POLITICAL LAW DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONSTITUTION

Branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation I. As to origin:
of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of - Enacted/Conventional Constitution: enacted by a
the state with the inhabitants of its territory Constitutional Convention.
- Evolutionary / Cumulative Constitution: a product of history
- Fiat / Granted Constitution: made by one sovereign for
Scope of Political Law
another
Constitutional - deals with how to balance with authority on one
hand and rights of individuals. Because this pertains to II. As to form:
government limiting the rights of individuals as recognized by - Written Constitution:
bill of rights and at the same time these rights put a limitation o not because it is in writing
on the powers of the state o all other sources are found in one single instrument
Administrative - deals on how government officials run the o CHARACTERISTICS: broad, brief, definite
government and the extent of the exercise of the powers on - Not Written Constitution
how one branch or one department, bureau or agency or o most sources are written are written but are
instrumentality relates with each other. scattered
Election - which pertain to the election of the representatives o some parts are not written
of the government by the people, the limitation on the conduct o ex. customs and traditions
of election
Law on Public Officers, Law on Public Corporations & Public III. As to the manner of changing the constitution:
International Law - RIGID CONSTITUTION
o difficult to change. Not flexible
o must follow a certain procedure (STAGES): proposal,
CONSTITUTION
submission, ratification
Primary source of understanding of political law
It is the highest fundamental law of the land, upon which all
powers are founded, that would limit, divide, assign the
exercise of the powers.
 A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent (Mary)
FACTS
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon.
Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final
on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was
submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October
23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184
(A - E)
Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (July 31, 1964)
o who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and
his wife Victoria Asuncion
o Asuncions and Galapons conveyed their respective shares
and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries Inc. (Judge Asuncion was the
president)
Macariola then filed an instant complaint against Asuncion (August 9,
1968)
"acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Asuncion in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the
New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce,
Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Dismissed by Judge Jose Nepomuceno (November 2, 1970)
Judge Asuncion be exonerated - After the investigation, report and
recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of CA,
she recommended on her decision (March 27, 1971)
ISSUE
Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals
violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which
he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in
business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a
judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?
DECISION
No.
But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities
Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code Asuncion purchased a portion
of Lot 1184-E was already final because none of the parties therein filed
an appeal within the reglementary period
applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property
lot in question was no longer subject to litigation
Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Galapon who earlier purchased
Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010
Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed abrogated
upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later
on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines
because of change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign
 o whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereignautomatically abrogated
o unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of
the new sovereign
o has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent Asuncion.
Par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 Asuncion cannot also be held liable to
because the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial
office
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics SC stated that respondent
judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that
their interest contravenes it

B1 Revision - overhaul/change philosophy or principles which constitution is founded; Amendment - not change the whole philosophy (By Congress or People)

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Mary)

FACTS o RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative

Atty. Jesus S. Delfin (on 6 Dec 1996) filed with COMELEC a
Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by Peoples Initiative
The COMELEC then, upon its approval,
o set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country,
o caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and
o instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations.
MD Santiago et al (on 18 Dec 1996) filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition & argues that
o the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend
the constitution; can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress and no such law has yet been
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes and on
local legislation.
The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III
Omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
DECISION
Yes, but inadequate.
 Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is
Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative still dependent on Congressional action.
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006
therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right
when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to
enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution
This provision = not self-executory > needs an enabling law to which reads in part:
be passed by Congress
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given
o Bernas: without implementing legislation Section 2, Art
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend
17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
b.2 Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (Psalm)
Facts
This case refers to the application of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
2 bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
MPH matched Renong Berhads bid also with Php 44.00 per share with a managers
check worth Php 33 million as bid security, but GSIS refused to accept both the bid
match and managers check
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court on October 1995, and the court
issued a TRO enjoining GSIS from perfecting and consummating the sale to Renong
Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the case.
MPH invoked Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provided that
in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Issue
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution by rejecting MPH.

Court Decision
Yes. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. For in choosing the awardee GSIS is
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is
complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it
(Judge Bellosillo, ponente)
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision
is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest
the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
The constitution is the fundamental, paramount, and supreme law of the nation. It is
deem written in every statute and contract.
Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the
matching bid of MPH.
 CASE DIGEST

Francisco v. House of Representatives

GR No. 160261 November 10, 2003 (Ralphs Skeleton)

FACTS:

On October 23, 2003 Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix Funtabella filed a second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide on the latter disbursements and
expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fun (JDF). Such impeachment complaint comes after
the first one filed on June 2003 by former President Estrada. Article XI Section 3 Par. 5 of the
1987 constitution provides that no impeachment complaint shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within the period of one year.

The 11th Congress stipulated rules on initiating impeachments pursuant to the aforementioned
article. The 12th Congress revised such rules to stipulate that no impeachment complaints can be
initiated within one year for the initiation of a former complaint.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

11th Congress 12th Congress

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of one (1) year
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as
provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same
official.(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied
ISSUES:

Should the Supreme Court decide on an issue of political nature in reference to the rules
stipulated by congress for their proceedings in the exercise of their power of Judicial Review?

Therefore,

What is Judicial Review and its requisites?

Is there an actual case or controversy?

Are the petitioners actual parties involved in the case at bar?

Was the case ripe for adjudication?

Is there a need for the Supreme Court decide the case at bar?

Issues as in the case itself:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article

XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original

DECISION

1. That the Supreme Court can decide an issue of Political Nature in reference to the rules made
by Congress as to their Impeachment Proceedings provided that the requisites of Judicial Review
are present.

2. The requisites of Judicial Review are the following with each decision included:

2a. That there is an actual case or controversy because the new rules of impeachment
proceedings as drafted by the 12th Congress contravenes the constitutional bar on the filing of
impeachment complaints against a public official within 1 year.
 2b. That the petitioners are actual parties involved in the case because the parties are

1. Taxpayers where an impeachment proceeding involves the use of public funds

2. Citizens

3. Lawyers who are in the legal profession

3. That the case is ripe for adjudication because the impeachment complaints have already been
filed thereby contravening the constitutional provision that no impeachment proceedings against
a public official shall ensue within one year of a former impeachment complaint.

4. That there is a need for the Supreme Court to decide on the case at bar because such case
places the Supreme Court and Congress at ends with each other in terms of separation of powers
as well as on the checks and balances of both branches of government.
 G.R. No. 165109, December 14,2009
MAMBA vs LARA
MAMBA, ET AL. VS. LARA, ET AL. (Mary)
FACTS:
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing
Governor Edgar R. Lara
to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures
Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and
flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor
without cost and commitment
ratified the MOA entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures
Corporation
o that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay
Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the
amount of bonds floated
authorized Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or
agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the
provincial government
o amount not to exceed P500M for the construction and
improvement of his priority projects, including the
construction of the New Cagayan Town Center, to be
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, for
the planning, design, construction and site development of the
town center project
Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N.
Fausto filed a Petition
for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the respondents
The RTC dismissed their petition on the grounds that the
petitioners have no locus standi to file a case (since not party to
the contract)
that the controversy is in the nature of a political question so
court cant take cognizance of it
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers
Whether the controversy is in the nature of a political question
DECISION:
Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers.
No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one.
Ratio Decidendi
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
For a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must be met:
1. public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or
some irregularity is committed
o although the construction of the town center would be
primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which
 respondents insist are not taxpayers money, a government
support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent
for paying the interest of the bonds. The governor
requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an
amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond (first
requisite has been met)
2. the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act
Issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality
o SC: locus standi is a procedural technicality
of the acts complained of
o By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show
direct injury
o In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where
public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the
court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.
A political question is a question of policy
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by
the legislative or the executive branch of the government to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated
calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
wherein there are rights involved which are legally demandable
and enforceable
It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of
justice because its determination would not involve an
encroachment upon the legislative or executive power
o political question refers to the wisdom
o justiciable question refers to the legality of the acts
complained of.
SC found the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial
review
Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear
violations of law by public respondents
overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the
irrevocable assignment of the provincial governments annual regular income, including the
IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the
lack of consultation and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as
well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town centera
So, even if the issues were political in nature > still within their
powers of review under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution
o includes the authority to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government
 GR NO 204819
IMBONG V OCHOA (Mary)
Judicial Review - power of the courts to declare that a law or executive
act is not in accord with the constitution; enforces constitutional
supremacy
FACTS
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law
violates the right to life of the unborn.
violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
violates the right to religious freedom.
violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
violates the right to equal protection of the law.
violates the right to free speech.
void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy
ISSUE
SUBSTANTIAL
Whether RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional
for violating the
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy
DEFINITION OF TERMS FOR DISCUSSION
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites:
there must be an actual case or controversy;
the petitioners must possess locus standi;
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity;
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota (cause of suit
or action) of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount
to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely
a theoretical question or issue.
THERE OUGHT TO BE AN ACTUAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY ADMITTING OF SPECIFIC RELIEF
THROUGH A DECREE CONCLUSIVE IN NATURE, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM AN OPINION ADVISING WHAT THE
LAW WOULD BE UPON A HYPOTHETICAL STATE OF FACTS. COROLLARY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF AN
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY IS THE REQUIREMENT OF RIPENESS. A QUESTION IS RIPE FOR
ADJUDICATION WHEN THE ACT BEING CHALLENGED HAS HAD A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE
INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGING IT. FOR A CASE TO BE CONSIDERED RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION, IT IS A
PREREQUISITE THAT SOMETHING HAS THEN BEEN ACCOMPLISHED OR PERFORMED BY EITHER BRANCH
BEFORE A COURT MAY COME INTO THE PICTURE, AND THE PETITIONER MUST ALLEGE THE EXISTENCE OF
AN IMMEDIATE OR THREATENED INJURY TO HIMSELF AS A RESULT OF THE CHALLENGED ACTION. HE MUST
SHOW THAT HE HAS SUSTAINED OR IS IMMEDIATELY IN DANGER OF SUSTAINING SOME DIRECT INJURY AS
A RESULT OF THE ACT COMPLAINED OF
Locus Standi: or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: Court leans on the doctrine that the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality:
Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute
if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality
o The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a
separability clause in the law
o The valid portion can stand independently as law.
DECISION
Yes. Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy.
WHEN AN ACTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IS SERIOUSLY ALLEGED TO HAVE
INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTION, IT NOT ONLY BECOMES A RIGHT, BUT ALSO A DUTY
OF THE JUDICIARY TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE.
Considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny.
 To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Except these provisions which are unconstitutional
Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they:
o require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and
o allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;
Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service
in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients and contraceptives,
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution
Please refer to posted Nachura reviewer to know more about the
Theory of Judicial Review
This case is 100pages long, kindly double, triple and infinite-check to
validate facts just to make sure na walang labis, walang kulang
Jose Angara v. Electoral Commission (Butch)

During the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Dionisio Mayor and
Miguel Castillo were the candidates running for the position of member of the National
Assembly in the 1st district of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, Jose Angara was proclaimed as the member-elect since he received the
most number of votes.
On November 15, 1935, Angara too his oath of office.
On December 3, 1935 the members of the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which
confirms the election of members of the NA against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
This puts an exclamation point to the winning of Angara.
On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed a Motion of Protest to the Electoral Commission against the
winning of Angara even after the passing of Reolution No. 8 by the National Assembly.
On December 9, 1935, Electoral Commission filed a resolution, par. 6 which states December 9
as the last day for the filing of the protest against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly.
On December 20, Motion to Dismiss the Protest was petitioned by Angara before the
Electoral Commission alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest, alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of
its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed
out of the prescribed period.
The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Electoral Commission.
Ynsua claims that EC proclamation stand and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest. He added that EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

Issues:

a. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over such matter or not.
b. Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Ruling:

There is a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand and the
Electoral Commission on the other.

A. No. When the Judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislative, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial supremacy which properly is
the power of judicial review under the constitution.
 In case of conflicts, the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to decide the
allocation of powers between the several departments is the judicial department.

B. No. Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by Ynsua. It is also decided that
the resolution of the NA cannot toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In the end the writ of prohibition is denied.

c.2 Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 190293, 20 March 2012 (Psalm)
Facts
This case refers to the limitations for the exercise of judicial review
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family
of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In
response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946
declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for
identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President
Arroyo submitted her report to Congress, based on the finding that lawless men have
taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government.
On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the
Presidents action. But two days later, on December 12, 2009, 8 days after declaring
martial law, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Fortun and others challenged the constitutionality of Martial Law in Maguindanao.
Issue
WON the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ
in Maguindanao, render the issues regarding constitutionality moot and academic?
Ruling
Yes. given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and
before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanaos
inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent
of beating a dead horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the
Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the
acts of the Executive or the Legislative department.
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law before the joint houses
of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the
same.
The president and congress act in tandem exercising the power to proclaim
martial law/suspend privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
They exercise power not only sequentially, but in a way, jointly, since, after the
president has initiated the proclamation, only Congress can maintain the same
based on its evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power the president
does not have.
SC must allow congress to exercise its own review power, which is automatic
rather than initiated.
Only when congress defaults in its express duty to defend the constitution
through such review should the Supreme Court step in as final rampart.
Since the president withdrew Martial Law before congress could act, cases
regarding constitutionality are moot and court has nothing to review.
 Two. Since the president withdrew her proclamation of martial law in just 8 days, they
have not been meaningfully implemented.
Military did not take over the operation and control of LGUs in Maguindanao.
President did not take over the operation and control of LGUs in Maguindanao.
President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should
ordinarily be enacted by Congress.
No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported.

In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, 580 SCRA 106 (2009) (Psalm)

Facts
This case refers to the exercise of judicial review
On July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice
Ruben Reyes in the consolidated Limkaichong case which was used by this Court as a
working basis for its deliberations. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit
a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes
immediately circulated the ponencia in the same session.
On July 22, 2008, En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios Reflections (which discussed
the legal basis for the ponencia) which had in the meantime been circulated to the
members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through
and set the date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26,
2008. On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in
the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral
arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, held a press conference and circulated to the media an undated letter
signed by him, together with a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter,
Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the
implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the
promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed
on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court,
the Court investigated the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of
Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal
document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate actions.
And for Biraogo to show cause within ten days from receipt of the resolution, why he
should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the
same together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.
The committee then conducted initial hearings.
Issue
Whether Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is responsible for leaking the unpromulgated ponencia

Court Decision
Yes. The leak came from the office of Justice Reyes. the committee found that based on
the circumstantial evidence, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to
circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the
parties fell due, and to withhold the information that the promulgation of the ponencia
was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after lunch despite his
admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at lunchtime, it was
Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.
The court finds Justice Reyes, together with two others administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct.
The subsequent retirement of a judge from service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he is answerable. The instant case is not moot and
academic, despite Justice Reyes retirement.
The Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and
employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary.

Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (Psalm)

Facts
This case refers to the Courts right to review cases
On June 20, 1991, RA 7056 was enacted for the 1992 National and Local Elections
Gov. Emilio Osmena filed a petition against COMELEC, arguing that RA 7056 was
unconstitutional (Note: no need to read the following subfacts since topic is only about
judicial review)
Republic Act 7056 violates the Constitutions mandate for holding synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution;
The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;
 The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution,
to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible,
resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for
its amendment or revision.
COMELEC questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to review the case for the controversy
was merely a political one, therefore does not fall under courts jurisdiction.

Issues
WON the Court has the right to review the case
WON RA 7056 was unconstitutional (no need to study if it is only about judicial review)

Court Decision
On 1st issue
Yes. What is involved is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056.
Even if it was political in nature, it will still come within the Court, considering the
expanded jurisdiction conferred by Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
includes authority to determine whether grave abuse or discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch.
On 2nd Issue
Yes, it is unconstitutional. RA 7056 contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the
1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections,
by mandating that there be 2 separate elections in 1992.
The term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over
beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of
office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local
election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to
be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the
campaign period.
 SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981 (Mary)
Functions of Judicial Review
1. Checking - invalidating a law or executive act that is found to be
contrary to the constitution
2. Legitimating - upholding the validity of a law which results from a
mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of the law
WHEN THE COURT EXERCISES THIS FUNCTION, IT USES THE DOUBLE NEGATIVE BY DECLARING THAT THE LAW IS
"NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL". THIS IS NO MERE SEMANTICS. THE COURT CANNOT DECLARE THE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL FOR IT ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY, SO THAT A DECLARATION TO
THAT EFFECT BY THE COURT WOULD NOT MAKE IT MORE CONSTITUTIONAL. ON THE OTHER HAND, ANYONE
WHO CHALLENGES THE VALIDITY OF A LAW HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW ITS INVALIDITY. DECLARING
THAT THE LAW IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL IS TANTAMOUNT TO SAYING THAT THE CHALLENGER HAS NOT MET
THE BURDEN REQUIRED.
3. Symbolic - to educate the bench at bar as to the controlling
principles and concepts on matters of great public importance
LEGITIMATING FUNCTION
FACTS
Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting
proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
resolutions (suing as taxpayers)
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to
own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved
by the vote of 122 to 5
Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5
with 1 abstention
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.
The petitioners contend that such resolution is against the constitutions
in proposing amendments:
ISSUE
Whether 1973 constitution is a fundamental law.
Does the Interim Batasang Pambansa have the power to propose
amendments?
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as a
standard for proper submission?
DECISION
Yes, it is.
Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary where they
dismissed the petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification with a vote of 6 to 4, the Supreme Court
said:
o This being the vote of majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new constitution being considered in force
and effect (in force and effect on January 17, 1973)
WITH SUCH THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND WITH THE RECOGNITION
OF THE CARDINAL POSTULATE THAT WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAYS IS NOT ONLY
ENTITLED TO RESPECT BUT MUST ALSO BE OBEYED, A FACTOR FOR INSTABILITY WAS
REMOVED. THEREAFTER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, ALL DOUBTS ARE RESOLVED. THE 1973
CONSTITUTION IS A FUNDAMENTAL LAW.
 Yes, it has.
The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
is indubitable.
o The applicable provision of the 1976 amendment is quite
explicit, which reads:
THE INTERIM BATASANG PAMBANSA SHALL HAVE THE SAME POWERS AND ITS MEMBERS
SHALL HAVE THE SAME FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS AS THE INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE REGULAR NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY AND THE MEMBERS THEREOF.
o One of such powers is precisely that of proposing
amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the
power to propose amendments upon special call by the
Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members
to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments
Majority vote.
It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-
fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies
as well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed.
o not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned
o not a requirement either when Interim Batasang
Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments
o even on the assumption that the requirement of 3/4
votes applies, extraordinary majority was obtained.
RESOLUTION 1 WAS APPROVED BY A VOTE OF 122 TO 5; RESOLUTION 2 WAS APPROVED WITH A VOTE
147 TO 5 WITH 1 ABSTENTION, AND; RESOLUTION 3 WAS APPROVED WITH A VOTE OF 148 TO 2 WITH 1
ABSTENTION. AS TO THE REQUISITE STANDARD FOR A PROPER SUBMISSION, THE QUESTION MAY BE
VIEWED NOT ONLY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE PERIOD THAT MUST ELAPSE BEFORE THE HOLDING
OF THE PLEBISCITE BUT ALSO FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUCH AMENDMENTS HAVING BEEN CALLED TO
THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE SO THAT IT COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY BE MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE
PROPERLY INFORMED AS TO THE PROPOSED CHANGES. AS TO THE PERIOD, THE CONSTITUTION INDICATES
THE WAY THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED. THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISION:
"ANY AMENDMENT TO, OR REVISION OF, THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL BE VALID WHEN RATIFIED BY A
MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD NOT LATER THAN THREE MONTHS
AFTER THE APPROVAL OF SUCH AMENDMENT OR REVISION. THE THREE RESOLUTIONS WERE APPROVED
BY THE INTERIM BATASANG PAMBANSA SITTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON FEBRUARY 5 AND 27,
1981.
The petitions are dismissed for lack of merit
 SALONGA vs PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 (Mary)
UNIDENTIFIED FUNCTION
FACTS:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima
facie (evidence that is correct until proven otherwise) case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents
from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.
Epilogue
Roots back to the rash of bombings in Metro Manila area during
August, September and October of 1980
Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE HAS BEEN SET AT 2:30 OCLOCK
P.M. ON DECEMBER 12, 1980 AND THAT PETITIONER WAS GIVEN TEN (10) DAYS FROM RECEIPT
OF THE CHARGE SHEET AND THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE WITHIN WHICH TO FILE HIS COUNTER-
EVIDENCE.
The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has
not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies
of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint
signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga,
along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended
by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981
counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him
On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City)
denied the motion.
On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including
Salonga.
The resolutions of the said Judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4
January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari.
It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an
information against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still
deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
DECISION
1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus
on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
 opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information
filed under the questioned resolution.
o The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and
the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it
once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
o Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the
filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
o In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
THE FACT THAT THE CASE IS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THIS TRIBUNAL FROM
SETTING FORTH IN LANGUAGE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE, THE OBLIGATION OF FIDELITY ON THE
PART OF LOWER COURT JUDGES TO THE UNEQUIVOCAL COMMAND OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT
EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED.
o In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15,
THE CENTERS NEW CHARTER PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTS LEGISLATIVE POWERS UNDER
MARTIAL LAW. NEVERTHELESS, THE COURT DISCUSSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON THE
PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF FILIPINO CULTURE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY. (ARTICLE XV,
SECTION 9, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION).
o In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183),
THE FACT THAT THE PETITION WAS MOOT AND ACADEMIC DID NOT PREVENT THIS COURT IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS SYMBOLIC FUNCTION FROM PROMULGATING ONE OF THE MOST VOLUMINOUS
DECISIONS EVER PRINTED IN THE REPORTS.
Prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case
against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to
overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive
organization.
o The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the
charges against Salonga.
o The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not
validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against Salonga found in the records.
 G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner (Mary)

CHECKING FUNCTION to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of
FACTS: the winning candidate until further orders.
On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections.
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board
between the two came to a head when several followers of the
of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latters
before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the
men.
petitioner had seasonably made.
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, faced trial for
Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the
these murders.
decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-
Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of
election developments were to run true to form.
Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul
o Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the
the said decision on the basis that it should have been decided by
private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to
COMELEC en banc.
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the
o His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said
And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing
the 1987 Constitution.
that the proclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot
required by the Constitution. and academic.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to
the petitioner being dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
was authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
HELD:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the
office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-
both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient
justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues
involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose
is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant
pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions
but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in
quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always
the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because
the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
Please re-read case. Totally not confident on how this was summarized.
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a
restraint upon the future.
2. No. The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections
2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MAY SIT EN BANC OR IN THREE DIVISIONS. ALL ELECTION CASES MAY BE
HEARD AND DECIDED BY DIVISIONS EXCEPT CONTESTS INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA,
WHICH SHALL BE HEARD AND DECIDED EN BANC. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, ALL ELECTION CASES
SHALL BE DECIDED WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THEIR SUBMISSION FOR DECISION.
Purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by
the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases.
objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act
en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it
might then be too late already
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it
not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and
academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of
the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative
of the Constitution
 ABS- CBN vs. COMELEC, GR 133486, Jan 28, 2000 (Mary)

SYMBOLIC FUNCTION
FACTS
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had occasion to
This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 98-
reiterate that
1419.
"ALSO HAS THE DUTY TO FORMULATE GUIDING AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS,
Petitioner asserts that respondent acted with grave abuse of
DOCTRINES, OR RULES. IT HAS THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION OF EDUCATING BENCH AND BAR ON THE EXTENT OF
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
PROTECTION GIVEN BY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES."7 SINCE THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF SPEECH
approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
AND OF THE PRESS ARE BEING INVOKED HERE, WE HAVE RESOLVED TO SETTLE, FOR THE GUIDANCE OF
petitioner or any other group from conducting exit polls during
POSTERITY, WHETHER THEY LIKEWISE PROTECT THE HOLDING OF EXIT POLLS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF
the May 11 elections.
DATA DERIVED THEREFROM.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and
academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been SC ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
held and done with. glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,
ISSUE when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a
Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case? certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

DECISION The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the COMELEC

en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the
The issue is not totally moot.
election itself
o While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the
o Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on
May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's
May 4, 1998.
fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
o Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a
feature of our democratic government.
swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections.
o By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections.
o Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition
To set aside the resolution of the issue now will
involves transcendental constitutional issues.
only postpone a task that could well crop up
again in future elections. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is
therefore justified.