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In the graph above, shows the trend in capital expenditures and other infrastructure spending a
percent of GDP. It also shows that around 1950s-1960s public investment was increase up to two percent of
GDP, and since that point on, spending declined dramatically to 1.1 percent of GDP in 1984. Some
advocates argued that shortsighted government policies that allowed the countrys infrastructure to
deteriorate are resulting to the failure to invest in public capital.
Aschauer in 1991 argued that the decline in infrastructure investment was a key factor to the low
performance of the U.S. economy in the last two decades.
Perekonomian
Indonesia
Lana
Soelistianingsih
Zhafirah
N.
Shabrina
Fiscal
Federalism
Journal
Review
Devin
(DV)
1406640985
-
Management
The graph above shows the distribution of spending across: direct federal spending, federal grants to
state and local governments, and spending by state and local governments from their own revenue. It does
clearly suggest that infrastructure is an important fiscal federalism issue. State and local revenues was the
major sources for spending at the major element in infrastructure investment around 1956-1989.
Comparing graph (a) and (b) that placed bellow, both offer perspectives on the distribution of the
responsibility to build public capital. Higher level of government should pay a share of costs of
infrastructure investment equal to external benefits. Hence, the graph (a) and (b) shows an estimation of
implicit value that embedded in fed. Infrastructure programs. In graph (a) clearly explained that the federal
government always been willing to subsidize the public capital than the maintenance of that capital. While
in graph (b) focuses only on grants for capital expenditures since, in graph (a) maintenance and operating
grants were always negligible.
The performance of state and regionals governments rapidly growing through states and suburb and
some cities that strapped has struggled to meet the demands of public goods before it placed. Hence, they
concentrated more on the geographically problem.
Perekonomian
Indonesia
Lana
Soelistianingsih
Zhafirah
N.
Shabrina
Fiscal
Federalism
Journal
Review
Devin
(DV)
1406640985
-
Management
The competition between state and regionals government discourages subnational governments from
making adequate investments in public capital. It actively competes one another to attract more investors
and doing more business. The federal government as the central of all of the regionals governments should
be responsible for providing infrastructure since it is less susceptible to such destructive competition.
Based on Oats and Schwab (1988) two main conclusions, first, if many local governments compete
against one another, then all local taxes become benefit taxes. Second, the outcome definitely would be
efficient.
It is difficult to square theory and actual practice, while the national infrastructure policy is
inconsistent with the principles of fiscal federalism in number of important aspects.
Fiscal Federalism in Europe
There is a great deal of infrastructure investment that is not public, and there is a great deal of
public investment that is not infrastructure investment. (T. Vlil, 2008).
The data above provided by Eurostat, breakdown about the public investment of European countries,
which the variable is the gross capital formation of the government. The aggregations are divided into four
different types that affect the economy through various channels; it seeks to measure public investments.
Investment in public goods affects the economy allocative efficiency indirectly through framework
conditions for productive activity. Redistribution affects the economy's income distribution rather than
allocative or productive efficiency per-se.
The theory of fiscal federalism, doesn't deal directly to the compositions of investment. It
distinguishes between consumption-oriented public expenditure and public expenditure that established to
produce public inputs for the production processes of private firms. Consider various types of public
investment as enhancements of production potential for different public services, hence, investment in
infrastructure will be considered to produce more services and redistribution investment is considered to
produce. And this will help to link the theory of fiscal federalism to the kind of data of the composition of
public investment in Europe.
Fiscal decentralization is measured by two variables, first, the share of tax revenue attributed to sub-
national levels of government. Second, control for investment grants from the central government to sub-
national levels of government; measured in relation to trend GDP. The tax variable reflect the fact that
Perekonomian
Indonesia
Lana
Soelistianingsih
Zhafirah
N.
Shabrina
Fiscal
Federalism
Journal
Review
Devin
(DV)
1406640985
-
Management
investment decisions are often taken a year before and based on knowledge about the revenue situation at
that time, while in contrast, capital transfers are contemporaneous with investment, as they finance
investment the same year it is undertaken (Rodden, 2003). The control variable takes a wider scope to the
general economic, fiscal, and demographic developments of significant determination of public investment.
Table above presents the results of one-step difference-GMM estimation. The Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions is used to determine the instrument set, which includes further lags of the dependent
variable and also three lags of the real GDP and the capital transfers variables. From the table above, we can
understand that there is a possible trade-off between bias and efficiency when the number of moment
conditions is increased with small samples. The choice of a large set of moment conditions is based on the
residual autocorrelation and the sargan test result.
Considering the result in table above concluded that higher sub-national tax share increases the
aggregate level of investment in infrastructure, hospital and school, and public goods. But at the other side,
it has no statistically significant impact on the aggregate public investment in redistribution.
Suggest that this decentralization and this fiscal federalism would increases economically productive
in public investment, in public spillover goods, local public goods, and global public goods.
Decentralization has changes the composition of public investment by reducing the relative share of
redistribution in public investment.