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**Relations with China and Japan are zero sum plan collapses
credibility with Japan
Pickering 14 Will Japan Become a Nuclear Weapons Power? HEATH PICKERING is
a writer for the E International Relations online database, JUN 29 2014 http://www.e-
ir.info/author/heath-pickering/
US china relations blossomed lots of other relations link uniqueness
The American nuclear security umbrella has influenced Japans decision to continue
its anti-nuclear stance(Hughes 2007, p. 75). The security guarantee is underpinned
by the United States-Japan Security Treaty, which marked its 50th anniversary on 19
January 2010.[4] The benefits of the pact were mutually beneficial: Japan provided
America with the worlds largest unsinkable aircraft carrier for which America could
execute its strategic objectives in East Asia, while America guaranteed Japans
security, allowing Japan to rebuild its economy, access American markets, and keep
defence spending minimal (Packard 2010, p. 96). There are several conceptual
scenarios where Japan might consider establishing their own nuclear weapons
program. While tensions always exist in any bilateral relationship, the alliance is
being bolstered, in part, due to the US pivot to Asia. If the US were to significantly
withdraw from the region, Japan would be inclined to bolster its defence capabilities
and review its overall strategic position. Also, if the US were to heavily reduce its
stockpile, it might put into question Americas ability to effectively protect Japan,
tempting Japan to establish its own weapons program (Deutch 2005, p. 51). In
addition, Hugh White (2011) has suggested that Japans reliance on US security
could become a liability if the US-China relationship blossomed, causing Japans
interests to be sidelined and encouraging Tokyo to increase its strategic position.
The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that
the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of
certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in
a combination of material calculations smaller states' assurance that the expected
costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits
and ideational convictions the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and
norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The
empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the
post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty
about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been
determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its
primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of
regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in
the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy
and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is
still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly
claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized
by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South
Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance
with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major
powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship
with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to
its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater
sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state
in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary
international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining
the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of
the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity
originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to,
US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance
of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the
potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually
identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China
by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American
preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further
explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and
against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic
of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant
state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is
manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical
assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable
hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a
normal country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand
the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to
be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its
remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella
over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat
from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between
them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese
strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with
US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been
to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China,
Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the
growing clout of nationalist hawks in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained normalization process cannot take place outside of
the restraining framework of the United StatesJapan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience
choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United StatesROK alliance may
be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh
argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual
identification in South Korea, the image of the US as the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North, and in the United States, an
image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an evil state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks
(Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States as indicated by domestic
protests and the rejection of TMD and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang,
2003, pp.7980). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The
ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary
concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy.
Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat
would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus,
while the United StatesROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States
as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business
and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis--vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and
political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India
has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the
United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the
agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that
could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the
United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function.
Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to
understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the
hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other
hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep
it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize
China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the
capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China
about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China,
with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to choose sides between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to
explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United
State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order
to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan
and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in
regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied
potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and
why the United StatesChina relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states'
structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese
activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power witness the growing concerns about
Regional
Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests.
attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This
process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of
US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates
in US fears about the region being lost to China, echoing Cold War concerns that
transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security
strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The
strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central,
South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first
threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus,
the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be
persuaded that China can act as a reliable regional stakeholder that will help to buttress regional
stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has
neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese
development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions
cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the
regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of
assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great
powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional
hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is
the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its
primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a
way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian
regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that
could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly
destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan
Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly
destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5.
Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I
have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional
stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region
since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of
the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with
greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order.
Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference
explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However,
the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict
between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a
contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global
security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality
requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails
social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership
position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain
its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be
reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can
Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be
ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian
security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global
leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of
disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of
key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding
analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at
junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which
in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American
geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one
factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if
only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional
challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds
of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to
previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus
over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could
accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia
as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result
of not doing so would appear to be much worse.
Both arms racing and china war are extinction risks dyadic
escalation is extremely unstable
Friedberg 15 Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University, P.H.D. Harvard University, member of the editorial boards of
Joint Forces Quarterly and The Journal of Strategic Studies and a member of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations,
The Debate Over US China Strategy, Survival, June 2015, Vol. 57 Issue 3, p89-110.
22p
An explicit American shift towards offshore balancing would greatly exacerbate
these risks. While it is possible that the prospect of being forced to provide for their
own security would shock at least some current US allies into more vigorous
defence programmes, it would likely demoralise others, creating new opportunities
for Beijing to pursue divide-and-conquer strategems. The advocates of this
approach assume that, even if they cannot balance China alone, in the absence of
full US support other Asian countries will be impelled to cooperate more closely with
one another. Again, this may be easier in theory than it turns out to be in practice.
Some of the states that would have to join in a countervailing coalition (most
notably Japan and South Korea) have long histories of suspicion and animosity.
Others (such as Japan and India) do not, but they also have little experience of close
strategic cooperation of the kind that would be needed to counter a fast-growing
challenge. If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan
and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against Chinese
power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and
reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could
not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its
former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at
which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to
coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains a large
number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea,
Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea
and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to
instability.48
UQ
*Japan alliance Strong
U.S. Japan relations are on the brink Anti-China agenda is key
to holding alliance together
Why is BMD key if we have these joint exercises going on?
Jesse Johnson, 6-18-2016, "Top U.S. diplomat to visit Tokyo for talks with Japan,
India; China likely to be focus of discussions," Japan Times, STAFF WRITER,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/18/national/top-u-s-diplomat-visit-tokyo-
talks-japan-india-china-likely-focus-discussions/#.V2haovkrK5g
A top U.S. diplomat will make a three-day trip to Tokyo starting Sunday for trilateral
talks with India and Japan a meeting likely to touch on maritime security and
cooperation amid Beijings growing assertiveness in the S outh China Sea. Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will visit the capital
through Tuesday, where he will co-host a U.S. delegation with Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal, the U.S. State Department
said in a statement Friday. He will meet both Japanese and Indian government
officials to discuss trilateral cooperation and region-specific issues, the statement
added. These discussions will likely include the disputed South China Sea, where
Beijing has embarked on a massive land-reclamation program that has stoked
concern in the region. On Wednesday, Russel will travel to Osaka for meetings with
Japanese business leaders. Maritime Self-Defense vessels joined a U.S. Navy
aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships from India to jointly practice anti-
submarine warfare, air defense and search-and-rescue drills in the Malabar
exercises one of the largest and most complex drills held by the three countries
in waters east of Okinawa. Defense Ministry officials said Thursday that a Chinese
reconnaissance vessel entered Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea
west of Kuchinoerabu Island in Kagoshima Prefecture around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday.
The incursion was just the second time a Chinese military vessel had entered
Japanese waters since the end of World War II.
the United States is the best guarantor of Japan's security. ISLANDS IN THE SUN Given Japan's pragmatic approach to foreign
policy, it should come as no surprise that the country has reacted cautiously to a changing international environment defined by China's rise. Tokyo has doubled down on its strategy of
deepening its alliance with the United States; sought to strengthen its relations with countries on China's periphery; and pursued closer economic, political, and cultural ties with China
The one development that could unhinge this strategy would be a loss of
itself.
confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios that would test the U.S.-
Japanese alliance; what is difficult to imagine are realistic ones. The exception is the very real danger that the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (known as the
Diaoyu Islands in China), in the East China Sea, might get out of hand, leading to nationalist outbursts in both countries. Beijing and Tokyo would find this tension difficult to contain, and
political leaders on both sides could seek to exploit it to shore up their own popularity. Depending on how events unfolded, the United States could well become caught in the middle,
torn between its obligation to defend Japan and its opposition to actions, both Chinese and Japanese, that could increase the dangers of a military clash. The Japanese government,
which took control of the uninhabited islands in 1895, maintains that its sovereignty over them is incontestable; as a matter of policy, it has refused to acknowledge that there is even a
dispute about the matter. The United States, for its part, recognizes the islands to be under Japanese administrative control but regards the issue of sovereignty as a matter to be
resolved through bilateral negotiations between China and Japan. Article 5 of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, however, commits the United States to "act to meet the common danger"
in the event of "an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan." Washington, in other words, would be obligated to support Tokyo in a conflict
over the islands -- even though it does not recognize Japanese sovereignty there. The distinction between sovereignty and administrative control would matter little so long as a conflict
over the islands were the result of aggression on the part of China. But the most recent flare-up was precipitated not by Chinese but by Japanese actions. In April 2012, Tokyo's
nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara (who resigned six months later to form a new political party), announced plans to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands that were privately owned
and on lease to the central government. He promised to build a harbor and place personnel on the islands, moves he knew would provoke China. Well known for his right-wing views and
anti-China rhetoric, Ishihara hoped to shake the Japanese out of what he saw as their dangerous lethargy regarding the threat from China and challenge their lackadaisical attitude about
developing the necessary military power to contain it. Ishihara never got the islands, but the ploy did work to the extent that it triggered a crisis with China, at great cost to Japan's
national interests. Well aware of the dangers that Ishihara's purchase would have caused, then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda decided to have the central government buy the
islands itself. Since the government already had full control over the islands, ownership represented no substantive change in Tokyo's authority over their use. Purchasing them was the
way to sustain the status quo, or so Noda hoped to convince China. But Beijing responded furiously, denouncing Japan's action as the "nationalization of sacred Chinese land." Across
China, citizens called for the boycott of Japanese goods and took to the streets in often-violent demonstrations. Chinese-Japanese relations hit their lowest point since they were
normalized 40 years ago. Noda, to his credit, looked for ways to defuse the crisis and restore calm between the two countries, but the Chinese would have none of it. Instead, China has
ratcheted up its pressure on Japan, sending patrol ships into the waters around the islands almost every day since the crisis erupted. The United States needs to do two things with
support Japan in a conflict would cause enormous consternation in Tokyo. The Japanese
right would have a field day, exclaiming that the country's reliance on the United States for its security had left it unable to defend its interests. The
Obama administration has wisely reiterated Washington's position that the islands fall within the territory administered by Tokyo and
has reassured the Japanese -- and warned the Chinese -- of its obligation to support Japan under the security treaty.
Yes prolif - Tech
Japan has the plutonium to prolif now
TABUCHIAPRIL 14 Japan Pushes Plan to Stockpile Plutonium, Despite
Proliferation Risks By HIROKO TABUCHIAPRIL 9, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/world/asia/japan-pushes-plan-to-stockpile-
plutonium-despite-proliferation-risks.html?_r=0
TOKYO Just weeks after Japan agreed to give up a cache of weapons-grade
plutonium, the country is set to push ahead with a program that would produce new
stockpiles of the material, creating a proliferation risk for decades to come . Though
that additional plutonium would not be the grade that is most desirable for bombs,
and is therefore less of a threat, it could in knowledgeable hands and with some
work and time be used to make a weapon. The newly created stockpiles would
add to tons of other plutonium already being stored in Japan.
A2 No Prolif - outdated
Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal
politics Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the
capacity, and are bypassing legal restraints
Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security
Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), Out of the Mushroom Clouds
Shadow, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-
obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/]
With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving
its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States
and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments
to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East
Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread ,
especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan
has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency the global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from
uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional
Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil
abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These
attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture
and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and
25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan,
U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities populations. Anti-
nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles
of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of
whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan
and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet,
restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further
reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and
non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders renunciation of nuclear weapons has
never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s
asserted that the weapons would enhance their countrys national security and international
standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw no reason
why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.) After Chinas
first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if the [Chinese] had nuclear
weapons, the Japanese also should have them. He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis
Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did Japan not build atomic
bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952
and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on
nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various
schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson
inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our nuclear
deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. These
reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended
nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara:
The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear
weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of
Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he
convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the
U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, where the two countries foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate
their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international
commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister
Fumio Kishida who hails from Hiroshima renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review
Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes
the reality of atomic bombings. And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its
military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States
that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside
widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in
the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal
would not necessarily violate the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006,
but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its
conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of
Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts
to Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an
advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And
if Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day
it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently
waiting period,
freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile tech nology thanks to its space program,
and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel
more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could
probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to
five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo
fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active
role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the
meetings should expand to include South Korea trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should
continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered
around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense
budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of
U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about
the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of
the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign
policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to
rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter
Chinas rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear
increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial
suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security
necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With Japans nuclear restraint
no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades
ago will become ever more consequential.
A2 Prolif Impact Defense
The reason proliferation is stable is because of alliance
agreements allied proliferation is intrinsically unstable
because it invites preemptive attacks and asymmetrical
escalation ladders
Lanoszka 12 Alexander, Ph.D. in IR, Postdoctoral Fellow Dickey Center for
International Understanding, Dartmouth College, Protection States Trust?:
Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-
Protection-States-Trust-022012.pdf
As doubts over the superpowers commitment
4.3 Nuclear Behavior as Insurance and Bargaining
increase, the secondary state will be more apt to explore military policies that insure against the
effects of patron abandonment. They are more likely to adopt ambiguous nuclear postures or even begin pursuing
their own nuclear weapons program. Having a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a robust insurance policy for
the secondary state. Goldstein (2000) notes that the secondary state is not required to develop
such an extensive and technologically advanced arsenal as those possessed by the US and the
Soviet Union. Rather, it needs to have a sufficient number of weapons that are capable of second-
strike delivery to deter the adversary from launching a direct attack. Indeed, the philosophy guiding the
secondary states approach to deterrence is different from that of their patrons.
Superpowers rely on the threat of controlled escalation in which they proceed 21
through limited but gradually more intense exchanges to communicate their resolve in
inflicting damage. Engaging in controlled escalation requires advanced command and control
systems as well as the ability to absorb nuclear damage . These requirements are especially
demanding for smaller states that are less able to meet them.16 Consequently, such
states opt for a poison pill strategy in which their deterrence policy rests on the
threat of uncontrolled escalation. The high likelihood of both parties losing
control of a nuclear exchange characterizes this form of confrontation. For such an exchange
to occur there needs to be an element of risk that neither side could attenuate (Powell 1987, 719). A states
technological capacity for managing its nuclear weapons poses such a risk if it is involuntarily
underdeveloped and thus prone to accidents and other organizational failures.
These concerns gain significance when it comes to secondary states . Their national
command structures are likely to be small and more concentrated than is the case for
superpowers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, they face a much higher probability of being thrown into
disarray during the conflicts initial stages. Nuclear retaliation, therefore, becomes less inhibited
and results in the infliction of massive damage on the adversary (Goldstein 2000, 47-
51). Backwards inducing from this possibility leads the adversary to refrain from direct military attack on the
secondary states have to
secondary state.17 Such are the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, but
pass through various stages of nuclear development first . Indeed, there is a paradox
underlining nuclear weapons acquisition . As much as having a nuclear arsenal
might engender international stability, the process by which states finally acquire
nuclear weapons generates instability (Sagan and Waltz 1995). Adopting an
ambiguous nuclear posture or pursuing a nuclear weapons program provokes
alarm amongst neighboring states, regardless of whether they are allies. Those
states might be unsettled by the uncertainty of the potential proliferators intentions
and the fear of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail (coercion) in the future. Moreover, though the
secondary state acts to hedge against superpower abandonment in their effort to obtain greater foreign
policy autonomy, they also risk punishment from the superpower for threatening to
undermine its alliance structures.
Yes war
Kroenig 8/16/15 (2015, Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor and
International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown
University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an expert on US national
security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear deterrence, arms
control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. He is the author or
editor of several books, including A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear
Threat (forthcoming 2014) and Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons (2010), which won the International Studies Association
Best Book Award, Honorable Mention. His articles on international politics have
appeared in such publications as American Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Policy, International Organization, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, and The Washington Post. He regularly provides commentary on BBC, CNN,
C-SPAN, NPR, and many other media outlets. From May 2010 to May 2011, he
served as a Special Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, where he worked on defense
policy and strategy for Iran. In 2005, he worked as a strategist in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense where he authored the first-ever, US government strategy for
deterring terrorist networks. For his work, he was awarded the Office of the
Secretary of Defenses Award for Outstanding Achievement. Dr Kroenig regularly
consults with the defense, energy, and intelligence communities. He is a life
member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The History of Proliferation Optimism:
Does It Have a Future?, Taylor and Francis)
proliferation optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear
First and foremost,
deterrence theory. Optimists argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear
war would mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever
choose to start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own
survival and the survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts and
policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully rational.34 Yet,
these debates overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that
nuclear proliferation contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a
situation of MAD among rational states.35 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on
peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.36 Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that some risk of
nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to function. To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner,
Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple
understanding.37 After all,great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons .
And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States
cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to
coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly
threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost
exclusively to answering this question.38 And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to
escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will
spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange.
As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase
in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently
credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of
nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis , as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason
that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a competition in
risk taking. 41 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage
of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the
crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been 20 high stakes nuclear crises
deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The
right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run
against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed
Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that
Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a
crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in
order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal
politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Irans client Hizballah, the US presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other
issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an
attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to
dismiss it out of hand.An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used,
even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive , namely national survival,
to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used . But this objection ignores the fact that
leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also
have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons might be
used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as placing
nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to
low-level commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an
attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists first principles
about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally
opponents.44 Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose
to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context, any sane leader
would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second
scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear
war.45 For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a nuclear-
armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis , while leaving its adversary with enough left to
lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could
choose to launch a nuclear strike on a US military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States
intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back
If launching
down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war.