VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.

Complainants, assisted by respondent,elevated the matter to the Court

SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA vs. ATTY. AMADO
R. FOJAS248 SCRA 68 (September 7, 1995)
The Case: Petitioners: The Complainants, former clients of the
respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect
and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual
investigation of this complaint." Attached in their Affidavit of Merit, they
allege that because of the respondents neglect and malpractice of law
that they lost their case to Judge Capulong and their appeal in the Court
of Appeals.
Respondent: The unfavorable judgment by the Regional Trial Court in the
case is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits
of the case. He further claims that the complainants filed this case to
harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main
labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the
dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file
the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that
such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The Antecedent Facts:Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas, and Nordista,
members of Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA), were
alleged to have illegally expelled Paulino Salvador from the union. The
latter filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
which ruled in favor of Salvador. Subsequently, Salvador filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela a complaint against the
complainants for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
of Appeals but affirmed the decision in toto by the RTC.
Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
Ruling: It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility1. Once he agrees to take up the
cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Else wise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.

The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1)
res judicata and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Later, he filed a supplemental
motion to dismiss. Judge Capulong granted the motion but was later re-
instated upon Salvadors motion for reconsideration and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a non extendible period
of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion
having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari. Both petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
were denied, respondent still did not file the complainants answer. The
respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to
stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to
no avail. Thereafter, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Salvador.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD
and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an
attorney-client relationship with her when, before the trial of the case,
she went to defendants counsel, gave him the papers of the case and
other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him
legal fees. That respondents law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written
opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion
was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that
Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney
Francisco's professional services. Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel
for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after.
Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her and defendant.
Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and
Atty. Francisco?
Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not
merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed
either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action
in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as
deeds, bills, contracts and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client
should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional
capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client's
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon,
just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating
his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in
pursuance of a request by the latter.
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to
Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication was
transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if
we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal
and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand
to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client
ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.
An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment
"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the
client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being
retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the
other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the
absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made
nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has
no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services which he has retained him to perform."

Junio v Grupo
Facts:
Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be used in
the redemption of a property in Bohol. For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo
did not redeem the property so the property was forfeited. Because of
this, Junio wanted the money back but Grupo refused to refund. Instead,
Grupo requested that he use the money to help defray his childrens
educational expenses. It was a personal request to which Grupo
executed a PN. He maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were
very close since Junios sisters served as Grupos household helpers for
many years. Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal
services was purely gratuitous or an act of a friend for a friend with
consideration involved. He concluded that there was no atty-client
relationship existing between them.
The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility which forbids
lawyers from borrowing money from their clients. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that he be suspended indefinitely from the
practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.
Held:
Yes. If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an
attorney in his professional capacity and the attorney voluntarily permits
in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation of
master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his influence by not
returning the money. Grupo has committed an act which falls short of
the standard conduct of an attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is
required by law to repay his loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer
whose conduct serves as an example.
*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month and to
pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal rate.
* Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.