Gatchalian Promotions Talent Pool, Inc. vs. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED.

. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of

Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all
Facts: courts of this Decision
The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L. Naldoza for
appealing a decision which is final and executory, deceitfully obtaining $2,555 from the
client allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case, and issuing a spurious receipt to
conceal the illegal act. Respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an
appeal and asserted that it was the latter who initiated the action to delay the
execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two other charges. Trial procedures
were instituted before the IBP.
Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before RTC Makati,
Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in
the amount of $2,555. Having been acquitted in the criminal case, he manifested a
Motion for Dismissal of the IBP case.
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the ground that the
criminal case for estafa is completely different from the proceedings before him.
Acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter. He further noted that
the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it
found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555. He was suspended by the IBP
for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative proceeding since
he was acquitted of the criminal charge.
(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the decision of the
POEA knowing it to be final and executory.

Held:
(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
xxx
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the
trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a
similar finding in the administrative action before this Court.
(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither
has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the
POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence
that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this
Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's failure to
submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this
charge has no leg to stand on.
xxx
TABAS v MANGIBIN
Facts: A deed of mortgage was delivered to Hilda Tabas evidencing a real
property in La Union that was mortgaged to her by Galvan. The deed of mortgage was
registered in the Register of Deeds of La Union. Subsequently, a certain Lilia
Castillejos represented herself as Tabas and appeared before Mangibin, who was a
notary public, and asked the latter to prepare a discharge of the mortgage and to
notarize it afterwards. Mangibin prepared the discharge of real estate mortgage
without asking Castillejos for anything to serve as identification except for a
Community Tax Certificate (CTC). This enabled Galvan to mortgage the property
again, this time to a rural bank Tabas informed Mangibin that her signature in the
questioned discharge of REM was forged but Mangibin did nothing to help. He even
threatened to file a counter suit against her if she files a case against him. Tabas filed
this complaint for disbarment. Mangibin admitted that the discharge of REM was a
forgery but interposed the defense that it was beyond the scope of his duty to
ascertain the identity of persons appearing before him, and that he had no available
means of ascertaining their real identities.
Issue: W/N Mangibin should be held administratively liable for negligence in the
performance of his duty as a notary public to ascertain the identity of the person
appearing before him.
Held: YES, Mangibin was negligent in performing such duty. Notarization is
invested with public interest. It converts a private document into a public one, making
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Such document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the
public must be able to rely upon an acknowledgement by a notary public appended to
a document. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document.
Mangibin should have requested other forms of identification or asked questions to
ascertain her identity. Mangibin violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. His notarial
commission is revoked and he is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2
years.
MELVYN G. GARCIA, v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREO
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015
FACTS: Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo. Garcia alleged that
he married Virginia Alcantara and they had two children. In 1971, he and Virginia
separated. Garcia alleged while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing
complainants children, filed an action for support against him and his sister. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie
Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreo, alleged that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his
previous conviction for homicide and despite the facts that he is only on parole and
that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of
law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Sesbreo alleged that, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the IBP and
Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. Sesbreo alleged that
his sentence was commuted and the phrase with the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty
was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence.
Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED IN A CONVICTION
FOR HOMICIDE.
HELD: YES, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreo be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. xxx Moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full
civil and political rights. There was no mention that the executive clemency was
absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely
commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment the penalty imposed on Sesbreo. Commutation is a mere reduction
of penalty.Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty
for Sesbreos crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced
penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that [i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist.
Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbreo has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional
pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to
those possessing good moral character. A violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer,
including the penalty of disbarment.
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is DISBARRED
AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO. from the practice of law
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
FACTS: Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on
May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple
encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special
Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union
produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court
in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily
was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed
void under Philippine law.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed. On October
31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. CATINDIG AND ATTY. BAYDO SHOULD BE

DISBARRED.

HELD: Only Atty. Catindig should be disbarred. The facts gathered from the evidence
adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.From his own admission, Atty.
Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he
cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still
married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense
of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our
laws on marriage.
With regards to Atty. Baydo, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed
amorous relationship between her and Atty. Catindig. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim were mere allegations, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01,

HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA, namely: ELESEO A. ZAULDA and RODOLFO A.
ZAULDA, Petitioners,
vs.
ISAAC Z. ZAULDA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the February 11, 2011 Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R.
SP No. 05379, dismissing the petition for review of the petitioners, and its March 6,
2012 Resolution,2 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The February
11, 2011 CA Resolution reads:
A perusal of the Petition revealed there were impediments to the Court's subsequent
action thereon:
1. the Petition was not filed in the nick of time inasmuch as the Court could not have
pursued action on or before September 9, 2010 which was supposedly the last day
specified on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review dated August
23, 2010, postmarked August 24, 2010, and received by this Court on September 13,
2010 for the simple reason that this Division apparently received a copy of the Motion
only on September 14, 2010, and the Rollo was forwarded to the Office of the ponente
only on January 5, 2011. Certainly, parties and counsel should not assume that Courts
are bound to grant the time they pray for. By parity of reasoning, a motion that is not
acted upon in due time is deemed denied.
2. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners identity on the attached
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping as required by Section 12, Rule
II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which now requires a photocopy of
petitioners competent evidence of identity.
Accordingly, petitioners Petition for Review dated September 9, 2010 is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.3
[Emphases supplied]
The Antecedents:
The controversy stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession and
declaration of ownership filed by the heirs of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, namely, Eleseo A.
Zaulda and Rodolfo A. Zaulda (petitioners), against respondent Isaac Z. Zaulda
(respondent), before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Banga-Libacao-Madalag,
Banga, Aklan (MCTC).
The complaint4 alleged, among others, that petitioners were the legal heirs of the late
Amada Aguila Zaulda; that the latter was one of the children and legal heirs of the late
Teodulo Aguila and Dorotea Zolina (Spouses Aguila); that they were co-owners of a
parcel of land, Lot 917-M, with an area of 4,263 square meters, situated in Barangay
Guadalupe, Libacao, Aklan; that they acquired the subject property by inheritance
from the Spouses Aguila per Deed of Extra-judicial Partition of Realty, dated
November 2, 1993; that they have been in open, continuous and adverse possession
of the subject property since time immemorial as evidenced by tax declarations for the
years 1945, 1953, 1957, 1980, 1985, and 1990; that sometime in March 2000,
respondent, through force and intimidation, forcibly entered the subject property and,
there and then, cut and took with him bamboos and other forest/agricultural products;
that on March 29, 2000, respondent, together with two (2) other unidentified persons,
forcibly entered the subject property and, with threat and intimidation, constructed and
built a house made of light material; and that petitioners demanded respondent to
vacate and turn over the subject property to them but the latter refused to do so.
In his Answer,5 respondent averred that Erene Aguila Zaula (Erene), his predecessor-
in-interest, was the actual and physical possessor of the subject land; that the property
which the petitioners were claiming was donated to the Municipality of Libacao, Aklan,
for school site purposes; that after the donation, Tax Declaration No. 6636 covering
the said land was cancelled, and a new Tax Declaration No. 8619 in the name of the
Municipality of Libacao was issued and Tax Declaration No. 8618 for the remaining
portion of 3,805 square meters was issued to Spouses Aguila; that in Tax Declaration
No. 8618, it was erroneously entered therein that it contained 14,500 square meters
when it should be only 3,805 square meters; that petitioners caused the survey of the
land and instead of confining themselves to the remaining area of 3,805 square
meters, they included part and portion of the property including the subject land which
was owned by Erene; and that when the heirs of Erene found out that part of their land
was included in the tax declaration issued to spouses Aguila, they filed a protest
before the DENR.
On December 29, 2008, the MCTC rendered judgment,6 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds preponderance of evidence in
favor of plaintiffs (as regards Lots 1, 3 and 6) by:
1. Declaring plaintiffs the lawful owners entitled to possession of the Lots 1, 3 and 6
described in the Commissioners Report and Sketches being part and parcel of
plaintiffs inherited Lot 917;
2. Declaring Lot 1 as the portion owned by the heirs of Amada Zaulda and Lot 3 as the
portion owned by the heirs of Coronacion A. Vidad by virtue of the Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition executed by the heirs of spouses Teodulo and Dorotea Aguila; Lot 6
(portion of the barangay road) as included in plaintiffs inherited Lot 917;
3. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda and intervenors Celedonia Aguila-Villorente
and Danny A. Villorente, their assigns and privies to peacefully deliver possession of
the above-mentioned lots to plaintiffs and/or their representatives;
4. Ordering the defendant Isaac Zaulda to remove the nipa houses he built found on
Lot 3 at his expense.
Further, (with respect to Lots A and B):
5. Declaring Lots A and B described in the Commissioners Sketch found on page 164
of the record, as the combined area of Lot F-39 owned by parties predecessor
Estanislao Aguila covered by tax declaration no. 011-0458 and are therefore co-owned
by his heirs: plaintiffs, defendant, and intervenors included along with the rest of the
children and descendants of Teodulo Aguila, Erene Aguila Zaulda and Jaime Aguila;
6. Ordering all parties to respect the co-ownership among them over Lots A and B until
they execute an agreement of partition into three (3) equal parts representing the
shares of Teodulo, Erene and Jaime.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC), partly modified the
decision of the MCTC and declared respondent as the owner and possessor of lots 1
and 3, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Defendant Isaac Zaulda is declared, as reflected in the Commissioners Sketches
and Reports, dated July 11, 2002 and March 4, 2004, the lawful owner and possessor
of Lot No. 916 (shaded blue) and parts of Lot 1 and 3 (shaded green) as against the
plaintiffs;
2) Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is
affirmed.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Eleseo Zaulda, the lone surviving heir of Amada Aguila-Zaulda, after his co-
heir Rodolfo Zaulda passed away, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. In the assailed resolution, dated February 11,
2011, the CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and for lack of
competent evidence on affiants identity on the attached verification and certification
against forum shopping.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the assailed resolution,
dated March 6, 2012.
Hence, petitioners filed this petition, raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time
despite the motion for extension of time having been timely filed; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or not the
RTC erred in reversing the decision of the MCTC based on erroneous findings of facts
and on mere suppositions and presumptions absent any evidence on the same.
On January 17, 2013, respondent filed his Comment, 9 reiterating that no special and
important reason exists to warrant the Courts review of the assailed CA resolutions,
the same having been issued in accord with law and supported by jurisprudence.
On June 6, 2013, petitioners filed their Reply,10 invoking the relaxation of the strict
application of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. They submit that
the petition should not have been dismissed based on technicalities because the
appeal was instituted in accordance with the rules. They pray that the petition be given
due course as they were deprived of their property without due process of law
considering that the case was not properly ventilated upon, more so that the findings
of fact of MCTC and RTC were different.
The Courts Ruling:
Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file
a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the
clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to
be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x.
Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. [Emphasis supplied]
In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above
quoted provision.
Records show that on March 10, 2010, petitioners timely filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial11 of the RTC decision (dated January 20, 2010,
received by petitioners on February 25, 2010), but the same was denied in the RTC
Order,12 dated August 4, 2010, copy of which was received by petitioners on August
10, 2010. Thus, they had until August 25, 2010 within which to file a petition for review
pursuant to said Section 1, Rule 42.
On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed their Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review before the CA, paying the docket and other lawful fees and deposit for
costs and prayed for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from August 25, 2010 or
until September 9, 2010, within which to file the said petition.
On September 9, 2010, they filed the Petition for Review.13
The Court notes that the petition for review before the CA was filed within the
additional fifteen (15) day period prayed for in their motion for extension of time to file
it, which was filed on time by registered mail. To repeat, the petition was filed on
September 9, 2010, within the fifteen (15) day period requested in their motion for
extension of time to file the petition.
As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which
was filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was
physically in the appellate courts possession long before the CA issued its Resolution
on February 11, 2011, dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. The
record shows that 1] the CA received the motion for extension of time to file petition for
review on September 13, 2010; 2] the CA Division received the motion on September
14, 2010; and 3] the ponentes office received it on January 5, 2011.
Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be attributed at all to the
petitioners. The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the
ponentes office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the
division personnel at the CA. It was the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a
petition just because the motion for extension reached the ponentes office beyond the
last date prayed for. Clearly, the petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their right
to be heard on the merits because of the CAs unreasonable obsession to reduce its
load. In allowing the petitioners to be fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal
attributable to its inept or irresponsible personnel, the CA committed an unfortunate
injustice.
The petitioners could not also be faulted that the motion for extension of time was
received by the CA on September 13, 2010. The rules allow parties to file a pleading
by registered mail.14 They are not required to ensure that it would be received by the
court on or before the last day of the extended period prayed for. Though no party can
assume that its motion for extension would be granted, any denial thereof should be
reasonable.
Granting that the petition was filed late, substantial justice begs that it be allowed and
be given due course. Indeed, the merits of petitioners cause deserve to be passed
upon considering that the findings of the RTC were in complete contrast to the findings
of the MCTC which declared petitioners as the lawful owners entitled to possession of
the lots in question.
In Montajes v. People of the Philippines, 15 petitioner therein, due to erroneous
computation, filed his petition for review before the CA two (2) days after the expiration
of the requested 15-day extension period. The Court held in that case that being a few
days late in the filing of the petition for review did not automatically warrant its
dismissal and where strong considerations of substantial justice were manifest in the
petition, the stringent application of technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction. It found that the circumstances obtaining in that case merited the
liberal application of the rule absent any intention to cause delay.
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification,
records16 show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the
presentation of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec.
12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of
identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport,
drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay certification,
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS)
card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for
the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and
Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19,
2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy
to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the
competent identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For
said reason, there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of
the CA, attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not
required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it. Thus, the CAs dismissal of the petition for
lack of competent evidence on the affiants identity on the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed
required, non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has
been consistently held17 that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance
therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide
an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The
court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may
act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident
that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may
be served. The Court, in Altres v. Empleo, 18 issued guidelines based on previous
jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on,
or submission of a defective, verification as well as on certification against forum
shopping, as follows:
xxx
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.
x x x.19
Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification
requirement, the rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher
objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.20
In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz,21 where the verification was marred only by a
glitch in the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered
view that, in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not
defeat the petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained
by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be
served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal rather than dispose of the case on
ROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
529 SCRA 146 (2007) The Court said no explanation was offered by Atty. Hermenegildo, however, for
turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, Atty. Hermenegildo was
The clerk of court has the duty to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.
public property. Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the
turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of from the records, with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. These
the Regional Trial Court North Cotabato, was administratively charged with grave circumstance are viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle- records, a duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as clerk of court.
subject matter of a criminal case which was placed under his care and custody. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking
The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a sworn affidavit officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and
complaint filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki proper administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police of management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of
Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers. exhibits and public property committed to their charge.
The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes refused to receive it
because it was already cannibalized and unserviceable.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge
Rabang recommended that the administrative complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo
be dismissed because there was no proof of Pentecostes claim that the vehicle was
cannibalized from the time that it was under Atty. Hermenegildos custody until its
transfer to Philippine National Police (PNP) of Kabacan. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct

HELD:
It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and
public property committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991
Manual For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the
2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) which provides all exhibits used as
evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence
shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of
Court.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, Atty.
Hermenegildo was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes
motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that
would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.