Ratio Decidendi:

Sheker vs. Sheker

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance
of the decedent's will. Such being the case, a money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion
for claims which is to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of
the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy,
but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.

Bunyi vs. Factor

In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who
can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Possession de
facto is the physical possession of real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue
in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a partys possession, provided, that he
has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of
the property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts.

In the present case, the right of respondents predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to
uphold respondents right to possession over the same. Respondents right to the property was vested in her
along with her siblings from the moment of their fathers death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected
from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary
rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.

Garcia Fule vs. CA

In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should
be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence
is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court.
Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fules petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B.
Garcia was granted as a special administratix.

Roberts vs. Leonidas

The probate of a will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled
in an intestate proceeding.

In the present case, it is held that the judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm
died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art.
838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Uriarte vs. CFI

Testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. If in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed.

In the present case, Vicente had already waived the procedural defect of the venue being improperly
laid. Moreover, he knew that there was a will when a Motion to Dismiss was filed in Negros court, so he should
have filed an MTD in Manila court earlier: The Manila court already appointed an administrator and admitted
the will to probate more than 5 months earlier. Furthermore, as to the interest of Vicente in the case; there are
two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased
parent:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

Cuenco vs. CA

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

In the present case, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with
it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City
court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which
would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having
thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue,

Romero vs. CA

Section 3, Rule 87 states that:

Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust,
no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained
against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee
or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate
of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.

In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and
constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order
adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties
are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership
and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.

The petition that was filed by the petitioners is thus barred.

Ypon vs. Ricaforte

The rule is that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting
the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case.
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In the present case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246. Since a determination of heirship cannot be made
in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
altogether proper.

Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

In the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their
inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, especially in light of the fact that the
parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same
and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

Pacioles vs. Chuatoco-Ching

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass
upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in
the inventory. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."

In the present case, clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper
course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.

Aranas vs. Mercado

The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Moreover, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

In the present case, the determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory
of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.

Vda. De Rodriguez vs. CA

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted
by the parties

In the present case however, the proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or
advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid.
The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the other hand,
up to this time, no separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles to the
disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation.

In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to
the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and
distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.

Pereira vs. CA

The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.

In the present case, even assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira
for purposes of administration, the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent is unnecessary
because when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of
an administrator as is in this case.
Portugal vs. Portugal-Beltran

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are
all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose,
the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do
so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement,
whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates
the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent
to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of
the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any
just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

In the present case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a
will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for
settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned.

In the matter of Intestate Estate of Delgado

Rule 74 Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states:

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of
the register of deeds.

In the present case, since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication
by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir
to the estate.

Cua vs. Vargas

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with
the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate.

In the present case, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following
Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge
and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
Neri vs. Heirs of Uy

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead
properties have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is
authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer."

Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties
with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be
holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the latters
benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states: "if property is acquired through mistake
or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their
shares equivalent to P 5,000.00 each or a total of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.

Reillo vs. San Jose

A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and
consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. The deed of settlement made by petitioners was invalid because it
excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares in the subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

In the present case, the RTC found that, based on the allegations contained in the pleadings filed by the parties,
petitioners misrepresented themselves when they alleged in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights that they are the sole heirs of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina;
that petitioners prayed for a counter-petition for partition involving several parcels of land left by the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina which bolstered respondents claim that petitioners falsified the Extrajudicial
Settlement which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresas name; thus, a ground
to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and the title.

Bautista vs. Bautista

Unquestionably, the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is invalid insofar as it affects the legitimate share pertaining
to the defendant-appellee in the property in question.1avvphi1 There can be no question that the Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition was fraudulently obtained. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be
instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four years from
the discovery of the fraud. Significantly, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner
provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively.

In the present case, defendant-appellee is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extra-judicial
settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot on December
21, 1981. From the time of its registration, defendant-appellee had four (4) years or until 21 December 1985,
within which to file his objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. Unfortunately,
defendant-appellee failed to institute the present civil action within said period, having filed the same only on 17
January 1994 or more than twelve (12) years from the registration of the deed of extra-judicial partition. Hence,
defendant-appellees right to question the deed of extra-judicial partition has prescribed.