G.R. No.

L-23718 August 28, 1925

In the matter of estate of Henry w. Elser, deceased.

VICENTE E. REYES, claimnant-appellant,
vs.
C.W. ROSENSTOCK, executor-appelant.

Facts:

The plaintiff obtained a judgment against Henry W. Elser, who was then living, and for
the foreclosure of a certain real mortgage on property in Manila and the sale thereof to satisfy the
judgment. Pending proceedings to appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment, Elser and
Rosenstock was appointed as executor of his estate. Thereafter, the appeal was perfected by him
as executor, and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed by the Sumpreme Court and the
case returned to the court of its origin for further proceedings. Then, execution was issued, and
the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff of Manila at public auction. The sale was duly
confirmed, and no appeal was taken from the order of confirmation.

Thereafter, plaintiff duly applied for obtained a deficiency judgment against the Elser
estate. After obtaining the deficiency judgment, the plaintiff at once applied to the Court of First
Instance for the appointment of a committee on claims to examine and approve his claim against
the Elser estate, of which the defendant was duly notified, and to which he duly objected.

After a hearing the court appointed Jose de Guzman and P.D. Carman as commissioners.

Then the plaintiff, based upon his deficiency judgment, filed with the commissioners his
proof of claim, to which the defendant objected. Later, plaintiff's claim was allowed in full by the
commissioners, as a claim against the Elser estate, to which the defendant excepted.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for a reconsideration, which was denied, and from an
order approving the allowance of the committee on claims, the defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Reyes contended that At all times prior to May 17, 1924, claimant-appellees deficiency
judgment, the laters present claim, was a mere contingent claim. The holder of a contingent
claim is not a creditor and it is not known until the happening of the contingency, that he will
become one; the Code nowhere calls him a "creditor;" he is merely "a person" who has a
contingent claim. It is true that claimant-appellee during all of "the time previously limited" was
a mortgage creditor of the estate, but as such creditor, he elected not to surrender and prove his
claim as he might have done under section 708, or to present the possibility of his requiring a
deficiency judgment, to the committee in the form of a contingent claim. But claimant-appellee,
on August 2, 1924, when he applied to the court to have the committee recommissioned did not
apply as a creditor with a mortgage credit which he had failed to present, but he applied as the
holder of a claim which had been contingent during all of "the time previously limited" and had
not been presented as required by section 746 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and which had
then become absolute, after the expiration of the "time previously limited." There is no remedy in
section 690 for a holder of a contingent claim who has not presented it before the "time
previously limited" has expired. Section 690, as we have seen, is a remedy for a "creditor" of an
estate, who was a creditor before the expiration of the "time previously limited;" but to have been
a creditor, he must have had a claim which he could have presented and proved, before the
committee; moreover, it must have been the same claim which he now seeks to have allowed and
not a mere contingent claim. The holder of a contingent claim is not a creditor. Therefore it must
be concluded that section 690 does not provide for recommissioning the committee to hear a
contingent claim that has become absolute. Provision for that proceeding is made in section 748
of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a jurisdictional fact required by that section is that the
contingent claim must have been presented to the committee before the expiration of the "time
previously limited" and mentioned in the committee's report as provided in section 746 of the
Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim in question is a contingent claim, and that as such it should have
been presented to the original committee on claims of the estate, and that because it was not
presented it is barred.

Ruling:

A "contingent claim" is one which has not accrued, and which is dependent on the
happening of some future event.

A "contingent claim," within the rule that claims against an estate which are not
contingent are barred if not presented within a certain time, is one depending upon something
thereafter to happen. Such a claim is not contingent after the happening of the event.

A "contingent claim," is a claim against a decedent, not absolute or certain, but depending
upon some event after the death of the testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A
subsisting demand against the estate of a deceased person which had matured and was capable of
being enforced during the lifetime of the deceased is not a contingent claim.

Plaintiff's claim comes squarely within the last definition.

Defendant's contention that the claim of the plaintiff is a contingent one is not tenable.

In Hinlo vs. De Leon (18 Phil., 221), this court, on page 230 of the opinion, says:

If there is a judgment for a deficiency, continues the section above quoted, "after the sale
of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the security, he may prove his deficiency judgment, before the
committee against the estate of the deceased. . . ."

In Osorio vs. San Agustin (25 Phil., 404), this court, on page 409 of the opinion, says:.
 . . . . In view of the fact that the plaintiff had elected to abandon the security given him
by his mortgage and to prosecute his claim before the committee, he forfeited his right to
bring an action upon the security in another separate and distinct action. . . .

Merely to avoid possibility of misunderstanding, I think it well to point out that under the
provisions of section 708 of Act No. 190, part of which is quoted in the opinion, it would appear
that in case a creditor elects to rely upon his mortgage he may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon the security by an ordinary action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant; and if there is a judgment for a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged premises or
the other property pledged in the foreclosure or other proceeding, he may prove his deficiency
judgment before the committee and to that amount he may share in the general assets of the
estate of the deceased. In other words, a creditor holding a claim against the deceased person
secured by mortgage or other collateral security may rely upon his security and institute an
ordinary action based thereon without abandoning his right to present his claim to the committee
should the security not be sufficient to pay the debt.

That is this case. The construction for which the defendant contends would nullify the second
provision of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and leave it without any legal force and
effect.The Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:.

Sec. 689. Court to limit time for presenting claims. The court shall allow such time as the
circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present their claims to the committee
for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than twelve months, or
less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The court
may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed
eighteen months..

Sec. 690. When time may be extended. On application of a creditor who has failed to
present his claim, if made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a
committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made
before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on such
terms as are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one
month, for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify
the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of
their doings to the court..

The contention of the defendant that the petitioner was not a creditor within the meaning of
section 690 is not tenable. Petitioner's claim was based upon a judgment rendered in a court of
competent jurisdiction forty-nine days before the death of Elser, and pending the appeal
Rosenstock, as executor, on his own motion, was made defendant as such, and the final judgment
upon which the property was sold was rendered against Rosenstock as executor of the Elser
estate. The defendant has filed an able and exhaustive brief, but has overlooked the fundamental
fact that the original judgment in this case was personally rendered against the deceased while he
was still living.
G.R. No. L-27701 July 21, 1928

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
V. CONCEPCION E HIJOS, INC., and VENANCIO CONCEPCION,
defendants-appellants. HENRY W. ELSER, defendant-appellee.

Facts:

Herein defendants-appellants Hijos, acquired a loan from herein plaintiff-appellant (BPI)

which was secured by mortgage of a parcel of land and several shares of stocks. The former
defaulted payments and the later instituted foreclosure proceedings. Shortly afterwards, the Hijos
entered into negotiations with a certain Henry W. Elser (herein defendant-appellee). The later
sent a letter to the bank signifying his intentions of subrogating in the Hijos obligations with the
bank in exchange for the properties subject of mortgage. BPI did not reply to the letter. The
Hijos and Elser pursued with the negotiation and concluded a deed of purchase and sale of the
subject properties with the transfer of obligations in consideration. Then, Elser sent another letter
indicating the existence of the deed of purchase and sale. BPI never gave any notice of its
conformity but petitioned the court to include Elser as party defendant on the strength of the
obligation assumed by him. The Hijos answered the petition by praying that instead of only
including Elser as defendant, that he becomes a defendant on their place with respect to the
obligations sued upon and asking for the dismissal of the case as to them on the ground. Before
judgment, Elser died. He then was substituted by the administrator of his estate, Rosenstock, who
thereafter became the executor of Elsers estate. Rosenstock filed various amended answers and
cross-complaints rooting mainly on the invalidity of the contract between Elser and the Hijos on
the ground that he was of unsound mind during its execution.

After a lengthy trial, the court rendered decision absolving Elser while ordering the Hijos
to pay their obligation to BPI and providing for sale of the mortgage property in case of non-
payment of judgement. Both the plaintiff and the defendants Concepcion excepted to this
judgment and moved for a new trial on the usual statutory grounds. The motions were denied and
exceptions noted.

Issue:

Whether or not BPI has a valid cause of action against the estate of Elser on the ground of
the deed of purchase and sale between him and the Hijos with regards to the subject project
property.

What is the effect of the transfer of property subject of mortgage to Elser by the Hijos in
terms of the latters liability to BPI?
Ruling:

1. The contract between Elser and the Hijos only affect them being the parties under the
principle of privity of contract. The exception would be pour autrui stipulation
withwhich the said contract had non.

2. The fact the the contrac entails subrogation of obligations would seem to be a
novation of the Hijos obligation towards BPI. However, For a valid novation, the
creditor must duly accept the arrangement. In this case, BPI made no such absolute
acceptance which would validate and effective novation.

3. As to the effect of transfer or the property subject of mortgage to Elser, the Court
ruled that:

The effects of transfer of a mortgaged property to a third person are well

determined by the Civil Code. According to article 1879 of this Code, the creditor
may demand of the third person in possession of the property mortgaged payment
of such part of the debt, as is secured by the property in his possession, in the
manner and form established by law. The Mortgage Law in force at the
promulgation of the Civil Code and referred to in the latter, exacted, among other
conditions, also the circumstance that after judicial or notarial demand, the
original debtor had failed to make payment of the debt at maturity. (Art. 135 of
the Mortgage Law of the Philippines of 1889.) According to this, the obligation of
the new possessor to pay the debt originated from the right of the creditor to
demand payment of him, it being necessary that a demand for payment should
have previously been made upon the debtor and the latter should have failed to
pay. And even if these requirements were complied with, still the third possessor
might abandon the property mortgaged, and in that case it is considered to be in
the possession of the debtor. (Art. 136 of the same law.) This clearly shows that
the spirit of the Civil Code is to let the obligation of the debtor to pay the debt
stand although the property mortgaged to secure payment of said debt may have
been transferred to a third person. While the Mortgage Law of 1893 eliminated
this provisions, it contained nothing indicating any change in the spirit of the law
in this respect. Article 129 of this law, which provides for the substitution of the
debtor by the third person in possession of the property, for the purposes of giving
notice, does not show this change and has reference to a case where the action is
directed only against the property burdened with the mortgage. (Art. 168 of the
Regulation.)

4. Counsel for the appellee also argue that the bank, having failed to present its claim to
the committee on claims and appraisal, it must be regarded as having elected to rely
on its mortgage alone and therefore can have no personal judgement against the Elser
estate. That is good law. Section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
 SEC. 708. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim
against the deceased, secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon
the security and prosecute his claim before the committee, and share in the general
distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon security, by ordinary action in court, making the executor or administrator a
party defendant; and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledge, in the foreclosure or other proceedings to
realize upon the security, he any prove his deficiency judgment before the committee
against the estate of the deceased; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security
alone, and foreclose the same at any time, within the period of statute of limitations,
and in that event he shall not be admitted as an creditor, and shall receive no share in
the distribution of the other assets of the estate;

As will be seen, the mortgagee has the election of one out of three courses: (1) He
may abandon his security and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate,
or (2) he may foreclose, secure a deficiency judgment and prove his deficiency judgment
before the committee, or (3) he may rely upon his security alone, in which case he can
receive no share in the distribution of the assets of the estate.

In this case the bank did not abandon the security and took no steps of any sort
before the committee within the time limit provided by the sections 689 and 690 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The committee ceased to function long ago, and the bank has
now nothing to rely on except the mortgage. Intentionally or not, it has bought itself
within the third course provided for in section 708; it has no alternative.

But counsel for the plaintiff say that the amount of the deficiency, if any, could
not be proved before the foreclosure sale and had been effected; that section 708
expressly provide for the proof of the deficiency judgment before the committee after the
sale of the mortgaged property; that this provisions must be construed to mean that the
presentation and prosecution of the claim of the deficiency must be made after, not
before, the sale; and that if the mortgagee presents his claim from a deficiency before a
deficiency judgment have been rendered, he will lose his rights under the mortgage and
be regarded as having abandon his security.

This clearly a misconception of the statute, and the cases cited by the appellant in
support for its contention are not in point. Until the foreclosure sale is made, the demand
for the payment of deficiency is a contingent claim within the meaning of sections 746,
747, and 748 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which sections reads as follows:

SEC. 746. Claims may be presented to committee. If a person is liable

as surety for the deceased, or has other contingent claims against his estate which
cannot be proved as a debt before the committee, the same may be presented with
the proof, to the committee, who shall state in their report that such claim was
presented to them.
 SEC. 747. Estate to be retained to meet claims. If the court is satisfied
from the report of the committee, or from proofs exhibited to it, that such
contingent claim is valid, it may order the executor or administrator to retains in
his hands sufficient estate to pay such contingent claim, when the same becomes
absolute, or if the estate is insolvent, sufficient to pay a portion equal to the
dividend of the other creditors.

SEC. 748. Claim becoming absolute in two years, how allowed. If such
contingent claims becomes absolute and is presented to the court, or to the
executor or administrator, within two years from the time limited for other
creditors to present their claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by
the executor or administrator, and, if disputed, it may be proved that the
committee already appointed, or before others to be appointed, for the purpose, as
if presented for allowance before the committee had made its report.

These sections are in entire harmony with section 708; the amount of the deficiency
cannot be ascertained or proven until the foreclosure proceedings have terminated, but the claim
for the deficiency must be presented to the committee within the period fixed by sections 689
and 690 of the Code. The committee does not then pass upon the validity of the claim but reports
it to the court. If the court "from the report of the committee" or from "the proofs exhibited to it"
is satisfied that the contingent claim is valid, the executor or administrator may be required to
retain in his possession sufficient assets to pay the claim when it becomes absolute, or enough to
pay the creditor his proportionate share if the assets of the estate are insufficient to pay the debts.
When the contingent claim has become absolute, its amount may be ascertained and established
in the manner indicated by sections 748 and 749. As will be seen, the bank both could and should
have presented its claim to the committee within the time prescribed by the law. The concurring
opinion of Justices Malcolm and Fisher in the case of Jaucian vs. Querol (38 Phil., 707), contains
a very lucid expositions of the law on the subject and further comment is therefore unnecessary.

The appeal is without merit and the judgment of the court below is affirmed with the
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

Comparative Analysis between Reyes vs Rosenstock and BPI vs Hijos

In Reyes vs Rosenstock, the claim against the estate of Elser arose from a judgment
before his death. Thus, such a claim was not considered to be a contingent claim. A "contingent
claim," is a claim against a decedent, not absolute or certain, but depending upon some event
after the death of the testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A subsisting demand
against the estate of a deceased person which had matured and was capable of being enforced
during the lifetime of the deceased is not a contingent claim. A "contingent claim," is a claim
against a decedent, not absolute or certain, but depending upon some event after the death of the
testator or intestate which may or may not happen. A subsisting demand against the estate of a
deceased person which had matured and was capable of being enforced during the lifetime of the
deceased is not a contingent claim.
 In BPI vs Hijos, on the other hand, even if BPI really had no cause of action against the
estate of Elser, the Court explained for the sake of argument the even if there was a course of
action against the estate of Elser as a contingent claim, such claim was not proceeded in due
time. Court explained that a creditor has three courses of actions: (1) He may abandon his
security and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate, or (2) he may foreclose,
secure a deficiency judgment and prove his deficiency judgment before the committee, or (3) he
may rely upon his security alone, in which case he can receive no share in the distribution of the
assets of the estate. In this case the bank did not abandon the security and took no steps of any
sort before the committee within the time limit provided by the sections 689 and 690 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The committee ceased to function long ago, and the bank has now nothing to
rely on except the mortgage. Intentionally or not, it has bought itself within the third course
provided for in section 708; it has no alternative. Hence, BPI can no longer make a claim against
the estate of Elser even if it had a valid claim by virtue of the contract between the Hijos and
Elser.

Unlike the former case, the claim against the estate in the latter case was a contingent
claim and actionable against the estate of the decedent. The only thing is, in the said claim in the
latter case, the credit no longer have the option to because of time limitations.

G.R. No. L-4232 November 7, 1908

FELIX BAUTISTA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AQUILINA TIONGSON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts:

Felix Bautista is the administrator of the estate of the late Ciriaco Tiongson. Aquilina
Tiongson is the sister of Ciriaco. Felix instituted a petition for partition with regards to properties
coinherited by Ciriaco and Aquilina from their father alleging that the Tiongson siblings held the
properties as co-owners pro indiviso. Lower Court order partition.

Issue:

Whether or not an administrator or executor has the right to petition for partition which
the deceased co-owned by the decedent.

Ruling:

The proceedings instituted by Felix Bautista as administrator of the intestate estate of

Ciriaco Tiongson, wherein he asks for the partition of certain lands which the said deceased and
his sister, Aquilina Tiongson, inherited from their late father, Emeterio Singson, and which they
possessed pro indiviso, are governed by sections 181 to 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 No provision of the said sections authorizes an administrator of the property of an
intestate to bring an action demanding the partition of real estate owned pro indiviso by the
deceased, whose property he is administering, and by another person.

In the above cited sections, the law refers to a coparcener, coheir, or other person
interested in the undivided property held, because any one such person is a real party concerned
in the partition. In cases like the present, where the property is held by a person, not as a coheir
but as the exclusive owner, the right of action for partition, which supposes joint ownership and
community of property, pertains only to the heirs of the late Ciriaco Tiongson, not to the
administrator who, when claiming the division of real estate not included in the inventory, or
which he did not take charge of on commencing to exercise office, but which is alleged to belong
to the estate, is not authorized to represent the intestate succession of the property administered
by him; because the latter, as successors to the deceased, are the only parties who may maintain
such an action for partition of real estate held pro indiviso by coheirs or owners in common. The
matter should be decided in accordance with the provisions contained in the first part of the Code
of Civil Procedure.

Only in the event that one of the parties in interest were a minor, could he be represented
by his guardian, tutor or curator ad litem, with the court's approval, to institute an action for the
partition of the property or appear therein, under the provisions of section 195 of the said code.

It is to be noted that in dealing with the partition of property, the law mentions the
personality of the guardian or curator who represents a minor, but no mention is made of the
executor or administrator, inasmuch as the partition of property which, as a matter of fact, does
not form a part of the inheritance, cannot be regulated by the sections of the Code of Civil
Procedure which refer to special proceedings in connection with testate or intestate estates, but
by those of the chapter on partition of real property.

G.R. No. L-7075 March 25, 1912

RODRIGO ALBANO, administrator of the estate of the deceased Silverio

Agtarap, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORNELIO AGTARAP, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants.

Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural, and at his death left four sons, one
of whom, Silverio, died on the 10th of September, 1907.

Upon the death of Silverio Agtarap, his widow, Juana Domingo, began special
proceedings for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband by petitioning for an
administrator and Rodrigo Albano was appointed.

As such administrator Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action improperly entitled "in the
matter of the claim for the widow's legal portion" against the other three heirs of Lucio Agtarap.

The judgment of the court below directs:

 That one-fourth part of this property be delivered to the administrator of the
intestate estate of the late Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that, after proper
proceedings, their respective portion may be adjudicated to the widow and other heirs of
the said Silverio; without special finding as to costs.

Issue:

Whether or not the administrator of the estate of the decedent had the right to pursue the
latters inheritance in order to include such property to his inventory.

Ruling:

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellants.

Comparative Analysis between Bautista vs Tiongson and Albano vs Agtarap

In the first case, the Court ruled that an administrator has no right to petition a partition
regarding a property owned in common by the deceased with other co-owners because the
subject property I not part of the inventory of property of estates. In the second case, however,
the Court allowed the administrator to pursue the inheritance of the decedent. It would seem that
there is identity between both cases and that it would be ridiculous that each case resulted to a
different outcome. However, in my opinion, the difference can be reconciled because, although
the cases seem to be of the same circumstances, I the first case, the property subject of partition
was held by the decedent as co-owner and that the right to move partition is personal to him. In
the second case however, the subject property was never in the possession of the decedent as an
owner or a co-owner so the rules governing co-ownership which does not include administrator
as having legal standing to petition a partition. This difference may have been huge part of the
Courts decision in the second case.

G.R. No. L-29414 July 17, 1928

TEODORICO UY TIOCO, petitioner,

vs.
CARLOS IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and ALEJANDRO M.
PANIS, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of the estate of the deceased
Basilisa Yangco. Before the final settlement of accounts, Panis presented a motion in the probate
proceedings for the allowance of attorney's. The respondent judge, over the objections in writing
presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis.
Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the
sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion
for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until
a few days before the filing of their motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied.
Meanwhile, Bruno, on of the minor sons of the decedent passed away. A certain Atty. Felix
Wijangco, file a motion in the probate proceeding that Brunos share will now go to the father,
herein petitioner, Teodorico Uy Tioco and that that the property involved in the case is
community property in which one-half belongs to the petitioner, hence, the minor Pedro Uy
Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the property pertaining to the estate, and that therefore
his appeal from the order allowing the attorney's fees can only relate to one-fourth of the amount
allowed, wherefore the movant asked that the administrator be ordered to make payments of
three-fourths of the amount within five days from the presentation of the motion. To this motion
the guardian ad litem objected, but under the date of March 6, 1928, the respondent judge
ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of P15,000 within five days. The
administrator refused to make such payment, and on March 17th the court, after citing him to
show cause, again ordered him to pay as provided for in the order of March 6, under penalty of
removal from office.

Issue:

Whether or not it was proper for the respondent judge to grant the enforcement of the
payment of the attorney's fees.

Ruling:
NO, it was not proper to grant the enforcement of the payment of the attorneys fees. The
arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's
fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist
him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for
his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The
liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial
to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment
should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice
prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated the respondent
judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees above-mentioned
until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has
been passed upon by this court or dismissed.
JOSE YNZA vs. HUGO P. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the orders of the CFI of Iloilo, authorizing payment to Atty.
Benjamin Tirol for professional services. Appellant, Ynza, objects to said payment on the ground
that Hugo Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of Julia Ynza, being a member of the bar, he did not
need the assistance of Atty. Tirol, and that, at any rate, the latter had rendered legal services, not
to the estate of Julia Ynza; but to said Hugo Rodriguez in his individual capacity.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Tirol is entitled to payment for services rendered to Rodriguez.

Ruling:

YES. Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications, not as a lawyer, but as
an administrator. He was involved in eight cases, not in his private capacity, but as trustee or
administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza. It is clear therefore that as counsel for Rodriguez in said
cases, Atty. Tirol had rendered services for the benefit of the estate of Julia Ynza.

Comparative Analysis of Uy Tioco vs Emperial and Ynza vs Rodriguez

The common ground of the two cases is that question of attorneys fees