Stonehill v.

Diokno
Facts:

Respondents-prosecutors made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against petitioners and their
corporation to search persons and premises of their offices and residences and to seize personal properties such as
books of accounts, financial records, other documents and papers showing all business transactions whether legal
or illegal. The warrants were issued in connection with violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code, but no specific offense was alleged. The petitioners contented that
the warrants were null and void because their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The
petitioners filed to the SC petition for certiorari and injunction but the court issued only a writ of preliminary
injunction as regards the papers, documents and things seized in the residences of the petitioners.

Issues:

1. WON the search warrants were valid.

2. WON the petitioners can validly assail the search and seizure in corporate premises.
3. WON the documents and other effects can be used as evidence.

Ruling:

1. No, the search warrants were not valid. Under the Constitution, no warrant shall be issued upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge and that warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In
the case at bar, the respondents failed to allege in the warrants specific offense violated in the Central Bank
Laws and other laws hence it is possible for the judge to determine probable cause. The search warrants were
also in the form of general warrant because it failed to specify with particularity the things to be seized. Search
warrant authorizing the seizure of documents showing all business transactions, whether legal or illegal is
against the explicit provision of the Constitution. Therefore, the search warrants were invalid.
2. No, the petitioners cannot validly assail search and seizure in corporate premises. The petitioners have no
cause of action because the Corporation has personality distinct and separate from its officers. The legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired. The objection to an unlawful
search is purely personal and cant be availed by third parties. Hence, petitioners as officers of their
corporation cannot assail the validity of the search and seizure conducted in corporation premises on their
individual capacity.
3. No, the documents and other effects cannot be used as evidence. The ruling in Moncado case that illegally
seized documents are admissible as evidence must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the Constitutional provision of unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is
competent evidence to establish probable cause, there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with
the requirements of the Constitution. The only possible explanation for the issuance of warrant is to fish
evidence. Hence, the documents and other effects are inadmissible as evidence.

Borlongan v. Pena
Facts:

Respondent Pena filed a civil case for recovery of agents compensation against Urban Bank and petitioners
Borlongan. The petitioners argued by presenting documents that they did not appoint respondent as agent and it
was Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) that appointed Pena. Pena contested that the documents were falsified and
filed a complaint-affidavit to prosecutors office. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified
and made the MTCC judge to issue warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a motion to quash, recall warrant of arrest
and/or reinvestigation arguing that they were denied due process because they were not given the right to submit
their counter-affidavit. MTCC denied the motion and said that petitioner could no longer question the warrant of
arrest since they already posted bail. Petitioners instituted special civil action to CA but the appellate court
dismissed the case. Hence, the present petition to the SC.
Issues:

Issues:
1. WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to
preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;
2. WON the Information charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were
properly issued; and
3. WON SC can determine probable cause.

Ruling:
1. No, they were not deprived. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, preliminary investigation is required for
an offense with penalty of at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day. In the case at bar, the
petitioners were charged of Art. 172 of RPC (falsification of documents) with penalty of four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court
and preliminary investigation is not mandatory. The prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does
not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable cause. The
prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
2. No, the warrants of arrest should not have been issued due to lack of probable cause. Under the constitution,
the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause. What the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. In the case at
bar, the respondent failed to establish that the alleged documents were falsified hence no probable cause. His
claims were mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
3. Yes, the SC can determine the existence of probable cause. As a general rule, the court does not interfere with
the prosecutors determination of probable cause and also does not review the factual findings of the trial
court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. But under
exceptional cases, court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of
probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect
the orderly administration of justice.

People v. CA
Facts:

Petitioner Danilo Varona, general manager of Varona Trading, sold 27 units of transformers to UP Iloilo but
Varona pulled out the properties for repair due to factory defects. Meanwhile, Varona sold the transformers to
Ruben Siao doe dismantling and conversion according to end-users specifications. UP demanded the return of the
properties but Varona failed to comply which is the reason why UP referred the matter to NBI. NBI was able to
secure a search warrant on the ground of the offense of stolen and embezzled goods and seized the
transformers. Siao filed a motion to quash the search warrant and granted by the RTC. UP filed a criminal
complaint of estafa against Siao and Varona but RTC dismissed the case against Siao because there was no cause of
action to hold him liable. Disagreeing with RTC quashal of search warrant, Varona appealed to CA but the appellate
court sustained the ruling of RTC. Hence, the present petition to the SC.

Issue:
WON there was a valid search warrant.

Ruling:

No, the search warrant was not valid. Under the Constitution, a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Under a jurisprudence (Stonehill v. Diokno), a search warrant
must relate to a specific offense. In the case at bar, the offense alleged was stolen and embezzled goods which is
too broad and may be interpreted as robbery, theft, or estafa. It lacks particularity. Moreover, probable cause no
longer exists due to the dismissal of estafa case against Siao.

Pita v. CA
Facts:

Respondent former Mayor Bagatsing initiated an Anti-Smut Campaign to seize and confiscate from dealers,
distributors, new-stand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, indecent and later burned. The seizure was done without search
warrant and respondent claimed that the confiscation was in the exercise of police power under P.D 960 and
article 201 of RPC. Leo Pita, publisher and co-editor of Pinoy Playboy, one of the publications seized, filed a case
for injunction claiming that the magazine is decent, artistic and not per se obscene. He also contested that the
publication is granted by the Constitution on freedom of speech and press. RTC denied the motion for writ of
preliminary injunction and affirmed by CA. CA stated that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of press is not
without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to
public morals. Hence, the present petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON the searches and seizures were valid.

Ruling:

No, the searches and seizures were not valid. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a
judicial warrant; otherwise they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In the case at bar, the respondent
is not armed with warrant and the confiscation is not among the instances that would yield to warrantless arrest.
The former mayor respondent cannot validly order the raid without lawful search warrant based solely on his
opinion that there was violation of penal laws. It is the judge that should determine the presence of probable
cause and not the executive.

People v. Desmond
Facts:

Virginia De Los Santos-Dio, majority stockholder of H.S Equities, Ltd. and representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd.
invested USD 1,150,000 to the Ocean Adventure project of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI) as
represented by its chairman and CEO, Timothy Desmond. Dio invested another USD 1,000,000 but this time on
behalf of Westale Assets, Inc in a separate business venture called the Miracle Beach Hotel project adjoining the
Ocean Adventure. After sometime, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of USD
5,500,000 inclusive of the value of marine mammals to be used in the Ocean Adventure and also guaranteed
substantial returns on investment. She likewise claimed that SBMEI had no capacity to deliver its guarantees and in
fact SBMEI incurred huge losses, over-valued its marine mammals and without Dios consent, Desmond made a
disbursement out of the special fund devoted only to Miracle Beach expenditure. O these grounds, Dio filed estafa
case against Desmond. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found probable cause but during
the trial in the RTC, the judge ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that there was no probable cause since not
all elements of estafa were present. Consequently, the RTC denied issuance of the warrant of arrest. Respondent
appealed to the CA but the appellate court upheld the ruling of RTC. Hence, the instant petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON there was no probable cause?

Ruling:

There was a probable cause. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judges dismissal of a case must
be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged. In the case at bar, records show that certain essential facts namely (a)
whether Desmond induced Dio to invest and (b) whether Desmond misappropriated the fund in special account
devoted solely to Miracle Beach remain controverted. As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements
of the crime estafa had been established. Hence, this is not a case of a clear absence of probable cause.

The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche v. Fria

Facts:

The Law Firm of Chavez, Miranda and Aseoche filed a criminal complaint before the MTC for the crime of Open
Disobedience against respondent Atty. Fria for her failure to issue writ of execution which is her ministerial duty.
The Law Firm was the counsel of the plaintiff in Civil Case 03-110. The judgment rendered in the said civil case was
favored to the plaintiff and the court ordered the issuance of writ of execution but later the court ruled that it has
no jurisdiction over the civil case hence the order of issuing writ was null and void. In her counter-affidavit, Atty.
Fria argued that the draft writ of execution was not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen, who was
then on leave. She also contended that she did not sign the draft writ since the presiding judge issued an order
stating that he himself will sign and issue the writ. MTC ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by the
Law Firm due to lack of probable cause. According to the MTC, the Law Firm failed to prove the existence of the
other elements of the crime of Open Disobedience, that is there should be a judgment or order of a superior
authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction, after the Court who ruled in the civil case declared to have no
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

WON there was no probable cause?

Ruling:

There was no probable cause. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Also, under a jurisprudence (Los Santos-
Dio v. CA), the Court ruled that a clear-cut case of lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show
uncontroverted and established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the crime charged. In the case at
bar, the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open
Disobedience. The judgment rendered in the Civil case was void hence the element that there should be a
judgment rendered within the jurisdiction of the court was lacking. Hence, there was a clear case of the lack of
probable cause.
Tabajura III v. People
Facts:

Respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable filed 2 criminal complaints against petitioners for the crime of Grave Coercion
and Trespass to Dwelling in the MTC. Petitioner denied the allegation and argued that they went to Daisys house
to thresh out matters regarding some pieces of missing jewelry. Daisy was a former employee of Miladay Jewels
Inc. and was then administratively investigated in connection with the missing jewelries. In fact, information for
estafa was filed against Daisy. Judge Adriatico of the MTC found probable cause for the crime of Grave Coercion
and Trespass to Dwelling and issued a warrant of arrest against Petitioners. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of Mauro De Lara, which was the basis of finding probable cause
and issuance of the warrant, was only hearsay because it was not sworn before the judge and that De Lara did not
personally appear before the judge during the preliminary investigation. The motion was denied by the MTC hence
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC affirmed MTC and also found probable cause.
Petitioners filed petition for review before the CA but the appellate court denied on the ground of wrong mode of
appeal. Hence, the present petition to the SC.

Issues:

1. WON CA erred in denying petition for review.

2. WON the warrant of arrest is valid.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the CA erred in denying the petition. The present controversy involved petitioners sacrosanct right to
liberty, which is protected by the Constitution. No person should be deprived of life, liberty or property
without the due process of law. While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of the courts is a laudable objective,
it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. In the case at bar, the procedural law
states that remedy that should have been made was notice of appeal but it can be set aside if it would impair
a substantial right guaranteed by the Constitution such as the right to liberty.
2. No, the warrant of arrest is not valid. Under the Rules of Court, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he
finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers that a probable cause exists. In the present case, Judge Adriatico gravely
abused his discretion of finding probable cause when he issued warrant of arrest based solely on the
statement of a witness whom he did not personally examine in writing and under oath, neither did he
propound searching questions. Plainly, these fall short of requirements imposed by the Constitution.

Republic Gas Corporation v. Petron Corporation

Facts:

Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell thru LPG dealers association filed to NBI a complaint for illegal trading of
petroleum products against some traders. The NBI agent conducted test-buy operation and confirmed REGASCO as
engaged in refilling and sale of LPG cylinders bearing the registered marks of Petron and Shell without the latter
authority. NBI applied to the RTC for the issuance of search warrant which the latter granted. Subsequently, NBI
lodged a complaint in the DOJ against REGASCO and its officers for the crimes of trademark infringement and
unfair completion and violation of Intellectual Property Code. Meanwhile, Asst. Prosecutor Velasco issued a
resolution dismissing the case on the ground that the evidence was insufficient which was affirmed by the
Secretary of Justice. The Secretary said that the refilling of cylinders is by no mean an offense by itself and it is the
legitimate business of REGASCO. In addition, a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders. There was no evidence that the complaint have been committed by the petitioner officers in their
individual capacity. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the appellate court reversed the
resolution of DOJ. Petitioners then filed the present petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON there was probable cause to hold petitioners liable for the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair
competition.

Ruling:

Yes, there was probable cause. According to the SC, mere unauthorized use of container bearing the registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers can be considered trademark infringement. In the case at bar,
petitioners actually committed trademark infringement when they refilled the cylinders bearing the registered
marks without the respondents consent. Petitioners, being corporate officers and directors, through whose act,
default or omission the corporation commits a crime, are liable for the crime. Being in direct control and
supervision of the management and conduct of the corporation, they must have known or aware of the illegal
practice of trademark infringement.

Luz v. People
Facts:

Alteza, a police traffic enforcer saw the petitioner, Luz, violating a municipal ordinance for not wearing a helmet
while driving a motorcycle. Alteza invited Luz to the sub-station since the place where Alteza flagged down Luz is
almost in front of the said sub-station. While the police officers were issuing a citation ticket for the violation of
the ordinance, Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alteza
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket and they saw plastic sachets suspected to be shabu. Based
on this, petitioner was convicted for the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Petitioner appealed to the CA
but the appellate court affirmed RTC. Hence, the present petition to the SC.

Issue:

1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid.

2. WON the search was valid.

Ruling:

1. No, the warrantless arrest was not valid. Under the law, the general procedure for dealing with traffic violation
is not the arrest but the confiscation of the drivers license. In the case at bar, when Luz was waiting for Alteza
to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on
the part of Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of liberty or take him in custody. Even if we assume that the
petitioner was deemed arrested, still the requirements for valid arrest were not complied with. The Court
has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason of the arrest, their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. In the current case, these
requirements were only complied with after the petitioner has been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
2. No, there was no valid search. Under the law, the following are the instances of valid warrantless search: (1) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless searches; (v) customs search; (VI) a stop and frisk search and (VII) exigent
and emergency circumstances. In the case at bar, the warrantless search did not fall from any of the
circumstances mentioned, hence, the search was invalid.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Mendoza
Facts:

Petitioner NBI applied with RTC - Makati the issuance of a search warrant covering documents and articles found
at the offices of respondent in Makati City for alleged violation of the Securities Regulation Code and estafa under
article 315 of RPC. NBI and SEC searched and seized the described documents and shortly after, they filed a
criminal complaint before the DOJ against the respondents. Mendoza, et al, respondents, filed a petition for
prohibition and injunction before RTC - Muntinlupa. They alleged that after 3 months from the seizure, the
petitioner failed to turn over the articles to RTC - Makati, the issuing court of the warrant, thus violative of Rule
126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures. Simultaneous with the action in RTC - Muntinlupa, Pastrana and Abad,
other respondents, filed with RTC - Makati a motion to quash the subject search warrant. RTC - Muntinlupa
rendered its decision and issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the respondents. Petetioners then filed
to the CA petition for certiorari. During the pendency of the case in CA, RTC - Makati rendered its decision
nullifying the search warrant and declared the evidence as inadmissible as evidence. CA also rendered its decision
and affirmed RTC - Muntinlupa. It also declared that action before RTC - Muntinlupa was proper and distinct from
the action in RTC - Makati.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in holding that RTC - Muntinlupa has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.s injunction.

Ruling:

Yes, the CA erred in holding that RTC - Muntinlupa has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al. Under Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, questions concerning the issuance of search warrant and suppression of evidence seized under
it are matters that can be raised only in the issuing court except when criminal action has already been instituted.
In the case at bar, the action that Mendoza filed with the RTC - Muntinlupa, the objective of which is to prohibit
the government agencies in using the seized items as evidence, is actually an action to suppress their use as
evidence. Consequently, Mendoza should have filed it with RTC - Makati, the issuing court of the warrant. Clearly,
although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or office of Mendoza, they were entitled to
file with RTC - Makati a motion to suppress the use of the seized items as evidence against them.

People vs. Doria

Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police who caught accused Doria red-handed of selling prohibited
drugs and during the operation, the police officers searched for the marked bills that they used in buying said
drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police
officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped
in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this present petition to the SC.

Issue:

WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of
evidence obtained therefrom were valid.

Ruling:
No, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was not lawful. Under the Rules of Court, search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. There was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her
arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. The
marijuana was also not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by
the trial court.

Sabio v. Gordon
Facts:

In 2006, Senator Miriam Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455, directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOM-SAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The resolution was referred to the
respondent Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum requiring the petitioners to appear in the public
hearing scheduled and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Sabio
declined to attend and invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 (the E.O issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino creating the
PGCC). Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 states that no member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance. He argued that the purpose of the investigation was not to aid legislation and cases were already filed
in the court regarding the matter. Despite repetitive invitation and subpoena, Sabio refused to attend hence the
senate issued an arrest order against him for contempt. Chairman Sabio filed with the SC a petition for habeas
corpus against respondents. Sabio with other petitioners also argued that the subpoenae violated their rights to
privacy and against self-incrimination.

Issue:

WON the respondent violated the petitioners right to privacy.

Ruling:

No, there was no violation of the petitioners right to privacy. The Constitution guaranteed the right to privacy
however it is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. In the case at bar, the alleged
anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of
the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and
officers of PHILCOMSAT Holding Corporation, as well as from the Chairman and Commissioners to aid it in crafting
the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination
regarding PCGGs efficacy.

Gamboa v. Chan
Facts:

Former President Arroyo issued A.O 275, creating the Zenarosa Commission, a body tasked to investigate the
existence of private army group (PGAs) within the country. The respondent PNP Ilocos Norte conducted a series
of surveillance and classified petitioner Mayor Gamboa of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, as someone who keeps PGA. The
media also reported the petitioner as a politician maintaining PGA. Petitioner then filed a petition for the issuance
of writ of habeas data contending that her right to privacy was violated by the respondent and her reputation was
maligned and destroyed. The petitioner also contended that the information gathered by the PNP and transmitted
to Zenarosa Commission was unverified. The respondent, in return, alleged that they acted within the bounds of
their mandate and the information stored in their database supposedly pertaining to two criminal cases in which
Gamboa was implicated. The RTC issued a writ but later on the lower court also denied the petition on the ground
that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that subject information originated from the respondent
and that they forwarded this database to Zenarosa Commisison without the benefit of prior verification. Gamboa
then appealed to SC.

Issue:

WON respondent violated the petitioners right to privavcy.

Ruling:

No, the respondent did not violate the petitioners right to privacy. The right to privacy is considered a
fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, as ruled in jurisprudence
(Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks and Sabio v. Gordon), the court underscored that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding state interest. In the case at bar, A.O 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate existence of PGA with ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently as mandated by the Constitution. Pursuant to this, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
Zenarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened Gamboas right to privacy in life, liberty
or security. Gamboa also failed to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PGAs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance.
Hence, it is clear that the states interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa.