Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS
FACTS:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its
bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner,
is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art
XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is
not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the FACTS:
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation
may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty The petitioner Candido Lopez was arrested
for the violation of a self-executing constitutional on the morning of September 19, 1930 by the virtue
provision does not render such a provision of warrant of arrest signed by the Speaker of the
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The House of Representatives in the implementation of a
omission from a constitution of any express resolution of the said House. The warrant of arrest
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
was issued by reason of an alleged act of contempt
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
against the Legislature committed on October 23,
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not 1929 upon the person of Representative Jose
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, Dimayuga by the petitioner during the second
but any legislation must be in harmony with the session of the Philippine Legislature. The
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional constabulary officer took the petitioner into custody.
right and make it more available.[17] Subsequent The petitioner is asking that the said warrant of
legislation however does not necessarily mean that arrest be declared null and void and that he be
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself,
released from the said arrest.
fully enforceable.
`ISSUES:
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or Whether or not the House of Representatives
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the has the right of a legislative body to extend
provision does not require any legislation to put it in punishment for contempt beyond the adjournment of
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When the session of the Philippine Legislature.
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just RULING:
that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be Yes. The Philippine Legislature has the
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the essential and inherent power to punish contempt.
absence of any legislation on the subject;
The right of the legislative body to punish contempt
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted
only ceases when the existence of the legislature
to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and ceases to prevail.
puissance, and from which all legislations must take GoldCreekMiningCorporationv.Rodriguez
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

FACTS

Lopez vs De los Reyes

 PetitionerallegesthatitownstheNobFraction ISSUE/S:1)Whethertheminingclaiminvolvedinthe
mineral claim situated in Benguet, located in presentproceedingformedpartofthepublicdomainon
publiclands,inaccordancewiththeprovisions November15,1935,whentheprovisionsofArticleXII
of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, as oftheConstitutionbecameeffectiveinaccordancewith
amendedbytheActofCongressofFebruary6,
section6ofArticleXVthereof
1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine
Commission. 2)Ifnot,whetheramandamusistheproperremedyin
ThatsaidclaimwaslocatedonJanuary1,1929
thecase
towhichanoriginaldeclarationoflocationwas
registeredintheofficeoftheminingrecorderof
Benguet, Mountain Province, on January 7,
1929; HELD:1.No.Theminingclaimunderconsiderationno
That petitioner and its predecessors in interest longer formed part of the public domain when the
have been in continuous and exclusive
provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became
possession of said claim from the time it was
located. effective,itdoesnotcomewithintheprohibitionagainst
Petitionerhadtheclaimsurveyedandproduced thealienationofnaturalresources;andthepetitionerhas
platandfieldnotesoftheclaimandacertificate therighttoapatentthereforuponcompliancewiththe
statingthatmorethanP1,600worthoflaborand termsandconditionsprescribedbylaw.
improvementshadbeenexpendedonsaidclaim,
which were approved by the Director of the
BureauofScience.
Petitionerfiledanapplicationforpatentwiththe 2.However,theCourtheldthatitwasnotjustifiedto
miningrecorder,anddulypostedanoticeofthe grant the relief sought by the petitioner following the
saidplatandapplicationupontheclaim. precedentestablishedinWilburvs.UnitedStatesexrel.
A notice of petitioners application for patent Krushnic,supra,that"mandamuswilllietocompelthe
was forwarded by the mining recorder to the secretaryoftheInteriortodisposeofanapplicationfora
divisionofminessothatthelattercouldorderfor patentforaminingclaimonitsmerits,wherehisrefusal
itspublication,madeonceaweek,for60daysin
todosoisbasedonhismisinterpretationofastatute."
anewspaperofgeneralcirculation,commencing
February13,1936
ThatpetitionerpaidP113totherespondentas
purchasepriceofthesaidclaim,andsoithas *NOTE:TheCourtheldthatmandamuswasnotproper
requested the respondents as Secretary of in the case, because in cases where a public officer
AgricultureandCommerceandasdirectorofthe
misinterpretsastatuteintheperformanceofhisduties:
Bureau of Mines to approve petitioners
application for patent, prepare the necessary Everyexecutiveofficerwhosedutyisplainlydevolved
papersrelativetoitsissuancetobesignedbythe upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and
President, however, the respondent have failed when his refusal is brought before the court he might
andrefusedtodoso. successfully plead that the performance of the duty
Petitionerallegesthatitisentitledtothepatent involved the construction of a statute by him, and
appliedforasithascompliedwiththerequisites thereforeitasnotministerial,andthecourtcouldonthat
oflawfortheissuanceofsuchpatent.
accountbepowerlesstogiverelief.
Respondent alleges as special defense that the
PetitionersarenotentitledtoapatentoftheNob
Fraction claim pursuant to the Constitutional
provision that 'natural resources, with the FRANCISCO JR. VS NAGMAMALAKASAKIT
exceptionofpublicagricultureland,shallnotbe
NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
alienated',andconsequentlytherespondentsare
under no obligation to approve Petitioners MAGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.
applicationandareboundbydutytopreventthe
issuancethereof. FACTS:
 Under the Rules of Procedure in initiated against the same official more than
Impeachment Proceedings (House once within a period of one year.
Impeachment Rules) adopted by the House
of Representatives (House), in cases where ISSUE:
an impeachment filed by a Member of the
House, or by a citizen and endorsed by a W/N POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Member, the impeachment proceedings are EXTENDS TO THOSE IMPEACHMENT
deemed initiated on the day that the PROCEEDINGS
Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or, if the Committee finds it to be
insufficient in substance, the day the house HELD:
affirms or overturns such finding. Under
Section 17 of said Rules, no impeachment SECTION 16 AND 17 OF RULE 5 of Rules
proceedings against the same official cannot of procedure in impeachment proceedings
be initiated within one (1) year from the date
approved by HOR are
a previous impeachment proceeding is
deemed initiated as provided in Section 16. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
June 2, 2003, Former president Estrada filed
2nd impeachment complaint against CJ
an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Davide is barred under par. 5 sec. 3 of Article
Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven associate X1 of the constitution.
justices for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public Trust and
other High Crimes. IMPORTANT TOPICS DISCUSSED.
On july 22 HOR adopted a resolution
directing the committee on justice to conduct To determine the merits of the issues raised in
investigation on the manner of disbursements the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn
and expenditures by CJ of judiciary to the Constitution itself which employs the well-
development Fund, settled principles of constitutional construction.
October 13, 2003, first impeachment
complaint dismissed. For the reason that: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the
sufficient in form but insufficient in words used in the Constitution must be given
manner
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
Four months and three weeks after filling of
are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
first impeachment complaint against CJ
Hilario Davide filed with Secretary General Land Tenure Administration
of the house by representative Gilbert
teodoro and felix fuentebella. Founded on
the alleged results of the abovementioned
legislative inquiry. This impeachment Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
complaint was accompanied by a anima. The words of the Constitution should be
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all House framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
Members.
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in
Thus arose the instant petitions against the
this wise:
House, et. al., most of which contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional for violating Section 5, A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction
Article XI of the Constitution, which states is the intention underlying the provision under
that no impeachment proceedings shall be consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in
the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain
the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,
in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose[
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon this Court, through Chief
Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional
Convention could not have dedicated a provision
of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection
2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms,not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretarythis Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is
not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult
the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are
of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in
the framers's understanding thereof
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR.
 VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-40004
January 31, 1975
MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS: The petitioner of the case assails the
nullity of some Proclamations, decrees and orders
that was passed at the time of then President
Ferdinand Marcos. They alleged that under the 1935
Constitution and 1973 Constitution, President
Ferdinand Marcos does not hold any legal office nor
possess any lawful authority, making some of the
Proclamations, decrees and orders void.
Issue: Whether or not the issued
Proclamations, decrees and orders are valid.
Held: Since President Marcos was the only
incumbent President at the time, because his term
under the 1935 Constitution has yet to expire on
December 30, 1973, the Constitutional Convention,
in approving the new Constitution, had in mind only
him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new
Constitution it provided that all the proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated,
issued or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding and effective even after lifting of
Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution,
unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President,
or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly.
The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of
authority to legislate, but a recognition of such
power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial Law.
The court ruled Presidential Proclamations nos.
1366 and 1366-A and Presidential Decrees nos.
629,630, 637 and 637-A to be valid and the petition
was dismissed.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS
This is a petition to seek the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by the Pres. Corazon Aquino on July 25,
1987. The assailed provision is Section 1 of the
above-mentioned article which allows the cabinet
members, undersecretary or executive secretaries
and other appointive officials of executive
department to hold 2 positions in the government
and government corporations.
According to petitioners, the cited provision
contravenes the provision of Article VII, Section 13
which states that The President, Vice- President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. xxxxxxxx The unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution meant that
exceptions must be clearly and expressly provided in
the Constitution.
On the other hand, respondents claim is that the said
phrase makes reference to Article VII, Section 7 par
(2) which states that Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any
subdivision..
ISSUE:
1. WON the prohibition in Sec 13, Article VII are
concerned admit of the broad exception made for
appointive official in general under Section 7,
Article I-XB.
2. WON EO 284 be declared unconstitutional
HELD:
1. NO. The intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official
family in terms of holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere
 because they exercised more powers and
therefore, more checks and restraints on
them are called for because there is more
possibility of abuse in their cases.
A foolproof yardstick in
constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, the Court in construing
a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.
Section 7 of Art IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public official and
employees, while Section 13 of Art VII is
meant to be an exception applicable only to
President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Therefore, the phrase unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution in Section 13,
Art VII cannot refer to broad exceptions
provided in the Sec 7 because it would
obliterate the distinctions so carefully set by
the framers of the Constitution.
The said phrase must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution
itself: a) V-P being appointed as member of
the Cabinet; b) acting as president in
instances provided under Sec 7, Art VII; c)
ex-officio member of the JBC.
2. Yes. EO No. 284 is unconstitutional, thus
declared null and void. In the light of the
construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than 2 positions in the government
and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
Vera vs. Avelino
Facts:
COMELEC submitted to the President and to the
Congress of the Philippines, its report on national
elections. The report contains that the election held
in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan
and Tarlac did not reflect the true and free
expression of the popular will due to the acts of
terrorism and violence in the said provinces. When
the Senate convened, there has been protests against
the election of the petitioners. They are Jose O.
VERA, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero.
Petitioners are included among the sixteen
candidates for senator receiving the highest number
of votes. There was a resolution approved referring
to the report by the COMELEC and ordering that
petitioners shall not sworn, nor seated as members
of the senate. The resolution is called PENDATUN,
wherein it provides for the situation in the said
provinces above and a resolution on what should the
country must do in condemning all the acts that seek
to defeat the popular will. It also contains that the
pending hearing and decision on the protest lodged
against the petitioners election, wherein the
terrorism averred in the report of the COMELEC
and in the report of the Provost Marshal, constitutes
the ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
The Petitioners immediately took an action against
their colleagues praying for an order to annul and
compel the respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats and exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
Respondents traverse the jurisdiction of SC and
assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the petition to annul the
Pendatun Resolution can be decided by the SC
Ruling: The court refused to intervene and affirmed
the inherent right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership. The Senate did
not exceed in their powers for before the
organization of the Commonwealth and the
promulgation of the Constitution, each House of the
Congress exercises the power to defer oath-taking of
any member against whom a protest had been
lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension
was necessary, before the final decision of the
contest. It was also held that the result of the
elections in the said provinces were not the
legitimate expression of the voters choice and that
the Senate made no grievous mistake in foreseeing
the probability that, upon proof of such widespread
lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annul the
returns in that region and declare herein petitioners
that they are not entitled to seats in the Senate.
TAADA VS. CUENCO
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Ta.ada and Diosdado
Macapagal sought to oust respondent senators from
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that
the that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the
Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and
in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the
corresponding oath of office therefor", said
respondents had "acted absolutely without
color of appointment or authority and are
unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising
the powers of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal."
Respondents assail the courts jurisdiction to
entertain the
petition, upon the ground that the power to choose
six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been
expressly conferred
by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact
that the draft
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to
the respective political
parties the right to elect their respective
representatives in the Electoral
Commission provided for in the original
Constitution of the Philippines, and
that the only remedy available to petitioners herein
"is not in the judicial
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public
opinion."
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar raises merely
a political question.
RULING:
Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in this treatise
the wellknown
and well-established principle is considered that it is
not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the
policy of legislative or
executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary
powers are granted by
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which
those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The
courts, therefore, concern
themselves only with the question as to the existence
and extent of these
discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative
and
executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of
government because in very many cases their action
is necessarily
dictated by considerations of public or political
policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course
will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the
executive to exercise
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by,
statute, but, within
these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a
given status exists, and
these determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom,
may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on
the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is
the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from
which we quote:. "It is
well-settled doctrine that political questions are not
within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory
provisions. "It is not easy, however, to define the
phrase `political
question', nor to determine what matters, fall within
its scope. It is
frequently used to designate all questions that lie
outside the scope of the
judicial questions, which under the constitution, are
to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the
government."
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question
whether
certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid
for non-compliance
with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a
political one and may be
settled by the Courts.
The term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum
(supra), it refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in
the present case. Here, the court is called upon to
decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the
Senate, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in
the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party
having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a
political question. The Senate is not clothed with
"full discretionary
authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The
exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which
are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly
within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity the proceedings
in connection therewith.
STATCON: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION:
The spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof, and whatever is in the spirit of the
statute is within the statute although it is not within
the letter therof, while that which is within the letter,
but is not within the spirit of the statute is not within
the statute.
Doctrine of contemporaneous or practical
construction: As a general rule, it is only in cases of
substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine has
any application. Where the provision is clear, a
contemporaneous or practical executive
interpretation is entitled to no weight and will not be
allowed to distort or in any way change its natural
meaning.
MANDATORY VS. DIRECTORY: Prime object is
to ascertain the legislative intent, which must be
obtained from all the surrounding circumstances,
and determination of which does not depent on the
form of the stature. Consideration must be given on
its nature, its object, and the consequences which
would result from construing it. Words of permissive
character may be given a mandatory significance IN
ORDER TO EFFECT THE LEGISLATIVE
INTENT. On the other hand, the language of the
statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed
directory whenever legislative purpose can best be
carried out by such construction, and legislative
intent does not require a mandatory construction.
ROMAN CATH. APOSTOLIC ADM. OF
DAVAO INC., vs. LAND REG. COM., et al.
-Mateo L. Rodis (Filipino & Davao Resident)
executed a deed of sale for a parcel of land with
TCT No. 2263 to Roman Catholic Adm. Of Davao
Inc., with Msgr. Clovis Thibault as incumbent on
October 4, 1954
-When presented to the Registry of Deeds of Davao,
the latter stated its resolution in the case of
Carmelite Nuns, requiring petitioners to file an
affidavit declaring 60% of the members of their
corporation as Filipino citizens
-The 2 cases (this case and that of Carmelite Nuns)
are NOT similar since the case of Carmelite Nuns
have 5 incorporators and that the property was
donated to it,
While in the case at bar, Roman Cath. Apostolic
Adm., is a Corporation Sole and the property sold to
it would be owned by the totality of the Catholic
Population in Davao not by the corporation itself.
-The Land Registration Commissioner ordered the
Registry of Deeds to DENY Registration of TCT
No. 2263 because there was no proof regarding the
60% Membership of Filipino citizens that is being
required.
** Petitioners contend that
1) Corporation Law and Canon Law states that
corporation sole are merely ADMINISTRATORS of
properties that they may acquire
2) Catholic Church is Composed of a) Clergy and b)
Lay Members (people)
3) Bureau of Census and Statistics show that more
than 80% of the population of the area are Catholic
which is more than enough to satisfy the 60%
requirement.
**Respondents contend that
1) Although Petitioner is not the owner of the
property,it still has the power to exercise right of
ownership over said land held in trust by it.
2) Conglomeration of persons CANNOT be
pointed out as the recipient nor can the masses
(people) be referred to as the beneficiary who
can exercise a right of ownership over said land.
-Sections 153, 155, 157 of Corporation Law states
that there is no room for doubt that bishops in a
Corporation Sole can act as ADMINISTRATORS
for the church and that such properties acquired
upon the death of the incumbent (bishop,
archbishop, etc.) will pass to his SUCCESSOR not
to his heirs.
-Roman Catholic Church has NO nationality and
framers of the constitution did not have in mind such
religious corporations when they came up with the
60% requirement of Filipino citizens being members
of corporations (Sec.159 and Sec. 13 of Public Act
1459)
-The nationality of the head of a diocese has no
bearing on his functions which are LIMITED to
ADMINISTRATOR of temporalities (properties
held in trust, temporarily for the people and the
church in this case) and that the Corporation Sole is
CANNOT considered as aliens since they have no
nationality at all.
-a Corporation Sole is only entitled to purchase,
convey, sell, lease, etc.and deal with real properties
and personal properties if it pursuant to the purpose
why such corporation was formed.
-Sec.159 states that corporation sole may only
purchase and hold real estate and personal properties
for its church, charitable, benevolent and educational
purposes. They hold properties in trust for their
locality or diocese.
RULING : LRC's decision (Land Reg. Com.) is
REVERSED and Registry of Deeds is ordered to
register deed of sale

WILLIAM CHIONGBAN, petitioner
vs
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Customs,
JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as Collector of
Customs of the Port of Cebu, and
VICENTE DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as
General Manager of the Philippine Shipping
Administration, respondents
PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
intervenor
[No. L-2007. January 31, 1949]
FACTS
William Chiongban, petitioner, sought to
permanently prohibit respondent Custom officials
from cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioners vessels and respondent Philippine
Shipping Administration from rescinding the sale of
three vessels to petitioner. The bases of the
respondents acts are first, their belief that the
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not
qualified by law to operate and own vessels of
Philippine registry and second, that the petitioner
violated the contract of sale between them, on the
ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having
alleged in the said contract that his father was a
naturalised Filipino citizen.
ISSUES
1. Whether of not the petitioner is a Filipino citizen
2. Whether or not the privilege of citizenship
granted by subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of
the 1935 constitution is strictly personal and
does not extend to the children of the grantee
HELD
1. YES. The petitioner is a Filipino citizen pursuant
to subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which states that-
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands
of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongban, a Chinese
citizen and father of the petitioner, was elected to
and held the office of municipal councillor of the
town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis, a fact that is
established from the findings from NBI, Opinion of
the Secretary of Justice and as admitted by
respondents in their pleadings.
It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the
Constitution, the petitioners father became a citizen
by virtue of the above stated provision. The
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a
Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article
VI) of the Constitution, his father having become a
Filipino citizen upon the adoption of the
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the
settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate
minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
1. NO. The members of the Constitutional
Convention would have not dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it
could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, section 1, Article VI of the 1935
constitution, they permitted, if not willed, that
said provision should function to the full extent
of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone,
but i conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document. They adopted said provision
fully cognisant of the transmissive essence of
citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it
been their intention to curtail the transmission of
citizenship in such a particular case, they would
have so clearly stated.
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the
issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and respondent Custom officials are
hereby ENJOINED from cancelling the registration
certificates of petitioners vessels and respondent
Philippine Shipping Administration is hereby
ENJOINED from rescinding the sale of the three
vessels made to petitioner. No costs.
It is so ordered.
GALMAN v. PAMARAN
138 SCRA 294, August 30, 1985
PONENTE: Cuevas, J.
FACTS: the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal
On August 31, 1983, former Senator Benigno S. prosecution. Article IV, Section 20 of the
Aquino, Jr. who was returning to the country after a Constitution (now Article III, Sectiosn 12 and 17)
long sojourn abroad was gunned down to death. P.D. renders inadmissible any confession obtained in
1886 was promulgated an ad hoc Fact Finding violation thereof. The rule applies not only to
Board, more popularly known as the Agrava Board, confessions but also to admissions, whether made by
in order to determine the facts and circumstances a
surrounding the killing and to allow a free unlimited
and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the
tragedy. Pursuant to the power vested in it by P.D.
1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein
various witnesses appeared and testified and/or
produced documentary and other evidence. Two
Information for murder one for the killing of Sen.
Benigno S. Aquino and on for the killing of Rolando
Galman were filed based on a preliminary
investigation, in accordance with the two reports
submitted by the Board In both criminal cases,
private respondents were charged as accessories,
along with several principals, and one accomplice.
The prosecution, represented by the Office of the
petitioner, offered as part of its evidence, the
individual testimonies of private respondents before
the Agrava Board. Private respondents, through their
counsel, objected the admission of the evidences
contending that it will be in derogation of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and
violate the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.
Petitioner opposed, contending that said immunity
was not available to them because of their failure to
invoke their right against self-incrimination before
the Fact Finding Board.
Respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
which was assailed in the two petitions, admitting all
the evidences offered by the prosecution except the
testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the
private respondents in view of the immunity granted
by P.D. 1886.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies by the private
respondents who did not invoke their rights against
self-incrimination before the Agrava Board are
admissibl in evidence.
HELD:
No. According to fair play and due process, private
respondents should have been informed of their
rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements given by them may be used against them.
It is for this reason that the court cannot subscribe to
the view of the petitioners that the right against self-
incrimination must be invoked before the Agrava
Board to prevent use of any given statement against
witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a
criminal proceeding or any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense.
(FOR STATCON TOPIC: AIDS TO
CONSTRUCTION)
Any interpretation of a statue which will give it a
meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be
avoided. If two or more constructions or
interpretations could be resorted to, the one which
will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even
though the one that would be disregarded shows the
more usual and apparent import of the language
used. A statue must be given a reasonable
construction that will bring it within the fundamental
law.
Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections
192 SCRA 100
December 4, 1990
Facts: Article 10, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution states that autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera shall be
created. In line with this, the people of the provinces
of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao, and the city of Baguio voted in a
plebiscite regarding the implementation of Republic
Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. However, the results showed that only the
Ifugao Province approved by a majority vote, while
the mentioned provinces and city devastatingly
rejected.
Subsequently, the respondent issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has
been approved by majority of the votes in the
province of Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice also
issued a memorandum stating that only the
provinces and city voting for the establishment of
the CAR shall be included in the said region.
Therefore, only the province of Ifugao legally and
validly constitutes the CAR. This resulted to the
petitioner filing a petition for the declaration of non-
ratification of the Organic Act for the Region
upholding that the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 6766 require that the said region should be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: Whether or not the Ifugao Province alone can
legally and validly constitute the CAR.
Held: A well-established rule in statutory
construction provides that the language of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense it has
in common use, and that the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. This rule is applied in this case.
Upon the application of this rule, it then follows that
the words (provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas) mentioned in Article 10, Section
15 of the Constitution indicates that the region to be
created should be composed of more than one
constituent unit, as the word in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is supported by
the fact that the 13 regions in the Philippines are
groupings of contiguous provinces made up of
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures.
Also, the entirety of Republic Act No., 6766 is
instilled with provisions against a sole province
constituting the region. Implementing Republic Act
No. 6766 would not only violate the provisions of
the Constitution, but also of the Act itself.
Therefore, the petition is granted. Resolution No.
2259 is declared null and void, and the Ifugao
Province alone cannot legally and validly constitute
the CAR.
III. Ordinary Sense vs Technical Sense
Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 239 (1951)
Facts:
These are two special civil actions
of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners
against the respondents. It is alleged that the
respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully
the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to
appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before
said tribunals on the ground prohibited by section
17, Article 17 of the Constitution:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly
be financially interested in any contract with the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Congress during his term of office.
He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral
Tribunals or before any court in any civil case
wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in
any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of
the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office. . . .
Issue:
Whether the prohibition contained in
the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is
applicable to the petitioners.
Ruling:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that
it is applicable, because the words "any court"
includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-
martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of
the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It must be taken as established that where
words are used which have both a restricted and a
general meaning, the general must prevail over the
restricted.
What is a Court-Martial?
The court-martial is a court at all, and
within its field of action, as fully a court of
law and justice as is any civil tribunal. In the
language of Attorney General Cushing, a
court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by
the same authority that any other exists.
In re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was
held: That court-martial are lawful tribunals
existing by the same authority as civil courts
of the United States
Court-martial cases are criminal cases
within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI,
of the Constitution is also evident, because
the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or
punished by the Articles of War are offenses
against the Republic of the Philippines.
Court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It
has no civil jurisdiction whatever and it
cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or
award damages in favor of an individual. Its
judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil
verdict.
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and
the prosecution of an accused before it is a
criminal and not an administrative case, it
would be a bar to another prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense (Right of the
accused against double jeopardy)
It is obvious that there exist the intention of the
framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17,
Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution for prohibiting
the appearance of members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives as counsel for the accused
in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as
such in civil courts, because the independence of
civil court's judges is guaranteed by our
Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to
appear as counsel for the accused in court-
martial, the respondents did not unlawfully
exclude them from the enjoyment of any right,
and hence the petitions for mandamus in these
two cases are denied with costs against the
petitioners.
Ruffy et al vs Chief of Staff
Facts:
 1. Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial
Commander of Phil. Constabulary in
Mindoro at the outbreak of war. Other
petitioners were corporals.
2. When Japanese landed in Mindoro,
petitioners retreated to the mountains instead
of surrendering and led a guerilla movement
called Bolo Combat Team (BCT).
3. At the time, Mindoro was part of the 6 th
Military District (6th MD) of the Philippine
Army. The Commanding Officer (CO),
Colonel Peralta, assigned Major Ramon
Ruffy as the Acting Commander, while other
petitioners were promoted or given ranks.
4. 6th MD sent Lt. Col. Enrique Jurado to be the
CO of BCT relieving Mjr. Ruffy as Acting
CO. Jurado gave petitioners funds for palay
and salary.
5. Lt. Col. Jurado was allegedly killed by the
petitioners. After the crime, it was alleged,
they seceded from the 6th MD.
6. Ruffy was acquitted. Other personnel,
Fransisco and Furtos, filed the petition at bar.
Issue:
1. Were the petitioners subjected to military law
at the time of the commission of the offense?
Petitioners contended that political law was
suspended during war.
2. Is the 93d Articles of War unconstitutional,
which is the imposition of death penalty for
crime of murder by military court? Art VII of
Constitution states that Supreme Court has
jurisdiction on all crim cases which impose
death penalty.
Held:
1. Yes, they are subject to military jurisdiction
because they accepted appointments as
officers of the BCT even though they were
originally guerillas. The suspension for
political law only applies to civilians. In
times of enemy occupation, officers are not
relieved of their duties.
2. No, the 93d Articles of War is constitutional.
Court Martial is executive in nature not
juridical. It is a constitutional function of the
president, as the commander in chief,
provided to him by Congress to aid him in
enforcing discipline and order.
Note: Dissenting opinion states that the court still
has power to review Court Martial decision.
Krivenko v Registry of Deeds
Facts: Alexander Krivenko bought a residential lot
from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by
the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds
of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko
then brought the case to the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from
which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
Issue: w/n an alien under our Constitution may
acquire residential land
Held: NO
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as
follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization
of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inaguration of
the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding
 twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of
water "power" in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.
Under this constitutional provision, lands are
classified into three types: agricultural, mineral,
timber. In several SC decisions, the court held that
the phrase public agricultural lands are those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
timber nor mineral lands. (definition followed in
many court decisions) The Court ruled that in
determining whether a land is agricultural or not, the
test is not only as to whether it is actually
agricultural, but its susceptibility to cultivation for
such purposes. At the time the Constitution was
adopted, the term public agricultural land was
construed as to include residential lands.
As a general rule, words that have, or have been
used in, a technical sense or those that have been
judicially construed to have a certain meaning
should be interpreted according to the sense in
which they have been previously used, although
the sense may vary from the strict or literal
meaning of the words.
Case: Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
Parties: Pamatong (Plaintiff)- filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for President
COMELEC (Respondent)- denied the
Certificate of Candidacy and subsequent motion for
reconsideration
Salient Facts:
1. Petitioner filed his certificate for candidacy;
denied by respondent
2. COMELEC declared petitioner and others
nuisance candidates because they cannot affors
nationwide campaign and/not nominated by a
political party
3. Petitioner invoked "equal access to opportunities
for public service" under Section 26, Art. 2 of the
1987 Const. In effect, respondent amended such
provision when they disqualified him as a candidate
4. This provision is only a privilege and has not
ripen into an enforceable right
5. Same provision is not self-executing, as it is
merely a guideline for legislative or executive
action; hence, the State is not mandated to take
positive acts in accordance with it.
Gonzales Vs. COMELEC
November 9, 1967
Facts: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed.
This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the
plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the
general national elections shall be held (November
14, 1967). his was questioned by Ramon Gonzales
and other concerned groups as they argued that this
was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who
would be more interested in the issues involved in
the general election rather than in the issues
involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the
procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA
4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of
Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question.
Issue: A. Whether or not the act of Congress in
proposing amendments is a political question.
B. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held
simultaneously with a general election.
Held: A. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It
must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. Such powers are not
constitutionally granted to Congress. On the
contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as
repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That
being, when Congress makes amendments or
proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as
Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is
not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether
or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.
B. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that
a plebiscite must only be held on a special election.
SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the
[1935] Constitution to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a general election.
The circumstance that the previous amendment to
the Constitution had been submitted to the people
for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
** Mandatory v Directory statutes: The only thing
about the mandatory and directory statutes is that the
R.A 4913 is a directory statute that provides
instruction. Thus, not making it unconstitutional
because it merely directs what to do on special
elections. Mandatory statutes are statutes that
prohibits or mandates a person to do something
positively or negatively. On the other hand,
Directory statutes are statutes that merely directs or
discretionary in nature.
Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No.81490, Aug.3l, 1988
Facts:
Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman
by Hagonoy Water District (HWD) from January 3,
1977 to May 16, 1985 when he was indefinitely
suspended and thereafter dismissed on July 12, 1985
for abandonment of work and conflict of interest.
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and underpayment of wages and
emergency cost of living allowance against HWD
with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(former name ng Department of Labor and
Employment).
HWD immediately moved for outright dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Being a government entity, HWD claimed, its
personnel are governed by the provisions of the
Civil Service Law, not by the Labor Code, and
protests concerning the lawfulness of dismissals
from the service fall within the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of
Labor and Employment.
Labor Court's Ruling:
The Labor Arbiter proceeded to hear and try the case
and rendered a Decision in favor of Villanueva.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate
petitioner immediately to his former position as
SERVICE Foreman, without loss of seniority rights
and privileges, with full backwages, including all
benefits provided by law, from the date he was
terminated up to his actual date of reinstatement.
In addition, respondents are hereby ordered
to pay the petitioner the amount of P4,927.50
representing the underpayments of wages from July
1983 to May 16, 1985.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. HWD's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Issue:
Whether local water districts are Government
Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCC) whose
employees are subject to the provisions of Civil
Service Law?
Supreme Court's Ruling:
Water Districts are government-owned and
-controlled corporations whose employees are
subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Laws.
PD 1479 wiped away PD 198's provision exempting
the employees of water districts from the application
of the Civil Service Law. While the 1987
Constitution provides that Civil Service embraces
GOCCs with original charters, the applicable law at
that time was that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction to render the decision that he in fact
rendered. The Court merely stated that for
whatever that effect might be, and it will deal
with that when an appropriate case comes before
the Court- the Court believes that the 1987
Constitution did not operate retrospectively so as
to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to
render a decision which, under the law applicable
at the time of the rendition of such decision, was
clearly outside the scope of competence of the
Labor Arbiter. NLRC had nothing before it which
it could pass upon in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. A decision of the Labor Arbiter without
jurisdiction over the case is a complete nullity,
vesting no rights, imposing no liabilities.
Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Joese D. Filoteo Jr., a police
investigation of good standing and competence was
charged as mastermind for hijacking a postal
delivery van on May 1982 which contained pension
checks for U.S. government pensionados. During the
custodial investigation, petitioner executed a sworn
statement waiving his right to counsel under Sec. 20
art 4 of the 1973 Constitution. In the defense of the
petitioner, he alleged that he was abducted by force
and was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to be accompanied by counsel. He
also contents that he was forced and tortured to
admit in participation in the hijacing. On June 1987,
petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime charged against him and his co-
accused.
Issues: Are the written statements, the extra judicial
confessions executed by the accused without the
presence of a counsel admissible as evidence against
him?
Held: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim the 1983 ruling
in morales v enrile that the right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel which was later
incorporated in the 1987 constitution. The reason for
this is that the petitioners extra judicial confession
which needs the presence of a counsel and also his
waiver to the right to counsel was made in May
1982, a year before the ruling in the case of morales
was made. The prospective application of laws
according to Art 4 of the civil code shall likewise be
applied to judge made laws in pursuant to art 8 of
the civil code. Furthermore, only penal laws can be
given retroactive effect if it benefits the accused, and
not the Constitutional provisions layed down by the
constitution.
Explanation:
Nangyari lahat to during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. According to the latter:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation xxx
shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel. xxx Any confession obtained in volation of
this section shall be inadmissible as evidence.
Therefore, walang sinasabi sa 1973 constitution na
bawal i-waive ung right to counsel and the presence
of a counsel in case of such waiver.
UNLIKE in the 1987 constitution, wherein
naincorporate na ung ruling sa case ni Morales v.
Enrile which provides the right against self
incrimination and right to counsel during custodial
investigation pero this time sinabi na these rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel
Therefore, ung waiver ng petitioner ng right to
counsel makes the extra judicial confessions
admissible as evidence under the 1973 Constitution.
Co vs. Electoral tribunal
Facts: The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal declared that the
respondent Jose Ong Jr. is natural born
Filipino Citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
Congressional election for the 2nd district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the
candidates for the position of representative
are the petitioners; Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent.
Jose Ong Jr was proclaimed the duly lected
representative aof the 2nd district of
Northern Samar. Herein petitioners filed
election protests on the grounds that Jose
Ong Jr, is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and no a resident of the 2nd
district of Northern Samar.
Issue: WON Jose Ong Jr is a citizen of the
Philippines
Ruling:
Yes. In 1895, the private respondents
grandfather, Ong te, arrived in the
Philippines from China and established
residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar. The father of the private respondent,
Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905
but was brought to Samar in 1915. He filed
with the Court an application for
naturalization and was declared a Filipino
citizen. In 1984, Jose Ong Jr. married a
filipina named Desiree Lim. For the
elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong Jr
registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar and voted there during those
elections. Under the 1973 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers and those born
of filipino mothers with an alien father were
placed on equal foooting. They were both
considered as natural born citixend.
Besides, private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
Further, the intent of the framers of Art VI,
sec 1 is to make it both prospective and
retroactive. A remedy is therefore provided,
which is to treat equally all those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine Citizenship either before
or after the effectivity of the Constitution.
The provision is curative in nature since it
was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women
smile emoticon