Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Part 1
Tanada vs Tuvera
Facts:
>Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due
process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law.
>The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon
approval.
>The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The
court ordered the respondents to publish in the official
gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are
of general force and effect.
>The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette.
>In a comment required by the solicitor general, he
claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the
clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the
new civil code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative, that the publication
when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issue:
W/N publication in the Official Gazette is still required
considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise
provided.
Held:
>Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
>Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to
the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides
1 for the date of its effectivity.
>Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality.
RJP Notes
>The law itself makes a list of what should be published
in the Official Gazette. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category.
>Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Umali vs. Estanislao
Facts:
>Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT
ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND
ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO
INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE
POVERTY THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1)
AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
> The said act was signed and approved by the
President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14
January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general
circulation.
>On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.
>On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No.
104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for
mandamus for himself and in behalf all individual Filipino
taxpayers, to COMPEL the respondents to implement
Rep. Act 7167 with respect to taxable income of
individual taxpayers earned or received on or after 1
January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December
1991.
Issue:
W/N Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the
President on 19 December 1991, or on 30 January
1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication
on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation
Held:
>Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, The clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot
in any event be omitted.
>This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on
any other date without its previous publication.
 Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Part 1
>Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.
>Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took
effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15)
days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the
"Malaya."
PNB vs Vega
Facts:
>On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169
providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans
Bank.
>It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24,
1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals
their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement
upon reopening the bank.
>In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of
authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening,
>Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings
of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Issue:
W/N RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
Held:
> Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take
effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective
on said date.
>Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its
effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have
general application thus it took effect on the date
provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the
petitioners.
>The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws
take effect after 15 days following completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has
the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the
clause unless otherwise provided.
Liam Liaw vs Olympic Sawmill
Facts:
2
>On 7 September 1957, Liam Law (plaintiff) loaned
P10,000.00, without interest, to Olympic Sawmill Co.
and Elino Lee Chi, as the latters managing partner
(defendants).
RJP Notes
>The loan became ultimately due on 31 January 1960,
but was not paid on that date, with the debtors asking for
an extension of 3 months, or up to 30 April 1960.
>On 17 March 1960, the parties executed another loan
document. Payment of the P10,000.00 was extended to
30 April 1960,but the obligation was increased by
P6,000 which formed part of the principal obligation to
answer for attorneys fees, legal interest, and other cost
incident thereto to be paid unto the creditor and his
successors in interest upon the termination of this
agreement.
>The defendants again failed to pay their obligation.On
23 September 1960, the plaintiff instituted the collection
case before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
>The defendants admitted the P10,000.00 principal
obligation, but claimed that the additional P6,000.00
constituted usurious interest.
>On 26 June 1961, the Trial Court rendered decision
ordering defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00plus the further sum of P6,000.00. The
defendants appealed before the then court of
Appeals,which endorsed it to the Supreme Court stating
that the issue involved was one of law.
Issue:
W/N Whether the allegation of usury should be made in
writing and under oath, pursuant to Section 9 of the
Usury Law.
Held:
>Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, in regards to the
agreement of the parties relative to the P6,000.00
obligation, "it is presumed that it exists and is lawful,
unless the debtor proves the contrary".
>No evidentiary hearing having been held, it has to be
concluded that defendants had not proven that the
P6,000.00 obligation was illegal. Confirming the Trial
Court's finding, we view the P6,000.00 obligation as
liquidated damages suffered by plaintiff, as of March 17,
1960, representing loss of interest income, attorney's
fees and incidentals.
>The main thrust of defendants' appeal is the allegation
in their Answer that the P6,000.00 constituted usurious
interest. They insist the claim of usury should have been
deemed admitted by plaintiff as it was "not denied
specifically and under oath".
Section 9 of the Usury Law (Act 2655) provided:
SEC. 9. The person or corporation sued shall file its
answer in writing under oath to any complaint brought or
filed against said person or corporation before a
competent court to recover the money or other personal
or real property, seeds or agricultural products, charged
or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. The
 Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Part 1
lack of taking an oath to an answer to a complaint will
mean the admission of the facts contained in the latter.
>The foregoing provision envisages a complaint filed
against an entity which has committed usury, for the
recovery of the usurious interest paid. In that case, if the
entity sued shall not file its answer under oath denying
the allegation of usury, the defendant shall be deemed to
have admitted the usury. The provision does not apply to
a case, as in the present, where it is the defendant, not
the plaintiff, who is alleging usury.
>Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally
non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and
borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards
to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be
considered repealed with retroactive effect.
>Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
... Section 24(d), Republic Act No. 876, known as the
Arbitration Law, which took effect on 19 December 1953,
and may be retroactively applied to the case at bar
because it is procedural in nature. ...
People vs Donato
Facts:
>Private respondent Rodolfo Salas alias Commander
Bilog raised publicly and took arms throughout the
country against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government.
>That from 1970 to the present, the above-named
accused in their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed
organizations (NPA and CPP),in conspiracy with, and in
support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the
forces of the government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, and other acts in the
pursuit of their unlawful purpose.
>In a separate petition for habeas corpus (separate case
GR 76009) for private respondent Salas was filed with
the SC but was dismissed on the basis of the agreement
of the parties under which herein private respondent "will
remain in legal custody and will face trial before the
court having custody over his person" and the warrants
for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and
they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person.
3 distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-
>In his Order of 7 July 1987, public respondent Judge
Donato, taking into consideration Executive Order No.
187, granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed
the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private
respondent the additional condition that he shall report
to the court once every two (2) months within the first
RJP Notes
ten (10) days of every period thereof. (This was
challenged by petitioner by alleging that private
respondent Salas waived his right to bail in the separate
case mentioned above.)
Issue:
Whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged
with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such
right may be waived.
Held:
1. We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot
be denied to the private respondent for he is charged
with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter
of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.However,
under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding
P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on
24October 1990 and which took effect after publication
in at least two newspapers of general circulation,
amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion to
Reclusion Perpetua. However, this amendatory law
cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly
committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him
(a.k.a. no retroactive effect)
2. We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has,
however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
CUSTODY - "Custody" has been held to mean nothing
less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the
"care and possession of a thing or person."When the
parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as
petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall
of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed,
however, "to submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their persons ." Note should be made of
the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine
distinction between legal custody and court having
custody over the person.
 Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Part 1
In respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction
over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine
distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
should remain in custody.
BAIL - In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law
,...
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in
custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The
purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.
RJP Notes
It presupposes that the person applying for it should be
in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
VALIDITY
But, is such waiver valid?
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs,or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.