Ethic-s, Rel~tivilinz,dnd the Self 47

paths. What if happiness for thousands can be maximized by infringing on

only one person's freedom? The utilitarian answer is frequently reflected in
social decisions for which it would be uaerly irnpracl.ical to consider &c will
of one person over so many. The Kantian answer is that one is never justified
in acting against the Categorical I~nperativeor in violating a person's will to
ltchicve practical gains, or e m to avoid great h a m . One must choose either
to be a good utilitarian and minimize unhappiness, or to be a good Kantian
and respect free will despite the consequences. Most crucially, one ultimately
decides which choice is morally preferable, in v i m e of the value taken to be
most self-evident at the time.
This conflict illustrates the moral relativist's point, Here are two moral
tkreorics, both of which are internally logically consistent, and both of which
appeal to allegedly self-justifying first principles that often generate mutu-
ally exclusive but allegedly obligatory courses of action.
Much more recently, Bernard Williarns has accounted for this kind of
dilemma in "The Truth in Relati~ism."~ Williams explains the "truth" in rel-
ativism by laying out the parameters of conflict for mutually exclusive ethi-
cal systcms, In short, he saps, there musc be at least two systems of belief,
say, S1 and S2, that are (a) to some extent self-contained and (b) exclusive of
one another. The most straightforward case is one in which S1 and S2 entail
conflicting consequences, C1 and C2, r ~ s p e c t t v c l ~
S1. yields one conse-
quence (e.g., by answering "yes" to a yes/no question), and S2 yields another
(by answering "no" to the same question). Of course, there must be a "vo-
cabulary of appraisat" in order for these systems of belief to be engaged in
such a confrontation, Simply stated, each must know what the other is say-
ing, to be able to disagree. Hence we have the parameters of a system-based
conflict, whereby .fundamentally different belief systems lead to very differ-
ent conclusions about what is, and what is not, obligatory. Finally, it is
worth mentioning that for WilIiams, moral relativism applies only to ethical
confrontations that are "real," or that presmt a reasonable option for "going
over" from one system to another.
What would be the basis for "going over" from one belief system to an-
otberl The a n s w r is sirnpjy that one must be sufficiently persuaded to do
so. The dispute cannot be reasonably settled by appealing to what I have
been calling a "higher" Moral Truth. A person is sufficiently persuaded by
another belief system (or not), depcndirlg on what be or she values.
VVillkms's claim that a confrontation has to be "real" and not just conceiv-
able (or "notional") is open to question, but I think his account of ethical
confrontation is excellent. However, his account of real confrontation be-
twecll exclusive ethical systems does not show that moral relativism is true,
strictly speaking. What Williams has shown is that moral relativism ispiausi-
ble, but no more plausible than another belief system-such as Kantian