On her own.

Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband
[G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and
SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained
the Civil Code provision[4] that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping
the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City [1] to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen
who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to
the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring
Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. [2]Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded
the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen
years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat
the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. [3] The court also found that
the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial
capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not
qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family
Code which states:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child
but her brother and sister.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien husband with a former Filipino
wife seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.[5] Although the wife
in said case was qualified to adopt under Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under Article 185 because he was an alien
ineligible to adopt here in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose.[6] The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it
is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. [7] Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
"Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel R. Due and Alvin
R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law."

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors
Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law.
He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his
wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a
Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him
from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule
that aliens may not adopt.
 FIRST DIVISION
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools.
IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93
ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
LIM, Present:
MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Petitioner. CARPIO,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.
ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty [5] given under Republic Act No.
P. LIM,
Promulgated:
MONINA P. LIM, 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
Petitioner. May 21, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case

The Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and

already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision dated

15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. [7] Michael

Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and
also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. [8] Petitioners husband Olario likewise

Michael Jude P. Lim.

executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

The Facts
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered

as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. [10] The DSWD issued a similar

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo
Certification for Michael.[11]

Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain

Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
The Ruling of the Trial Court
[2]
make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since

Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled

born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185
[4]
1 August 1983.
of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section

7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the

because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial

which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply. courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA

8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
responsibilities. spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
Hence, the present petition. That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
Issue he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
singly adopt.
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4 th) degree
The Courts Ruling of consanguinity or affinity; or

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouses; or
sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance
of his/her financial accountabilities.
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
age of majority. (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

We deny the petition.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
Effects of Adoption
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal

situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. [12]
having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. [13] The father and the mother shall jointly
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. [14] Even the remarriage of the surviving parent
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
of the person or property of the children.[15]
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
of age[16] emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. [17] However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the

application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the
same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To
this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be

except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior

adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent Court.

and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii)

the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. [18] Therefore, even if We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is

emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of

the rights[19] of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the

from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were

parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled [20] such filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

as support[21] and successional rights.[22] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the

child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
SO ORDERED.
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow

childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the

adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to

promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. [23] But, as we have ruled in Republic v.

Vergara:[24]
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the
trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with

her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

 [G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition [1] to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the
petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided
for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for
civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration [5] praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of
adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only
one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the
middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should
be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under
Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and
needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.
This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the
world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. [8] It is both of personal as well as public interest
that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of
surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an
adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be
used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article
176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil
Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of
the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the
child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be
written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child
uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the
mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is
Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory
on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial
or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames
since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the
father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use
their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the
Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should
say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters.
[13]
Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. [16] The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
[24]
18 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for
them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[27]

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right
and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998] year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her
husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V.
Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States
to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking
venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the following
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA reasons:
CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract without the written consent of her
DECISION husband;

ROMERO, J.:
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States and had been transferring from one
place to another to avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the
latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would have to
be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the 3. Her husband had divorced her.
case.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially
of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, [2] in Special
capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children,
that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private
namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3,
respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that
1981.
Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption with a
Clavanos.
dispositive portion reading as follows:
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with
alimony pendente lite[3] with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu [4] which rendered a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony
decision[5] approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted
apart or from bed and board. They further agreed: and approved. These children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and
Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the (1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though they were in fact the
net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City; legitimate children of the petitioners;

(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person or persons, (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,
natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily
requires husbands consent as the parties are by this agreement legally separated; [6]
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration
the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7] purposes.

Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he
SO ORDERED.
divorced his American wife and never remarried.

While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:
month[8] a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another, deposited in the
bank in the name of his children.
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the Clavano family, especially their
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, maternal uncle, petitioner Ronald Clavano.
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of
the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-
 (2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press, real estate business, export
business and gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets
and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed Menchu, approved of the adoption because of
her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she could not provide them a secure and
happy future as she travels a lot.
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they would go to church together
and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos Keith had testified and
expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger ones were observed by the
court to have snuggled close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on a very shaky foundation
because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of his being an improvident father of
his family and an undisguised Lothario. This conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged
paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of comparatively recent dates were attempts at
verisimilitude as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna Marie was dim if not nil because
it was petitioner who devised, engineered and executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe
County court.
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien from the standpoint of Philippine laws and
therefore, how his new attachments and loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open
question.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her Child Study
Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is
commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal.
514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the
parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131
Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170
Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v.
Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St.
Rep. 17.)[9]
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would be in the
best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He
asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because:
(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine
did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by
law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has
been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio,
92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of
the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding
of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is
amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in fact even maintained bank
accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision
in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce
decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child.
Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has
submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the childrens names totalling $2,126.98. The last
remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce
decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a
total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this
date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in default of
the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a
father, contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as follows
Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings, Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
1) 118-606437-4 Oct. 29, 1987
Matewan National Bank of Williamson, West
March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Virginia, U.S.A.
2) 73-166-8 Oct. 26, 1987
Security Pacific National Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
December 31, 1986 2,622.19 U.S.A.
3) 564-146883 Oct. 29, 1987
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph
Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor
himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. The second is an `or account, in the names of Herbert
Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the
funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence `the aim and purpose of
providing for a better future and security of his family.[10]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the decree of legal
separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise
agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United
States was borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioners
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the joint complaint
for divorce.
 Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was belied by the award to
him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate courts findings that as
an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take
away the fact that he is still a father to his children. As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he
had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that
Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7)
kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma
Soco should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose
Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a
witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim
that they could love the children much more than he could.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that the petition
for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly
licensed child placement agency under whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents. (Underscoring supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91 amending Articles
27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling and appropriate
social services from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly licensed
child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-placement agency under
whose care and legal custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents. (Underscoring supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [12] As such, when private respondents filed the
petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the
Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended
by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent
and the latters spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent
of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also
embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the
child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if there are no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
childrens home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or
by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption
shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child [13] or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The
court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is
in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court
declared:
x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed
more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information
to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a
petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give
the court jurisdiction.[14]
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her express consent to this
adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex `A. Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of
age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife
and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE
issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang,
not long after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant. [15]
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner,
sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the
circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence [16] dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only
upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child
may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. [17] This Court is not
expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
[18]
However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of
the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, [20] this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the
trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
that should have elicited a different conclusion[21] on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children,
thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim ones rights or interests. [22] In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.[24] While admittedly,
petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the following
handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to Dear Bert on a C.Westates Carbon
Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been a long time since the last time youve heard from
me excluding that of the phone conversation weve had. She discussed petitioners intention to buy a motorbike
for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be engendered by Keiths use of it. She said that in the
last phone conversation she had with petitioner on the birthday of Ma, she forgot to tell petitioner that Keiths
voice had changed; he had become a bagito or a teen-ager with many fans who sent him Valentines cards.
She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative almost dalaga who could carry on a conversation
with her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de
Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried because
Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told
petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and quite spoiled being the youngest of the children in Lahug.
Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said
so much about the children because they might not have informed petitioner of some happenings and spices
of life about themselves. She said that it was just very exciting to know how theyve grown up and very
pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters. She ended the letter with the hope that
petitioner was at the best of health. After extending her regards to all, she signed her name after the word
Love. This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of a note from Menchu on the left upper
corner. Anna Marie stated that we wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very
excited when petitioner called up last time. She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so
petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she
missed petitioners call because she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner
that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack.
Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner to
be very fatherly about the childrens needs because those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked
for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would incur, she would
replace these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider
shoes.
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be thought of at Xmas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed to Dear Dad. Keith
told his father that they tried to tell their mother to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s)
on June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told
his mother to write petitioner about it and well see what youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates,
nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He
told petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with their mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had
prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00
oclock in the evening. He wished his father luck and the best of health and that they prayed for him and their
other relatives. The letter was ended with Love Keith.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the Christmas card with $40.00,
$30.00 and $30.00 and the card of Joeton with $5.00 inside. He told petitioner the amounts following his
fathers instructions and promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter
directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He informed petitioner of activities during the
Christmas season that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of
his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their
blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine,
who was also smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother was leaving for the United
States on February 5, they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his things and
$200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even when
they would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had
seen him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become very maldita who was not always
satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with Love your son,
Keith. The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box,
socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of of her birthday on January 23 when she
would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun
at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9 although Keiths classes had started on January 6.
They would feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing
them. She signed, Love, Charmaine.
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not been remiss in writing letters
to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed him that
he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in
Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for his reward from
petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told
petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished
him the best. He added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter. She asked for money from
petitioner to buy something for the school and something else. She promised not to spend so much and to
save some. She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said hi! to petitioner. After ending the letter
with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she asked for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing him; that he would like to have
some money but he would save them; that he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not
around; that he would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the official altar boy. He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that he was saving some in the
bank and he was proud because he was the only one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that
Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He
informed petitioner that he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group.
He asked him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that
they could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner
would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to write because he did not want to commit any
mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter
should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and
Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the year 83 written on the upper right hand corner
of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when their Mom was there where
she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree
to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he
would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving stars for
excellence. Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner
would come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January 1986. Keith told his father that
they had received the package that the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He
asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards
that would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already
ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him not to be shy about
it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior
to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. [25] Exhibits 24 to 45
are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts below simply
glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments
between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to
his children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the
courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside the
possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his seeming
steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed
in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keiths testimony was actually the effect of the filing of
the petition for adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his
father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment to the children. This is hardly surprising for,
from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted and
certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their
emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but
come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his
hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court
of Appeals,[26] the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and
market vendor instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with
his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with
him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to
her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award custody of a child to the
natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful
associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not
take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at
her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget
that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a
failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that
they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they
committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who
never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however
unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x.
 In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, [28] the Court stated that (I)n ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the
child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. Thus, in awarding
custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and
welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either
parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. (Italics supplied) [29]
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a
holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual
needs of the child.[30] The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not
only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily
activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioners meager financial support to
ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said courts has
led us to examine why the children were subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that
bound them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the
children was not exactly the paramount consideration that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the country, as she was wont
to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the
adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of
supporting her children.[31] In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the
country for two years and came home twice or three times, [32] thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who
actually left her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when he
went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano family
must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the
prospective adopter should be Anna Maries brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family
decided to devolve the task upon private respondents.[33]
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman, private respondent
Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an
international flight stewardess.[34] Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could take care of the
children while their parents are away,[35] thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the
childrens surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would
be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. [36] To be sure, he also testified that he
wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their
brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from their father.
One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Maries health she was a victim
of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment.However, she herself admitted that her health condition
was not that serious as she could still take care of the children. [37] An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically
care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles [38]- she could not have been employed
if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority
apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that
her children would never be at ease with the wife of their father.[39]
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to the sons of
Wilma Soco.[40] As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being comparatively
conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the
part of a family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court
place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless,
the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion
that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.[41] Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a
bad husband does not necessarily make a bad father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.
[42]
Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a
telegram[43] to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He
traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite
his family once more in the United States.[44]
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement with his wife on the
support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could not have procured
gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioners testimony that he did not receive his share from
the sale of the conjugal home,[45] pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation
case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his family,
particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter,
petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how meager.
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper
context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. [46] The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is
not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child.[47]
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the manifestation/compromise agreement
between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private
respondents counsel,[48] the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the
legal separation was all embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This
conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into
contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the
adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents apparent reliance on
the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioners consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of
necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213
of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the exercise of parental
authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to
his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the childs services and earnings, and the right to
direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. [50]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of which is vested by the
law upon the parents,[51] as
x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and
senses. As regards parental authority, `there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases (a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a personality.[60]
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights
of the Child.[61]
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep
them in their custody and company.[52] (Italics supplied)
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).[62]

As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award
government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particularrelevance to instant case are
was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
the following provisions:
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, [53] there was no factual
finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back recognized in the present Convention.[63]
to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Maries motion for reconsideration thereon. The
Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to
file a contempt charge against them.[54] States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal
relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the childs best interests. [64]
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in
petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of
exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .[65]
parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption.[55] But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in
this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of
petitioners abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the exercise of
facts on record. his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.[66]

As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v. Escao [56] that a
divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is
contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently
remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established customs and tradition of
our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals,[57] a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his
child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their upbringing
and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents;
neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost,
the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a pronounced trend to
place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the
paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on
Intercountry Adoption[58] and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children.[59]
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to
children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child.This is not, however,
to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over
him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be
respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal age while
Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to
lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for
their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for
adoption was filed.[67] Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by
law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following policies in the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were
entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses
registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then
married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they
shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent
given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.

G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano,

Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her
husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner
then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and
granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the
three minor Cang children. The trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives
consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption necessary.

Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a
decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because the findings of the
lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed
without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them