PIANDIONG ET AL V.

THE PHILIPPINES
CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999
19 October 2000

Facts:

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of

robbery with homicide and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The Supreme Court denied the appeal, and confirmed both
conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions
for reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998.

The Communication:

Piandiong et al complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed,

because the judge considered that an aggravating circumstance existed, as
the crime was committed by more than three armed persons. According to
counsel, however, this was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

They further claim that they were hit in the stomach in order to make them
confess.

They further state that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses deserved no

credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and
their description of the perpetrators did not coincide with the way Piandiong,
Morallos and Bulan actually looked. Counsel also states that the judge erred
when he did not give credence to the alibi defence.

They further complain that the death penalty was unconstitutional and
should not have been imposed for anything but the most heinous crime.

The State Partys Defense:

The State party explains that domestic remedies were exhausted with the
Supreme Court's decision of 3 March 1998, rejecting the supplemental
motions for reconsideration. The convicts and their counsel could have filed a
communication with the Human Rights Committee at that date. However,
they did not do so, but instead petitioned the President for clemency.
According to the State party, in submitting themselves to the President's
power, the convicts conceded to the decision of the Supreme Court.

The State party refers to the Supreme Court's judgement which found that
the shooting of the police officer in the jeepney, the subsequent robbery of
the shot policeman, and finally the second shooting of him while he was
pleading to be brought to hospital, revealed brutality and mercilessness, and
called for the imposition of the death penalty.

With regard to the claim of torture, the State party notes that this was not
included in the grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court, and thus the
Supreme Court did not look into the issue.

The State party notes that the accused had legal assistance throughout the
trial proceedings and the appeal. With respect to the right to life, the State
party notes that the Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of the
death penalty as well as the methods of execution and found them to be
constitutional.
In respect to counsel's request to the Committee for interim measures of
protection as a matter of urgency, the State party notes that counsel found
no need to address the Committee during the year that his clients were on
death row after all domestic remedies had been exhausted. Even after the
President granted a 90 day reprieve, counsel waited until the end of that
period to present a communication to the Committee.

The Committees View:

The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that it is generally for the courts of
States parties, and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts and
evidence in a particular case. This rule also applies to questions as to the
lawfulness and credibility of an identification. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeal, in addressing the argument about the irregularity of the line-up
identification, held that the identification of the accused at the trial had been
based on in-court identification by the witnesses and that the line-up
identification had been irrelevant. In these circumstances, the Committee
finds there is no basis for holding that the in-court identification of the
accused was incompatible with their rights under article 14 of the Covenant.

The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not
for the Committee, to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and
to interpret the relevant domestic legislation. In the circumstances, the
Committee finds that the facts before it do not reveal a violation of the
Covenant in this respect.

It is not for the Committee to examine issues of constitutionality, the

substance of the claim appears to raise important questions relating to the
imposition of the death penalty to Piandiong et al namely whether or not the
crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated
by article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the
Philippines is in compliance with the State party's obligations under article
6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant. In the instant case, however, the
Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel
nor the State party has made submissions in this respect.

The Committee reiterates its conclusion that the State committed a grave
breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims to
death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the
communication.

The Rights Violated:

1. Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights