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The Review of Metaphysics
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WHO'S AN "IDEALIST"?
H. DARREN HIBBS
(2) Does idealism entail assent to one or more propositions of any sort?
The Review of Metaphysics 58 (March 2005): 561-570. Copyright ? 2005 by The Review of
Metaphysics
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562 H. DARREN HIBBS
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WHO'S AN "IDEALIST"? 563
The antimaterialist thesis (~M) is the denial of M or: the thesis that an
exhaustive inventory of reality includes nothing but entities that are
material, or spatially extended, is false. On this view, idealists are said
to believe that immaterial or nonspatial entities exist, or at least that
materialism provides an incomplete account of the contents of reality.
At first glance, it seems that each idealist above would as
sent to the antimaterialist thesis, but this is not the case. The
problem with the antimaterialist characterization of idealism is
twofold. First, not all philosophers who are traditionally con
sidered idealists would agree with the proposition above.
Kant's version of idealism makes no claims about the status or
content of reality as it is in itself. According to a traditional
reading of Kant, we know that phenomenal reality will include
the appearance of material bodies, but we cannot substantiate
materialist or antimaterialist claims about the noumenal
realm. Thus, on this reading of the Kantian view, one is not
epistemically entitled to assert the falsity (or truth) of materi
alism as a thesis about the ultimate content of reality.
A second difficulty involves the fact that philosophers who
are not typically considered idealists might assent to ~M as
well. For instance, a traditional theist might argue that materi
alism provides the correct analysis of creation (excepting
souls, perhaps) but as a theory it is incomplete or incoherent
without the foundation of theism, or an appeal to mind. A the
ist holding such a view probably considers himself a realist and
would likely scoff at being labeled an idealist because he be
lieves that an adequate explanation of material reality requires
an appeal to a creative mind. But how can this theory be compared
with Berkeleyan idealism? Berkeley rejected both the coherence of
materialist concepts of extramental, material objects and the exist
ence of such objects. For Berkeley, material bodies are merely collec
tions of ideas that are perceived by immaterial minds. Although some
types of theism have been characterized as idealist, it seems clear that
theists who hold a materialist view of nature are deeply opposed to
the essential tenets of immaterialist versions of idealism. Using the
antimaterialist criterion above would result in a classificatory system
that ignores the fact that the only general point of agreement between
the traditional theist and Berkeley is that some notion of God is a
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564 H. DARREN HIBBS
IDEALISM, in its philosophical sense, is the view that mind and spiritual
values are fundamental in the world as a whole.7
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WHO'S AN "IDEALIST"? 565
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566 H. DARREN HIBBS
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WHO'S AN "IDEALIST"? 567
existence. To say that material bodies are feeble entities that rely
upon immaterial objects for their existence is far from asserting the
Berkeleyan notion that material bodies are just collections of ideas in
immaterial minds. Furthermore, Plato ascribes to a theory of forms
that has no correlation in Berkeleyan metaphysics. Thus, the breadth
of philosophical positions that have been characterized as idealist are
so diverse that the term "idealism" alone cannot provide the basis for
a satisfactory classificatory system.
It is my contention that there are two fundamentally op
posed metaphysical traditions in the West that have each been
labeled a type of idealism. The difference between these gen
eral philosophical positions is such that placing each under the
rubric of idealism renders the term "idealism" at best uninfor
mative, and at worst severely misleading. Therefore, a revised
method of categorizing metaphysical doctrines that have been
characterized as types of idealism is needed. I intend to argue for a
method of classification that reflects the philosophical roots of two
metaphysical traditions within idealist thought, which I will call res
idealism and mens-idealism.
The distinction between these two metaphysical traditions cen
ters on the ontological status of material bodies. The mens-idealist ar
gues that material bodies do not exist as extramental realities but only
as phenomena within immaterial mind(s). For the mens-ideaiist, ma
terialist accounts of the physical objects in experience are simply
false; there are no such extramental objects in existence. Immaterial
mind and its contents provide an exhaustive ontological inventory of
the universe. The res-idealist does not argue for the non-existence of
material bodies but claims that material bodies cannot be the only
type of entity in existence. Typically this involves the claim that mate
rial bodies possess extramental existence (at least with respect to fi
nite, or human minds) but something essentially unlike matter must
be responsible for the existence of the physical world.
Now we can determine how this classification works with the
standard idealist philosophical systems. The representatives of the
mens class of idealism include Berkeley and, provided the relevant in
terpretation is adopted, Leibniz and the Absolute Idealists (Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel). Each of these figures has been interpreted as
critics of a materialism that explains extramental bodies in terms of
states of consciousness.
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568 H. DARREN HIBBS
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WHO'S AN "IDEALIST"? 569
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570 H. DARREN HIBBS
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