BPI vs FIRST METRO

FACTS:
On August 25, 1989, FMIC, through its Executive Vice President Antonio Ong, opened current account
and deposited METROBANK check no. 898679 of P100 million with BPI Family Bank (BPI FB) . Ong
made the deposit upon request of his friend, Ador de Asis, a close acquaintance of Jaime Sebastian,
then Branch Manager of BPI FB San Francisco del Monte Branch. Sebastians aim was to increase the
deposit level in his Branch.

BPI FB, through Sebastian, guaranteed the payment of P14,667,687.01 representing 17% per annum
interest of P100 million deposited by FMIC. The latter, in turn, assured BPI FB that it will maintain its
deposit of P100 million for a period of one year on condition that the interest of 17% per annum is paid
in advance.

This agreement between the parties was reached through their communications in writing.

Subsequently, BPI FB paid FMIC 17% interest or P14,667,687.01 upon clearance of the latters check
deposit.

However, on August 29, 1989, on the basis of an Authority to Debit signed by Ong and Ma. Theresa
David, Senior Manager of FMIC, BPI FB transferred P80 million from FMICs current account to the
savings account of Tevesteco Arrastre Stevedoring, Inc.

FMIC denied having authorized the transfer of its funds to Tevesteco, claiming that the signatures of
Ong and David were falsified. Thereupon, to recover immediately its deposit, FMIC, on September 12,
1989, issued BPI FB check no. 129077 for P86,057,646.72 payable to itself and drawn on its deposit
with BPI FB SFDM branch. But upon presentation for payment on September 13, 1989, BPI FB
dishonored the check as it was "drawn against insufficient funds

Consequently, FMIC filed A COMPLAINT against BPI FB. FMIC FILED an Information for estafa against
Ong, de Asis, Sebastian and four others. However, the Information was dismissed on the basis of a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused.

Issue:
Was THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN FMIC AND BPI FB A TIME DEPOSIT or an INTEREST-BEARING
CURRENT ACCOUNT WHICH, UNDER THE EXISTING BANK REGULATIONS, WAS AN ILLEGAL
TRANSACTION?

Is the bank liable for the unauthorized transfer of respondents funds to Tevesteco?

Decision:
We hold that the parties did not intend the deposit to be treated as a demand deposit but rather as an
interest-earning time deposit not withdrawable any time.
When respondent FMIC invested its money with petitioner BPI FB, they intended the P100 million as a
time deposit, to earn 17% per annum interest and to remain intact until its maturity date one year
thereafter.

Ordinarily, a time deposit is defined as "one the payment of which cannot legally be required within
such a specified number of days.

In contrast, demand deposits are "all those liabilities of the Bangko Sentral and of other banks which
are denominated in Philippine currency and are subject to payment in legal tender upon demand by
the presentation of (depositors) checks.

While it may be true that barely one month and seven days from the date of deposit, respondent FMIC
demanded the withdrawal of P86,057,646.72 through the issuance of a check payable to itself, the
same was made as a result of the fraudulent and unauthorized transfer by petitioner BPI FB of its P80
million deposit to Tevestecos savings account. Certainly, such was a normal reaction of respondent as
a depositor to petitioners failure in its fiduciary duty to treat its account with the highest degree of
care.

Under this circumstance, the withdrawal of deposit by respondent FMIC before the one-year maturity
date did not change the nature of its time deposit to one of demand deposit.

We have held that if a corporation knowingly permits its officer, or any other agent, to perform acts
within the scope of an apparent authority, holding him out to the public as possessing power to do
those acts, the corporation will, as against any person who has dealt in good faith with the corporation
through such agent, be estopped from denying such authority.
Petitioner maintains that respondent should have first inquired whether the deposit of P100 Million and
the fixing of the interest rate were pursuant to its (petitioners) internal procedures. Petitioners stance
is a futile attempt to evade an obligation clearly established by the intent of the parties. What
transpires in the corporate board room is entirely an internal matter. Hence, petitioner may not impute
negligence on the part of respondents representative in failing to find out the scope of authority of
petitioners Branch Manager. Indeed, the public has the right to rely on the trustworthiness of bank
managers and their acts. Obviously, confidence in the banking system, which necessarily includes
reliance on bank managers, is vital in the economic life of our society

Significantly, the transaction was actually acknowledged and ratified by petitioner when it paid
respondent in advance the interest for one year. Thus, petitioner is estopped from denying that it
authorized its Branch Manager to enter into an agreement with respondents Executive Vice President
concerning the deposit with the corresponding 17% interest per annum.
Yes. We uphold the finding of both lower courts that petitioner failed to exercise that degree of
diligence required by the nature of its obligations to its depositors. A bank is under obligation to treat
the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, whether such account consists only of a few
hundred pesos or of million of pesos.10 Here, petitioner cannot claim it exercised such a degree of care
required of it and must, therefore, bear the consequence.

BPI VS YU
BPI also imposed a charge of P4,052,046.11 in attorneys fees, the equivalentof 10% of the principal,
interest, and penalty charges.
T hi rd
. BPI did not provide documents to support its claim for foreclosure expenses of P446,726.74 and cost
of publication of P518,059.21.As an alternative to their three causes of action, the Yus claimed that BPI
was in estoppel to claim more than the amount stated in its published notices. Consequently, it must
turn over the excess bid of P6,035,311.46.After pre-trial, the Yus moved for summary judgment,
pointing out that based on theanswer, the common exhibits of the parties, and the answer to the
written interrogatories to the sheriff, no genuine issues of fact exist in the case. The Yuswaived their
claim for moral damages so the RTC can dispose of the case through a summary judgment. Initially,
the RTC granted only a partial summary judgment. It reduced the penaltycharge of 36% per annum to
12% per annum until the debt would have been fully paid but maintained the attorneys fees as
reasonable considering that BPI already waivedthe P1,761,511.36 that formed part of the attorneys
fees and reduced the rate of attorneys fees it collected from 25% to 10% of the amount due. The RTC
ruled thatfacts necessary to resolve the issues on penalties and fees had been admitted by the parties
thus dispensing with the need to receive evidence.Still, the RTC held that it needed to receive evidence
for the resolution of the issues of (1) whether or not the foreclosure and publication expenses were
justified; (2) whether or not the foreclosure of the lot in Pili, Camarines Sur, was valid given that the
proceeds of the foreclosure of the properties in Legazpi City sufficiently covered the debt; and
(3)whether or not BPI was entitled to its counterclaim for attorneys fees, moral damages,and
exemplary damages. The Yus moved for partial reconsideration. On January 3, 2006 the RTC
reconsideredits earlier decision .BPI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
86577. But the CA rendered judgment on January 23, 2008, affirming the RTC decision in all
respects.And when BPI asked for reconsideration, the CA denied it on July 14, 2008, hence, thebanks
recourse to this Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOAN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM WERE VALID ANDENFORCEABLE.

RULING:
BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues thatthe parties
raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were valid andenforceable; 2) whether or
not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in interest;
4) whether or not the Yus are stopped from questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a
compromiseagreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses
of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violatedthe Truth in Lending
Act.But these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established bythe pleadings
and the admissions of the parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any

Bank ruling declared valid the penalty charges that were stipulated in the promissory notes. What the
Court disallowed in that case was the collection of a handling chargethat the promissory notes did not
contain. The Court has affirmed that financial charges are amply disclosed if stated in the promissory
note in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Arcilla,Jr.

The Court there said, Under Circular 158 of the Central Bank, the lender is required to include the
information required by R.A. 3765 in the contract covering the credit transaction or any other
document to be acknowledged and signed by the borrower. In addition, the contract or document shall
specify additional charges, if any, which will becollected in case certain stipulations in the contract are
not met by the debtor. In this case, the promissory notes signed by the Yus contained data, including
penaltycharges, required by the Truth in Lending Act. They cannot avoid liability based on arigid
interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act that contravenes its goal. Nonetheless,the courts have
authority to reduce penalty charges when these are unreasonable andiniquitous. Considering that BPI
had already received over P2.7 million in interest andthat it seeks to impose the penalty charge of 3%
per month or 36% per annum on thetotal amount dueprincipal plus interest, with interest not paid
when due added to andbecoming part of the principal and also bearing interest at the same ratethe
Courtfinds the ruling of the RTC in its original decision reasonable and fair. Thus, the penaltycharge of
12% per annum or 1% per month is imposed.
Three.As for the award of attorneys fee, it bei

In Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu, the Supreme Court explained that
to resolve the issue of the excessive charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC
simply had to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and
the real estate mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the
admissions and other disclosures between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not
only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution of these documents but also what they stated,
the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence of the parties.

Be that as it may, BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the
following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between them were
valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3) whether or not
the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from questioning the
foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not
the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether
or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act.(RULES OF COURT, Rule 35, Section 5).
 But, the Supreme Court held that these are issues that could be readily resolved based on
the facts established by the pleadings and the admissions of the parties.(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures, August 16, 2004). Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or
item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such
a great waste of time and resources. Otherwise stated, a summary judgment is apt when the essential
facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact.(BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, INC., vs. SPS. NORMAN AND ANGELINA YU, G.R. No. 184122, January 20, 2010,
ABAD, J.).

CHINA BANK vs Ortega

Facts:

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To
satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the ChinaBanking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the
CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a
court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information concerning to bank deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the
China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank
would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that
the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and
the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It
is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their
assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank

EQUITABLE PCI VS NG NGOR

facts: On October 7, 2001, respondents Ngor and Go filed an action for amendment and/or reformation
of documents and contracts against Equitable and its employees. They claimed that they were induced
by the bank to avail of its peso and dollar credit facilities by offering low interests so they accepted
and signed Equitables proposal. They alleged that they were unaware that the documents contained
escalation clauses granting Equitable authority to increase interest without their consent. These were
rebutted by the bank. RTC ordered the use of the 1996 dollar exchange rate in computing respondents
dollar-denominated loans. CA granted the Banks application for injunction but the properties were sold
to public auction.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an extraordinary deflation

RULING: Extraordinary inflation exists when there is an unusual decrease in the purchasing power of
currency and such decrease could not be reasonably foreseen or was beyond the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the obligation. Deflation is an inverse situation.

Despite the devaluation of the peso, BSP never declared a situation of extraordinary inflation.
Respondents should pay their dollar denominated loans at the exchange rate fixed by the BSP on the
date of maturity.

INTENGAN VS CA

Facts:

Citibank filed a complaint for violation of the Corporation Code against 2 of its officers. The complaint
was attached with the affidavit of Vic Lim, VP of Citibank, who was then instructed by the higher
management of the bank to investigate the anomalous/highly irregular activities of the said officers. As
evidence, Lim annexed bank records purporting to establish the deception practiced by the officers.
Some of the documents pertained to the dollar deposits of petitioners. As an incident to the foregoing,
petitioners filed respective motions for the exclusion and physical withdrawal of their bank records that
were attached to Lims affidavit. The filing of Informations against private respondents was
recommended for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1405. Private respondents appealed before the
DOJ which ruled in their favor. Resort to the Court, referred the matter to the CA which then held that
the disclosure was proper and falls under the exception under R.A. No. 1405.

Issue:
Whether or not the disclosure falls under the exception under R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling: NO.
Actually, this case should have been studied more carefully by all concerned. The finest legal minds in
the country from the parties respective counsel, the Provincial Prosecutor, the Department of Justice,
the Solicitor General, and the Court of Appeals all appear to have overlooked a single fact which
dictates the outcome of the entire controversy. A circumspect review of the record shows us the
reason. The accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits; consequently, the applicable law is not
Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act (RA) No. 6426, known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of
the Philippines.
Thus, under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. Incidentally, the acts of
private respondents complained of happened before the enactment on September 29, 2001 of R.A. No.
9160 otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
A case for violation of Republic Act No. 6426 should have been the proper case brought against private
respondents. Private respondents Lim and Reyes admitted that they had disclosed details of
petitioners dollar deposits without the latters written permission. It does not matter if that such
disclosure was necessary to establish Citibanks case against Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino.
Lims act of disclosing details of petitioners bank records regarding their foreign currency deposits,
with the authority of Reyes, would appear to belong to that species of criminal acts punishable by
special laws, called malum prohibitum.

MARQUEZ VS DESIERTO
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at the bank where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are
involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v.
Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain George Trivinio purchased trail managers check and
deposited some of it to an account maintained at petitioners branch. Petitioner after meeting with the
FFIB Panel to ensure the veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera inspection. Petitioner being
unable to readily identify the accounts in question, the Ombudsman issued an order directing
petitioner to produce the bank documents. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the
court due to the clear conflict between RA 6770 and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner
in contempt before the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the accounts is an
allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling: NO.
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union
Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the
Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative
to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the
ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo,
et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening of the bank account for inspection.

SAMPAGUITA VS PNB

Facts
Sampaguita secured a loan from PNB in an aggregate amount of 8M pesos, mortgaging the properties
of Sampaguitas president and chairman of
theboard. Sampaguita also executed several promissory notes due ondifferent dates (payment dates).
The first promissory note had 19.5%interest rate. The 2nd and 3rd had 21.5%. a uniform clause therein
permitted PNB to increase the rate within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on
whatever policy it may adopt in the future x x x, without even giving prior notice to petitioners. There
was also a clause in the promissory note that stated that if the same is not paid 2 years after release
then it shall be converted to a medium term loan and the interestrate for such loan would apply.
Later on, Sampaguita defaulted on its payments and failed to comply with obligations on promissory
notes. Sampaguita thus requested for a 90 day extension to pay the loan. Again they defaulted, so
they asked for loan restructuring. It partly paid the loan and promised to pay the balance
lateron. AGAIN they failed to pay so PNB extrajudicially foreclosed themortgaged properties. It was sold
for 10M. PNB claimed that Sampaguita owed it 12M so they filed a case in court asking sampaguita to
pay ford eficiency. RTC found that Sampaguita was automatically entitled to the debt relief package of
PNB and ruled that the latter had no cause of action against the former. CA reversed, saying
Sampaguita was not entitled, thus orderedthem to pay the deficiency Appeal = Went to SC.
Sampaguita claims the loan was bloated so they dont really owe NB anymore, but it just overcharged
them!
Issues/Ruling:
W/N the loan accounts are bloated: YES. There is no deficiency; there is actually an overpayment of
more than 3M based on the computation of the SC. Whether PNB could unilaterally increase interest
rates: NO

Ratio:
Sampaguitas accessory duty to pay interest did not give PNB unrestrained freedom to charge any rate
other than that which was agreed upon. No interest shall be due, unless expressly stipulated in writing.
It would be the zenith of farcicality to specify and agree upon rates that could be subsequently
upgraded at whim by only one party to
the agreement. The unilateral determination and imposition of increased rates isviolative of the
principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308of the Civil Code. One-sided impositions do
not have the force of law between the parties, because such impositions are not based on the parties
essential equality. Although escalation clauses are valid in maintaining fiscal stability and retaining the
value of money on long-term contracts, giving respondent an unbridled right to adjust the interest
independently and upwardly would completely take away from petitioners the right to assent to an
important modification in their agreement and would also negate the element of mutuality in their
contracts. The clause cited earlier made the fulfillment of the contracts dependent exclusively upon
the uncontrolled will of respondent and was therefore void. Besides, the pro forma promissory notes
have the character of a contract dadhsion, where the parties
donot bargain on equal footing, the weaker partys [the debtors]participation being reduced to the
alternative to take it or leave it. Circular that lifted the ceiling of interest rates of usury law did
Not authorize either party to unilaterally raise the interest rate without the others consent. The
interest ranging from 26 percent to 35 percent in the statements of account -- must be equitably
reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Rates found to be iniquitous or
unconscionable are void, as if it there were no express contract thereon. Above all, it is undoubtedly
against public policy to charge excessively for the use of money. It cannot be argued that assent to the
increases can be implied either from the June 18, 1991 request of petitioners for loan restructuring or
from their lack of response to the statements of account sent by respondent. Such request does not
indicate any agreement to an interest increase; there can be no implied waiver of a right when there is
no clear, unequivocal and decisive act showing such purpose.

SALVACION VS CENTRAL BANK

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious
illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar
account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed
against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to
almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp.
but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign
currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action
for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a
foreign transient?

HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued
in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would
satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic
basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System
and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made
by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is
just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually,
if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would
result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

SORIANO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing a
loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan
in the bank, nor did the bank's officers approved or had any information about the said loan. The state
prosecutor conducted a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special
Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information against Soriano
for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.

Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:
that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter transmitted by the BSP to the
DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner
and oath of subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the complaint; and
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa uner par. 1(b) of Art.
315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as
amended by PD 1795), and therefore a person cannot be charged of both offenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of law.
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order denying a
Motion to Quash.

Ruling:
Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely transmitted for
preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not the letter transmitting them initiated the preliminary
investigation and therefore is the complaint which substantially complied with the manadory
requirements of law.

No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice
on his part to present special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.