, Article 243 of which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra el Gobierno
para cualquiera de los objetossiguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad
personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario a su voluntad.
2. Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el
Reino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3. Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o
arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra
clase de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6. Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades
constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de
1850. Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of
engaging in war against the forces of the Government and of using serious violence for the
purposes stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of this express statutory
inclusion of the acts of war and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the
Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave and less grave
offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot be accepted in this jurisdiction.
Again, if both classes of offenses are part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor,
neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other. In fact,
Cuello Calon admits that the difficulty lies in separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition
from the offenses independent therefrom. Ergo, offenses that are not independent therefrom,
but constituting an integral part thereof committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its
successful conclusion are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed, the above quoted
statement of Cuello Calon to the effect that grave felonies committed in the course of an
Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose
Perez Rubio, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene
declarado:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que segun los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y
259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con
motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos
Codigos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876
estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas o sujatas a
responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre
de 1868; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryQue el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fue
resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto que imprimio el fanatismo, y
cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos
artisticos que se decian existentes en la Catedral:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que esto lo
demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra la persona del
Gobernador; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los
horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito
que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de Viva la religion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que
la apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de
asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no
ha cometido el error de derecho sealado en los casos 1. 3. del articulo 4. de la ley sobre e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263,
establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de
1870. (Page 239; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.) (See, also, El Codigo Penal, by octubre 1903. Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, Tomo xxviii p. 250).
Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on whether murder may
be complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question for determination was whether the killers
of the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should have been convicted only of
rebellion or sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not because of the gravity of the
acts performed by the accused, but because they had no political motivation. Moreover,
the Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary to said quotation from Cuello Calon
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden publico
cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre
1903, 19 noviembre 1906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryla resistencia o acometimiento a la fuerza
publica por los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como un
delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de
ciertos delitos, es vacilante; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryasi, v. g., el acometimiento al teniente
de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida
para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un
hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como accidente de la rebelion, 3
Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion
y no uno de los delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890. Entre estos
delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan causar los sediciosos, 19
noviembre 1906. (Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal,
pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de una parte, y el
de atentado, esta constituida por la circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los
primeros, los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y demas infracciones
que durante su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la
sentencia recurrida que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el
atendado que se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el recurso fundado en
supuesto distinto. (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz tumultuariamente para
impedir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden
estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y
penados separadamente.
La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye, en su caso,
una circunstancia o accidente de la sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este
articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su
motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las
disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryG. 23-6-890; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryt. 44; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypagina 671) (II Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que agredieron al
alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y
anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.) del Codigo Penal;
Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin
que sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que
agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de la sedicion, de la cual
eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser
comun el objeto que se proponian y no individual; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy al calificar y
penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado cralaw, ha incurrido en error de derecho
numero 2., en relacion con el 264, numeros 1. y 3., por su aplicacion cralaw (Sent. 3
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not to all offenses
committed in the course of a rebellion or on the occasion thereof, but only to delitos
particulares or common crimes. Now, what are delitos particulares as the phrase is used in
said article 244? We quote from Viada:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los delitos particulares o comunes cometidos en una
rebelion er sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como delitos
especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados
con las penas que en este Codigo se las sealan. Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como
comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion,
no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y
otro de los objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extrao a la rebelion,
y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado
como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como objetos de la
misma, en los numeros 3., 4. y 5. del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos
ataques a las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a la
propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes? En cuanto a
los casos de los numeros 4. y 5., estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se requiera
para la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe servirnos de norma y
guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extrao a ella. Cuando no
exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido contra los particulares o
cualquiera clase del Estado, y el atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o
corporaciones mentados en el numero 5. del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de
sedicion, sino que deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las
disposiciones respectivas de este Codigo y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza
ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos que deberan
reputarse como delitos comunes todos aquellos hechos innecesarios 2 para la consecucion del
fin particular que se propusieran los sediciosos y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia
sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para
el logro del objeto especial a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados. Asi, en el
caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se
propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el
comisionado; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypero para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron, fue
preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y
llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio
tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como accidente inherente a la misma
sedicion, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la consecucion del fin
determinado que se propusieron los culpables.
Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se mata por matar, el
hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino como un
delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo correspondiente. (III Viada, pp. 311-
312.) (Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de un caracter
especial distintas de los denominados delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la division
de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y delitos
comunes o de derecho comun.
Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v. gr., los
delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra la propiedad, etc.)
La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego revisten este caracter los que
atentan contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden externo (independencia de la
nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado,
contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como politicos todos
los delitos, cualesquiera que sean incluso los de derecho comun, cuando fueron cometidos por
moviles politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que
objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que,
apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de caracter politico.
Asi podria formulares esta definicion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary es delito politico el cometido
contra el orden politico del Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado
por moviles politicos. (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippines
Islands or any part thereof, then said offense becomes stripped of its common complexion,
inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political
character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the Defendant in U. S. vs.
Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) an insurgent who killed a prisoner of war because he was too weak
to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without endangering the
safety of the latter was dismissed upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner of war
formed part of, and was included in, the crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an
amnesty, to the benefits of which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of insurgents
was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for having shot and
killed a woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of rebellion with homicide was
not considered in that case. Apart from this, the accused failed to established the relation
between her death and the insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor alleged that he
had been prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense was independent from the
rebellion. The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the Supreme Court of Spain
in cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries, as well
as in the field of international relations. Referring to the question as to what offenses are
political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial
authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p.
71), thinks that it should be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be
surrendered for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of
political disturbances. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in 1866, while discussing
an amendment to the act of extradition, on which the treaty between England and France was
founded, gave this definition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Any offense committed in the course of
or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion. Hansards Debates Vol. 184, p.
2115. In the Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by the most
eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges, without a definition
being framed that would draw a fixed and certain line between a municipal or common crime
and one of political character. I do not think, said Denman, J., it is necessary or desirable that
we should attempt to put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the
whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring a particular case within the
description of an offense of a political character. In that case, Castioni was charged with the
murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in the canton of
Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a member of the state council of the canton of
Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton. For some time previous to the murder, much
dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the
mode in which the political party then in power were conducting the government of the canton.
A request was presented to the government for a revision of the constitution of the canton and,
the government having declined to take a popular vote on that question, a number of the
citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which
they took rifles and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed
several persons connected with the government, and forced them to march in front of the
armed crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in the name of
the people, and was refused by Rossi and another member of the government, who were in the
palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed in, pushing before
them the government officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni, who was armed
with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A second door, which was locked, was broken
open, and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage, was shot through
the body with a revolver, and died, very soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no
one else was injured. Castioni fled to England. His extradition was requested by the federal
council of Switzerland. He was arrested and taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the
statute, who held him for extradition. Application was made by the accused to the high court of
justice of England for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell, now
lord chief justice. The attorney general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the
solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council of Switzerland.
This array of distinguished counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as
one of the highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in
the disturbances that the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and not necessary for the rising. The
opinions of the judges as to the political character of the crime charged against Castioni, upon
the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to the following passages.
Judge Denman says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of a
number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political object, and
as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.
Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses,
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political character done
without reason, done against all reason; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut at the same time one
cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their political
excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often do things which are against
and contrary to reason; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut none the less an act of this description
may be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political rising, even though it
is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all reason, by those
who can calmly reflect upon it after the battle is over.
Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was one of the
judges, and joined in the views taken as to the political character of the crime charged against
Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the English court in
that case to the four cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion follows that the
crimes charged here, associated as they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a
political character.
The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of Montevideo in
1888, and recommended by the International American Conference to the governments of the
Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article
23):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a state or common
offenses connected with these, shall not warrant extradition. The determination of the character
of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon which the demand for extradition is
made; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand its decision shall be made under and according to the
provisions of the law which shall prove to be most favorable to the
accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty stipulations
between any of the American nations, but the article cited may be at least accepted as
expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The article is important with respect to
two of its features:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited
for an offense connected with a political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or
external safety of the state; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the decision as to the character
of the offense shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall prove
most favorable to the accused. The first provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the
exemption from extradition of persons charged with political offenses,
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses, and it is
enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a common crime be
connected with a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the
execution of such, to be covered by the privilege which protects the latter Calvo, Droit Int.
(3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of humanity found
everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration with respect to even the worst
features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When this article was under
discussion in the international American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia,
submitted some observations upon the difficulty of drawing a line between an offense of a
political character and a common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in
terms worthy of some consideration here. He said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses are necessarily
mixed up with the political in many cases. A colleague General Caamao (of Ecuador) knows
how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to feed his troops,
etc.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand since he does not go into the public markets to purchase
these horses and that beef, nor the arms and saddles to mount and equip his forces, he takes
them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is called robbery everywhere, and is a
common offense in time of peace, but in time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to the
manner of waging it. International American Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615. (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (23) on pages 249-250,
Vol. I, of Cuello Calons aforesaid work on Derecho Penal. constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una definicion de estos delitos. El
Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como delitos contra revolucionarios los hechos
encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de trabajadores y campesinos y de
los gobiernos de la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad
exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales
fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria. El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930 considera en eu
articulo 8. como delito politico todo delito que ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un
derecho politico del ciudadano. Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun deteminado, en todo
o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se
definen asi:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Son delitos politicos los atentados punibles directamente
ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del
gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos
politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero. parrafo 3., 2.
La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto 3
septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del delito politico:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizacion y funcionamiento del
Estado o contra los derechos que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el
culpable.
2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho comun que constituyen
hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos previstos en seccion
1.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary como los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito
politico o a permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor sea inducido por un motivo
egoista y vil.
4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comunidad o un estado de
terror. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested
of their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed
upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in
the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the word of Rodriguez
Navarro:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo
(75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina Penal
del Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting
the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it
does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with
separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said
offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The
reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are
the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently
from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is
a means necessary for the commission of another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then, be
considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the two offenses are independent
of each other. On the contrary, since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of
the other, the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two
offenses are unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he is twice guilty of having
harbored criminal designs and of carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be
presumed that the object of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one. We cannot assume that the
purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single sentence of which said article consists,
was to favor the accused, and that, before the sentence ended, the former had a change of
heart and turned about face against the latter. If the second part of Article 48 had been meant
to be unfavorable to the accused and, hence, the exact opposite of the first part each
would have been placed in, separate provisions, instead of in one single article. If the first part
sought to impose, upon the culprit, a penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the
two or more offenses resulting from his single act were punished separately, then this, also,
must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing with an offense which is a necessary means
for the commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when the counterpart
of our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not
appear to have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder committed in
furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed as a means necessary for
the success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article 259 of
the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin
with, these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of
prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that common crimes committed
during a rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, shall be respectively punished
according to the provisions of this Code. Among such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71,
then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a substantial reproduction. Hence, had the
Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines believed that murders committed as a means
necessary to attain the aims of an uprising were common crimes, the same would have been
complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not
escaped our attention. Those cases involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for
the purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police force of Manila, and in an
encounter with the latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition
in the first case, they were accused of murder in the second case. They pleaded double jeopardy
in the second case, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the information were those set
forth in the charge in the first case, in which they had been convicted. This plea was rejected
upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that
the offense of sedition is distinct and different from that of murder, although both were the
result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the other was not
discussed or even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case
Article 89 of the old Penal Code which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code but this Court refused to do so. Again, simply because one act may constitute two or
more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after
conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against double jeopardy. For instance, if
a man fires a shotgun at another, who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced
his death, may he, after conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal injury, be
accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or
may the former be convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or
less serious physical injuries? The mere formulation of these questions suffices to show that the
limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense does
not constitute a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same
act, if one offense is an essential element of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the
issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must necessarily
be considered modified by our decision in the cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No.
1, p. 159) and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and other
offenses is that war within the purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition may be eliminated the fine.
waged or levied without killing. This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusion
drawn therefrom that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent
therefrom, and may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is
not indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill another without inflicting
physical injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or
shock. Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be convicted of homicide with
physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that treason may be committed without torturing or
murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy
by taking direct part in the maltreatment and assassination of his (citizens) countrymen, in
furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain treason, not complexed with murder
or physical injuries, the later being as charged and proven mere ingredients of the former.
Now then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of
rebellion? The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide,. etc., have not even
tried to answer this question. Neither have they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned
decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by
the Executive Department in the apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of
crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent in connection
therewith, as well as of the possible implications or repercussions in the security of the State.
The careful consideration given to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal branch of the
Government is reflected in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work
undertaken, and the many meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of
elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear to settle
justiceable controversies by the application of the law. And the latter must be enforced as it is
with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity not as the judges would have it. In
other words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of
the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in
furtherance thereof as specified in Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Penal Code as constituting only one crime, punishable
with one single penalty namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to note, in
this connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were
much stiffer, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Life imprisonment to death for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the rebellion,
and, also, for subordinate officers who held positions of authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, if
the purpose of the movement was to proclaim the independence of any portion of the Philippine
territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period for said promoters, maintainers and leaders of
the insurrection, and for its subordinate officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any of those
enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) for subordinate officers other than those
already adverted to; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) for mere participants in the rebellion
falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period for
participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were
tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which
reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or P20,000, for every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any
rebellion or insurrection cralaw or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such
rebellion or insurrection. Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the Revised
Penal Code. The penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292.
Although the Revised Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the
promoters, maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers joining the
same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it reduced the penalty of
imprisonment for mere participants to not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant when we bear in mind it
was approved on December 8, 1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the
communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of their widespread activities and
of their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents
of the law, who gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the
prosecution of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary57 Phil., 372),
Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the
first information against the first two alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to
sedition on and during the month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto.
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935, incorporated a formal and
solemn declaration (Article II, section 5) committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic
of the Philippines, to the promotion of social justice. Soon later, Commonwealth Act No. 103,
creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was passed. Then followed a number of other statutes
implementing said constitutional mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of said
legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are predicated upon a recognition of the
fact that a good many of the problems confronting the State are due to social and economic
evils, and that, unless the latter are removed or, least minimized, the former will keep on
harassing the community and affecting the well-being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been
one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Such
policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for the past five
or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said
law and in their prosecution the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of
the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and
demerits of such policy. This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the
government the Congress of the Philippines. However, the following quotation from Cuello Calon
indicates the schools of thought on this subject and the reason that may have influenced our
lawmakers in making their choice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los hechos que
hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas graves y peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se
consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un dao individual, aquellos producen profundas
perturbaciones en la vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la misma vida del Estado. En
consonancia con estas ideas fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los
crimenes mas temibles.
Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una transformacion
profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos criterios de
antao quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla general suave y benevolo.
El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo
lugar en Francia en el ao 1830. El gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una honda separacion
entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y
sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran
difusion que en casi todos los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un
tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de estos hechos. No solo las penas con
que se conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en algunos paises se
creo un regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena
de muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la criminalidad
politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas nacidas y difundidas
bajo los regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha
afirmado que la criminalidad da estos hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que la
delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, qua depende del tiempo, del lugar, da las
circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de los moviles y
sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a
determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo de un ideal.
Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos malhechores,
se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3., b), que llego a
alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo autoritario, y que tambien ha
hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que,
especialmente en los ultimos aos, la frecuencia de agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado
la publicacion de numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado. (Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the offense to
dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the
offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments concerned. The
judicial branch cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in
judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence,
undermining the foundation of our republican system. In, short, we cannot accept the theory of
the prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that which would allegedly result from
the adoption of the opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information
against Defendant-Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said Defendants,
as means necessary 4 for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said Defendant may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under
consideration, because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is strong.
However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case of Montano
vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-6352):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryit must also appear that in case of conviction the Defendants criminal
liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this
Court has been made.
In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced by the lower court,
not to the extreme penalty, but to life imprisonment. Furthermore, individual freedom is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere
general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty
is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its
enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our
Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom. Thus, in
line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law, we said in the aforementioned case of
Montano vs. Ocampo:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right
guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and
liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the degree of
proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.
xxx xxx xxx
In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be
taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been
observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in
capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the Defendant would flee, if he
has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of
evasion of prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the Defendants official and social
standing and his other personal circumstances, seem remote if not nil.
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an additional
circumstance in his favor he has been detained since January 1951, or for more than five (5)
years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the same has not been, and is
not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for
some Appellants other than Hernandez as well as the brief for the Government, are
pending submission. It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from the opposition to
the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused
showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant- Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is
hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000,
and its approval by the court, let said Defendant-Appellant be provisionally released. It is SO
ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground
that its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with
the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-
file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection,
hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system
shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko
Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of
the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the
principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization
Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis
supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
(exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not
appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate
prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing
professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the
deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of
the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL;
thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions
(GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file
and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP
officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have
been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that:
(1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of
such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with
other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
accordance with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of
the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last
paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate
that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional
infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based
on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws
over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification
be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. 15 The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification must also
be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. 18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the
rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers
and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a
rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the
Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent
cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating
a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such
provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. 21 An act of the legislature, approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other
GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may
be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation
in the light of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the
Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which
placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a
business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property
except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The
Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting
the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan
designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject
to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably
and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for
any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance
valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a
later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such,
for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts
will afford relief in an appropriate case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v.
Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation
being a valid exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued
enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It
noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the
law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to
the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states: 31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which
Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the
last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine
War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for
their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that
said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from
and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The
purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts
so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in
said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not
so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein
declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force
(Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present
their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342
and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in
plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as
far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the
purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded
works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their
hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not
even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes
in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be
as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the
only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the
continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present
time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and
without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is
illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for
animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor
carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they
were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes
became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since
their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company
of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or
cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893,
had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
 The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection
of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles
on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even
greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and
death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of
competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal
responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for
killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid
when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is
applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be
exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited
in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A.
356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies,
among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an
attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act
of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by
motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common
carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been
required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This
certainly is not equal protection of the law." 34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in
determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its
operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a
law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. . 36 (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also
violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS,
LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted
from the coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the
BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress
also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other
GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation,
(SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC); 38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other
GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the
coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. -
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification
system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based
on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the
private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing
laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as
closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an
actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish
such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided,
however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by
the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject
to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the
SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service
rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis
supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
 (e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and
Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of
Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the
authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the
employees and personnel of other government financial
institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the
GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to
establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the
officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses,
privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective
management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt
from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition
Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for
an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon
recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other
emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation,
position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities.
The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in
the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors
once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the
Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from
existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758,
as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation
and administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home
Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position
classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board
of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and
which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on
salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the
Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in
the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system
and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other
government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no
more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or
increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore
be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation,
position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to
make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act
No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven
other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-
file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable
because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to
the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the
passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other
GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all
members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it
cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences. 40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that
Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the
exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of
the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is
Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment,
simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against
a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises
indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to
determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion
or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the
lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy
determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if
this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and
equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a
policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the
ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the
private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages. 45 Also, the Department of
Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational
Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors: 46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of
the positions;

In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that (3) the kind of supervision received;
what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se,
but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP
rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on
the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal (6) kind of supervision exercised;
protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41

(7) decision-making responsibility;

It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other
GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL,
there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have
long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
governmental entities.

(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to
provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable
positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then,
GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already
identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also
provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees,
additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial
institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such
technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies." 42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b)
provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification
System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government
and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1
to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B
of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the
Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each
government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and
institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without
distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.

comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance
with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis
of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles:
(a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption
from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned
considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2)
the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not
only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining
competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling
up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution,
and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary
authority,48 and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions. 49 It has
the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas of money,
banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank
financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted
GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were
exempted because of the importance of their institution's mandate cannot stand any more than
an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily
varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is
there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was
granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the
seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these
institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven
GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of
time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that
of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably
linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal
role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective
personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation
package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards.
Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the
subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-
file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of
the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any
substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the
exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar
to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other
GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP -
made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from
the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC
- which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket
exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the
rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced
with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting
the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore,
that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest
facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what
he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion
that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the
other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make
them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling
in Johnson v. Robinson: "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic
54
shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when
other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different
treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting
educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian
life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that
caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative
service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other
hand, involves a six-year commitment
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service
performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of
personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military
veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and
potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities
caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a
special need for readjustment benefits55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there
are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to
justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention
the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales
would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis
for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from
other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos.
7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a
"preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at
the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative
power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and
by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate
exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards
the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP
(whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central
Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of
constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested
in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely
raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly
situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court
held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of
the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven
other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right
to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy
exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is
superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those
included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the
power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary
to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another,
even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven
GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with
candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes
are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. 62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of
the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have
followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis"
test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis,
to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most
contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must
not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection
scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that
the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative
purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically
concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And
usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did
not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence
between means and ends was not required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new
equal protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major
intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren
Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most
areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection
remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution
by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply
differentiated two-tier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the
deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict
scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection
imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to
ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between
classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally
tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to
achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the
new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely
the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by
searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an
impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect
classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict
scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other
cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well:
illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient
of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and
amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the
right of interstate travel .]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal
protection, although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was
also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's
equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool
without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the
fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot,
while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also
been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential
"old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought
formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that
would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most
elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was
developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of
two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the
equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree
of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe,
on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and
 the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions,
although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger
Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection
law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did
with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a
virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even
while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal
protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas
the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while
clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less
demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the
best established example of an "intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case,
the Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends
must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old"
mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be
"necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under
the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the
"intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone
forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic
law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds
that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are
regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which,
while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency,
prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour,
language, religion or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which
varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court
set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention
only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. 69 But over the years, the
European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the
ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those regarded
as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others.
Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the
member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would
have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be
regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would
have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively
on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention."72 The European Court will
then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it
will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-
owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law
and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the
protection of human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent
to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); 77 the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional
instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights; 78 the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social
Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights
(of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has
adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the
Member States of the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional
"first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining
rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal
and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and
European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive
obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention
of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions
administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally,
many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions
relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier
tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether
discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope
of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit
provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and
not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the
Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but
contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in
ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond
the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social
security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not
of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by
legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to
 provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise
of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the
Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be
struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection.
International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights
Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in
declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international
law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge
to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor,
compel this approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we
held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in
favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more
reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of
work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the
office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to
both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in
Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should
be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this
jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our
decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the
employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own
problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even
idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. 96 Our laws must
be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.
More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all
and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that:
"[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a
tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution.
The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing
inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII,
are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater
equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law
bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to
afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653.
Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly
been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or
the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would
call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met,
or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by
the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of
checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have
neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue,
but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting
and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to
support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v.
Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine
whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not
satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the
Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution -
"then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking
through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as
well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that
drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the
government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the
higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of
the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while
the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented
rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of
people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free
the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to
this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit
and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to
lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI
rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the
politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to
their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given
any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is
the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION
rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President,
TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional
Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout
the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General,
and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are
here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an
interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system
of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no
other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has
taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices
in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld.
To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings
as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its
purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal
system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal
matters, from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or
confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding
through the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between
nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different
users and changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of
monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the
industry to finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal
delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous
upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered
69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse
or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act.
Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act
is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove
obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly
connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute
on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the
title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act
and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith." 4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one
subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within
the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a
subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have
been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it
may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses.
Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales
and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by
both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when
they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the,
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice
President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers. 10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute
of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors;
the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the
Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more,
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as
where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking
privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to
former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered
because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or
have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was
carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is
reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause,
resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we
fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And
while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking
privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of
justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same
Judiciary.)
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the
extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office
and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice. It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
communication between the government and the people.
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos,
the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is
55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the
any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as
sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the
the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction
retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege
while extending it to others less deserving.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office
volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to
dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national
functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of
budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming
1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine
fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached
the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process
the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this
they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from
it.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection
should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of
of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
an operation that can save his life.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which IV
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
solved by violating the Constitution.
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul
Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke.
While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar
discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable.
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we
are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide
the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us
the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal
trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of
which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June
2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid
more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that
employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in
this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the
principle we uphold today.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying
out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four
tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local
hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the
School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is
classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies
the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave
his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path
all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign
land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself
and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education
of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the
primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same
economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his
home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable
employment after along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in
the field of international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE
Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997.
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38
in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local
hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same
benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all,
regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and
who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.6
The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case.
The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to
deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits
accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree
that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to
render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the
international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity
therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and
conditions of employment which include the employment which include the
employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for
salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
 All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance
with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has
the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under
terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international
practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited
Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the
agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in
the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on
reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial
distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited
tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a
good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the
School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles
of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work."
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the
field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135,
for example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female
employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7
thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal
truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This
rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less
or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has
discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is
treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and
justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services
with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
bargaining rights.
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of
industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more
according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental
idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used
as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as
foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the
"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-
hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-
hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees'
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School
also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3708 May 18, 1953
ROYAL L. RUTTER, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN, defendant-appellee.
Susano A. Velasquez for appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J.Esteban two parcels of land situated in the
city of Manila for the sum of P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of
P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or
before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same parcels of land
has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been registered, a new
title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage duly annotated on the back
thereof.
Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that
had accrued there-on, and so on August 2, 1949, Royal L. Rutter instituted this action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance due, the interest due thereon, and the
attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged in accordance with law.
Placido J. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up a defense the
moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the
Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last
war; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be
enforced until after the lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine
War Damage Commission, and this period has not yet expired.
After a motion for summary judgment has been presented by the defendant, and the requisite
evidence submitted covering the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not yet demandable
under the moratorium law. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the
first time the constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Hence this
appeal.
The only question to be determined hinges on the validity of Republic Act No. 342 which was
approved by Congress on July 26, 1948. It is claimed that this act if declared applicable to the
present case is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the
impairement of the obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1, Constitution of the Philippines).
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any
subsequent aggreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage
claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; and section 3 of said Act
provides that should the provision of section 2 be declared void and unenforceable, then as
regards the obligation affected thereby, the provisions of Executive Order No. 25 dated
November 18, 1944, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945, relative to
debt moratorium, shall continue to be in force and effect, any contract affecting the same to the
contrary notwithstanding, until subsequently repealed or amended by a legislative enactment. It
thus clearly appears in said Act that the nullification of its provisions will have the effect of
reviving the previous moratorium orders issued by the President of the Philippines.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of recent
enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western civilization has
made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as
moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the
sovereign power" (58 C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote 87). In the United States, may state legislatures
have adopted moratorium laws "during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or
caused by, a war" (41 C.J., p.213). Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at
the time of the civil war suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable
time, . . . whether they suspend the right of action or make dilatory the remedy" (12 C.J., p
1078). The laws were declared constitutional. However, some courts have also declared that
"such statutes are void as to contracts made before their passage where the suspension of
remedied prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable in duration" (12C.J., 1078). The true test,
therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute lies in the determination of the
period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the fact that it
impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This argument,
however does not now hold water. While this may be conceded, it is however justified as a valid
exercise by the State of its police power. The leading case on the matter is Home Building and
Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U. S., 398, decide by the Supreme Court of the United States
on January 8, 1934. Here appellant contested the validity of charter 339 of the laws of
Minnesota of 1993, approved April 13, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as
being repugnant to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. The statute was sustained by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota as an emergency measure. "Although coceding that the
obligations of the mortgage contract was impaired, the court decided that what it thus described
as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within
the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic
emergency which the legislative had found to exist". This theory was up-held by the Supreme
Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the following pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the
State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts
already in effect." . . . . Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy
of protecting contracts against impairement presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This
principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of
state power has had progressive recognition in the decision of this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner otherwise
appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the performance of
existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .
. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally,
or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed to destroy the limitation to be construed so as to destroy the reserved
power in its essential aspects. They must be construed to harmony with each other.
This principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt as its
policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means
to enforce them. But it does not follow that conditions may not arise in which a
temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of
the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved
power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community. It cannot be
maintained that the constitutional prohibition should be so construed as to prevent
limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if
made necessary by great public calamity such as fire, flood, or earthquake. See
American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200. The
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be
deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of state power to
protect the public interest in the other situation to which we have referred. And if
state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts in the
present of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood or earthquake, that
power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need demanding such
relief is produced by other and economic causes (78 L.ed. 426, 428-429.)
This decision elicited several comments. One came from the Harvard Law Review. It said:
"Forsaking its well-trodden of the new mortgage moratory laws meet its scrutiny, and in so
doing announced an elastic concept of the contract clause which, if not newly formulated, at
least received such unequivocal expression that it bids fair to revolutionize a tradition of
constitutional interpretation. . . . The court rested its decision on the ground that laws altering
existing contracts constitute an impairment within the meaning of the contract clause only if
they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment. Application
of this 'rule of reason was justified on the theory that all contracts are made subject to an
implied reservation of the protective power of the state, and that therefore statutes which
validly exercise this reserved power, rather than impairing the obligations of an existing
contract, are comprehended within them" (47 Harvard Law Review, pp. 660, 661-662).
But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in the
determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the
enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted that the application of the reserved
power of the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security of the people
should be limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. If these
bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the constitutional
inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. We can cite instances by which
these bounds may be transgressed. One of them is that the impairment should only refer to the
remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the
obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile (W.B. Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh,
79 L.ed. 1298, 1301-1303). Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy. The rule
requires that the alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing
contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy
hardly pursuing (Bronson vs. Kinziel, I How, 311, 317; 46 Har. Law Review, p. 1070). In other
words, the Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the police power,
may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith 277 N.W., pp.
762, 769). As justice Cardozo aptly said, "A different situation is presented when extensions are
so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow . . . The changes of remedy now challenged as
invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to
all. So viewed they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the
incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security (W.B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56, 62). In fine, the decision in the Blaisdell case is predicated on the ground that the
laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the
Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their
enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No.
342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is
a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable
under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations
who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the
Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by
the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonabled time within which to pay
their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized buy their creditors. While it is
admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is
not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared
as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (section 1).
But we should not lost sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is
still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain languaged means that the creditors would
have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive.
while the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works
injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is
more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States (Home Building and Loan
Association vs. Blaisdell, supra).
There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court of the United States declared the
moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the constitution because the period granted
to debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated emergency. One of them is
W. B. Worthen Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435; 78 L. ed., 1344, 1347. Here the Legislature
of Arkansas passed na act providing for an exemption, "without limitation as to amount or
restriction with respect to particular circumstances or relations, of all moneys paid or payable to
any resident of the state under any life, sick, accident or disability insurance policy, from liability
for the payment of the debts of the recipient", and an attempt was made to apply the statute to
debts owing before its approval. The court held that "such an exemption, applied in the case of
debts owing before the exemption was created by the legislature, constitutes an unwarranted
interference with the obligation of contracts in violation of the constitutional provision", and
cannot be sustained even as emergency legislation, because it contains no limitation as to time,
amount, circumstances or need (supra, 292 U. S., pp. 426-432).
The other case is W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh (supra). Here certain Municipal Improvement
Districts organized under the laws of Arkansas were empowered to issue bonds and to mortgage
benefit assessments as security therefor. One of these districts acted upon the powers thus
conferred. Some of the bonds were in default for nonpayment of principal and interest. So an
action was brought by the bond-holders to foreclose the assessment upon the lots of delinquent
owners. These bonds and mortgages were executed under the statutes then in force. Later the
legislature of Arkansas passed three acts making changes in the remedies available under the
former statutes, which changes were attacked as an unconstitutional impairment of contracts.
The court sustained this view holding that the "changes in the remedies available for the
enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, be
pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a
spirit of oppression. . . . A State is free to regulate the procedure in its courts even with
reference to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the time for pleading or for
trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reversed; by a different situation is presented when
extensions are so piled up to make the remedy a shadow."
The third case is Louisville joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed 1593.
This case presented for decision the question whether subsection (s) added to section 75 of the
Bankruptcy Act by the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at L. 1289 U. S. C.
title 11, sec. 203, is consistent with the Federal Constitution. The court said that it is
unconstitutional if applied to farm mortgages already existing, holding that "property rights of
holders of farm mortgages are unconstitutionally taken, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, by
a statute (Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75(s) Frazier-Lemke Act of June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at
L. 1286) applicable only to debts existing at the time of its enactment which provides that a
farmer whose farm is mortgaged, and who has failed to obtain the consents necessary to a
composition under the Bankruptcy Act, may, upon being adjudged a bankrupt, if the mortgagee
assents, purchase the mortgaged property at its them appraised value by agreeing to make
deferred payments of stated percentages of the appraised value over a period of six years, with
interests at 1 per cent per annum, or, if the mortgagee refuses his assent to such purchase,
may obtain a stay of all proceedings for a period of five years, during which he shall retain
possession of all or any part of his property, under the control of the court, provided he pays a
reasonable rental therefor, and that at the end of five years he may pay into court the appraised
price thereof, or, if a lien holder shall request a reappraisal by the court, the reappraised price,
whereupon the court shall, by an order, turn over full possession and title of the property to the
debtor, and he may apply for his discharge."
In addition, we may cite leading state court decisions which practically involved the same ruling
and which reflect the tendency of the courts towards legislation involving modification of
mortgage or monetary contracts which contains provisions that are deemed unreasonable or
oppressive. Some of those which may be deemed representative follows:
1. Pouquette vs. O'Brien, 100 Pac. 2nd series, 979 (1940). The Supreme Court of Arizona held
unconstitutional a 1937 statute authorizing courts to extend for a period of not longer than two
years all actions or foreclosures of real estate mortgages, and a 1939 statutes authorizing the
courts to extend foreclosure proceedings not later than March 4, 1941.
2. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph Arp et al., 283 N.W. 441, 120 A.L.R.
932 (1939). The Supreme Court of Iowa declared unconstitutional the Moratorium Acts enacted
in 1933, 1935 and 1937, providing for extension of the 1933 Moratorium Act covering a period
of six years.
3. First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith et al., 227 N.W. 762 (1938). The Supreme Court of
Nebraska declared unconstitutional the Nebraska Moratorium Law as reenacted, extending the
benefit of the remedy to a period of six years, as being repugnant to the contract clause of the
Constitution.
4. Milkint vs. McNeely, Clerk of court, et al., 169 S.E. 790 (1933). The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia declared unconstitutional certain acts of legislature enacted in 1932, extending
the period of redemption three years beyond the one-year period then allowed by statute, being
an impairment of contract as to sales made prior to enactment thereof.
5. Haynes vs. Treadway, 65 Pac. 892 (1901). The Supreme Court of California declared
unconstitutional a statute which extends the right of redemption from six months twelve months
being a substantial impairment of the obligation contracts if applied to a mortgage already
executed.
6. Swinburne vs. Mills, 50 Pac. 489 (1879). The Supreme Court of Washington declared a
statute unconstitutional in so far as it provides that, on a decree for foreclosure of a mortgage
executed before the act was passed, the debtor shall be entitled to have the order of sale stayed
for one year, as being an impairment of the obligation of contract.
These cases apply with added force in this jurisdiction considering the conditions no prevailing in
our country. We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can see it and feel it as
we gaze around to observe the wave of reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the
country since liberation thanks to the aid of America and the innate progressive spirit of our
people. This aid and this spirit have worked wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely
stated that in the main the financial condition of our country and our people, individually and
collectively, has practically returned to normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by
local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance of peace and order in our midst. Business,
industry and agriculture have picked up and developed at such stride that we can say that we
are now well on the road to recovery and progress. This is so not only as far as our observation
and knowledge are capable to take note and comprehend but also because of the official
pronouncements made by our Chief Executive in public addresses and in several messages he
submitted to Congress on the general state of the nation. To bear this out, it would suffice for us
to state some of those public statements which we deem to be most expressive and
representative of the general situation. We quote:
We have balanced our national budget. We shall again have at the end of the current
fiscal year a sizeable surplus. . . .
We have greatly improved the economic and financial conditions of the country.
Through the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, loans amounting to P90,480,136 have
been granted for the recontruction and rehabilitation purposes. . . .
We have set up the Central bank to expand our credit, stabilize our currency and
provide a new source of financing for the agricultural and industrial development of
the nation.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The commitment thus far made is not only a favorable sign ushering in finally the
implementation of our plans of economic development, but a significantly successful
test of the solvency of our foreign credit, for it was accepted only after a thorough
examination of our resources and development plans by a board of economists of
international authority (Pres. Quirino's "State-of-the-Nation" Message of the Joint
Session of Congress on Jan. 24, 1949, 45 Off. Gaz., Ja., 1949).
We have strengthened, . . . our internal and external finances. Six years ago, we were
a country prostrate from the destruction of war. . . . today, we can say that our people
not only have returned to their prewar activities, but . . . have progressed and
prospered far beyond what they ever dreamed of before the war.
. . . Three years ago the national income stood at four billion pesos; today it is over
seven billion pesos. . . . The government income has been steadily rising from 60
million pesos in 1946 to approximately 600 million pesos today, also a progress in six
years.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The ravages of war are fast disappearing, and instead, what beautiful vistas
unfold themselves before our eyes at this moment in our immediate surroundings.
Compare this beautiful view with that of the past and all that we have accomplished in
scarcely six years of struggle, sacrifice, determination, and bold decision. (Applause.)
We have brought this nation out of the paralysis of destruction into economic
normalcy and financial stability. . . .
. . . Our external finances have greatly improved, and . . . our pesos is one of the
most stable currencies in the world today. (Applause.) I repeat, our pesos is one of
the most stable currencies in the world today.
All these find grateful reflection in a better-sheltered, better-clothed, better-fed, and
healthier population that has grown from 18 million to 20 million in a half dozen
years, in a school enrollment that has doubled since the outbreak of the last war from
less than 2 million to over 4 million young students in the public schools, and in
democratic processes that are gaining in vigor and permanence with each passing
year" (Address of his Excellency Quirino, President of the Philippines, on the occasion
of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the independence of the Philippines, July
4, 1952, Luneta, Manila, 48 Off. Gaz., pp. 3287-3289).
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us
under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of
Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and
without effect. And what we say here with respect to said Act also holds true as regards
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater force and reason as to the latter,
considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is need to
make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said Act if and when it is
declared unconstitutional or invalid.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from will be reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,800 with
interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent annum from August 27, 1942, until its full payment,
plus 12 per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay this judgment as stated, the properties
mortgaged will be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance
with law. So ordered.