DIGEST OF DIGESTS- GUARDIANSHIP

Nery v. Lorenzo

Facts:
1. A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo. The vendor
was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of whom later assailed the validity of
the said transaction. The latter contended that despite the order of the guardianship court authorizing the sale
of the lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was
conducted without notifying the two older siblings although they were already more than 14 years of age at
that time.

2. The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of the property likewise intervened in the action. The lower
court adjudged them the owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to be null and void.

3. The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the spouses (as to the 3/4
portion) by the guardian is valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their mother their participation
in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the children of the
deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorize the sale of the property

RULING:
No, the juridictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to the jurisdictional defect that
the minors over 14 years age were not notified. The probate court is therefor correct in not have authorized the sale
due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The rights of the young should never be ignored and it does not matter if
their guardian is their mother, as even in some cases, the interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.

Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to protect the rights of persons or
individuals who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position.

FELICIANO FRANCISCO, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO,

Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San

Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over
by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a
first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the
incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the
appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other grounds, the
petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting.

It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed to submit
an inventory, for which reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10)
days within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from guardianship. Petitioner
thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection
on the ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land
and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in his inventory.
The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order of April 17,
1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.

On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered his finding, relying
on the deed of sale as the best evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his
order dated September 12, 1980, respondent judge acknowledged that his finding was
"rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge
ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Accordingly he filed a
notice of appeal and record on appeal.

Meanwhile, the court, on motion of private respondent, required petitioner to submit

within three days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. (referring to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"

Before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed an "Omnibus Motion" with the
court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain guardian from exercising office; (2) order guardian
to surrender to court all properties of the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian .

Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion claiming that
the same was premature. The trial court, however, disregarded the opposition and required
petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within three (3) days his nomination for guardian of
Estefania San Pedro.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, but the trial court overruled the
same. Subsequently, the court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian of the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro.

Petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the
validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal of its decision
and appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact
that respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed another MR which The CA denied saying that:
Petitioner failed to object to the appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now
invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old
age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal.

Ruling: No.

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person,
called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs.11 A guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being, not
that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's property, as wen as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities,
but those of one in loco parentis as well.

Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of
the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in
determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the
physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals,
character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen
as the probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full
period during which guardianship will be necessary.

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by mental

incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented
from properly discharging the duties of his office. 14 A guardian, once appointed may be
removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days
after it is due to render an account or make a return.15

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for petitioner
Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court about the
"rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding
him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate
court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by
petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward.
While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to
be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal was still pending, We
hold and rule that respondent appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said
execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is
a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court will not
interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an
abuse thereof, 18 which We find none herein.

Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection
of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower
court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian. We agree with the reason given
by the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal that "an indefinite
continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12,
1980, relieving the present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."

UY VS. CA

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and
be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article
124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions
on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in
the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice
and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the
heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where
both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in
their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such
incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the
ground of lack of due process.

Encarnacion Lopez Vda de Baluyut vs. Luciano

Sotero Baluyut, died and left an estate allegedly valued at not less than 2 million pesos. He was
survived by his 75 year old widow (Encarnacion).
After his demise, Alfredo Baluyot (his alleged nephew), filed a petition for the settlement of
the decedent's estate, alleging that Encarnacion was mentally incapable of administering
her affairs and the decedent's estate or of acting as executrix of his will, if any. He prayed
that, after hearing, he be appointed administrator and, in the meantime, special
administrator.
Alfredo also filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a petition to declare
Encarnacion an incompetent and to place her under guardianship, alleging that due to a
head injury, she "has suffered impairment of her mental faculties" and that "she is no
longer competent, physically and mentally", to manage her affairs. He also claimed that he
was able, qualified and ready to act as her guardian.
Upon learning of the guardianship proceeding, Encarnacion filed a verified opposition
denying the allegations regarding her alleged mental incompetency. She alleged that the
 petition was filed after Alfredo's attempts to get possession of the decedent's estate were
aborted and after her residence was ransacked, resulting in the loss of important papers
and cash of not less than P100,000.She further alleged that the documents being used by
Alfredo against her were "the product not only of an illegal seizure but of a plain and
simple robbery"; that the filing of the petition was "an act of disrespect to the deceased",
since Alfredo was reared by the spouses Sotero Baluyut and Encarnacion Lopez; that
there could be no justice in declaring her an incompetent just to enable Alfredo to take her
properties.
Alfredo then filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be subjected to a neuropsychiatric
examination. Encarnacion filed a countermotion to remove said motion from the record.
Alfredo filed an amended petition praying that Mrs Cuesta and Mrs. Viray be appointed
guardians of the person and property of their sister, Mrs. Baluyut. The latter vehemently
opposed the amended petition. Later, Alfredo moved orally that he be considered
disqualified to act as guardian in view of his appointment as special administrator.
The lower court granted Alfredo's motions that he be considered disqualified to act as
guardian and that Mrs. Baluyut should undergo a neuropsychiatric examination at the PGH
before Doctors Lourdes V. Lapuz or Baltazar Reyes. The lower court also advised Mrs.
Cuesta and Mrs. Viray to file their own petition for appointment as guardians of Mrs.
Baluyut. On June 20, 1975 dismissed Alfredo's petition for guardianship.
On May 6, 1975, Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed in the same court their petition praying
that Mrs. Baluyut be declared an incompetent and that they be appointed as her guardian.
They repleaded the material allegations of Alfredo's amended petition.
They also filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be ordered to remain at the
conjugal residence and that she be placed under the court's protection or in her sisters' custody
so that she could be available for psychiatric examination. The lower court granted the motion
without hearing. Mrs. Baluyut filed a motion to set aside this order. She also filed a motion to
strike out the original petition for guardianship. The motion was alternatively labeled as an
opposition to the petition. Those motions were denied by the lower court.
Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray then filed a new petition for guardianship, without mentioning
previous petitions. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel claims that no filing fee was paid for docketing the
petition.
On August 12, Mrs. Baluyot was scheduled to undergo a neuropsychiatric examination
commissioned by Dr. Lapuz, pursuant to an order issued by the lower court.
On September 25 the lower court issued the questioned order declaring Mrs. Baluyut an
incompetent on the basis of the report of Doctor Lapuz.
Mrs. Baluyut was first examined by Ma. Paz U. Guzman, a psychologist. The latter found that
Mrs. Baluyut was "an integrated well-functioning individual", "an aware and responsive individual
who has a mind of her own", and "competent enough to understand her Position relative to the
case involving her".
Doctor Lapuz found that Mrs. Baluyut was aware of what the present court case was all about;
that Mrs. Baluyut spontaneously declared that she preferred to associate with the Espino spouses
because they treated her kindly, and that Mrs. Baluyut said that her other relatives were probably
envious and desired to get hold of her assets.
The evaluations of the psychologist and the psychiatrist, were reproduced, which according to
Mrs. Baluyut's counsel do not sustain the declaration of incompetency.
Summary of the report of Dr. Ma. Paz U. de Guzman, Clinical Psychologist, states:
o The subject's test data point up an integrated well-functioning individual. She reaches
Dull Normal limits on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale in comparison to her age
group. She is relevant and in touch with reality. No gross pathology is gathered from the
tests, Rather the results show an aware and responsive individual who has a mind of her
own. She is competent enough to understand her position relative to the case involving
her.
 o The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale yielded a Performance Scale IQ of 80 which
places the Subject's intellectual functioning at, the Dull Normal range. This represents
her current functioning and how she compares with her peer group. The subject scores
indicate her weakest area to be in visual motor functioning. This deterioration appears to
be purely a function of impaired vision and reduced motoric speed due to her advanced
age rather than a psychogenically based depression

Summary of the report of Dr. Lourdes V. Lapuz, Psychiatrist states:

In summary, the subject is a 74 year-old woman in whom the ageing process has
rendered the intellectual capacity sufficiently impaired to warrant a recommendation for
kind and consistent guidance in the handling of her affairs. She would best be helped by
people who are truly interested in her welfare. Being of a kind and dependent nature
herself, she needs to be looked after. She would be more confused and lost if
continuously in the center of hostilities. She needs a simple, well-directed life among kind
people who will tend to her day-to-day activities. She may be able to grasp a situation
correctly and superficially but she will need help regarding details and more complex
procedures .Psychological testing (Weschler Adult Intelligence; Bender-Gestalt;
Roscharch) shows functions at the dull normal, but otherwise integrated and in touch with
reality. The test also showed impairment for recent memory and in visual-motor functions.

Mrs. Baluyut's counsel observed that the lower court's order was "issued in a blitz
manner", without any hearing on the psychiatrist's report, without giving notice to her, and
without giving her a copy of the report.
On October 6, Mrs. Baluyot filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order declaring
her an incompetent. She called attention to the fact that in the administration proceeding,
Judge Vicente G. Ericta had declared her "competent" in his order dated March 24,1975
and that Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (the successor of Judge Ericta) in his order of November
27,1975 appointed Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix after concluding that she was competent
to act as such, considering the findings of Judge Ericta and of the psychologist and
Doctor Lapuz.
On October 8, the lower court scheduled a hearing to determine who should be appointed
guardian of Mrs. Baluyut. Her counsel did not appear at the hearing maybe because of his
pending motion for reconsideration. At that hearing, Mrs. Cuesta, Mrs. Viray, her husband Atty.
Fortunato Viray, Sr. and Alfredo G. Baluyut testified upon direct examination by Atty. Fortunato
Viray, Jr. The oral evidence was presented for the purpose of proving that Mrs. Viray was
competent to act as guardian of her sister, Mrs. Baluyut.
On October 20, the lower court motu proprio issued another order justifying its prior declaration
that Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent.
On October 24, the cross-examination of Doctor Lapuz was scheduled but the hearing was not
held due to the indisposition of Doctor Lapuz. In the meantime, Mrs. Baluyut filed another motion
to set aside the declaration of incompetency.
On December 10 the lower court issued an order denying Mrs. Baluyut's motion for
reconsideration. It ruled, that as a socio-legal court, it was duly empowered under section 29-B of
the charter of Quezon City to avail itself of the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists
and other qualified specialists (Republic Act No. 4836, creating the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court by amending Republic Act No. 537, the charter of Quezon City).The lower court
further held that the declaration of incompetency was interlocutory and that a prompt resolution of
the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's incompetency was imperative in view of the verified statements of
her two sisters and nephew-in-law that more than 1 million pesos had been "withdrawn by her
through the machinations of third persons".
On Dec. 29, 1975, the instant petition for review was filed wherein Mrs. Baluyut assailed for the
first time the lower court's jurisdiction to declare her an incompetent. She contends that her
competency is involved in the administration proceedings pending in Branch 18 of the CFI of
Quezon City which court (not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) has jurisdiction over the
issue as to her competency. She invokes section 29-A of the Quezon City charter which provides
 that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in guardianship
cases (paragraph 2), but which also provides an exception in its last sentence quoted below: If
any question involving any of the above matters (the seven classes of cases over which the court
has exclusive original jurisdiction) should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary
court said incident shall be determined in the main case.
Issues

1. WON the resolution in the guardianship proceeding as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency
should await the adjudication in the administrative proceeding (pending in the probate court) of
the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix; and
2. WON she was denied due process when the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court summarily
declared her an incompetent just one day after it received the psychiatrist's report and before that
report was set for hearing.

Ruling

1. Jurisdictional issue.
The lower court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding for the
guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut as an alleged incompetent. However, Mrs. Baluyut's
competency to act as administratrix was in issue in a Special Proceeding instituted by Alfredo
for the settlement of the estate of Sotero Baluyut, where he alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was
mentally incapable of administering the estate.
Mrs. Baluyut prayed in a counter-petition that she be appointed as administratrix, which was
granted by the court after finding that she was sui juris or was still in possession of her
capacidad de obrar o capacidad de ejercicio. In fact, she qualified as administratrix on
November 29, 1975.
The court held that in consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the charter
of Quezon City the guardianship proceedings should be suspended and should await
the adjudication of the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix.
As observed by Justices Barredo and Antonio during the deliberation in this case, the
incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency
that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. The mere fact that a person may be
incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed
under guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he
is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship.
Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction or
authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the
ordinary court has a salutary purpose. That provision or exception is designed to obviate the
rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the CFI Quezon City and the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court.

2. Issue as to alleged denial of the process.

Doctor Lapuz interviewed Mrs. Baluyut alone "for a psychiatric evaluation". The psychiatrist
in her report did not categorically recommend that a guardian be appointed for the
person and property of Mrs. Baluyut. Doctor Lapuz said that Mrs. Baluyut needed "kind
and consistent guidance in the handling of her affairs" and required "help regarding details
and more complex procedures".
The lower court did not notify the parties of the filing of the psychiatrist's report, did
not give them a chance to register their objections and did not set the report for
hearing as required in sections 9 to 11, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. Instead, on the
day following the receipt of the report, the lower court declared Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent
within the meaning of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the word
"incompetent" includes "persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
 and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation" (Sec.
2).
The declaration was made although the guardianship court had not examined the
alleged incompetent. Mrs. Baluyut's counsel in a pleading dated October 21, 1975 called
the guardianship court's attention to the fact that in the administration proceeding, Judge
Ericta had already found in his order of March 24, 1975 that she was "healthy and mentally
qualified". That conclusion was based on the examination made by Judge Ericta. During the
hearing of the motion for reconsideration, the Court placed the widow Encarnacion Lopez
Vda. de Baluyut on the witness stand and asked a series of questions to determine her
mental capacity. The cross-examination by the Court shows this woman is healthy and
mentally qualified.
The lower court, upon being apprised of the foregoing conclusion of the probate
judge, should have at least tried to take judicial notice of what was happening in the
administration proceeding. The voice of prudence should have cautioned the
guardianship court to avoid the issuance of a declaration contracting the probate
court's pronouncement on Mrs. Baluyut's capacity to act.
The court hold that Mrs. Baluyut's contention that she was denied due process of law
when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency
notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the Psychiatrist is tenable. A
finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence. That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to
justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs, Baluyut is an incompetent.
Here, the two courts of Quezon City made divergent findings on Mrs. Baluyut's
capacity to act (Art. 37, Civil Code). The guardianship court declared Mrs. Baluyut as
an incompetent and then scheduled the cross-examination of the psychiatrist so that
the parties could ascertain whether the declaration of incompetency is correct or not.
The said court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined
Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Moreover, the
lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court for appointment of guardians.
Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and
place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent
must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has
been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of
their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).
Undoubtedly, the lower court could consult a psychiatrist but the normal procedure is to hear
first the evidence of the parties and examine the prospective ward. The testimony of the
alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the determination of whether he should
be placed under guardianship. WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of September 25 and
December 10, 1975 are set aside.

REBECCO PANLILIO, ERLINDA PANLILIO and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners, v.

HON. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA, Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati Branch 149 and FE V.
FEDERIS, Respondents.

FACTS:Parties: Petitioners: Rebecco Panlilio, natural paternal grandfather Erlinda

Panlilio, natural paternal grandmother, Jose Marcel Panlilio, natural father of Michael
Lancelot F. Panlilio, born July 7, 1990

Respondents: Fe V. Federis, natural mother ofMichael Lancelot F. Panlilio, born July 7, 1990
Hon. Josefina G. Salonga, Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati Branch 149
 December 14, 1993 Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court
stationed in Naic, Cavite, appointed Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio guardian ad litem of
Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio pending determination of the merits of the special proceedings
initiated by the grandparents to be appointed as guardians ad litem of the ward. Basis of the
petition: cruelty, moral depravity and gross neglect of private respondent.
December 22, 1993 Fe V. Federis filed a a petition for habeas corpus. Case was later
assigned to Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati. Argument: the parental
authority of the mother over her illegitimate child and the general proscription that no child
under 7 years shall be separated from the mother except under certain cases.
December 23, 1993 Makati RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus.
December 29, 1993 Makati RTC issued a hold departure order of Michael Lancelot F.
Panlilio.
January 10, 1994 Hon. Josefina G. Salonga gave verbal order to produce the body
of the minor child on January 10, 1994 which prompted petitioners to forthwith file the
petition at bench
ISSUE: Whether or not the Makati RTC has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition
filed by the mother/private respondent.
RULING: No, the Makati RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter since the Cavite RTC
has already took cognizance of the case. The various branches of the [RTC] being co-equal
cannot interfere with the respective cases of each branch, much less a branchs order or
judgment. SC hereby directed Hon. Salonga to dismiss the habeas corpus case.
RATIO: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an
insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the Makati court to entertain the habeas
corpus case on account of the previous assumption of jurisdiction by the Cavite court, and
the designation of petitioners as guardians ad litem of the ward.
The doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary
principle of higher importance in the administration of justice that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.
The immediate assumption of authority by the Makati court, although possibly
motivated by a noble goal, is tantamount to defeating the very essence of the order
emanating from the Cavite court. While habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain
custody of minor children as enunciated in Salvana and Saliendra v. Gaela (55 Phil. 680
[1931]; 5-B, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 64) yet this principle is
understood to presuppose that there is no other previous case whose issue is necessarily
interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding. Verily, the existence of an
anterior suit, such as the termination of private respondents parental authority in the Cavite
Court, coupled with the order appointing principal petitioners as guardians ad litem of the
ward, is sufficient to momentarily stave off private respondents short-cut and subtle
attempt to regain custody of her son at another forum, by reason of the corollary principle
that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of
its own jurisdiction.
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts"
It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the
appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court
of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to
civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the
proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on
the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations
exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of
jurisdiction and of the process. (14 Am, Jur. 435-436, cited in Francisco, Vicente, Revised
Rules of Court, pp. 57-58, Vol. I, 1965 ed.).
 Luna v. IAC

Facts:

Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna
who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her
correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as
Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.

Shirleys parents gave her to the petitioner spouses who thereafter took care of her as if she was
their own child. The petitioners and Shirley were supposed to go on a trip abroad but the private
respondents, Shirleys natural parents, refused to give their consent to the request for the application of
Shirleys visa. Consequently, the petitioners have to leave and Shirley was left to her natural parents.

When the petitioners returned, the private respondents refused to return Shirley to them. This
prompted them to file a habeas corpus petition in CFI (Spec. Proc. No. 9417) against the respondents.
CFI rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and asked the private respondents to turn over Shirley
to the petitioners.

The private respondents appealed to the CA (CA-G.R. No. SP-12212). CA reversed the CFIs
decision. Petitioners filed for an MR but said motion was denied. They filed a review of the decision to
SC but was denied as well for lack of merit.

Upon finality of the judgment, the case was remanded to RTC Makati, MM, where respondent
judge issued an order for issuance of writ of execution enforcings SCs resolution and the decision of CA.
The petitioner opposed the execution and filed for a motion for reconsideration of the order and to
set aside the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events and circumstances that such
execution of judgment will cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child.

The respondent judge held a hearing on the motion. During said hearing, Shirley made
manifest that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be
separated from the petitioners and forced to stay with the respondents.
Even with such objection, respondent judge still denied the motion to set aside the writ of
execution. Petitioners filed a MR of the order but it subsequently denied. They filed a petition for
certiorari with prohibition and preliminary injunction with restraining order in CA but the same was denied,
hence the recourse to SC.

Issue:WON procedural rules (duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of higher courts) in child
custody cases should prevail over the preference of the child.

Ruling:

No. It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower
court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower
court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose than execution;
nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to
settle so much as has been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay of
execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends
of justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such
execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the
judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued; or that
it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgement debt has been paid
or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.

In this case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the trial court that she would
kill herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with the private respondents is a
supervening event that would justify the cancellation of the execution of the final decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-12212).

The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she
should be taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents is a
circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment rendered in of the CFI (Spec. Proc.
No. 9417) inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.

Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount.

This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the
rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the
minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do
no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live
in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development.

MARCELO E. INTON, vs. DANIEL QUINTANA and the administrator or administratrix of the testate
estate of the late Alejandro Quintana and Alejandra Malibiran

Marcelo E. Inton, Fe Severa, E. Inton, Antonion E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, brothers and sisters, were
the owners in equal and undivided shares of a parcel of land. On May 10, 1936, Marcelo E. Inton, Fe
Severa E. Inton, both of age, and their mother Fileda Enrile, the latter acting "in representation" of
Antonio E. Inton and Olimpia E. Inton, then under age, sold that land to Alejandro Quintana and Alejandra
Malibiran. By virtue of the sale, the purchaser took possession of the property and held it until 1942, when
they died and the land, in the extrajudicial partition among their heirs, passed into the hands of
defendants.

Sometime in 1944, when Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton had attained the age of majority, Daniel
Quintana attempted to have them as well as their brother Marcelo and their sister Fe Sevarra execute an
absolute deed of conveyance. The four brother and sisters commenced the instant suit.

The parties, through counsel, submitted the case for decision on an agreed statement of the issues
reached at the pre-trial. The ONLY ISSUE between them is generated by the different interpretation each
of them places on the contract quoted in paragraph three of the complaint, to wit:

1. While plaintiffs interpret it as a contract subject to ratification by the minors Antonio

Inton, Defendant's interpret it as a contract of absolute sale; and

2. While plaintiffs contend that Antonio Inton who become of legal age in the year 1939,
and Olimpia Inton who reached the age of majority in 1941 exercised their right to
repudiate or disapprove that contract within the period fixed by law; defendants, on the
other hand, urge that none of the said minors exercise that right within a reasonable period
and that consequently, they are both guilty of laches.
 Each of the parties herein is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from the date hereof within
which to submit a memorandum.

Although the mother was said to be the minor children's guardian an allegation on which there
is not the slightest evidence it does not appear that she was authorized to enter into this
transaction or that the sale was approved by the competent court. Without the court's authority or
approval, the sale was ineffective as to the minor children even if she were the minors' judicial
guardian. A guardian has no authority to sell real estate of his ward, merely by reason of his
general powers, and in the absence of any special authority to sell conferred by will, statue, or
order of court. A sale of the wards realty of guardian without authority of the court is void.

The court below held that the sale was conditional, conditioned in the ratification by the minor brother and
sister when they became of age, and since these failed or refuse to ratify the sale, it declared the same
"cancelled, null and of no effect."

RULING:

Our interpretation of the contract leads us to a different result. We agree with counsel for the defendant
that the provision regarding the ratification of the sale by the minors was intended as a protection
of the purchasers. The phrase "Hacemos constar, tambien" clearly denotes continuity of thought a
notion to make ratification an additional safeguard of the purchasers right, like the warranty of the title and
peaceful possession which was implied if not expressed.

There was nothing in the circumstances of the vendors which contradicts the express statement
in the first paragraph of the deed that the sale was "real y absoluta." If the minors should repudiate
the sale that could work prejudice to the buyers alone.

(MAO NAJUD NI ANG SA GUARDIANSHIP)

The situation of the buyers was different. They evidently, and with reason, realized the defects of Fidela
Enrile's legal capacity to act in behalf of his minor children.

The reasonable interpretation of the condition of ratification seems therefore to be that it was in
the nature of an option extended to the buyers either to call off the whole transaction or to stick to
the sale with reference to the shares of the adult children who had full capacity to dispose of their
property independently of the minor children's future action.

In this connection, the conducts of the plaintiffs and their mother is illuminating. It appears that Antonio
Inton reached the age of 21 in 1939 and Olimpia Inton in 1941, and their mother, it is alleged, died shortly
before the present action was instituted. Yet it was only after the defendant undertook to have the
four brothers and sisters execute a new deed of conveyance that they made up their minds to
rescind the sale. We take this delay as an eloquent reputation of the plaintiff's theory on the meaning
and scope of the controverted clause. Their delayed action, only provoked at that by defendants move, is
doubly significant when we take account of the considerable increase in value which the property had
gained. We place little or no faith in the assertion that Antonio and Olympia learned of the sale only in
1944, shortly before they commenced this action. Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, this
assertion strikes us as untenable.

As heretofore noted, the time which Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton, the younger children, might bring a
suit to recover their property is governed by law. What the mother said or intended to say in the deed
of sale cannot bind them. A contract cannot impose contractual obligation on any one not a party
to it. Granting the defendant's contention that by the terms of the contract election by the minors to ratify
was to be made promptly after they reached majority, those terms did not have the effect of shortening
the period of prescription which the law has fixed. Those who executed the contract could not change
the period of prescription to the prejudice of the minor children any more than they could alienate
the latter's property without due authority.

The present suit is essentially one to recover land. The right of this action of this character prescribes in
ten years. Under section 40 of Act No. 190 an action for recovery of title to, or possession of legal
property or an interest therein, may be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues.
Assuming that the cause of action accrued in 1936, the date when the contract was entered into, the
period of ten tears expired two years after the action was begun, the complaint having been docketed on
July 10, 1944. True, section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "If a person entitled to bring
the action mentioned in the proceeding section of this Chapter is, at the time the cause of action accrues,
within the age of minority, . . ., such person may, after expiration of ten years from the time the cause of
action accrues, bring such action within three years after such disability is removed." It is also true that on
July 10, 1944, when this action was filed, Antonio Inton was already 26 years of age, more than three
years after he reach majority. But section 42 has been construed by this Court in relation of section 40 in
the sense that, "If the three years after attainment of majority expires before the full ten-year period
elapses, prescription becomes effective at the expiration of the latter period." (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil.,
362).

In conclusion, we hold void in sale as to the shares of Antonio Inton and Olimpia Inton, and valid as to
Marcelo's and Fe Severa's shares. Antonio and Olimpia shall refund to the defendant the sum paid by the
Quintanas for the former's shares P400. The deed of sale recites that this amount this amount was to
be used for their education. This statement has not been disproved or denied. As to any improvement the
defendant or his grantors may have introduce on the land, no evidence whatever was presented.

MARGATE V. RABACAL

This is an application for the registration of a residential land, with a house, containing an
area of 465 square meters, situated in the barrio of San Miguel, Iriga, Camarines Sur, more
particularly describe in plan PSU 123636 (Exh. A), and in the technical description (Exh. 4),
by Jose Margate who claims to have purchased the property from Julia Rabacal, for
P4,000.00. An order of general default was entered against the whole world, with the
exception of the Director of Lands who did not file any formal opposition, andJulia Rabacal
and her minor children who opposed the application, on the ground that the
property was under guardianship proceedings when sold; that the sale was not
authorized by the court; that the purchase price of P4,000.00 was not fully paid, as there
was a remainining balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot and house was
P10,000.00. After due hearing, the registration court confirmed the title of the applicant to
the parcel of land in question, and ordered that the same be registered in the name of Jose F.
Margate, widower, citizen of the Philippines, with residence at Iriga, Camarines Sur, and that
once the decision has become final, the decree and title thereof issue.

As found by the registration court, the parcel of land and house, in question,originally
belonged to Francisco Vela who was in possession thereof as early as 1889. After his death in
1903, he was succeeded by Pedro Evangelista, who purchased the land. Evangelista later on
sold the land to Valentin Magistrado,who possessed it until he sold the same to a certain
Tinay, mother-in-law of Vicente Brinas who built a house thereon and possessed the land
until be sold it to Dr. Julio Berina. Dr. Julio Berina died on October 15, 1945, survived by his
widow, Julia Rabacal, and his minor children Jesus, Corazon, Julio, Fe,Helen, Ramon and Eli,
all surnamed Berina, the oppositors herein.

Julia Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minor children and letters of guardianship was
issued in her favor (Exh. 5). On March 16, 1948, a petition (Exh. B), was filed by the
guardian Julia Rabacal, alleging that it was necessary to sell parcel 4 of the
inventory (Exh. 6), in order to defray the expenses in the prosecution of Civil Case
No. 919 and for the support and education of the wards.

Applicant Jose F. Margate, who was then intending to buy a house and lot of one Mr. Brown,
happened to meet Julia Rabacal who offered to sell to him the residential lot in question, for
P5,000.00. After negotiations, the parties agreed on the selling price of P4,000.00. After the
agreement, Rabacal began getting money from Margate, such that when Rabacal secured
the authority to sell (Exh. C), from the court, she had already obtained from Margate the
sum of P500.00, and after having secured the order of authority to sell, Rabacal showed to
Margate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal,
acknowledged before a Notary Public, Jose Madara, selling the land in question to Margate
for P4,000.00 (Exh. D), on which date Margate paid the balance of P3,500.00 to Rabacal. At
the time the house was already in a ruinous condition, because of the typhoon Jean, and for
the repair and improvement of the same, Margate spent around P6,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale (Exh. B), executed by the guardian, Julia Rabacal in
favor of applicant, had no binding effect, because the authority to sell was cancelled and the
sale was not approved by the guardianship Court.

HELD:No. As appropriately commented by the trial court, the cancellation of the authority to
sell did not, and could not, affect, the rights of the buyer, because "at the time that the
order cancelling the authority to sell was entered, the guardian, Julia Rabacal, had already
acted in accordance with authority, Exhibit C, and sold the land to Jose F. Margate. The
authority of the Court had already been exhausted, after it was fulfilled by the
guardian, and there was nothing to cancel. Moreover, the cancellation of the order to
sell was entered by the Court due to the deception of the guardian, who informed the court
that she could not find any buyer of parcel 4 of the inventory. If the court had been informed
of the sale, the court would certainly not have revoked the authority. Moreover, the
revocation was entered without notice to the purchaser Jose F. Margate". With respect to the
lack of approval of the sale by the court, His Honor held that the law merely requires that the
guardian should be authorized, and that the authority to sell did not impose the condition
that the deed of sale executed by the guardian should be approved by the Cou rt. The
approval of the sale by the court, under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case,
would then be merely pro-forma, since the appellants were not able to show any reason why
the guardianship could would have refused to approved the sale which was already a fait
accompli and within the authority given by said court.

Upon the death of Dr. Berina on October 15, 1945, said properties descended to the
surviving spouse Julia Rabacal and his minor children. Under the old Civil Code (whose
provisions should apply), Julia Rabacal was entitled to one-half (1/2) as her share in the
conjugal property. This being the case, at least, the one-half portion belonging to her which
was included in the sale of the entire property to the appellee, could stand as legal and
valid. In her behalf, she could dispose of her share, even without the benefit of judicial
approval which merely goes to show that, the sale of the entire or whole property in
question, was not altogether null and void.

The rules alleged to have been violated, (Secs. 2, 3 and 4, of Rule 96, Rules of Court) refer to
the proceedings in the guardianship court and not to the proceedings in the registration
court, where the Registration Law (Act No. 495), specifically provides the procedure to be
followed, in the event the parties in a registration case desire to have the decision thereof
reviewed. The present appeal does not allege fraud in the registration. Moreover, there
being a presumption that the sale in question is valid, the same can not be attacked
collaterally in the registration proceedings. Appellants should have filed a separate action to
avoid or rescind the said sale, on the ground specified by law.

SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE AND ESCANLAR

Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of
Spec. Pro. 7279 of the CFI of Negors Occidental.
- In such capacity, he leased one of the properties of the estate, which was a fishpond,
to Escanlar for a period of three years and with a yearly rental of P3,000.
o This transaction was done without previous authority of approval of the
court where the proceedings was pending.
- Months after, Nombre was removed as administrator by order of the court and he
was replaced by one Sofronio Campillanos.
- Escanlar refused to surrender the fishpond even if he was informed that there was a
new admininstrator.
- Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a
lease contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner San Diego for five
years with a yearly rental of P5,000.
- Nombre opposed Campillanos motion and contended that:
o The lease he made was good for three years;
o To grant Campillanos motion would in effect nullify the contract in favor of
Escanlar, a person on whom the court has no jurisdiction;
o The validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator must
be recognized unless so declared void in a separate action
 - The trial Court declared the the lease to Escanlar was null and void for want of
judicial authority.
- On appeal, the CA granted Nombre and Escanlars injunctive writ.
- Campillanos insisted on the invalidity of the contract in favor of Escanlar and such
cannot be an obstacle to the execution of another contract of lease by Campillanos.
- CA ruled that the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate
of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore,
exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance,
he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court.
- Only San Diego appealed the decision to the SC and he argued that:
o There is a limitation to the right of a judicial administrator to lease real priority
without prior court authority and approval if it exceeds one year under No. 8,
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code
- Respondents Nombre and Escanlar maintain that there is no limitation of such right
and such law does not apply in this case.
Issue:

1. Whether or not a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate
without prior judicial authority and approval
2. Whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on agency should apply to judicial
administrators
Held:

1. YES.

The Rules of Court provide that "An executor or administrator shall have the right
to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration, and
shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will." (Sec. 3, Rule
85, old Rules.)

Lease has been considered an act of administration.

2. NO. We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the
contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and
approval. The law and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter militates in favor of this
view.

While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent
(petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects,
identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial
administrator.

A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of

said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. A judicial administrator
before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not
true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection
which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems
from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the
acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of
the appointing court.

Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, G.R. No. L-9620, June 28, 1957
 In Special Proceedings No. 163, appellee Severo Viloria was appointed guardian of the person
and estate of minor, Roy Lelina, beneficiary of arrears pay, insurance, and other benefits from the
US Veterans Administration (USVA), due to the death of his father.
The court authorized the guardian to withdraw up to P30/month from the estate of his ward for the
boys support and other expenditures.
USVA filed a motion alleging receipt of certain letters from its central office in D.C, that Lelinas
father did not serve in the armed forces and consequently, his heir was not entitled to the National
Service Life Insurance.
USVA prayed that the guardian be ordered to stop further payment of monthly allowances to the
minor. This was granted.
Later, the USVA Administrator again filed a motion for a refund of the sum of $2,879.68 from the
wrongful payment of insurance benefits.
Viloria opposed by submitting evidence of the service record of the minors father, causing the
motion for refund to be denied
After such denial, Viloria moved to be allowed to withdraw P4,000 for the minors needs. This was
opposed by the USVA citing the US Code, which provides that:

Decisions of the Administrator shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact and no
other official of the United States, except a judge or judges of the Unite States courts, shall have
jurisdiction to review any such decisions.

CFI held: status quo should be maintained since the issue on W/N the minors father really served
in the US armed forces is one it cannot determine in the guardianship proceedings. In the
meantime, no refund or withdrawal is to be made. Thus this appeal by the USVA.

Issue: W/N the US Code finds application in the present proceedings

Held: NO. The appeal has no merit. The provisions of the US Code make the decisions of the USVA final
and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to him for resolution, but they are not applicable
to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great
difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the
conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts),
and those actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their
jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make
the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in
effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate
instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator.

Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the guardianship
proceedings since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the proper
administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in
the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.

LIM SIOK HUEY, ET AL., vs.

ALFREDO LAPIZ, ET AL.,

This is an action to recover damages amounting to P83,701.30 filed in the Court of

First Instance of Laguna. The plaintiffs are:

(a) Lim Siok Huey, Pua Yek Ben, Pua Chok Ben, Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, the first
being the surviving spouse and the last four the surviving children of Chua Pua Lun,
represented by their counsel, and the defendants are:

(b) Alfredo Lapiz, Victorino Sapin, Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco.

The damages are claimed by reason of the death of Chua Pua Lun as a result of
a collision suffered by the jeepney in which he was a passenger.

Defendant Alfredo Capiz, the driver of the driver of the Jaguar jeepney, in answer to the
complaint, alleged that the vehicle driven by him was hit by the Kapalaran bus which was
driven by defendant Vicente Reyes due to the negligence of the latter, thereby causing the
death of Chua Pua Lun who was a passenger of the jeepney. Defendant Victorino Sapin in
turn alleged that he was not the owner of the jeepney driven by Lapiz, while defendants
Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco, the first as driver and the second as owner of the bus,
alleged that the collision between the two vehicles was due to the negligence of Alfredo
Lapiz.

Plaintiffs Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, being minors, the court, upon motion of their
counsel, appointed Chua Pua Tam, a brother of the deceased, as guardian ad
litem to represent them in this case.

After trial, the court rendered decision "dismissing the complaint, defendant Lapiz cross-
claim against defendants Reyes and Limjuco as well as the counterclaim of these last two
named defendant against the plaintiff and their cross-claim against defendants Lapiz and
Sapin." Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount involved.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court made the following pronouncement:

Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the Court is however, of the opinion that the
present action cannot be maintained not on the ground invoked by the defendants but on
the theory that the plaintiffs have not authorized anyone to file the complaint
against the defendants. While an attorney representing a client `in a case pending in
Court is presumed to be authorized for the purpose, nevertheless in the case under
consideration, such presumption had been destroyed and overcome by the very evidence
presented by counsel himself. The plaintiffs are all citizens and residents of
Communist China and they have not communicated with anyone in the Philippines
in connection with the filing of an action for damages in their behalf arising from
the death of Chua Pau Lun.

Chua Pua Tam, who is the brother-in-law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the others,
testified that the plaintiffs had not written to him nor had he communicated with
them. The letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping Kok by his sister Lim Sick Huey
(Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain any intimation much less of an
authorization for the filing of a claim for damages in behalf of the widow and
children of the deceased, Chua Pua Lun, against the parties responsible for his
death. Under this situation, the Court has no other alternative but to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the evidence on record does not show that the plaintiffs have authorized
much less directed the commencement of the present action.

Issue: Appellants now contend that the trial court erred (1) in finding that plaintiffs, being
residents of Communist China, have not authorized anyone to file the present case against
the defendants; (2) in dismissing the complaint when the authority to prosecute the case
stems from the appointment of Chua Pua Tam as guardian ad litem of minors Pua Sam Ben
and Pua Go Kuan; (3) in dismissing the case when the same could be considered as
prosecuted by a negotiorum gestor and (4) in finding that there was no authority to file the
case when such question was not raised in issue nor was evidence adduced on the point.

With regard to the first question, we find no error in the findings made by the trial court.
Indeed, the same is supported by the record and the evidence. Thus, it appears that the
plaintiffs who are the widow and children of the deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and
residents of Communist China and notwithstanding the fact that they have been informed of
the death of the deceased, they have not sent any communication to anyone in the
Philippines giving authority to take whatever action may be proper to obtain an
indemnity for his death other than two letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping Kok by
his sister Lim Siok Huey and his mother, which do not contain any intimation nor
authorization for the filing of the present action. The most that they contain was an
inquiry with regard to the progress of the case and the administration of the duck-raising
business which the deceased left in the Philippines. Such certainly cannot be considered as
an authority to the present counsel to file and prosecute the present case in behalf of the
widow and children now residing in Communist China.

It should be noted that the present action was initiated by plaintiffs represented merely
by their counsel and the question arose as to whether the latter had the proper authority to
represent the former in view of the fact that they are all residents of a foreign country. And
the question was properly raised in view of the rule that, while a lawyer is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears,
he may however be required by the court on motion of either party to produce his
authority under which he appears (Section 20, Rule 127). Undoubtedly, the question
was properly raised by counsel for the defendants as otherwise the trial court would not
have given proper attention to the matter. Indeed, on this point, the trial court made this
important comment: "While an attorney representing a client in a case pending in Court is
presumed to be authorized for the purpose, nevertheless in the case under
consideration, such presumption had been destroyed and come by the very evidence
presented by counsel himself ." (Emphasis supplied)

It is true that one Chua Pua Tam was appointed as guardian ad litem of two of plaintiffs
who allegedly are minors to represent them in the prosecution of the present case, but while
this representation may only benefit the minors, and not the other plaintiffs, yet the same
would not suffice to meet the requirement of the rule which provides that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest (Section 2,
Rule 3). Again, we need hereto show that Chua Pua Tam was authorized by the heirs abroad
to act as such in behalf of the minors for it was in this belief that he was so appointed by the
trial court. But when in the course of the," trial it developed that he never had any
communication with any of the heirs and much less received any authority from
them either to prosecute this case or to act, as such guardian in behalf of the
minors, the trial court lost no time in disauthorizing him and considering his
representation ineffective. Thus, on this point, the trial court said: "Chua Pua Tam, who is
the brother-in law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the others, testified that the plaintiffs had
not written to him nor had he communicated with them. The letters supposedly sent to Lim
Ping Kok by his sister Lim Siock Huey (Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain any
intimation much less an authorization for the filing of the claim for damages in behalf of the
widow and children of the deceased."

Nor can the claim that Chua Pua Tam can be considered as negotiorum gestor be
entertained because in the present case there is need of express authority on his part
to represent the minors by virtue of an express provision of our Rules of Court.
In negotiorum gestio no such authority is required.

The contention that the trial court considered the issue regarding the lack of authority
on the part of counsel to represent plaintiffs in this case or of Chua Pua Tam to act as
guardian ad litem of the minors even if the same was not raised by any of the opposing
parties or their counsel, cannot be entertained, it appearing that the same was expressly
raised by defendants Reyes and Limjuco not only in the course of the trial but in their
answers. Moreover, this flaw in the case of the plaintiffs was discovered by the court in the
course of the trial in view of the evidence presented by the very counsel of plaintiffs. In view
of such development, the trial court could not but take notice of the matter considering the
prayer in defendants' answer that they be given "such reliefs as this Court may deem just
and equitable in the premises.".

CUI V PICCIO

Facts: Don Mariano Cui sold three of his lots to three of his children in equal shares.
However, one was not able to pay, so Mariano shared ownership with his two other children,
Antonio and Mercedes. The two children borrowed money from Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, subject to mortgage of the land. Mariano allowed the mortgage, with the
condition that all the rentals will go to him. He did not participate with the payment of the
loan. Nearly a year later, his other children filed a guardianship proceeding, which the court
granted. The other children tried to nullify the sale to Antonio and Mercedes, which was still
pending. When they asked the court to deliver the rental payments to them, Judge Piccio
granted it.

Issue: Whether Piccio acted in grave abuse of discretion in allowing such delivery of rental
payments to the ward

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec 6 of Rule 97, the ward may ask the guardian court to deliver an actual
or prospective interest which was owned by the ward, and was embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed by another. In the case at hand, Sec 6 of Rule 97 does not apply, since the rental
payments Is still a subject of controversy, as to who really owns such payments. This must
be litigated in a ordinary civil action, to which a guardian court does not have jurisdiction.
 BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES,

Reeder Vancil, the father of the minors Valerie (6 years old) and Vincent (2 years old)
died as a US Navy serviceman. Bonfacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder and the grandmother
of the minors, filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of the said
minors consisting of proceeds from their fathers pension benefits with a probable value of
P100,000.00 in the RTC of Cebu City.

Helen Belmes opposed to the guardianship proceedings asserting that she is the
natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors in Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing and that the petition was
filed under improper venue. She further alleged that Bonifacia Vancil is a naturalized
American citizen and a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A.

The trial court rejected the opposition and appointed the grandmother as the
guardian of the minors.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this present petition alleging that Helen is
unfit to be a guardian of the minors considering that Valerie was raped seven times by the
mothers live-in partner while under her custody.

ISSUE:Who between the biological mother and the grandmother of minor Vincent should be
his guardian.
HELD:
As to Valerie, this petition has become moot with respect to her considering that she is
already of major age.

As to Vincent, the court agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent,
being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be
his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Indeed, being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of
said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article
214 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute

parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

In the case at bar, petitioner did not show proof that Helen is an unsuitable guardian
for the minor Vincent.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
 Moreover, the court observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old
age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal
Case No. CBU-16884 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying
here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to
Vincent for only two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the
wards

VDA CHUA VS CA

Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent
Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in
Davao City.

On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the
guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.

Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of

Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged
that at the time of the decedents death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner
presented the following documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and
a resident of Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao
City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns
for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as
married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence
was Davao City.

Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the
late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never
contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven
his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in
favor of herein respondents.

Issue: Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?

Held: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which
petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the
marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence
Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so
when the private respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged
to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.

PINEDA V CA

Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI, for brevity), a crewing/manning outfit, procured Group
Insurance from respondent-appellant Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life
insurance coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. During the
effectivity of the policy, six (6) covered employees of the PMSI perished at sea when their
vessel sunk somewhere in Morocco. They were survived by complainants-appellees, the
beneficiaries under the policy.

Complainants-appellees sought to claim death benefits due them. The President and
General Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval evinced willingness to assist complainants-
appellees to recover the benefits arising from the deaths of their husbands/sons. They were
thus made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon, special powers of attorney
authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among others, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for
their benefit indemnities of sums of money due them relative to the sinking of the vessel.
By virtue of these written powers of attorney, complainants-appellees were able to receive
their respective death benefits. Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as
employer and policyholder of the life insurance of its deceased workers, filed with
respondent-appellant formal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through its
President, Capt. Nuval.

Insular drew against its account 6 checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and
another for P40,00.00, payable to the order of the families. The checks were given to PMSI.
Capt. Nuval, the PMSI president, pocketed the amounts and deposited them in his account
with the Commercial Bank of Manila, now Boston Bank.

After the complainants-appellees learned that they were entitled, as beneficiaries, to life
insurance benefits under a group policy with respondent-appellant, they sought to recover
these benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied their claim on the ground that the
liability to complainants-appellees was already extinguished upon delivery to and receipt by
PMSI of the six (6) checks issued in their names.

The families filed a petition with the Insurance Commission. They won and Insular Life was
ordered to pay them P500 a day until the amount was furnished to them. The Insurance
Commission held that the special powers of attorney executed by complainants do not
contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain and receive from
respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured; also,
that Insular Life did not convincingly refuted the claim of Mrs. Alarcon that neither she nor
her husband executed a special power of authority in favor of Capt. Nuval and that it did not
observe Sec 180 (3), when it released the benefits due to the minor children of Ayo and
Lontok, when the said complainants did not post a bond as required.

Section 180:
. . . In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the latter's absence or incapacity,
the mother of any minor, who is an insured or a beneficiary under a contract of life, health or
accident insurance, may exercise, in behalf of said minor, any right, under the policy,
without necessity of court authority or the giving of a bond where the interest of the minor
in the particular act involved does not exceed twenty thousand pesos . . . .

Insular Life appealed to the CA. CA modified the decision of the Insurance Commission,
eliminating the award to the minor children, Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok. Hence, this petition
by the beneficiary families.

Issues:

1. WON Insular Life should still be liable to the complainants when they relied on the special
powers of attorney, which Capt. Nuval presented as documents, when they released the
checks to the latter.
2. WON Insular Life should be liable to the complainants when they released the check in
favor of Ayo and Lontok, even if no bond was posted as required.
Held: Yes to both. Petition granted.

Ratio:

1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority
to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent company insurance proceeds
arising from the death of the seaman-insured.
Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the collection and
receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies.
They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries themselves. Even
the Insular representative admitted that he gave the checks to the policyholder.

Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. However, it
acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying without question on the
special power of attorney. Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the
beneficiaries.

2. Insular Life was grossly negligent in delivering the checks, drawn in favor of the
petitioners, to a party who is not the agent mentioned in the special power of attorney.

The Court did not agree with the opinion of the public respondent (CA) that since the
shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under
Article 225 of the Family Code, their mothers could receive such shares without need of
either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a bond. It is of the view that
said Article had repealed the third paragraph of Section 180 of the Insurance Code. The
pertinent portion of Article 225 of the Family Code reads as follows:

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over
the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount
as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of
the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
prescribed for general guardians.

It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of the unemancipated
common child's property, the father and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of
the child's property. However, if the market value of the property or the annual income
of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to
guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.

It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code
speaks of the "market value of the property or the annual income of the child," which
means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual income; if this exceeds
P50,000.00, a bond is required. There is no evidence that the share of each of the
minors in the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property.
Without such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only
property.