CASES FOR SELF DEFENSE

G.R. No. 172606

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Present:
Plaintiff-Appellee,
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT,
Accused-Appellant. November 23, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if false. It is

time, then, to remind the Defense about the requisites of the justifying
circumstance and about the duty of the Defense to establish the requisites
by credible, clear and convincing evidence.

Melanio Nugas y Mapait appeals the decision promulgated on March

8, 2006,[1]whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for
murder under the decision rendered on August 17, 2000 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 73, in Antipolo City (RTC).

Antecedents

On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City

charged Jonie Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) with murder committed as
follows:

That on or about the 26 th day of March 1997, in the Municipality

of Antipolo, Province of Rizal Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and
 confederating with an unidentified male person, whose true
identity and present whereabout is still unknown, with treachery
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said bladed weapon one Glen Remigio y Santos hitting
the latter on the left neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal
stab wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

On April 7, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, learning of

the identity of the unidentified male co-conspirator of Araneta as Melanio
Nugas y Mapait (Nugas), amended the information to include Nugas as a
co-principal, to wit:

That on or about the 26 th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality

of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed
weapon one Glen Remegio y Santos hitting the latter on the left
neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wound which
directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Upon arraignment on June 9, 1998, Araneta and Nugas, both assisted by

counsel de officio, voluntarily and spontaneously pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.[4]
In the course of the presentation of evidence for the Defense, Araneta
manifested his willingness to change his plea, and to enter a plea
of guilty as an accomplice in homicide. On July 19, 1999, the RTC
approved his offer to change plea. The plea bargaining was with the
conformity of the State Prosecutor and the heirs of the victim. Thus, after
ensuring that Araneta had understood the consequences of his new plea
of guilty, the RTC allowed him to enter a new plea. He was subsequently
duly convicted as an accomplice in homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.[5]

The trial proceeded against Nugas.

Evidence of the Prosecution

 On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio
(Glen), his wife, Nila Remigio (Nila), and their two children, Raymond and
Genevieve, then 11- and 6-years old, respectively, were traveling on board
their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos Highway in COGEO,
Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right
because their children sat between them. While they were passing along
Carolina Village, two men waved at them signalling their request to hitch a
ride. Glen accommodated the two men, one of whom was carrying a
maroon plastic bag, allowing them to board the vehicle at the rear. When
the vehicle neared Masinag Market, the two men suddenly brandished
knives that each pointed at Glens and Nilas necks, warning them not to
make any wrong move if they did not want to be harmed. Considering that
the two men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen continued
driving the vehicle. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville Village, the man
behind Glen suddenly stabbed Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men
alighted and fled. Glen pulled the knife from his neck and handed it to
Nila. He drove to the nearest hospital, but he collapsed on the way and lost
control of the vehicle, causing it to run over two pedestrians, one of whom
died and the other suffered a broken arm. Once the vehicle hit the railings
of a gas station, Nila cried for help. Concerned citizens immediately rushed
Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60 meters away. Nila
stayed behind to look after their children. When she checked the vehicle,
she found the knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the
assailants at the rear of the vehicle. She gathered the articles and later
turned them over to the police officer in charge of the investigation. The
maroon plastic bag was found to contain the following items: a National
Bureau of Investigation clearance,[6] a police clearance,[7] Social Security
System papers,[8] and official receipts,[9]all issued in the name of Araneta, a
stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of keys.

Despite undergoing treatment, Glen succumbed, [10] and his body was
brought for autopsy to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. The
autopsy revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal stab wound on the left
side of his neck originating from the front and going towards the back and
downwards towards the center of his body, piercing the apex of the left lung
and transecting the left common carotid artery; that the stab wound had
been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and that the immediate cause of
his death was the hemorrhage resulting from the stab wound. [11] It was
opined that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the
assailant used his left hand, he was probably directly behind the victim; but
had he used his right hand, he had to be somewhere to the extreme left of
the victim.
During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her
husband and who had stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as
the person who had sat behind her and who had carried the maroon plastic
bag that she had later recovered from the backseat.

Other witnesses presented were the investigating police officer, the

medico-legal officer who had performed the autopsy, and Atty. Jose S.
Diloy, the lawyer who had assisted Araneta in executing a sworn statement
pointing to Nugas, his own uncle, as the person who had stabbed the driver
of the vehicle they were riding on March 26, 1997.

The State adduced object and documentary evidence, including the

knife, the maroon plastic bag and all its contents, Medico Legal Report No.
M-0406-97,[12] and the sworn statement of Araneta.[13]

Evidence of Nugas

Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did

so in self-defense. He claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a
passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that when he and Araneta boarded the
vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo, about four other passengers were
already on board; that he argued with Glen about the fare, because Glen
was overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of Rempson
Supermarket, Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get something
from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that thinking that Glen was
reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand
from where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya);
and that when asked why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the
knife for protection because he was living in a squatters area.

Ruling of the RTC

On August 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Nugas of murder, ruling that his
guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC accorded greater credence to the testimony of Nila because

she had consistently narrated the incident. It observed that although Nila
had initially made a mistake in identifying who, as between Nugas and
Araneta, had stabbed her husband, she had rectified her error upon seeing
the two accused together in person; that despite the resemblance of Nugas
and Araneta to each other, she had firmly pointed to Nugas as the person
who had stabbed Glen; that even granting to be true Nugas version that
Glen had pushed and punched him, his stabbing of Glen could not be a
reasonable and necessary means to repel the attack, for, by all standards,
fists were no match to knives; that treachery had been duly proved beyond
reasonable doubt, because Nugas position inside the vehicle in relation to
Glen, who had sat on the drivers seat, and Nugas manner of inflicting the
fatal blow from behind warranted the inference that Nugas had taken
advantage of his position to specially ensure the execution of the felony,
without risk to himself arising from any defense that Glen might make.

The RTC disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MELANIO

NUGAS is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Nugas is hereby further ordered to pay to heirs of Glen

Remigio the amount of P80,000.00 for actual
damages, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses and P50,000 as
death indemnity.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Ruling of the CA

Upon review,[15] the CA affirmed the factual and legal conclusions of the
RTC, and declared that Nugas invoking of self-defense shifted the burden
to him to prove the attendance of the elements of self-defense, but he
failed to discharge such burden.

Issue

Nugas has now come to the Court to reverse his conviction, and begs us to
delve into whether the affirmance by the CA was proper, and whether the
attendant circumstance of treachery was duly proven.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing, [16] and thereby

assumes the burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction will follow from his
admission of killing the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused
must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence, [17]because the
existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the
crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the
negation of any of the elements of the offense itself. [18]
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there
was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-
defense or at least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-
defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims
aggression.[19]

The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of self-
defense. The CA concurred.

The Court upholds both lower courts.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element

of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression,
there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. [20] The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat.[21] Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.[22]

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful

aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon,
an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive
and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot
or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. [23]

Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and
then reached for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe
that he had a gun there. For one, as the CA pointed out, Nugas admitted
not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag. [24]And, secondly, the
CA correctly found and declared Nugas testimony about Glen punching him
to be improbable, viz:[25]

It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to

accused-appellant Nugas position, can launch an attack against
the latter. First, the victim was at the drivers seat and seated
between him were his wife and two children. Second, the victim
was driving the FX vehicle. Third, accused-appellant Nugas
was seated directly behind the victim. All things considered, it is
highly improbable, nay risky for the victims family, for him to
launch an attack.

Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-

defense because he had not been subjected to either actual or imminent
threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen
committed no unlawful aggression towards him.

With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-

defense, not having been established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still
determine whether the remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant.
As the Court made clear in People v. Carrero:[26]

Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential

element to support the theory of self-defense and the
complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability;
without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain
that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under
which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two
conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code.
[27]
When an act of aggression is in response to an insult,
affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as
the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of
the provocation, and in such a case the courts can at most
consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason
for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal
Code. (emphasis supplied)

Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the
means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that such
means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. [28]
 The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without
warning, and the attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape,
thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself or to retaliate.Treachery may also be appreciated when the
victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable
to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.[29]

The CA exhaustively discussed and rightly determined the presence

of treachery as a circumstance attendant in the killing of Glen and the
improbability of Glen launching an attack against or defending himself from
Nugas by reason of their relative positions. We affirm the CA, because
there was nothing adduced by Nugas that refuted how the relative positions
of Glen and Nugas had left the former defenseless and unable to parry or
to avoid the fatal blow of the latter. Verily, Nugas stabbed Glen from behind
with suddenness, thereby deliberately ensuring the execution of the killing
without any risk to himself from any defense that Glen might make.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 8,

2006 finding MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. L-24014 October 16, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO LARA, defendant-appellant.

Julio Borbon, Pedro Villamor and B. Quitoriano for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Abra, finding the appellant, Gregorio Lara, guilty
of the offense of homicide, committed upon the person of one Cayetano
Querido, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years,
eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
Gregorio Lara, the appellant, is a resident of the municipality of La Paz, in
the Province of Abra, and at the time of the homicide which is the subject of
this prosecution, was about 32 years of age and married; while the
deceased, Cayetano Querido, age not stated, was a resident of the same
municipality. At about 8 o'clock on the night of September 25, 1924, the
deceased, accompanied by four other persons, planted himself at the
crossing immediately in front of the appellant's house and began to
entertain his companions by speaking insulting words of and to the
appellant. These expressions were to the effect that a concubine to whom
the appellant was supposed to be devoted had been, or was about to be,
enticed away by some other person. Among the words attributed to
Querido on this occasion are the following: "Wake up, Ramon, they are
eating your chow" (meaning in local slang that some one else was enjoying
Lara's concubine). Another expression, having about the same significance,
was: "They are burning your clothes": and again, yet more broadly:
"Gregorio Lara, they are enticing your concubine, and nevertheless you
permit it." These expressions were greeted with loud guffaws from
Querido's companions. Another statement made by Querido on this
occasion was to the effect that he had been anxious to run up against Lara
for some time but that Lara was not now coming out of nights. It is further
stated that, upon addressing to Lara the offensive expressions which we
have quoted concerning his concubine, the deceased placed the palms of
his two hands in such a position as to form the tube of a trumpet, for the
purpose of changing the pitch of his voice.

Now, it happened that upon the same night an employee of the Bureau of
Lands, named Rufino Roque, had occasion to stop in La Paz upon an
official errand and, being acquainted with Gregorio Lara, he stopped at the
latter's house as a guest for the night. Being an employee of the Bureau of
Lands. Roque carried a revolver, and upon retiring to bed he suspended
the weapon, with its holster, from a peg on a beam in the house. The fact
that the revolver had been placed in this position was noted by Lara; and
after his patience had become exhausted towards Querido and his
companions he took the revolver down, and as it was unloaded, placed two
cartridges in the cylinder, at the same time starting for the street. Upon
seeing this movement on the part of Lara, Querido and his companions
scattered. Querido went in an easterly direction along one of the streets,
accompanied by Artemio Casel, a high-school student of the age of 16
years. The two went along together for a little way, perhaps a hundred
meters, when Querido stopped and hid behind the corner of a fence in front
of the house of Nicolas Velasco. At the same time Querido said to Casel,
"Move away a little as I am going to smash him." Artemio, therefore,
instead of hiding in the same place with Querido, turned to the other side
and hid himself also behind a fence, in order to see what Querido was
going to do to Lara.

Lara, meanwhile, had emerged from his house with pistol in hand, and
reaching the center of the street, he found that his entertainers had all
disappeared. Seeing this, he discharged his pistol into the air, as a sort of
warning against a repetition of the incident; and instead of going
immediately indoors again, he turned into the street and went in an easterly
direction, being desirous, so he says, of ascertaining from his neighbors the
identity of the members of the party. The direction pursued took him over
the same course that had been followed by Querido and Casel; and after
he had passed the spot where the two were hiding, Querido jumped out
from behind and threw his arms around Lara in an effort to pinion his hands
and get possession of the pistol. Lara at once attempted to free himself
from his assailant and succeeded in breaking Querido's hold. At the same
time he turned so as to confront Querido, and the struggle for the
possession of the revolver was continued. In the course of this struggle,
perhaps immediately after Lara turned, the revolver was discharged. The
bullet passed into Querido's abdomen on the left side, passed entirely
through the body, and emerged in the right gluteal region. The shot did not
immediately disable Querido, who continued his efforts to get possession of
the pistol. This he was unable to do, but being a man of strength, he
succeeded in throwing one of his arms around Lara's neck, in which
position he held him as in a vice while he called to Mariano Dolor, whose
house was only a few paces away, to come to his assistance.

Meanwhile, Rufino Roque had heard the first pistol shot and was aroused
by it from the borders of sleep. Roque's first thought was of his revolver,
and, upon looking up, he saw that it was missing from its holster. He
immediately slipped on his clothes and hastened out into the street.
Hearing the second shot, he went in the direction of the sound and arrived
at the scene of trouble before any other person. His first effort of course
was directed towards the recovery of the pistol, and his movements
towards this end were apparently interpreted by Querido as of an unfriendly
nature. At any rate Querido at once threw his unoccupied arm around the
neck of Roque and held him prisoner in the same manner as he was
already holding Lara. At this moment Mariano Dolor came upon the scene,
where he found Querido holding both Lara and Roque firmly with his arms
around their respective necks, while he appeared to be supporting himself
by leaning upon their shoulders. Mariano Dolor says that Querido called to
him twice that he had been shot by Lara, and he asked Dolor to take
possession of the pistol, which Dolor did. Querido then freed his prisoners,
and all went together to the municipal building, for the purposes of the
official investigation. On the way thither Querido, weakened by the wound
he had received, needed assistance, and Lara assisted others in
supporting him as he walked.

The wound, produced in the manner above stated, caused the death of
Querido within about three days. In this interval he signed two written
statements concerning the homicide. The first of these statements was
made before the justice of the peace immediately after the arrival of the
principals at the municipal building; and the document would hardly be
admissible as a dying declaration, since it does not appear that the
declarant then really thought that death was certain. His words on this point
were these: "Perhaps I am going to die very soon, justice." However, the
statement was introduced in evidence, apparently without objection, and on
examination it will be found to contain nothing prejudicial to the appellant
aside from the fact (which is admitted) that Lara did that shooting. The
declarant added: "We were able to take from the hands of Lara the revolver
which a friend had lent him." In a later statement, signed by Querido in the
presence of E. Parado and Feliciano Farias, after he had given up hopes
of life, he stated in substance that Lara entertained rancor towards him
because he (Lara) suspected that the declarant had induced his concubine
to seek another man. There is nothing in either of these statements that
throws any light upon the immediate circumstances of the shooting,
additional to what is revealed by the testimony of the living witnesses. The
failure of the declarant to state any fact unfavorable to the accused with
respect to the conditions under which the shot was fired strongly confirms
the contention of the appellant that it occurred while the two combatants
were struggling over the pistol.

It appears that a few days after the homicide the appellant himself was
subjected to an examination by Lieutenant Garcia, and on that occasion he
stated that he discharged the revolver as soon as he succeeded in
breaking loose from the person who had seized him. From this it has been
argued that the danger had then passed and that the firing of the pistol at
this juncture was not justifiable. We are of the opinion, however, that the
struggle for the possession of the revolver was continuous and that the
deceased was still engaged in his attempt to get the revolver when the shot
was fired.

Upon the foregoing state of facts, we are of the opinion that a case of self-
defense is completely made out, under subsection 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code, and that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. There was no
provocation whatever on the part of the appellant and the provocation given
by the deceased was of a nature to provoke wrath in the mind of any
spirited person. Again, there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased, in this, that while the appellant was passing along the street
during the nighttime the deceased sprang upon him from ambush and
began a struggle, primarily for the possession of the revolver and with the
criminal design of beating the appellant up. That this assault was
characterized by alevosia is manifest.

It only remains to inquire whether there was reasonable necessity for the
means employed by the appellant to repel the attack. In this connection it is
necessary to bear in mind the following circumstances, namely, the
darkness of the night, the element of surprise involved in the assault, and
the revealed intention of the deceased to beat the appellant up. Under
these conditions the appellant might well have reasoned that if the struggle
continued upon equal terms his assailant would undoubtedly in a moment
get possession of the revolver. If this should happen there was great and
real danger that in the excitement of the moment the deceased would have
shot the appellant a thing which he could have done with impunity. The
appellant, therefore, on the peril of his life, could not permit the deceased to
get possession of the weapon, and the only means of preventing it was the
firing of the pistol for the purpose of defense. When the deceased sprang
from behind on the appellant in the dark, when the latter was known to
have a pistol in his hand, the deceased acted at his peril, for it was but
reasonable to suppose that in the moment of surprise and struggle the
appellant would use the pistol against his assailant, if it should be within his
power to do so. 1awph!l.net

It will be remembered that the struggle for the possession of the pistol
continued for some time after the deadly shot was fired. While the appellant
was under cross-examination his attention was called to this fact, and he
was asked why he continued to fight for the retention of the pistol when, as
he then knew, there was no other cartridge in the cylinder. He replied, very
reasonably, we think, that he knew that if the deceased should get the
weapon in his hands he could easily kill the appellant by using it as a
cudgel.

It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature

does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to
sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the
consequences.

In United States vs. Patala (2 Phil., 752, 757), the deceased assaulted the
appellant with a knife. In the course of the ensuing struggle the appellant
wrested the knife from his assailant and with it inflicted upon him a fatal
wound. In support of the conviction it was suggested that when the
appellant got possession of the knife, the danger from the assailant had so
far passed that the appellant was not justified in using the knife. But the
Supreme Court, in reversing the decision and acquitting the appellant,
speaking through Mr. Justice Mapa, said: ". . . If through a fortunate
accident he came into possession of the knife, he could have lost control of
it through a similar accident and then found himself at the mercy of his
assailant. Therefore the act of the defendant rendering his assailant
powerless as well as he could under the critical circumstances of the
moment, and repelling his aggression, constitute, in our opinion, a true
case of self-defense, which exempts the defendant from any criminal
liability under paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code."

In United States vs. Molina (19 Phil., 227), the assailant carried a bolo. In
the course of the struggle this weapon came to the hands of the appellant
and with it he slew his assailant. The court held that the use of the weapon
by the appellant was justified, notwithstanding the fact that the deceased
had become disarmed by the loss of his bolo. The court, again speaking
through Mr. Justice Mapa, said: ". . . Considering the decidedly aggressive
attitude of the deceased from the commencement of this struggle until its
termination, it cannot be said that there was a cessation of the danger for
the accused, even for a single instant. If, through the various incidents of
the struggle, or any favorable accident whatever, the deceased had
succeeded in recovering the bolo or in possessing himself of the hatchet,
as he attempted to do to the last, the result of the combat would probably
have been very different; perhaps the accused, instead of being the slayer,
would himself have been killed. The accused certainly was not in duty
bound to expose himself to such a contingency, and while the struggle
continued, and consequently, the danger to his person or to his life
subsisted he had a perfect and indisputable right to repel such danger by
wounding his adversary, if necessary, as from the circumstances of the
case it was, without any doubt whatever, and even to disable him
completely so that he could not continue the assault. In our opinion, the
means employed by the accused were rationally necessary to repel the
assault, and as the latter was in all respects unlawful and was not preceded
by any provocation of any kind on the part of the accused himself, we
declare the said accused to be exempt from criminal liability, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code."

It these considerations correctly express the law in a case where the

assaulted party has slain the assailant with his own weapon, no less must
they be applicable to a case like the present, where the appellant has acted
in his own self-defense against an aggressor of superior strength and for
the purpose of preventing the aggressor from obtaining possession of the
only weapon which the party assailed could use. (U. S. vs. Salazar and
Villanueva, 15 Phil., 315.)

From what has been said it follows that the judgment appealed from must
be reversed, and the appellant will be absolved from the information, with
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-46485 November 2l, 1979

NORMAN LACSON, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Coronel Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals, 1 promulgated on April 26, 1977, affirming the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan Branch VIII, in Criminal Case No. 0429-
V, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Norman Lacson" convicting the
accused, petitioner herein, of the crime of frustrated homicide penalized
under Art. 249, in connection with Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, but
declaring him entitled to the privileged litigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense considering that two of the three requisites mentioned in Art.
11, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code are present, namely, unlawful
aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself and, taking into consideration the provisions of Art. 13,
No. 1 and Art. 69, both of the said Revised Penal Code, imposed upon him
a straight penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months of arresto mayor, and
ordered the said accused to indemnify the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, in
the amount of P500.00, and to pay the costs of the suit. 2

The petitioner was originally charged under two (2) informations. In

Criminal Case No. 0429-V, 3 he was accused of frustrated homicide for
having shot one Jimmy Pitalio on January 23, 1972 in the municipality of
Valenzuela, province of Bulacan. The petitioner was charged in Criminal
Case No. 0430-V 4 with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition for
having in his possession a Commanche Chief Caliber .22 Magnum revolver
which was not licensed in his name. This was the same gun he used in
shooting Jimmy Pitalio.

The two criminal cases were tried jointly. Thereafter the trial court rendered
judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 0430-V and convicting said
petitioner of the crime of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 0429-V. 5

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following

errors allegedly committed by the trial court: 6

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WHEN HE ATTACKED
APPELLANT.

II
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS
EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING

APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LEGITIMATE SELF-
DEFENSES."

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto 7 and
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision in a
resolution dated June 20, 1977. 8

The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed the following
errors: 9

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT
ARMED WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE ATTACKED THE
PETITIONER.

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO
PRESENT AS WITNESSES HIS MAID, HIS HELPER AND HIS
WIFE TO CORROBORATE HIS TESTIMONY RENDERS THE
DEFENSE VERSION UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT BECAUSE THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED
WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE ATTACKED THE PETITIONER,
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE
LATTER TO USE HIS WIFE'S GUN TO DEFEND HIMSELF
AND HIS WIFE.

IV

ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT

PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE,
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
 HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES ONLY AND NOT FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE.
10
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:

Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos Tan and Enrique

Masacote were neighbors in General Tiburcio de Leon,
Valenzuela, Bulacan. At about noon on January 23, 1972,
Carlos Tan invited Masacote and Pitalio to the birthday party of
his son in their house. While they were eating and drinking in
the yard, Tan told Pitalio that the laborers of Lacson were
leaving their work. Tan also asked Pitalio to find out whether the
latter could get the balance of his unpaid wages from Lacson.
Pitalio went to Lacson's residence, kicked open the gate of
appellant's residence, and forced his way inside the yard.
Appellant and his wife had just arrived and were alighting from
their car when Pitalio, under the influence of liquor, confronted
Mrs. Lacson and asked her to produce their truck driver named
Serafica, saying- 'Pag hindi mo siya hinarap sa akin ay may
mangyayari.' Appellant remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by the
law. This enraged Pitalio who replied: 'Ano ang batas, ito ang
batas!' Taking the Magnum. 22 caliber pistol of his wife from her
handbag the appellant then fired it once at chest.

Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio to the hospital. There

Pitalio's gunshot wound was treated and operated on (Exhibit
'A'). Pitalio's confinement in the Jose R. Reyes Memorial
Hospital lasted from January 23 to February 2, 1972. The
medical certificate issued unto him stated that his injury would
incapacitate him for more than thirty (30) days.

In its analysis of the evidence for the prosecution petition and for the
defense, the trial court found that: 11

Jimmy Pitalio, on the witness stand, admitted that at the time of

the incident he had drunk beer in the house of Carlos Tan but
being drunk. The Court believes, however, that at the tune he
was under the influence of liquor so much so that although he
knew that the balance of his salary which was a measly Pl.00 in
amount was due to him from the driver, he pressed Mrs. Lacson
for the non-payment and as a matter of fact, according to him,
he told Mrs. Lacson 'Never mind, Mrs. Lacson, alam kong
ginigipit ninyo ako.' Again, the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was
known as a person of bad character in the locality is shown by
the uncontradicted testimony of the accused who testified that
Carlos Tan and Masacote warned him about Jimmy Pitalio and,
by the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was convicted of serious physical
injuries against his own uncle (Exhibit 4), and likewise by the
 fact that he admitted having stoned the house of accused
Norman Lacson together with other companions.

The petitioner invoked self-defense. His evidence is that jimmy Pitalio

attacked him with a knife, and in order to prevent or repel the aggression
he took the gun of his wife from her handbag and shot at the offended
party.

The trial court rejected petitioner's theory of complete selfdefense.

However, lt ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, stating thus: 12

Considering, therefore, the fact that at the time of the incident

the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, was drunk and considering
his bad character, the Court believes, therefore, that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of Jimmy Pitalio. It was Jimmy
Pitalio who provoked the incident by going in a drunken
condition to the house of the accused The fact that Pitalio was
of a violent temperament, strong and aggressive, previously
convicted of serious physical injuries against his own uncle,
plus the fact that he entered the residence of the accused in
this case, makes the Court conclude that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the offended party in this case.

The trial court held that there was no reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the unlawful aggression but found that there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused because: 13

That there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the

accused in this case is very clear because it was Jimmy Pitalio
who himself provoked the incident by accusing the wife of the
accused of depriving him of his wages. The Court therefore
finds that although there was no reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the first requisite of
unlawful aggression was present, as well as the third requisite
of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not he is entitled to

acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals found the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the offended party and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
petitioner. Both said courts, however, found the use of the gun by the
petitioner as an unreasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression of
the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, apparently on the belief that the latter did
not have any weapon.

The petitioner testified that the offended party was armed with a "knife like"
knife when he confronted Mrs. La and the accused. The trial court found
that when the petitioner remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by the law,
Pitalio was enraged and replied "Ano ang batas, ito ang batas! " Implicit in
this statement of Pitalio is that he was referring to something as "ito ang
batas. " This statement of Pitalio tends to corroborate the testimony of the
petitioner that the offended party was armed with a "kris-like" knife. The trial
did not state to what Pitalio, the offended party, referred when he said
"... ito ang batas! " before he was fired at by the petitioner. The statement
could not have simply referred to the fists of the offended party. It is
contrary to normal human behavior for the petitioner to have taken the
pistol of his wife from her handbag and fired at Pitalio if Pitalio have any
weapon at all. The only logical conclusion is that had a knife when he said
"Ano ang batas!" The phrase "into ang batas " could only have referred to a
weapon.

In People vs. Boholst-Caballero, 14 this Court said.

In cases such as the one now before Us where there are

directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the
accusation the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to
look for some facts or circumstances which can be used as
valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a
testimony, for after all the element of probability is always
involved in weighing testimonial evidence, so much so that
when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces judgment that
a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its
own personal knowledge but as the result of an evaluating
process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be
proved.

Considering the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
Jimmy Pitalio, the offended party, was drunk at the time he was shot; that
Pitalio was known as a person of bad character in the locality; that Pitalio
had been convicted of serious physical injuries committed against his own
uncle; that on a previous occasion, Pitalio admitted having stoned the
house of petitioner, Norman Lacson; and the fact that Pitalio had intruded
into the residence of the accused, the use by the petitioner of a gun as the
only available weapon to repel the aggression cannot be considered as an
unreasonable means of defending himself and his wife from the offended
party.

This Court explained the meaning of reasonable means employed thus:

That there is reasonable necessity of the means employed by

herein appellant to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
cannot seriously be disputed. 'Reasonable necessity of the
means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which
will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, the instinct,
 more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and
the proportionateness thereof d 's not depend upon the harm
done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury ... As
WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of
this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon
this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and
hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. 15

In the instant case, there was an imminent danger of the lives of the
petitioner and of his wife from the unlawful attack of an enraged, drunken,
and armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his wife, who was. beside him,
afforded the petitioner the only reasonable means to ward off the attack.

The petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-

defense. It is no longer necessary to discuss the other errors assigned by
him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed

is hereby set aside and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
in the information in C Case No. 0429-V of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 114917. January 29, 2001]

LUCIBAR ROCA y BONDARIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal by certiorari are the Decision[1] dated November 15, 1993, of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12317 and its Resolution [2]dated
March 21, 1994, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The
assailed decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 8982, [3] convicting
petitioner of the crime of homicide. Petitioner does not seek acquittal but
prays for the modification of the penalty imposed so that he will be entitled
to probation.

Petitioner was charged with murder, in the Information against

petitioner, dated October 15, 1989, as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of August 1989, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill and armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife,
did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully, and feloniously attack, stab and
wound one OLIVER DIAZ with treachery in that said OLIVER DIAZ, was
stabbed and wounded suddenly and unexpectedly with said weapon
without giving him a chance to defend himself to insure its execution of the
act without risk to said accused out of any defense which said OLIVER
DIAZ might make, thereby inflicting upon him a stab wound (L) which injury
caused the death of said OLIVER DIAZ.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.

Contrary to Art. 248, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. [4]

Petitioner was arraigned on December 4, 1989, and with the assistance

of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. At the pre-trial conference of August
9, 1990, however, petitioner changed his mind and manifested his
willingness to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide with
mitigating circumstances. Private complainant Paciana Diaz, the victims
mother, interposed objections. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of eyewitness Miraflor

Salvero, common law wife of William Diaz, a brother of the victim. Her
testimony, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court reads:

. . .At about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 1, 1989, she was going
to the boulevard and upon passing the residence of Paciana Diaz, noticing
that there were plenty of people and observing that there was a commotion,
she went near. She saw deceased Oliver Diaz coming from the south along
Rizal Avenue, and as he turned to the right on a blind corner along a store,
he was suddenly stabbed by the accused with a Batangas knife. The
deceased was hit on the left side of his body. Accused was about to thrust
the knife again, but the victim ran (away). Eventually, they saw the victim
fall to the ground at a distance towards the south, and with the help of one
Danny Gomez, they loaded the victim on a pedicab and brought him to the
Holy Child Hospital, and although he was immediately given emergency
treatment, the victim died[5]

Petitioner interposed incomplete self-defense and defense of a

relative. His version of the incident, as capsulized by the trial court and
adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:

In the afternoon of August 1, 1989, while he was playing majong (sic) in the
house of Norma Jumawan, he heard a commotion and quarrel, which
prompted him to stand up and went (sic) out into the road. People were
shouting the nickname of his brother Toto and he went near the place of the
incident, and saw his brother Sergio Roca, Jr., nicknamed Toto being
ganged up by Eliseo Diaz, Paciana Diaz, Sandra Diaz, and Estella Diaz
and Roy Diaz. Both Roy Diaz and Paciana Diaz were armed with bolos and
Eliseo Diaz was armed with a wooden club. Estella Diaz and Sandra Diaz
were holding each separately to both legs and shoulders of his brother. He
pushed and kicked Roy Diaz which caused the latter to fall. But, Eliseo
Diaz came around and hit him on the head resulting in his falling on the
ground. Upon falling to the ground, he saw a stainless (steel) knife lying on
the sand where he fell. He picked up the knife and saw victim Oliver Diaz
coming to his direction. Victim Oliver Diaz went near him and struck him
three times with a wooden club, and he was hit on the arms and
forearms. When the victim tried to deliver the fourth blow, he stabbed Oliver
with the knife he earlier picked up. Afterwards, he ran outside, and went
back to the house of Norma Jumawan, the majong place, and hid himself
there. At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, he went to the
house of his sister-in-law in Miciano Road, and later, he went to a house of
a friend in Lo-oc, both in the same city, and past twelve midnight, he went
back to the house of his sister-in-law. The following day he went to the
Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, but, being told that they cannot give
him a medico-legal report, he proceeded to the City Health Office where he
was examined by Dr. Edilburgo Ruperto, who gave him a medico-legal
report (Exh. 2). After having been examined by Dr. Ruperto he boarded a
pedicab from the City Health Office, and proceeded to the bus terminal at
Lo-oc and boarded a passenger bus for Bais City. On August 5, 1989, his
wife arrived in Bais City, and he requested her to (ask) the Dumaguete City
Police to fetch him for fear of his life. Upon arrival of the Dumaguete
policemen in Bais City, he surrendered, and afterwards, he was brought to
Dumaguete City.[6]

The trial court found petitioners testimony to be improbable and full of

inconsistencies, noting that he was evasive and hesitant on the witness
stand. Finding that there was no question as to the identity of the killer of
the deceased Oliver Diaz, the trial court then convicted petitioner of
homicide. The dispositive portion of the judgment states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, and after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilt hereby sentence accused Lucibar Roca y Bondario
to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Oliver Diaz civil
indemnity in the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and

subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner now assigns the following issues for our resolution:

1. Is Miraflor Salv[e]ro, sister-in-law of the deceased, Oliver Diaz,

worthy of credence and belief?

2. Did petitioner (accused) act in incomplete self-defense and

defense of a relative in killing the deceased Oliver Diaz?

3. Did petitioner voluntarily surrender to the authorities so as to be

entitled to this mitigating circumstance?

4. Should the penalty to be imposed on petitioner in RTC Crim.

Case No. 8982 (CA-G.R. No. 12317) be probationable? [8]

The first issue involves the credibility of the prosecutions main witness,
Miraflor Salvero. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as the records show
her to be the common-law-wife of the victims brother, her testimony is
tainted with bias.

The Office of the Solicitor General counters that it is jurisprudentially

settled that mere relationship of the prosecution witness to the victim does
not necessarily make her testimony unworthy of belief.

Where the bone of contention is the credibility of a witness, settled is

the rule that the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility is accorded
great weight by appellate courts absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain matters which, if taken into consideration, would have
materially affected the outcome of the case. [9] And where the trial courts
findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon this Court. [10] The determination of the
credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court judge because of his
unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. [11]

In the instant case, we note that petitioner fails to point out any matter
which may have been overlooked or misconstrued by the trial court and the
appellate court in their respective assessments of Miraflor Salveros
testimony. Petitioners main contention that she was biased against him is
merely grounded on her common law relationship to the brother of the
deceased. Petitioner presented no concrete proof to show her testimony
was biased. We have held that the witness relationship to the victim does
not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. [12] No legal
provision disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying if they
are competent. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and
label Miraflor Salveros testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. This
Court has taken cognizance of the fact that in many instances, crimes are
committed with just the victims kinfolk as witnesses. [13] Note further that the
records are bare of any showing that Miraflor Salvero was motivated by any
ill motive to testify falsely against petitioner. Where there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to
bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime,
his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit. [14] We find no
reason therefore, to disturb the findings of the trial court in which
respondent court concurred, respecting the credibility of prosecution
eyewitness Miraflor Salvero.

On the second issue, petitioner faults respondent court for not

appreciating his claim of incomplete self-defense and defense of a relative,
it having been established during the trial that his brother was the subject of
an attack by Eliseo, Sandra, Paciana, Estela and Roy, all surnamed Diaz,
who were armed with bolos and a wooden club. Furthermore, petitioner
alleges that the court a quo erred when it did not give credence to his claim
of incomplete self-defense, since he was clubbed by the deceased, whom
he had to stab with a knife he picked up from the ground, so as to protect
himself. Petitioner points out that the victim was a drug addict and an ex-
convict, notorious in the neighborhood for violent behavior.

The Solicitor General notes that petitioners stance is not supported by

the records. The prosecution clearly proved that petitioner stabbed the
victim while the latter was running towards his house. Thus, unlawful
aggression was absent on the part of the victim, and this negated
petitioners theory of incomplete self-defense and/or defense of a relative.

In invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, complete or

incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence all the elements of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. [15] The accused must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged
criminal act.[16]

For defense of a relative to be appreciated, the following requisites

must concur: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the
defense took no part therein.[17]

Note that for self-defense or defense of a relative, whether complete or

incomplete, to be appreciated, the requisite of unlawful aggression on the
victims part is indispensable.[18] If there is no unlawful aggression, there is
nothing to prevent or repel.[19]

The records show that petitioner sought to prove the element of

unlawful aggression on the victims part by pointing to the injuries which
said victim had allegedly inflicted upon him. To support this claim, petitioner
presented a medico-legal report prepared by the Assistant City Health
Officer of Dumaguete City, who examined him on August 2, 1989, as well
as the testimony of said examining physician to the effect that:

(Petitioner was) found to be suffering from (1) superficial laceration located

just above the left elbow at the back side with a U-shape(d) opening facing
upward (2) contusion at the same area (3) superficial laceration on the left
forearm (4) contusion located at the right side above the head a little above
the earline. All the injuries were classified as slight physical injuries, and it
(sic) may have been caused by the skin (being) hit with a hard object on
(sic) several blows[20]

The fact that petitioner sustained these injuries does not signify that he
was a victim of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an assault or
attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which
places the defendants life in actual peril. [21] In this case, the superficiality of
the injuries allegedly sustained by petitioner at the hands of the victim is no
indication that his life and limb were in actual peril at the time of the
killing. Note that the examining physician characterized the injuries suffered
by petitioner as slight physical injuries. This clearly shows that petitioners
life could not have been in danger at the time of the killing. Moreover,
petitioner failed to present any other witness to corroborate his claim that
Oliver Diaz was the unlawful aggressor. On the contrary, the positive
testimony of eyewitness Miraflor Salvero points to petitioner as the one who
stabbed the deceased unexpectedly and without provocation.

With respect to petitioners claim of defense of a relative, we quote with

approval, the following findings of the trial court:

[B]oth prosecution and defense are jointly in accord that both the victim
Oliver and accused Lucibar Roca were not part of the initial neighborhood
quarrel, but came from separate directions after the start of the said
quarrel.

From these (sic) joint accord of both parties on some facts and conflicting
points of testimonies of the incident, this Court arrived at these
findings: Accused Lucibar Roca upon arriving [at] the place where the
quarrel took place, participated in the same, but having been hurt in the
melee (not caused by the victim) retreated upon [noticing] his
disadvantageous position, and upon retreating met the unsuspecting victim
Oliver, and stabbed the latter.[22]

The foregoing findings show that the victim was not one of the
assailants of petitioners brother during the affray, which immediately
preceded the stabbing incident. The mere fact that the deceased was a
drug addict and ex-convict given to violent behavior does not justify killing
him. The victim may have been a character in their community, but he was
not one of those responsible for attacking petitioners brother with a deadly
weapon. In view of the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Oliver
Diaz against petitioners brother, petitioner could not claim defense of a
relative when he mortally wounded Oliver. Petitioners attempt to exonerate
himself from the consequences of his act must fail in the absence of the
first element of defense of a relative, namely unlawful aggression on
Olivers part.

On the third issue, petitioner charges the appellate court with reversible
error for failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor. He contends that he gave himself up to the police
before a warrant for his arrest could be issued and his act should therefore
be considered as a voluntary surrender.

The Solicitor General argues that respondent court was correct in

refusing to credit petitioner with voluntary surrender since he did not in fact
do so, but instead he fled to Bais City, where he waited for the police to
fetch him.

For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be

appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply with three
requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself
to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.[23] There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense
concomitant to his capture.[24]

In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts findings that
petitioner fled to Bais City and only decided to have the police fetch
him, four days after the incident, for fear that the victims relatives might
avenge his death. Hence, we agree that there was no voluntary surrender
on his part. We find no reversible error committed by the appellate court in
refusing to credit petitioners claim of voluntary surrender. The records show
that he had several opportunities to surrender to the authorities or to their
agents. He could have given himself up right after the incident by not
fleeing the scene of the crime. He could have surrendered to P/Cpl. Ralph
Rabina, a member of the Intelligence Unit of the Dumaguete City police
force, who was a relative of his wife and who made the request for his
medico-legal examination by the City Health Officer.Petitioner could have
given himself up to the authorities right after his medico-legal examination
considering that the office of the City Health Officer was close to the City
Hall where authorities or their agents were likely to be present. We find that
spontaneity and an intent to surrender are absent where, as in this case,
petitioner only decided to give up for fear of a possible vendetta.

The fourth issue involves the correctness of the penalty imposed upon
petitioner. Petitioner insists that the penalty should be lowered so as to
entitle him to probation. The issue is premised on the consideration that the
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, voluntary surrender,
and plea of guilt would entitle him to a reduction of the penalty imposed. As
earlier discussed, however, the respondent court did not err in refusing to
give credence to petitioners claims of incomplete self-defense and/or
defense of a relative, as well as his allegation of voluntary surrender. We
agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the only mitigating
circumstance in petitioners favor is his offer to plead guilty to homicide at
the pre-trial. This offer was duly considered by the trial court in determining
the imposable penalty and by the appellate court in affirming his
sentence. Petitioners prayer to this Court that he be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correcional as
maximum[25] lacks basis and must be denied.WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 15, 1993 and its resolution of March 21, 1994, in CA-G.R. No.
12317, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under
Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth
Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July
2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her
guilty of seven (7) counts of violation ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation
of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The
accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465
reads as follows:

That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value
to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993
payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Contrary to law.[3]

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of
the checks and dates of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:

Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount

93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00

93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00

93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00

93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00

93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00

93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00

93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty

pleaded not guilty.[5]

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So
Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October
1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of
Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of
Account[7] shows the total liability of the mother in the amount
of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital
from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount
of P418,410.55.[8]The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted
to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein
she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. [9] To assure
payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering
the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they
were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital
due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon
thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered
mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven
(7) Informations subject of the instant case.[10]

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to
issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the
hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room
facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and
subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late
delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and
bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment
of her mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her
mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter
contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the
hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands
of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an
account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers
immediate discharge.[11]

Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the

prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the
case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory
of the defense.[12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered
a Decisionfinding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and
sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven
(7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on
their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-
two (42) months.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the
Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court
erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of
valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account.She protested that
the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without due
regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
 In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of
imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each
case.[15]

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of

involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge
of her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere
act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being
a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.[16]

Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable
consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in
payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]

In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate

court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court
declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22,
the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with
due regard to the protection of the social order.[19]

Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues
raised before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to
the appellate court based on the following grounds:

A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT

PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE
OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS.

B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF

AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.

C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE

OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE
SUBJECT CHECKS.

D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE

CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN
THE ACCOUNT.

E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE

HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED
 CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing

jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though
not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an
ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check
is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same,
regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.[21]

We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys

conviction.

Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect,
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case. [22] Jurisdiction of this Court
over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual
findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings
are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. [23]

In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse

the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this
case. She, however, claims that the issuance of the checks was under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was
no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.

However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a

greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised
involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as
previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the
defense and rendered judgment accordingly.

Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments

unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They
likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below,
rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
 The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable
fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be
resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear
of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. [24]

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of
such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed
to it.[25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones
life or limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be
speculative, fanciful, or remote.[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear
must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. [28] It
must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape.[29]

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition
the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to
the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit
suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so
life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its
alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of
her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts
one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother
might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not
impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or
demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime.She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior
to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or
jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank
and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to
avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of

checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified
that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue
postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big
problem.[31] Besides, apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is
bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was
compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals
demands.

Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of

her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find
application in this case.

We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to

exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought
to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the
one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.[32]

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or

anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. [33] Ty
could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime.By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other
forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the

greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence
or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to
pay her mothers hospital bills.

The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state
of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre
had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was
done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite
clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or
injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.

Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in

the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is
wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the
findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add,
need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not
necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.

As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the

checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was
issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable
Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument
acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for value.[39] In alleging
otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without
consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the
presumption.

A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her

burden of proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to
consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by
the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation
to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract,
such as the maker or indorser.[40]

In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the
facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate
obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by
force of her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging
responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in
favor of the hospital.

Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her
personal obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there
was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.
[41]
tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the
maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him
personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon
a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of
the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or
suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original
obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the
requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave
up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the
appellants.This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. [43] The thrust of the law is
to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.
[44]
As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,[45] what is
primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its
worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of

insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making,

drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds.[46] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. [47]

Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she
did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge
necessarily exonerates her liability.

The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the

drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential
element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof is inconsequential.[48]

In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of

Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction
between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to
persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve
special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of
the law.

Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative

facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant
petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a
warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was
able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate
need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became
an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-
purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit,
since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to
cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.

In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an
actual account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court
and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in
payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.

Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of

imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender
nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,[50] adopting
the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52]authorizes
the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject
to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in
view of Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-
2000. It is stated therein:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not
to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in

the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of
a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does

not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22;
(2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only
a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment.[54]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding
petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to
pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check
subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the
amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing
the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.