SAFETY OF PASSENGERS

HERMINIO L. NOCUM vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY

G.R. No. L-23733. October 31, 1969
BARREDO, J.
FACTS: Appellee (Nocum), who was a passenger in appellant's (Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co.) Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay,
Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a
box, loaded in said bus. A total of 37 passengers were injured.
The bus conductor testified that the box belonged to a passenger whose name he
does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items and clothes.
He also said that from its appearance there was no indication at all that the contents
were explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he just relied on
the word of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista added that they were not authorized to open the
baggages of passengers because instruction from the management was to call the
police if there were packages containing articles which were against regulations.
The trial court's decision is that appellant(LTBC) did not observe the extraordinary or
utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the articles 1733, 1755, &
1756 of the Civil Code. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
HELD: NO. We are not convinced that the exacting criterion of said provisions has not
been met by appellant in the circumstances of this particular case.
Article 1755 provides: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the
passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which
they had no control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor,
fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be
presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and
limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must
be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to
any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be
verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being
transgressed.

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Since We hold that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of
negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of
its passengers, "according to the circumstances of the (each) case", We deem it
unnecessary to rule whether or not there was any fortuitous event in this case.
The appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is dismissed.

Mecenas v. CA
Facts:
On April 22, 1980, two vessels, Tacloban City and Don Juan collided at the Talbas
Strait within the vicinity of Mindoro. M/V Don Juan sank and hundreds of passengers
died. Among them were petitioners parents, whose bodies were never recovered.
Petitioners filed a complaint seeking damages against Negros Navigation. The trial
court awarded P400,000, but the Court of Appeals reduced the award to P100,000.

Issue:

Whether the reduction of the award was properly ruled upon by the Court of Appeals

Held:

No. In an action based upon a breach of the contract of carriage, the carrier under our
civil law is liable for the death of passengers arising from the negligence or wilful act
of the carrier's employees although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or even in violation of the instructions of the carrier, which
liability may include liability for moral damages. It follows that petitioners would be
entitled to moral damages so long as the collision with the "Tacloban City" and the
sinking of the "Don Juan" were caused or attended by negligence on the part of
private respondents.

Whether petitioners are entitled to exemplary damages as claimed must depend upon
whether or not private respondents acted recklessly, that is, with gross negligence.
We believe that the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in this instance
playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision" constitutes behaviour that
is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives
and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted.
There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she
had been certified as allowed to carry. We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and
Negros Navigation are properly held liable for gross negligence. We find no necessity
for passing upon the degree of negligence or culpability properly attributable to PNOC

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and PNOC Shipping or the master of the "Tacloban City," since they were never
impleaded here.

Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape
behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative
incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In requiring compliance with the
standard of extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in fact that of the highest
possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a presumption of
negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to
tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human
beings and their property. Both the demands of substantial justice and the imperious
requirements of public policy compel us to the conclusion that the trial court's implicit
award of moral and exemplary damages was erroneously deleted and must be
restored and augmented and brought more nearly to the level required by public
policy and substantial justice.

Negros Navigation VS Court of Appeals

(GR NO. 110398) 7 November 1997

Petition: Review for certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the Regional Trial Courts award of damages to private respondents for
the death of relatives which resulted from the sinking of petitioners passenger sea
vessel.
Petitioner: Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Ramon Miranda, Sps. Ricardo and Virginia de la
Victoria.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Pertinent Principle/Concept of StatCon: Stare Decisis

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1980, Ramon Miranda, one of the private respondents in this case
purchased four special tickets (Numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) from the
petitioner for his wife, children and niece who were then bound to leave for Bacolod
City to attend a family reunion.

On 22 April 1980, private respondents aforementioned relatives boarded M/V Don

Juan of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., that was leaving Manila at 1:00 PM. As expected,
said vessel sailed on time. However, on the evening of 22 April, petitioners vessel
collided with the M/T Tacloban City- an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC).
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Obviously, several passengers perished in the sea tragedy. Some bodies were found,
and some, including the relatives of private respondents were never found.

Knowing the ill-fate of the M/V Don Juan, private respondents, namely Garcia and Sps
de la Victoria filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the PNOC, and the
PNOC/STC. Private respondents sought for damages for the death of their relatives
namely Ardita de la Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon Miranda Jr., and Elfreda de la
Victoria.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents, and asked
petitioners, including PNOC and PNOC/STC to pay the moral damages sought by
Garcia and Sps. de la Victoria. And upon review by the Court Appeals, the appellate
court affirmed the RTCs decision with several modification.

ISSUES:

Several issues were raised in this case. However, for the sake of having a discourse on
the abovementioned principle/concept of Statutory Construction, we shall focus on
the issue of whether or not the ruling in the Mecenas VS CA, finding the crew
members of petitioners to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duty, is
binding in this case.
HELD:

Yes. The courts adherence to the Mecenas Case is dictated by the principle of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled).

The petitioners assail the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas Case, arguing
that although the same case arose out of the same incident as that involved in the
Mecenas, THE PARTIES ARE DIFFERENT AND TRIALS WERE CONDUCTED SEPARATELY.
Furthermore they contend that the decision in this case must be based on the
allegations, the defenses pleaded and evidence adduced stated on the records of the
case.

The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The Supreme Court stated that although
the merits of the individual claims against the petitioner are different in both cases,
there remains a similarity which is material in the decision of the court vis--vis the
case at hand, i.e. the cause of the sinking of its ship on 22 April 1980 and the
liabilities (of petitioner) for such accident.

DOCTRINE
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 STARE DECISIS
o Stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not
disturbed what has been settled).
o Under the principle of Stare Decisis, it is required that past decisions of the
court be followed in the adjudication of cases.
o A ruling of the supreme court as to the construction of a law should be followed
in subsequent cases INVOLVING SIMILAR QUESTIONS.
o The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which
it is applied are substantially the same. If facts are dissimilar, then the
aforementioned principle does not apply.
o Purpose of this principle is to have stability in the law.

The doctrine of stare decisis applies in this case. It is a rule that a ruling of the court
as to the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent cases INVOLVING
SIMILAR QUESTIONS. Although the personal circumstances and claims of Mecenas,
and Miranda and de la Victoria are different as contended by the petitioner, the two
cases raised similar question/issue, i.e. on the damages for which the petitioner was
liable due to the sinking of its ship.

Korean Airlines v. CA
Facts:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was
initially listed as a chance passenger. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check
in and was cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a
KAL officer pointed at him and shouted, Down! Down! and he was barred from
taking the flight. When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was
unable to report for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent
of Pan Pacific was informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority
to Perico, while the other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1
seat became available, it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for
damages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with modification on the
damages awarded.

Issues:
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(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold
KAL liable for breach of contract

(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to what extent

Held:

(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees
toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. The
breach of contract was aggravated in this case when, instead of courteously
informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted
"Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him embarrassment and public
humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in at
the departure counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle
bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage had already
been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of carriage
between him and KAL had already been perfected when he was summarily and
insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:

a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed breach
of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-appellant's
rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped off"
plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely and
arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines," which
clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to moral
damages.

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c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been
fully established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so expressly
pleaded in the complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for the public
good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is not so
serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of
P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and
realistic.

Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a

minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a
snapping sound was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement
flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the
hospital, and their bills were paid by respondents spouse on July 14. Before Mrs.
Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving
their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed.
Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and
moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority
complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force
majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the
waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was
invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver
of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and
effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the
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terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects
of the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit
was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced
dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the
instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended
thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted
by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable.
We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had
exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more
demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure
of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with
the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted
wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross
negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact
lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded
damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

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Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which
actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction
of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim
for restoration to her conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must
have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

YRASUIGUI VS PAL
Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein respondent.
Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of
the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed.

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal
protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th
Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in
saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate
the equal protection guarantee.

SPS VILORIA VS CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the United States, they approached Holiday
Travel, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines, to purchase tickets from
Newark to San Diego. The travel agent, Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they
cannot travel by train because it was already fully booked; that they must purchase
plane tickets for Continental Airlines; that if they wont purchase plane tickets; theyll

9
never reach their destination in time. The couple believed Magers representations
and so they purchased two plane tickets worth $800.00.

Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip wasnt really fully booked and
so they purchased train tickets and went to their destination by train instead. Then
they called up Mager to request for a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the
couple to Continental Airlines. As the couple were now in the Philippines, they filed
their request with Continental Airlines office in Ayala. The spouses Viloria alleged
that Mager misled them into believing that the only way to travel was by plane and so
they were fooled into buying expensive plane tickets.

Continental Airlines refused to refund the amount of the tickets and so the spouses
sued the airline company. In its defense, Continental Airlines claimed that the tickets
sold to them by Mager were non-refundable; that, if any, they were not bound by the
misrepresentations of Mager because theres no contract of agency existing between
Continental Airlines and Mager.

The trial court ruled in favor of spouses Viloria but the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of agency exists between Continental Airlines and
Mager.

HELD: Yes. All the elements of agency are present, to wit:

there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship;

the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and
the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The first and second elements are present as Continental Airlines does not deny that
it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel to which Mager is part of, whereby
Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on the
airlines behalf. The third element is also present as it is undisputed that Holiday
Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is Continental Airlines and not
Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday
Travel on its behalf. The fourth element is also present considering that Continental
Airlines has not made any allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that
was granted to it.

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Continental Airlines also never questioned the validity of the transaction between
Mager and the spouses. Continental Airlines is therefore in estoppel. Continental
Airlines cannot be allowed to take an altogether different position and deny that
Holiday Travel is its agent without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever
damage or prejudice that may result from such denial or retraction to Spouses Viloria,
who relied on good faith on Continental Airlines acts in recognition of Holiday
Travels authority. Estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the
avoidance of harm that will befall an innocent party due to its injurious reliance, the
failure to apply it in this case would result in gross travesty of justice.

SULPICIO LINES VS SESANTE

FACTS:
October 23, 1988: Tito Duran Tabuquilde (Tito) and his 3-year old daughter Jennifer
Anne (Anne) boarded the M/V Dona Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila, bringing with
them several pieces of luggage.
Storm Signal No. 2 had been raised by the PAG-ASA authorities over Leyte as early as
5:30 P.M. of October 23, 1988 and which signal was raised to Signal No. 3 by 10 P.M
ship captain ordered the vessel to proceed to Tacloban when prudence dictated that
he should have taken it to the nearest port for shelter, thus violating his duty to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely to their
destination
October 24, 1988 morning: M/V Dona Marilyn, while in transit, encountered inclement
weather which caused huge waves due to Typhoon Unsang.
Angelina Tabuquilde contacted the Sulpicio Office to verify radio reports that the
vessel M/V Dona Marilyn was missing
Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship was merely "hiding" thereby assuaging her
anxiety
October 24, 1988 2:00 P.M.: vessel capsized, throwing Tito and Anne, along with
hundreds of passengers, into the sea.
Tito tried to keep himself and his daughter afloat but to no avail as the waves got
stronger and he was subsequently separated from his daughter despite his efforts.
October 25, 1988 11:00 A.M.: He found himself on Almagro Island in Samar
He immediately searched for his daughter among the survivors in the island, but
failed
Angelina tried to seek the assistance of the Sulpicio Lines in Manila to no avail
Angelina spent sleepless nights worrying about her husband and daughter in view of
the refusal of Sulpicio Lines to release a verification of the sinking of the ship
October 26, 1988: Tito and other survivors in the Almagro Island were fetched and
were brought to Tacloban Medical Center for treatment
October 31, 1988: Tito reported the loss of his daughter and was informed that the
corpse of a child with his daughter's description had been found
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Tito wrote a letter to his wife, reporting the sad fact that Jennifer Anne was dead
Angelina suffered from shock and severe grief upon receipt of the news
November 3, 1988: coffin bearing the corpse of Anne was buried
November 24, 1988: Tito filed a claim for damages against Sulpicio Lines for the death
of Anne and the loss of his belongings worth P27,580
Trial Court: in favor of Tito
actual damages, P30,000.00 for the death of Anne
P100,000.00 as moral damages
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs
ISSUE: W/N Tito has a right to recover damage for his lost belongings

HELD: NO. Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
P27,580.00 as actual damages for the loss of the contents of the pieces of baggage is
deleted and that the award of P30,000.00 under Article 2206 in relation Article 1764
is increased to P50,000.00.
There is no showing that the value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was
based on the bill of lading or was previously declared by Tito before he boarded the
ship
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
only deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are entitled to actual and compensatory
damages without the need of proof of the said damages
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least
Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. . . .
Deducing alone from said provision, one can conclude that damages arising from
culpa contractual are not compensable without proof of special damages sustained by
the heirs of the victim.
With respect to the award of moral damages, the general rule is that said damages
are not recoverable in culpa contractual except when the presence of bad faith was
proven
in breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may be recovered when it results in
the death of a passenger
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines gives the Court the discretion to grant said damages in breach of contract
when the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent and reckless manner
The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of dropping anchor in or at the
periphery of the Port of Calapan, or returning to the port of Manila which is nearer,

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proceeded on its voyage on the assumption that it will be able to beat and race with
the typhoon and reach its destination before it (Unsang) passes

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 66102-04,
[August 30, 1990]

Facts: About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua,
Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro
Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune
and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their
respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney
that day because the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay
P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual
relationship was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary
evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On
the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida
Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and
Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the
jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.

Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the
jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped
on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern
lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the
western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney's front faced the south
(from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The
jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane,
which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No.
753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos
Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached on
the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after
stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus
bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision,
three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida
Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What
could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic. At the time and in the
vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were
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there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
LibLex

After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San
Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide.

Issue: who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of
the jeepney?

Held: Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling
that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is
erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in
case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily
discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,
and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver.
In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver
nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the
driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's
liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover
only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit provision
of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
-----------------------------------------------
The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of
last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another
vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence,
and (3) the substantial factor test, concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.

The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by
the respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about the 'last clear chance' would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It
does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty
of negligence."

It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident
occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot
even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the

14
jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear
wheel was detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the
perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or
some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters
north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes
admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the
accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24
seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have
covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the
situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him.
Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes, could have
taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western shoulder) or (2) to
swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This
Court does not so believe, considering the existing exigencies of space and time.

As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and unrebutted that the
Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate
that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures) are mute
confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture) after the Rabbit bus
came to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front wheels resting most
probably on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It
too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except
the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture clearly shows
coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters from the
point of impact show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right
attempting to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully
clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have
been due to limitations of space and time.

"Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also
have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which
was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the hypothesis (sic) that
the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it were
based alone on the sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one
were to consider the time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune
jeepney was crossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation
then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater
risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside."

After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.

15
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that
the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event

Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89880, [February 6, 1991]

Facts: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, and a Mazda passenger bus along the national road at
Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The front left side portion of the body of the truck sideswiped
the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat
to the last rear seat.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained.

During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned
by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The
vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and or
operated as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a
franchise, with a line from Naic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and
vice versa, which Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter
transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18, 1983.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While
the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels
of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane.
Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was
merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power
and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder
of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand
tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each
other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other
side of the road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and
felling it." (Rollo, pp. 48-50)

After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case, the trial court reached the
conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with
each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
16
aforementioned persons. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was
only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision.
In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the
doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants

Held: Yes. The trial court found and We are convinced that the cargo truck was
running fast. It did not overlook the fact that the road was descending as in fact it
mentioned this circumstance as one of the factors disregarded by the cargo truck
driver along with the fact that he was driving an old 1947 cargo truck whose front
wheels are already wiggling and the fact that there is a passenger bus approaching it.
In holding that the driver of the cargo truck was negligent, the trial court certainly
took into account all these factors so it was incorrect for the respondent court to
disturb the factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment.

The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last
clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As
the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of
a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.

The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp.
798-799).

In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark decision
held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. ruled that the principle of "last clear
chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It
does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty
of negligence."

17
Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field
of joint tort feasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the
injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked
as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury."

Lara v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-9907, June 30, 1958

Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao. Defendant is
engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. It should be
noted that the deceased went to the lumber concession of defendant in Parang, Cotabato upon
instructions of his chief in order to classify the logs of defendant which were then ready to be
exported and to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. It took Lara six days to do
his work during which he contracted malaria fever and for that reason he evinced a desire to
return immediately to Davao. At that time, there was no available bus that could take him back
to Davao and so he requested the defendant if he could take him in his own pick-up. Defendant
agreed and, together with Lara, other passengers tagged along, most of them were employees of
the Government. Defendant merely accommodated them and did not charge them any fee for
the service. It was also their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, the passengers
would alight and transfer to a bus that regularly makes the trip to Davao but unfortunately there
was none available at the time and so the same passengers, including Lara, again requested the
defendant to drive them to Davao.

The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be accommodated and the
back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides and
with a 19 inches tall walling at the back. When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement
of the passengers remained the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on
a suitcase and his head covered by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara
accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries.

Issue: Whether or not accident occurred not due to the negligence of defendant but to
circumstances beyond his control and so he should be exempt from liability.

Held: Yes. It therefore appears that the deceased, as well as his companions who rode in the
pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service
and so they can be considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law. As
18
accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes
to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to
their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or
operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its
operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of
travel. This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a
guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in
an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same
obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride" (5
Am. Jur., 626-627). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in
duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law
(Articles 1755 and 1756, new Civil Code).

It should also be noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the deceased in his own
pick-up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of transportation that
regularly makes trips for the public, and if defendant agreed to take the deceased in his own car,
it was only to accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that he be so
accommodated. It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in the pick-up of defendant
took their respective seats therein at their own choice and not upon indication of defendant with
the particularity that defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat but which
invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to his desire to be at
the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position because such was more
convenient for him due to his feverish condition. All the circumstances thereof clearly indicate
that defendant had done what a reasonable prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.

There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an unforeseen
accident caused by the fact at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have fallen from
the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then
bumpy, rough and full of stones.

Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118664, [August 7, 1998]

Facts: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL in San Francisco, California
bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela
Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila. As an incentive for

19
traveling on the said airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at
the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.

Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko
Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to
the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting
ash fall blanketed NAIA rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents' trip
to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers and paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. The flight of
private respondents was again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure. Since JAL did not defray
their hotel accommodation expenses during their stay in Narita, Japan, private respondents were
forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds.

Private respondent insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they
were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that
airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "
force majeure,

Issue: whether or not JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the
delay were caused by " force majeure."

Held: No. We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled
that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.
Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and
diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However,
this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even
if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense or "
force majeure" as an exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.

Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of
"force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. 6 Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the
effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal
expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that
JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15,
1991.

20
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience
for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their
unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL
but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or
negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is
too much of a burden to assume.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode
of travel. 7 In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of
the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or
expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks

Japan Airlines v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 161730, [January 28, 2005]

Facts: Respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines bound for
Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko
Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for
shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a
foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call
for not more than 72 hours. During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that
Michael appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this
inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries and were brought instead to the
Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight.

The immigration official also handed Mrs. Higuchi a Notice 5 where it was stated that
respondents were to be "watched so as not to escape". Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International
Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japan's Immigration Department to handle
passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest
House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles.
Respondents were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and
meals.

On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages 6 claiming that JAL did not
fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at
Narita Airport. JAL denied the allegations of respondents. It maintained that the refusal of the
Japanese immigration authorities to issue shore passes to respondents is an act of state which
JAL cannot interfere with or prevail upon. Consequently, it cannot impose upon the immigration
authorities that respondents be billeted at Hotel Nikko instead of the airport resthouse.

Issue: whether or not JAL is guilty of breach of contract.

21
Held: No. Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket
to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises.
The passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date
and it becomes the carrier's obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed
destination. 10 If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies
or is injured, the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage. 11

We find that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL
has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however,
such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could
not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power
to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even
by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein
respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents' shore pass
applications.

Prior to their departure, respondents were aware that upon arrival in Narita, they must secure
shore pass entries for their overnight stay. Respondents' mother, Mrs. Imelda Asuncion, insisted
though that Ms. Linda Villavicencio of JAL assured her that her children would be granted the
passes.

Mrs. Higuchi did all she could to assist the respondents. Upon being notified of the denial of
respondents' applications, Mrs. Higuchi immediately made reservations for respondents at the
Narita Airport Rest House which is really more a hotel than a detention house as claimed by
respondents. 16

More importantly, nowhere in respondent Michael's testimony did he state categorically that Mrs.
Higuchi or any other employee of JAL treated them rudely or exhibited improper behavior
throughout their stay. We therefore find JAL not remiss in its obligations as a common carrier.

Necesito v. Paras, G.R. No. L-10605, L-10606, [June 30, 1958]

Facts: In the morning of January 28, 1954, Severina Garces and her one- year old son, Precillano
Necesito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines at
Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its
regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan, truck No. 199 entered a
wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after
wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was
breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was
injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. He was brought to the Provincial

22
Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with fragments one centimeter out of line.
The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost.

Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totaling over P85,000 having been filed in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac (Cases Nos. 908 and 909) against the carrier, the latter pleaded that
the accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the
defendants or of the driver Bandonell.

After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the
bad condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering
knuckle, which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and
cellulous", a condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that
regular thirty-day inspections were made of the steering knuckle, since the steel exterior was
smooth and shiny to the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the knuckles are designed and
manufactured for heavy duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus No. 199 that
broke on January 28, 1954, was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected
again on February 5th. Hence, the trial court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to
fortuitous event, dismissed both actions.

Issue: whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle,
and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence
required by law.

Held: Yes. 1755. It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability
rests upon negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law
requires, and by Art. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden
of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required. In the
American law, where the carrier is held to the same degree of diligence as under the new Civil
Code, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus expressed: "The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover
damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a
manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if
it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with
regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the
manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards
the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability".

The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control
over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier.
Having, no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the
passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore,
that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held
to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable.

23
In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering
knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks
developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the
steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden
flaws that would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical
importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in loss of balance
and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers. No argument is
required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine whether the resistance
of this critically important part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of
the knuckle was impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that
it could be detected. We are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle
as practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost
diligence of very cautious persons" "as far as human care and foresight can provide", and
therefore that the knuckle's failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the
carrier from responsibility.

It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each
and every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the
carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine
the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety
of the passengers.

DEL PRADO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

G.R NO. 29462
FACTS: The Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the
conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico
Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on
R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street
and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off
passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the
guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, when the
plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being made from
the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of
the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when
the car was passing.

24
The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that
the plaintiff, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his
desire to board the car, in response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping.
Upon this the plaintiff seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular handspot, at the same time
placing his left foot upon the platform. However, before the plaintiff's position had become
secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached the flatform, the motorman applied the
power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car
caused the plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, He therefore
fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day the
member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as
the plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on either side with both right and
left hand. The latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by
the plaintiff, but we are of the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the
motorman slowed up slightly as the plaintiff was boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due
in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at the moment when the plaintiff put his foot on
the platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed by us.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was Contributory Negligence
HELD: YES. The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board
the car; that he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses;
and that he in fact knew nothing of the incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and
someone called to him to stop. We are not convinced of the complete candor of this statement,
for we are unable to see how a motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person
boarding the car under the circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered that the
front handpost which, as all witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in attempting to board
the car, was immediately on the left side of the motorman.
With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no
obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers
at other points than those appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a
system of street cars if a company engage in this business were required to stop any and
everywhere to take on people who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in too
great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless, although the
motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that
would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car.
The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
The distinction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the
reason that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of
positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of
article 1903 of the Civil Code, by providing that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach
of contractual duty (culpa contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special
defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony
showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this
car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived
from a breach of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions.
The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on
the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of
injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held
25
to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by
accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform. Again, the situation
before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act
of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of
the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine,
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO. VS. CA
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
FACTS: On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25,
1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said date,
while petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner
corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat.
However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter
bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before banging said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where
he expired.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the
supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety
of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and
negligence which gave rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint plus an award of damages in their favor by way of a counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dangwa should be held liable for negligence cause by its driver.
HELD: YES. The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge
that the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his
intention to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is
no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public
utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes
the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have
the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The
premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train,
streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford
passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by
boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while
they are doing so.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar
which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the
moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board
and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and
conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice. The victim
26
herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it
has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons
boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety
of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need
not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier
assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This
is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the gravely
injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible
proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous
indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could have forthwith turned at
Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to
allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the
victim.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY VS. NATIVIDAD
G.R NO. 145804; FEBRUARY 6, 2003
FACTS: On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however,
was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow
or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously. On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein
respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit),
and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad
and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding
token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to

27
link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have
stopped the train. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
HELD: The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account
of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.[7] In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners,
according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been
at fault,[10] an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the
Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of
the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis
of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families
in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated
by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that
has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be
described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the
same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.[16] Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is
28
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable
act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie
between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus,
Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. The award of nominal damages in
addition to actual damages is untenable.

LA MALLORCA VS. CA
G.R No. L-20761; July 27, 1966
FACTS: On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with
their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over
2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga),
owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico,
Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their
personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff
Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child,
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare
is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers
bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the
group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get
down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot
on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left
behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said
Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his
bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off
while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding
the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said
conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when
the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point
where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in
front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed,
and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the
bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant
seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and

29
actual damages sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the
court below rendered the judgment in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the
passenger alighted from the vehicle.
HELD: NO. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the
carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person
who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a
passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the
usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report
that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of
engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily
delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad
and company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed
the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for
the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father)
had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the
bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the
bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near
the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the
carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated
when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was
caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
on the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was
established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the
conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started
to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to
the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court
of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged
peculiarly liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CO. VS. CA
G.R No. 84458
FACTS: The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila,
having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10. On May 12, 1975, said vessel

30
arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank
having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said
gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control
of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26,
1975 between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa
was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had
disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane
was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel,
and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes
were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He
was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May
15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder"
(See also Exh. "B"). For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses,
Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00. Anacleto Viana who was only forty
(40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in good health. His average
annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His parents,
herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of twenty (20)
cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered
mental anguish and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had
to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana.
HELD: YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable
time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time
or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been
carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim
his baggage.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of
passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as
compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need
at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage
whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short
period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La
Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine
enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
31
Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel.
As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his
cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping
procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it
may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his
baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only
one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of
petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. Consequently,
under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said
carrier at the time of his tragic death

6.1. Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, [May 31, 2000]

Facts: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear
of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so,
an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney.

As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her
confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
32
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to
his jeepney. The Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Issue: whether or not petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Held: Yes. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety
of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence
at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.

Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several
factors militate against petitioner's contention.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater
than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the

33
injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning
by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito

7.1. Gillaco vs Manila Railroad

Facts: "That at about 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco,
husband of the plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila
Railroad Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila;That when the train reached the
Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company
assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened to be in said station
waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty; That Devesa's tour of duty on that day was from 9:00 a.m.,
until the train to which he was assigned reached La Union at 7:00 p.m. of the same
day;.
That Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same
dating back during the Japanese occupation; That because of this personal grudge,
Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company
for his use as such train guard, upon seeing him inside the train coach; That Tomas
Gillaco died as a result of the would which he sustained from the shot fired by
Devesa."

It is also undisputed that Devesa was convicted of homicide by final judgment of the
Court of Appeals. Appellant's contention is that, on the foregoing facts, on liability
attaches to it as employer of the killer, Emilio Devesa; that it is not responsible
subsidiary ex delicto, under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, because the crime
was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary
duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the complaint did not aver
sufficient facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on appellant's part was
shown. The Court below held the Railroad company responsible on the ground that a
contract of transportation implies protection of the passengers against acts of
personal violence by the agents or employees of the carrier.

Issue: whether or not resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe carriage with
the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.

34
Held: Yes. The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a
personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was
entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain
or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal
rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the
thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was
therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of article 1105 of the old Civil Code,
being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances.

No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in
the protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast and complex activities of
modern rail transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard against all
possible misunderstanding between each and every one of its employees and every
passenger that might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as
demanding diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide.

The lower Court and the appellees both relied on the American authorities that
particularly hold carriers to be insurers of the safety of their passengers against
willful assault and intentional ill-treatment on the part of their servants, it being
immaterial that the act should be one of private retribution on the part of the
servant, impelled by personal malice toward the passenger. But as can be inferred
from the previous jurisprudence of this Court, the Civil Code of 1889 did not impose
such absolute liability .The liability of a carrier as an insurer was not recognized in
this jurisdiction.

Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when the
crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the
transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is
clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the
Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting
transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to
guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the
commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the
passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the
killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was
that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not
that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had
assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be
deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or
employee of the carrier.

7.2. Maranan v. Perez, G.R. No. L-22272, [June 26, 1967]

Facts: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
35
Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken
to the Court of Appeals.

On December 6, 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was
dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court,
the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling
enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no
absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant
facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of
the guilty employee.

Issue: whether or not the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil
Code.

Held: Yes. R.C. was a passenger in a taxicab owned by P. P. when he was stabbed to
death by the driver, S.V. In the subsequent action for damages, P. P. cited Gillaco vs.
MRR, 97 Phil., 884, which ruled that the carrier is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its employees upon the passengers. Held, the Gillaco case does not apply.
There, the passenger was killed outside the scope and course of duty of the guilty
employee while here, the killing took place in the course of duty of the guilty
employee and when he was acting within the scope of his duties.

Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from
Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondent
superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the
passenger safely.

36
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of
the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the
act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the
majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the
course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in
excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability
here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees.

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows
the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this
rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. vs. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-
390, and Haver vs. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85:
(1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that
full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care
prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers
and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants
charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's
violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the former's confiding in the servant's
hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating
therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by
law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk
of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it,
and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns
of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court
rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil
Code.The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct.
Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver
was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he
was convicted by final judgment.

37
ISAAC VS ALEMAN TRANS

FACTS:

May 31, 1951: Cesar Isaac boarded Bus No. 31 from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili,
Camarines Sur and seated himself on the left side resting his left arm on the window
sill but with his left elbow outside the window
Before reaching his destination, a pick-up car at full speed and was running outside of
its proper lane came from the opposite direction
The driver of the bus swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its
front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the
rampart of the road.
The bus could not bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile of
gravel, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of
his passengers.
Despite efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car
He was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood
transfusion to save his life
After 4 days, he was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under
went treatment for 3 months
Later, he was moved to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed
for another 2 months.
He incurred expenses of P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by A.L.
Ammen Trans. Co.
Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint - collision occurred due to the negligence of the
driver of the pick-up car
ISSUE: W/N if there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the
accident resulting in injuries is due to causes which are inevitable and which could
not have been avoided or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of that high
degree of care and skill which the carrier is bound to exercise for the safety of his
passengers neither the common carrier nor the driver is liable therefor

HELD: YES. Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the

38
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756 Ooom.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

principles governing the liability of a common carrier:

the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There
is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of
each case
a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, having due regard for all the circumstances
a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or
injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence
the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel
where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is
obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into
account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be
required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such
care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and
conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgment the case renders
possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part
Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of
the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision
It is true that Isaac's contributory negligence cannot relieve A.L. Ammen of its liability
but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762,
new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position
taken by Isaac

39
8.2. Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-55347, [October 4,
1985]

Facts: September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Winifredo Tupang,
husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical
defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two
hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing
Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his
death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that
somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called
the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the
information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge
where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure

due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Tupang was later buried
in the public cemetery of Lucena City by the local police authorities."

On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR
did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. Moving for
reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first time, as a defense,
the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the
Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its own, and that its
funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or
execution. The motion was denied; the respondent court ruled that the ground
advanced could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not PNR is immune from suit. Whether or not petitioner exercised
extraordinary diligence.

Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the
said Act provides:
"The Philippine National Railways shall have the following powers: a. To do all such
other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and b.
Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law."

Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and
attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no question then
that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
any other corporation.

40
No. The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by
the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he and many other
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the
train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it
approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time. Neither did the train
stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the
train at Iyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to
their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any
injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was
negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as
correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such
presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it

appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he
opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have
held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said
platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence,
while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the
amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary
damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner,
the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.

41
 INJURY TO PASSENGER DUE TO ACTS OF CO-PASSENGER OR STRANGER
9.1 PILAPIL VS. CA G.R No. 52159; December 22, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus
bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said
bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon
reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to
Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the
left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye. Private respondent's personnel lost no
time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and
treated.
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan of
Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in his left
eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr.
Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left
eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant should be held liable
HELD: NO. Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes
injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The
negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when
the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the
degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its
passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of
ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take
doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is
not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and
all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use
by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining
them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this respect.
Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a carrier were made
liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the bus riding public lose confidence in
the transportation system. Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy would be
better left to the consideration of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to protect the
public from the increasing risks and dangers of lawlessness in society.
9.2 BACHELOR EXPRESS INC, VS. CA
FACTS: On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by
Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City
passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that
about fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier
which caused commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former
42
already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which
caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes
but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut,
private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio while
Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a
complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and
the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their
respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off
the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and
the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice
of its employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not
a traffic accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the control
of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of as it was an act of
a third party who is not in any way connected with the defendants and of which the latter have
no control and supervision.
ISSUE: (1) What was the proximate cause of the whole incident?
HELD: The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of
contract of carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature of
its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. In the case at bar, Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express,
Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently,
pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have
acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance
with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a
commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the
sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut
causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in

43
the bus is within the context of force majeure.However, in order that a common carrier may be
absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused
by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
injuries resulting from such accident.
ISSUE: (2) Whether or not the petitioner's common carrier observed extraordinary
diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.
. At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the
speed of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that according to Collango
himself, the bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that
the bus was still on its second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising
vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated stop
and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably
fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative
officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers and
the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading
capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop
the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell
from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor
panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not
properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers.

9.3. Fortune Express Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is
the widow of Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince
Alexander are their minor children.

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit
No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a
Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take
revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his
findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at
Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of petitioner, at its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken. 1

44
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be
passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City.
Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as
one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of
the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the
steering wheel. Then one of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the
bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the
passengers to get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus
and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway. 2 LibLex

However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At
that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who
had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to
spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The
armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were going to burn
the bus along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants,
Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side
of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw
that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to
pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan
City, but he died while undergoing operation.

Issue: whether or not there was a breach of contract of carriage. Whether or not seizure of the
bus is a force majeure?

Held: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of
the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of
petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken,
petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.

Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 6 a common
carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting
their baggages.

45
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner's employees failed to prevent the attack on one
of petitioner's buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family.
Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

No. Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 7 we held that to
be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation
must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above
would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 8 it was held that the common carrier was liable for its
failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was
warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was foreseeable, and,
thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to
the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to
attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liability.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals 9 and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals 10
in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure.
In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install
window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus
by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 12 it was ruled that a
common carrier is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by
grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art. 1755 of
the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents
therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of
passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the
present case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered
force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's
operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing
was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.

Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence

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The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to
the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out
that the intended targets of the violence were petitioner and its employees, not its passengers.
The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the
collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding.
Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get
off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty.
Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to
help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan.
Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.

9.4. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Heirs of Battung, Jr., G.R. No. 208802

Facts: Respondents alleged that in the evening of March 22, 2003, Romeo L. Battung, Jr.
(Battung) boarded petitioner's bus with body number 037 and plate number BVJ-525 in Delfin
Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila. 5 Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and
slept during the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muoz, Nueva
Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man
who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left
with a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter,
brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. 6 Hence,
respondents filed a complaint 7 on July 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of
P1,826,000.00 8 based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and
Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103. Respondents
contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death
on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus, responsible therefor. As
such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable for Battung's death. 9
In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary diligence
required by law from common carriers. In this relation, they claimed that a common carrier is not
an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung's death should be properly deemed a
fortuitous event. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the payment of
their counterclaims for damages and attorney's fees.
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto. It held that the killing of Battung cannot be deemed as
a fortuitous event, considering that such killing happened right inside petitioner's bus and that
petitioner, et al. did not take any safety measures in ensuring that no deadly weapon would be
smuggled inside the bus.

Issue: whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages to respondent arising from culpa
contractual.

Held: No. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
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being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is
rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by
law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger
was solely due to a fortuitous event.

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained
by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the
law requires. Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the
above-said provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the
negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its
passengers.

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption. [The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established proving
either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered
by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury
sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier's] employees,
and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as
well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers
over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise
would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not
the intention of the lawmakers.

In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in
the method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioner's employees, namely,
that of Duplio and Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the
case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger who,
after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle. 25 Thus, there is no proper
issue on petitioner's duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the
passengers transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against petitioner under
Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code should not apply.

No similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel petitioner or its employees to
implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers. There was also
no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious actions which
would have forewarned petitioner's employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or
any of the passengers.

In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride
petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio,
saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made
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the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the corresponding fare,
which Daraoay did. 31 During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which
would rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity.
With no such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e.,
bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that
petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family in
relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil Code.As such, petitioner cannot
altogether be held civilly liable.

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