The Socratic Political Theory

You must either persuade [the state] or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it
instructs you to endure (Crito 51.b)

In these few words, Socrates in Crito summarizes his practical political theory, that to the
state is owed complete obedience. Brickhouse and Smith examine this passage with an eye
towards those who would wish to circumvent it by proposing exceptions to its seemingly
authoritarian nature with examples culled from various passages in the early dialogues.

The first, and most prominent, is the hypothetical situation proposed by Socrates in the
Apology, in which he proposes that even if the jury were to acquit him on the one condition that
he cease from his philosophical practices, that he could not obey such an order. Their argument
against this being in conflict with Socrates political views hinges upon the nature of the
hypothetical, namely, that what is being proposed is not a law, but rather a condition of acquittal,
and that what Socrates is demonstrating is that given the choice between death and the
preservation of his life through unjust means, he would choose death. There seems little need to
go much deeper into this example, although Brickhouse and Smith do work through a variety of
permutations on this theme, finding fault with each one.

The second example is the case where Socrates recounts his disregard for what he clearly
perceives as an unjust command by the the Thirty. Here, Brickhouse and Smith dismiss it as a
possible contradiction on the grounds that it would have been clear to all that the Thirty did not
carry legal legitimacy and so Socrates would have been free to ignore their commands where he
perceives them to be immoral. This appears to be a more specious argument than the first, for it
is apparently based on nothing more than the fact that since the Thirty were unpopular with the
democratic forces of Athens, they would naturally not be perceived as legitimate. However, this
is as much an argument from silence as is the one they seek to dismiss, and is not nearly as
uncontroversial as it is portrayed.

None of the contemporaneous sources, no matter how hostile to the rule of the ThirtyIsocrates,
Lysias, Plato, and Xenophondenies the legitimacy of their election.
 The final possible argument against the obvious reading of Socrates political theory is
based on Socrates moral principles, that it is never acceptable to commit an injustice, even in
response to injustice. The question is how then could Socrates consistently follow his political
principles when he as much as admits that there were unjust laws in Athens? (Crito 51.e)
Brickhouse and Smith propose that, just as children and slaves were not considered accountable
for unjust acts in obedience to their respective authorities, neither was the citizen held
responsible for injustices commanded by the state.

Anticipating the objection that this would be the very argument used by those accused of
war crimes, Brickhouse and Smith seek to mitigate the argument by pointing to the contextual
nature of Socrates political theory, that it is Athens laws that are under consideration, and as
such his theory cannot be generalized to other people. (Brickhouse 5.2.7) However, it would
be an odd political theory that could not be generalized, at least to some extent, and one would be
hard pressed to believe that Socrates did not, in fact, think his political theories were not in fact
based on his moral theory, which clearly are general principles. Finally, their attempt to distance
Socrates from justifying war criminals is thoroughly undermined in the very next section when
they put the very same words (only following orders) into the mouth of Socrates and claim that
it has validity as a moral argument.

If we do accept Brickhouse and Smiths argument, that we have no legitimate exemptions

to the Socratic political theory as stated in the Crito, then despite whatever protestations they
might make, we in fact do have an authoritarian Socrates, one who is compelled

to obey the state in all matters, whether just or unjust. That this is not blind
obedience does not improve Socrates position in the least, for then we clearly have an individual
performing actions which he has clearly reasoned out to be unjust, both to himself and to others.
It is not at all clear that such a violation of conscience is superior to unthinking obedience.

It is unfortunate that Brickhouse and Smith felt compelled to spend so much more time
on the first example, although perhaps understandable considering the attention the acquittal
hypothesis has received, since upon reflection, this was clearly the easiest of the three objections
to address. I fear that by being distracted by the acquittal hypothesis, they failed to adequately
address the weightier objections which followed. The question of Socrates and the Thirty does
not seem to be clearly answered to me, and yet I do feel that in the end, they have made a strong
argument for understanding Socrates political theory precisely as it is stated in the Crito. Their
attempts to ameliorate the impact of this theory on our moral sensibilities is far less successful,
however, and more attention should surely have been paid towards rehabilitating Socrates from
the uglier potential consequences of the theory.