Regime Change in Nato

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida
EXAMINING THE PROCESS OF REGIME CHANGE IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by
Barak Carlson
2006
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300 North Zeeb Road
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To: Interim Dean Mark D. Szuchman
College of Arts and Sciences
This dissertation, written by Barak Carlson, and entitled Examining the Process of Regime
Change in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Divide between Rhetoric and
Reality, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you
for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.
Elisabeth Prugl
Mohaiddin Mesbahi
Richard S. Olson
Ralph S. Clem, Major Professor
Date of Defense: April 17,2006
The dissertation of Barak Carlson is approved.
Interim Dean Mark D. Szuchman

College of Arts and Sciences
IntertnrDeSh Stephan L. Mintz

University Graduate School
Florida International University, 2006
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My interest in international regimes, including the role of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, was initially piqued during my participation in a number of NATO Steering
Groups while I was assigned as a project officer to the U.S. Department of Defense Joint
Program Office for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles during the late 1990s. My experience with
various NATO committees gave me an appreciation for the wide range of issues
undergoing continuous scrutiny and coordination among Alliance member governments.
Subsequent exchanges with my peers during numerous visits to Allied military installations
gave me a greater appreciation for the unique role of the United States within NATO and
the emerging differences in worldviews and capabilities among Alliance members. I later
drew upon these experiences as an instructor at the Air Command and Staff College, where
I was fortunate to be surrounded by top-notch academicians who offered further insights
into the changing nature of the Alliance and of contemporary diplomacy in general.
The writing o f this dissertation has been among the most challenging and humbling
experiences of my life and could not have been completed without the guidance and
support of many people. I wish to thank the faculty and staff of the International Relations
Department at Florida International University for their inspiration and support throughout
my studies. This department is made up of excellent scholars who present a valuable and
diverse curriculum while demonstrating a genuine interest in the success of their students.
My committee was made up of exemplary professors from both the International Relations
and Political Science departments that were not only able to provide me with valuable
scholarly input, but also offered a consistent level of encouragement that exceeded my
expectations. I would like recognize my major professor, Dr. Ralph Clem, for his ability to
iii
help me navigate through the many challenges presented by this research while retaining a
positive outlook. The other members of my committee, Dr. Elisabeth Prugl, Dr. Mohiaddin
Mesbahi, and Dr. Richard Olson, were each extraordinarily helpful in guiding my research
and offering constructive feedback throughout the writing process. Finally, I would like to
thank my wife, Christine, for her patient review of innumerable drafts and for all she
continues to do to make me cherish her more each day.
iv
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EXAMINING THE PROCESS OF REGIME CHANGE IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
by
Barak Carlson
Florida International University, 2006
Miami, Florida
Professor Ralph S. Clem, Major Professor
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a product of the Cold War
through which its members organized their military forces for the purpose of collective
defense against the common threat of Soviet-backed aggression. Employing the
terminology of regime theory, the creation of NATO can be viewed as the introduction of
an international security regime. Throughout the Cold War, NATO member states
preserved their commitment to mutual defense while increasingly engaging in activities
aimed at overcoming the division of Europe and promoting regional stability. The end of
the Cold War has served as the catalyst for a new period of regime change as the Alliance
introduced elements o f a collective security regime by expanding its mandate to address
new security challenges and reorganizing both its political and military organizational
structures.
This research involves an interpretive analysis of NATOs evolution applying ideal
theoretical constructs associated with distinct approaches to regime analysis. The process
o f regime change is investigated over several periods throughout the history of the Alliance
in an effort to understand the Alliances changing commitment to collective security. This
research involves a review of regime theory literature, consisting of an examination of
primary source documentation, including official documents and treaties, as well as a
review o f numerous secondary sources. This review is organized around a typology of
power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis. This
dissertation argues that the process of regime change within NATO is best understood by
examining factors associated with multiple theoretical constructs. Relevant factors provide
insights into the practice o f collective security among NATO member states within Europe,
while accounting for the inability of the NATO allies to build on the experience gained
within Europe to play a more central role in operations outside of this region. This research
contributes to a greater understanding of the nature of international regimes and the process
of regime change, while offering recommendations aimed at increasing NATOs viability
as a source o f greater security and more meaningful international cooperation.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................1

General Statement of Problem Area.........................................................................1
Research Purpose.......................................................................................................2
Significance o f Study.................................................................................................4
Methodology.............................................................................................................. 5
Theoretical Perspective and Literature Review.......................................................8
Realism and Power-based Regime Analysis........................................................... 14
Neoliberal Institutionalism and Organization-based Regime Analysis.................29
Liberalism, Constructivism and Norm-based Regime Analysis............................ 39
Distinguishing Collective Security and Collective Defense Regimes................... 51
Conclusion................................................................................................................. 64
II. NATO DURING THE COLD WAR....................................................................... 67

European Security After World War I I ................................................................... 68
Establishing the North Atlantic Treaty.................................................................... 76
Acceptance o f West German Statehood and NATO Membership........................ 82
Increased Nonmilitary Cooperation..........................................................................86
Balancing Defense and Detente................................................................................95
NATOs Dual-Track Strategy................................................................................... 99
European Integration During the Cold War............................................................. 101
Regime Analysis: NATO During the Cold War......................................................104
Conclusion..................................................................................................................112
III. POST-COLD WAR NATO...................................................................................... 113

Promoting East-West Cooperation........................................................................... 114
NATO Interventions in the Balkans.........................................................................130
The Growing Capabilities Gap.............................................................................. 147
The European Union as a Rival Security Regime...................................................157
Regime Analysis: Post Cold War NATO ................................................................ 168
Conclusion..................................................................................................................183
IV. NATOS ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM..............................186

Nature of the Threat................................................................................................... 187
Initial Responses to the September 2001 Attacks on the United States................ 196
Command Structure Considerations........................................................................ 209
NATO Support for Operation Enduring Freedom.................................................. 219
NATOs Role in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations in Afghanistan... 228
Confronting Iraq Over Alleged WMD Development............................................. 237
NATO Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom..........................................................249
NATOs Role in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq.................254
Contrasting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations......................................260
vii
Regime Analysis: NATOs Role in the Global War on Terrorism....................... 268
Conclusion..................................................................................................................291
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION..................................................................... 293

Overview o f Findings................................................................................................294
Implications o f Research.......................................................................................... 306
Recommendations for Further Research................................................................. 324
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................................327
VITA .................................................................................................................................... 356
viii
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACO Allied Command Operations
ANO Abu Nidal Organization
AFNORTH Allied Forces North
AFSOUTH Allied Force South
ANA Afghan National Army
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
CFE Conventional Forces Europe
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CINCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
COMAIRSOUTH Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
COMNAVSOUTH Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe
COMSTRIKFORSOUTH Commander Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CSBM Confidence and Security-Building Measures
CSCE Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
DPC Defense Planning Committee
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defense Community
EEC European Economic Community
EPAF European Participating Air Forces
ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI European Security and Defense Identity
EU European Union
EUCOM United States European Command
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
FLA Future Large Aircraft
FRELOC Fast Relocation
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IFOR Implementation Force
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JFC Joint Force Command
JNA Yugoslavian Peoples Army
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
MLF Multi-Lateral Force
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAEWF NATO Airborne Early Warning Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NIWS NATO Intelligence Warning System
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons
NRF NATO Reaction Force
NTECG NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group
OAF Operation Allied Force
ODF Operation Deliberate Force
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP Partnership for Peace
PLF Palestine Liberation Front
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
ROE Rules of Engagement
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SFIR Stabilization Force (Iraq)
SFOR Stabilization Force (Kosovo)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOF Special Operations Forces
STANAVFORLANT Standing Naval Forces Atlantic
STANAVFORMED Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean
TEDC Training and Education Doctrine Center
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UN AMI United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection

Commission
UNPA United Nations Protected Areas
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAFE United States Air Forces Europe
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
WEU Western European Union
xii
WMD Weapons o f Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
xiii
It is generally recognized as undesirable that an
international organization should be frozen into a rigid pattern.
- Lord Hastings Ismay, Secretary General of NATO (1955)
Chapter 1: Overview of Research and Literature Review
General Statement o f Problem Area
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a product of the Cold War
through which its members organized their military forces for the purpose of collective
defense against the common threat of Soviet-backed aggression. Employing the
terminology of regime theory, the creation of NATO can be viewed as the introduction of
an international security regime. In addition to this initial mutual defense obligation, the
member states of NATO increasingly engaged in activities aimed at overcoming the
division of Europe and promoting regional stability that foreshadowed the introduction of
a collective security regime. During the more than forty years between the formation of
the Alliance and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO member states jointly
addressed such issues as West German statehood and Alliance membership, increased
nonmilitary cooperation, and the pursuit of detente between East and West. Each of these
issues presented numerous challenges and introduced tensions among member states that
threatened to undermine Alliance unity.
The end of the Cold War has served as the catalyst for a new period of regime
change within NATO to cope with a new security environment. NATO has expanded its
mandate to address new security challenges and reorganized both its political and military
organizational structures. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, observed in the
late 1990s, Over the years, NATO has helped develop principles of collective security -
and the instruments necessary to sustain it - for the wider Euro-Atlantic region. Although
one of NATO's core functions remains collective defense, the end of the Cold War
offered opportunities for allies to pursue a much broader, cooperative approach to
security.1 This dissertation assesses various ways that international relations theory
accounts for the changes in the Alliances post-Cold War approach to security by
reviewing NATOs evolution both during and after the Cold War and the resulting
willingness of Alliance members to respond collectively to global threats.
Research Purpose
Literature in the field of international relations recognizes collective defense as a
security arrangement where states pledge their cooperation and support in the event that
any alliance member is attacked by a third party. Collective defense arrangements
generally emphasize military coordination and are organized in response to a specified
threat. In contrast, collective security arrangements generally seek to address a broad
range of threats originating from either within or outside of the alliance. Collective
security arrangements commonly obligate members to act in response to any perceived
threat to international peace, including emerging threats not anticipated during the
formation of the agreement.
Numerous scholars and political leaders have portrayed NATO as undergoing a
regime change from an organization committed to the practice of collective defense to
one aspiring to collective security. NATOs expansion into Eastern Europe and its
leadership of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans are commonly cited as examples of
1 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, C ollective Security and the Post-Cold War World: Speech by
Secretary Solana at the Conference on Crisis Management and N A TO Reform, June 1998,
http ://w w w.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980615a.htm .
the member governments efforts to reinvent NATO as a collective security organization.
Yost provides an informative look at this transformation and expresses a number of
reservations regarding the implications of regime change.2 Kupchan and Kupchan view
this transformation in more positive terms, characterizing NATO as moving beyond its
role as a traditional alliance and functioning as a hybrid between a collective defense and
a collective security organization. While these and other works acknowledge the
Alliances collective security aspirations, there has been little effort to systematically
explore the resulting pattern of cooperation resulting from this alleged regime change.
Subsequent efforts to expand the practice of collective security to threats emerging
outside of Europes borders have been marked by divisions among Alliance members and
a marginalized role for the Alliance. This research seeks to identify theoretical
constructs that contribute to an understanding of the Alliances foray into the practice of
collective security.
This research seeks to answer the questions, What factors have influenced .
NATOs introduction of a collective security regime? and Why have Alliance members
encountered difficulties extending NATOs mandate to include the practice of collective
security outside of Europe? This study utilizes existing scholarship on international
regimes to examine both internal and external factors that are likely to have influenced
the decisions of NATO member states to act collectively in response to shared security
challenges. This dissertation provides insights into the behavior of Alliance members
2 David Yost, NATO Transformed - The Alliance's N ew R oles in International Security (W ashington D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1998).
3 Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, Concerts, C ollective Security, and the Future o f Europe,
International Security 16, no 1 (1991): 114-161.
both during and after the Cold War and complements other research assessing
contemporary patterns of international cooperation and conflict.
Significance o f Study
This dissertation contributes to existing scholarship on the relationship between
international regimes and state behavior.4 While scholars commonly examine the
conditions favoring regime formation and compliance, comparatively little research has
been completed regarding the sources of change in existing international regimes.
NATOs contributions to transatlantic security during the Cold War are well-documented
and there is generally little controversy regarding the Alliances ability to maintain a
credible commitment to collective defense against Soviet-backed aggression throughout
this era.5 NATOs contribution to transatlantic security in the post-Cold War era has
been the subject of less study and its contributions to transatlantic security remain much
more contentious. Much of the existing literature on changes to transatlantic security
regimes focuses on the implications of organizational changes within the Alliance rather
than the conditions leading to these reforms.6 A closer look at the behavior of Alliance
members toward the demands of regime change reveals a complex and inconsistent
pattern of cooperation. This research investigates the process of regime change while
4 Relevant scholarship includes Stephen Krasner, ed. International Regimes (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell
University, 1983), Joseph N ye, Nuclear Learning and U .S.-Soviet Security Regim es, International
O rganization 41 (1987), and Oran Young, Com pliance an d Public Authority: A Theory with International
Applications (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979).
5 Relevant scholarship includes Alistair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s (London: W iedenfeld and N icolson,
1960) and John Lewis Gaddis, We N ow Know: Rethinking Cold War H istory (N ew York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
6 An example o f an emphasis on organizational implications can be found in Robert McCalla, N A T O s

Persistence After the Cold War, International O rganization 50, no 3 (Summer 1996): 445-475.
drawing upon divergent approaches to regime analysis as they relate to NATOs
continued evolution since the end of the Cold War.
Methodology
This research involves an interpretive analysis of NATOs evolution applying
ideal theoretical constructs associated with distinct approaches to regime analysis. This
is an informal, qualitative methodology that aims at gaining a greater understanding of
the events in question. The process of regime change is investigated over several periods
throughout the history of the Alliance in an effort to understand the Alliances changing
commitment to collective security. This research involves the examination of primary
source documentation, including official documents and treaties, as well as a review of
numerous secondary sources. The approach to this research accepts the likelihood that
there are several complementary factors influencing the practice of collective security
among NATO member states. Potential explanations are drawn from a review of regime
theory literature, which are organized around a typology of power-based, organization-
based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis. Various factors associated with
each approach to regime analysis are examined throughout a discussion of NATOs
evolution across three time periods.
The first period of study involves an examination of the factors contributing to
NATOs creation and evolution during the Cold War. NATO was organized in response
to a unique set of challenges facing the United States and Europe in the late 1940s. The
North Atlantic Treaty embodied an unprecedented peacetime security regime obliging
member states to equate an attack on any member state to an attack on themselves. The
acceptance of this collective defense commitment served as the foundation for
international cooperation and encouraged the formation of more extensive ties among
NATO member states. Both Alliance procedures and organizations evolved over
subsequent decades in response to internal and external pressures. These changes were
generally intended to increase the security of Alliance members while maintaining unity
within the Alliance. Throughout this period, NATO member states remained committed
to a collective defense regime while introducing reforms that enabled the Alliance to
pursue objectives commonly associated with the practice of collective security.
The second period of study emphasizes NATOs adoption of a collective security
regime in the immediate post-Cold War era. The process of regime change accelerated
after the end of the Cold War as the Alliance found ways to become more active in a
more permissive security environment. Member states viewed NATO as a means of
contributing to transatlantic security by serving as a stabilizing force at a time of
increased uncertainty regarding the future of European security affairs. Despite
expectations that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would lead to the United States
abandonment of Europe, American leaders chose to remain engaged in Europe and
initiated reforms that would retain NATOs central role in preserving peace throughout
the region. The practice of collective security was also promoted by organizational and
normative factors that increased the scope of activities undertaken under the purview of
NATO leaders. The changes introduced during this period encouraged an increased
dialogue within the Alliance and greater engagement with neighboring states. These
activities soon led to the expansion of the Alliance to include more of Central and Eastern
Europe and the conduct of combined military interventions to address emerging security
challenges within the region.
The third period of study examines NATOs role in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) following the attacks by A1 Qaeda on the United States in September 2001.
NATO member states initially demonstrated their solidarity with the United States by
immediately invoking the mutual defense clause specified in Article Five of the North
Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance. However, while
formulating a response to the attacks, the United States rejected the option of deferring to
NATO for leadership of the military offensive in favor it leading an ad-hoc coalition.
While numerous NATO member states participated in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) through bilateral agreements with the United States, the Alliances formal
authority was limited to directing supporting missions until the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) eventually assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) conducting peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Even while military
operations were underway in Afghanistan, accusations that the Iraqi government had ties
to terrorist organizations and continued to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
alarmed many members of the Alliance. NATO member states were unable to achieve a
consensus regarding the nature of the Iraqi threat and the NAC refused to act on
American requests to provide assistance with war preparations. The lack of consensus
within the Alliance meant that NATO was neither a source of assistance to the American-
led coalition, nor was it able to dissuade the United States and a handful of allies from
invading Iraq. Despite the creation of an international security force similar to ISAF, the
Alliance avoided a significant role in the Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction effort
beyond an agreement to provide training and technical assistance.
This dissertation argues that the process of regime change within NATO is
accounted for by various factors associated with power-based, organization-based and
norm-based approaches to regime analysis. Relevant factors associated with each of
these theoretical constructs are identified through an examination of international
relations literature related to regime theory. These factors are employed in subsequent
chapters to demonstrate the applicability of these theoretical constructs to the behavior of
NATO member states within the Alliance. These approaches each provide insights into
the practice of collective security among NATO member states within Europe, while
accounting for the inability of the NATO allies to build on the experience gained within
Europe to play a more central role in operations outside of this region.
Theoretical Perspective and Literature Review
Regime theory has remained an active subfield in international relations since its
origin in the work of scholars studying transnationalism in the early 1970s. The literature
addresses the nature of regimes as well as questions of how and why regimes form and
the ways regime compliance is enforced. Scholars in this field seek to understand why
regimes are established to govern some aspects of international cooperation rather than
others.
The first question likely to be asked by a student of regime theory is What are
international regimes? It is clear that regimes promote cooperation among states as an
alternative to relying on self-help strategies to manage conflicts and interdependence
problems, but there are a surprising number of definitions of the term. Many definitions
of regimes emphasize their organizational characteristics. Keohane defines international
regimes as institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to
particular sets of issues in international relations.7 These rules and procedures regulate
the conduct of states in a specified issue area and tend to associate regimes with
international law.
A normative component is also common among definitions offered in the
literature. Regimes specify the range of acceptable behavior to be encouraged or
tolerated among participants. Young emphasizes this aspect of regimes in his definition,
stating, International regimes are human artifacts characterized by a conjunction of
behavioral regularities and convergent expectations on the part of their members.8
Other scholars conceive of international regimes as social institutions which regulate
conflicts between states by constraining their behavior through the observation of norms
and rules in their dealing with disputed objects.9
An element of effectiveness is also important to the definition of regimes. A
discussion of regimes should have some means of distinguishing empty political rhetoric
from successful efforts to instill international order. For example, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1927, condemning recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies should be viewed as a weak (br even failed) regime because it was not
accompanied by behavioral changes on the part of signatory states. Keohane argues
against the measure of effectiveness, finding it sufficient that a regimes rules are taken
7 Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory
(Boulder, CO:W estview Press, 1989), 3.
8 Owen Young, Com pliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International A pplications (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 109.
9 Manfred Efinger, Volker Rittberger, and M ichael Ziirn, International Regimes in E ast-W est Relations
(London: Pinter Press, 1988), 69.
into account by participants, rather than complied with. He states, A set of rules need
not be 'effective' to qualify as a regime, but it must be recognized as continuing to exist.
Using this definition, regimes can be identified by the existence of explicit rules that are
referred to in an affirmative manner by governments, even if they are not necessarily
scrupulously observed.10 This assertion is also made by Haggard and Simmons who
point out that to define regimes on the basis of observed behavior, and then use them to
explain the same behavior is a form of circular reasoning and is logically unsound.11
Some scholars remain dissatisfied with the terminology altogether. Stein
observes that scholars have fallen into using the term regime so disparately and with
such little precision that it ranges from an umbrella for all international relations to little
more than a synonym for international organizations.12 As a structural realist, Strange
finds the concept to be fuzzy and less useful for understanding international relations
than fundamental concepts such as power and interest. She offers an alternative
definition of regimes as the government of a society by an individual, a dynasty, party or
group that wields effective power over the rest of society.13 She concludes that scholars
are better off studying underlying power structures than regimes, which are merely
symptoms of these structures.
10 Robert Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,in N eorealism and
Neoliberalism : The Contem porary D ebate, ed. David Baldwin (N ew York: Columbia University Press,
1989), 28.
11 Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons. Theories o f International Regim es, International O rganization
41, no 3 (Summer 1987): 492-493.
12 Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: R egim es in an Anarchic W orld, International

O rganization 36, no 2 (Spring 1982): 299.
13 Susan Strange, Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique o f Regim e A nalysis, in International Regimes, ed.
Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993), 344.
10
One commonly cited definition combines many of the elements of other
definitions, while withholding judgment regarding the factors bringing the regime into
existence. Krasner defines international regimes as implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations
converge in a given area of international relations.14 Insights into the constitutive
elements of this definition are provided by Haufler who observes, Principles are beliefs
of fact, cause, and right. Norms are standards of behavior. Rules tell the actors what to do
or not to do under specified conditions. Decision-making procedures refer to practice and
implementation.15 This study utilizes Krasners definition of international regimes
along with an understanding of the constitutive elements as specified by Haufler above.
Various approaches to regime analysis place different degrees of emphasis on the
collective will of member states rather than the characteristics of the organizations
created to carry out this will. As a means of retaining this distinction, this study uses the
term international regime when discussing the scope of collective agreements including
principles, norms, and shared objectives. The term international organization is used
when discussing the bodies that pursue the collective will of regime participants. It is
important to keep these two components distinct when investigating the behavior of states
towards regimes, particularly in discussions regarding an insufficiency of common will,
rather than an inability to carry out the common will.
14 Stephen Krasner, ed. International R egim es (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.
15 Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International R egim es and Non-
State Actors, in Regim e Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittenbeger, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993), 96-7.
11
The increased scope of international regimes since 1945 is reflected in the growth
of formally chartered international organizations from fewer than 100 in 1945 to nearly
200 by 1960 and to over 600 by 1980.16 Following this period, the growth in the number
of international organizations has accelerated since the end of the Cold War.
International regimes exist in many issue areas where states and other international actors
have a desire to take collective action. Examples of regimes include the GATT-based
international trade regime, the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the regime for the
protection of the ozone layer. Environmental regimes are abundant, addressing such
issues as air pollution across state borders and fishing in international waters. Many
aspects of the global economy are subject to regimes. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) oversees international trade regimes. Monetary policies are highly
institutionalized through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to these
issue areas, regimes also play an important role in international security. Numerous
international security regimes have been examined in the literature on International
Relations and these security regimes have been found to have both global and regional
consequences.
The Tubingen project is an informative study on international security regimes in
the context of East-West relations in Europe.17 The case studies were selected to. test the
effectiveness of regimes by examining regime compliance when overall relations among
the participants are in a period of decline. The researchers declared a regime to be
16 Harold Jacobson, N etworks o f Interdependence: International Organizations and the G lobal P olitical
System (N ew York: Alfred Knopf Press, 1984), 100-2.
17 Manfred Efinger, Volker Rittberger, and M ichael Ziirn, International R egim es in East-W est Relations
(London: Pinter Press, 1988).
12
present in a given issue area if two conditions were met: (1) the actors in the issue area
(de facto states) had agreed upon a set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures to
govern their behavior with respect to the conflict(s) in question, and (2) the rules thereby
created had proved effective in the sense that they were, by and large, complied with by
the actors. Efinger, Rittberger, and Ziirn carried out case studies in thirteen issue areas.
By these standards, several regimes historically affecting transatlantic security are judged
to be effective, including an intra-German trade regime introduced in the 1960s, a regime
for access to West Berlin in the mid-1970s, and the creation of the Confidence and
Security-Building Measures (CSBM) regime set up in the mid-1980s.
While new regimes are continuously being debated and formalized, existing
regimes also evolve and change over time. Birnie examines the evolution of regimes in
18
her study of international treaties and conventions. She views treaties as the first step in
regime formation, where general principles are agreed to and serve as a foundation for
negotiations for more detailed and demanding agreements. Regimes begin as a
framework and adapt to changes in the security environment, rather than representing a
static set of rules. Each state may pursue regime change in a number of ways such as
introducing a regime that better suits its interests or withdraw from existing regimes.
While a comprehensive theory of regime change has yet to emerge, scholars and
practitioners of international negotiations have offered a wide range of explanations for
success or failure in efforts to reach agreement on rules, norms, and decision-making
procedures to deal with common problems.
18 Patricia Birnie, The Scope, Limits, and Theoretical Basis o f International Legal Regulation, in The
International P olitics o f the Environment, eds. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (N ew York,
Oxford University Press, 1992), 51-84.
13
Huntington identifies three related factors contributing to the creation of a
collective defense regime overseen by NATO.19 The first of these are shared economic
interests. The second is shared political and economic values, based on a common
commitment to liberal democracy and capitalism. The third is the shared perception of a
threat to the existing balance of power emerging from the Soviet Union. The importance
of each of these factors is emphasized in competing approaches to regime analysis that
align themselves quite well with general theoretical perspectives in international
relations. He finds the balance of power factor to be the most significant, stating
Without the last of these three, the [regime] would never have come into existence.20
The factors Huntington identifies as influencing the creation and maintenance of
international regimes are similar to others proposed throughout the literature. The
remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on the theoretical perspectives associated
with power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis.
My typology of regime approaches distills several factors related to each of the
theoretical constructs that are later utilized to examine the process of regime change
throughout the history of the NATO Alliance.
Realism and Power-based regime analysis
Realism is a state-centered view of the international system that strives to be non-
normative, describing relations between states as they are rather than how they should be.
Realists view states as the principal actors in world politics, focusing primarily on the
19 Samuel Huntington, W hy International Primacy Matters. International Security 17 no. 4 (Spring 1993):
68-83.
20 Ibid, 71.
14
most powerful states, because these states dominate and shape international politics. This
body of theory was in many ways formed in reaction to the idealism of the early
twentieth century, and the failure of liberalism to reorganize the international
environment in a way that would lead to a more peaceful world. Realists continue to
view the international system as a Hobbesian state of nature. While they may agree that
creating a peaceful world would be desirable, they recognize that competition and
conflict are fundamental aspects of international relations.
In this environment, realists characterize relations between states as conflict and
competition as states seek to preserve their interests against the competing interests of
other states. Realists depict international cooperation as extremely difficult to achieve,
because of each states preoccupation with security. States recognize that there are
potential gains from cooperation, but they must remain conscious of relative gains.
Realists argue that states are usually more concerned about relative gains than absolute
gains, and are interested in how much a cooperative partner gains from any interaction.
Power-based regime analysis is favored by realists and neo-realists who tend to view
regimes as compromises in self-interest.
These theorists generally characterize the formation of international regimes as a
means of promoting the interests of particular member states. Regime creation and
regime change can be viewed as functions of the existing distribution of power.
Goldstein represents the views of many realists with his emphasis on the extent to which
contemporary international regimes reflect the interests of dominant states at the time of
15
their founding.21 The nature of contemporary international regimes is thought to be
explained in large part by the balance of power and the preferences of the most powerful
states in the international system. In this way, international regimes are simply a record
of the methods and results of power politics.22 Several theorists have contributed
important ideas to the development of a realist perspective on international regimes.
Hans Morgenthau is considered by many to be the father of modern realism.
For Morgenthau, politics is reduced to the struggle for power which is reflected in human
nature. In Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace, he observes,
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.. ..whenever [politicians]
strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for
power.23 Power is depicted as anything that aids in the control of man over man. It can
be measured in terms of a states ability to influence other states. Realists attribute order
in the international system to the distribution of power. Power is measured in terms of
military capacity, wealth, size, and control over resources. States deploy power resources
in pursuit of their interests. Calculations about power dominate the decisions of leaders as
states compete amongst themselves for power. Regime patterns are thus subject to the
distribution of power between states.
21 Morris Goldstein, The G lobal Effects o f Fund-Supported Adjustment Program s: IM F O ccasional P aper
42 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1986).
22 Michael Donelan, Elements o f International P olitical Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990),
36.
23 Hans Morgenthau, P olitics Am ong N ations: The Struggle fo r P ow er and Peace, 5th edition (N ew York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 27.
16
In Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, Morgenthau explains that international
politics has not outgrown the pre-liberal stage of development and he demonstrates
how anarchy in the international environment has prevented the success of liberal
organizations such as the League of Nations.24 Morgenthau also questions the
replacement of traditional diplomacy with a more scientific approach to international
affairs. He sees very little promise in the international conferences organized by the
League of Nations and other groups seeking to conduct open, multilateral negotiations on
the problems facing states. In a criticism of Wilson and other advocates of collective
security, he states that it is the practice of nations to clothe their own particular
aspirations and action in the moral purposes of the universe.25 He concludes that the
clear separation of morality and politics is necessary to allow theorists to distinguish
between truth and idolatry. Morgenthau rejects ethics or ideology as an explanation for
state actions. As an alternative, realism imposes the judgment that statesmen think and
act in terms of interest defined as power.26
Morgenthau refers to balance of power behavior as not only inevitable, but an

97
essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations. Balancing implies some
level of cooperation, and Morgenthau argues, Given such a system, no nation will agree
to concede political advantages to another nation without the expectation, which may or
24 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific M an Versus P o w er Politics, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946).
25 Hans Morgenthau, Six Principles o f Political Realism, in Classic Readings o f International Relations,
eds. Phil W illiams, Donald Goldstein, and Jay Shafritz (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Press,
1994), 38.
26 Hans Morgenthau, P olitics Among Nations, 5.
27 Ibid, 167.
17
may not be well founded, of receiving proportionate advantages in return.28 Because of
the unforgiving nature of competition, interstate cooperation is commonly viewed as a
zero-sum game. States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but generally only
when these arrangements result in balanced or equitable gains. Equitable gains are
those reflecting the relative power of the states.
Waltz provides a neorealist view on the formation and maintenance of regimes in
Theory o f International Politics?9 Neorealists emphasize the importance of the
structure of the international system, as determined by the distribution of power among
states. Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz does not assume that states are inherently aggressive
because they are driven by a lust for power; he points out that their behavior is simply the
result of a wish to survive in an anarchic environment. Whereas human nature is the
underlying cause of insecurity in Morgenthau's view of realism, anarchy plays that role in
Waltz's theory. Waltz observes that wars can occur in anarchy because there is nothing
to prevent them .. .[and therefore] force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as
oft
the first and constant one.
The anarchical nature of the international system means that states can only
guarantee their survival through their own efforts to maximize their power relative to
other states. Once the survival of the state is assured, states seek to achieve other goals
such as tranquility and prosperity. This emphasis on self-sufficiency serves as a barrier
to cooperation. Waltz writes, The impediments to collaboration may not lie in the
28 Ibid, 179.
29 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International P olitics (Reading, MA: Addison-W esley Press, 1979).
30 Ibid, 113.
18
character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity
- at the least, the uncertainty of each others future intentions and actions - works against
o1
cooperation. States remain conscious of relative gains when collaborating with other
states. When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided...If an expected gain is to be divided, say
in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a
policy intended to damage or destroy the other.32
Waltz argues that actors in a self-help world have trouble cooperating because of
their concern with relative gains, but that this concern depended upon how much actors
feared that other countries could use their gains against them. Much research has been
done to identify the conditions under which a state will prefer relative or absolute gains.
Grieco introduces a variable k to represent this sensitivity to the gap between absolute
and relative gains. He argues that this sensitivity has six main sources, including such
things as whether the partner has been an ally or adversary in the past, whether partners
perceive a common enemy, how they perceive the trajectory of future power relations,
and the convertibility of various types of influence.33
Waltz finds that conflict among states is best explained not by the internal
characteristics of individual states, but by the distribution of power in the international
31 Ibid, 113.
32 Ibid, 105.
33 Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Am ong Nations: Europe, America, and N onTariff B arriers to Trade ( Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). A similary variable r is used to explore this sensitivity in Duncan
Snidal, International Cooperation Am ong Relative Gain M aximizers International Studies Q uarterly 35
(1991): 387-402.
19
system. He argues that a bipolar system is less prone to conflict than a multipolar system,
because this structure reduces the uncertainties and miscalculations that can lead to war.
Anarchy encourages great powers to behave defensively and to maintain rather than upset
the balance of power. He finds that the first concern of states is to maintain their
position in the system.34 The importance of relations between any two states is reduced
in a bipolar system because great powers do not fear the loss of smaller allies. The great
powers will neither over-react (chain-gang) nor under-react (pass the buck) in
response to threats to smaller allies, as they are more likely to do in multipolar systems.35
The polarity of power distributions within the international system may vary, with greater
polarity increasing the cohesion among alliance members. This approach leads Waltz to
see the bipolar balance of power itself as responsible for the relative peace during the
Cold War rather than the characteristics of individual states or organizations.
Waltz accepts that international regimes can serve useful functions on behalf of
their members, but he does not think of the resulting organizations as important
international actors in themselves. This leads to the conclusion that international regimes
are shaped and limited by their member states and have little independent effect. State
power remains the most important factor in determining the relationship of states to
34 Waltz, Theory o f International P olitics, 95.
35 Thomas Christenson and Jack Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting A lliance Behavior in
Multipolarity, International O rganization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 136-168.
36 It is important to note that W altzs view on the peaceful nature o f bipolar distributions o f power are not
universally shared by realists. Gilpin argues that bipolarity can lead great powers to react strongly to
marginal threats in the b elief that even small losses affect the credibility o f commitments. In his view,
multipolarity induces more fluid balancing behavior and uncertainty regarding each states commitment to
its alliances to deter the use o f force. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in W orld P olitics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
20
regimes. Regimes are created to increase the power or influence of dominant states
within a specific issue area. The regimes themselves regimes have only marginal effects
on anarchy and the willingness of states to cooperate. Neorealists accept that powerful
states may use regimes to advance their interests, but they do not feel that states are
constrained by them. Regimes are thought to have little impact in areas of fundamental
conflict or on occasions when gains from unilateral action outweigh those achieved
through cooperation. States, their interests, and the international distribution of power
are seen as the primary determinants of national security, and this explains how and
under what circumstances states cooperate.
Mearsheimer also rejects classical realisms reference to aggressiveness in human
nature as the source of international conflict in The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics?1
Mearsheimer finds that the desire for survival in an anarchic international environment
serves as a sufficient explanation for interstate conflict without the need to debate the
nature of man. States are driven to seek more power to maximize their odds of survival.
He observes that in an anarchical international system, there is uncertainty regarding both
the capabilities and intentions of other states. Mearsheimer maintains, Another state
may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be certain of that judgment because
intentions are impossible to divine with one hundred percent certainty.38
Mearsheimer characterizes his form of realism as offensive realism. He
emphasizes military power over other forms of national power. In international
37 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f G reat P ow er P olitics (New York: Alfred A. K nopf Press, 1948).
38 John Mearsheimer, The False Promise o f International Institutions, in Theories o f War an d P eace, ed.
M ichael Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 335.
21
politics.. .a states effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how
they compare with the military forces of rival states.39 Mearsheimer refers to other
forms of power (such as economic wealth and population) as latent power that is most
significant in its ability to be transformed into military power. In a departure from Waltz,
Mearsheimer finds that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the
international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to
gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the
benefits outweigh the costs. Each state's goal is to be the hegemon in the system.40
This behavior contributes to the creation of security dilemmas where an increase of
power of one state results in suspicious and hostile reactions from others, particularly
among great powers. Under these conditions cooperation is limited and relative
capabilities become the primary concern of a state. Since todays ally could become an
adversary in the future, states are wary of agreements that may provide greater gains to
other states. Each state pursues policies that attempt to maximize a states power relative
to other states, and the cycle continues.
Mearsheimer accuses regimes of promoting a false sense of security, because they
can be used by states to maximize their relative power, while remaining in the event that
states fail to live up to their commitments. Cooperation is difficult under anarchy
because states are unable to accurately assess the intentions of other states, and there is no
central authority to appeal to if another state fails to live up to its agreements.
39 John Mearsheimer, O ffensive Realism , University o f Chicago M agazine 94 , no 3 (2002): 12.
40 Ibid, 13.
22
Participation is based on the self-interest of the state; members decide which behavior
will most effectively promote their strategies and their interests. He argues that
international regimes are less a consequence of collective will than a reflection of the
distribution of power in the international system.
Many realists concur with the assertion that cooperation emerges from the
concentration of power or the practice of balance of power politics rather than from the
value of the agreements themselves. International norms and rules reflect dominant state
interests and therefore have no independent authority from which to enforce compliance.
Realists such as Carr argue that in the absence of centralized authority, the strongest
country is willing and able to promote regimes that serve as an extension of its power.
Carr states, Any international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power.41 In
a condition of unipolarity, realists expect a hegemon to create and enforce regimes to
ensure international stability and preserve its favorable status. The actual substance of
the regime is a projection of the dominant country's particular preferences. A hegemon
can enforce regime compliance through coercion or incentives such as side payments.
Hegemonic stability theory credits a single dominant state with the successful formation
of international regimes.
While realists emphasize hegemony in terms of material factors, such as a
preponderance of military and economic resources, other scholars are likely to include
ideational factors such influence over the creation and maintenance of international
norms. Ikenberry and Kupchan view hegemony as a social process. Hegemonic control
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Y ears Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International
Relations, (New York: Macmillan Press, 1946), 168.
23
emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemons vision of international order and
accept it as their own - that is, when they internalize the norms and value orientations
espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the
international system.. .Power is thus exercised through a process of socialization in which
the norms and value orientations of leaders in secondary states change and more closely
reflect those of the dominant state.42 They find that socialization complements material
power noting, Rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on right. Furthermore, it
is less costly.43
Critical scholars present alternate views of hegemony that expand the state-
centered concept centered in realism. Cox ascribes to the critical school of theorists that
reject the positivist assumption that the aim of social science is to identify causal
relationships in an objective world. According to Smith, critical scholars point out that is
it not possible to separate the subject from object, nor to distinguish between normative
inquiry on the one hand and empirical scientific research on the other.44 Gramsci, who
is the source for Coxs conception of hegemony, draws on Marxism in his portrayal of
hegemony as the dominance of one social class over another. In his work, hegemony is
exercised through intellectual and moral leadership that is translated into political power
for the dominant class. Robert Cox describes how domestic hegemony can expand to
42 John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, Socialization and Hegem onic Power, International O rganization
44 no. 3 (Summer 1990): 285.
43 Ibid, 286
44 Steve Smith, The Self-Images o f a Discipline: A Genealogy o f International Relations Theory in

International Relations Theory Today, , eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press:
1995), 24-6.
24
world hegemony. Cox interprets hegemony as social phenomenon expressed "in norms,
institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for
those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the
dominant mode of production.45 Cox argues that hegemony may be imposed or
consensual, adding that dominance by a powerful state is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition of hegemony.46
Several scholars have examined the unique role of hegemony in the creation of
international regimes. Kindleberger provides a classic illustration of hegemonic stability
theory in study on the role of hegemonic leadership in the Great Depression.47 He finds
that one of the main factors contributing to the severity of the Great Depression was the
absence of a hegemonic state to lead the world economy. The United States was able but
unwilling to provide economic order in the world during the interwar years, while Great
Britain was willing but unable to play the role of hegemon. Gilpins presentation of
hegemonic stability theory provides another realist view on the relationship between
regimes and the international balance of power. Gilpins hegemonic stability theory finds
that international order rests on one powerful state, which dominates all other states
through its preponderance in military and economic capabilities. Gilpin portrays a
hegemon as a powerful state who plays a unique role in preserving of the stability of the
45 Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 10
no 2, (1981): 137.
46 Ibid, 139.
47 Charles Kindleberger, The W orld in D epression: 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1973).
48 Robert Gilpin, War an d Change in W orld P olitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
25
international system. In his study of American hegemony in the mid-to-late twentieth
century, he finds evidence that the United States used its power and influence to
promote trade liberalization and a stable international monetary system primarily in order
to advance its own political and economic interests.49 His assumption that international
regimes require the efforts of a powerful leader leads to the expectation that there is
likely to be less compliance with international regimes as the hegemons power declines.
A second example of hegemonic leadership in Ruggies account of changes to
international economic regimes from orthodox liberalism to embedded liberalism
during the European reconstruction after the Second World War.50 Ruggie documents
changes in the international regimes governing liberal economics. In this instance of
regime change, the United States exercised hegemonic leadership by unilaterally defining
the rules and procedures of the embedded liberal economic regime and using its
dominant economic position to bring it about. A new economic order resulted from the
ability of the hegemon to entice or coerce other states into complying with regimes that
were consistent with its vision of a desirable international order. Elsewhere, Ruggie
notes, The American vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order has been clear
and consistent, and it embodies certain key multilateral principles: movement toward
greater openness, greater nondiscrimination of treatment, and more extensive
opportunities to realize joint gains. It does not include endowing multilateral
49 Robert Gilpin, "The Rise o f American Hegemony," in Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the
United States 1941-2001, ed. Patrick O'Brien and Armand C lesse (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.,
2002), 166.
50 John Ruggie, International Regim es, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order, International O rganization 36 no. 2 (Spring 1982): 379-415.
26
organizations with extensive autonomy.51 This view is reflected in renewed calls for
American leadership in the post-Cold War era. Kagan finds that to be effective,
multilateralism must be preceded by unilateralism. In the toughest situations, the most
effective multilateral response comes when the strongest power decides to act, with or
without the others, and then asks its partners whether they will join.52
International regimes often become a public good provided unilaterally by the
hegemon. Public goods have the characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry.
Non-excludability where it is not possible to provide a good for one actor without all
others having access to it. Non-rivalry is the condition where the consumption of a good
by one actor will not interfere with others access to it. Regimes will persist so long as
such a power concentration exists; regimes will decline with the diffusion of international
power. Regimes may also dissipate the hegemon's resources, which Krasner finds will
allow an existing regime to persist until the hegemon's control over relevant resources
declines, after which the regime collapses.53 Without the efforts of a hegemon to enforce
a regime, regimes are likely to be disregarded when national interests conflict with
compliance, particularly when security concerns are present.
Realism is pessimistic regarding the formation of international regimes without
hegemonic leadership because these regimes result in a reliance on other states for their
survival. This behavior is inconsistent with realisms views on the self-help nature of
51 John Ruggie, Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism After the Cold War, P olitical
Science Q uarterly 109, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 560.
52 Robert Kagan, The Benevolent Empire, Foreign P olicy 111 (Summer 1998): 33.
53 Stephen Krasner, Regimes and the Limits o f Realism: Regim es as Autonomous V ariables', in
International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1983).
27
international relations. To the extent that non-state actors are considered by realists, they
are generally believed to have little long-term influence on how such state patterns of
action are developed. When cooperation occurs, it is led by a hegemon, and
predominantly reflects the hegemon's concerns. This pessimism towards regimes has led
some scholars to question the continued relevance of NATO, including several who
predict the imminent demise of NATO. Others point out that the Alliance may only
persist until a crisis makes its shortcomings clear. As Walt notes, An aging alliance may
appear robust and healthy so long as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the
basic rationale for the arrangement is crumbling.54
In summary, power-based regime analysis is favored by realists and neo-realists.
These theorists generally characterize the formation of international regimes as a means
of promoting the interests of particular member states. Regime formation and regime
change can be viewed as functions of the existing distribution of power and the interests
of the dominant states in a particular issue area. In the case of a single dominant state,
hegemonic stability theory claims that the hegemon will seek to create and enforce
regimes to ensure international stability and preserve its favorable status. International
regimes often become a public good provided unilaterally by the hegemon through
coercion or incentives such as side payments. Without the efforts of a hegemon to
enforce a regime, regimes will be routinely disregarded. The balance of power and the
efforts of hegemon to actively enforce regime compliance thereby become key factors in
successful regime change.
54 Stephen Walt, W hy Alliances Endure or Collapse, Survival 39 no. 1 (Spring 1997): 167.
28
On the occasions when such regimes are formed, many realists expect them to last
only as long as the distribution of power and perception of threat remain constant.
Pedersen notes Structural realism has some particularly weak spots, the case of
European integration being one... [due to] its inability to provide an explanation of the
high degree of institutionalization and notably its durability in the European region.55
Neoliberal institutionalism provides an complementary approach to realisms power-
based approach to regime analysis. This body of work depicts regimes as more than a
consequence of the balance of power, but as a source of international order valued for
their ability to allow states to cooperate for mutual gains.
Neoliberal Institutionalism and Organization-based regime analysis
Neoliberal institutionalism refers to a body of work addressing the formation and
maintenance of international regimes. This theoretical approach depicts the international
system as made up of states existing under anarchy, but it allows regimes a more
independent role in the international environment. Neoliberal institutionalism examines
the incentives that states face that both promote and deter cooperation, and the role that
regimes play in facilitating this process. While realists see regimes as the creation of
powerful states who seek to preserve their interests, neoliberal institutionalists view
regimes as arising out of mutual desires to achieve better outcomes through cooperation.
Regimes do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them;
55 Thomas Pedersen, Germany, France and the Integration o f Europe: A R ealist Interpretation (London:
Pinter Press, 1998), 30.
29
the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power.56 Neoliberal
institutionalists do not assume that rules alone drive behavior, but that states seek regimes
to acquire the benefits of cooperation. These arrangements allow members to focus on
maximizing absolute gains with less concern about relative gains.
This approach to regime analysis assumes regimes exist to allow participants to
take collective action to achieve joint gains or to avoid joint losses. While hegemonic
states may have particular incentives to bring regimes into existence, relatively small
groups of states can also overcome collective action problems and form regimes. Snidal
employs game theory in his research to depict the interaction of states and the role of
like-minded groups to form regimes to address common concerns.57 The balance of
power is not as important as the desire to achieve joint gains from cooperation. Absolute
gains can be sought without undue concern for relative gains. Neoliberal institutionalists
view regimes as arrangements to encourage international cooperation, and moderate the
effects of anarchy. These regimes give states an alternative to acting alone and help to
overcome the distrust and competition among states that threaten their security. Regimes
help states cooperate to mutually achieve their goals and the organizations promoting
regimes serve as important actors in the international environment. The rise in both the
authority and number of international organizations in the aftermath of World War II has
been the subject of much discussion among neoliberal scholars.
56 Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, International Studies Q uarterly 32, no. 4
(December 1988): 382.
57 Duncan Snidal, The Limits o f Hegem onic Stability Theory, International O rganization 39, no. 4
(Autumn 1985): 579-614.
30
In After Victory, Ikenberry describes the creation of a new international order that
hinges on the ability of states to restrain power institutionally and bind themselves to
long-term commitments.58 He finds that regimes constrain the actions of all members,
including a hegemon. Although the United States has a preponderance of power,
members of multilateral organizations such as NATO are less likely to engage in
competitive security policies with other participants in the regime. Rather than seeking
gains in zero-sum situations, the allies work together to combine their capabilities in a
manner that expands a liberal international order. Ikenberry finds that realism and
neoliberal institutionalism provide competing explanations for the proliferation of
regimes following World War II and he shows how an institutionalist approach more
accurately accounts for the post-Cold War international cooperation.
Ikenberrys claim is supported by the continued expansion of NATO and other
international security organizations, the absence of conflict between Western states, and
the general acknowledgement of the power restraining functions of these regimes. He
views the regulative role of regimes as more important than shifts in the balance of
power. Even though the United States held an influential role in the regime, the actual
exercise of that power was sufficiently constrained and institutionalized and the
possibilities of reassurance sufficiently available that cautious cooperation rather than
outright power balancing was possible.59 By creating forums and decision-making
58 John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding o f O rder after M ajor
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), xi.
59 Ibid, 222.
31
procedures that promote common interests while simultaneously limiting their members
ability to act unilaterally, regimes shape the international environment.
While realists seek to predict international behavior based on power and interests
alone, neoliberal institutionalists such as Keohane and Nye find the international
disposition toward regimes to be affected by levels of interdependence.60 They define the
components of complex interdependence as mutual sensitivity and mutual vulnerability.
Sensitivity is the extent to which one state is affected by the actions of another, while
vulnerability is the extent to which a country can isolate itself from external events. At
higher levels of interdependence, the opportunity costs of not coordinating policy are
greater and grow to exceed the costs of making agreements and sacrificing autonomy. As
a result, there is a higher demand for international regimes in an environment of high
interdependence. As the number and importance of related issues increases, the formation
of regimes becomes more desirable than the alternative of creating new rules and
procedures for each issue that arises.
Regimes coordinate the behavior of states and help make cooperation possible
even within an international system based on anarchy. Regimes promote interstate
cooperation that will allow states to overcome conflicts over interests as depicted in the
logic problems such as Rousseaus Stag Hunt.61 While Rousseau accurately described
the incentives for defection based on a single encounter, neoliberal institutionalists point
out that the expectation of repeated interactions creates an incentive for cooperation over
60 Robert Keohane and Joseph N ye, P ow er and Independence: World P olitics in Transition (Boston: Little
Brown, 1977).
61 Jean Jacques Rousseau, D iscourse on the Origin and Basis o f Inequality Among Men, reprinted in The
Social Contract and the First and Second D iscourse. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
32
time. States that defect undercut their overall reputation for cooperation, weakening not
only the regime they violate but others as well. As long as the stakes remain fairly
uniform in each round and reliable information on other states' actions is available, states
fs 9
will be less likely to defect and risk the benefits of maintaining existing regimes.
Regime compliance continues as long as the costs of compliance remain lower than the
benefits provided, including future benefits associated with stability. Short term gains are
sacrificed for the expectation of even larger joint gains being realized through compliance
with a regime.
In After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
Keohane explores concerns about the stability of international order following the
seemingly dramatic decline of American hegemony in the 1970s.63 Keohane utilizes an
organization-based rather than a power-based approach to regime analysis to explain how
international regimes can endure and evolve, even when circumstances that gave rise to
them have changed. He identifies the obstacles to international cooperation as
uncertainty, informational asymmetries, and fears of cheating. International regimes
continue to persist even without hegemonic oversight because of their ability to help
overcome collective action and market failure dilemmas.64 Regimes influence the flow
of information and opportunities to negotiate; the ability of governments to monitor
62 Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold, Reinventing C ollective Security After the Cold War and Gulf
Conflict, P olitical Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (September 1993): 217.
63 Robert Keohane, A fter Hegemony: Cooperation and D iscord in the World P olitical Econom y (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
64 For more information on collective action and market failure see Mancur Olson, The L ogic o f C ollective
Action: Public G oods and the Theory o f G roups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
33
others compliance and to implement their own commitments - hence their ability to
make credible commitments in the first place; and prevailing expectations about the
solidarity of international agreements.65 In short, regimes aid cooperation by reducing
both transaction costs and information costs while giving states access to a greater set of
capabilities as a result of their collective efforts.
Regimes reduce transaction costs by creating a forum and set of procedures for
negotiations. These activities help states to overcome obstacles such as information
asymmetries, moral hazards and irresponsibility, making governments policies more
transparent and predictable to other members. As a result of these existing forums and
procedures, states can more easily negotiate future agreements. Regimes reduce
information costs by providing forums to discuss and disseminate information. In
addition, regimes create a sense of legal liability that obligates actors to the rules and
agreements making up the regime. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states reject
cooperation primarily because of fears of cheating and that regimes can reduce the
attractiveness of cheating by emphasizing reciprocity. Keohane finds that international
regimes reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for illegitimate
ones.66 Under these conditions, regimes deter cheaters and protect victims, so that states
can create and maintain mutually-beneficial agreements. This approach to international
regimes implies that the persistence of regimes is greatly influenced by the ability of the
65 Keohane, A fter Hegemony, 2.
66 Ibid, 90.
34
organizations that embody them to provide information and coordinate member actions
that allow all member states to achieve benefits.
Although Keohane emphasizes interstate economic cooperation, organizational
approaches to regime analysis have been effectively adapted to security affairs. Despite
the existence of anarchy, regimes can influence the behavior of states in a manner that
reduces uncertainty and increases security. Regimes can facilitate cooperation by
assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing
information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members.67
Keohane, Nye and Hoffman demonstrate how some security regimes influence the
exercise of state power by providing a forum for governments to signal their intentions
and promoting information sharing to make policies more predictable.68 International
regimes promoting security often result in the formation of organizations that provide a
means for verifying military capability, for discussing intentions, and resolving disputes
among member states. International security regimes not only promote the pursuit of
greater absolute gains, but encourage collective responses to international security
challenges that offer advantages over unilateral responses anticipated by states operating
in an anarchic international environment.
The ability of regimes to overcome the condition of anarchy and promote
cooperation among states is not universally accepted among theorists. In Cooperation
Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, Grieco explores the
67 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory, International Security 20 no.
1 (Summer 1995): 45-6.
68 Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffman, eds. A fter the Cold War: International Institutions
an d State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
35
question of how and why states are willing to cooperate in an anarchical international
system.69 Grieco examines both realism and neoliberal institutionalism, to determine
which best explains the problem of international cooperation. Grieco tests the neoliberal
institutionalist assertion that international regimes can promote cooperation by reducing
conflict and allowing states to seek absolute gains. The subject of Griecos study is trade
negotiations, which are a topic of low politics generally favored by neoliberal
institutionalists. He states, Realist theory is typically the form of analysis that is brought
to bear on relations between adversaries, and, except for analyses of military alliances,
70
realism is not usually applied to relations among states that are on friendly terms.
Since his findings tend to be more consistent with realism in a domain that is thought to
favor neoliberal institutionalism, his conclusions gained particular interest within the
discipline.
Grieco finds that throughout the negotiations that he studied, international
regimes were not capable of mitigating the effects of anarchy. This behavior could be
expected to be even more pronounced when there are security implications to such an
agreement. He concludes that neoliberals misunderstand the influence of anarchy on the
preferences and actions of states. Neoliberalism mis-specifies the effects of anarchy on
the character and goals of states.71 He argues that realism provides a better explanation
because this theory addresses both concerns with cheating and the gaps in relative gains.
69 Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among N ations: Europe, America, and N onTariff B arriers to Trade (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
70 Ibid, 2-3.
71 Ibid, 2.
36
Elsewhere, he notes, Most states concentrate on the danger that relative gains from joint
action may advantage partners and may thus foster the emergence of what at best might
be a potentially more domineering friend and at worst could be a potentially more
powerful adversary.72 Griecos argument fails to recognize that the effects of anarchy
have been tempered, if only locally, through international regimes that provide a credible
security pledge. In the case of NATO, Joffe finds The United States swept aside the
rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in
centuries past.. . . Once the problem of security was dispatched, collective gain could
overwhelm the zero-sum logic of rivalry and relative gains.73
In summary, an organization-based approach to regime analysis is favored by
neoliberal institutionalists. These theorists characterize regime creation and enforcement
as resulting from a process of multilateral bargaining through which all member states
seek long term benefits in the form of joint gains or lowered costs. Neoliberal
institutionalist theory centers on questions of interstate cooperation, which can be
portrayed as efforts to achieve more optimal outcomes in light of both common and
conflicting interests. International regimes govern the actions of all participating states
uniformly, including placing constraints on the behavior of a hegemon. Participating
states comply with international regimes, even taking actions that conflict with short-term
national interests, to pursue the benefits of long term cooperation. Regimes persist due to
their ability to draw upon relevant capabilities in order to provide absolute gains for all
72 Joseph Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits o f Cooperation: A Realist Critique o f the N ew est Liberal
Institutionalism International Organization 42 no. 3 (Summer 1988): 499.
73 Joseph Joffe, The L im ited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens o f Alliance
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), 183-4.
37
member states rather than simply providing relative gains for the hegemon. Regime
change comes about as regime participants recognize that existing structures and
procedures can be adapted to promote new instances of collective behavior.
Organization-based regime analysis thereby emphasizes the ability of the organizational
structures to meet the needs of all members when presented with the opportunity for
collective action.
Neoliberal institutionalism complements other theoretical perspectives allowing
for the influence of norms and other social phenomenon in international relations. This
approach emphasizes rules and organizational characteristics less than social interactions.
Kowert points out that many neoliberal theorists have thus been particularly reluctant to
focus on informal structure and norms in the area of security studies.74 Keohane offers
another critique, stating Institutional theory takes states conceptions of their interests as
exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory...nor does realism predict
interests. The weakness of systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their
relative predictive power.75 Constructivism is a useful means of understanding the
formation of interests through its emphasis on the social nature of international relations
and the importance of identities and norms in the constitution of national interests.
74 Paul Kowert, Norms, Identity, and Their Limits, in The Culture o f N ational Security: N orm s and
Identity in W orld Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press: 1996), 461.
75 Robert Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War, in N eorealism
an d N eoliberalism : The Contem porary D ebate. Ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993), 285.
38
Liberalism, Constructivism and Norm-based regime analysis
Liberal thought originated during the Enlightenment and is characterized by a
belief in progress and that through cooperation, individuals can improve their condition
and learn to live in peace. Liberals generally view human beings as perfectible and
history as a progression toward the eventual elimination of war through education and
reform. Early liberal theorists questioned the relationship of the individual and the state
and developed new perspectives on social and economic affairs. Their view of human
nature depicts a basic unity of interests among individuals, which results in common
interests among states. Liberals find that individual interests cannot be confined within
the borders of one state, and the actions of individuals create both formal and informal
linkages across state borders. Liberals recognize that the internal characteristics of states
vary considerably and that these differences have significant effects on state behavior
toward regimes. These scholars claim that regime compliance is not dependent on
repetitive cost-benefit analyses, but the result of patterns of interaction resulting in shared
norms. These interactions can reduce the sense of competition between them and
promote peaceful relations and closer integration.
While realists viewed the outbreak of World War II as evidence of the
intractability of balance of power politics, post-war liberal thinkers such as Mitrany and
Haas emphasize that interdependence among states would continue to give regimes an
important role in the pursuit of international peace. In A Working Peace System, Mitrany
observes that modern states are characterized by multiple channels of access which
39
weaken the grip of central decision makers on foreign policy.76 These states are
increasingly dependent on one another to achieve their goals of economic growth and
social security for their citizens. Rather than viewing the state as a unitary actor, he
emphasizes that authority is decentralized within states as well as among states. Mitrany
shows how regimes embodied in such organizations as the International Labor
Organization promote international cooperation because they perform key social and
economic functions that are outside of the authority of individual states. Integration in
one sector of the economy creates pressure for integration in related sectors, a process
termed functional spillover. Political integration can be expected to follow economic
and social integration. Mitranys views, labeled functionalism, predict an increase in
political integration at the expense of state sovereignty. Regimes promoting integration
could limit the effects of anarchy and create conditions more favorable to increased
international cooperation.
In Beyond the Nation-State, Haas draws on functionalism as he examines the
process of regime formation through the early experiences of the European Community
(EC). Haas finds that supranational bodies like the EC are the appropriate regional
counterpart to the nation state which no longer feels capable of realizing welfare aims
within its own narrow borders.77 He anticipates increasing authority at the supranational
level as a result of economic integration among European states. Haas neofunctionalism
depicts organizations as actively promoting regimes leading to political integration,
76 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, Quadrangle Press, 1943).
77 Ernst Haas, Beyond the N ation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1964), 158.
40
primarily as a result of domestic economic groups pursuing their own interests across
state borders. Successful economic integration causes individuals and groups to begin to
shift their loyalty from national authorities to supranational authorities, a process termed
political spillover. Political spillover results in strong supranational organizations that
can enforce order as an alternative to the dominance of anarchy as the principle guiding
interstate cooperation.
In Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch and a team of
researchers analyze a number of historical case studies in an effort to identify conditions
favorable to the formation of security communities. These authors define a security
community as one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community
will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.
Within these communities, states become interdependent and create regimes to govern
their relations in accordance with shared norms, values and expectations. Integration
comes through the attainment, within a territory of a sense of community and of
institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time,
7Q
dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population This integration is
the basis of economic interdependence, rough compatibility of values among decision
makers, mutual predictability of behaviors among said decision makers, and some degree
of mutual policy responsiveness.80
78 Karl Deutsch, et al, P olitical Community and the North Atlantic Area: International O rganization in the
Light o f H istorical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5.
79 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis o f International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 5.
80 Ibid, 58.
41
Deutsch found that regimes can assist in the formation of security communities.
Deutsch argues that trade and other forms of intercultural exchange can help develop a
sense of community which makes the use of violence less likely as a means to resolving
conflict. He finds that the main value of functional organizations today may well be in
their side-effects, especially in forming habits of communication and
responsiveness... such organizations also help to increase the range of different common
functions and services, with the organizations to carry them out.81 International
cooperation can become so frequent and rewarding that it mitigates trends toward
conflict and may even lead to more direct forms of political integration.82
Deutsch found that although the North Atlantic area was far from integrated, it
seemed to be moving toward closer integration. Historically, regimes complement the
process of integration, but are not sufficient for integration. However, even in the early
years of the Alliance, the efforts of member states to increase their economic and social
cooperation in addition to its security functions made it more than a military alliance.
Deutsch felt that there were good prospects for increased integration among NATO
members as the Alliance adopted more characteristics of a collective security regime. He
acknowledged that the Soviet threat gave security cooperation greater urgency, but he did
not view it as a necessary condition for closer integration. Deutsch states, Planners
might find that they could move ahead more vigorously if they dropped what may be a
tacit assumption that both the danger of an East-West war and the opportunity for
81 Ibid, 189.
82 Ibid, 155.
42
integrating the North Atlantic area will disappear at the same moment. In his view,
increased security cooperation through NATO may be one of the most effective ways to
advance the development of political community in the North Atlantic area, and to
contribute to the eventual abolition of war.84
Many scholars have observed the remarkable record of peaceful relations among
democratic states, implying the existence of a democratic community governed by its
own norms. Owen combines normative and organizational explanations to argue that
liberal principles and democratic processes work together to make war highly unlikely
O f
among democracies. His observations apply to states where liberalism is the dominant
ideology and citizens have leverage over decisions to wage war. Declarations of war are
institutionalized and provide numerous opportunities for liberal ideals of peaceful
competition, persuasion, and compromise to be acted upon. Relations among Western
democracies have been particularly characterized more by peaceful cooperation than by
considerations of balance of power.
Constructivism complements liberalism in its depiction of the shared interests and
peaceful behavior of democratic states toward each other. What liberals characterize as
democratic values are viewed by constructivists as shared interests and norms.
According to Lebow, realism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism all share a
83 Ibid, 191.
84 Ibid, 203.
85 John Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace, International Security 19, no. 2 (Autumn
1994): 87-125.
43
common ontology consisting of egoistic, autonomous states.86 However, while both
realism and neoliberal institutionalism emphasize material factors in the formation and
maintenance of regimes, constructivists generally believe international relations are
governed by shared ideas. The constructivist ontology asserts reality is social rather than
material. As a result, the outcome of state relations can be attributed to the influence of
ideas instead of such material factors as wealth, geography, and military technology.
In The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,
Katzenstein and others argue that norms play an important role in world politics, shaping
both cooperation and conflict in ways that are not accounted for by theories that focus
either on material structural forces or on individual choice.87 Norms serve as collective
understandings of appropriate behavior, which can be invoked by the participants in a

oo
discourse to justify their arguments. Over time, commonly agreed and jointly
observed principles and norms become internationalized by the actors involved, thereby
reshaping the perception of interests.89 Hurrell similarly finds that states comply with
international regimes not based on external sanctions or the threat of them but based
rather on the existence of shared interests, of shared values, and of patterned
86 Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision o f P olitics: Ethics, Interests and O rders (Cambridge: Cambridge
87 Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture o f N ational Security: Norms and Identity in W orld P olitics (N ew
York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
88 Thomas Risse-Kappen, C ollective Identity in a Democratic Community, in The Culture o f N ational

Security: N orm s and Identity in W orld P olitics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University,
1996), 369.
89 Volker Rittberger, R egim e Theory: Findings from the Study o f East W est Regim es, Cooperation and
Conflict, 26 no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 165-83.
44
expectations.90 In the international environment, the perceived legitimacy of rules and
their underlying norms influence the willingness of international actors to comply.
Regimes are thus credited with being self-enforcing in that they manage to socialize their
members into compliance.91
The constructivist emphasis on social factors can be employed to generate new
understandings regarding the formation of interests and the pursuit of security. Buzan
concurs with realist assertions that individuals and states seek security, but he views the
concept of security as more complex and multifaceted than the straightforward pursuit of
power. Buzan also challenges the realist depiction of states as functionally equivalent,
noting that states differ not just in their physical characteristics, but in terms of their
organizing ideologies and their legitimacy among their own population.92 The pursuit of
national security involves reducing vulnerability and threats, which may be military,
political, economic, societal, or environmental. In his work with Waever and Wilde,
Buzan describes the process of securitization.93 An issue becomes securitized when it is
deemed an exception to the normal political processes. Securitization follows the logic of
constructivist speech-act processes, wherein an actor designates a referential object as an
existential threat and an audience accepts this claim. Buzans work provides a useful
90 Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study o f Regim es A Reflective Approach, in Regime
Theory and International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 190.
91 Oran Young, Com pliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International, A pplications (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979).
92 Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An A genda f o r International Security Studies in a P ost-C old War
Era, 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 70-1.
93 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de W ilde, Security: A N ew Framework f o r Analysis, Analysis
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), 34-42.
45
account of how individuals, states, and communities pursue security in a complex manner
that may involve many issues and interests.
Buzan, Waever, and Wilde also introduce the concept of a security complex to
explain changes and variations in state behavior as it relates to the pursuit of security.
Security complexes are shaped by the balance of power and interactions among actors
that result in patterns of cooperation and conflict. A security complex is a set of units
whose process of securitization is so interlinked that security problems cannot be
resolved apart from one another.94 In some of their most recent work, Buzan and
Waever suggest that regional security complexes are increasingly useful to an
understanding of state behavior.95 Regional security complexes exist as miniature
anarchies when states geographical proximity and history of interaction motivate them
to put added emphasis on their relations with selected states. The authors recognize a
tendency to greater integration within regional security complexes, which is a step
towards forming a security community. This is particularly relevant to relations among
European states, which have gradually formed heterogeneous complexes across
numerous issue areas embodied in international regimes such as the European Union
(EU) and NATO.
Constructivism portrays international relations as a social process made up of
agents and structure. The world is constructed through the actions of agents. These
actions occur based on the meanings that the objects and situations have for them. The
94 Ibid, 12.
95 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure o f International Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
46
structure of the system consists of the identities of these agents and the ideas that give
meaning to their material capabilities. The process of identity creation is continually
shaped by the interactions of actors and their experiences. One result of positive
experiences with interstate cooperation can be the formation of an international
community. Hurrell states, The aim is to identify a conception of international society
consistent with self-interest and with the realities of power. Yet, at the same time, there
was the awareness that international society could not be understood solely in these terms
and had to be rooted within the cultural and historical forces that had helped shape the
consciousness of society and had molded perceptions of common values and common
purposes.96 Constructivists commonly view states as agents having a collective identity,
based on common elements of their national identities. States form their collective
identity based on how they see themselves in relation to other states in international
society, and this identity affects the way they determine their interests.
Constructivism emphasizes the important role of identity in the formation of
actors interests. According to Wendt, both realism and neoliberal institutionalism regard
state interests and identities as constant and exogenously given while constructivists
view them as endogenous to interaction.97 A recognition that identities and interests
may be treated as dependent variables endogenous to interaction allows constructivists to
treat collective action not merely as a problem for changing the price of cooperation for
96 Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study o f Regimes: A R eflexive Approach, in Regime
Theory and International Relations, eds.Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (Oxford: Clarendon Press:
1995), 63
97 Alexander Wendt, C ollective Identity Formation and the International State, Am erican P olitical
Science R eview 88, no. 2. (Summer, 1994): 384.
47
QO
self-interested actors, but as a process of creating new definitions of self. He and other
constructivists argue that interests cannot simply be deduced from assumptions about
anarchy, but are rooted in identity. Wendt finds that any cohesive group (whether
national, subnational, or transnational) will be built around some type of collective
identity. State interactions continually produce and reproduce conceptions of self and
other, resulting in the continuous redefinition of identities and interests. In this way,
state interests and identities are co-constituted along with the social structures of the
international system.
In A Social Theory o f International Relations, Wendt acknowledges that anarchy
exists in the international system, but he finds that collective identities may influence
anarchy." He identifies three cultures of anarchy: enmity, rivalry, or friendship. The
collective identity of states determines the dominant culture of anarchy and the levels of
conflict and cooperation will vary accordingly. Collective identity formation is
influenced by a number of variables, including interdependence, common fate,
homogenization, and self-restraint. While realists view regimes as a product of changes
in power or threat, constructivists view regimes as emerging out of collective identities.
Identity is therefore a critical element in social and political interactions, aiding in an
understanding of how individuals come together to form groups and how states come
together to form regimes.
98 Ibid, 387.
99 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International P olitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999).
48
Onuf pioneered rule-oriented constructivism, arguing that international relations
can be analyzed according to the rules invoked or challenged by agents speech acts.100
Rules assist in the formation of identities and interests. Onuf identifies several types of
rules, including instruction rules, directive rules and commitment rules that guide the
behavior of agents. Speech acts reflect how agents deal with rules, by either by
complying or not complying with existing rules or contributing to rule changes.
International regimes are sets of stable rules that specify relationships between agents.
These regimes can take many forms, including collective defense and collective security
arrangements between states.
Regimes emerge as states develop mutual expectations of cooperation as a result
of their experiences with each other. Initial experiences with cooperation among states
develop into norms that encourage further cooperation over time. Regimes emerge from
the choices agents make and entail the mutual acceptance of norms of behavior.
International security organizations such as NATO and the European Union provide a
means for states to increase their security at the cost of complying with the norms of the
regime. These norms include a commitment to consultation and compromise based on
the premise that no nation has either the inherent strength or the special moral authority
to decide important international issues without the consent of other states.101
Constructivism recognizes the inevitable change in both international regimes and
collective identities as a result of routine state interactions.
100 Nicholas Onuf, W orld o f Our M aking Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International
Relations (Colombia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
101 Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies a t War: America, Europe and the Crisis in Iraq (New
York:McGraw-Hill, 2004), 52.
49
Collective identities are based on shared norms, leading liberals and
constructivists to expect democracies to form international organizations reflecting their
sense of community. This sense of community provides insight into the relationship
between identity, interests and regimes. Some scholars find that the basis of Western
unity lies in NATOs commitment to defend common values such as representative
democracy, rule of law and the market economy.102 In many ways, NATO is a
contemporary embodiment of the pacific federation described in Kants Perpetual
Peace, resulting in differences between the relations of liberal and non-liberal states.
Nye observes, The United States shares the values of democracy and human rights more
thoroughly with the majority of European countries than most other states. Values matter
in American foreign policy and the commonality of values between the United States and
Europe is an important force keeping the two sides together.103 Doyles contribution to
democratic peace theory notes that liberal states view each other as just, but because
non-liberal states are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations
become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a
presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity.104
Constructivists depict the Cold War as a clash of distinct identities and interests derived
from these identities. NATOs collective identity helped to sustain a sense of community
among NATO members during numerous economic and military crises
102 Owen Harries, The Collapse o f the W est, Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993): 41-53.
103 Joseph Nye, The U.S. and Europe: Continental Drift? International Affairs 76, no. 1 (January2000):
55.
104 M ichael D oyle, Liberalism and World Politics, Am erican P olitical Science R eview 80, no. 4
(December 1986): 1161.
50
In summary, norm-based regime analysis is favored by both liberals and
constructivists. Both perspectives foresee the emergence of security communities among
democratic states. The presence of a regime may result in the mutual adjustment of
national interests favoring the preservation of the international community. Regimes can
affect states interests by influencing ideas about the legitimacy of member state actions
when compared to established norms. Shared values among participating members can
influence member state behavior over time and contribute to regime formation and
changes to existing regimes. The process of adopting a collective security regime within
NATO has been a social process, involving a reconceptualization of security, identity and
interests among member states. While a collective defense regime implies a collective
response to an overt act of aggression from a known threat, the practice of collective
security is more complex and introduces new challenges for the Alliance.
Distinguishing Collective Security and Collective Defense Regimes
Literature in the field of international relations recognizes a number of potential
approaches to establishing international order. Balance of power behavior is commonly
observed among states in a perpetual condition of competition and conflict. States may
form alliances as a means of externally balancing against other groups of states.
Collective defense is practiced through an international security regime whereby states
pledge their cooperation and support in the event that an alliance member is attacked by a
third party. Collective defense regimes generally emphasize military coordination among
a limited number of states and are organized in response to a specified threat. An
alternative regime is the creation of a collective security community that assumes
responsibility for the preservation of peace. An ideal collective security arrangement
51
calls upon all states to share in the responsibilities for peace and international order and
obligates all members to punish any transgression. Collective security regimes generally
seek to restrain threats to international peace originating from either within or outside of
the alliance. Kupchan characterizes a collective security regime as one based on the
principle of all against one; that members will build up military capability against an
aggressor should one emerge.105 Collective security arrangements commonly obligate
members to act in response to any perceived threat to international peace, including
emerging threats not anticipated during the formation of the agreement. While the
practice of collective defense predates the modern state system, collective security has
consistently been proposed as an alternative approach establishing a peaceful
international order.
The call for a new international order based on the practice of collective security
has a long history in international relations. In the early 18th century, Saint-Pierre
proposed a strong federation among European states that would enforce international law
and have the authority to arbitrate disputes among states. He regarded war as an evil
practice that stood in the way of further political and social reform in Europe. In A
Project fo r Perpetual Peace, Saint-Pierre proposes that European monarchs appoint
representatives to a Senate of Peace that would mediate disputes within the federation as
an alternative to war.106 His work is one of the earliest attempts at collective security, as
105 Charles Kupchan, The Case for C ollective Security, in Collective Security A fter the C old War, ed.
George Dow ns (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f M ichigan Press, 1993), 120.
106 Abbe de Saint-Pierre A P roject f o r Perpetual P eace (1713). Reprinted in Steven Cooper, ed. Peace
Projects o f the Seventeenth Century (New York: Garland Press, 1974).
52
he calls for member states to unite their military forces against individual states that
refuse to obey international law as interpreted by the Senate for Peace.
Saint-Pierres project argues for the adoption of collective security regimes by
emphasizing the tragedy of war, but was unable to convince European monarchs to
renounce war as a means of resolving international conflicts. Saint-Pierre views war as
an unsuitable means of resolving conflict due to its extraordinary social and economic
costs. He assumes that self-interested monarchs would prefer a system of mediation once
they are made aware of the immense advantages which a perfectly certain peace would
bring to them and to their Royal Houses.107 As it turned out, these advantages were not
generally acknowledged among monarchs, and the difficulties of implementing such a
collective security continued to challenge liberal thinkers.
Rousseaus works describe the potential benefits of a social reorganization on
both the domestic and international levels. In Social Contract, Rousseau views human
nature as perfectible through political will.108 Under the social contract, people submit
themselves to the general will in order to live in a peaceful society. Rousseau states,
What man loses through the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right
to everything that tempts him and that he can acquire. What he gains is civil liberty and
the proprietary ownership of all he possesses.109 Rousseau characterizes legitimate
government as the expression of the general will. However, when Rousseau sought to
107 Ibid, 16.
108 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, D iscourse on the Origin and Basis o f Inequality Among Men (1754). Reprinted
in The Social Contract and the First and Second D iscourses, ed. Susan Dunn (New Haven, CT: Yale
109 Ibid, 164.
53
extend the social contract to the international level in Perpetual Peace, he encountered a
number of obstacles. While a strong federation of European states was necessary to end
interstate war, he recognized that war often provided personal benefits to the rulers of
these states. As described in his allegory of the stag hunt, individuals often abandon
collective duty for the sake of individual gain. The same behavior at the international
level undermines collective security. Rousseau observed, Kings are concerned with two
objects alone: to extend their rule abroad or to make it more absolute at home. 110
Although the idea of a federation committed to maintaining peace seemed the most
promising approach to eliminating war, Rousseau saw no real possibility that European
states would willingly concede their sovereignty.
Kant was able to overcome the challenge expressed by Rousseau and other
theorists by arguing that the establishment of pacific federations would be an inevitable
result of human progress in Thoughts on Perpetual Peace.111 Kant anticipates the
creation of a peaceful international order built on representative democracies,
international law and economic interdependence. Republican constitutions eliminate the
waging of wars based on the whims of monarchs. International law contributes to the
development of norms respecting the rights of both citizens and republics. Economic
interdependence creates transnational ties that encourage states to accommodate each
other rather than going to war.
110 Ibid, 102-3.
111 Immanuel Kant, Eternal P eace and O ther International Essays (1795). Reprinted in Eternal P eace and
O ther International E ssays (Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1914), 84-5.
54
Kant argues that powerful and enlightened people organized as a republic,
which by its very nature must be disposed in favor of perpetual peace would be more
pacific. 112 Citizens of republics would have greater influence over their governments and
would be very loath . . . to bring upon themselves all the horrors of war.113 Kant
recognized that wars involve large costs and impose suffering on the population of a state
that its leaders often do not appreciate. Leaders that are forced to consult with their
citizens are more likely to become aware of the benefits of peace and respect for
international law. Kant therefore felt that republics were uniquely suited to form a
federation that would maintain the rights of each state and decrease the likelihood of war
as it expanded to include more republics. According to Kant the world would eventually
escape from occasions of war by establishing public coercive laws applying to an
ever-growing state of nations, such as would at last embrace all the nations of the
earth.114
Kants collective security arrangement functions differently than traditional
alliances or Hobbes Leviathan. He finds that the pursuit of peace makes it necessary to
establish a federation of peoples [to] protect each other against external
aggression... [going beyond an] alliance which can be terminated at any time. 115 He
argues that'peace is possible even in the absence of a supreme international authority.
Rather than empowering a separate authority, states themselves would enforce
112 Ibid, 84-5.
113 Ibid, 77.
114 Ibid, 84-6.
115 Michael D oyle, Ways o f War and Peace, (New York: W .W . Norton, 1997), 256.
55
international peace. He proposes an arrangement wherein all states would be obligated to
act against an aggressor, because every states security interests are believed to be
affected by such aggression. Kant describes this as a system of international right
founded upon public laws conjoined with power, to which every state must submit-
according to the analogy of the civil or political right of individuals in any one state.116
This federation would facilitate open diplomacy, relying on discussion and arbitration to
settle conflicts in a lawful manner.
Like Kant, Bentham tended to perceive liberal states as more benign in their
international conduct than traditional states. Democracies, as opposed to authoritarian
governments, were thought to behave in a manner more compatible with the interests of
humanity. Bentham advocates a collective security arrangement similar to that of Kant,
promoted by democratic states where disputes would be mediated according to
international law in a Common Court of Judicature.117 Along with Kant, his writings
are viewed by many as the foundation for President Woodrow Wilsons thoughts on
collective security that were eventually embodied in the League of Nations.
Wilson shared Kant and Benthams view of progress and believed men and
women could invent solutions for all of mankinds problems, including war. Like Kant,
he advocated the replacement of unstable balance-of-power arrangements with an
international community of states. In pursuing collective security as an alternative to
balance of power politics, Wilson adopted the concept that security is indivisible.
116 Kant, Eternal P eace and O ther International Essays, 65.
117 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the P rinciples o f M orals and Legislation (1781). Reprinted in An
Introduction to the Principles o f M orals an d Legislation (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1988).
56
Wilsons approach to foreign policy emphasized American leadership in the promotion of
a collective security regime, but he was unable to bring the United States into such an
organization. While Wilson succeeded in bringing the League of Nations into existence,
a lack of hegemonic leadership and enforcement authority limited its ability to carry out
its mandate and ultimately led it its irrelevance as relations among member states
deteriorated in the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Despite
increasing evidence of interstate cooperation, collective security has continued to draw
criticism since the failure of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of World War
II.
In an ideal collective security community, ideological and cultural factors would
not affect the willingness of states to act. Yiotti and Kauppi characterize such a system
as the collective commitment of a group to hold its members accountable for the
maintenance of an internal security norm.118 The practice of collective security requires
a broad commitment to restoring the status quo. Wight emphasizes the effort to maintain
the status quo in his definition of collective security as a system in which any breach of
the peace is declared to be of concern to all the participating states, and an attack on one
is taken as an attack on all.119 A collective security regime implies the existence of an
inclusive community wherein all members are committed to resist or overwhelm any act
of aggression through coordinated action.
118
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds., International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, G lobalism
(New York: MacMillan, 1993), 48.
119 Martin W ight, Systems o f States, (London: Leiscester University Press, 1977), 149.
57
Much of the pessimism regarding the practice of collective security stems from
differences between reality and these ideal conditions. In a study of historical attempts to
invoke collective security commitments, Wight finds little reason for optimism. Both
ancient and modern collective security regimes were entirely ineffective, as every
system of collective security has been.120 One reason for these failures is identified by
Joffe, who finds that states "do not elevate the punishment of wrong-doers above all other
values, and they are loath to sacrifice their particular interests on the altar of abstract
justice.121 Jakobson, the former Finnish ambassador to the United Nations, expresses
little hope for the success of collective regimes, even among European states. In his
experience, international organizations remain abstractions unless brought to life by the
national will of the member states... the reality is that, although politicians pay lip service
to the idea of collective action in defense of common values or of the principle of
collective security, nations will take up arms only when their own national interests are
directly threatened.122
Claude has written extensively on collective security and collective defense
regimes and expresses pessimism regarding the success of collective security in practice.
He points out that collective security has historically been pursued after a period of
extended conflict, as the victors attempt to cement their dominant position. Collective
security is the ideology of a coalition that is at or near the point of winning a major
120 Ibid, 62.
121 Josef Joffe, C ollective Security and the Future o f Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends, Survival
(Spring 1992): 39.
122 Max Jakobson, C ollective Security in Europe Today. Washington Q uarterly 18 no. 2 (Spring 1995):
62.
58
war... [but] the zeal for accepting the responsibilities of membership in a collective
security system is ephemeral...a passing fancy, briefly entertained by victors in coalition
wars.123 The successful practice of collective security in the post-Cold War period
implies that interstate relations have fundamentally changed since 1815, 1919, or 1945.
Claude finds that two principles of collective security tend to contradict each
other in practice. Respect for the principle of collectivism would impel a state to remain
passive in the face of what it regarded as aggression, if no collective determination of the
fact of aggression and authorization of counteraction were forthcoming. Adherence to the
collective security maxim that anybodys aggression threatens everybodys stake in world
order would impel a state to take action on the basis of its own judgment that aggression
had occurred, even without benefit of collective legitimization.124 Reminiscent of
Morgenthau, Claude concludes that contemporary statesmen have not been able to adopt
an outlook that suits the practice of collective security. He states, Collective securitys
promise of guaranteed security and stable peace is highly attractive, but the world has
discovered that its leaders and peoples do not really put peace unconditionally above
justice in their scale of values, or believe that peace is indivisible.125
Claude finds that a collective security system is incompatible with collective
defense, because collective security calls for replacing balance of power arrangements
and collective defense regimes, which are by definition exclusive, with an inclusive
123 Inis Claude, C ollective Security after the Cold War, in Collective Security in Europe and Asia, ed.
Gary Guertner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Press, 1992).
124 Inis Claude, The C ollectivist Theme in International Relations, International Journal, 24 (1969): 655.
125 Inis Claude, The Balance o f Power R evisited, R eview o f International Studies 15 (1989): 83.
59
community. Collective security requires the defense of all against all. In Power and
International Relations, Claude states, The world is conceived not as a we-group and a
they-group of nations, engaged in competitive power relations, but as an integral we-
group in which danger may be posed by one of us and must be met by all the rest of
us.126 Collective security involves a pact against war involving the entire international
community, all of whom pledge to oppose future aggression. He notes, The abstractness
of the enemy is a leading characteristic of collective security. 127 In contrast, a collective
defense regime obligates states to organize their defenses against one or more identifiable
external threats. Lagon similarly distinguishes collective security systems, which are
organized to deal with threats from within the system, from collective defense alliances
which are formed against external threats.128 Cold War NATO is characterized as a
specified collective defense system, while post- Cold War NATO is more accurately
portrayed as an unspecified collective defense system. Collective defense of this kind
is concerned with creating a pledge for united action against one or more unspecified
external aggressors.
Kissinger also views collective security as an arrangement that is fundamentally
inconsistent with collective defense. Traditional alliances were directed against specific
threats and defined precise obligations for specific groups of countries linked by shared
national interests or mutual security guarantees. Collective security defines no particular
threat, guarantees no individual nation, and discriminates against none. It is theoretically
126 Inis Claude, P ow er and International Relations (N ew York: Random House, 1962), 114.
127 Inis Claude, Swords into P lowshares (N ew York: Random House, 1971), 257.
128 Mark Lagon, The Illusions o f C ollective Security, The N ational Interest 40 (Summer 1995): 50-61.
60
designed to resist any threat to the peace, by whoever might pose it and against
whomever it might be directed.129 He finds that collective security requires that all
states share the same perception of a crisis and are equally prepared to take action
regardless of risks to national interests. Since this rarely occurs in the international
system, Kissinger observes that no act of aggression involving a major power has ever
been defeated by applying the principle of collective security and he cautions against
NATO incorporating these principles into its doctrine.130 Kissinger finds NATO has
become more akin to a collective security organization, like the United Nations, than to a
traditional alliance.131 He is critical of NATOs attempts to graft a system of collective
security on top of an alliance system, stating that this has never worked no matter how
132
cleverly legal points are argued.
In NATO Transformed - The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, Yost
also characterizes NATO as migrating from a collective defense regime to a collective
security regime in the aftermath of the Cold War.133 Yost finds that the need for regime
change is amplified by the question of NATOs relevance after the end of the Cold War.
During the Cold War, he depicts NATO as primarily focused on establishing military
capabilities to deter Soviet aggression and, if necessary, to conduct military operations in
129 Henry Kissinger, D iplom acy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 247.
130 Ibid, 249.
131 Henry Kissinger, A Dangerous D ivergence, The Washington Post, December 10, 2002.
132 Henry Kissinger, Letter to the Editor, The Washington Post, July 23, 1997.
133 Yost, David. NATO Transformed - The Alliance's N ew R oles in International Security (Washington
D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1998).
61
defense of allied territory. NATOs exclusive preoccupation with collective defense had
less appeal following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading Alliance leaders to seek
to adopt other regimes. NATOs transformation came in the 1990s with its commitment
to assuming responsibility for the preservation of peace outside of its borders.
While he recognizes that NATO has not yet transformed into a Kantian or
Wilsonian system of universal collective security, Yost argues that the allies have
adopted the ideology of collective security, including the idea that security is
indivisible.134 Yost expresses concern that the pursuit of collective security is not
sustainable in the long run because it is inconsistent with collective defense and could
damage the cohesion and effectiveness of the Alliance. He views NATOs new missions
as a subject of discord among allies unwilling to commit resources to preparing for what
11C
seem to be improbable or secondary contingencies. He finds an unavoidable tension
between the goals of inclusiveness and effectiveness, which may become unmanageable
and lead to the failure of both regimes. In his view, NATO risks surrendering its
military effectiveness in a relatively small, close-knit collective defense pact at the
expense of the inclusiveness collective security requires.136 This concern was
commonly expressed during the debate over NATO expansion. Senator Jesse Helms
remarked during U.S. Senate debate over NATO expansion in 1998, We are not inviting
new nations into the NATO that won the Cold War but rather into a diluted NATO
converted from a well-defined military alliance into a nebulous collective security
134 Ibid, 293.
135 Ibid, 277.
136 Ibid, xii.
62
arrangement.137 The pursuit of both collective security and collective defense risked
introducing complications that could damage relations between member states and hasten
the decline of the alliance.
An alternative approach to avoiding the potential contradictions between these
security regimes is for NATO to abandon collective defense in favor of collective
security. The exclusive nature of collective defense can be portrayed as provocative to
non-member states, which is unnecessary given the democratic aspirations of Russia and
former Warsaw Pact states. Kupchan argues for a reorganization of NATO along the
lines of a collective security system responsible for peacekeeping and peace
enforcement; confronting external threats as well as those that might arise from
within.138 These changes would enable NATO member states to focus on what have
become the most common security tasks for the Alliance rather than the increasingly
remote risk of an attack by a hostile Russia. Kupchan claims, The elimination of
NATOs Article 5 guarantee would weaken the Alliances deterrent power, but as long as
Russia continues to pose no danger to Central or Western Europe, the tradeoff makes
sense.139
While these scholars have argued that collective defense and collective security
are inherently incompatible, others are more open to combining these regimes. Gulick
argues that collective security, far from being alien to the age-old tradition of the
137 A llison Mitchell, NATO Debate From B ig Risk to Sure Thing, The N ew York Times, March 20,
1998.
138 Charles Kupchan, Reviving the W est, Foreign Affairs 75 no. 3 (May/June 1996): 97-98.
139 Ibid, 100.
63
balance of power, not only derives out of the latter, but also must be regarded as the
logical end point of the balance-of-power system, the ideal toward which it has been
moving, slowly and haltingly, for several hundred years.140 Similarly, Wright views
collective security as a planned development of the natural tendency of balance of
power policies, rather than being a distinct approach to international order.141 Finally,
Hampton points out that while international security regimes may serve the minimal
function of collective defense, they all have not been created for that purpose
exclusively. 142 These theorists are comfortable with international organizations pursuing
multiple regimes along with a multitude of objectives and argue for more optimism
regarding the likelihood of such a regime change for NATO.
Conclusion
This chapter has served to clarify the scope of this research and place it in context
with other international relations scholarship. Relevant regime theory literature has been
examined, yielding three-part typology of approaches to regime analysis. This chapter
has also served to distinguish the regimes of collective defense and collective security as
they apply to the dilemmas facing NATO in the post-Cold War era.
Subsequent chapters examine the changes in NATO as a function of factors
emphasized in power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime
analysis. A power-based approach views regimes as a means for promoting the interests
140 Edward Gulick, E u ropes Classical Balance o f P ow er (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955),
307-8.
141 Quincy Wright, Tbe Study o f International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), 163.
142 Mary Hampton. The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification.
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1996).
64
of a hegemon and emphasizes the efforts of the hegemon to the maintenance and
perpetuation of an international regime. Many aspects of international regimes can be
viewed as a public good, requiring the hegemon to bear disproportionate responsibility
for the organization and enforcement of the regime. A power-based approach based in
realism suggests that the process of regime change will be a result of determinations by
the hegemon that such a change is consistent with their national interests along with a
willingness to bear the burdens of this change. In the absence of hegemonic leadership, a
regime may fail to come into existence or will be unable to adapt to changing
circumstances. An organization-based approach based in neoliberal institutionalism
emphasizes the contributions of rules and decision-making procedures to the behavior of
regime participants. These rules and procedures can promote collective action in
numerous issue areas and can guide the process of regime change. The process of regime
change is influenced by the organizations access to relevant capabilities. An
international regime is unlikely to evolve in a direction that does not complement the
existing capabilities of the member states and organizational bodies. Finally, a norm-
based approach to regime analysis based in liberalism and constructivism views regimes
as a social phenomenon driven by a commitment to common principles and norms. This
approach to regime analysis links the process of regime change to interactions among
states and the formation of collective identities rooted in shared values. Concurrence on
the objectives to be pursued by the regime as well as the means to achieve these
objectives is related to an ongoing sense of community among member states and
influences their commitment to the regime.
65
NATO embodies a transatlantic security regime that links the United States, a
global hegemon, with Canada and much of Europe. Over the past several decades,
NATO member states have demonstrated an ongoing commitment to collective defense
while introducing aspects of a collective security regime. The three dominant approaches
to regime analysis identified in this chapter are employed throughout this study to gain an
understanding of the process of regime change in NATO both during and after the Cold
War, with an emphasis on reforms favoring the practice of collective security. The
analysis emphasizes how these approaches complement each other to provide a well-
reasoned account for member state behavior throughout each of the periods of study, and
ultimately serve as a basis for conjecture regarding the future of the Alliance.
66
We were all brought up, I think, in a Cold War and we knew that the Alliance was
essentially static, pretty linear, pretty defensive, and in its philosophy, pretty reactive.
Is this the right mindset fo r the Alliance in the 21st Century?
- General James Jones, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Operations (2005)
Chapter 2: NATO During the Cold War
A thorough analysis of recent changes within NATO and informed forecasting of
its future necessitates an understanding of the Alliances history. NATO underwent
numerous changes on its way to embracing a collective security regime and many of the
factors associated with power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches
were present during this evolution. NATO was organized in response to a unique set of
challenges facing the United States and Europe in the late 1940s. A convergence of
interests resulting from the perception of a growing Soviet threat, helped to overcome
nationalist divisions and forge a transatlantic relationship through an unprecedented
peacetime security regime. This chapter will examine the security environment in
Europe that led to the creation of the North Atlantic treaty and changes in both internal
and external conditions that resulted in the Alliances evolution in subsequent decades.
This inquiry examines the manner in which NATO has adapted both its strategy and its
organizations in response to internal and external pressures. These changes were
generally intended to increase the security of Alliance members while maintaining unity
within the Alliance. This review of NATOs evolution throughout the twentieth century
finds the allies remaining committed to a regime of collective defense security while
increasingly engaging in activities associated with the practice of collective security. The
culmination of this evolutionary process was the creation of an international organization
67
increasingly willing to venture into collective security undertakings as NATO member
states attempted to cope with post-Cold War international security challenges.
European Security After World War II
NATO grew out of the wartime alliance between the United States, the Soviet
Union, China, France, and Great Britain. Even while the war was still underway, western
leaders gave considerable thought to the organization of an international order to
maintain international peace following the end of hostilities. In 1943 British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill declared in a speech at Harvard University, It would be a
most foolish and improvident act on the part of our two Governments, or either of them,
to break up this smooth-running and immensely powerful machinery the moment the war
is over.. . . We are bound to keep it working and in running order after the war-probably
for a good many years.1 A similar vision was expressed by President Roosevelt in his
call for the four policemen (United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China) to
enforce a post-war peace and prevent a relapse back into war and anarchy. The
institutionalization of this wartime alliance first took the form of the United Nations
(UN).
The UN was founded as the fulfillment of Churchill and Roosevelts shared
vision. Roosevelt had believed that each of these allies, including the Soviets, could
constructively contribute to post-war reconstruction and the pursuit of a more peaceful
global order. Discussions among London, Moscow, and Washington in the summer of
1944 eventually yielded a consensus on the UNs purpose and organizational structure.
1 Richard Best, Cooperation With Like-M inded P eoples: British Influences On Am erican Security Policy,
1945-1949 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 28.
68
During the Dumbarton Oaks discussions in Washington, D.C., the allies completed their
plans for the division of responsibilities among the UN Security Council, the General
Assembly and UN Secretariat. France was invited to join the Security Council, thereby
sharing the burdens and responsibilities of the other victors of World War II. While the
UN was introduced with great optimism, it soon became apparent that it was ill equipped
to fulfill its mandate.
While still in its infancy, the UN was prevented from creating the conditions for a
stable peace in Europe by the ideological conflict between East and West. Time after
time, the UN proved incapable of countering Soviet aggression due to the UNs lack of
access to military forces and the USSRs veto within the Security Council. The Soviets
continued to undermine the conduct of free elections in Eastern Europe and refused to
fulfill existing agreements to include non-Communists in the governments of Romania
and Bulgaria. Rather than promoting self-determination among European states, the
Soviet Union was seeking to increase its control in the occupied states. NATOs first
General Secretary, Lord Hastings Ismay, later observed, It was proving impossible to
reach agreement with the Soviets on any international issue... From behind the Iron
Curtain came nothing but slander and bullying.2 Paul Henri Spaak, the second
Secretary General of NATO, also viewed the intractability of the Soviets as a key
contributor to the call for a new alliance structure. He noted that every village and town
in Europe should erect a statue to Joseph Stalin because he was the true father of the
2 Hastings Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (Utrecht, NE: Bosch-Utrecht Press, 1955), 6.
69
NATO alliance.3 Western leaders were initially reluctant to confront the Soviets due to
the imbalance of forces in Europe immediately following the war.
While the United States and Western European states rapidly demobilized
following the end of World War II, Soviet forces were maintained at their wartime levels.
Within a year, American forces in Europe were reduced from over three million men to
less than four hundred thousand. British forces were reduced from nearly one and one
half million to less than half a million troops. In contrast to this rapid demobilization, the
Soviet Union kept some five million troops in the armed forces after the war. A year
after the war the Soviets had 30 divisions in Eastern Europe, 175 divisions in the western
Soviet Union and another 125 divisions in strategic reserve.4 The military might of the
Soviet Union, teamed with Stalins aggressive policies, drove Western leaders to seek
new security arrangements to counter Soviet advances.
In March 1946, Prime Minister Churchill warned of the descent of an iron
curtain over Eastern Europe that would require a coordinated response from Great
Britain and the United States. The wartime annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
had been followed by the Soviet Unions continued domination of Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania, Eastern Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Although Great Britain shared
Americas historical hostility toward European security commitments, Churchill
observed that in this case prevention is better than the cure and that such an association
3 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, H ow D id NATO Survive The Cold W ar? NATO V ideo Lecture
Transcript, March 11, 2004, http://www.Nato.Int/M ulti/Video/Lectures/031104/V 031104al .htm.
4 These force level estimates are drawn from analysis presented in Hastings Ismay, NATO: The First Five
Years, 1949-1954 (Utrecht: Bosch-Utrecht, 1955) and Richard Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: H ow
Alliance Partnership Won the Cold W ar (Santa Monica, CA: RA ND Corporation, 1993).
70
would play its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace as a
compliment to the United Nations.5 Churchill sought an arrangement that would reverse
Americas ongoing withdrawal from Europe and ensure a robust American commitment
to European security. However, American foreign policy leaders were reluctant to
discuss a formal peacetime alliance with Great Britain or any other European state at that
time.
Previous American leaders had remained faithful to the advice of the countrys
I
founding fathers and remained detached from European affairs. President George
Washington had cautioned in his farewell address to steer clear of permanent alliances
with any portion of the foreign world, while Thomas Jefferson warned of entangling
and embroiling our affairs with those of Europe.6 Over the next 150 years, the United
States had consistently avoided unnecessary involvement in European affairs. Only one
formal alliance with European powers had been executed, the Franco-American treaty
ending in 1800. Even after World War II, the isolationist impulse remained strong, and
demobilization was pursued with great vigor. Rather than accepting Churchills advances,
leading American policy makers sought to promote European self-sufficiency in defense
matters through economic and military aid.
George F. Kennan, Jr. realized the importance of preventing the Soviet Union
from controlling vast portions of Eastern and Central Europe, which served as the
5 Don Cook, Forging The Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950 (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1989), 52-3.
6 Yale University Libraries, Farewell Address O f 1796, http://www.Yale.Edu/Lawweb/Avalon/

Washing.htm and University o f Virginia Library, The Writings o f Thomas Jefferson, Volume 2,
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=JefBv022.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/en
glish/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part= 1&division=di v 1
71
foundation for his strategy of containment. As deputy head of the U.S. mission in
Moscow from May 1944 to April 1946, Kennan was in a unique position to observe and
comment on American-Soviet relations. His containment strategy was justified in an
8,000-word telegram to U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes near the end of his term and
further developed in an anonymous 1947 article published in Foreign Affairs.1 Kennan
argued, The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be
a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies...Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is
something that can be constrained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force
at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the
shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.8 Kennan preferred for the United States to act as
a balancing power, intervening to prevent Soviet hegemony while Western Europe
recovered. He advised against arrangements that encouraged the division of Europe into
Soviet and American spheres of influences, preferring to encourage the creation of a
European balance of power that could contain the Soviet Union with only a limited
military commitment on the part of the United States.
President Harry Truman put Kennans containment strategy into practice with his
proclamation of the Truman Doctrine calling for a dramatic increase in American aid to
states opposing Soviet expansionism. The Greek government had been fighting
communist guerilla forces since 1944, and with support from bases in neighboring
7 X , The Sources o f Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs 25 (July, 1947): 566-582.
8 Ibid, 575-6.
72
communist states, the rebels posed a genuine threat to continued democracy in Greece.
When Great Britain declared in March 1947 that it could no longer provide aid to Greece,
President Truman recognized that the United States must fill this void. Yet, in his view,
neither the United Nations nor any other single state could adequately fulfill this role.
Truman therefore announced it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures9 and he requested $400 million in supplemental funding for aid to both
Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine deepened the American commitment to
European security and would soon be expanded into all of Europe through the European
Recovery Plan (commonly known as the Marshall Plan).
U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European Recovery Plan
during a speech at Harvard University in June 1947. It was increasingly clear to
American leaders that many European states were on the verge of economic collapse and
that they were too weak to provide for their own security. The Marshall Plan was
therefore designed to promote European independence from, rather than increasing
dependence on, the United States. Marshall Plan aid was to be distributed to the
European states in accordance with their own reconstruction programs. Marshall
emphasized, This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come
from Europe.. .The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all,
9 Fordham University, Address Before A Joint Session O f Congress, March 12, 1947: The Truman
Doctrine, http://www.Fordham.Edu/Halsall/Mod/1947TRUMAN.html.
73
European nations.10 He further stressed that American aid was directed not against any
country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.11 Economic
assistance was offered to the Soviet Union and other countries behind the Iron Curtain,
but Stalin refused to allow any of the governments under his influence to participate in a
program he viewed as imperialistic. Western Europe benefited from the rebuilding of
much of its economic infrastructure (particularly the iron-making and power industries)
at a cost to the United States of more than $13 billion over four years, equivalent to two
percent of the United States gross national product.12
Despite the promise of unprecedented levels of economic aid, some European
leaders expressed concern for the future security of Western Europe after talks between
the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union broke down over the future
of Germany in December 1947. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin said I am
convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal with the West on any reasonable terms in
the foreseeable future and that the salvation of the West depends upon the formation of
some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe. Backed by the
United States and the Dominions such a mobilization of moral and material force will
inspire confidence and energy within, and respect elsewhere.13 In response, Secretary
Marshall foreshadowed the events that would lead to the creation of the NATO alliance,
10 Fordham University, Speech At The Harvard University Commencement, June 5, 1947,

http://www.fordham.ed u/halsall/mod/1947marshallplanl .html.
11 Ibid.
12 Dana Allin, Debating Intervention, NATO Review no. 4 (Winter 2002): 4.
13 Theodore Achilles, The Omaha Milkman: The R ole O f The United States In The Negotiations, in
NATO's Anxious Birth, edited by Andre D e Staerck. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 30.
74
remarking that Europe should come together for their own protection, see what they
could do, and then turn to the United States, and see what we could do to make up the
difference between what the situation required and what they were able to do by their
own efforts. 14
British leaders pressed for the organization of a collective defense regime among
Western European states. Negotiations were given a sense of urgency by the fall of the
Czechoslovakian government to Soviet-backed communists in February 1948.
Czechoslovakia now joined the list of Soviet-sponsored governments holding power in
much of Central and Eastern Europe. This coup increased the Soviet military threat by
giving the Soviets access to the Czech arms industry, as well as ownership of the only
European source of uranium. British efforts soon culminated in the signing of the
Brussels Treaty in March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Great Britain. This treaty established the Western European Union (WEU), which
promoted greater integration of political, economic, and military activities in the pursuit
of a common defense system. The Brussels Treaty was intended to last fifty years,
during which the signatories agreed that if any of the allies should be the object of an
armed attack in Europe, the others would provide all the military and other aid and
assistance in their power.15
The creation of the WEU and continued Soviet aggression finally forced the
United States to become more active in European security affairs. The Soviets
14 Charles Bohlen, The Transformation O f Am erican Foreign P olicy (New York: Norton Press, 1969), 92-
3.
15 Western European Union, Text o f The M odified Brussels Treaty, http://www.Weu.Int/Treaty.htm.
75
challenged Norwegian sovereignty in 1948 by compelling them to sign a mutual defense
agreement similar to one that had been presented to Finland the previous year. Soviet
forces began a blockade of Berlin the following month in response to the merging of the
economic activities in the American and British occupation zones. American airpower
was mobilized to conduct the Berlin airlift, which greatly increased the number of
American forces stationed in Western Europe. It soon became clear to American leaders
that many European countries were too divided and weak to withstand both domestic
communist influences and Soviet military pressure.
Establishing the North Atlantic Treaty
President Truman accepted the necessity of an expanded American security role
in Europe, declaring that the United States would match the determination of the free
peoples of Europe to protect themselves.16 Truman authorized negotiations with the
Brussels Treaty powers for an expanded agreement that would also bind Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal in a collective defense regime. Senator
Arthur Vandenberg, in consultation with the U.S. State Department, crafted a resolution
which recommended the association of the United States by constitutional process, with
such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid, as affect its national security.17 In June 1948, the Vandenberg
Resolution passed in the U. S. Senate with an overwhelming majority of senators voting
in favor. This confirmed the extent of support for a change in Americas foreign policy
16 Gerard Mangone, A Short H istory o f International O rganization (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1954)
270.
17 Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Senate Resolution 239, Eightieth Congress, 2nd Session, June, 11,
1948, http://www.Yale.Edu/Lawweb/Avalon/Decade/Decad040.htm .
76
that would make it possible for the United States to enter an Atlantic alliance. Formal
negotiations began in December 1948 and an agreement was completed in April 1949,
while the Berlin blockade was still under way.
The North Atlantic Treaty (also commonly referred to as the Washington Treaty)
provided the framework for a new European security order while emphasizing the
treatys consistence with the UN charter. The treaty makes reference to Article 51 of the
UN Charter which affirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or
collective defense.18 The treaty commits each member country to sharing the risks as
well as the benefits of collective defense. Member states are bound not to enter into any
other international commitment that might conflict with the treaty. Negotiators drafted a
treaty that fulfilled the needs of many Western European leaders, famously summarized
by Lord Ismay as a desire to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans
down.19
The North Atlantic Treaty serves as a model of succinctness and flexibility.
Unlike many other international treaties, it contains only fourteen short articles. These
articles were written to provide overall regime guidance, while allowing the necessary
restructuring to take place in response to changing circumstances The preamble and the
first two articles of the treaty make it clear that the member countries believe that they
belong to a community of nations within which cooperation should be developed not only
18 Article 51 o f the U N charter states Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right o f
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member o f the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
19 David Yost, NATO Transformed,The Alliance's N ew R oles in International Security (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1998), 52.
77
for defense, but in other fields. Article One obligates the Alliance members to resolve
disputes in a peaceful fashion, while Article Two encourages greater regional stability
through increased communication. Article Two states The Parties will contribute toward
the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening
their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon
which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well
being.20 This flexibility inherent in Article Two has allowed the allies to consult on
security developments anywhere in the world and to extend their cooperation into non
military fields. More recently, this article has been cited as providing the authority for
NATOs conduct of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
Despite the obvious concerns over Soviet aggression at the time of the treatys
signature, there are no specific references to the Soviet Union and the treaty remains open
to addressing any threats to member states. The Alliances commitment to collective
defense is emphasized in Article Three, which states, The Parties, separately and jointly,
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.21 Should any member
state feel threatened by a particular course of events, Article Four calls for the creation
organizational structures to facilitate consultations. Article Five articulate the treatys
security guarantee that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and that they will assist the
20 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. Text O f The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.
http://www.Nato.Int/Docu/Basictxt/Treaty.htm.
21 Ibid.
78
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.22 While this language enables the use
of force in response to an attack, members are not obligated to respond forcefully under
all circumstances. President Truman observed, The Brussels Pact nations wanted the
North Atlantic pact to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would
supply all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. This, of course,
implied going to war...[this] was an obligation which, in view of our Constitution, we
were not prepared to assume.23 While Article Five underscores the collective defense
activities that have historically dominated the Alliance, the presence of the other articles
makes it clear that NATOs authority is not limited to threats to a member states
survival.
The remaining eight articles set some of the organizational rules for NATO.
Included in these articles are the creation of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and its
authorization to organize subsidiary bodies as necessary. These articles also specify
provisions for the addition of new members, the departure of existing members, and a
review of the treaty after a period of ten years. According to Lord Hastings Ismay, the
authors of the treaty, did not attempt, at the outset, to draw up a blueprint of the
international organization which should be set up, or to lay down any hard and fast rules
22 Ibid.
23 Harry Truman, M emoirs: Volume II: Years o f Trial and Hope, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1955), 249.
79
of procedure. They realized that these could only be evolved step by step in the light of
practical experience, and they proceeded accordingly.24
Any hopes that the mere pledge of mutual support would be sufficient to ensure
the future security of Europe were short lived. During the signing ceremony for the
North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman expressed hope that the security pledge alone
would be sufficient to serve as a shield against aggression and fear of aggression - a
bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society,
the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all its citizens.25 Similarly,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified to Congress in 1949 that the North Atlantic
Treaty would not commit the United States to send any soldiers back to Europe.
However, the day after signing the NATO treaty, the Brussels Pact countries submitted a
formal request for military and financial aid to the U.S. State Department. Similar
requests were soon made by Denmark, Italy, and Norway as these states reassessed their
security needs.
The ratification of the Washington Treaty in 1949, followed shortly by the
detonation of the Soviet Union s first nuclear device, created a favorable environment
for further increases in American military aid to Western Europe. The 1949 Mutual
Defense Assistance Act recognized that unless the military strength of Western Europe
was greatly strengthened, these states were unlikely to be able to effectively oppose a
Soviet invasion during any time in the next ten years. With the passage of the Mutual
24 Ismay, NATO: The F irst Five Years, ix.
25 Cook, Forging the Alliance, 54.
80
Defense Assistance Plan, the United States provided more than a billion dollars in aid to
Europe in the first year alone. American assessments of the Soviet threat were updated
with the the release of National Security Council document number 68 (NSC-68) in 1950,
This study concluded that the United States would have to dramatically increase both its
nuclear capabilities and NATOs conventional forces in Europe in order to adequately
deter the Soviet Union. Over the next several years, American and Canadian aid
programs would provide nearly $30 billion of assistance, with more than half of this
allocated for military equipment. American defense spending increases were joined by
greater spending among European allies. The aggregate of the defense budgets of all the
NATO countries rose from $18.5 billion in 1949 to $62.7 billion in 1953.26 Larger, more
capable forces were needed to serve as a credible deterrence to the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies and NATO governments pursued a combined strategy to enable their
forces to work together toward this end.
NATOs first strategic concept document, entitled The Strategic Concept fo r the
Defense o f the North Atlantic Treaty Area, was approved in December 1949. The
function of this document was to encourage greater cooperation and coordination
between the military forces of member states. The defensive nature of the Alliance was
emphasized throughout the strategy as well as the need for unity of effort among diverse
military forces. Lord Ismay observed, It became obvious that collective capacity to
resist armed attack could not be effectively developed unless there were unity of
command, unified planning and uniformity of military training, procedure and, as far as
26 D efense spending estimates drawn from Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years.
81
possible, equipment. And so it came about that by the end of 1950, sovereign states were
to entrust their forces to international commanders, assisted by international staffs.27
This strategy sought to oppose Soviet expansion in accordance with the political
objective of containment. The 1949 Strategic Concept emphasized the deterrence role of
NATO forces. The Secretary General emphasized, Only if this mission was
unsuccessful were these forces to be used against armed attack.28
Execution of the 1949 Strategic Concept led to a delegation of missions designed
to take advantage of each Alliance members relative strengths. For example, the
strategic bombing mission was delegated to the United States while protection of sea
lines of communication was assigned to the British. The continental European allies
provided the majority of ground and air forces for territorial defense. It eventually
became clear that the necessary manpower for these forces exceeded the capacity of the
Europeans. American soldiers and airmen were deployed to Europe, with President
Truman, Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall, and NATOs first Supreme Allied
Commander Europe General Eisenhower all publicly stating that these forces would
come home once Europeans were able to put in place their own ground and air forces.29
Acceptance o f West German Statehood and NATO Membership
While containment and deterrence continued to dominate the Alliances relations
with the Soviet Union, a more constructive relationship was sought with Germany in the
27 Ibid, 161.
28 Ibid, 189.
29 Ernest May, The American Commitment To Germany, 1949-1954, in Am erican H istorians A nd The
Atlantic Alliance, ed. Lawrence Kaplan (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 68.
82
early 1950s. Old animosities between Germans and other Europeans had to be overcome
to allow a more unified opposition to Soviet expansion; many Europeans continued to
fear the renewal of German nationalism, as expressed in the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947.
This treaty governed British and French policies regarding the reconstruction of Germany
and obliged each of the signatories to provide mutual assistance in the event of future
German aggression. Despite their distrust of Germany, British diplomats soon began to
recognize the need for German participation in the defense of Western Europe. In March
1948, British Foreign Minister Bevin advised Prime Minister Clement Atlee, Instead of
being bottled up in Central Europe, we feel the Germans have a great contribution to
make to the worlds industrial and social development. Our aim is to protect ourselves
against any further aggression by Germany and at the same time to bring her back into
the community of nations as a united entity on a democratic basis, with democracy as
Western civilization understands it.30 Secretary of State Dulles shared these views,
expressing an intense concern for what he described as 'the suicidal strife' between
France and Germany: . . . a 'firetrap' that had engulfed too many.31 NATO was seen as a
vehicle for overcoming this historical division as well as providing a means for a more
meaningful West German participation in the defense of Western Europe.
As the Federal Republic of Germany took shape in the aftermath of the Berlin
Airlift, American leaders recognized the potential economic and military contributions
that West Germany could make to the Alliance. A forward defense strategy, emphasizing
30 Sean Kay, NATO A nd The Future O f European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 1998), 18.
31 Ronald Preussen, John F oster Dulles: The R oad To P ow er (N ew York: Free Press, 1982), 35.
83
the opposition to Soviet forces as far to the east as possible, appeared to give the greatest
hope for the successful defense of Western Europe. President Truman observed,
Without Germany the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the
Atlantic Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense in depth powerful enough to
offer effective resistance to aggression from the East. Any map will show it, and a little
arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the
joint defense of Europe.32 During this period, the allies looked for ways to gain German
participation in the defense of Western Europe while maintaining assurances that
Germany would not pose a threat to its neighbors.
The solution proposed by French Premier Rene Pleven was the creation of an all-
European army, through which France would exercise even greater oversight over
German rearmament. Pleven outlined the creation of a European Defense Community
(EDC), under which a European Assembly would appoint a European Minister of
Defense to organize a combined military force funded by a common budget. These
forces would be placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force and would operate in
accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact.33 Under this
arrangement, Germany would contribute manpower but would not have its own General
Staff, defense ministry, or armaments industry. American leaders approved of the EDC
as a means of limiting German military ambitions, but they insisted that the primacy of
NATO be maintained. The EDC treaty was signed in May 1952, after the allies rejected
32 Truman, M emoirs, 253.
33 Leinden University, History O f European Integration Site: The Pleven Plan, http://www.Eu-
History.Leidenuniv.Nl/Index.Php3?M =l 0& C =51.
84
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalins offer to restart talks on German reunification.
Interestingly, while a number of European parliaments ratified the treaty, it was the
French parliament that refused to ratify the treaty and led to its abandonment.
Following the rejection of the EDC, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
proposed the interim step of bringing West Germany and Italy into the WEU. As part of
its acceptance into the WEU in October 1954, West Germany agreed not to manufacture
advanced weapons systems such as warships or long-range bombers, except at the request
of NATO. In a public declaration on October 23, 1954, the Government of the Federal
Republic of West Germany agreed never to have recourse to force to achieve the
reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German
Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise
between the Federal Republic and other states.34
French officials viewed NATO as an instrument of "double containment,
directed at both Germany and the Soviet Union. While some member governments
feared that West Germanys admission might aggravate tensions over Berlin and the
question of eventual German reunification, the desire to increase NATOs ability to
defend Western Europe overrode these fears. General Eisenhower concluded in his first
annual report to the NAC, Even with the maximum potential realized through collective
efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of
security and stability in Europe unless Germany can be counted on the side of the free
34 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Resolution o f Association by Other Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, October 22, 1954, http://www.nato.int/docu/
basictxt/b541022d.htm.
85
I f
nations. ' The key to overcoming the remaining trepidation regarding the resurrection
of West German armed forces was the decision by the United States, Great Britain and
Canada to maintain ground and air forces in Germany. The French ambassador to NATO
was reportedly moved to tears by this decision, exclaiming for fifty years, ever since
1905, French public opinion has waited for this announcement and at last we have it!36
France at last concurred with the Federal Republics entry into NATO and West
Germany joined the Alliance in 1955.
Increased Nonmilitary Cooperation
NATO Secretary General Ismay was among the first to recognize The military
effort, urgent as that is, represents one of the means, but not all, to achieve that end [of
security]...We touch here one of the profound reasons why so many of the peoples of the
member countries show moderate interest in NATO. They are ready to accept the
Atlantic alliance as a form of insurance policy against armed attack, but they are not yet
prepared to recognize it as a means of achieving progress in more fruitful fields of human
endeavor. It is up to the Council to correct this error.37 Ismay created a commission
consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Italy, and Canada to make
recommendations on greater NATO activity in non-military fields. The report by the
Committee of Three recommended that NATO develop political organizations and
increase the thoroughness of its political consultation. The Report o f the Committee o f
35 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, SACEUR, First Annual R eport (Brussels: NATO O ffice o f
Information and Press, 1951), 2.
36 Edward Fursdon, The European D efense Community: A H istory (London: M acmillan Press, 1980), 321-
2.
37 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 159.
86
Non-Military Cooperation concluded that NATO members should also be concerned
with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader
interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the
United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and
oo
for the solution of the problems that now divide the world. In December 1956, the
NAC accepted the committees recommendations and agreed to increase the level of
nonmilitary cooperation among its members. The new missions arising out of this period
included efforts to limit drug trafficking, promote scientific cooperation, further
economic cooperation, and address common environmental problems. While the political
side of the Alliance grew somewhat stronger as a result of these efforts, collective
defense remained the top priority for Alliance members and received the greatest amount
of attention and funding.
During this same period, NATO leaders found it necessary to update the
Alliances military strategy. As a result of the burden placed on American forces with
the outbreak of the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration initiated a New Look
review aimed at complementing NATO's conventional posture with nuclear forces.
Despite efforts to build larger military forces among the NATO allies and the deployment
of substantial American forces to the continent, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
maintained unquestioned conventional superiority over NATO forces throughout the
1950s. However, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was still in its infancy and the United States
expected to maintain an advantage in nuclear forces for quite some time. NATO allies
38 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Report O f The Committee O f Three On Non-Military
Cooperation In N A T O , http://www.Nato.Int/Docu/Basictxt/Bt-A3.htm.
87
sought to overcome their inferiority in conventional forces by transitioning from a
strategy of containment to that of massive retaliation. This strategy would deter a
Soviet attack by pledging that NATO would respond to aggression using every means at
its disposal, even allowing for the first use of nuclear weapons.
Throughout the 1950s, world events were making the limitations of nuclear
deterrence more apparent within the Alliance. The possession of nuclear weapons by the
United States could not prevent the communist takeover of China, nor could it be
effectively leveraged in other struggles against the expansion of communism. According
to one historian, Eisenhowers reluctance to authorize air strikes against the Vietminh in
defense of the French position at Dien Bien Phu sealed the fate of EDC.39 American
nuclear superiority also failed to enable the United States or its allies to aid Hungary
during its attempt to drive the Soviets out of their country in 1956. Rather than giving the
United States greater leverage, the fear of escalation actually led President Eisenhower to
reassure the Soviets of American disinterest. He asked his cabinet, In view of the
serious deterioration of their position in the satellites, might they not be tempted to resort
to very extreme measures and even to precipitate global war?40 Even with unchallenged
American nuclear superiority, NATO was unable to adequately ensure European security.
While NATO had embraced the concept of massive retaliation in 1957 through revisions
to strategic guidance, increasing Soviet nuclear capability very quickly put the credibility
V
39 Neill Nugent, The G overnm ent And Politics O f The European P olitical Community (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1989), 36.
40 John Gaddis, We N ow Know : Rethinking Cold War H istory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
235.
88
of this strategy in doubt and led to a debate on future Alliance strategy that was to last
almost a decade.
These difficulties increased as improvements to the Soviet Unions offensive
strike capabilities signaled that the United States was vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear
attack resulting from any conflict originating in Europe. This vulnerability threatened to
undermine the credibility of Americas commitment to Europe along with the strategy of
massive retaliation. Extended deterrence was also undermined by the Kennedy
administrations promotion of a strategy of flexible response, which would initially
favor non-nuclear responses to international crises. As one historian observes, Since the
United States controlled nuclear decisions in NATO, reassurance had decreasing
credibility for some European members.4' Changes to existing nuclear forces were
proposed in an attempt to increase the credibility of extended deterrence.
In an effort to preserve its leadership role in the Alliance and restrict the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in general, the United States sought to dissuade other
European allies from developing their own nuclear inventories. Great Britain had
obtained nuclear technology through their involvement in the Manhattan Project,
resulting in their first successful nuclear test in 1952. The United States formally pledged
to coordinate the development and operation of its nuclear forces with Great Britain in
the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, but the United States remained unwilling to help its
other European allies establish their own nuclear forces. One means of averting
proliferation was to provide non-nuclear European allies with a greater voice in the
41 Kay, NATO A n d The Future O f European Security, 42.
89
control of nuclear weapons. One historian finds that the nuclear sharing issue reflected
the belief that joint management and even ownership would help build a community of
shared interests and responsibilities among the allies, and would answer the demand for
equality of status from states like West Germany.42 Under existing arrangements, any
decision to use nuclear weapons would occur at the national level, ultimately residing
with American or British leaders. Late in his second term, President Eisenhower initiated
discussions for a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF). This force would consist of a fleet of five
American Polaris missile submarines assigned to the NATO area with command and
control shared among the United States and its NATO allies. Similarly, NATO
commanders overseeing intermediate-range Jupiter missiles deployed to Turkey were
delegated the authority to launch in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States.
These proposals propped-up European confidence in extended deterrence, but were soon
overshadowed by the efforts of France and other allies to develop their own nuclear
forces.
President Kennedy viewed the nuclear control issue differently than his
predecessor. Kennedy stated in 1959, We should face the fact that the fundamental
purpose of the French atomic bomb is not to increase French capabilities but to increase
its stature in the Alliance. The French bomb is aimed at Washington rather than Moscow.
This is an odd way to run an alliance.43 American submarines were delivered to NATO
in 1963 as Eisenhower promised, but remained under American command. In addition to
42 Mary Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, The Alliance, A nd German Unification
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 55.
43 Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse, 81.
90
reversing the delegation of authority approved by the Eisenhower administration,
Kennedy proposed American control over all NATO nuclear forces. MLF collapsed
under differences that would contribute to a challenge to Alliance unity. American
officials convinced the West Germans to support their proposal for a combined force, but
French leaders remained vigorously opposed. The MLF concept was abandoned in favor
of the forward deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons as a signal to the
Warsaw Pact that they might be used early in a conflict. The forward deployment of
these nuclear forces in Europe was meant to reassure NATO allies that the United States
intended to deter or, if need be, defeat the Soviets in the event of future aggression. This
deployment failed to resolve existing disagreements and contributed to French and
German doubts regarding the future utility of the Alliance.
Transatlantic relations were also strained by the Suez Canal crisis in 1956.
Egyptian President Nassar nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, which had gained
increased significance to the region as Middle Eastern oil exports grew. France and
Great Britain used the pretext of a peacekeeping mission following Israels invasion of
Egypt to gain control of the Canal Zone and remove Nassar from power. American
leaders, offended by the lack of consultation by its allies and concerned about the risk of
Soviet involvement on the side of the Egyptians, forced France and Great Britain to
withdraw and accept the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. The incident
served as a reminder of the balance of power within the Alliance and the leverage that
American leaders exercised over other NATO member states. The United States sought
to enforce the norms of the regime, particularly those calling for consultation among the
allies prior to taking action in areas where members share interest. French leaders
91
became particularly disillusioned with their subordinate status and accelerated their
efforts to develop a defense capability free from American influence.
When Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he proposed a reorganization
of the NAC to increase French influence within NATO. This reorganization would
recognize the United States, Great Britain, and France as the leaders of the Alliance and
authorize these three states to form a combined command structure to oversee all military
forces deployed in Europe. When this tripartite structure was rejected by American and
British leaders, De Gaulle continued to express his dissatisfaction with many
organizational aspects of NATO and began to decrease participation in and funding for
common programs. Under De Gaulles leadership, France was able to continue to benefit
from NATOs efforts while steering resources toward the pursuit of its own national
interests. France took advantage of the security situation in Europe to become a free
rider and retain benefits of transatlantic cooperation with only a minimal investment in
the organization.
De Gaulle accelerated efforts to establish a French nuclear force and to strive for
greater French self-sufficiency in defense of its homeland and extraterritorial interests.
One historian attributes his actions to a belief that nuclear weapons could be used only
in defense of ones own national territory and that American engagement in Europe
would inevitably weaken with time.44 De Gaulle viewed Europe as a Europe of Nation
States and felt that state interests were clearly dominant to those of international
organizations. He was dismissive of claims that the future security of France could be
44 Gregory Flynn, French NATO Policy: The N ext Five Years (Washington, D.C.: R AND, 1989), 3.
92
guaranteed by outside powers and pursued reforms that slowed the pace of European
integration. Former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson characterized de Gaulles
policies as a historically backward step that would reintroduce the disease of nationalism
whose symptoms had been suppressed at such great cost and effort.45 De Gaulle
rejected this claim, stating in a 1959 press conference, I believe that the Alliance will be
all the more vital and strong as the great powers unite on the basis of cooperation in
which each carries his own load, rather than on the basis of an integration in which
peoples and governments find themselves more or less deprived of their roles and
responsibilities in the domain of their own defense.46 French representatives refused to
sign NATO strategy document MC 14/3, which formally adopted Flexible Response. De
Gaulles dissatisfaction with Frances role in NATO led to tensions between the United
States and France and Frances eventual withdrawal from NATOs integrated military
structure.
American forces were first ordered out of France in 1959 when de Gaulle chose to
ban all foreign troops and nuclear weapons from French soil. As most of these weapons
were under the control of United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), several American
squadrons were transferred from France to bases in Great Britain and West Germany. On
March 7, 1967, de Gaulle emphasized his desire to regain full sovereignty [over] French
territory and stated that his government would no longer accept the presence of foreign
units, installations, or bases in France falling in any respect under the control of
46 Edgar Furniss, D e Gualles France and NATO: An Interpretation, International O rganization 15, no. 2
(Summer 1961): 358.
93
authorities other than French authorities.47 Later that month, NATO initiated operation
FRELOC (Fast Relocation) and withdrew from numerous military installations around
the country. Although Frances wish to distance itself from NATO caused considerable
consternation, the manner in which this occurred demonstrated the allies mutual respect
for each other. The peaceful nature of this process stood in stark contrast to the violent
crackdown by Soviet troops when Hungary attempted to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact
in 1956.
The removal of NATO units from France created a number of hardships for the
Alliance. In Paris, NATO headquarters had been located only minutes away from
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters and United States
European Command (EUCOM) headquarters, which fostered a close working
relationship among these organizations.' After the move, NATO headquarters was
relocated to Brussels, Belgium while SHAPE headquarters went to Mons, Belgium and
EUCOM headquarters to Stuttgart, Germany. Rather than being only minutes apart,
SHAPE and EUCOM were now separated from NATO headquarters by approximately
50 miles and 265 miles respectively. In addition to the time and expense of relocating
command, control, and computer facilities, the loss of guaranteed access to Frances air
defense system and to French segments of NATOs communications network threatened
the Alliances ability to coordinate operations in the event of an attack. France pledged
to cooperate with NATO on most issues, but would not attend meetings of NATOs
Military Committee, its Defense Planning Committee, or participate in combined
47 Kenneth Hunt, NATO Without France: The M ilitary Im plications (London: Institute For Strategic
Studies, 1966), 12-16.
94
exercises. British leaders joined American critics of Frances actions, concluding,
President de Gaulles policy of cooperation not coordination is unfortunately the
recipe for military disaster. His idea of a renascent Europe, based on a series of proud
and strong national armies has the musty smell of obsolescence.48 As NATO
reorganized its operations in the aftermath of the FRELOC deployment there was once
again recognition that the Alliance must adapt to new strategic realities or face
irrelevance.
Balancing Defense and Detente
The failure of the MLF, combined with the influence of de Gaulles rhetoric and
NATOs inaction over the erection of the Berlin Wall also led West German leaders to
question the primacy of NATO in its foreign policy. Germanys allies seemed
increasingly less interested in pursuing reunification, which continued to be a core goal of
German foreign policy. President Kennedy called it silly to discuss the possibility of
risking nuclear war over Berlin, stating that all of us know that Germany will probably
never be reunited.49 Brandt now sought to open up a dialogue with the East, which held
a greater promise of ensuring West German security while increasing the potential for
eventually achieving German reunification. The pressure for changes within the Alliance
was now becoming too great for NATO leaders to ignore.
In light of these increasingly conflicting views, NATO member states once again
reassessed their approach to security. The Harmel review was an attempt to renew the
48 Alistair Buchan, NATO In The 1960s: The Implications O f Interdependence (New York: Praeger Press,
1960), 43.
95
solidarity within the NATO Alliance by conducting an in-depth review of the Alliances
aims. The process was initiated in 1966 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who
was tasked to identify ways of strengthening the Alliance by identifying appropriate tasks
and specifying the procedures for their fulfillment. According to Leon Sloss, a
participant in the Harmel review, The most important objectives of the Harmel report
were to restore a sense of solidarity and purpose in the Alliance, and to gain public
support for the Alliance at a time when people began to question whether a military
alliance still was required.50 The Harmel report found that detente and defense were
equally important and compatible aspects of NATO policy. The report concluded,
Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary.
Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for
effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and
stability rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interests of
detente.51 The Harmel report called for the creation of specialized groups to seek a
greater consensus on security issues by balancing objectives associated with both defense
and detente.
Alliance strategy was influenced by a general acceptance of the principle of
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). By the late 1960s, it had become clear that both
the United States and the Soviet Union had sufficient nuclear forces to retaliate with
devastating force in the event of a first strike by either side. One historian characterizes
50Ibid, 111.
51 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Future Tasks O f The Alliance - The Harmel Report,
http://www.N ato .Int/Docu/B asictxt/B 671213a.htm.
96
the European allies as facing a dilemma where on one hand there is apprehension that
the United States would not provide the necessary protection, while on the other, there is
S9
a real fear of the consequences of a nuclear exchange. Another finds the preference
for detente over defense among some Europeans to be indicative of a belief that they
knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction, through
commercial and political ties, through patience and forebearance.' NATOs previous
strategy based on defense through deterrence needed to be complemented by an effort to
create a greater dialogue and thereby reduce the risk division within the Alliance.
The Harmel report, titled Future Tasks of the Alliance, was formally endorsed
by the allies in 1967, resolving differences that had emerged within NATO over the risks
and benefits of engagement. While the United States favored maintaining a strong
posture of deterrence, the report recognized the value of proposed efforts to promote a
reduction in East-West tensions through various political and economic initiatives. The
report called for NATO to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of
stability, security and confidence that will allow the allies to pursue the search for
progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can
be solved.54 In addition to the task of deterring Soviet aggression, NATO leaders agreed
to coordinate their efforts towards German reunification and arms control and to continue
to seek to diffuse tensions through transparency and confidence-building activities.
52 Thomas Schwartz, A m ericas Germany: John J. M cC loy and the Federal R epublic o f Germany
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 3.
53 Robert Kagan, O f Paradise and Power: Am erica and Europe in the N ew World Order (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2003), 28.
54 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Future Tasks O f The Alliance.
97
The acceptance of the Harmel report was shortly followed by the announcement
of Chancellor Brandts Ostpolitik initiative and an acceleration of arms control efforts.
The Harmel report acknowledged no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible
without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in
Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and
Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of
Germany. Between 1969 and 1972, Brandt negotiated an unprecedented number of
agreements with the Soviet Union and the East bloc, including the 1972 Basic Agreement
between West and East Germany. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger would
later say of these efforts, I do not believe in divisible detente in the sense that one side
does the defense and the other side does the negotiating . . . that Europe should have a
monopoly on detente and America on defense55 For his part, Kissinger oversaw
negotiations on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
(SALT) treaties that sought to ensure a balance of nuclear forces and create a climate of
stability for future negotiations.
Despite the allies general support for detente, there were countless differences
among the allies regarding its implementation. Distrust of Ostpolitik was expressed by
British and French leaders who concurred with Kissingers view that the new German
government informed rather than consulted. They reported progress; they did not solicit
advice.56 Similarly, American arms negotiations with the Soviets were complicated by
55 Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse , 139.
56 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 530.
98
demands from allies that West European interests must be taken into account. Americans
and Europeans found themselves disagreeing on important events such as the conduct of
the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and devaluation of the dollar. One historian notes a
widening view of security during this period as the United States pursued a global policy
while the Europeans concentrated on regional issues.57 Disillusionment with detente
became more significant in the United States as more Americans became convinced that
arms control provided more benefits to the Soviets than to themselves. A backlash began
to form against detente within the United States, while Europeans remained committed to
its continued practice.
NATOs Dual-Track Strategy
The competing norms of deterrence and detente divided the allies as they debated
the appropriate response to an improvement in Soviet nuclear forces in the mid-1970s. In
1977, the Soviets began replacing obsolete nuclear missiles with the mobile, medium-
range SS-20 missiles. These new weapons could not reach the United States, but posed
an increased threat to Western European allies due to their ability to carry multiple
warheads and to be launched within minutes. In December 1979, NATO responded with
a dual-track strategy balancing the two practices of detente and deterrence by agreeing
to modernize nuclear weapons systems in Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms
control agreements with the Soviet Union. American Pershing II and cruise missiles
would be deployed in Europe while the United States led negotiations aimed at limiting
intermediate-range nuclear weapons on both sides. Three weeks after the dual-track
57 Lawrence Kaplan, Am erican H istorians A nd The A tlantic Alliance. (Kent, OH: Kent State University
Press, 1991), 7.
99
decision, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, leading President Carter to characterize this
period as a threat to world peace greater than any since 1945.58 In the face of these
challenges, NATO clung to a strategy that favored unity over fragmentation and chaos.
Despite difficulties in the transatlantic relationship, NATO allies once again
demonstrated that they were willing to accept the domestic political and economic costs
of pursuing a common strategy. The deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear
missiles was extraordinarily controversial within many member states. In the words of
one historian, the public demonstrations in Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain
seemed capable of overthrowing not only individual governments but NATO itself.59
When the first Pershing II missile system became operational in 1983, the Soviets tried to
force the Alliance to choose between collective defense and detente by suspending all
arms-control negotiations until the new weapons were withdrawn. The ability of the
allies to withstand both internal and external pressure eventually brought the Soviets back
to the negotiating table and vindicated the dual-track strategy.
During a series of summit meetings in 1986, President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev discussed the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe. Despite
a revival of concerns that any change to the status quo would undermine the credibility of
the United States commitment to European security, American leaders succeeded in
negotiating the removal of all intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe the next year.
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty became the forerunner to a series of arms
58 Gaddis, We N ow Know, 126.
59 Gerard Smith, The SS-20 Challenge And Opportunity: The Dual-Track D ecision And Its Consequences,
1977-1983, in Am erican H istorians an d The A tlantic Alliance, ed. Lawrence Kaplan (Kent, OH: Kent
State University Press, 1991), 130.
100
control agreements and a general thawing of East-West relations. As one historian
observes, The INF treaty could have signaled the termination of the Alliance. Its goals
were either realized or well on the way to realization.60 The ratification of the INF
treaty would be shortly followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the
end of communist rule in several Eastern European states. As NATO member states
recognized that they were on the verge of winning the Cold War, they once again found
the need to adapt the Alliances strategy and organizations to a new set of challenges.
European Integration during the Cold War
While NATO evolved to become the primary forum for transatlantic coordination
on matters of collective defense and military force planning, a separate set of regimes
were taking root within Europe to enhance cooperation on economic and social policies.
Jean Monnet, an influential French politician, is commonly viewed as the driving force
behind European integration. Monnet recognized as early as 1943, The countries of
Europe are too small to give their peoples the prosperity that is now attainable and
therefore necessary....To enjoy the prosperity and social progress that are essential, the
States of Europe must form a federation or a 'European entity' which will make them a
single economic unit.61 Although related proposals for the creation of a European
Defense Community were unable to garner sufficient public support in the immediate
aftermath of World War two, a number of steps were taken to promote closer economic
ties. In 1951 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed
60 Kaplan, Am erican H istorians and The Atlantic Alliance, 8-9.
61 Jean Monnet, M em oirs (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 222.
101
the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The
ECSC was formed to regulate the production of coal and steel among its members. These
resources were identified due to their significance as the foundation of modern military
power. The ECSC was intended to do more than assure the efficient distribution of
economic commodities. According to Robert Schuman, the German-born Foreign
Minister of France and one of the drafters of the treaty, the ECSC was intended to make
war between its members not just unthinkable but materially impossible.62
The 1957 Treaty of Rome broadened the scope of economic cooperation among
member states to more sectors of the economy. The ECSC was joined by the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM). The EEC was charged with reducing protectionism and working towards
the goal of establishing a common market within twelve years. EURATOM coordinated
nuclear energy programs among member states. The Treaty of Rome enumerated four
policy areas that would bring the common market into practice. These four freedoms
included the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital among the borders of
member states. Reducing the significance of national borders was identified as a key part
of the strategy to eventually bring about a united Europe with strong supranational
institutions overseeing interstate relations. The three communities had the same
membership and shared a Court of Justice and Parliament, while maintaining separate
Councils and Commissions.
62 European Union Office o f External Relations, Declaration o f 9 May 1950, http://europa.eu.int/abc/

sy m bols/9-m ay/decl_en. htm
102
The quest for greater economic integration proceeded in an uneven fashion over
the next two decades. The process of integration was later described by former European
Commission President Jacques Delors as a cycle in which years of stagnation are
followed by swift advances which in turn lead to crisis and back to stagnation.63 While
France had historically led the drive toward integration, even French leaders felt the
process proceeded too quickly at times. An agreement to transition away from decision
making through concensus to a process of majority-voting in the Council was opposed by
President de Gaulle. France withdrew from the Council of Ministers for six months until
a compromise was reached allowing member states to veto proposals on matters of
national importance. The Merger Treaty of July 1967 brought the various Councils and
Commissions of the three communities into into a single European Council of Ministers
and European Commission.
The European Community (EC) both deepened and widened during the 1970s and
1980s. The cooperation among EC member states resulted in a more than six hundred
percent increase in internal trade from 1958 to 1970, compared to a trade increase of only
seventy percent between Europe and rest of the world.64 The membership of the EC
expanded to include Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland following Predident de Gaulles
retirement from politics. The EC Despite renewed French desires to eventually establish
a European security regime separate from NATO, other member states shared little
interest. EC member states pledged to consult with one another on major international
63 Yves Boyer and Burkard Schmidt, Should and Can Europe Bridge the Capabilities Gap? NATO R eview
50, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 14.
64 Philip Thody, An H istorical Introduction to the European Union (London and N ew York: Routledge,
1997), 19.
103
problems, but were unwilling to establish formal organizational structures that might rival
those of NATO. When French President Mitterrand suggested the revitalization of the
WEU during the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit, British leaders expressed reservations that
such an effort would represent a challenge to the unity of NATO.65 The highest priority
for most EC members was the creation of a single European market. The 1986 Single
European Act brought the objectives of the Treaty of Rome closer by providing specific
provision for the free exchange of goods and services within the community. The
authority of the EC was expanded to address additional aspects of environmental and
immigration policies. The Single European Act also introduced the concept of European
Political Cooperation, which would allow for closer consultation on defense and security
issues in accordance with French desires. By the end of the decade, European integration
had sufficiently progressed to make EC member states more prepared to deal with the
Germanys reunification along with the other economic, political, and military challenges
that would accompany the end of the Cold War.
Regime Analysis: NATO During the Cold War
A power-based approach to regime analysis is consistent with the formation of
NATO as a collective defense regime and accounts for many of the changes within the
Alliance during the Cold War. Realists credit the looming Soviet threat to the global
balance of power as the primary factor in the creation of a collective defense regime.
NATO was formed to compliment existing European efforts to cooperate in the defense
of Western Europe from Soviet aggression. NATO satisfied European security concerns
65 Michael Clarke, Britain, in Brenner, M ichael, ed. NATO an d Collective Security (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1998), 7.
104
by linking the interests of the United States to Europe while contributing to an American
strategy of containment. Collective defense reduced the risk of a potential resurgence of
a threat from either the Soviet Union or Germany while providing a means for the United
States to contribute to the economic and military recovery of Europe following the
Second World War. NATOs defining characteristic was the involvement of the United
States, which avoided the devastation of six years of war on the continent and emerged as
the dominant economic and military power. NATO was created as a vehicle for
American aid to Western Europe, with the United States bearing much of the cost of
European defense.
The preservation of American hegemony was a primary objective of post-War
United States foreign policy and was accepted by its NATO allies as a means of ensuring
their own security. The presence of a strong United States in Europe prevented the
emergence of competing security structures that could divide European states into
factions that develop their own security dilemmas or could more easily be brought under
Soviet influence. With the imminent threat of Soviet aggression as their foremost
security concern, European states were less concerned with the potential future
consequences of encouraging American hegemony than they were with ensuring their
survival in the near term. The United States developed close security ties with the states
of Western Europe that discouraged the creation of competing security regimes among
these states.
The expectation among the allies that continental Europe would serve as the site
for a future confrontation with the Soviet Union drove force structure considerations on
both sides of the Atlantic. In order to prepare for large scale conventional wars in Europe
105
or elsewhere, the American military emphasized mobility, along with the capacity to
project and sustain forces over distance and time. American force planning guidance
called for less dependence on large conventional armies while increasing the need for
agile military forces and improved intelligence assets. In contrast, European members of
NATO had historically structured their militaries around an expectation that their military
forces would most likely be utilized to defend Western Europe against Soviet aggression
implied that the battle would occur on or near their own territory. The demands placed
on these militaries during the Cold War called for the maintenance of large conscript
armies capable of fielding heavy armor formations supported by tactical airpower. These
forces were organized for territorial defense, a role that failed to emphasize the need to
project forces over great distances, or to sustain them far outside of their borders for long
periods. The organization of Allied force structures along different models suited the
practice of collective defense within Europe, while reinforcing the hegemonic role of the
United States within the Alliance.
As the Alliance hegemon, military capabilities of the United States greatly
exceeded those of its allies and gave American leaders a large voice in determining
Allied strategy. The United States maintained a dominant role in the Alliance, but at the
cost of developing and deploying much more extensive nuclear and conventional military
forces than those of its NATO allies. American nuclear deterrence a cornerstone of
collective defense efforts, and the presence of American troops enabled the credible
practice of extended deterrence. Periods of indecision and inaction on the part of the
Alliance can be associated with an absence of American leadership while many of the
initiatives embodying regime changes were sponsored by American leaders. Changes in
106
strategic paradigms from the concept of massive retaliation to flexible response and
the practice of detente consistently reflected American preferences and capabilities. The
European allies continued dependence on the United States to assure the security of the
continent gave American leaders political leverage that extended even to events outside
of Europe. The outcome of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis is one example of the influence of
the United States over even the most capable and determined members of the Alliance.
The United States continued to successfully provide policy leadership within NATO even
when its proposals had strong domestic consequences for its European allies, as many
NATO governments experienced during the debate over NATOs dual track strategy.
From an organizational perspective, NATO made a number of important
contributions to transatlantic security during the Cold War, even if it did not substantially
alter the hegemonic status of the United States. In their defense of neoliberal
institutionalism entitled The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, Keohane and Martin
do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable condition
. . . what we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with
power realities.66 NATO successfully contributed to the defense of North America and
Western Europe because member states recognized their interdependence and developed
ways of cooperating to achieve their common security objectives. By operating within
NATO, states gained access to additional assets as well as better information on the
potential behavior of its allies. Increased information and transparency among allies
reduced uncertainty and led to better decision-making. Keohane and Martin view NATO
66 Robert Koehane and Lisa Martin, The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory, International Security 20, no.
1 (Summer 1995): 42.
107
as an important venue for overcoming policy differences between members during the
Cold War because Allied rules and procedures promoted conditions of reciprocity and
transparency. This resulted in an environment conducive to eliminating the need for
relative gains among member states.
NATO developed numerous internal organizations created to coordinate the
military preparations necessary to ensure the defense of Europe, while the EC contributed
to European security by promoting economic integration. NATO organizational bodies
generally promoted the United States involvement in European security rather than
acting as a constraint on American power. These bodies focused on coordinating defense
preparations within Europe, to include common military strategy, force planning,
logistical support, and the development of common equipment and doctrine. A command
structure, led by the senior American general officer in Europe, was specified as a means
of ensuring unity of command for NATO forces. NATO committees often based their
guidance on existing United States practices in such issue areas as air defense, nuclear
planning, and communications planning.
Organization changes resulted from occasions when member states questioned the
ability of NATOs norms, rules, and procedures to meet existing challenges. NATO
leaders introduced countless reforms to improve relations among member states as well
as the Alliances capability to achieve shared objectives. NATOs internal organizations
and procedures helped Alliance members overcome their differences and achieve a
consensus regarding collective action. The credible practice of nuclear deterrence served
as the center of this debate in the 1960s and 1970s, and further organizational reforms
would be anticipated with the end of the Cold War.
108
The concepts of a collective identity and shared values emphasized in a norm-
based approach to regime analysis are also quite relevant to the formation and evolution
of NATO during the Cold War. A common fear of Soviet expansion provided the
catalyst for the formation of an international security regime, with NATO representing
the acknowledgment that America and Europe shared a common identity and that their
future prosperity and security was linked. Haglund views NATO during the Cold War as
an embodiment of the collective identity of the West, an imagined community
constructed by the perception of a threat to its shared culture by the Soviet Union and the
communist states in the east.67 In contrast to realist depictions of NATO as a product of
American hegemony, a norm-based approach to regime analysis suggest that the nature
of the European, Soviet and American governments influenced regime formation in
NATO more than material factors.
A norm-based approach to regime analysis characterizes transatlantic relations
during the Cold War as the emergence of a security community among democratic states.
Weber asserts that NATO represents just such a community during this period.68 He
suggests that a security community can be institutionalized through the acceptance of
norms of equality, unanimous decision-making and by efforts to enhance transparency
and facilitate the transfer of information among states. Eden similarly observes, Insofar
as the Atlantic community has a collective identity, it is expressed largely through the
67 David Haglund, Community o f Fate or Marriage o f Convenience? ESDP and the Future o f Transatlantic
Identity, in NATO and European Security: Alliance P olitics fro m the End o f the C old W ar to the A ge o f
Terrorism, eds. Alexander Moens, Lenard Cohen and Allen Sens (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 1-18.
68 Stephen Weber, D oes NATO Have a Future? in The Future o f European Security, ed. Beverly
Crawford. (Berkeley, CA: University o f California: 1992), 360-95.
109
institutions of NATO.69 NATO members came to the Alliance with a liberal,
democratic identity which distinguished them from other non-democratic states. These
states were part of a voluntary transatlantic community in which all members felt they
had a stake in each others security.
Risse-Kappen focuses on NATO as he examines how the norms that govern
international regimes reflect the collective identity of their members.70 The recent
proliferation of regimes has accompanied the rise of liberal democratic governments.
International cooperation is more common among liberal states that share a common
understanding of concepts such as order and justice. He observes that democracies
perceive each other as peaceful because of the norms that guide their domestic politics
and they form international organizations to promote and defend their common values.
He argues that democratic states are able to make stronger commitments to international
regimes due to the nature of their liberal democratic structures and their normative
characteristics. NATO membership bolstered the national security interests and defense
practices of member states who practice regular consultation, consensus-building and
equal participation in the decision-making process.71
A common commitment to norms of consultation and compromise deepened the
ties among member states and contributed to their perception of NATO as a democratic
69 Douglas Eden, Europe and the A tlantic Relationship: Issues o f Identity, Security and P ow er (N ew York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 2.
70 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, C ollective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case o f N A TO in The

Culture o f N ational Security: Norms and Identity in W orld P olitics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (N ew York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-399.
71 Risse-Kappen, C ollective Identity in a Democratic Community, 369.
110
community. Democratic governance promotes norms establishing the equality of
citizens, majority rule, and the preference for compromise over violent confrontation.
These norms were reflected in the Alliances political and military structures. Since no
collective action can be taken over the objection of any member, NATO members sought
common positions out of necessity. The allies frequently consulted each other and were
able to achieve some manner of international legitimacy before taking action. NATOs
evolution during the Cold War was guided by a commitment to multilateralism bringing
together sovereign states of different capabilities, but shared values.
The norms and rules of NATO exerted an effect on the behavior of member
states, even if collective decisions did not always reflect national preferences. In the first
few decades of its existence, a sense of community influenced the process through which
member states formed their interests. NATO s collective identity reinforced the
commitment of member states to the regime and allowed its members to overcome
frequent crises and changes in the international system. The allies were held together by
a mutual understanding that the Soviet threat was the central geopolitical challenge of
the time, Europe was the primary terrain on which that threat had to be confronted, and
West Europeans were the primary allies of the United States.72 Sustaining this sense of
community would be but one of many challenges facing the Alliance in the aftermath of
the Cold War.
Ill
Conclusion
The three approaches to regime analysis provide a number of insights into the
creation and evolution of NATO during the Cold War. The formation of NATO was
consistent with the interests of the United States by aiding the practice of containment
against the Soviet Union and serving as a means of promoting American hegemony
within Europe. The United States bore much of the responsibility for the defense of
Western Europe and the presence of a benevolent hegemon allowed European states to
pursue greater economic integration that provided further benefits to the region.
Emerging collective security functions allowed for the reintegration of Germany into
Western Europe and prevented the development of security dilemmas among the allies
by using the institutional mechanisms of the Alliance to promote transparency,
cooperation, and collective action.73 Occasional crises occurred among the allies, but
the effects of these crises were tempered by a sense of community based on shared values
and compliance with accepted norms. A commitment to collective defense was
maintained throughout this era and a pattern of cooperation was established that would
enable the Alliance to readily adapt to future changes in the international security
environment.
73 Tom Lansford, A Bitter H arvest: U.S. Foreign P olicy and Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003),
179-180.
112
At NATO, transformation is nothing new. But it is fair to say that changes during
NATOs first 40 years were relatively gradual and comparatively small. Changes over
the past 16 years, however, have been much more sudden and far-reaching.
- NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2005)
Chapter 3: Post-Cold War NATO
The 1990s were a period of rapid and far-reaching changes in the internal
relations between member states and in the relationship of NATO with the rest of the
international community. This period of change would be characterized by great
uncertainties regarding the nature of the emerging threat and the best ways to prepare the
Alliance to face future challenges. During the Cold War, member states overlooked
many lesser threats as they focused on countering the capabilities of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact states. Numerous secondary threats persisted, and were in many ways
magnified in the post-Cold War era. The risk of civil wars in Europe, nuclear weapons
proliferation, and transnational terrorism all increased as Soviet influence declined and a
security vacuum formed. As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher later observed,
The Europe that has emerged from behind the Iron Curtain has many of the features of
the Europes of 1914 and 1939: ethnic strife, contested borders, political extremism,
nationalist passions and economic backwardness.1
The typology of approaches to regime analysis utilized throughout this study
provide a useful means of examining the process of regime change within NATO during
this era. The United States viewed NATO as a means of influencing the changing
security environment in Europe and serve as a stabilizing force during this period of
1 Margaret Thatcher, The D owning Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 813.
113
uncertainty. Despite expectations that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would lead to
the United States abandonment of Europe, American leaders chose to remain engaged in
Europe and initiated reforms that would retain NATOs central role in preserving peace
throughout the region. The practice of collective security was to be accompanied by
organizational and normative changes allowing the Alliance to become more proactive in
the management of security challenges. This chapter examines the accelerated process
of regime change during the 1990s that ushered in the Alliances further embrace of
collective security, despite the challenges emerging from the European Unions efforts to
establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for its members and the
persistence of a capabilities gap between the United States and the other members of
NATO.
Promoting East-West Cooperation
The decline of the Soviet threat that had served as NATOs primary raison detre
introduced a period of uncertainly within the Alliance. Hungary's former Deputy
Defense Minister Istvan Gyarmati later noted, The static conditions of high risk-high
stability in Europe have been replaced by the dynamic condition of Tow risk-low
stability, which is characterized by a broader spectrum of diverse security challenges.2
Under such circumstances, the allies faced a more diffuse set of threats and the previous
cohesion and unity could not be taken for granted. The allies initial response to the
dissolution of the Soviet Union was to pursue a policy of cooperation with both Russia
and the former Warsaw Pact states. This emphasis on cooperation yielded a number of
2 Istvan Gyarmati, Hungary's Security and The Enlargement, in The Challenge O f NATO Enlargement,
ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 110.
114
important initiatives over the next several years, including the creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the introduction of the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) and the opening up of the Alliance to new member states.
NATOs post-Cold War strategy emphasizing cooperation with former
adversaries was intended to reduce mistrust by increasing communication among member
and non-member states and promoting a sense of shared responsibility for regional
security. A transition from confrontation to cooperation could help socialize Warsaw
Pact states in the ways of democracy, particularly regarding norms of non-violence,
governmental transparency, and military subordination to civilian authority. This was
consistent with President George H. W. Bush's call for a new world order, where he
stated his vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A
partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through
international and regional organizations.3 NATO had performed this function
throughout the Cold War with respect to West Germany, Portugal, Spain, Greece and
Turkey, and advocates of expansion hoped the states of Central and Eastern Europe might
similarly be reshaped into allies.
A commitment to greater cooperation was formally embraced by the Alliance in
July 1990 when NATO heads of state issued the London Declaration calling for an end to
the confrontation between East and West. The London Declaration included proposals to
transform the Alliance and promote cooperation with NATOs former adversaries. This
declaration called for the governments of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states to
3 Henry Kissinger, D iplom acy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 804.
115
visit NATO headquarters and to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO. The
allies claimed that these states are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE [Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act.4 In addition, the London Declaration
promised that the allies would work to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion by
pursuing a major transformation.. .determined to create enduring peace on this
continent.5
The next challenge for the NATO allies was to develop a suitable strategy to bring
their vision of a stable, peaceful region into reality. A Strategy Review Group was
formed within a month of the London Summit to prepare a new Strategic Concept.
Michael Legge, then NATOs Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and
Policy and the chairman of the Strategy Review Group observed, The former Harmel
dual approach of dialogue and defense... [became] a triad of cooperation, dialogue and
defense.6 A new Strategic Concept was adopted at NATOs Rome Summit in
November 1991. The twelve drafts generated over sixteen months compared favorably to
the decade of debate that preceded the adoption of a flexible response strategy in the
1960s.
4 NATO Office o f Information and Press. Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic A lliance Issued
By The Heads O f State And Government Participating In The Meeting O f The North Atlantic Council, July
6, 1990, http://www.Nato.Int/Docu/Basictxt/B900706a.htm .
5 Ibid.
6 Michael Legge, The Making O f N A TO s N ew Strategy, NATO Review 39, no. 6 (December 1991): 12.
116
Rather than seeking to undermine the governments of Eastern and Central Europe,
NATOs new strategy hoped to limit instability in the East. The 1991 Strategic Concept
stated, the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious
economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial
disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.. .could,
however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which
could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on
the security of the Alliance.7 This strategy called for a reduced dependence on nuclear
weapons as well as substantial reductions in the size and readiness of NATO military
forces. These reductions were directed in favor of greater confidence-building activities
to enhance transparency and improve communication, including the further verification
of arms control agreements. The Alliance pursued a broad approach to security.. .to
draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political,
economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defense
dimension. NATOs new approach to security yielded several initiatives, beginning
with the creation of the North Atlanic Cooperation Council (NACC).
NACC was formed in 1991 as a means of building upon ad-hoc military and
diplomatic contacts to establishing regular consultations between NATO and the
governments of European non-member states. The Council initially included all the
members of the former Warsaw Pact as well as a number of states with observer status,
7 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed B y The Heads O f State
And Government Participating In The M eeting O f The North Atlantic Council, Novem ber 8, 1991,
http://www.Nato.Int/Docu/Basictxt/B911108a.htm .
8 Ibid.
117
including Austria, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. NACC had a mandate to
overcome adversarial relationships stemming from the Cold War and to encourage
confidence-building measures such as the verification of military force reductions, limits
on the production of war material, and reciprocal over-flight agreements. The demands
placed on the NACC by both member and non-member states soon proved to be
overwhelming. Some participants referred to it as a gigantic talking shop where the
formal opening speeches usually filled up most of the time available and the conclusions
of the proceedings merely restated the questions originally posed for debate.9 Within a
couple of years, the responsibilities of NACC were delegated to its successor
organizations, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and PfP.
EAPC eventually replaced NACC with a more extensive series of consultations
which were to be tailored to the individual needs of Partner states. EAPC complemented
regional security cooperation seminars with direct political security consultations
between the partner states and NATO representatives. Security cooperation seminars
were hosted by many of the Partner states, including Georgia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. An Action Plan
was developed calling for additional transparency measures and the development of
disaster response capability to be shared among participating states. The Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Center and Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit
emerged from this effort. Over the next several years, these organizations allowed
9 Jonathan Eyal, N A T O s Enlargement: Anatomy o f a D ecision, Journal o f International Affairs 73, no. 4
(October 1997):701.
118
participating states to gain experience in combined operations while providing
humanitarian relief to Kosovar refugees in Albania and flood victims in Ukraine.
Partnership for Peace represented an opportunity for NATO to form organizations
that would actively pursue cooperation beyond a limited political dialogue. PfP was first
proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO
defense ministers in October 1993 and its implementation was made a top priority by
American representatives to NATO. Then U.S. Permanent Representative on the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) Robert Hunter described PfP as part of a new experiment in
security that marks a decisive end both to history's most destructive war and to its Cold
War aftermath. For the first time, Europe has a chance to found Continent-wide security
on a basis other than the balance of power - with its associated risks of a catastrophic
clash of arms.10 PfP was envisioned as a way to move beyond consultations and enable
non-member states to begin operating along side NATO forces using Allied doctrine and
standard operating procedures. Within its first year, NATO shared hundreds of internal
documents with participating states to encourage standardized military doctrine and the
development of concepts of operation to be used in combined exercises and eventual real-
world deployments.
PfP programs directed the conduct of combined planning efforts along with joint
military exercises related to peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian
operations. These efforts promised to improve the interoperability of military systems
through the standardization of weapons, and commonality of logistical procedures among
10 Robert Hunter, Enlargement Part o f a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe, NATO
Review 43. no.3 (May 1995): 4.
119
participating military forces. Hundreds of PfP-sponsored multilateral operations and
exercises were eventually held, most modeled after NATO peacekeeping efforts in the
Balkans and hosted by Partner states.11 The value to these activities among the nearly
thirty participating nations led NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea to describe PfP as a kind
11
of a permanent Marshall Plan for defense.
PfP allowed participants to gain most of the benefits of NATO, but lacked the
collective defense guarantee maintained among member states. While the assistance with
military reforms and cooperative activities were of sufficient value to traditionally neutral
European states such as Austria and Switzerland, other states were motivated primarily
by the future possibility of NATO membership. Duffield observed, The more these
countries interact during NATO military exercises, training for peacekeeping operations,
and so on, the more they will have and will feel that they have a de facto military or
security guarantee. In other words, the more that NATO is involved with them and the
more they restructure their forces and decision-making processes to be compatible with
NATO, the harder it will be for NATO to refuse to act if their security is endangered.13
Nonetheless, Poland, the Czech Republic and other participating states expressed some
disappointment with PfP, viewing the program as another attempt by existing members to
postpone a decision on their admission to the Alliance. Critics were even observed
11 Notable PfP operations include Cooperative Support (beginning in 1995), Cooperative Zenith (beginning
in 1996), Cooperative Safeguard (beginning in 1997), and Cooperative Jaguar (beginning in 1998).
12 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, How Did NATO Survive The Cold War? NATO Video
Lecture Transcript, March 11, 2004, http://w ww.Nato.Int/M ulti/Video/Lectures/031104/V031104al.htm .
13 John Duffield, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Alliance Theory, in Explaining
International Relations since 1945, ed. Ngaire W oods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 117.
120
replacing the word Peace with Postponement or Procrastination or even
Prevarication, because of their impression that PfP was simply a means of stalling on
the question of NATO expansion.14
There was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the desirability of NATO
expansion in the 1990s. This was not a question of legality, since the Alliance had
previously added Greece, Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty provides for expansion, stating The Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this
treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this
treaty. 15 Alliance membership was attractive to a number of former Warsaw Pact states
because it would bring them closer to prosperous Western European states, while
providing a security guarantee and helping them normalize relations with Russia. Many
European members of the Alliance were ambivalent towards the idea of expansion. The
strongest supporters were states along NATOs periphery. Germany was particularly
anxious to create an economic and security buffer between itself and the former Soviet
states by making Poland, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia NATO's eastern border.
German Defense Minister Yolker Ruhe wrote, A situation in which Germanys east
border is the border between stability and instability in Europe is not sustainable in the
14 David Yost, NATO Transformed: The A llian ces N ew Roles in International Security (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1998), 98.
15 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. Text o f The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
121
long run. Germanys eastern border cannot be the eastern border of the European Union
and NATO. Either we export stability of we import instability.16
Critics of expansion argued that this process was not only unnecessary, but could
itself prove to be a source of insecurity. PfP was indeed advocated as an alternative to
expansion by many European and American officials concerned about retaining the
credibility of NATOs collective defense pledge. Among the American officials
advocating this view were U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, who opposed expansion and, in
particular, feared diluting the effectiveness of NATO.17 Critics noted that the former
Warsaw Pact states had armed forces that were militarily incompatible with those of
NATO member states. The modernization of these forces could be expected to take
many years and prove very costly. Experience had shown that it was nearly a decade or
so before the German and Spanish militaries could integrate fully with NATO forces.
The cost of military reforms among the prospective member states would also compete
with funding for much-needed social and political reforms. International financier
George Soros expounded this view writing, The problems of Central and Eastern Europe
require political integration and economic prosperity, not the extension of military
alliances. The countries of the region need political, moral, and economic assurance that
they are indeed part of the West and of the world of open societies. To give them armies
and military alliances instead misconstrues the threat. In fact, the expansion of NATO
16 Volker Ruhe, Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a N ew Era, Survival 35, N o. 2
(Summer 1993): 130.
17 James Goldgeier, NATO Expansion: The Anatomy O f A D ecision, The Washington Q uarterly 21, no.
1 (Winter 1998): 88.
122
can easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy, generating the very dangers against which it
is meant to defend.18
A related risk associated with expansion was the chance of the Alliance being
drawn into existing interstate conflicts involving candidate states. Prospective NATO
member states were involved in numerous disputes in the mid-1990s that had the
potential to escalate into military conflict. Hungary had difficult relations with Romania,
Yugoslavia and Slovakia over the treatment of ethnic Hungarian minorities living in these
states. Romania also had territorial issues with Moldova and Ukraine that were likely to
bring Russia into any potential conflict. Poland's border with Belarus was inadequately
monitored, which made Poland likely to become involved in any future internal conflicts
within Belarus.19
Proponents of expansion also had to look for ways to overcome Russian
opposition to expansion. Since the early 1990s, NATO member governments had
assured Russia that any loss of influence in Europe would not be translated into a
Western gain. Russian President Boris Yeltsin had expressed his opposition to
18 George Soros, Can Europe Work? A Plan to Rescue the Union, Foreign Affairs 75 no. 5
(September/October 1996): 12. Later events found these fears to be overstated. A key R A ND study finds
that prospective membership in NATO had indeed contributed to increased investor confidence and the
accelerated econom ic growth that accompanies investment capital. The extension o f N A T O s security
guarantee is thought to have reduced pressure on new members to seek costly and potentially destabilizing
military capabilities. See David Ochmanek, N A T O s Future: Im plications f o r U.S. M ilitary C apabilities
and Posture (Washington DC: RAND, 2000).
19 Once again, these risks proved to be manageable. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana observed in
1999, The possibility o f NATO membership has already given many nations o f Central and Eastern
Europe an incentive to put to an end to old quarrels, border disputes or other unresolved security-related
issues. Already a number o f bilateral treaties have been signed, including Romania-Hungary, Romania-
Ukraine, Germany-Czech Republic, Hungary-Slovakia and Poland-Ukraine, to cite just a few. This is a
truly fantastic achievement. Javier Solana, NA TO Beyond Enlargement, in The Challenge o f NATO
Enlargement, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 5.
123
expansion on numerous occasions and his National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed
had even gone so far as to predict the outbreak of World War III if NATO tried to
expand. Expansion without Russian concurrence might undermine key arms control
agreements such as the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement and Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties. Expanding NATO hundreds of miles eastward raised concerns
among Russian military leaders due to the inability of Russian air defense systems to
provide adequate warning in the event of a future missile strike. These and other
considerations made former Secretary of State and United States ambassador to the
Soviet Union George F. Kennan particularly critical of expansion. Kennan labeled
proposals for NATO expansion in the highest degree deplorable and warned it never
pays... for one great power to take advantage of the momentary weakness or distraction
of another great power in order to force upon it concessions it would never have accepted
in normal circumstances.. . . over the long run, it almost always revenges itself.20
Kennan later observed, Bluntly stated, expanding NATO would be the most fateful error
of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to
inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to
have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the
atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relationship; and to impel Russian foreign
91
policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.
20 George Kennan, A t A Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982-1995. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 330.
21 George Kennan, A Fateful Error. The N ew York Times, February 7, 1997.
124
Despite the concerns of critics within and outside his administration, President
Clinton expressed confidence that the Alliance would expand as early as January 1994,
when during a speech at NATOs Brussels Summit he stated, While the Partnership is
not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire
NATO dialogue so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new
members, but when and how.22 The failure of European states to effectively intervene in
the Balkans resulted in calls for the Clinton administration to restructure its European
policy and play a more prominent position in European affairs. Some analysts suspected
election year politics also played a role in the administrations conversion from a policy
of Russia-first to a pro-expansion position in the fall of 1994. One scholar concluded,
The decision to accelerate the timetable for NATO's expansion was based neither on
strategic logic nor military threat, but was domestically driven. President Clinton's bid for
votes among those with strong cultural, ethnic, and religious ties to Central and Eastern
Europe led him to declare in Detroit on October 22, 1996, in the final two weeks of a
bitterly contested election campaign, that he wanted the first group of Central and Eastern
European countries ... admitted in 1999.23
The NAC called for a study on the implications of NATO expansion in December
1994. The resulting Study on NATO Enlargement strongly advocated the expansion of
the Alliance and cited many favorable outcomes resulting from expansion. The study
recommended that expansion be approached as a process rather than a single event, so
22 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary. Press Conference By The President With Visegrad Leaders,
January 12, 1994.. http://www.Friends-Partners.Org/01dfriends/News/SummitW isegrad.Pressconf.html.
23 Alvin Rubenstein, NATO Enlargement vs. American Interests, Orbis 42, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 37.
125
states not immediately invited to join NATO could expect to be considered again at a
later date. The promise of NATO membership was expected to encourage further
democratic reforms within candidate states, such as greater civilian control over military
forces. The study also found that expansion would help improve relations among states
in the region by encouraging greater consultation and cooperation. Transparency in
defense planning and budgeting could also improve relations among these states and
contribute to regional stability. Candidate states would be expected to pursue policies
that promote stability and well being by economic liberty, social justice, and
environmental responsibility...[and] establish appropriate democratic and civilian control
of their defense force.24
The Study on NATO Enlargement also resolved the question of whether candidate
states would be offered "full" membership in NATO. Several NATO member states had
specified conditions regarding their membership. Both Norway and Denmark prohibited
the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory and specified limitations on the
peacetime stationing of foreign forces within their borders. France participated in
political decision-making organizations, but had not participated in NATO's integrated
military command since 1964. New Alliance members would be offered full
membership and given equal status in the combined military planning of the Alliance,
including planning for contingencies involving nuclear weapons. While separate
assurances were given to Russia regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons on the
24 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501 .htm.
126
territory of new member states, there were no other limitations on the rights and
responsibilities of new member states.
Critics of expansion questioned the alleged relationship between democratization
and NATO membership. The logic of causality could be challenged because NATO
requires that aspirant countries have a working democratic system in place before they
are accepted as members. As Reiter found in his study of Central European governments,
"NATO membership was not necessary for democratization because each [candidate
state] already has a strong national commitment to democracy.25 Like-minded critics
were unconvinced that the promise of eventual membership could be credited with the
prerequisite reforms within candidate states. Mandelbaum noted, The countries under
active consideration are precisely those best placed to make a successful transition to
democracy and free markets without NATO membership.26 Bebler similarly observed,
If NATO enlargement is indeed to improve security and stability in the former Eastern
Europe, as publicly claimed, then the invitations ought to have been extended to the
weakest and neediest among the post-communist states in transition, and not to the
militarily and economically strongest and those less exposed to potential external
threats.27
25 Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement D oes N ot Spread Democracy, International Security 25, no.4
(Spring 2001): 60.
26 Michael Mandelbaum, Preserving The N ew Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion. Foreign
Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1996): 13.
27 Anton Bebler, Postscript, in The Challenge O f NATO Enlargement, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT:
Praeger Press, 1999), 205.
127
By 1996, twelve states had formally expressed interest in joining NATO. Each of
these states entered intensive talks with NATO representatives to learn how the Alliance
works and to provide information on progress toward meeting the criteria for
membership. Conditions in many of these states were far too unstable to make them
attractive candidates for membership. Although Romanian leaders expressed a desire to
join the Alliance, their pace of political and economic reform was unimpressive.
Slovakia also continued to experience internal political turmoil that made some observers
question Prime Minister Meciars commitment to democracy. Russian officials wanted
to clarify that there was no prohibition against Russias eventual eligibility for
membership. While no explicit barrier existed, there was little expectation that Russia
would be invited into the Alliance in the immediate future.
American leadership was apparent throughout the process of expansion. Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke led a team of negotiators that simultaneously tried
to build a consensus within the Alliance while reassuring the Russians that NATO
expansion would have no adverse security implications for them. Russian concurrence
came in May 1997 with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation, and Security, which had been primarily negotiated between American and
Russian officials. German leaders, while remaining strong supporters of NATO
expansion, were put off by the unilateral approach taken by the Americans. French
involvement had also been limited, and their support for including Romania and Slovenia
in the list of invitees was virtually ignored. The unwillingness of American diplomats to
128
give their European allies a larger role in the process prompted at least one French
official to ask, When exactly did the Americans go from leadership to hegemony?28
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary soon emerged as the most
likely candidates for future membership. Polands candidacy benefited from the
international recognition of its important role in challenging Soviet authority in the
1980s. Poland also had a very high level of domestic public support for NATO
membership and demonstrated its readiness by increasing defense spending in line with
Alliance guidance. Finally, Poland had a strong record as a contributor of troops for UN
peacekeeping operations, providing more troops in 1997 than any other state. While the
public support for NATO membership and the commitment to military modernization
was lower in the Czech Republic, its location between Germany and Poland and the
charismatic leadership of President Vaclav Havel made it an attractive candidate.
Hungary did not have geographic contiguity with the rest of the Alliance members, but
had steadily pursued economic and political reforms and continued to play an active role
in support of NATO operations in the Balkans.
Economic and political readiness were among the determining factors for these
three states. As President Clinton remarked to the Senate as the membership protocols
went forward for confirmation, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been
leaders in Central Europe's dramatic transformation over the past decade and already are
a part of NATOs community of values. They each played pivotal roles in the overthrow
of communist rule and repression, and they each proved equal to the challenge of
28 Steven Erlanger, Yeltsen Basks at Summit; Some Europeans are Cool to the U .S ., The N ew York
Times, M ay 30, 1997.
129
comprehensive democratic and market reform. Together, they have helped to make
Central Europe the Continent's most robust zone of economic growth.29 NATO leaders
extended invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic at the July 1997 summit
in Madrid and these states formally joined NATO during the Washington Summit
marking the Alliance's 50th anniversary in April 1999.
NATO Interventions in the Balkans
While continuing to support the overall strategy of collective defense, the
Alliance found it necessary to strengthen its commitment to collective security in the
post-Cold War era. Contemporary NATO documents define collective security as
political solidarity among member countries; the promotion of collaboration and strong
ties between them in all fields where this serves their common and individual interests;
the sharing of roles and responsibilities and recognition of mutual commitments; and a
joint undertaking to maintain adequate military forces to support Alliance strategy and
on
policy. Collective security is practiced through the conduct of non-Article Five
missions such as crisis management and peacekeeping. Norman Ray, then NATO
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, observed The NATO of today has
moved far beyond the core task of safeguarding its members territory. It is actively
trying to create the conditions for long-term stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. To
29 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Clinton Transmittal To Senate O f Protocols To NATO Treaty,
February 11, 1998, http://www.fas.org/m an/nato/offdocs/us_98/98021108_tpo.htm l.
30 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. NATO Handbook. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/.
130
this end, NATO has assumed new missions, undertaken major internal reforms and
introduced a qualitatively new era of partnership and security cooperation in Europe.31
Out-of-area missions had historically been avoided and the topic remained
divisive among the allies throughout the early 1990s. The 1967 Harmel Report advised
against such actions, stating Nor is it advisable for NATO to intervene in conflict
situations elsewhere in substitution for an ineffective United Nations organization;
indeed, NATO action might well provoke Soviet intervention and accordingly spread the
danger. The legal objections against the extension of NATO responsibilities outside the
NATO area are well founded. The treaty contains no provisions for operational activities
of the Alliance in other regions.32 The revised strategy laid out in the 1991 Security
Concept also omitted such missions, noting The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose:
none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense.. . . The role of the
Alliances military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence
of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.33 Out-of-area
missions are particularly vulnerable to collective action problems because the territorial
integrity of member states are not directly threatened. In the absence of any consensus
among Alliance members regarding the conduct of such missions, NATO would be
unable to act.
31 Norman Ray, Security Cooperation And The N ew N A TO , The Challenge O f NATO Enlargement, ed.
Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1999), 10.
32 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Future Tasks O f The Alliance - The Harmel Report
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b67123a.htm.
33 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed B y The Heads O f
State And Government Participating In The Meeting O f The North Atlantic Council, Novem ber 8, 1991,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm
131
The outbreak of war among former Yugoslav republics served as the first major
challenge to European security after the Cold War and stood at the center of the debate
over the practice of collective security. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been
cobbled together in the aftermath of World War Two and remained unified throughout
the Cold War despite ethnic divisions between Serbia and the rest of republics (Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia). Over a period of nearly forty
years, Josip Broz (Tito) demonstrated an extraordinary ability to contain the violence
between ethnic factions. Titos death in 1980, followed by years of deteriorating
economic conditions weakened the already tenuous links between the republics. This
process was fueled by leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic who manipulated ethnic
divisions to increase Serbia's power and influence over the other republics. Milosevic
called for the creation of a greater Serbia encompassing all territory in the former
Yugoslavia occupied by ethnic Serbs. Milosevics actions were unacceptable to several
of the other republics, leading them to seek independence from Serbian dominance.
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, which was forcefully opposed by
the Serbian-controlled Yugoslavian Peoples Army (JNA) and ethnic Serbs living within
these republics. JNA troops were driven from Slovenia in ten days, but fighting was
much more prolonged in Croatia.
Any solution to the violence stemming from the breakup of Yugoslavia was
initially left to other international organizations. The UN passed Security Council
Resolution 713 declaring an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and began a series of
negotiations to help find a resolution to the conflict. While the chronic violence in this
area was of great concern to neighboring states, it was less of a concern for those
132
Alliance members more distant from the conflict, such as the United States. Many
European leaders welcomed the opportunity to address the conflict without American
leadership. French, Belgian, and Spanish representatives to the CSCE reduced the
likelihood of American involvement by insisting that any peacekeeping request be made
to individual governments and not to NATO headquarters. On the occasion of a
breakthrough in negotiations between Slovenia and Serbia, Jacques Poos, the Foreign
Minister of Luxembourg and holding the presidency of the European Community,
declared This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans!34
European Community and UN negotiators initially succeeded in achieving a
ceasefire between Serbia and Croatia without American assistance. In April 1992, the
UN organized UNPROFOR to oversee the ceasefire in Croatia. A lasting peace was not
achieved and fighting broke out again in early 1993. Unable to stop the fighting again,
the UN created Protected Areas (UNPAs) to encourage the combatants to demilitarize
key regions and discontinue ethnic cleansing. UNPAs were poorly suited to both tasks,
and UN monitors were primarily left to simply document the ongoing atrocities. The
continued efforts of the EC and UN were even less successful in ending the factional
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A referendum was held in March, 1992 and the
participants overwhelmingly favored independence. This referendum had been boycotted
by ethnic Serbs, who declared their own independent republic within Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Ethnic cleansing was rampant as each side attempted to link together
territory under its control. Reflecting on the efforts of the UN and EC to bring peace to '
34 Andraes Kinitis, The EU's Foreign Policy And The War In Former Y ugoslavia, in Common Foreign
And Security Policy: The R ecord A nd Reform, ed. Martin Hollad (London: Cassell, 1992), 150.
133
the region, the Canadian Charge dAffaires in Croatia remarked Unless America is
engaged, it simply doesnt work.35
The absence of American leadership contributed to the unwillingness of NATO to
pursue collective security in the early 1990s. American leaders were anxious to. reduce,
rather than increase the United States role in European security in the period
immediately following the end of the Cold War. The U.S. government took the position
that it would not become directly involved in the fighting, but would simply strive to
contain the conflict. Without American support for intervention, NATO was unable to
take collective action.
When the level of violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina later escalated to
levels that swayed American leaders toward intervention, there was still disagreement
regarding the Alliances role as a peacemaker. Historical ties to the region divided the
allies, with Greece and a handful of other NATO states being more supportive of Serbias
efforts to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia. Mueller found that two conflicting
assessments of the underlying causes of the conflict further divided European and
American leaders.36 The dominant view within the French and British governments
characterized the Yugoslav conflict as a civil war fueled by ethnic rivalries. According to
Mueller, If the war were the consequence of endemic cultural forces, then it had no
culprits. All sides were equally guilty and equally innocent - victims of forces beyond
35 Leonard Cohen and Alexander Moens, Learning the Lessons o f UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping
in the Former Y ugoslavia, Canadian Foreign P olicy 6, no. 2 (1999): 85-101.
36 Karl Mueller, The D em ise o f Yugoslavia And The Destruction O f Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects,
And Responses, in D eliberate Force: A Case Study In Effective A ir Campaigning, ed. Robert Owen.
(Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2000), 1-37.
134
their control. If that were the case, then the proper role of an intervention was that of
37
neutral mediator. American leaders were quicker to view the Serbs as aggressors in
the region. The dominant American view was that the Yugoslav conflict was the result of
political manipulation by Serbian leaders exploiting the situation for their own interests.
American leaders favored a peacemaking strategy aimed at compelling the Serbs to agree
to a political settlement. This normative difference in the perception of the causes of the
conflict contributed to the delay in NATOs action. As acknowledged earlier, Claude
notes that the practice of collective security requires states to achieve a consensus on the
nature of aggression, as well as a solution.38
NATOs political organizations eventually forged an incremental set of
agreements that helped the allies achieve a consensus oh both the nature and desired
resolution of the conflict. NATO first became involved in the conflict by agreeing to
enforce the existing UN-sponsored sanctions on Yugoslavia. In 1992, NATO leaders
agreed to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures,
peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council.39 Operation
Provide Promise was first authorized, consisting of thousands of flights by American,
German, and French air forces to bring humanitarian relief supplies to Sarajevo and
surrounding areas. A more intrusive effort to decrease the violence in the region was
undertaken by NATO and Western European Union (WEU) forces through Operation
37 Ibid, 462.
38 Inis Claude, The Balance o f Power R evisited, Review o f International Studies 15 (1989): 77-85.
39 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. Communique Issued B y The Ministerial M eeting O f The North
Atlantic Council, December 17, 1992, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm /49-95/c921217a.htm .
135
Sharp Guard. This effort consisted of joint naval patrols in the Adriatic Sea to enforce
the UN arms embargo against the former Yugoslav republics.40 However, as American
sympathies for the Bosnian Muslims grew, the United States began to limit its
participation in these patrols. The United States also began withholding needed aerial
reconnaissance and satellite intelligence for the operation while funding air drops of
weapons and military equipment to the Bosnian Army. The Clinton administration
became increasingly convinced of the advantages of a lift and strike strategy and
lobbied its NATO allies for support. This strategy called for a lifting of the United
Nations-imposed arms embargo in conjunction with the threat of NATO air strikes in the
event that either side failed to pursue negotiations.
Operational cooperation between UN and NATO forces began with the activation
of Operation Sky Watch to enforce a ban on military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina in
accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 781. This effort
was strengthened in 1993, when UNSCR 816 banned all unauthorized flights over
Bosnia-Herzegovina.41 Operation Deny Flight emerged and grew to include close air
support missions to protect UN personnel, as well as offensive air support to include the
targeting of air defenses, command and control sites, and weapons storage depots. Deny
Flight lasted for three years and marked NATOs first foray into combat with the
shooting down of four Bosnian-Serb aircraft violating the no-fly zone in February 1994.
40 A number o f states disregarded the U N embargo and routinely supplied arms to the combatants in the
region. States that were lax on controls included Albania, Macedonia, Italy, Greece, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Hungary. Because the most o f these violations o f the embargo were occurring over land, Operation
Sharp Guard was primarily a symbolic exercise.
41 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 816, March 31,
1993, http://daccessdds.un.org/docAJNDOC/GEN/N93/187/17/IM G/N9318717.pdf70penElem ent.
136
NATOs participation in the ground war soon followed in November 1994 with an
airstrike on Udbina airfield in Croatia.
Under Operation Deny Flight, a two-key system of control was established over
NATO forces. This arrangement required authorization from within both NATO and the
UN prior to any close air support or offensive strike missions. In practice, NATO
requests for strikes were commonly denied or limited by the UN. Owen relates a number
of incidents where the use of airpower was frustrated by this system of control.42
Bosnian Serbs took approximately 350 UN observers hostage in May 1995 in order to
pressure NATO into halting its close air support operations. Bosnian Serbs also shot
down an American F-16 over the no-fly zone in an effort to humiliate NATO and the UN.
In July, UN forces came under attack in the city of Srebrenica and requested close air
support. While NATO commanders authorized the strikes and readied the aircraft for
attack within minutes, UN officials did not provide their authorization for two days. UN
authorization came too late to prevent the fall of the city to Serbian forces. The
ineffectiveness of the current strategy was apparent by the continued presence of heavy
weapons in the UN-designated exclusion zone and Bosnian Serb offensives within UN
"safe areas". U. S. Secretary of Defense William Perry expressed American frustrated
with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stating Paralyzed into inaction, NATO
42 Robert Owen, ed. D eliberate Force: A Case Study In Effective A ir Campaigning (Montgomery, AL: Air
137
seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis.. . . It appeared to me that
NATO was in the process of unraveling.43
NATO allies finally consented to the more aggressive American strategy after the
fall of Srebrenica. Evidence of an apparent massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims
during and immediately after the assault on the city contributed to an increase in support
for a more comprehensive air campaign. NATO leaders issued an ultimatum to the
Bosnian Serbs to refrain from attacking Sarajevo or face an escalated military response.
A Serbian mortar attack on Sarajevos Markale marketplace in August 1995 killed 350
people and served as the trigger for Operation Deliberate Force (ODF). UN and NATO
officials authorized a series of airstrikes that lasted twenty-two days, interrupted by an
unnerving three-day pause in the bombing toward the beginning of the campaign. The
scale of the attack was much smaller than that of Desert Storm in Iraq a few years earlier.
Forty-eight targets were struck by 1,026 weapons - the equivalent of a single days
activity in Desert Storm 44 NATOs air campaign, combined with Muslim and Croat
territorial gains, pushed the Bosnian Serbs toward accepting a ceasefire and beginning
negotiations to end the fighting while retaining Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state. A
peace agreement was signed in Dayton, Ohio sixty days after the airstrikes had begun.
NATOs military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought with it the
responsibility for a long-term peacekeeping presence in the region. Implementation
Force (IFOR) and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) called for 60,000 and 30,000
43 Sean Kay, NATO an d the Future o f European Security. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc,
1998) 80.
44 Owen, D eliberate Force, 485.
138
troops respectively to serve in Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR, also known as Operation
Joint Endeavor, was characterized by NATO officials as NATOs first ever ground force
operation, its first-ever deployment out-of-area, and its first ever joint operation with
NATOs Partnership for Peace partners and other non-NATO countries.45 Both IFOR
and SFOR were primarily organized to prevent another outbreak of factional fighting,
although the troops assigned to these operations also helped organize elections, rebuild
infrastructure and conduct de-mining activities 46 The presence of NATO troops in
Bosnia-Herzegovina contributed to more stable conditions within the state, enabling free
and fair elections to be held in 1996.
NATOs experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the allies with an
opportunity to demonstrate the validity of collective security and raise NATOs profile as
the primary forum for transatlantic security. NATOs eventual willingness to put an end
to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicated the growing support for a collective
security regime among Alliance members. The Alliance had unanimously agreed to
undertake its first out-of-area mission and the resulting commitment to collective security
went a long way toward addressing speculation that the Alliance was no longer relevant
to European security. The division and inaction plaguing the Alliance during the first
few years of the crisis had been replaced by a shared commitment to restore peace to the
45 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Basic Fact Sheet: N ATO s Role In Bringing P eace To
The Former Yugoslavia, March 1997 (Brussels: NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, 1997).
46 Fourteen Partnership for Peace countries participated in IFOR (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine)
along with four additional states (Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco). Four more countries (Argentina,
Ireland, Slovakia and Slovenia) also joined SFOR, bringing the total o f non-NATO participating countries
to twenty-two.
139
region. However, while factional violence was suppressed in this part of the region, there
was little these forces could do about the increasingly violent confrontations between
Serbians and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
Some of the unease expressed in the early 1990s regarding the practice of
collective security returned, albeit in a lesser form, when hostilities broke out in Kosovo.
Kosovo had lost much of its autonomy in 1989 when President Milosevic had first
attempted to establish a Greater Serbia out of the republics of the former Yugoslavia.
Kosovar Albanians, which made up the majority of the population, resisted Serbian
efforts to exercise greater control over Kosovo. By mid-1998, the Yugoslav Army and
Serbian paramilitaries had begun an ethic cleansing campaign targeting Kosovar
Albanians, resulting in thousands of deaths and some 400,000 refugees. This resurgence
of violence would once again test of the Alliances commitment to collective security.
Whereas it took more than three years for the NAC to reach a decision regarding
NATOs intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO leaders were able to make the
decision to intervene to sin Kosovo much more quickly. However, the conduct of the
campaign was fraught with difficulties and marked by numerous disagreements among
the Allies.
The UN had deployed international observers to Kosovo, but the Security Council
remained divided over the resumption of sanctions or an explicit authorization of force
against Serbia. UNSCRs 1160 (March 1998), 1199 (September 1998) and 1203 (October
1998) uniformly condemned the violence in Kosovo and urged participation in an OSCE
Verification Mission, but fell short of explicitly authorizing the use of force to restore
140
peace and security in the region.47 French and German officials felt UN authorization
was a necessary prerequisite to NATOs use of force, while some other European
policymakers were opposed to the idea of threatening to use force at all. A divide had
formed among advocates of a military intervention, which included American strategists,
and those favoring continued diplomacy.
However, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated further, the NAC was able to
build a consensus in favor of the more aggressive strategy of military intervention. The
emerging consensus once again demonstrated the value of NATOs norms, rules, and
procedures. The political and military committees were able to investigate topics of
interest to member governments and provide detailed contingency plans for their
consideration. Member states were able to express their concerns privately and negotiate
a compromise without extensive public debate. The practice of consensus avoided the
formal casting of votes within the NAC, so member states would not be publicly
portrayed as winning or losing on a particular issue. Participants in the process,
including General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during Operation
Allied Force (OAF), viewed these rules and procedures as an essential means of enabling
government leaders to balance national interests with those of NATO as a whole. During
OAF, General Clark found that the NAC served as a shock absorber, enabling ministers
47 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, March 31,
1998, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G EN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf70penElem ent.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, September 1 2 ,1 9 9 8 , http://daccessdds.un.org/
doc/U NDOC/GEN/N98/090/2279/96/PDF/N9827996.pdf?OpenElem ent. United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1203, October 24, 1998, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/
321/21 /P D F /N 9832121 .pdf?OpenElement.
141
to express publicly their reservations about a particular target or activity, but then
privately accept the allied consensus to move ahead with the campaign.48
Rather than postponing any threat of military force until after UN authorization,
NATO allies decided to begin planning for the use of military force in Kosovo and issued
an activation order to assemble forces for airstrikes in the fall of 1998. Continued
Russian obstruction within the Security Council led to a decision by the NAC in
November 1998 to discontinue any reliance on UN authorization as a condition for
military action. NATO leaders also rejected a proposal to act under a mandate from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Given the shortcomings
of the dual-key system of command and control in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these leaders
favored a single chain of command. While UN or OSCE support was desirable, the
collective will of NATOs nineteen member states was considered sufficient political
legitimacy for whatever military action the Alliance might wish to take to restore peace in
Kosovo.
With the implied threat of a pending NATO military intervention, a Contact
Group consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia
continued to negotiate with both Serbian and Kosovar Albanian representatives through
March 1999. The talks ended when the Kosovar Albanian representatives signed a peace
accord that was subsequently rejected by the Serbians. Serbian military and police
forces immediately began a new offensive against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, which
finally triggered NATO airstrikes. According to NATO estimates, by the beginning of
48 W esley Clark, Waging M odem War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 429.
142
April 1999 an estimated 1.5 million people (equivalent to 90 percent of the population of
Kosovo) had been expelled from their homes and driven into Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Albania and other European countries.49
OAF was conducted as a combined military campaign, but followed an
operational plan primarily laid out by American personnel serving on the SHAPE and
EUCOM staffs. American planners identified virtually all the targets and kept specific
target information out of the hands of other NATO personnel. The NAC was initially
given target categories rather than exact targets because of fear of leaks. U.S. Navy Vice
Admiral Murphy later recalled, The target lists were not made available to NATO until
the day of planning required . . . master-target files was [sic] retained in U.S.-only
channels and then shared with selected allies, as necessary for consultation. But this was
a reflection of the very real concern that all the senior commanders had, that we didnt
have an airtight security system within some areas of the NATO operation.50 This
concern was justified early in the campaign after evidence was uncovered that key
portions of the NATO operations plan were being leaked to Serbian officials. A U.S.
Department of Defense spokesman acknowledged the leaks, characterizing them as one
of the costs of coalition warfare.51
49 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Handbook.
50 U.S. House o f Representatives, V ice Admiral Daniel Murphy Testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee, Military Readiness Subcommittee, October 26, 1999, http://www.house.gov/hasc/testim ony/
106thcongress/99-10-26murphy.htm.
51 Roberto Suro and Thomas Ricks, Pentagon A cknow ledges K osovo Air War Data Leaked, The
Washington Post, March 10, 2000.
143
The air campaign was divided into three increasingly destructive phases, with the
NAC exercising the authority to move from one phase to the next. The first phase
consisted of fielded military forces, while the second phase added dual-use infrastructure
such as bridges and petroleum depots, and the third phase attacked Serbian government
facilities throughout the country. General Clark observed, fundamental differences
within the Alliance on the nature of the campaign. The U. S. was increasingly committed
to the idea of strategic strikes, going after the heart of Milosevics power. The European,
or at least the French and a few others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to
Kosovo, trying to hit the ground forces, and avoiding actions that might antagonize or
damage Serbia further.52 This led to problems expanding the target list, particularly the
authorization to attack Phase Three targets.
Among the reasons given for the extended duration of OAF are the stringent rules
of engagement put in place to address the political sensitivities of NATO member states.
Many compromises were necessary to maintain a consensus during the campaign.
NATOs political committee and military committee ultimately determined the scope of
these campaigns and exercised control over even many tactical decisions. NATO
procedures allowed individual countries to place limitations on how their forces were to
be used and to exercise veto authority over crucial aspects of the campaign. These
procedures prevented tasked the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from
attacking some targets that he felt were necessary to his campaign strategy, lengthening
the duration of the war in Kosovo and making a successful outcome less than certain in
52 Clark, Waging M odern War, 237.
144
the minds of many participants. Cordesman reports that France and several other NATO
countries put political limits on the number and nature of sorties flown early in the war,
and . . . political constraints on targeting played a major role in limiting the impact of air
strikes in creating the kind of shock and compellance that might have led to an earlier
resolution of the war.53 In congressional testimony shortly after the war, General Short
noted that French restrictions interfered with his ability to strike important strategic
targets in Belgrade and increased the danger to aircrews by preventing strikes against
surface-to-air missile sites and interceptor aircraft stationed in Montenegro.54 Senior
American commanders acknowledged the tension between military and political
consideration stating, As commanders, of course, we would have wanted to conduct a
more rapid, overwhelming campaign with more strike power. Our desire to do so,
however, had to be balanced with the need to maintain Alliance cohesion and unity. The
loss of unity would have ended the campaign.55
President Milosevics determination to hold out against Alliance military pressure
made Operation Allied Force a demanding test of NATOs commitment to collective
security. While ODF had lasted only 22 days, the Kosovo air campaign passed that
milestone with a worsening humanitarian situation on the ground and little indication that
the Serbians were ready to yield. The extended duration of the 77-day long air campaign
53 Andrew Cordesman, The Lessons an d Non-Lessons o f The A ir A nd M issile Cam paign In Kosovo
(Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, 2001), 10.
54 U.S. Senate, Combined Prepared Statement o f General W esley Clark, Admiral Janes Ellis, Jr., and
Lieutenant General M ichael Short, o f the United States European Command Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, October 21, 1999, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/1999/991021wc.pdf.
55 Ibid.
145
put a great deal of strain on relations among NATO member states. Eventually, as
NATO aircraft struck more Phase Two and Phase Three targets, it eventually became
more difficult for the Serbians to effectively employ their military forces. With
discussions among Alliance leaders favoring the imminent conduct of a ground offensive,
Russias former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari
(also acting as a representative of the EU) negotiated an agreement with Milosevic to
begin withdraw his forces. The withdrawal of JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces gave
NATO adequate justification to stop the bombing, bringing OAF to an uneasy end in
June 1999.
NATO leaders agreed to organize a peacekeeping force to oversee the Military
Technical Agreement laid out in the ceasefire, just as they had done following ODF.
Kosovo Force (KFOR) eventually consisted of approximately 50,000 troops, the vast
majority provided by European NATO member states. A total of 39 states contributed
forces to provide security within Kosovo, allowing the eventual return of refugees and the
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Over the next several years,
KFOR contributed to the extensive political and economic reform in Kosovo. NATO
personnel participated in efforts to restore agricultural production, reform education,
rebuild hospitals, homes, roads and related infrastructure. KFOR even supported the
creation of an independent media and the reform of political parties and the judiciary.
With increasing evidence of KFORs contributions to restoring peace in the region,
NATO could once again claim a central role in transatlantic security. Flowever, it
remained clear that NATO was not yet able to consistently practice collective security in
a manner that suited all its members. While NATOs intervention in Kosovo obtained its
146
primary objectives, the numerous difficulties encountered along the way demonstrated
the need for further reform.
The Growing Capabilities Gap
Technological superiority over the Soviet Union and it Warsaw Pact allies had
long been a priority for NATO militaries during the Cold War, and technological
advances in warfare continued to remain an important as the Alliance adapted to the post-
Cold War security environment. John Colston, then NATOs Assistant Secretary General
for Defense Policy and Planning, recently remarked The decade or so following the
Cold War saw NATO embrace the goal of expanding security and stability across more
of the Euro-Atlantic area by means of partnership, cooperation and ultimately, in some
cases, enlargement.. .as the Alliance became engaged in a number of crisis-response
operations further and further afield, the very nature of the military forces which Alliance
operations required changed fundamentally.56 Achieving a consensus for collective
military action among NATO member states often required military planners to assure
limited casualties among combatants along with an avoidance of unnecessary collateral
damage that would impact civilians. Advantages in targeting and precision attack
increased the likelihood that NATO forces could fulfill the objectives of a mission under
conditions acceptable its members.
NATO states struggled to remain technologically advanced in a demanding fiscal
environment. In the aftermath of the Cold War, most states reduced their defense
expenditures in an effort to gain a peace-dividend which would allow them to reduce
56 John Colston, Marrying Capabilities to Commitments, NATO R eview 52, no. 2 (Summer 2004)
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue2/english/military.html.
147
their overall spending or increase spending in other areas. The military capabilities of
most European NATO member states exceeded those of other states in the region, which
meant there was little cause to increase defense spending based on the need for territorial
defense. These states did not feel a pressing need to improve their military capabilities,
particularly if it came at the expense of ongoing economic and social reforms. High rates
of defense spending were also discouraged among EU member states attempting to meet
the demanding economic criteria imposed by their efforts to create a single European
currency. All NATO member states, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, made
large cuts in defense spending in the early 1990s. An EU Study found that the eight
nations of Europe that represent eighty percent of the EUs Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) reduced their defense budgets from an average of 3.2 percent of GDP to 1.9
percent during a ten-year period from 1985 to 1995.57 Defense spending in the United
States declined from a high of 5.4 percent of GDP to stabilize around 3 percent of GDP
58
by 2001. Even with these reductions, the United States was spending 85 percent more
each year on defense than rest of its NATO allies combined.59
Defense spending reductions constrained the ability of European NATO member
states to develop new weapon systems or effectively employ existing troops and
equipment in high-intensity combat operations. In order to avoid the domestic political
consequences of sharp troop reductions, the majority of spending cuts affecting European
57 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, Eurostat Statistics in Focus, Econom y and Finance, no.
4298, June 1998, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/4298.
58 Walter Boyne, O peration Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why (N ew York:
Forge Books, 2003), 62.
59 Edgar Buckley, Attainable Targets, NATO R eview 50, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 6.
148
militaries targeted their procurement budgets. While the United States reduced defense
expenditures in the early 1990s, it also shed manpower. By 2001, the United States
military had half as many troops as the rest of its NATO allies combined, which allowed
the United States to significantly outspend its allies significantly in the areas of
modernization and procurement.60 At this time, United States was spending about $35
billion each year on new weapons systems and on research and development, while the
rest of NATO spent only around $9 billion.61 In fact, the portion of the United States
defense budget allocated for military R&D exceeded the entire defense budget of nearly
all its NATO allies.
While significant differences in capability existed among European member
states, the greatest contrast could be found by comparing the military capabilities of the
United States with its European allies. The United States emerged from the Cold War
with professional military forces well-suited for power projection. In contrast,
conscription remained in place throughout much of Europe, introducing both legal and
practical obstacles to the deployment of their military forces. The demonstrated
effectiveness of the United States military forces led to a belief that American military
power could be applied to a greater number of foreign policy problems. The number of
foreign operations conducted by American military forces grew rapidly from 19 military
60 Ibid.
61 Tom Lansford, A B itter H arvest: U.S. Foreign P olicy and Afghanistan (Burlington, V T : Ashgate, 2003),
100.
149
deployments abroad in the 1980s to 108 such deployments in the 1990s.62 Great Britain
and France came closest to approaching the power projection capabilities of the United
States, but even they were not sufficiently equipped to respond to crises outside of
Europe without assistance from the United States. One analyst estimated the combined
assets of all European NATO militaries suited to the role of mobile defense to be
equivalent to only ten percent of that available to the United States military.63
A capabilities gap between the armed forces of the United States and its NATO
allies manifested itself in a number of ways. Despite a large surplus of manpower in
comparison with American forces, few European troops were sufficiently trained or
equipped available for rapid and sustained deployment. A recent comparative study
estimated that while the European members of NATO would have difficulty rapidly
deploying more than six percent of their military personnel abroad for a one year period,
the United States military can deploy more than sixty percent of its ground forces under
the same circumstances.64 In regard to airpower, European air forces emphasized tactical
rather than independent strategic air operations. European militaries also lacked the
requisite sealift and airlift assets to assure a rapid and sustained deployment out-of-area.
European air forces had little strategic airlift capability and relied on the United States or
other foreign countries to provide long-range air transport. European navies were
63 British American Security Information Council, European Defense: N ot more Tanks, More Cops:
BASIC Study, Novem ber 1999. http://www.basicint.org/europe/ESDP/1199-not_more_tanks.htm.
64 M ichael O Hanlon, Expanding G lobal M ilitary C apacity f o r Humanitarian Intervention (Washington

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 56.
150
similarly lacking the necessary air defense capabilities for open ocean operations, having
been equipped to operate close to their own borders and within the cover of their land-
based air and ground forces.
The readiness of European forces to operate alongside those of the United States
began to be called into question by the late 1990s. A 1998 Defense Science Board report
pointed out, U.S. and allied military commanders and other officials have expressed
concern that with the USAs unmatched ability to invest in next-generation m i l i tary
technologies, it runs the risk of outpacing NATO and other allies to the point where they
are incapable of operating effectively with U.S. forces on future battlefields.65 By
fielding forces that could not be efficiently coordinated and had different levels of self
protection capabilities, NATO commanders risked being able to accomplish their
objectives without unacceptably high risks of failure or fratricide. Stand-off attacks using
long-range aircraft and missiles became a preferred means of projecting American power
at relatively low risk. The capabilities gap meant that when compared to the American
military, the military forces of virtually all European Union member states lacked the
ability to launch devastating attacks from safer distances and therefore had to pay a
bigger price for launching any attack at all.66
Growing concerns over the readiness of NATO forces on the part of American
leaders prompted U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen to propose the creation of a
targeted improvement program during a November 1998 NATO conference. This
65 Bryan Bender, U.S. Worried by Coalition Technology-Gap, J a n es D efence Weekly (July 29, 1998):
8.
66 Robert Kagan, O f P aradise and Power: Am erica and Europe in the N ew W orld O rder (New York:
151
proposal resulted in the announcement of NATOs Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
the following year. According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, DCI was
mostly about transport and logistics, about getting forces to the area of operation and
keeping them fed and equipped.67 DCI reemphasized that all NATO military forces
needed to be interoperable, deployable, and sustainable, and listed fifty-eight specific
projects intended to improve NATOs effectiveness. These projects were organized into
five capability areas: mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement,
survivability, and interoperable communications. Some of these projects included
standoff detection of chemical and biological weapons, airborne ground surveillance, day
and night all weather air weapon systems, interoperability through increases in
standardization, and enhanced capabilities against modem sea mines and torpedoes.68 A
High Level Steering Group was formed within NATO to oversee DCI for a period of two
years. This group was made up of senior officials from each member state and chaired
by the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. The Steering group was tasked to review
progress and provide guidance to each of the projects under their purview.
While DCI could attest to yielding some capability improvements, the overall
result of the program was disappointing. Among the criticisms of DCI, the program was
said to have suffered from ambiguity over targets and individual national
contributions.69 Other critics simply viewed it as an attempt by the United States to
67 U.S. Department o f State, Secretary o f State Strobe Talbott Presentation to the Royal Institute o f
International Affairs in London, October 7, 1999, , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department o f State, 1999).
69 James Appathurai, Closing the Capabilities Gap, NATO R eview 50 no. 3 (Fall 2002): 4.
152
convince its European allies to terminate domestic weapons systems program and
purchase American equipment and munitions. By the summer of 2001, the Steering
Group reported that Alliance members were spending only half of what was needed to
meet the existing force goals. NATOs Secretary General admonished those
governments that failed to follow through on the commitments of DCI, stating for the
Europeans there is a clear message.. .if a crisis comes along, the capability will not be
there.70
NATO operations in the Balkans provided clear evidence that combined military
operations also left much to be desired in the minds of many military leaders. In the
months following OAF, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen and General Shelton, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called on NATO leaders to overcome glaring
weaknesses in command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.71 Many
European aircraft were operating with insecure communications systems or systems that
were incompatible with those of the U.S. military. Gen. John Jumper, then Commander
in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe testified to the House Armed Services Committee that
these shortcomings jeopardized operational security throughout OAF. General Jumper
relayed incidents of target and aircraft position data being intercepted by Serb
commanders who were able to monitor NATO communications and adjusted their plans
70 Michael Gordon, Armies o f Europe Failing to M eet Goals, Sapping N A TO , The N ew York Times, June
7, 2001.
71 U.S. Department o f Defense, Transcript: Cohen and Shelton N ew s Conference at NATO M inisters
Conference, September 22, 1999, http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/defence/archive/
1999/september/dd 1927.htm.
153
72
accordingly. European air forces were of limited use to campaign planners since few of
their aircraft could fly at night or in bad weather. Some night-capable aircraft, such as
Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16s, lacked the more accurate munitions needed for
sensitive targets.73
The troubling lessons of Kosovo were noted on both sides of the Atlantic. In a
fall 1999 address to The British Royal Institute of International Affairs, U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott pointed out the growing dissatisfaction with combined
operations, stating Many Americans are saying never again should the United States
have to fly the lions share of the risky missions in a NATO operation and foot by far the
largest bill.74 General Naumann, then Chairman of NATOs Military Committee,
testified to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, As a European, I am ashamed
we have to ask for American help to deal with something as small as Kosovo.75 Despite
a general recognition of the problem, there was little expectation that European
governments would commit sufficient resources to close the capabilities gap. A German
defense analyst commented soon after OAF, The situation would be hilarious if it
werent so tragic.. .We come out of the Washington and Cologne NATO and [EU]
72 U.S. House o f Representatives, Military Readiness Subcommittee Hearing on the Readiness Impact o f
Operations in Kosovo: Problems Encountered, Lessons Learned, and Reconstitution, October 26, 1999
http://www.house.gov/hasc/testim ony/106thcongress/99-10-26jum per.htm .
73 John Peters, et al., European Contributions to O peration A llied Force: Im plications f o r Transatlantic
Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: R A ND , 2001), 73.
74 Nicola Butler, NATO Ministers Fudge the Essentials, D isarm am ent D iplom acy 42 (December 1999).
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd42/42nato.htm.
75 U.S. Senate. United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Testimony on the Lessons Learned
from the Military Operations Conducted as Part o f Operation Allied Force, and Associated R elief
Operations, with Respect to Kosovo. Novem ber 3, 1999, http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/
c991103.htm.
154
meetings with strong statements of how Europe has learned its lesson from Kosovo, but
7 ft
the defense budget shows that we havent learned a thing.
Growing concerns over interoperability and burden sharing were also prevalent
among American representatives. While all NATO member states expressed political
solidarity through their concurrence with the decision to initiate OAF, only thirteen states
participated in the air campaign itself. Many European air forces made important
contributions, to include numerous strike missions by British and French aircrews and the
considerable role played by German and Italian aircrews in the Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses (SEAD). However, the limited availability and capability of European
aircraft meant that American aircrews once again dominated the overall conduct of this
operation. Air refueling missions, electronic warfare missions, and the most demanding
precision attack sorties were reserved for American aircrews. The United States provided
more than seventy percent of the aircraft and munitions utilized during the war. The
American militarys central role in the air campaign resulted in the United States paying
more toward the cost of the operation that all of its NATO allies combined. The United
States eventually paid sixty percent of the $5 billion air campaign along with an
anticipated annual cost of $3.5 billion to maintain 7,000 troops in Kosovo to participate
77
in KFOR. The high cost to the United States led some American policymakers to
renew questions about whether the benefits of multilateral operations outweighed their
cost and complexity. American lessons regarding the conduct of OAF included the need
76 Douglas Barrie and Jack Hoschouer, Bundeswehrs Unclear R ole Underlies Budget Conflicts, Defense
N ew s, August 9, 1999.
77 Tom Lansford. A ll For One: Terrorism, NATO an d the United States ( Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002),
50.
155
to improve the regimes organizational rules and procedures for conducting such a
campaign. General Clark observed a general agreement with one NATO defense
ministers suggestion that the fundamental lesson was of OAF was that we never want to
do this again.78 The tensions over Kosovo had stressed relations among member states
as well as its regional partners, including Russia. The unease evident throughout the
campaign led NATO leaders to propose another strategic review to clarify the Alliances
commitment to collective security.
The 1999 rewrite of NATOs Security Concept emphasized the need for the
Alliance to continue pursue the capabilities needed to permit the Alliance to extend its
commitment to collective security. Secretary General Solana emphasized NATOs
commitment to both collective defense and collective security in a speech during the
1999 Rome Summit, "This adaptation will keep NATO strong and able to function as a
coherent politico-military Alliance in a very different security environment. NATOs
internal adaptation will allow us to provide for our collective defense and contribute to
7Q
collective security. The 1999 Security Concept found that Alliance members shared a
common interest in regional security which was threatened by the appearance of
complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic
conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of
78 Clark, Waging M odern War, 417.
79 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO: Its 50th Anniversary -The W ashington Summit - The
Next Century, January 25, 1999, http://www.Nato.Int/Docu/Speech/1999/S990125a.htm .
156
weapons of mass destruction.80 In order to counter these risks, the 1999 Security
Concept called for NATO to adopt non-Article Five operations such as crisis
management and crisis response operations as core missions.
The revised Security Concept recognized that the Alliances emphasis on crisis
management would require the development of new capabilities and continued
organizational reform. NATO leaders called for member states to strive to develop
capabilities that would give the Alliance the ability to build-up larger, adequately
equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfill the full range
01
of Alliance missions. The anticipated increase in out-of-area missions would require
the allies to support the organization of rapid reaction forces and to increase their
combined power projection capabilities. These reforms fueled expectations among some
observers that the Alliance would soon be better prepared to cope with the challenges of a
new century, while more pessimistic views recognized this as simply another case of
political rhetoric exceeding the real commitment of member states to alter the status quo.
The European Union as a Rival Security Regime
NATO and the EC coexisted with relative ease during the Cold War due to their
clear division of responsibilities. NATO provided a link with American military power
in an effort to counter the threat of a Soviet invasion, while the EC helped its members
become more prosperous through economic integration. Uncertainties regarding the
continued American commitment to European security and the broadening of the EUs
80 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, http://www.Nato.int/Docu/
Pr/1999/P99-065e.htm.
81 Ibid.
157
mandate into new issue areas challenged the historical roles of both regimes. As Norman
Ray, NATOs Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, would later observe As
the European allies seek to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the
old division of labor - where NATO took care of European security while the European
institutions focused mainly on economic integration - no longer reflects transatlantic
realities.82 As European integration progressed during the 1990s, American and
European leaders struggled to form new expectations for both regimes.
The 1991 Maastrich Treaty officially established the European Union , with
existing progress toward economic integration representing one pillar in the process of
bringing about closer relations between member states. The economic pillar was
strengthened with additional agreements bringing the EU closer to establishing a single
currency. A second pillar emerging from the treaty was termed Justice and Home Affairs
and consisted of consisting of efforts to standardize policies on social issues such as
asylum, immigration, drugs and terrorism. The third and final pillar designated the WEU
as the defense component of the EU and formalized the goal of establishing a Common
Foreign and Security Policy. The text of the treaty stated that this common policy shall
include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing
of a coirimon defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.83
Advocates of CFSP saw the need to increase coordination in foreign policy areas and
reduce Europes dependence on the United States in security matters. Little consensus
82 Norman Ray, Security Cooperation and the N ew N A TO , 13.
83 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, Treaty on European Union, http://europa.eu.int/en/

record/mt/top.html.
158
existed among Europeans beyond voicing the inevitable necessity for greater cooperation
on security matters in the future. Europeans were divided among alternate visions of
pursuing a military capability fully independent of NATO, as French leaders had long
desired, or more moderate British and German proposals to pursue a European Security
and Defense Identity within NATO.
A common rationale for ESDI emphasized the necessity of an alternative security
structure in the event that the United States chose not to honor its commitment to defend
Europe. One scholar notes, The European countries, led by France, demanded a
capacity for European action because they feared abandonment by America and therefore
they needed an alternative.84 The United States maintained security commitments
around the globe and could be expected to shift its focus away from Europe as NATOs
victory over the Soviet Union became more certain. European concerns of abandonment
by its North American allies were heightened when Canada announced in February 1992
that it would withdraw its standing forces from Europe. Public debate within the United
States over the cost of stationing American troops in Europe added to the unease of many
Europeans. Despite these concerns, German leaders advocated a cautious approach to
ESDI that would allow EU members to search for greater convergence or identity of
interests while not changing the basic political and military structure of the [NATO]
alliance.85 This position was consistent with the commitments made in NATOs 1991
84 Hanns Maull, Strategic Outlook: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities, in NATO and C ollective
Security, ed. Michael Brenner (N ew York: St. Martins Press, 1998), 235.
85 Peter Schmidt, ESDI: A German A nalysis, in Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, ed. Charles
Barry (Washington, DC: National D efense University Press, 1996), 37.
159
Security Concept to maintain NATO as the essential forum for consultation among the
allies despite the growing contribution of other regimes such as the EU and CSCE.86
An improvement in relations among large European states and the emergence of a
European identity had a number of practical defense implications. France had been
particularly willing to adopt an integrated European approach toward security and
actively promoted the organization of a robust, independent European military force.
France kept its distance from NATO and other cooperative security arrangements during
the Cold War in order to preserve its ability to look after its own security and its interest
in its former colonies. French leaders felt the need for changes in their security policies
following the end of the Cold War, changing their perception of vital interests from
national defense to European defense. One scholar characterized the transformation of
French security and defense policies since the end of the Cold War as so radical that one
can assimilate it to a shift in nation-state identity meaning the Europeanization of French

87
exceptionalism. French reforms included the professionalization of its military forces,
a new emphasis on conventional forces over nuclear forces, and the increased
deployment of forces within Europe rather than in post-colonial Africa. Changes in
doctrine and arms procurement were also made to favor multinational programs. This
reversal from French policies of national independence toward greater military
cooperation among EU member states would aid the efforts to establish a CFSP.
86 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The A lliances Security Concept Agreed by the Heads o f State
and Governments Participating in the M eeting o f the North Atlantic Council, Novem ber 8, 1991,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a,htm.
87 Bastien Irondelle, Europeanization without the European Union? French military reforms 1991-96,
Journal o f European Public Policy 10, no 2 (April 2003): 219.
160
The EUs 1992 Petersberg Declaration stated that WEU forces would continue to
be allocated to the collective defense of NATO while developing a capability to conduct
independent operations. EU member states agreed Military units of WEU member
states acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue
tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking.88 American suspicions regarding EU initiatives have at times run counter
to European efforts to develop new capabilities. As one pair of scholars point out,
Washington has consistently urged its European allies to do more. But it has just as
consistently warned them not to do so in ways that challenged NATO or in any other way
weakened Alliance unity.89 American leaders were initially critical of attempts by EU
member states to form multinational forces to engage in the tasks identified in the
Petersberg Declaration without U.S. participation. The Franco-German Eurocorps was
established in May 1992, with the assurance by both French and German officials that the
corps would complement rather than duplicate NATO units. As a concession to
American concerns, Germany and France agreed in December 1992 to place the
Eurocorps under NATO command in the event of a crisis.
The United States supported ESDI as a means of increasing the military
capabilities of NATO member states, but emphasized the necessity of pursuing European
military reform within NATO. President Clinton and his senior advisors promoted the
concept of separable but not separate European capabilities and successfully gained the
88 Western European Union, Petersberg Declaration, June 19, 1992, http://www.weu.int/documents/

920619peten.pdf.
89 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First, Survival 43, no. 1 (2001): 79.
161
endorsement of this approach to an ESDI among its European allies at a 1994 NATO
summit.90 U.S. State Department officials emphasized NATOs primacy, making it clear
that the United States would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within
NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that
would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates but that could eventually compete with
NATO.91
NATOs experience in ODF also affected the course of ESDI. The size and
advanced technology of American military forces had made them essential to the conduct
of ODF. Most NATO militaries had difficulty sustaining combat forces outside of their
own borders. In contrast, American military forces were almost exclusively depended
upon to provide many of the high-technology capabilities required for such a campaign,
including air transport, satellite intelligence, and electronic jamming. American aircraft
flew two-thirds of all sorties during ODF, primarily because allied air forces lacked the
precision strike capabilities demanded by the campaign planners or were otherwise less
suited to the missions. While recognizing that ODF could not have been conducted
without American participation, European leaders did not want to give the United States
veto power over future operations. American reluctance to deploy ground troops to the
Balkans in advance of a peace agreement had made it more difficult for the Alliance to
act. European alliance members were willing to commit ground troops, but required
access to NATO assets for command and control of their forces. The Alliance needed the
90 Margarita Assenova, The D ebate on N A T O s Evolution: A R eport o f the CSIS Eastern Europe Project.
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), 28.
91 Stobe Talbott, Presentation to the Royal Institute o f International Affairs in London, October 7, 1999.
162
ability to support operations involving a subset of member states when universal
participation was unlikely. By creating an alternative means of employing forces, all
member states could share the benefits of having a particular threat brought under control
without having to deploy forces.
An important organizational reform toward the creation of this capability within
NATO was the organization of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The CJTF
concept was first proposed by U.S Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at a meeting of NATO
defense ministers in October 1993 and was endorsed by Alliance members at the Brussels
summit the following year. The CJTF concept addressed the organization and command
of multinational forces from multiple military services. These forces would be
generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not
involving the defense of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.
It provides a flexible and efficient means whereby the Alliance can generate rapidly
deployable forces with appropriate command and control arrangements.92 The existence
of CJTFs meant that neither the United States nor any other single state would have to
participate for such operations to take place, although all Alliance members would still
have to agree to initiate the mission.
The creation of CJTFs also addressed some of the challenges arising from an
increasing interest in ESDI among European leaders. American leaders were anxious to
support European efforts to develop more capable military forces, but opposed any plans
for CFSP that might decouple the United States from Europe, duplicate NATO structures
92 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Fact Sheet: The Com bined and Joint Task Force
Concept, August 8, 2000 (Brussels: NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, 2000).
163
and capabilities, or discriminate against NATO members not in the European Union or
WEU.93 The CJTF concept satisfied both American and European leaders by providing a
flexible framework for organizing military forces under circumstances that did not
necessarily involve the entire Alliance. Under the agreements formed at NATOs 1994
Brussels summit and 1996 Berlin summit, CJTFs could serve under the control of either
NATOs integrated military structure or the WEU, depending on which member states
chose to participate in an operation. In practice, NATO assets included logistics,
transport, and support functions that could be utilized for a range of military operations
involving any number of member states. CJTFs provided enhanced flexibility with
respect to the use of troops and resources, making it easier for Alliance members to agree
to conduct collective security operations in the future. CJTFs could be formed without
the participation of all NATO member states and would be open to the participation of
non-member states. As a result, CJTFs might take the form of a NATO-only CJTF
solely consisting of NATO member states, a NATO-plus CJTF augmented by forces
from non-member states, or even a NATO-plus-minus CJTF consisting of a subset of
NATO member states operating along side forces from non-member states.94
In contrast to ad-hoc coalitions, CJTFs would benefit from regular exercises held
among likely participants in advance of any operational deployment. These exercises
involved Alliance assets and allowed standardized procedures to be developed that could
be tailored to specific contingencies. CJTF procedures were developed in a number of
93 W illiam Drozdiak, U.S. Tepid on European D efense Plan: American Stance V exed EU Leaders The
Washington Post, March 7, 2000.
94 Charles Barry, N A T O s Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and. Practice, Survival 36, no. 3
(Spring 1996): 92-3.
164
exercises including Exercise Allied Effort in November 1997 and Exercise Strong
Resolve in March 1998. The experiences gained from these exercises as well as
operations in the Balkans resulted in the NACs decision in 1999 to bring CJTFs into
operation, a process that would continue to take several years to complete. CJTF staffs
were organized within NATO headquarters to serve as the nucleus for future operations.
Once operational, these headquarters nuclei join with augmentation modules and
support modules appropriate to a particular operation to form a CJTF headquarters
specifically structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question.95
A renewed debate over the division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU
followed the 1998 Saint-Malo summit between British Prime Minister Blair and French
President Chirac. A joint declaration from the summit emphasized the need to reconsider
the integration of the WEU and EU and establish an autonomous security role for the EU.
The following year, the European Council issued a statement that the Union must have
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises
without prejudice to actions by NATO.96 American leaders expressed concern that the
EU intended to conduct regional crisis management and peacekeeping operations
independently, limiting NATO to Article Five collective defense operations. After
extensive lobbying by American and British officials, the European Council brought their
position more in line with agreements formed at the Saint-Malo summit. Under this
96 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, P residency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June
3 -4 ,1 9 9 9 (Brussels: European Union, 1999).
165
approach, any autonomous capability for the EU would be exercised after consulting with
NATO, limiting the EU to take decisions and approve military action where the [NATO]
Alliance as a whole is not engaged.97
The overreliance on American planning and capabilities during OAF once again
energized efforts to establish an effective ESDI. The EU appointed former NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana to be the High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy in 1999. Solana soon began establishing the requirements for an all-
European military force and announced his goals for such a force in the months following
OAF. The Headline Goal for a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was to have
between 50,000 and 60,000 troops that could be deployable within sixty days and
sustainable for a year. Observers soon pointed out that EU member states needed to
prepare a force of 200,000 troops to allow for rotation and with EU defense budgets
declining, and were doubtful that the goal could be reached.98 The size of the force
fueled American concerns regarding the impact on military forces allocated to future
NATO contingencies. British and German officials attempted to reassure the United
States by clarifying that they regarded the ERRF to be an as an adjunct to NATO, to be
used when NATO chose not to be involved in an operation rather than an independent
European Army.
The EUs 1999 Helsinki conference resulted in further initiatives to provide the
EU with access to a more credible military force. EU leaders agreed at this conference to
97 Embassy o f France to United States, Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence,
Saint-Malo, December 4, 1998, http://www.info-france.org/news/statmnts/pr/stmalo.htm.
98 Assenova, The D ebate on N ATO s Evolution, 30.
166
establish a number of committees and related organizations to serve as the necessary
infrastructure for the organization and deployment of military forces for EU-led
operations. Contemporary observers noted, Unlike NATO, the WEU has no peacetime
supreme commander, no peacetime military headquarters, and no standing command and
control structure. Without infrastructure, training, and major exercises, the WEU has no
capability to project power or promote stability in the event of a crisis threatening its
member states.99 In an effort to avoid the duplication of capabilities, NATO leaders
once again agreed to give EU member states access to NATO assets as well as the
further adaptation of NATOs defense planning system to incorporate more
comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.100 These agreements
allowed the EU to create new political and military bodies, including a Political and
Security Committee, a Military Committee composed of national defense chiefs, assisted
by a Military Staff with various functional experts.
By the fall of 2001, EU High Representative Javier Solanas increasing
diplomatic profile in the Balkans and the increasing competence of EU security
committees justified including the EU in an extension of NATOs peacekeeping
responsibilities into Macedonia. Operation Essential Harvest involved the deployment of
3,500 NATO troops to Macedonia for thirty days to collect weapons and monitor a
ceasefire between the Macedonian government and Albanian minorities. The EU
99 Kay, NATO and the Future o f European Security, 130.
100 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, W ashington Summit Communique: An A lliance for the 21s1
Century, April 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm.
167
provided economic incentives to promote compliance with the weapon collection efforts
and organized a follow-on policing mission following the end of the month-long weapons
collection effort. The partnership between the EU and NATO in Macedonia
demonstrated the growing role of the EU in regional security efforts and the first tangible
demonstration of Europes reduced dependence on the United States.
Regime Analysis: Post-Cold War NAT0
Many realist scholars were initially skeptical about NATO retaining a central role
in European security after the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Waltz joined other realists in concluding that NATO must either disappear or be
reorganized around a new balance of power. In an essay shortly after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Waltz asks, How can an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy
opponent? concluding NATOs days are not numbered, but its years are.101
Mearsheimer also predicted a breakdown in the unity among NATO members following
the end of the Cold War. In a 1990 article he states, It is the Soviet threat that holds
NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to
abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may
102
disintegrate. He anticipated a weakening of American and Soviet influence in
Europe resulting in a multipolar Europe that is more prone to internal conflict. While
Americas engagement through NATO mitigated the effect of anarchy on Western
101 Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure o f International Politics Brown, in The P erils o f Anarchy:
Contem porary Realism and International Security, eds. M ichael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven
Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 73-4.
102 John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International
Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 49.
168
Democracies and facilitated cooperation among them, the decline of the Soviet power
could be expected to remove the incentive for continued cooperation.103
When confronted with NATOs continued existence later in the 1990s, realists
found that NATO persisted due of its role as a vehicle for American hegemony.
According to Waltz, NATOs persistence embodies Americas folly of continuing to
dominate the foreign and military policies of European states.104 American hegemonic
power therefore became the source of NATOs persistence rather than the cause of its
decline. The relative power of the United States grew following the collapse of Soviet
Union and substantial reductions in defense spending in Europe. Waltzs analysis reveals
that a changing balance of power resulted in undisputed American hegemony, and NATO
has become a vehicle for the promotion of American interests within Europe.
Mastanduno similarly characterizes NATOs persistence as a result of its compatibility
with American hegemony. He argues that the United States has followed a policy of
preserving NATO and the multilateral cooperation this entails, in part, because it wishes
to keep the potential regional powers of Germany and Russia, which it has engaged
through NATO programs, from challenging American preponderance.105
A second line of reasoning recognizes that the dissolution of the Soviet Union did
not ensure the reemergence of a Russian empire or signify the end of disagreements
among states in the region. Many realists emphasized the need to retain the Alliance as a
103 Ibid, 45.
104 Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, International Security 25 (Summer 2000): 12.
105 Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment, International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring
1997): 49-88.
169
hedge against a resurgence of Soviet power. There were considerable fears that the
collapse of the Soviet Union would not be any more peaceful than earlier periods of
imperial collapse, such as those that followed the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or
the Ottoman Empire. Prominent realists favoring continued American support for NATO
included Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and then U. S. Senate Foreign Relations
Chair Jesse Helms. Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe summarizes the views
of these NATO supporters, stating The course that we are seeking for Russia foresees an
optimistic outcome, and maintains an optimistic outlook. But we are not naive about
Russia, and we are acutely conscious of the dangers, of the hard lessons of history.. .An
integral part of our pragmatic partnership policy for Russia is that we continue to remain
strong, so we have a military hedge against whatever might come.106 These realists felt
that the United States should remain engaged in Europe through NATO in order to have
the best opportunity to assure a peaceful future for the region.
This perspective also values NATO as a hedge against a reversal of the dominant
pattern of peaceful relations among European states since the end of World War Two.
Kay sees a need to maintain NATO to enhance security by expanding the Alliance into
Central and Eastern Europe. NATO enlargement would consolidate the new status quo
after the Cold War by reassuring Germanys neighbors about its growing power and
increasing the Wests deterrence capacity against Russia.107 In this way, NATOs
persistence and expansion into new roles is once again viewed as consistent with the
106 U.S. Department o f Defense, Honorable Walter B. Slocom be, Under Secretary O f D efense For Policy
Remarks To The Atlantic Council On European Security Washington, D.C. June 14, 1996,
http://w w w .D od.M il/R eleases/1996/B062096_Bt371-96.htm l.
107 Kay, NATO an d the Future o f European Security, 6.
170
desire of American leaders to keep the United States at the center of a European security
dialogue.
This research provides substantial evidence supporting a power-based approach to
regime analysis in the actions of the United States as it sought to retain its influence over
European security affairs. Many practical examples of American leadership can be found
in the introduction of collective security tasks in the post-Cold War era. NATOs
Partnership for Peace program, its introduction of Combined Joint Task Forces, and the
Alliances approach to expansion were all largely guided by American diplomacy. Many
of these initiatives served the dual purposes of aiding NATOs transition into the practice
of collective security while preserving the Alliances mandate in light of further
European integration. The United States consistently strove to ensure NATOs primacy
as the EU increasingly expanded its role in European security. The renewed credibility
of the Alliance in the 1990s owes much to the commitment of American leaders to
remain engaged in Europe and encourage its allies to contribute to the collective
resolution of common security challenges.
The United States played a decisive role in planning and executing the Alliances
successful military interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The determined
leadership of the United States was of inestimable value during these interventions, in
many ways justifying U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albrights designation of the
United States as the indispensable power with unique capabilities and
171
1 f)8
responsibilities. American leadership enabled NATO to take a more active role in
bringing about an end to the fighting in the region. However, the a pattern of American
dominance in the conduct of military interventions was also emerging, and European
leaders increasingly came to view the United States as having an insufficient regard for
the interests and concerns of their NATO allies.
The dominant role of the United States was clear in NATOs first military
intervention in the Balkans. American reluctance to deploy ground troops to the Balkans
in advance of a peace agreement had initially made it more difficult for the Alliance to
act. Early efforts by NATO and the WEU to decrease the violence in the region through
the conduct of Operation Sharp Guard were unilaterally abandoned by United States. As
emphasized in Muellers research, American leaders held a contrasting view of the
conflict in Bosnia -Herzegovina that viewed the Bosnian Serbs as aggressors and argued
for a peacemaking strategy aimed at compelling the Serbs to agree to a political
settlement. This difference in the perception of the causes of the conflict contributed to a
delay in collective action until European allies eventually adopted the American
perspective. Once NATO agreed to an approach consistent with the preferences of the
United States, American diplomats played a leading role in negotiations with Serbian
leaders and American airpower provided the means to carry out an effective air
campaign. While recognizing that the military and diplomatic strength of the United
States made it easier for the Alliance to act in any manner, some participants concluded
108 Charles Kupchan, et al, P ow er in Transition: The Peaceful Change o f International Order (N ew York:
United Nations University Press, 2001), 94.
172
that during ODF NATO had been manipulated to allow the U.S. to conduct its own
unilateral policy in the Balkans.109
The pattern of American dominance in NATO operations was also apparent in the
conduct of OAF. The United States led a Contact Group joined by Great Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia continued to negotiate with both Serbian and Kosovar
Albanian representatives through the spring of 1999. Many European policymakers were
opposed to the idea of threatening to use force against the Serbian military, while French
and German officials felt force should only be used in conjunction with a UN mandate.
American diplomats advocated for a repeat of the airstrikes that had coerced Serbia into
earlier negotiations, and lobbied for the Alliance to act in spite of Russian obstruction
within the UN Security Council. OAF was conducted as a combined NATO military
campaign following an operational plan primarily laid out by American personnel serving
on the SHAPE and EUCOM staffs. American planners identified virtually all the targets
and limited access to target information. One observer notes a sharp distinction between
American and European lessons learned from OAF, finding Whereas many in Europe
saw the Kosovo air campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and
American generals, most Americans - particularly within the military saw just the
opposite: excessive European meddling with French politicians and European lawyers
interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and compromising operational
security.110 Senior American officers commanding operations in the Balkans had
109 BBC N ew s, A llies and Lies, June 22, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/audiovideo/programmes/

correspondent/1390536.stm
110 Philip Gordon, NATO After 11 September, Survival 42, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002): 97.
173
expressed a good deal of frustration with the oversight provided by the NAC. General
Shelton, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified to the Senate Armed
Services Committee soon after OAF, Working within the NATO alliance unduly
constrained U.S. military forces from getting the job done quickly and effectively.111 In
contrast, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine found that NATOs experience in OAF
confirmed the status of the United States as a hyperpower and made it all the more
necessary that a united Europe strive to constitute a factor of equilibrium.112 The
differences in these perspectives would have significant implications for the Alliances
attempts to extend the practice of collective security outside of Europe.
An organization-based approach to regime analysis offers its own rationale for
why regimes persist even after there are changes to the perceived threat or distribution of
power. International organizations are not static bodies, and have demonstrated the
ability to be more adept at accommodating change than many realists recognize. Duffield
credits the organizational characteristics of NATO with giving the Alliance a central role
in transatlantic security. He states, NATOs institutional character has probably
contributed to the Alliances persistence.. . . [these] supranational bodies and the
individuals who head them have almost certainly helped the Alliance to adapt to
changing external circumstances, by defining new tasks, identifying ways to achieve
111 U.S. Senate, Joint Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee by Secretary o f D efense W illiam S.
Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton on the K osovo After Action Review, Oct. 14, 1999 http://armed-
services.senate.gove/statem nt/1999/991014wc.pdf.
112 The A geing A lliance, The Econom ist (October 23, 1999): 10
174
them, forging compromises, and otherwise providing leadership.113 NATO provided
access to time-tested rules and procedures that allowed member states to gain access to
capabilities well-suited to emerging security challenges.
Organization-based approaches to regime analysis emphasize that regime change
can often be more easily accommodated by evolving current organizations rather creating
new ones. Neoliberal institutionalists point out that new organizations entail start up
costs and states have no way of recouping the sunk costs of existing organizations. Even
organizational shells have value, and can serve as a vehicle for regime change. As Betts
states, Shells are far from useless-they can maintain the base from which remobilization
and coordination can be accomplished in a shorter time than if they had to be
accomplished from scratch.114 In the case of NATO, McCalla observes, the allies
spent forty-five years learning how to work as a long-term coalition through a
sophisticated political and military structure...Developing new institutions or
consultative frameworks entails start-up costs; NATOs appeal is that these costs already
have been paid.115 The persistence of international organizations can be attributed to
the unwillingness of member states to give up the current and future benefits of regimes,
which may lead to the persistence of organizations whose initial utility has called into
question by changes in the international environment.
113 John Duffield, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Alliance Theory, in Explaining
International Relations since 1945, ed. Ngaire W oods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 343-345.
114 Richard Betts, Systems o f Peace as Causes o f War? C ollective Security, Arms Control, and the N ew
Europe, in Coping with Com plexity in the International System, eds. Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis.
(Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1993), 272.
115 Robert McCalla, NATO's Persistence After The Cold War, International O rganization 50, no. 3
(Summer 1996): 464 .
175
Institutionalists point out the numerous ways that NATO evolved to serve many
interrelated security functions beyond collective defense. McCalla notes, The wider the
range of functions that an alliance fulfills beyond its core defense function, the less
responsive it will be to changes in the threats it faces and the more likely it is to be
transformed in purpose as its external environment changes.116 NATOs internal
organizations created effective procedures that provided military, political, and economic
benefits to members while preserving their sovereignty. These procedures addressed
force planning and funding, along with operational considerations such as combined
command arrangements and integrated air and land defenses. They also resulted in
common equipment standards as well as compatible procedures for training and logistics.
Allied states arranged to share communication networks, command and administrative
facilities, as well as military equipment. These analysts argue that NATO organizations
provided unique contributions to regional security that the allies would be unwise to
abandon.
The rules and procedures of NATO organizations facilitated the practice of both
collective defense and collective security during this period. The NAC preserved internal
bodies promoting the security commitments among member while introducing new
initiatives intended to preserve strengthening ties to emerging democracies. The
consultation, planning and command functions associated with defending Western
Europe from a potential Soviet invasion made NATO valuable source for the preparation
and conduct of combined military operations. NATO succeeded in restoring peace to the
116 Ibid, 470.
176
Balkans after similar attempts by other international organizations failed. The Alliances
success in these endeavors was due to in great part to the contributions of legacy
organizational bodies that promoted consensus and effectively coordinated the activities
of member state military forces.
When compared to the European Union, NATO remained an intergovernmental
organization with little impact on the sovereignty of its member states. Disputes were
more commonly resolved among NATO member states than through the delegation of
authority to supranational bodies. As during the Cold War, procedures dictating
decision-making via consensus and weak enforcement measures prevented NATO
organizations from independently constraining member state behavior. NATO
nonetheless proved to be the most capable international security organization in the
region, influencing both member and nonmember states due to the effectiveness of
Alliances consultative bodies and the credibility of the Alliances mutual security
guarantee.
A norm-based approach to regime analysis suggests that presence of shared
values and a common identity among member states contributed to the ongoing
commitment of member states to the Alliance throughout this era. In the aftermath of the
Cold War, NATO faced speculation that it would not survive the disappearance of its
enemy. Harries concludes, The political West is not a natural construct but a highly
artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile East to bring it
into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now
177
survive the disappearance of that enemy.117 Without the Soviet threat, one key element
of identity was removed. However, the Alliance retained its unity due to a sincere
commitment to expanding the influence of shared values throughout the region. The
allies continued to associate NATO with shared interests and values that served as the
basis for continued cooperation. The peaceful emergence of democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe and the necessity of limiting ethnic conflict in the Balkans did not simply
affect European members of NATO, as all the allies had vested interests in the outcome.
NATOs efforts to respond to a changing international security environment are
consistent with constructivist portrayals of the ongoing co-constitution of identity and
interests. The changes in the transatlantic security environment prompted NATO to
expand its membership and adopt elements of a collective security regime. Central and
Eastern European states were welcomed into the Alliance as they demonstrated their
commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighboring states. NATO
organized and deployed military forces to bring an end to outbreaks of violence
threatening regional stability in accordance with evolving principles and norms.
NATOs status as a community of states sharing common values has been
emphasized by analysts favoring normative perspectives. Proponents of this view note
that NATO member governments are each guided by the principles of democracy, rule of
law and respect for human rights. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
identified the allies common desire to promote the expansion of desirable norms as one
key to the Alliances persistence, stating During the Cold War, military and geopolitical
117 Owen Harries, The Collapse o f the W est, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993): 47.
178
considerations mainly determined NATOs decisions. Promoting democracy within
NATO states and good relations among them was only complementary - desirable but
not the primary motive for bringing in new members. But today, with the end of the Cold
War, other, nonmilitary goals can and should help shape the new NATO.118 Gress even
goes so far as to claim that during the Cold War NATOs political and cultural
role...was more important than its military role.119
Koslowski and Kratochwil state that the events of 1989 transformed the
international system by changing the rules governing superpower conflict and, thereby,
the norms underpinning the international system.120 They depict the Cold War
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as a social structure between
two states identifying each other as enemies with conflicting national interests.
Gorbachevs policies of glasnost and perestroika effectively embraced norms more
consistent with those of NATO members and led to a change in Soviet identity.
According to Wendt, when these states stopped identifying each other as enemies, the
social structure changed and the Cold War ended.121 This change in identity affected the
entire international system, aiding the emergence of an anarchy of friends.
118 Strobe Talbott, Why NATO Should Grow, N ew York R eview o f Books 42, no. 13 (August, 1995): 28.
119 David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea O f The West A nd Its Opponents (New York: The Free
Press, 1998), 423.
120 Rey K oslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet
Empires D em ise and the International System , International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 215.
121 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics,
International O rganization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.
179
McSweeney finds that while the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved
under a new social structure, NATO continued to exist because its norms and rules are
compatible with an anarchy of friends.122 In his view, NATO consisted of more than just
a shared opposition to Soviet expansion; it reflects its members shared commitment to
liberal values, democratic governance, and economic interdependence. Both NATO and
non-members were seduced into a new set of practices and a new habit of identity as
they reconsidered their security and interests after the Cold War.123 As successor states
to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact chose to adopt identities compatible with those
of NATO members, projects such as PfP became possible and the Alliance embraced
several Central and Eastern European states as new members. The release of central and
eastern European states from Soviet domination allowed for a new definition of Europe
as a geographical sphere of influence where Western norms and values shall prevail.124
The rise of the EU and the pursuit of CFSP in the decade following the Cold War
threatened the creation of a European identity to rival the transatlantic identity embodied
in NATO. The membership of the two regimes is similar, with the obvious exclusion of
the United States from the EU. EU promotes exclusive identity distinct from transatlantic
identity, since the United States is barred from participation. The particular nature of a
European identity remains the subject of much scholarly speculation. According to
Waever, [A] mythic narrative of European history together with an international actor
122 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology o f International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1999).
123 Ibid, 214.
124 Robert Jackson, The G lobal Covenant: Human Conduct in W orld Affairs (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 189.
180
1
profile can produce a European international identity. ' Smith recognizes European
identity to be a shared European experience that is made up of a cultural cross-

i 'yft
fertilization rather than being tied to a single ethnic base. These traditions include
Roman law, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, humanism, romanticism
and classicism. Smith argues that any European identity is weak in comparison to
national histories, supported by vibrant myths, heroes, and legends. This view is shared
by Leonard, who refers to Europe as a patchwork of different cultures, religions,

1 97
languages and views.
The existence of established cultures has made it more difficult to establish a
cosmopolitan European identity. As a result, European Union officials have undertaken a
number of measures to promote the concept of a European identity. Gilles Andreani,
then-head of the French Foreign Ministry noted, The process of European integration is
a joint exercise in norm-setting and institution-building. Institutions are supposed to
provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose
128
and belonging. EU leaders have long sought ways to promote this sense of belonging,
with the recognition that imagined communities must be constantly reified to become
125 Ole Waever, The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections From a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-
Sovereignty Security Orders, in International Relations Theory and the P olitics o f European Integration:
P ow er Security and Community ed. M ichael W illiam s (London: Routledge, 2000), 279.
126 Anthony Smith, National Identity and the Idea o f European Unity, International Affairs 68, no. 1
(1992): 70-71.
127 Mark Leonard, M aking Europe Popular: The Search f o r a European Identity (London: Dem os, 1998).
128 Gilles Andreani, W hy Institutions Matter, Survival 42 no. 2 (Summer 2000): 83.
181
meaningful objects of identification.129 The EUs efforts to promote a European identity
were very similar to those associated with the promotion of national identity. The EUs
efforts to actively promote the concept of a distinct European identity increased with the
release of the Adonnino Report in 1985. The report marked the beginning of a Peoples
Europe campaign and the adoption of recognizable community symbols. The EU
adopted Beethovens Ode to Joy at its anthem and created the familiar twelve-starred flag
that now flies not just over official EU facilities, but over national and private facilities
that wish to promote European unity. The EU also recognized the importance of
education to the promotion of a European identity. Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty
sought to develop a European dimension in education. While member states remained
responsible for academic systems and curriculum, the EU sponsored several programs to
encourage cooperative educational programs. These programs also subsidized the study
of common history, which at least one study has credited with contributing to vast
improvements in Franco-German relations.130
The process of European integration challenged the effectiveness of NATO by
competing for resources and presenting and alternative, competing identity. The
existence of multiple political identities, each having implications for security policy,
made transatlantic relations increasingly complex. The persistence of multiple, and at
times conflicting, political identities forced political leaders to interact through competing
institutions. While these identities have much in common, such as the commitment to
129 Thomas Risse, The Euro Between National and European Identity, Journal o f European Public P olicy
10, no. 4 (August, 2003): 490.
130 Smith, National Identity and the Idea o f European Unity, 65.
182
democratic values, capitalism, and the rule of law, there are also emerging differences.
These differences would have significant implications for transatlantic relations as the
EU expanded its influence in the field of security.
Despite the emergence of another form of collective identity among Europeans,
shared values and interests among the United States and its European allies did not
disappear after the end of the Cold War. These states all sought to limit conflict among
European powers, preserve free trade, ensure access to strategic resources, and limit the
spread of local conflicts. NATO continued to contribute to the creation of a transatlantic
security community, marked by the existence of shared ideology and adherence to
common norms of state behavior. Expansion, EAPC and PfP all promoted the expansion
of shared values into new parts of Europe, along with a sense that the security of all
member states was linked. The shared interest in promoting common values and a
recognition of the vital importance of maintaining peaceful relations among European
states contributed to interventions in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The 1999
Strategic Concept reiterated the Alliances commitment to common values of
democracy, human rights, and rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to
secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe and served as the foundation for a
decision to expand the Alliances activities outside of the region.131
Conclusion
In its first fifty years, NATO member states moved from an alliance focused
entirely on territorial defense to a multifaceted set of principles, norms, rules and
131 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance's Strategic Concept.
183
procedures increasingly compatible with the practice of collective security. The process
of regime change accelerated after the end of the Cold War as the Alliance found ways to
pursue shared interests in a more permissive security environment. Power-based,
organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis all contribute to an
understanding of the process of regime change during the decade following the end of the
Cold War. The United States, in its role as alliance hegemon, strove to preserve its
influential role in European security and encouraged the Alliances embrace of collective
security. American leaders introduced many of the initiatives associated with this regime
change and accepted a disproportionate amount of the burden for bringing them into
practice. NATOs existing rules and procedures provided a strong foundation for the
expansion of the Alliances mandate to include collective security functions. Traditional
NATO bodies encouraging an open dialogue among alliance members on security issues
and the coordination of defense planning were made available to non-member states.
From a norm-based perspective, a sense of community was preserved among Alliance
members during this period based on the shared commitment to expand the common
values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law. The allies continued to actively
practice consultation and compromise to develop a consensus regarding how these values
should be promoted, to include greater cooperation with former adversaries and the
necessity of military interventions in the Balkans.
As NATO prepared to enter the 21st century, the Alliances commitment to the
practice of collective security would face new challenges. NATO leaders had addressed
some aspects of the out-of-area debate through its interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo, including an increased willingness to view a consensus among member
184
states as sufficient legitimacy for collective military action. According to one set of
scholars, Because Operation Allied Force proceeded without a wider international
mandate, it could be argued that the Alliances direct responsibility for a political
settlement is deepened and that NATOs collective security obligations are now as
extensive as its collective defense commitments.132 However, while Alliance members
had been willing to pool their efforts to shape the strategic environment within Europe,
future threats would surely bring their own unique complexities that could expose
differences among Alliance members and limit the ability of the Alliance to take
collective action. As the 21st century was approaching, De Wijk observed, a difference
of opinion between the European members of the Alliance and the United States as to
whether NATO is a regional or a global alliance.133 Similarly, Krause notes that
NATO is still a long way from defining itself as a coalition of those willing to export
stability to regional theaters outside of Europe.134 The next chapter will examine the
debate over further expanding the Alliances mandate to reach outside of Europe and
address the threats of international terrorism and WMD proliferation.
132 Cathal Nolan and Carl Hodge, The Healthy Bones o f a Single Pomeranian Grenadier: The Atlantic
Alliance and the Humanitarian Principle, in NATO f o r a N ew Century: Atlanticism an d European
Security, ed. Carl Hodge (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 15.
133 Ron D e Wijk, NATO on the Brink o f the N ew M illennium: the Battle f o r Consensus (London: Brassey
Press, 1997) 151.
134 Joachim Krause, Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What R ole for NATO? Survival
37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 147.
185
At the start o f the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which
unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses.
- Rome Summit Declaration by Heads of State of
NATO Member States and the Russian Federation (2002)
Chapter 4: NATOs Role in the Global War on Terrorism
This chapter continues the examination of post-Cold War regime change within
NATO by analyzing the Alliances collective response to the threats of transnational
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction following the September
2001 attacks on the United States. NATOs participation in both defensive and offensive
operations associated with the American-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) required
a consensus regarding the applicability of the regimes of collective defense and collective
security to new threats emerging from well outside of the Alliances traditional area of
operations. This chapter begins with a review of the perception of the threats posed by
transnational terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation in the
aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the United States. The initial responses of
NATO member states are examined, including their decision to invoke the collective
defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the
Alliance. This study continues with an account of the factors influencing the
organization of international coalitions under the leadership of the United States for
offensive military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This chapter concludes with an
assessment of the contributions made by each of the three approaches to regime analysis
to an understanding of the inconsistent commitment to collective action demonstrated by
the allies throughout this period. While a collective defense regime was preserved
throughout this period, the extension of NATOs collective security regime outside of
186
Europe faltered due to an unwillingness of United States to share command
responsibility, the inability of the Alliance to summon relevant capabilities, and a
breakdown in the sense of community favoring a common perception of threats and a
consensus regarding the appropriate courses of action to be taken.
Nature o f the Threat
The tactic of terrorism has been practiced throughout human history. Sandler and
Hartley define terrorism as the premeditated use of, or the threat to use, extra-normal
violence or brutality to gain a political objective through intimidation or fear.1
Terrorists aim to influence the policies of governments by creating a sense of insecurity
among the general population of a state. This sense of insecurity can lead a population to
question the ability of their government to provide for their safety and to demand policy
changes to reduce their perception of danger. Terrorism is often practiced by non-state
actors because it allows them to leverage their limited financial and military resources.
Terrorism is traditionally viewed as a weapon used by the weak against the strong. It is a
form of asymmetric warfare that allows small groups to pursue their political goals even
when opposed by governments fielding large, modern militaries.
Over the past several decades, NATO member states have frequently been the
target of groups employing terrorist tactics. The German and Italian governments faced
attacks by extreme leftist movements such as the Red Army Faction and the Red
Brigades. Both Spain and Great Britain struggled against internal separatist causes that
led to the formation of terrorist groups associated with the Basque National Liberation
1 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The P olitical Econom y o f NATO (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 170-171.
187
Movement and the Irish Republican Army. France faced Islamic extremists such as the
Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Preaching and Combat Group, both of which
conducted hijackings and bombings into the 1990s. Terrorist attacks also occurred within
the United States, including the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In general,
terrorist strikes were viewed as isolated criminal acts which did not rise to the level of a
direct threat to national security. Previous debates over giving the NATO alliance
greater authority to respond to acts of terrorism were rejected, primarily because
terrorism was generally viewed as a domestic threat involving a single member
government.2
Both scholars and practitioners of international relations expressed growing
concern for the threat posed by international terrorism toward the end of the twentieth
century. A number of terrorist groups demonstrated both the willingness and ability to
coordinate their efforts and to plan attacks resulting in unprecedented levels of violence.
Changes in technology and the organization of the post-Cold War international system
threatened to make future terrorist attacks more deadly. One scholar observed, As the
average state decreases in size [a trend demonstrated by the formation of numerous
successor states following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia], while
sophisticated weaponry becomes less and less expensive, the relative influence of non
state actors is likely to rise. Thus technology may increasingly favor terrorists over
2 Paul Gallis, NATO Enlargement: Congressional Research Service R eport 21055, (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 2003), 4.
188
states.3 A perceived increase in the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups to the
community of NATO member states would eventually lead NATO leaders to revisit the
question of developing organizational capabilities to promote a collective response to
terrorism. As U. S. Senator Richard Lugar observed in late 2001, In a world in which
terrorist Article 5 attacks on our countries can be planned in Germany, financed in Asia,
and carried out in the United States, old distinctions between 'in' and 'out-of-area' become
meaningless... If 'Article 5' threats to our security can come from beyond Europe, NATO
must be able to act beyond Europe to meet them if it is going to fulfill its classic mission
today.4
International terrorists began employing new and more threatening tactics in the
1990s, including the acquisition and use of WMD. The March 1995 nerve gas attack on a
Tokyo subway by the Japanese religious sect Aum Shinri Kyo demonstrated the ability of
some terrorist groups to acquire and employ chemical weapons. The leader of A1 Qaeda,
Osama Bin Laden, claimed to view the acquisition of WMD as his religious duty. Bin
Laden stated, Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I
have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I
seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims
not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on
3 Stuart Kaufman, The Fragmentation and Consolidation o f the International System , International
Organization 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 200.
4 Daniel Hamilton and Tim Garden, Should N A T O s N ew Function be Counter-Terrorism? NATO

Review 50, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 17.
189
Muslims.5 The willingness of these groups to employ such weapons signaled a change
from the more modest tactics and objectives historically associated with terrorism. A
2000 study by the National Commission on Terrorism concluded that contemporary
terrorist groups were more often motivated by fanaticism than political interests and that
these groups were less restrained in their methods.6
A1 Qaedas rise in the 1990s exemplified the growing threat of international
terrorism to Western interests. Osama Bin Laden began his campaign against the United
States in response to the deployment of American forces to Saudi Arabia during the
Persian Gulf War. He fought against the Soviets during the 1980s in Afghanistan and
maintained contacts throughout this region as well as in Southeast Asia and in Northern
Africa. Frank J. Cilluffo, who would later become the Special Assistant to President
George W. Bush for Homeland Security, described Bin Ladens role in A1 Qaeda as the
chief executive and chief financial officer of a loosely affiliated group of radical
terrorists, who share resources, assets and expertise, and who can come together for an
operation and then disperse. A1 Qaeda is simply the most visible head of a hydra.7 Bin
Ladens network would eventually spread across the globe, establishing cells in at least
60 states and conducting attacks on several continents.
Bin Ladens hostility toward the West came into focus with his declaration of a
fatwah against the United States and its allies in February 1998. Bin Ladenss
5 Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror, Time, January 11, 1999. http://www.time.com
/tim e/asia/new s/interview /0,9754,174550-2,00. html
6 National Comm ission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat o f International Terrorism: R eport
o f the N ational Commission on Terrorism (Washington: GPO, 2000).
7 Frank Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin, Fighting terrorism, NATO Review 49 no. 4 (Winter 2001): 13
190
Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders
outlined his allegations against the West and stated We, with God's help, call on every
Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to
kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is the individual duty of every
Muslim who is able.. .until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the
lands of Islam.8 Later that year, A1 Qaeda carried out nearly simultaneous bombings of
American embassies in the African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi,
Kenya. The United States issued an indictment against Bin Laden and gained sufficient
international support for the passage of a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
demanding that the government of Afghanistan stop providing sanctuary and training for
international terrorists and their organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate
with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.9 These demands went unanswered,
and the United States and it allies continued to search for ways to bring greater
international pressure on terrorist groups and states seeking to acquire weapons of mass
destruction.
The international communitys efforts during the 1990s to verify the destruction
of Iraqs WMD programs represented one front in this global counter-proliferation
campaign. UNSCR 687, adopted by the Security Council shortly after the 1991 Persian
Gulf War required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, rendering
harmless under international supervisions, of all chemical and biological weapons and all
8 Bernard Lewis, License to Kill: Usama bin Ladens Declaration o f Jihad, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6
(November/December 199B): 15.
9 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214, December 8,
1998, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/.
191
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto and to discontinue its
support for terrorist groups.10 A United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was
established to verify Iraqs compliance with the disarmament provisions of UNSCR 687.
UNSCOMs mission was to determine the extent of Iraqs WMD programs and supervise
their destruction. While Iraq was originally given 15 days to declare all of its WMD and
a year to destroy them, UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
conducted inspections over several years. Although UNSCOM succeeded in locating and
destroying large numbers of Iraqi weapons, its inspections were frequently obstructed by
Iraqi officials that resisted the inspectors efforts to visit some sites, conduct interviews
with Iraqi scientists, or gain access to sensitive documents.
Seven years of sporadic inspections ended with the departure of UNSCOM in
December 1998. UNSCOMs final report made it clear that Iraq had failed to fully
cooperate with the inspectors, stating Iraqs conduct ensured that no progress was able
to be made in the fields of disarmament. In light of this experience, and in the absence of
full cooperation by Iraq, it must, regrettably, be recorded again that the Commission is
not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraqs
prohibited weapons program.11 The following day, the United States and Great Britain
began a four-day bombing campaign against suspected weapons sites throughout
10 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, April 3,
1991, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1991/.
11 United Nations Documentation Center, Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the Executive Chairman o f
the Special Comm ission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) o f Security
Council resolution 687 (1991) http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s98-1172.htm
192
southern and central Iraq. Operation Desert Fox took place without Security Council
authorization due to divisions among the councils permanent members. President
Clinton justified the strikes by emphasizing the need to demonstrate the continued will of
the international community to enforce the inspections agreements. In his December 15th
address to the nation, Clinton stated, If Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections
system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by
the United States, has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild
his arsenal of destruction. And some day, make no mistake, he will use it again, as he has
in the past. 12 American and British forces flew hundreds of aircraft sorties and launched
cruise missiles at military facilities and locations suspected of concealing WMD
programs. This attack marked a transition from a strategy of containment to one of
removing Saddam Hussein from power.
American leaders justified their call for Saddams removal on accusations that the
Iraqi government maintained extensive ties to terrorist organizations, emphasizing the
risk posed by a rearmed Iraq acting in collusion with international terrorist groups. Iraqs
ties to Palestinian terrorist groups extended back to the 1970s. Iraq provided funding for
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until 1974 and then shifted its financial
support to the more radical Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). In October 1985, the Iraqi
government allowed Yasser Arafat to temporarily relocate his headquarters to Baghdad
following Israeli attacks on PLO facilities in Tunis. Iraq also provided sanctuary for the
12 University o f California American Presidency Project, Address to the Nation Announcing Military
Strikes Against Iraq, December 16, 1998, http://ww.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=55414.
193
members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) accused of hijacking the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro. While the ANO and the PLF maintained a presence in Baghdad
through the 1990s, there was no evidence that the Iraqi government encouraged these
groups to attack targets in the United States and Europe. Iraqi leaders seemed to
understand that evidence of their involvement in such an attack would very likely lead to
renewed military action by an international coalition led by the United States.
Accusations of Iraqi ties to A1 Qaeda surfaced throughout the 1990s, but were
never well-substantiated. The secular Iraqi government had little in common with the
Islamist A1 Qaeda leaders beyond a shared dislike of the United States. Nonetheless,
intelligence reports occasionally surfaced providing information on meetings between
Iraqi agents and A1 Qaeda representatives.13 A 1998 indictment by the Clinton
administration against A1 Qaeda leaders, asserted that they had reached an
understanding with the government of Iraq that A1 Qaeda would not work against that
government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development,
A1 Qaeda would work cooperatively with the government of Iraq. 14 Secretary of State
Colin Powell would later summarize American concerns in remarks to the United
Nations, stating Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a
supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support
13 Stephen Hayes, An Intelligent Democrat, The Weekly Standard, December 15, 2003.
14 Rowen Scarborough, Clinton First Linked A1 Qaeda to Saddam, Washington Times, June 28, 2004.
194
continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old.
The combination is lethal.15
By the end of the 1990s, American leaders had begun to view the nexus between
international terrorism and WMD proliferation as worthy of greater attention within
NATO. Many NATO leaders were less receptive to proposals to include a more explicit
counter-terrorism role for the Alliance in the revised Strategic Concept. Opposition was
encountered by officials from France, Spain, Germany, and Turkey, who continued to
view terrorism primarily as a domestic law enforcement issue.16 The new Strategic
Concept included terrorism among the list of other risks to the Alliance, but failed to
provide specific guidance to subordinate NATO bodies. At the 1999 Washington
Summit, American officials succeeded in getting the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to
agree to establish a WMD Center in an effort to implement the goal of intelligence
sharing and to ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to
strengthened common understanding among allies on WMD issues and how to respond to
17
them. While these initiatives increased the awareness of these threats among Alliance
members, they fell short of a clear shift in Alliance priorities. The election of George W.
Bush in November 2000 provided an opportunity for American leaders to reconsider their
approach to countering the threats of international terrorism and WMD proliferation as
part of a revised approach to U.S. foreign policy.
15 U.S. Department o f State, Secretary Pow ell Remarks to United Nations Security Council, February 5,
2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm
16 Matthew Kaminski, NATO is Unprepared to Fight Terrorism, Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2001.
17 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, W ashington Summit Communique: An A lliance for the 21st
Century, April 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm.
195
Initial Responses to the September 2001 Attacks on the United States
The September 2001 attacks by A1 Qaeda on the United States occurred while the
Bush administration was in the midst of reshaping American foreign policy. During the
2000 presidential campaign, then-Governor Bush had been critical of the Clinton
Administrations foreign policy, which Clintons Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
characterized as aggressive multilateralism. Bush expressed concern over President
Clintons willingness to commit military forces to various peacekeeping and nation-
building operations without sufficiently justifying how these operations were consistent
with the vital interests of the United States. In a February 2000 article in Foreign Affairs,
his foreign policy advisor, Condoleeza Rice, called for foreign policy changes more
clearly linked to the pursuit of American national interests. Rice stated, The belief that
the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of
someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, and there are strong
echoes of it in the Clinton administration. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing
something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect.18 A
change of leadership was expected to bring about a foreign policy that enabled the United
States to unabashedly pursue its interests. Shortly after the election, Charles
Krauthammer observed, An unprecedentedly dominant United States...is in the unique
position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. After a decade of Prometheus
18 Condoleeza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1,
(January/February 2000): 47.
196
playing pygmy, the first task of the administration is precisely to reassert American
freedom of action.19
During his first few months in office, President George W. Bush made a number
of decisions that contributed to perceptions that the United States was becoming more
unilateralist. He announced his intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty in order to pursue plans to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) system. The United States abandonment of this treaty concerned its NATO
allies, who felt this decision could undermine the continued efficacy of international arms
control and nonproliferation efforts. The Bush administration also reversed the previous
administrations support for the 1997 United Nations Kyoto Treaty on Climate Change,
ending efforts to pursue Senate ratification. In addition, American officials took
measures to retard the organization of an International Criminal Court (ICC) through the
United Nations. President Bush withdrew President Clintons signature from the treaty
and pursued an exemption for Americans participating in UN-sponsored peacekeeping
missions. The administration made American foreign aid conditional to the creation of
bilateral agreements preventing other states from prosecuting Americans through the
ICC. These indications that the United States was becoming less willing to compromise
its national interests for the sake of international cooperation dominated early
impressions of the Bush administrations foreign policy preferences.
The 2001 attacks by A1 Qaeda on the United States occurred nine months into
President George W. Bushs first term in office. The thousands of casualties experienced
19 Charles Krauthammer, The N ew Unilateralism, The Washington P ost, June 8, 2001.
197
in these attacks represented the most deadly series of terrorist attacks in history and
presented the United States and its allies with a demanding and unprecedented foreign
policy challenge. Allied expressions of support for the United States were immediate and
resolute. British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that the United Kingdom would
stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States as it recovered from the attacks while
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder condemned the attacks as a declaration of war
on the free world.20 NATOs Secretary General, George Robertson, also released a
statement declaring I condemn in the strongest possible terns the senseless attacks which
have just been perpetrated against the United States of America... These barbaric acts
constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and underlie the need for the
international community and the members of the Alliance to unite their forces in fighting
91
the scourge of terrorism. The non-member states participating in Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) also expressed their support, stating, We are appalled by
these barbaric acts and condemn them unconditionally. These acts were an attack on our
common values. We will not allow these values to be compromised by those who follow
the path of violence. We pledge to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of
terrorism. We stand united in our belief that the ideals of partnership and co-operation
will prevail.22 NATO was poised to play an important role in any response to these
20 Old Friends, Best Friends, The Economist, September 13, 2001. http://www.economist.com /
printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=780405
21 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement by the Secretary General o f NATO, September 11,
2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl -121 e.htm.
22 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement by the EAPC, September 12, 2001,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-123e.htm.
198
attacks, as these events were widely interpreted in Europe as a broader attack on
Western values of freedom, tolerance, and openness.23
The United States turned to its NATO allies for support well before determining
the precise nature of its desired response. Lord Robertson suggested invoking the
collective defense clause of the North Atlantic treaty, telling U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Invoking Article Five would be a useful statement of political backing, that it
would help the United States build an instant anti-terror coalition based in part on the
moral authority behind Article Five, and that it would be a deterrent - in that whoever
was responsible for the attack would know they had taken on not just the United States,
but also the greatest military alliance in the world.24
The invocation of Article Five characterized a response to these attacks as an act
of collective self-defense, authorizing, but not requiring, a military response in
accordance with a collective defense regime. NATO had never invoked Article Five in
the history of the Alliance and the conditions surrounding this request were certainly
different than those envisioned by the authors of the treaty. In an unusual turn of events,
this request would primarily involve the European members of NATO coming to the
assistance of the United States. In addition, the allies would be responding to an act of
violence carried out by a non-state actor, rather than a conventional act of interstate
aggression. Given the uncertainty identifying precisely who had carried out the attacks
and the type of response contemplated by the United States, some members of the NAC
23 Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European
Union (Santa Monica, CA: R AND, 2003), 1.
24 James Kitfield, NATO Metamorphosis, N ational Journal 34, no. 6 (February 2002): 3 7 6 -3 8 0 .
199
expressed caution. In an effort to demonstrate solidarity with the United States, while
respecting the concerns of several European allies, the NAC agreed to provisionally
invoke Article Five. Further action would be deferred until more was known about those
responsible for the attacks and a consensus could be reached regarding the nature of the
collective response.
The subject of invoking Article Five prompted some debate among member
states, and a genuine concern by some NATO officials that the Alliance would be unable
to organize a collective response. Article Five had primarily been viewed as a means of
deterring or responding to an attack by a state outside of the Alliance rather than a non
state actor. The British were among the earliest supporters of the invocation of Article
Five and were the first nation to pledge troops to any subsequent military action. German
diplomats were much less comfortable with the concept of applying NATOs collective
defense regime to acts of terrorism. While Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder appeared to
favor a collective response, any deployment of German troops would have to be approved
by a Bundestag dominated by a Social Democrat/Green party majority, potentially
resulting in a long, public debate over the appropriate level of German support.
Support for NATOs involvement was also mixed among members of the French
government. Control of the French government was divided at the time among the
conservative Gaullist party and the Socialist party. While Gaullist President Jacques
Chirac was generally supportive regarding American requests for assistance, the
Socialists, including Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, were less enthusiastic. The collective
response demanded by an Article Five declaration would likely involve the coordination
of many government agencies previously outside the reach of NATO bodies, and few
200
French leaders were anxious to give NATO that much authority. Additional concerns
were raised within France about the ability of a military alliance to address such an
unconventional threat.
The invocation of Article Five in this instance introduced a great deal of
uncertainty for European members regarding the costs and benefits of collective action.
A well-orchestrated counter-terrorism campaign could reduce the long term threat posed
by both domestic and international terrorist organizations. However, participation in
such a campaign would involve unknowable financial and military commitments and
would likely increase the risk of attacks in the short term. These leaders also recognized
the additional complexities of military action if the attacks were found to have been
carried out by groups operating within the territory of a NATO member state. As a
military alliance, NATO had no authority over domestic law enforcement agencies and
would encounter numerous difficulties coordinating operations within their own borders.
Invoking Article Five in response to terrorist attacks on the United States would also set
an important precedent that other states could follow in the event of future terrorist
attacks. Many NATO member states struggled with domestic sources of terrorism and
the use of Article Five to combat terrorism could force the Alliance to consider
operations against domestic sources of terrorism in the future.
American leaders were quickly convinced by the available intelligence that A1
Qaeda, rather than a domestic terrorist group, had been responsible for the attacks. A
U.S. State Department team briefed the NAC on October 2, 2001, producing evidence of
that the attackers were funded and trained by A1 Qaeda members operating out of
Afghanistan. These diplomats emphasized the importance of NATOs expression of
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political solidarity with the United States, but did not pursue the option of organizing a
military intervention under NATO command. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage reported later that he told the NAC, I did point out that in this coalition
building there is a continuum from, on the one hand, rhetorical or political support for
activities on this global attack on terrorism. It runs the gamut to sharing of intelligence,
sharing of financial information, perhaps overflight rights, etc. And at the far end of the
continuum is the possibility of some military activity either together or unilaterally.25
In a press statement released just after the meeting of the NAC, Lord Robertson
concluded, We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the
worldwide terrorist network of A1 Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden and his key
lieutenants and protected by the Taliban. On the basis of this briefing, it has now been
determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from
abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the allies in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.26 The decision
to invoke Article Five meant that NATO would aid the United States in carrying out a
response to these attacks, even to the extent that this response involved military
operations well beyond its members borders. As General Klaus Naumann, the Chairman
25 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Press Availability: U.S. Deputy Secretary o f State Armitage
and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, September 20, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/
2 0 0 1 /s0 10920a.htm.
26 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement by Lord Robertson, October 2, 2001
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm .
202
of NATOs Military Committee later clarified, The pledge to support the United States
came with no geographical limits: de facto, NATO became a global alliance.27
The confirmation of NATOs invocation of Article Five paved the way for more
substantial acts of assistance on the part of NATO member states. One of the first ways
that NATO states were able to assist the Americans in preparing for a strike against A1
Qaeda and the Taliban was to enable the United States to lower its troop commitments in
Europe. The United States hoped to build up its forces in Central Asia without having to
mobilize large numbers of National Guard and Reserve troops. One means of
accomplishing this was to transfer forces from NATO operations in Europe to
Afghanistan. Several NATO allies offered some relief to American forces by increasing
the size of their contingents participating in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.
Greece offered to provide additional troops to offset the reduction of American forces.
Norway offered to assume Lead Nation status in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), adding an
additional two hundred troops to the 1,000 Norwegians already serving in this
operation.28 Germany also deployed additional troops to bolster peacekeeping efforts in
Macedonia. These deployments would allow a counter-terrorism campaign to be planned
and conducted while still maintaining the Alliances security commitments in Europe.
NATO governments placed their security forces on a heightened state of alert and
increased their domestic counter-terrorism efforts in response to American concerns.
Upon discovering that an A1 Qaeda cell operating in Hamburg, Germany had played a
27 Klaus Naumann, Crunch Time for the A lliance, NATO R eview 50, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 9.
28 Norwegian Ministry o f D efense, KFOR 5-N orw ays Role as lead Nation http://odin.dep.no/fd/
engelsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120019/dok-nn.htm l.
203
key role in planning the September 11th attacks, CIA Director George Tenant reportedly
told the National Security Council, The best thing the Germans can do is get their act
together on their own internal terrorist problems and the groups that we know are
there.29 In response to American pressure, the German government made the disruption
of additional terrorist cells a top priority along with increased security for both German
and American governmental buildings. Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey
also implemented stronger security measures around the American and Israeli diplomatic
missions, and other likely terrorist targets. France was the first European state to
introduce the requirement for air marshals on international flights, placing a French air
marshal on the very first flight between France and the United States when commercial
air travel was restored on September 14, 2001.30 NATO member states worked to better
coordinate their individual efforts to increase security, recognizing that vulnerabilities in
one state could affect the security of all Alliance members.
NATO states played a large role in the global financial crackdown on
international terrorist groups. Much of the funding for international terrorism was
channeled through charitable organizations, in an attempt to circumvent recent UN
restrictions on such funding, including the 1999 United Nations Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 2000 United Nations Anti-Terrorism
Financing Convention. U.S. Treasury Department officials worked with allied
governments to implement more rigorous procedures for scrutinizing the accounts of
29 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (N ew York: Simon and Shuster, 2002) 180.
30 Embassy o f France in the United States, Frances Response to 9/11, http://www.francetourism.com/

update_ Vigipirate.asp
204
individuals and organizations suspected of financing terrorism. This review resulted in
the identification and seizure of twenty accounts in overseas banks with links to A1 Qaeda
o
by the end of September. The British government tasked nearly six hundred national
banks and investment facilities with a comprehensive review, and by the end of
November 2001 had frozen 77 million in 38 accounts.32 The French Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Finance, and Industry similarly reviewed suspected accounts in France
and by the end of December had frozen about 4.42 million Euro worth of funds belonging
to individuals and groups with links to A1 Qaeda and the Taliban.33
In December 2001, the NATO defense ministers tasked the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT) to produce a military concept for defending against terrorism. The Military
Concept fo r Combating Terrorism, which was officially approved during the November
2002 Prague Summit, organized Alliance contributions in defensive antiterrorism
operations, consequence management, offensive counter-terrorism, and military
cooperation with civil authorities.34 Specific recommendations included measures to
improve air and maritime protection and the creation of standing NATO forces for
consequence management. These forces would be available to be called on by member
31 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Operation Enduring Freedom Overview: Campaign
Against Terrorism Results, Period Covered 14-30 September 2001, October 1, 2001.
32 Stephan D e Spiegeleire, et al, Quick Scan o f P o st 9/11 N ational Counter-Terrorism Policym aking and
Implementation in S elected European Countries: Research P roject fo r the N etherlands M inistry o f Justice
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 121-3.
33 Ibid, 52.
34 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, N A T O s Military Concept for D efense Against Terrorism,
November 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm
205
governments in the aftermath of a WMD attack. NATO also established the Civil-
Military Planning Directorate with responsibilities for consequence management. This
directorate initiated an annual consequence management exercise, which served as a
yearly assessment of the readiness of member states to mitigate the damage resulting
from a terrorist attack. Finally, the military concept clarified that NATO may participate
in offensive counter-terrorism actions either in a NATO-led force or as part of an
operation led by another international organization or NATO member state.
NATO member states agreed to enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation,
both bilaterally and through new organizational entities. Obstacles to sharing tactical
intelligence on terrorist threats were examined and eliminated. The intelligence agencies
of member states began communicating more frequently, combining their watch lists of
both individuals and groups with links to terrorism. A review of intelligence practices
within the Alliance exposed the need to establish procedures for shared analysis of events
leading up to an international crisis. U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice
emphasized the value of this cooperation during a November 2001 press conference,
stating The key to the broad coalition is to remember that, while everybody
understandably wants to focus on military contributions, this is not the Gulf War. An
equally important part of this war on terrorism is the disruption of these terrorist cells
abroad. If you imagine that there are cells out there in sixty-plus countries that could be
continuing to plot, continuing to look for ways to wreak havoc, the intelligence and law
enforcement efforts that have resulted in over three hundred arrests of known and
suspected A1 Qaeda operatives is as important to this war on terrorism and to trying to
206
avoid another attack, either on ourselves or on others, as is the war in Afghanistan.35
NATO leaders strove for even greater results as they searched for ways to overcome
differences in the acquisition and analysis of intelligence.
The NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) emerged from a review of
intelligence sharing procedures directed by the NAC. The creation of NIWS was
intended to move away from the exchange of intelligence related to the status of
conventional military threats, toward a process of intelligence analysis emphasizing
emerging threats or regional crises. NIWS was given the mandate to warn of any
developing instability, crisis, threats, risks, or concerns that could impact on the security
interests of the Alliance and monitor de-escalation of a crisis.36 NIWS personnel were
tasked to perform qualitative analysis of data related to events of interest to member
states, whether they occur within NATO territory or in neighboring states. By sharing
some of these warnings, the allies would have a more even access to intelligence and a
greater likelihood of developing the political will to take collective action.
NATO leaders agreed to increase cooperation and coordination through further
support for NATOs WMD Center. This center was given additional resources to assist
its efforts to promote a common understanding on WMD issues among member states.
These efforts included the development of a public information strategy to increase the
awareness of proliferation issues, the exchange of information on how to enhance
military readiness to operate in a WMD environment how to protect civilian populations
35 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor C ondoleezza Rice,
Novem ber 8, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2001/l 1/20011108-4.html.
36 John Kriender, Anticipating Crises, NATO R eview 50, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 15.
207
in the event of a WMD attack. The center also worked to reduce the risk posed by
weapons proliferation by briefing member and non-member states on the destruction of
WMD stockpiles in Russia and elsewhere. In addition to advising other NATO
committees, the WMD Center conducted briefings with the EAPC, along with several
states participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue, and held discussions with the
governments of both Russia and Ukraine. The center also took steps toward establishing a
deployable Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) analytical laboratory manned by an
NBC event response team made up of experts from NATO member sates.
An increase in the quality and quantity of information exchanged among NATO
member states was only one part of American efforts to improve international counter
terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. American diplomats capitalized on the
extraordinarily strong levels of international empathy had arranged for dozens of
declarations of support from international organizations. In addition to NATOs
invocation of Article Five, the collective defense clause of the ANZUS treaty between the
United States, Australian and New Zealand had been invoked along with a similar clause
in the Pan-American Rio Treaty. In all, more than 100 states offered their cooperation
and the Bush administration conducted counter-terrorism operations with 200 different
intelligence or security services around the world.37 This support was in addition to the
30 states that offered the United States cooperation and support in criminal
investigations.
37 U.S. Department o f State, Operation Enduring Freedom Overview: Campaign Against Terrorism
Results, Period Covered 14-30 September 2001, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=519 4 .
208
Generous offers of support flowed in from around the world, giving the United
States access a great deal of flexibility in the way it would conduct the initial phases of
the GWOT. By the end of September 2001, 27 states had given the United States
permission to operate on their territory or transit through their airspace as part of a future
military operation.38 A number of NATO member states had expressed a willingness to
send military forces to conduct offensive military operations in Afghanistan alongside the
United States. Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Spain and Turkey, all
pledged to deploy ground, air, and naval forces, as needed. Some allies were initially
unable to commit troops due to legislative constraints. Belgium, for example, was
limited to deploying up to 1,000 troops outside of its borders, a limit already met through
its participation in NATO operations in the Balkans. Germany also had to follow strict
constitutional guidance before deploying troops outside of its borders. The organization
of an American-led coalition to conduct offensive military operations in Afghanistan was
driven by command structure considerations and the respective capabilities of allied
military forces.
Command Structure Considerations
Following its military interventions in Kosovo, NATO was promoted as the only
international organization capable of successfully organizing large-scale military
interventions in the post-Cold War era. Both the EU and UN had failed to organize
forces that could effectively intervene in the Balkans conflicts. NATO alone had
eventually brought an end to the fighting in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and
38 Ibid.
209
remained crucial to subsequent efforts to maintain peace in the region. NATO appeared
to be poised to serve as a foundation for future collective military operations, including
out-of-area operations, as endorsed by the 1999 Security Concept.
A NATO-led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was one option for the
organization of a multinational coalition to conduct counter-terrorism operations in
Afghanistan. The decision to use NATO's integrated command structure represented an
opportunity to expand the Alliances mandate outside of Europe. Several observers
called for the creation of a NATO CJTF to oversee both the military and non-military
aspects of the imminent counter-terrorism campaign. Sloan provided a representative
argument in favor of such a CJTF, claiming that a NATO-led operation would lend
greater legitimacy to military operations in Afghanistan.39 NATOs leadership of such a
CJTF would give the European allies greater influence over the conduct of the campaign
as well as a larger stake in the outcome. Structuring the campaign as a collective effort
would induce greater participation among European allies along with more equitable
burden-sharing. Sloan argued, Given invocation of Article 5 and the explicit willingness
of many NATO allies to contribute military capabilities to the war against terrorism, a
political consensus existed that could have been used to expand NATO's horizons and
establish a mechanism for NATO contributions in the future.40 The flexibility inherent
in the CJTF concept allowed for the participation of both NATO member and non
members states. Sloan noted, One advantage of the CJTF structure is that non-NATO
39 Stanley Sloan, Give NATO a Combined Task Force Against Terrorism, International H erald Tribune,
Novem ber 13, 2001.
40 Stanley Sloan, Crisis Response, NATO R eview 50, n o.l (Spring 2002): 28.
210
allies can be invited to participate. All the countries that want to become NATO members
as well as other European democracies would likely join in... NATO could, in effect
serve as a clearing house for existing and future allied contributions to the war on
terrorism.41
A NATO CJTF would utilize command and control procedures tested in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo and further modified through ongoing efforts to restructure the
Alliance commands. All military operations authorized by the NAC were headed by the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), an American officer also assigned as
the commander of United States Forces in Europe (EUCOM).42 Regional commanders
subordinate to SACEUR commanded operations in their sector of responsibility. In
December 1997, NATO revised its command structure from three regional commands
(North, Central, and South) to two (North and South). The leadership of each regional
command generally went to the member state providing the preponderance of forces,
with the command of Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) expected to rotate between a
British and a German officer while Allied Force South (AFSOUTH) was historically
commanded by an American officer. While the NATO CJTF command structure was
still evolving at the time of the A1 Qaeda attacks, existing guidance called for a CJTF
headquarters to be formed from elements of the selected regional headquarters and
augmented from other NATO headquarters as necessary.
41 Sloan, Give NATO a Combined Task Force Against Terrorism.
42 United States European Command (EUCOM) is one o f five regional combatant commands with an area
o f responsibility encompassing Europe, most o f Africa, and parts o f the Middle East.
211
A NATO-led military force for Afghanistan would most likely have followed a
command structure similar to that of ongoing NATO operations in Kosovo. NATO
command arrangements had been modified for both KFOR and SFOR in January 2001 to
establish unity of command over NATO forces involved in each operation. The
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) was given
responsibility for the conduct of peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo as part of his regional responsibilities. CINCSOUTH assumed the duties of
Joint Force Commander, assisted by component commanders. Air forces fell under the
direction of the Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH).
Maritime activities were directed by the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern
Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) and the remaining ground and supporting forces received
their direction from the Commander Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe
(COMSTRIKFORSOUTH). The role of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) was limited to providing strategic military guidance based on decisions
from the NAC.43
The creation of a NATO CJTF as the focal point for the war in Afghanistan was
rejected for a number of reasons. For one, NATO CJTF headquarters structures had not
yet been declared operational. The procedures and facilities for the command and control
of such a CJTF were in work and were not scheduled to be fully operational until 2004.
Secondly, the designation of a CJTF commander, would force NATO leaders to revisit
command issues still unresolved from OAF. French criticism of the command structure
43 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, A llied Forces Southern Europe, Operation Joint Guardian
Overview, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/kforAfor2.htm.
212
utilized in OAF included, The commander of United States forces in Europe, and
NATOs military commanding general, tends to be subsumed by U.S. plans and
command in case of a crisis. In this argument, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was the
most recent example of NATO military and political authorities merely ratifying
American military plans and operations.44 Lastly, while an American CJTF commander
could draw upon complementary staffs serving in both SHAPE and EUCOM, the
personnel on these staffs did not have sufficient regional expertise to oversee operations
in Afghanistan.
NATOs existing command structure was optimized for operations within Europe,
and had no particular experience or expertise to suggest a readiness to conduct offensive
military operations in other regions. The close proximity of many NATO member states
to the Balkans made NATOs access to their installations and manpower crucial to
military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and later in Macedonia. The
proximity of these states to the conflict also gave these allies a heightened interest in the
peaceful resolution of those conflicts and encouraged high levels of cooperation.
Europeans could reasonably be expected to have access to valuable human intelligence or
otherwise provide insights into the conflict due to their deep historical ties to the parties
on both sides of the conflict. This regional expertise of these allies could not be expected
to translate well to military operations outside of continental Europe.
American officials may have been willing to give greater consideration to a
NATO-generated force if this type of coalition gave the United States access to much-
44 Guillaume Parmentier, Redressing N A T O s Imbalances, Survival 42, no. 2 (2002): 96-112.
213
needed military capabilities. In reality, European member states did not have the m i l i tary
capabilities to make a decisive contribution to the type of military campaign anticipated
by American leaders. Military operations in Afghanistan would involve conducting high-
intensity combat operations far from Europe and under conditions to which the military
forces of the United States were better suited than those of its NATO allies. American
leaders were also concerned by the public comments of several European leaders that
indicated they would be cautious about the scope of military operations in Afghanistan.
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was quoted as emphasizing the need for
proportional strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan, while Belgian Prime
Minister Guy Verhofstadt declared that any military strikes must be focused on terrorist
organizations...It is evident that we will never take part in a wider world conflict.45
Finally, a sense of urgency regarding the need to respond quickly and decisively
to the September 2001 attacks was another factor that hindered the creation of a NATO-
led force. This sense of urgency was not nearly as strong in the months leading up to
Operation Deliberate Force (ODF) or Operation Allied Force (OAF). NATOs
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a gradual event, occurring years after the
outbreak of hostilities and only after a careful and thorough diplomatic debate. NATOs
reaction to events in Kosovo was more rapid, but offensive operations still only occurred
after many months of planning and diplomatic negotiations. American leaders expressed
a desire to retaliate quickly against A1 Qaeda while both international and domestic
support for a military response remained high. In his initial direction to his senior
45 Ibid, 100.
214
military commanders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized that they should
think days or weeks until the beginning of military operations.46 Such an aggressive
timeline was inconsistent with NATO procedures, where differences among allies must
be resolved prior to any collective action in order to achieve a consensus. The several
weeks between NATOs provisional invocation of Article Five on September 12, 2001
and the confirmation of the collective defense pledge following the meeting of the NAC
on October 2, 2001 was just one indication that the organization of a multinational force
for operations inside of Afghanistan would take quite some time.
An international coalition of forces operating through an American-led chain of
command ultimately represented a simpler and more responsive solution from the
perspective of American leaders. U.S. military doctrine called for American military
forces to operate worldwide under a regional combatant command structure, and it was
this structure that would serve as the foundation for the military coalition conducting
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Five regional combatant commands were in
existence, with standing facilities and staffs preparing contingency plans for operations
within their Area of Responsibility (AOR). Regional combatant commanders reported to
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, who in turn reported to the President. Allied personnel
could easily be incorporated into this command structure either as an adjunct force or
directly under American command. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
described it, a U.S.-commanded coalition would provide an effective military force
responsive to the desires of American leaders, allowing the United States to pick and
46 Woodward, Bush A t War, 43.
215
choose among its allies, fashioning moral authority of an international coalition without
having to deal with the problems of the whole Alliance.47
Rather than requesting that the NAC authorize the organization of a NATO CJTF,
President George W. Bush tasked the commander of United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM), General Tommy Franks, with the development of a campaign plan for
OEF. USCENTCOM was the regional combatant command responsible for the
command of U.S. military forces operating in an AOR stretching from the Horn of Africa
through the Middle East and into Central Asia. USCENTCOM commanders had led
coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm in the 1990s and continued to oversee the
conduct of Operation Southern Watch in Iraq. The USCENTCOM staff also had
experience dealing with regional leaders as well as the expertise to overcome the
inevitable problems of transporting and basing large numbers of American and allied
forces in Central Asia. Military planning could take place rapidly by utilizing existing
contingency plans estimating force availability and support requirements.
The differences in allied capabilities and operational concepts greatly influenced
the role that NATO would play in both OEF and subsequent stabilization efforts. As
American military planners built a strategy that came together favoring a combination of
airstrikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations rather than a large deployment
of conventional forces, the participation of NATO allies became less crucial. Few NATO
states had air and ground forces that complemented the strategy favored by American
military commanders, which would limit their value to an American-led coalition. Upon
47 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Press Availability: U.S. Deputy Secretary o f State Armitage
and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, September 20, 2001. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/
2 0 0 1 /s0 10920a.htm.
216
learning of the American approach to an invasion of Afghanistan, a Dutch military
analyst observed, NATO forces are not training for this kind of work.48
NATO Secretary General George Robertson acknowledged the difficulty that the
Alliance would encounter if it attempted to add a large scale warfighting operation to its
existing list of responsibilities. In a January 2001 speech he noted, For all the political
energy expended in NATO to implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and in the
EU to push ahead with the complementary Headline Goal process, the truth is that
Europe remains a military pygmy. Orders of battle and headquarters wiring diagrams
read impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tanks and aircraft give a similar
impression of military power. But the reality is that we are hard pressed to maintain about
50,000 European troops in the region and that a new operation would oblige most
European countries to slash their contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM [former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] to produce usable forces in any numbers.49 The
creation of another large intervention force under NATO command threatened the
continuation of existing operations by placing an even greater demand on the dwindling
personnel and resources of the European member states. While the attention of American
leaders continued to shift toward more volatile regions outside of Europe, other NATO
governments remained more inwardly focused. NATO leaders were preoccupied with
ongoing operations in Europe, including peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and conflict
prevention efforts in Macedonia. EU member states were preparing for the EUs first
48 Suzanne Daley, NATO, Though Supportive, Has Little to Offer Militarily, The N ew York Times,
September 20, 2001.
49 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Speech by the Secretary General at the Annual Conference o f
the D efence and Society, January 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020121a.htm
217
round of enlargement and the organization of the ERRF. Each of these activities would
affect the level of support that European militaries could provide to the GWOT.
The Bush administration formulated a military response to the September attacks
in a climate of strong domestic and international support. The organization of military
forces for OEF was conducted through a process U.S. Secretary of State Powell described
as the variable geometry of coalition-building. This approach attempted to build a
broad coalition of states by tailoring the participation of each state according to actions
they were both willing and able to take.50 The result of these efforts was a coalition of
coalitions, each tailored to particular aspects of the GWOT and made up of different
groups of state and non-state actors. The emerging series of diplomatic and military
coalitions gave the United States the access to international resources without sacrificing
control over the scope and pace of operations. One set of analysts observed,
Washington refused to cede any degree of control or even any right of consultation.
Assistance offered under even an implicit notion that participation conferred some such
rights was refused.51
Thus, rather than asking the NAC to organize a CJTF for deployment into
Afghanistan, American leaders asked individual allies to provide specific assets for an
American-led military campaign. NATO member states would make important
contributions to the military coalition, along with other key American allies. The United
States formed a military coalition for OEF based on the capability of allied forces, their
50 Woodward, Bush a t War, 49.
218
demonstrated interoperability with the American military, and the size and location of
support facilities. Many of the states bordering Afghanistan had little to offer in the way
of military forces, but provided transportation routes and access to bases that would be
crucial to the campaign. President George W. Bush remarked, Together, we're building
a very strong coalition against terror. And NATO is the cornerstone of that
coalition. But I want to remind my fellow citizens, the coalition goes way beyond
NATO.52 In the end, and the abundance of support pledged by other states and
international organizations allowed American leaders to organize a collective military
response on terms most favorable to their interests. Successful diplomatic efforts
combined with Americas military preponderance resulted in an approach to coalition
operations where, as Bush administration officials frequently observed, The mission has
determined the coalition; the coalition has not determined the mission."53
NATO Support fo r Operation Enduring Freedom
President George W. Bush made it clear from the beginning that the United States
would seek to retaliate against any state or non-state actor linked to the attacks. In his
address to the nation on September 11, 2001, President Bush declared, We will make no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor
them.54 As the evidence mounted against A1 Qaeda and the Taliban, the administration
52 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary. Remarks by the President and NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson in Photo Opportunity, October 1 0 ,2 0 0 1 , http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001
/10/20011010-6.htm l.
53 Woodward, Bush at War, 81.
54 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary. The President in His Address to the Nation, September 11,
2001, http://ww w .w hitehouse.gove/news/releases/2001/09/2001/20010911 -16.html.
219
clarified the objectives of a military response. Their primary objective was to capture or
kill the senior leadership of A1 Qaeda in order to prevent them from carrying out future
attacks. Previous attempts to disrupt A1 Qaeda had involved cruise missile strikes against
A1 Qaeda facilities, as the United States had done following an investigation into the
bombing of American embassies in Africa in 1998. President Bush felt the scope of the
most recent attacks justified a far more aggressive military response. He told members of
his cabinet, I dont want to use a million dollar missile to destroy a five dollar tent.55
The current administration envisioned military operations of greater scope and intensity
than previous attempts to target the leadership of A1 Qaeda. These operations would
seek to coerce the Taliban to cooperate with operations against A1 Qaeda or drive the
Taliban from power.
This policy was clarified during the Presidents address to Congress on September
20, 2001 when he called for all states to abandon the practice of sponsoring terrorism.
President Bush stated, We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are
with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime.56 He made several demands on the Taliban government, demanding that they
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of A1 Qaeda who hide in your land.
Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned.
56 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Joint Address to Congress and the American People, September
20, 2001, http://w w w .w hitehouse.gove/news/releases/2001/09/2001/20010920-8.htm l.
220
Protect journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your workers in your country. Close
immediately and permanently every terrorist structure. Give the United States full access
to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These
demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act
immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.57 The
Talibans refusal to comply with the American ultimatum led to the imminent outbreak of
hostilities.
The invasion of Afghanistan by large numbers of Western troops presented a
number of difficulties that American military planners hoped to avoid. These planners
did not wish to repeat the mistakes of foreign powers that had attempted to invade and
occupy Afghanistan in the past. Afghanistan endured many foreign occupations
throughout its history. Persian, Russian and British invasions all served to unify Afghans
against the invading powers. Feuding factions repeatedly came together to conduct
successful guerilla campaigns to drive out invaders. A large invasion force risked
resurrecting the traditional Afghan hatred of foreign invasion and giving the Afghan
people a reason to rally around the Taliban. Such a force would also require a great deal
of time to organize and deploy, making a covert operations strategy of providing
assistance to existing insurgencies within Afghanistan preferable to a conventional
ground invasion as a relatively quick and inexpensive means of achieving the
administrations objectives.
57 Ibid.
221
The United States provided the majority of forces for OEF, as would be expected
in a campaign initiated by American leaders and conducted under the oversight of an
American combatant command. The nature of the chosen strategy limited the necessity
for large deployments of ground troops, which allowed the United States to mobilize
National Guard and Reserve forces at much lower levels than during Operation Desert
Storm ten years earlier. American troop deployments peaked during at around 50,000
troops in the region (approximately 4,000 of which were operating inside of Afghanistan)
during the ground offensive in November 2001.58 Although American intelligence and
SOF personnel were only a small fraction of the deployed ground forces, their
contribution to the outcome was disproportionate to their numbers. According to one
estimate, only about 110 CIA advisors and 316 U.S. SOF personnel were sent to
Afghanistan to advise opposition forces and direct coalition airpower.59 These personnel
were joined by a small number of SOF units from NATO member states.
Those NATO member states possessing significant numbers of SOF personnel
available to serve alongside American units willingly offered them to the coalition. Great
Britain, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Denmark and France all deployed SOF forces to
Afghanistan during OEF. The number of SOF personnel contributed by each state
numbered in the tens rather than hundreds, but were complemented by larger contingents
of conventional troops held in reserve or employed in support functions. The overall
numbers of NATO allied troops participating in OEF climbed into the thousands during
58 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year o f Accomplishm ents, 7
October 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense/enduringfreedom.html
59 Woodward, Bush at War, 314 and 329.
222
the first few months of the campaign. Great Britain and Canada each made contributions
of between 1,700 and 2,500 troops, forming national contingents of troops operating
under the direction of U.S. Central Command. Germany, France and Spain also sent
sizeable contingents to the region. Even smaller NATO member states such as Norway
and the Czech Republic managed to deploy specialized units to the coalition for specific
missions such as reconnaissance and landmine removal.60
The coalition air campaign was dominated by American airpower, with NATO
allies providing additional forces in a complementary role. Approximately 400 U.S.
aircraft managed to conduct about 100 combat sorties a day for the first several weeks of
the campaign.61 These forces were supported by American reconnaissance and refueling
aircraft, including several unmanned aerial systems. The number of sorties flown by
American aircraft in OEF was higher than that of either ODF or OAF. U.S. aircraft flew
approximately 25,000 sorties between November 2001 and January 2002, dropping
roughly 18,000 bombs, including 10,000 precision munitions.62
American airpower was complemented by the deployment of nearly 100 aircraft
from other NATO member states. France made the single greatest allied contribution to
the air campaign during OEF, deploying numerous reconnaissance aircraft and tankers,
60 Global Security, Operation Enduring Freedom - Order o f Battle, http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-01 .htm
61 Ibid.
62 Michael E. O Hanlon, A Flawed M asterpiece, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May-June 2002): 47.
63 Global Security, Operation Enduring Freedom - Order o f Battle, and Nora B ensahel, The
Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica, CA,
RAND: 2003), Appendix A.
223
along with strike aircraft from the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and Mirage
2000 fighters operating out of Kyrgyzstan. French forces flew approximately ten percent
of the combat sorties during the first three phases of OEF, and played an important role in
support of coalition SOF units during Operation Anaconda in the spring of 2002. In the
first year of OEF, French pilots logged 12,000 flying hours and destroyed 33 targets
linked to Taliban or A1 Qaeda.64 Great Britain provided strike aircraft along with a small
number of tankers, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft. Canada deployed several
reconnaisance and transport aircraft and participated in homeland defense operations
under the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) by placing CF-18 fighters
on patrol throughout the country.65 Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Spain all contributed transport aircraft, which lessened the burden on American air
transport assets. Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark formed a detachment of 18 F-16
fighters to provide air support for ground forces operating in Afghanistan. This
detachment, designated the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF), logged nearly
4500 flying hours during the first year of OEF.66
On October 8, 2001 NATO leaders announced that Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft would be sent to the United States to help patrol U.S. airspace
in the first operational deployment of European military forces to the United States in the
64 Embassy o f France in the United States, National D efense Update, 7 April 2 005,
http://www.ambaffance-us.org/atoz/defense.asp.
65 Canadian Ministry o f National Defense, Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces Contribution to the
International Campaign Against Terrorism, January 7, 2001, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom /
view_news_e.asp?id=490.
66 Roar Sundseth , The War on Terrorism: A N orw egians Perspective, CENTCOM Coalition Bulletin,
no. 2 (November 2002): 8.
224
history of the Alliance. These aircraft were part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning
Force (NAEWF) that had been jointly manned and funded by the allies since 1980.
NAEWF was made up of aircraft based in Germany and Great Britain, serving under the
command of SHAPE and currently conducting monitoring missions in support of SFOR
and KFOR. French AW ACS were sent to the Balkans in order to backfill the NATO
AWACS transferred to NORAD to aid in the monitoring of American airspace for
several months. The deployment was given the name Operation Eagle Assist and
consisted of sending five AWACS aircraft and their aircrews to Tinker Air Force Base in
Oklahoma. Personnel from thirteen NATO member states participated in Operation
Eagle Assist flying over 4300 hours in approximately 360 operational sorties between
October 2001 and May 2002, which made up approximately twenty five percent of the
AW ACS patrols during this period.67
Three U.S. Navy carrier battle groups played a large role throughout the initial
phases of the conflict. The USS Roosevelt served as the hub for naval operations in the
theater, with the commander of the carrier battle group also providing direction to
coalition naval forces. In addition to serving as a platform for U.S. Navy aircraft
conducting airstrikes in Afghanistan, the USS Kittyhawk served as a forward operating
base for SOF troops. While the United States once again had the largest naval force
deployed to the region, NATO allies established an important presence in both the
Arabian and Mediterranean Seas. At the peak of the campaign, there were more than 80
coalition naval vessels deployed in the Arabian Sea.
67 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement by the Secretary General on the Conclusion o f
Operation Eagle A ssist, April 30, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/04-april/e0430a.htm.
225
The U.S. Navy was joined in the Arabian Sea by ships from several NATO allies
including Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Spain. The British navy played an important role in OEF from the very beginning, with
three Royal Navy submarines launching cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan on
October 7, 2001 and then again six days later. Great Britain also deployed a naval task
force to the region, led by the aircraft carrier, the HMS Illustrious. French naval assets in
the region included a frigate, supply ship, two minehunters, and a mobile support vessel.
Italy also contributed its carrier battle group, later relieved by a destroyer and a frigate.68
Canada deployed a naval task group comprised of three frigates, a destroyer and a supply
ship to operate alongside the American carrier battle groups in the region.69 Coalition
navies monitored commercial sea lanes, boarding suspicious vessels and escorting
coalition boats through the Arabian Sea. As the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan and
A1 Qaeda members began seeking refuge elsewhere, NATO vessels began naval patrols
off the coast of Somalia. Germany dispatched a seven-ship naval force for this purpose,
which coordinated its efforts with French and British aircraft conducting surveillance
flights over the country.70
The NAC approved Operation Active Endeavor as an adjunct to OEF on October
26, 2001, calling for the movement of the Alliances Standing Naval Forces
68 U.S. Central Command, International Contributions to the War on Terrorism, http://www.centcom.mil/

Operations/Coalition/joint.htm.
69 Canadian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Backgrounder: Canadas Action Against
Terrorism Since September 11, January 3, 2002, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/
canadaactions-en.asp.
70 Thomas Ricks, A llies Step Up Somalia Watch; U.S. Aim s to Keep A1 Qaeda at Bay, The Washington
Post, January 4, 2002.
226
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) from the Western to Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
STANAVFORMED consisted of nine ships, forming the nucleus around which to build
a more versatile and powerful naval force, whenever required.71 Operation Active
Endeavor pre-positioned NATO naval forces in the event that they were needed to
support any expansion of the campaign in Afghanistan. STANAVFORMED also
monitored commercial shipping in the area, reserving the right to intercept and board any
ships suspected of transporting or supporting terrorists. Shared interest in keeping the
Mediterraneans busy trade routes open and secure gave Operation Active Endeavor a
mandate that extended well beyond the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. After an initial
six month deployment, a rotation schedule was worked out with NATOs Standing Naval
Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) enabling a NATO presence to be extended
indefinitely and adding escort duties for ships passing through choke points in and
around the Mediterranean Sea.72
Ground, air, and naval forces from NATO member states clearly contributed to
the success of OEF, although their presence was not decisive to the outcome of the
campaign. While NATO forces demonstrated their ability to work together effectively
under American leadership, the campaign was not conducted without some conflict
among the allies. In the absence of a multinational command structure, French
participation in OEF was only approved on a case-by-case basis. Prime Minister Lionel
71NATO Office o f Information and Press, NA TO Naval Force D eploys to Eastern Mediterranean, October
9, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1008/el009a.htm .
72 Operation A ctive Endeavor would eventually be expanded to include the escort o f non-military ships
through the Strait o f Gibralter. This operation remains active and continues to contribute to the peaceful
flow o f commercial shipping throughout the Mediterranean.
227
Jospin emphasized, Frances participation in new operations necessitates our full
involvement in the definition of the objectives and military planning and, with respect to
our own forces, our approval of them73 While cooperation among participating NATO
forces was continually improving throughout OEF, the unease of some NATO leaders
with an American-led command structure begs the question of how long the collective
effort could have been maintained had major difficulties been encountered during the
ground offensive. The fall of the Taliban by the end of 2001 presented American and
European leaders with an opportunity to reflect on the progress of recent counter
terrorism operations and to decide where to proceed next in the ongoing effort to reduce
the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
NATOs Role in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations in Afghanistan
Alliance officials began preparations for some level of participation in post-
conflict stability operations in Afghanistan during the early days of OEF. These
preparations were an outgrowth of the invocation of Article Five of the North Atlantic
Treaty on October 4, 2001, and the NACs agreement to provide, individually or
collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to allies and
other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their
support for the campaign against terrorism.74 Given the Alliances experience in peace
73 French M ission to United Nations, Replies by M. Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister, to Questions in the
National Assem bly, Novem ber 6, 2001, http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/011106_mae_
jospin_asie.htm.
74 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement to the Press B y NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson o f the North Atlantic Council D ecision on Implementation o f Article 5 o f the Washington Treaty
Follow ing the 11 September Attacks Against the United States, October 4, 2001, http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm.
228
operations, NAC formally tasked NATO's military authorities on November 13, 2001
with preparing contingency plans for possible humanitarian operations in and around
Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General Robertson later emphasized the suitability of
NATO experience and capabilities to the situation in Afghanistan, stating NATO has a
vital role - in my view, the vital role - to play in multinational crisis prevention and crisis
management."75 NATOs experience in the Balkans had resulted in numerous initiatives
that could be replicated in future peace operations, including the formation of civil-
military coordination centers and the dissemination of common doctrine suitable to
provide guidance to multinational forces.
While the participation of the United States NATO allies in OEF merely
complemented the efforts of American combat forces, these allies made more significant
contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The actions of European
governments working through NATO, the EU and the UN contributed greatly to
maintaining order in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban. These efforts included
the German governments hosting of a conference of Afghan leaders to develop an
interim government to lead Afghanistans transition to democracy. European
governments were also reasonably well-represented in international aid contributions to
Afghanistan. During international aid conferences in Tokyo (2002) and Berlin (2004),
European states accounted for around 30% of the $12.5 billion in grants aimed at
financing post-war reconstruction efforts. 76 Another key contribution came with British
75 D iego Ruiz, The Road to Kabul, NATO R eview 51, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 10.
76 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, The E U s Relations with Afghanistan,

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/.
229
agreement to organize and command a post-Taliban stabilization mission to be fielded
alongside OEF coalition forces. The International Security Assistance Force was
established under a UN Security council mandate, but predominantly manned by NATO
member states and eventually placed under NATO command. NATOs post-war role in
Afghanistan demonstrated the Alliances continued relevance as well as an emerging
distribution of labor between the United States and its NATO allies in the conduct of
military interventions.
American leaders recognized the need for stabilization and peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan, but sought to keep these efforts separate from OEF. The
United States intended to maintain thousands of troops in Afghanistan to kill or capture
the remnants of A1 Qaeda and the Taliban, and American military leaders were reluctant
to see OEF transition into a peacekeeping operation. President George W. Bush strongly
favored the creation of an international peacekeeping force to lessen the burden on
American military forces and allow them to continue focusing on offensive operations.
President Bush reportedly remarked to the NSC in the fall of 2001, I oppose using the
military for nation building. Once the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers.77 In
December 2001 testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard
Haas, U.S. Department of State Director of Policy Planning, assured the committee that
the United States would have a very limited role in the post-war reconstruction of
Afghanistan. Haas suggested that other countries should accept most of the responsibility
for rebuilding Afghanistan, because the United States was doing the lion's share of the
77 Woodward, Bush a t War, 237.
230
no
worlds work in OEF. These views were also reflected in the comments of White
House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, when questioned about President Bushs apparent
distaste for peacekeeping missions. Fleischer told reporters during a January 2002 press
briefing, The United States has a series of commitments around the world to
peacekeeping that the president is honoring. The president would like, over time, to be
able to draw those down so the core mission of our military can remain focused on a
combat-ready force.79
In an effort to keep United States military forces focused almost entirely on
offensive counter-terrorism operations, American officials turned to its NATO allies with
a request that they take the lead in organizing and equipping a peacekeeping force for
Afghanistan. American diplomats succeeded in adding an appeal for international
assistance to the UN-sponsored Bonn Agreement, stating Conscious that some time
may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and
functioning, the participants in the U.N. talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations
Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United
Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul
and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded
to other urban centers and other areas.80 As conceived by American leaders, this
78 Jonathan Wright, U.S. outlines Limited Role in Rebuilding, Houston Chronicle, December 7, 2001.
79 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, January 28, 2002,
http://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2002/01/20020128-ll.htm l.
80
Afghan Transitional Government, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-establishment o f Permanent Government Institutions, Annex I: International Security Force, December
5, 2001, http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm.
231
multinational force would be subordinate to the American-led OEF coalition, and even
more significantly, virtually devoid of American troops.
The mandate for the first International Security Assistance Force to Afghanistan
(ISAF I) was established by UNSCR 1386 on December 20, 2001. ISAF I consisted of
approximately 5,000 troops with a mandate to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim
Authority as well as the personnel of the U.N. can operate in a secure environment.81 In
addition to assisting Afghan security forces, ISAF I would complement the work of the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other NGOs engaged
in providing economic assistance throughout the country. ISAF Is limited size and
mandate assured both Afghan citizens and participating governments that ISAF would
not play the role of an occupying army. ISAF I troop levels were small in comparison to
the tens of thousands of troops allocated to NATO-led peacekeeping and reconstruction
efforts in the Balkans. ISAF I would provide much-needed security assistance to
Karzais fledgling government, but would not have the resources to complete a wholesale
political and economic transformation of Afghanistan. U.S. State Department officials
estimated that a peacekeeping force deployed throughout all of Afghanistan with a
mandate similar to that of SFOR or KFOR would need around 25,000 troops, as
compared to the 4,700 peacekeepers in Afghanistan by the spring of 2002.82
81 United Nations Documentation Center. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, December
2 0 ,2 0 0 1 . http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G EN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf70penElem ent.
82 Michael Elliott, "The Battle over Peacekeeping: A s the fighting in Afghanistan Drags on, American
Troops Risk Being Dragged into a M essy Civil War," Time, March 4, 2002. http://www.tim e.com /time/
m agazine/article/0,9171,1001917,00.html.
232
Great Britain assumed leadership of ISAF I during its crucial first six months of
operations in Afghanistan. To prevent any conflict between ISAF I and OEF, American
and British representatives drafted agreements wherein ISAF commanders would keep
U.S. Central Command informed of their activities and allow OEF operations to take
precedence over those of ISAF.83 In return, OEF coalition forces would provide logistics,
airlift, communications and intelligence support for ISAF I. As lead nation, Great Britain
supplied the largest number of troops, around 1,800 soldiers, and appointed officers to fill
key leadership positions. As it turned out, 12 of the 18 states participating in ISAF I were
NATO members, while another five were members of NATOs PfP.84 ISAF I was
structured around three levels of command: ISAF headquarters in UK Permanent Joint
Headquarters near London, the Multinational Brigade headquarters in Kabul and the
Kabul International Airport task force. ISAF I commanders worked with the interim
Afghan government to begin the process of reopening Kabul International Airport along
with hundreds of other reconstruction and humanitarian aid projects.
Turkey volunteered to assume leadership of ISAF II after six months, and the
change of leadership was approved by the United Nations Security Council with the
passage of UNSCR 1413.85 This renewal of the mission was accompanied by the transfer
83 United Nations Documentation Center, Letter from the Permanent Representative o f the UK to the
President o f the Security Council, 19 December 2001, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2001/sc7248.doc.htm .
84 NATO member states in ISAF I included Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. PfP member states
included Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania and Sweden. N ew Zealand was the only non-NATO
participant in ISAF I.
85 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1413, May 23,
2002. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf7OpenElem ent.
233
of ISAF headquarters from its location near London to the Turkish General Staff
headquarters in Ankara and a rotation of forces among participating states. The overall
number of forces participating in ISAF II remained relatively stable, although some states
elected to withdraw troops while others began providing troops for the first time. The
vast majority of ISAF II forces continued to come from NATO member and partner
states. NATOs Secretary General, lobbied hard for continued contributions from NATO
member states reminding NATO members, Whereas geography once isolated Europe
and North America from the fall-out of instability in other parts of the world, this is no
longer the case today. Increasingly, we must expect far-away conflicts to spill over into
our societies in the form of migration, rising numbers of asylum seekers and smuggling,
or
of humans, drugs and weapons. ISAF II continued much of the work began under
ISAF I, along with increased efforts to train the Afghanistan National Army.
The rotation of forces and command responsibilities was repeated once again six
months later when Germany and the Netherlands jointly agreed to lead ISAF III
beginning in February 2003. This rotation marked a greater convergence between the
conduct of the Afghanistan peacekeeping mission and ongoing organizational reforms
within the Alliance. ISAF headquarters moved to the Bundeswehr Operational
Command near Berlin, which had recently been designated a joint NATO corps
headquarters for German and Dutch forces under AFNORTH. ISAF commanders
exploited their status within the NATO command structure and requested planning
assistance from the SHAPE staff. NAC approved their request and SHAPE helped ISAF
86 George Robertson, Investing in Security, NATO R eview 50, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 8.
234
commanders generate forces, and provided access to NATO intelligence along with
communications and information systems.87
As it became apparent that the Afghanistan governments need for security
assistance would continue indefinitely, the NAC debated whether SHAPES advisory role
to the lead nations directing operations in Afghanistan should be replaced by NATOs
formal command of ISAF. General James Jones, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander
Europe and Commander of the U.S. European Command, commented on SHAPES
suitability to command ISAF, stating It's not a classic NATO mission, but the key
countries involved are NATO members and they are using NATO terminology, NATO
procedures and NATO capabilities. In the event of crises that are humanitarian in nature
or require peacekeeping, NATO has proven that it can deal with them.88 NATO
command would provide greater stability and predictability to ISAF operations by
eliminating the need to search for a new lead nation and transfer operations to a new
headquarters every six months. As an additional benefit, the existence of a standing
headquarters would encourage greater participation by smaller NATO member and
partner states that were willing to contribute personnel, but unable to assume all of the
responsibilities of a lead nation.
By the fall of 2003, the NAC agreed to assume responsibility for the command,
coordination and planning of future ISAF missions. NATO General Secretary Robertson
lobbied hard for NATO leadership of ISAF IV, arguing AH of [our] members
87 D iego Ruiz, Afghanistan's Transformational Challenge, NATO Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 2005)
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art2.htm l.
88 Interview with General James L. Jones, SACUER, NATO Review 51, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 24.
235
understand and agree that if we do not go to Afghanistan, and succeed in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan and its problems will come to us. Worse still, we would have to deal with the
terrorists, the refugees and the drug traffickers with a much weaker international security
structure because NATO would have been severely damaged and the concept of
multinational security cooperation, whether in NATO, the European Union, the United
Nations or coalitions, would have been dealt an equally heavy blow.89 Rather than
transferring command of ISAF IV to Canada as planned in August 2003, the NAC
appointed a Canadian general officer as the Joint Force Commander for the NATO-led
mission along with a multinational staff drawn from participating states. Although
continuing to operate under a UN mandate, the NAC would provide direction to
participating forces from both NATO member and non-member states. Under revisions
to NATOs organizational structure, all military operations would receive strategic
guidance from Allied Command Operations (ACO), headquartered at SHAPE. Joint
Force Command (JFC) Brunssum in the Netherlands, one of two NATO JFCs, provided
operational command for ISAF to include manning, training, and deployment of ISAF
personnel. Within Afghanistan, the Kabul Multinational Brigade headquarters provided
tactical direction to ISAF IV forces organized into three battle groups. While NATO
once again demonstrated its utility as a resource for the organization and command of
multinational forces, this effort was limited to peacekeeping and reconstruction activities.
Offensive counter-terrorism operations would continue to be conducted by the American-
led international coalitions deployed first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.
89 George Robertson, Change and Continuity, NATO R eview 51, no 3 (Winter 2003): 3.
236
Confronting Iraq Over Alleged WMD Development
As conditions stabilized in Afghanistan in early 2002, the United States became
more concerned with the perceived threat posed by Iraq and other rogue states that
continued to pursue WMD programs and provide support for international terrorist
groups. Initial attempts to establish a link between Iraq and the September 2001 attacks
had proven unfruitful. Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned that there was no
evidence that Iraq had been directly involved in the attacks using this event to justify an
invasion of Iraq could undermine international support. Powell reportedly told President
Bush in the fall of 2001, They [the coalition partners] will view it as bait and switch -
its not what they signed up to do.90 Even Vice President Cheney recognized that world
opinion did not favor an attack on Iraq at that time, noting If we go after Saddam now,
we lose our rightful place as the good guy.91 The Bush administration decided to
emphasize the danger posed by Iraqs continued possession of WMD as part of an effort
to further isolate Iraq and create more favorable conditions for a future confrontation with
Iraq.
President Bushs January 2002 State of the Union speech described the risk posed
by states that continued to provide support to terrorist groups while disregarding
international nonproliferation accords. The President expressed a renewed emphasis on a
strategy of preemption, noting I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not
stand as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the
90 Woodward, Bush a t War, 87-91.
91 Ibid, 25.
237
worlds most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the worlds most destructive
92
weapons. The Bush administrations policy of preemption was rooted in
recommendations assembled through studies conducted within the Department of
Defense under Secretary Cheneys leadership in the early 1990s. Cheneys Defense
Strategy fo r the 1990s advocated the continued growth of American military power to
preserve the United States global dominance. The study recommended that American
military forces strive for the capability to launch preemptive attacks on states seeking to
develop weapons of mass destruction. While this study emphasized the existence of
proliferation concerns among a large number of states, President Bush expressed a
particular concern for the activities of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Bush stated, States
like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace
of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and
QQ
growing danger.
The Bush administration promoted its strategy of preemption throughout 2002,
making it clear that this strategy applied not only to counter-terrorism operations, but
could also be used to justify attacks on sovereign states. During his commencement
speech to the United States Military Academy at West Point in June 2002, President Bush
argued that the right of self-defense should be extended in order to authorize pre-emptive
attacks against potential aggressors before they are able to launch strikes against the
United States. He pointed out the shortfall of other strategies, noting Deterrence means
92 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, President Delivers State o f the Union Address, January 29,
2002. http://www. whitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html
93 Ibid.
238
nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction
can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We
cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.. .our security will require
all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.94 In September, 2002, the Bush
administration further described its policy of preemption in its first update to the National
Security Strategy of the United States. The NSS stated We must be prepared to stop
rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD
against the U.S. and out allies and friends...While the United States will constantly strive
to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.95
The Bush administrations attempts to increase international support for a
preemptive strike against Iraq included appeals to both the United Nations and NATO.
In the fall of 2002, the United States crafted a new Security Council resolution
authorizing the use of force in Iraq. President Bushs speech to the United Nations on
September 12, 2002 challenged the UN to enforce Iraqi disarmament pledges. He asked,
Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without
consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be
94 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, President Delivers Graduation Speech at W est Point, June 1,
2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.htm l
95 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, The N ational Security Strategy o f the United States o f Am erica
(Washington D.C.: White House, 2002), 15.
239
irrelevant?96 The United States succeeded in prodding the UN into action, but was
unable to gain unequivocal support for the use of force against Iraq. Instead, the Security
Council passed a UNSCR 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to comply with the
disarmament and inspection provisions specified in previous resolutions or face serious
consequences.97
American officials also explored ways of further improving NATOs ability to
participate in out-of-area operations upon short notice. Acting on lessons learned during
military operations in Afghanistan, American officials introduced a number of reforms
for consideration during the next NATO summit scheduled for November. U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld proposed the organization of a standing NATO Reaction
Force (NRF) in order to have forces on hand for short-notice deployments, as had been
required the previous fall. NRF was envisioned as a technologically advanced, flexible,
deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements
ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.98 This force
would have the ability to perform the full spectrum of military missions related to
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, ranging from humanitarian relief operations to
high-intensity combat operations. These troops would be maintained at a high state of
96 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations
General Assem bly, September 12, 2002, http://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2002/09/20020912-
l.html.
97 United Nations Documentation Center. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441,Novem ber 8,
2002. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf7OpenElem ent.
98
NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads o f State and
Government Participating in the Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Novem ber 21, 2 002,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.
240
readiness so that they could begin deploying within five days of a request with the
capability of sustaining operations for up to 30 days without outside assistance. It was
estimated to require roughly two years to organize, train and equip an initial NRF
brigade, with the full operational capability of the NRF to be achieved within four years.
A fully operational NRF force of 20,000 was envisioned to consist of multiple brigades,
each consisting of ground, air and maritime forces along with command and support
elements for independent out-of-area operations."
A second initiative introduced at the Prague Summit was the declaration of a new
commitment to improve the capabilities of NATO militaries to enhance their combat
effectiveness. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was intended to address
shortfalls in the counter-terrorism capabilities of many NATO militaries by enabling
them to deploy faster and to be sustained for longer periods far from their home bases.
Operational shortfalls were identified for particular emphasis in the areas of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat
effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air
defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and
combat service support units.100 Initial expectations were that PCC would quadruple the
number of large transport aircraft operated by European member states, establish an
99 The first operational deployment o f the NRF took place in October 2005 when the N A C agreed to
provide humanitarian relief to Pakistan follow ing a large earthquake. The NRF consisted o f forces from
several NATO countries equipped to provide food, shelter, and medical care for thousands o f Pakistani
civilians for up to six months.
100 NATO Office o f Information and Press, Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads o f State and
Government Participating in the M eeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Novem ber 21, 2 002.
241
interoperable pool of tankers, and increase the stock of precision-guided munitions
among European air forces by forty percent.101
In an attempt to assure a high level of compliance with the pledges made as part
of PCC, each state was asked to specify the capability improvements that it would pursue,
either alone or with other member states. Germany agreed to lead a consortium to
explore options for improving NATOs airlift capacity, to include proposals to lease a
number of transport aircraft in the short term. The Netherlands led an effort to explore
additional munitions purchases on part of several NATO governments. Spain accepted
the responsibility for crafting an lease arrangement for up to 100 tanker aircraft. Several
states, including Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey all agreed to
upgrade their intelligence and surveillance capabilities through the acquisition of
unmanned aerial vehicle systems.102 NATO General Secretary George Robertson, noted,
Many allies are committed to making improvements individually, others to forming
teams to address shortfalls more effectively. But importantly, all these commitments are
clear and specific - which will make it easy to monitor progress. In this way, the Prague
Capabilities Commitment marks a real turning point in the adaptation of European
capabilities to the requirements of the 21st century.103
While some discussions were held on the increased tensions over Iraq during and
after the Prague Summit, little progress was made on determining the Alliances role in
101 Christopher Bennett, Combatting Terrorism, NATO R eview 51, no 1 (Spring 2003): 6.
102 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, NATO: Building N ew Capabilities for N ew
Challenges, Novem ber 21, 2002, http://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2002/ll/20021121-6.htm l.
103 George Robertson, Transforming N A TO , NATO R eview 51, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 3.
242
the crisis. When asked in September 2002 about approaching NATO to organize and
command a multinational force for the invasion of Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld replied, I can't imagine it...I have no idea, it hasn't crossed my mind, we've not
proposed it.104 A declaration was issued during the summit expressing the support of
NATO governments for the terms laid out in UNSCR 1441. This declaration stated, We
support the goal of the international community for full disarmament of Iraq as stipulated
in the UN Security Council Resolution 1441. In the event of non-compliance with the
terms of this resolution, we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to
enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.105 NATOs relationship to such a
coalition was left unresolved, with many leaders clearly hopeful that the crisis would pass
before such a coalition would have to be formed.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited NATO headquarters in
December 2002 to formally request that the Alliance prepare to provide support to the
United States and Turkey in the event of war with Iraq. Alliance officials were asked to
consider sending AW ACS aircraft, Patriot missile defense units, and chemical and
biological warfare detection units to Turkey; to direct NATO naval forces to aid in the
defense of American ships in the Mediterranean Sea, to provide allied troops to defend
American military bases in Europe and possibly the Persian Gulf; to further offset
reductions in the United States military forces participating in NATO peacekeeping
missions; and to assist with postwar reconstruction and peacekeeping. After several
104 U.S. Department o f Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld M edia Availability En Route to Poland, September
22, 2002, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2002/t09232002_t0922sd.htm l.
105 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Summit Declaration on Iraq, November 21, 2002,
http://www.nati.int/docu/com m /2002/0211-prague/index.htm
243
weeks of discussion among subordinate planning bodies, these proposals were rejected in
light of opposition from several NATO governments. Representatives of France,
Germany, and Belgium all felt that it was premature to begin such planning while UN
inspectors were still in the process of assessing Iraqs compliance with UNSCR 1441.
While American requests for assistance were soon rescinded, the question of the
Alliances responsibility to aid in the defense of Turkey continued to be pursued.
The NAC was forced to reconsider the issue when Turkey invoked Article Four of
the North Atlantic Treaty. This article obliges NATO member states to consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence
or security of any of the Parties is threatened.106 Despite the added gravity of the
request provided by Turkeys reference to Article Four and the removal of American
appeals for NATO troop contributions, France, Belgium, and Germany once against
voiced their opposition and denied the request. Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel
summarized their concerns, stating that any concrete measures to provide for Turkeys
defense would signify that we have already entered into the logic of war... [and] any
initiative to still resolve the conflict in a peaceful way was gone.107 American officials
were both surprised and angered by the willingness of some member states to shirk what
they believed to be the Alliances collective-defense responsibilities to Turkey,
prompting U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to observe, The Alliance is breaking
106 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
107 Paul Ames, France, Germany, Belgium Block NA TO Plans to Protect Turkey, A ssociated Press,
February 10, 2003.
244
itself up because it will not meet its responsibilities.108 NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson attempted to be more upbeat, observing that there is complete agreement
among NATO countries about their commitment to defend Turkey, and on the substance
of the planning measures but that there has been a disagreement is over when to
formally task this military planning. Not whether to plan but when to plan.109
The deadlock in the NAC was overcome the Secretary Generals use of a
procedural maneuver that allowed the debate to be transferred to NATOs Defense
Planning Committee (DPC). The DPC was composed of representatives from all NATO
member countries except France, who had left the committee as part of its military
realignment in 1966. Lengthy discussion within the committee eventual resulted in the
agreement of Germany and Belgium to allow NATO to provide limited assistance to
Turkey. The resulting compromise specified that NATOs assistance relates only to the
defense of Turkey and would not obligate the Alliance to provide additional support for
a future invasion of Iraq.110 Operation Display Deterrence began the day after an
agreement was made, and consisted of the deployment of NATO AW ACS aircraft to
Turkey along with Patriot missile defense batteries and units specializing in the detection
of chemical and biological agents.
NATO member states remained divided in their views regarding the necessity for
a confrontation with Iraq over its alleged WMD programs. While U.S. public opinion in
108 Julia Preston and Steven Weisman, France Offering Plan to Expand Iraq Arms Hunt, The N ew York
Times, February 12, 2003.
109
N ATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement by the Secretary General on the North Atlantic
Council Meeting, February 6, 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030206a.htm .
110 NATO Blocked on Iraq D ecision, The W ashington Post, January 23, 2003.
245
the latter part of 2002 supported military action against Iraq, European public opinion
tended only to support military action only in the context of another UNSCR. Chancellor
Schroeders concern over growing anti-war sentiment led him promise that Germany
would decline to participate in any military operation in Iraq, even if such an operation
were authorized by the UN Security Council. He further promised to withdraw German
troops stationed in Kuwait in the event of an American attack on Iraq. U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld challenged characterizations of blanket opposition to the use
of force among European governments, stating Germany has been a problem and France
has been a problem, but if you look at the vast majority of other countries in Europe,
theyre not with France and Germany.. .Youre thinking about Europe as Germany and
France. I dont. I think thats old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe
today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east.111 France, Germany, and Belgium
found themselves leading a group of NATO governments on one side of the debate with
Great Britain, Spain, Italy, among those states supporting the United States. On January
30, 2003 eight European NATO heads of state issued an open letter of support for U.S.
11 2
policy toward Iraq. The letter acknowledged past American contributions to European
security and cautioned, The trans-Atlantic relationship must not become a casualty of
the current Iraqi regimes persistent attempts to threaten world security. In todays
111 U.S. Department o f Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center, January 22,
2003, http://www.defenselink.m il/news/Jan2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html.
112 The NATO states represented in this effort included Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.
246
world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion.113
These leaders further stated, We must remain united in insisting that his regime is
disarmed... The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are
our best hope of achieving this peacefully. Our strength lies in unity.114
The vast majority of new and prospective NATO members from Eastern and
Central Europe also aligned themselves with the United States. Shortly after the
publication of the first letter of support from eight NATO governments, a group of ten
aspiring NATO governments declared their support for the American position on Iraq.
The governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia published a letter stating, Our countries understand the
dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our
shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand
together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of
mass destruction.115 The support provided by these governments to the United States
was widely acknowledged to encourage American enthusiasm for further NATO
expansion. One scholar observed, In the east, it seems that much of the political class
113 Jose Maria Aznar, Jose-Manuel Durao Barroso, Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair, Vaclav Havel, Peter
M edgyessy, Leszek Miller, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, European Leaders in Support o f U .S ., Wall
Street Journal, January 30, 2003.
114 Ibid.
115 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statement o f the Vilnius Group Countries, February 5, 2 003,
http ://w w w. nato.int/romania/vilgroupo wel .htm.
247
believes that ensuring the continued American presence in Europe is more important than
lack of public enthusiasm for one particular war.116
The division among NATO governments was reflected in the UN Security
Council. American leaders remained willing to give the United Nations another
opportunity to act while additional American and British forces were deployed to the
Middle East. Troop deployments accelerated throughout the fall of 2002, with the goal of
making an invasion possible after the first of the year during the cooler winter months.
Renewed inspections by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) yielded mixed evidence of Iraqi cooperation between
November 2002 and January 2003. The inspectors January 2003 report noted that access
to previously restricted sites and interviews with some Iraqi scientists had been granted,
but that incidents of obstruction and harassment indicated that the Iraqi government
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament
which was demanded of it. 117 The Security Council was divided among leaders that
felt the inspections should be given more time, and those that contended that the
inspections had once again failed. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell summarized the
intelligence supporting allegations of Iraqs links to terrorist groups and possession of
WMD in a briefing to the UN General Assembly, only to have the French Foreign
Minister dispute much of his evidence. The United States, Great Britain and Spain
116 Anne Applebaum, Old Europe vs. N ew Europe, in B eyond P aradise and Power: Europe, Am erica and
the Future o f a Troubled Partnership, ed. Tod Linberg (New York: Routledge, 2005), 36.
117 United Nations Documentation Center, An Update on Inspection: Report o f the Executive Chairman o f
UNMOVIC to the United Nations Security Council, January 27, 2003, http://www.un.org/
Depts/unmovic/ recent%20items.html.
248
jointly introduced another resolution authorizing military action against Iraq while France
and Germany prepared an alternative resolution calling for a strengthened weapons
inspection regime. Both resolutions were withdrawn in early March after French leaders
made it clear that they, along with Russia, would veto any Security Council resolution
authorizing the immediate use of force against Iraq. This deadlock meant that any
support to the American-led effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power would have to
be provided on a bilateral basis, without the benefit of a mandate from either NATO or
the UN.
NATO Support fo r Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
In the first few days of the war, President George W. Bush noted that the
coalition that weve assembled today is larger than one assembled in 1991 in terms of the
number of nations participating. Im very pleased with the size of our coalition.118
While the coalition assembled for OIF did indeed consist of a greater number of states
than those assembled for either Desert Storm or OEF, only a few of these states
demonstrated a willingness or capability to contribute to combat operations in Iraq.119
Of these, Great Britain made the most extensive contribution to the military campaign.
Prime Minister Tony Blair overcame considerable parliamentary and public opposition to
give his country a leading role alongside the United States in both the military and
118 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Availability,
March 27, 2003, http://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2003/03/20030327-3.htm l.
119 The declared coalition o f 44 countries supporting military action in Iraq included: Afghanistan, Angola,
Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Great Britain, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, M ongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea,
Spain, United States and Uzbekistan.
249
diplomatic battles waged over Iraq. Great Britain contributed an armored division along
an Amphibious Task Group consisting of 33 ships. British deployments far exceeded
that of any other ally, eventually reaching 46,000 troops, and equating to nearly one
quarter of British land forces and one third of British air forces.120 These were among the
only forces to serve in combat roles alongside America troops during the invasion of Iraq.
Both military and diplomatic support was provided by a number of traditionally
Atlanticist states, including many of the Alliances newest members. Denmark
contributed a medical unit along with two warships and a submarine to monitor Iraqi
intelligence activities. Spain similarly deployed three naval vessels in support of OIF.
Spain, Italy, and Portugal all allowed the United States military to use their airbases and
seaports. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania offered the use of their bases and airspace
along with small numbers of support troops. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
contributed antibiological and antichemical warfare units, although these units remained
based in Kuwait throughout the duration of the war.121
The newest members of NATO offered support despite suggestions by some other
European leaders that overt support for the war might endanger their efforts to gain entry
into the EU. During a February EU Summit, the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs
Committee chairman, Elmar Brok, reminded candidate countries that the Maastricht
Treaty required all members to support without reservation the EU's foreign policy
positions and that support for U.S. policy in Iraq might ultimately endanger those
120 These numbers represent approximately one quarter o f the British land forces and one third o f British air
forces. John Keegan, The Iraq War (N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf: 2004), 100.
121 Condoleezza Rice, Our Coalition, Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2003.
250
candidates accession. 122 Despite these and other warnings, the Polish government
continued to express support for the United States and joined the British in sending
special operations forces to participate in the combat phases of OIF. Other NATO
governments were less interested in upsetting domestic and international contingents and
rebuffed the American requests for support.
Turkeys refusal to contribute forces or even to allow the United States to launch
attacks into Iraq from Turkish soil came as a surprise to many American officials. The
Islamist Justice and Development Party gained power during parliamentary elections in
November 2002, making negotiations more difficult for American diplomats and military
planners hoping to establish a northern front in the event of a war with Iraq. The Turkish
government resisted American pressure to allow United States military forces to launch
an attack against Iraq from its territory. Numerous enticements, including the offer of $6
billion in foreign aid, were insufficient to gain the approval of the Turkish parliament.123
Turkish desires to support the United States in its attempt to remove Saddam Hussein
from power were balanced by public opposition to initiating a war against a fellow
Muslim state and concerns that any assistance to Kurdish forces in Iraq could encourage
Kurdish separatists in Turkey to rekindle their attempts to acquire greater autonomy.
Turkeys rejection of basing and transit rights caused considerable difficulties for
American military planners. Although many states in the region agreed to quietly lend
support to the American-led coalition, there were few other governments willing to serve
122 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty N ew s Line, European O fficials Suggest Stances on Iraq Might A ffect
A ccession, February 10, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/02/100203.asp.
123 Keegan, The Iraq War, 138.
251
as basing sites. Saudi leaders declined to give the United States and its coalition partners
access to the command facilities used during the 1991 Gulf War. Strained relations with
Iran and Syria made the stationing of American troops on their soil out of the question
despite their history of conflict with the Iraq. Jordan had a history of greater cooperation
with the United Sates, but its government did not wish to allow coalition forces to operate
from their territory for fear of a public backlash. As a result, troops based in Qatar,
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait would serve as the central invasion force. Military planners
were forced to revert to a secondary strategy of equipping some 50,000 Kurdish fighters
in northern Iraq so that they could fight alongside coalition special operations forces.
The Turkish government eventually conceded to support this strategy by restoring
overflight rights for American aircraft and granting permission for the transport of
military supplies through Turkey.
The Iraq War began on March 19, 2003 with an American attempt to decapitate
the Iraqi leadership by launching an airstrike on a location just outside of Baghdad where
Saddam Hussein was reported to be meeting with top Iraqi officials. American and
British ground forces entered Iraq from Kuwait the following day, frustrating Iraqi
expectations that a massive air offensive would precede any land campaign. American
commanders arguing against a repeat of the 1991 Desert Storm air campaign pointed out
that an extended period of bombing would provide Iraqi leaders with both opportunity
and cause to use weapons of mass destruction against them.124 While Turkeys
unwillingness to allow coalition forces to enter Iraq from the north caused a revision to
124 Ibid, 142.
252
existing invasion plans, it also presented an opportunity for further deception. Instead of
having the forces intended for a northern attack join those already in the Persian Gulf,
coalition commanders kept them in the eastern Mediterranean in order to create the
impression that they were still weeks away from initiating a ground offensive. This
deception contributed to the element of surprise associated with the launching of an
immediate ground offensive.
Rather than relying on airpower to disrupt Iraqi command and control prior to
initiating the invasion, coalition commanders relied on the speed of their ground
offensive to disrupt Iraqi defensive preparations and complicate their efforts to organize
their forces for a counterattack. A rapid offensive was expected to build momentum that
would demoralize Iraqi troops and encourage mass surrenders or desertions. Coalition
forces advanced as rapidly as possible, bypassing Iraqi strongholds in order to secure
Iraqs southern oil fields and many of its population centers in the first few days of the
war. Pitched battles were fought to gain control of Najaf, Samawah, and Hillah, but with
very light losses among coalition forces. These troops entered Baghdad during the first
week of April and then moved on to secure Tikrit, Saddams birthplace and the last major
population center outside coalition control. On May 1, 2003 President Bush declared an
end to major combat operations in Iraq, once again emphasizing the significance of
Saddams defeat to the GWOT. Bush stated, Weve removed an ally of A1 Qaeda, and
cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will
253
gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no
more.125
NATOs Role in Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq
The collapse of the Iraqi government created a security vacuum in Iraq that
coalition forces were immediately called upon to fill. As Iraqi military and police forces
deserted their posts following the fall of Baghdad, a period of lawlessness ensued marked
by widespread looting and violence. Coalition forces shifted to a security posture in
order to reestablish order until domestic forces could be reconstituted and equipped to
fulfill this task. Long-standing conflicts between the ethnic Kurd, Shia and Sunni
populations of Iraq had to be carefully managed to prevent the country from further
collapsing into chaos or even civil war. While American leaders envisioned a peaceful,
democratic Iraq as becoming a beacon of hope for the region, the immediate post-war
situation threatened to make Iraq a source of violence and unrest that could have negative
implications for Iraqs neighbors.
Continued division within the UN and NATO meant that combat forces from the
United States, Great Britain, and Poland would have to transition into a peacekeeping
role with little outside assistance. Unable to find a regional ally willing to accept lead-
nation responsibility for the post-war peacekeeping effort as had been done in
Afghanistan, the United States maintained overall responsibility for post-war stabilization
efforts, with Great Britain and Poland each assuming control of small portions of the
country. Jay Gamer, head of the U.S. Department of Defenses Office of Reconstruction
125 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq
Have Ended, May 1, 2003 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.htm l
254
and Humanitarian Assistance, initially took charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) charged to guide the administration of government responsibilities in advance of a
new Iraqi government. British commanders established control over portions of southern
Iraq, pledging to maintain a division indefinitely for this purpose. The smaller Polish
contingent was less capable of independent operations, and soon requested administrative
support from NATO headquarters to carry out its responsibilities within its sector. An
agreement was established in June 2003, allowing NATO military authorities to conduct
a variety of supporting roles, including force generation, communication, and logistics
planning within the Polish sector. This support was crucial to the creation of a Polish-
led multinational division in south-central Iraq, with troop contributions coming from
several NATO states.
A massive commitment of resources was necessary to provide the new Iraqi
government with the necessary assistance to ensure adequate security and economic
revitalization of the Iraqi economy. The costs of Iraqi reconstruction were expected to
exceed those of the war itself, and were greatly underestimated by the Bush
administration and many of its supporters. Many hoped that reconstruction could be
financed primarily out of profits acquired by restoring Iraqi oil production. Pollacks
estimate of Iraqi reconstruction costs was typical of many pre-war assessments. Using
historical figures of between $75-$300 in international aid per person in post-war states
ranging from 1950s Korea to 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pollack calculated an annual
reconstruction cost of $7 billion. He estimated that at least $1 billion of this cost could be
offset by oil profits, with the rest shared by the United States and the international
255
community. This rationale brought the anticipated cost of Iraqs reconstruction to the
United States to $5 billion over three years.126
The relatively low estimates on the cost of Iraqi reconstruction were based on
optimistic assumptions that the United States and its allies would able to decapitate the
Iraqi government while keeping the countrys infrastructure intact. The estimated cost of
Iraqs reconstruction grew rapidly following assessments by the CPA, the United Nations
and the World Bank. These assessments found that the deterioration of Iraqs-
infrastructure since the outbreak of the 1980 Iran-Iraq War was much greater than
previously known. The effects of more than ten years of sanctions, compounded by the
damage inflicted by coalition forces and post-war looting helped raise the estimates of
reconstruction to between $50-$ 100 billion.127 These estimates did not include the cost
of maintaining large numbers of coalition forces in the region. Even with these forces in
place, additional security measures had to be taken, adding 50-80% to the cost of many
1 9R
reconstruction projects. While Iraqs vast petroleum reserves made it likely that the
Iraqi economy would eventually be revived, it would take a long period of time to reach
pre-Gulf War oil production levels. Issam Al-Chalabi, Iraqs oil minister in Iraq in the
late 1980s, estimated that it would still take several years to reach equivalent levels of 3.5
million barrels a day and perhaps as many as ten years before peak production of 5.5
126 Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The United States and Iraq: The Crisis, the Strategy, and the
P rospects A fter Saddam (New York: Random House, 2002), 471.
127 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, P aying f o r Ira q s Reconstruction, (Washington D.C.: CBO, 2004).
128 Griff White, Reconstruction Costs Unkown, The Washington Post, May 10, 2005.
256
million barrels a day could be achieved.129 In the meantime, international aid would be
required to help the Iraqi manage the process of rebuilding the countrys physical,
economic, and financial infrastructure.
An October 2003 donors conference in Madrid yielded promises of $13 billion in
foreign aid to Iraq on top of pledges of approximately $20 billion in aid from the United
States. Other NATO governments accounted for only a small portion of these pledges.
The combined pledges of European contributors and the EU totaled just over 1.25
billion. 130 The majority of aid from Europe was pledged by states that had publicly
supported the United States prior to the outbreak of war. British and Spanish
contributions alone made up the majority of European contributions, while both France
and Germany refused to agree to provide any new aid to Iraq.131 A second conference
held in Tokyo one year later yielded no new aid pledges, only a general agreement on the
need to accelerate the delivery of aid to Iraq in accordance with existing commitments.
The persisting high level of violence within Iraq contributed to the unwillingness
of international organizations to offer meaningful assistance. The UN established a
headquarters in Baghdad following the passage of UNSCR 1186 in May 2003, which
lifted economic sanctions and began the process of reintegrating Iraq back into the
international community. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) was
129 Alison Smale, Iraq May Be Years From Returning To Peak Oil Output, Ex-Minister Says,
International H erald Tribune, September 22, 2005.
130 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, The E U s Relations with Iraq, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/.
131 Public Broadcasting System, Iraq Aid, October 24, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/middle_east/july-dec03/iraq_10-24.html
257
formed to provide assistance in the conduct of elections, the restoration of essential social
services, and the drafting of an Iraqi constitution. These efforts were greatly curtailed
after the building occupied by the United Nations mission was struck by a suicide bomber
in August 2003. This attack killed more than twenty UN personnel, including the UN
Special Representative to Iraq, and contributed to the international communitys
hesitation to become more deeply engaged in Iraq. Nearly a year would pass before the
United Nations Security Council agreed to sanction a multinational peacekeeping force
for Iraq. In June 2004, the transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqi Governing
Council prompted a greater outpouring of international support. UNSCR 1546 responded
to a request of the Iraqi government by calling on all states and international
organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military
forces, as agreed with the Government of Iraq.132 Despite a general increase in
international support for stabilization efforts in Iraq, division within NATO continued to
limit the role of the Alliance would play in this process.
Twenty countries initially pledged troops for a UN-backed Iraq Stabilization
Force (SFIR) to serve under the direction of American commanders and augment the
coalition forces already in Iraq. The size of the international coalition peaked to 38 states
providing 50,000 troops to assist the more than 120,000 American forces maintained in
Iraq. Many NATO states agreed to introduce forces or expand their presence in Iraq
following the passage of UNSCR 1546, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Turkey. Germany
132 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, June 8,
2004, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf7OpenElem ent
258
and France remained conspicuously absent from the SFIR, but softened their opposition
to deploying a small NATO contingent to Iraq to conduct training for Iraqi military
personnel. Up to this point NATO headquarters had been performing training and
support functions outside of the country, which primarily consisted of coordinating the
attendance of several dozen Iraqi officers to various NATO service schools.
During the June 2004 Summit in Turkey, the NAC addressed a request from Iraqi
Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi to provide the Iraqi military with greater training assistance
and equipment. NATO governments agreed to increase shipments of military equipment
to Iraq, particularly Russian-built equipment from Central and Eastern Europe that would
be compatible with that operated by the Iraqi military. The Alliance established the
NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG) to solicit donations of
equipment. In a little more than a year, over 100 million worth of equipment was
donated to the Iraqi Armed Forces by NATO member states. The largest donation came
from Hungary, which donated 77 tanks and four tank-recovery vehicles to the Iraqi
Armed Forces. Romania and Slovenia also made substantial donations that totaled more
than 23,000 AK-47 rifles, 10,000 helmets and various types of other equipment.133
A NATO Training Implementation Mission was established in Iraq with a staff of
50 people to begin providing training to the Iraqi military and make preparations for a
more substantial NATO presence inside Iraq. Following Iraqi elections in January 2005,
NATO General Secretary De Hoop Scheffer announced, Iraq now has a democratically-
elected parliament and government that wants to work with all friends of Iraq to bring
133 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Nations have donated 100 million worth o f
equipment to the Iraqi Armed Forces, December 15, 2005, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/
NTM -I/Articles/NTM I_A_ 14_05 .htm.
259
peace and stability. In this new phase, there is no reason for any country not to make a
significant contribution to this effort, and compelling reasons why all of us should do
so.134 The allies agreed to fully fund the NATO training mission in Iraq and increase its
staff up to 360 personnel. The NAC announced a goal of increasing its annual training
capacity to 1,000 Iraqi officers inside Iraq and 500 outside of Iraq each year. This would
be accomplished through the creation of a NATO Training and Education Doctrine
Center (TEDC) and increased Iraqi enrollment in NATO training facilities in Germany,
Italy and Norway. All 26 NATO member states agreed to contribute in one form or
another to the Iraqi Training Mission, although some contributions fail to reflect the full
capacity of NATO military forces.135
Contrasting Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts
NATOs command of ISAF in the fall of 2003 boosted the confidence of Afghan
leaders in the international communitys commitment to Afghan security and led to
further improvements in the security situation within Afghanistan. ISAF forces
succeeded in training the first units of the new Afghan National Army and by November
2003, the relative calm in Kabul led Afghani officials to lift the nightly curfew that had
been in place for 23 years.136 NATOs leadership of ISAF also reinvigorated an ongoing
debate over extending ISAF operations beyond the boundaries of Kabul. President
Karzai had lobbied for an extension of the ISAF mandate and he was soon joined by
134 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Update: NATO committed to Iraq, says Secretary
General, June 23, 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/06-june/e0623a.htm.
135 For example, French leaders have failed to embrace the NATO training effort and sent only one officer
to Iraq to serve in the TEDC.
136 ISAF, Under the Leadership o f Turkey, G E N IC O M Coalition Bulletin, no. 3 (January 2003): 9.
.260
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
other regional leaders. Despite the wariness of some European governments, an
international consensus was eventually reached that would give ISAF a larger role in
Afghanistan.
The UN Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1510 on October 13,
2003, expanding the ISAF mission beyond Kabul.137 NATO officials agreed to expand
their presence in Afghanistan to other population centers, but resisted any proposals
calling for a large increase in the size of the ISAF contingent. Any increase in the
number of troops committed to ISAF would place greater strains on the limited number
of forces and equipment already participating in the Alliances other peacekeeping
missions. A compromise solution was found by adopting an approach pioneered by OEF
coalition forces continuing to pursue Taliban and A1 Qaeda figures in the region. ISAF
operations outside of Kabul would be conducted through the formation of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs had been utilized by OEF coalition commanders
since December 2002 as a means of extending their influence in remote areas and the
facilitating relations between military commanders, local authorities and representatives
of non-governmental organizations. Coalition commanders and Afghan government
officials shared an appreciation for the effectiveness of PRTs. The Afghan Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, observed PRTs are considered extremely
137 United Nations Documentation Center, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, October 13,
2003, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G EN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf7OpenElem ent.
261
successful by the people, are supported by the central government... [and] their impact
on reconstruction, development and peace will benefit all.138
Through the organization of several PRTs, ISAF forces began extending their
presence outside of Kabul in early 2004. These PRTs were typically made up of a group
ranging from several dozen to several hundred military and civilian personnel organized
to conduct patrols and perform reconstruction projects or provide security for others
involved in humanitarian relief. The first NATO-led PRT was sent to Kunduz in January
2004. NATO leaders announced their intention to assume responsibility for four more
PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif, Maimana, Feyzabad and Baghlan at the Alliances Istanbul
summit in June 2004. ISAF would establish a logistics support base near Mazar-e-Sharif
in order to have both logistical support and additional security personnel available to
PRTs operating in northern Afghanistan.139 The increased reach of ISAF enabled new
reconstruction efforts to get underway and complemented voter registration efforts in
preparation for national elections in the fall of 2004. NATO temporarily increased its
force levels to more than 10,000 troops around the time of the 2004 elections in
Afghanistan. Both Spain and Italy deployed additional battalions to assist the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan police with security in selected regions throughout the
country. The willingness of the allies to deploy more troops in the face of increasing
violence demonstrated the depth of NATOs commitment to Afghanistans future. As one
138 Frederic Greenwood, PRTs: Military Personnel Provide Unique Reconstruction Capabilities,
CENTCOM Bulletin no. 5 (May 2003): 6.
139 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Factsheet: NATO in Afghanistan, February 12, 2 005,
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm.
262
NATO official observed at the time, Afghanistan is where NATO's credibility is on the
line.140
NATO forces were temporarily increased once again prior to parliamentary
elections in September 2005. Increasing attacks on election workers and both civilian
and religious leaders were viewed as an attempt by groups hostile to the Afghan
government to disrupt the election process. NATO member states agreed to deploy an
additional 2,000 troops from the Netherlands, Romania, Italy, Austria and the United
States, bringing ISAF up to its highest troop levels to date, with some 11,400 soldiers in
Afghanistan. Taliban insurgents failed to disrupt the September 2005 parliamentary
elections in Afghanistan or organize an effective boycott. Election-day violence was very
limited, with no bombings or suicide attacks.
The peaceful conduct of Afghan legislative elections served as an opportunity for
NATO member states to once again reexamine their role in Afghanistan. ISAF expanded
into Western Afghanistan in 2005, with the goal of establishing a security presence in
50% of Afghanistans territory by the end of the year. During a September 2005
conference of NATO Defense Ministers in Berlin, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
formally proposed merging OEF and ISAF operations under a single NATO commander.
Officials from Germany, France, and Spain initially opposed any restructuring of the
ISAF mission that would require troops under NATO command to become more
involved in counterinsurgency operations. German Defense Minister Struck claimed that
merging the two missions would fundamentally change NATO's role in Afghanistan and
140 Paul Richter, NATO Balking At Iraq M ission, Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2004.
263
would make the situation for our soldiers doubly dangerous and worsen the current
climate in Afghanistan.. .NATO is not equipped for counter-terrorism operations. That is
not what it is supposed to do.141 A French Defense Ministry official, similarly observed,
"The two missions were completely different. If you suddenly merge special forces or
heavy counter-terrorism units with stabilizing forces, which is NATO's role in
Afghanistan, then you completely undermine NATO's role."142 A senior NATO official
characterized this opposition as pacifism among a number of member states. In his
experience, Countries like Germany and Spain are just not prepared to put their soldiers
in a position where they might get killed. They are happy to sign up for peacekeeping
operations, but they are not prepared to deploy their troops on the front line.143
A compromise solution was proposed by General Jones, SACEUR, wherein
NATO would oversee dual chains of command, one responsible for counterinsurgency
operations and the other for more traditional peacekeeping roles.144 Participating states
could contribute troops to one or both operations in order to enable both missions to
continue without forcing individual governments to commit their forces to tasks they
might not be prepared to accept. An increased number of troops from Canada, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands would make up the bulk of the additional forces need to
141 Judy Dem psey and David Cloud, Europeans Balking At N ew Afghan R ole, International H erald
Tribune, September 14, 2005.
142 Ibid.
143 Tom Coughlin, NATO 'Pacifists' Under Fire A s U.S. B egs Help On Terror Front Fine, London
Sunday Telegraph, September 18, 2005.
144 Daniel Dom bey and Peter Spiegel, Concerns In NATO A s Troops Prepare For Afghan M ission,
London Financial Times, September 12, 2005.
264
expand NATOs presence in southern Afghanistan. NATOs expansion into the south of
Afghanistan will cover an additional six provinces, and the establishment of at least four
new Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The addition of 5,000 NATO troops will be
accompanied by an equivalent reduction in American forces. British troops are expected
to play a lead role in the region, running a headquarters in Kandahar and overseeing
forces from Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States operating in four southern
provinces. German troops will lead NATO forces in the north and Italian troops will
oversee operations in western Afghanistan.
Combining the OEF coalition and NATO missions into a single operation marks
another crossroads for the Alliance that has the potential to either ease or exacerbate
transatlantic tensions. The outcome of this proposed merger of ongoing operations in
Afghanistan will depend primarily on the willingness of American leaders to reassert
their commitment to multilateralism. A perception that this proposal is simply a means to
provide short-term relief to overstretched American forces at the expense of its NATO
allies will lead to greater cynicism within many European governments. However, a
reorganization that maintains a strong American presence in the region while unifying the
chain of command for both counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations has the
potential to reinvigorate the Alliance by giving it a larger role in the GWOT. A single
NATO-led security assistance mission with significant participation by the United States
can provide an opportunity to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of NATO, but
only if American leaders avoid the domineering behavior that has characterized much of
the GWOT.
265
NATOs high profile in Afghanistan stands in stark contrast to its role in Iraq.
While the overall scope of the stabilization and reconstruction effort is much larger in
Iraq, NATOs training contingent is quite small. Individual NATO member states
continue to deploy troops to Iraq under the UN-mandate originating from UNSCR 1586
and through bilateral agreements with the United States, but the Alliances internal
bodies and shared resources have not been fully utilized.
NATOs training assistance has nonetheless helped the Iraqi government make
progress towards its goal of fielding a 10-division army along with adequate internal
security forces by the end of 2006. The number of Iraqi military and security forces only
recently began to outnumber the coalition forces in Iraq. According to U.S. Defense
Department estimates, Iraqi forces had grown from fewer than 100,000 in July 2004 to
more than 210,000 in November 2005.145 This number greatly exceeded the 160,000
foreign troops deployed in advance of the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections. Some 26
countries, including 12 NATO states continue to maintain around 23,000 troops in Iraq.
NATO contributions range from Great Britains 12,000-strong contingent to the handful
of Dutch and French officers participating in the NATO training force. According to
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the scope of activities undertaken by
coalition forces have shifted from conducting security operations essentially to a heavier
focus on training, equipping and assisting the Iraqi forces.146
145 Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld Rejects 'Quitting' A s 'Exit Strategy' From Iraq W ashington Times,
Novem ber 20, 2005.
146 Donald Rumsfeld, W e Must Be Patient About Progress In Iraq Seattle Times , July 4, 2005.
266
Plans are underway to reduce the number of foreign military forces serving in Iraq
as the countrys military and security forces become more capable and the political
process moves forward. The completion of milestones marking a national referendum
approving a new Iraqi constitution and the peaceful staging of parliamentary elections
allow for a reassessment of coalition troops levels. American leaders began troop
reductions in early 2006, with the intention of withdrawing as many as 100,000 troops by
the end of the year. Most of the other states participating in the coalition have announced
that they will also withdraw most, if not all, of their troops during this period.147 The
remaining troops will serve in an advisory role to Iraqi forces capable of defending their
population against internal and external threats. The opportunity will exist for NATO to
enlarge its presence in Iraq as part of the realignment of coalition forces, if the allies are
so inclined.
Any realignment of forces must account for the political developments in Iraq
along with the capability of the Iraqi security and military forces. Even many of the
United States past critics are advising against a rapid reduction of foreign forces. French
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin recently acknowledged that a rapid withdrawal
would lead to unwanted chaos in Iraq and he cautioned fellow European leaders that any
withdrawal should be coordinated with the local situation in Iraq and the regional
situation.148 The newly elected German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is also seeking to
improve relations with U.S. and avoid any further conflict over the role of coalition
147 U.S.-led Coalition Shrinks as More Nations Pull Troops, Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2005.
148 French D ove Turns Hawk on Pullout, New York Post, November 30, 2005.
267
forces in Iraq. During her first visit to the United States as Chancellor in January 2006,
she observed, Good transatlantic relations between not only the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America, but also between the European Union and the
United States... are in the vested interest of both sides.149 She subsequently emphasized
that NATO should remain as the center of political discussion on the implications of
[international] crises and the permanent analysis of the various threats.150 While NATO
member states have succeeded in overcoming much of the bitterness that characterized
the debate over the necessity for invading Iraq, the situation to date still stands as an
example of inadequate consultations and missed opportunities for collective action.
Regime Analysis: NATOs Role in the Global War on Terrorism
This chapter has examined the various ways that NATO contributed to global
efforts to counter the threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of
WMD. The unprecedented destruction resulting from the terrorist attacks on the United
States in September 2001, combined with the aspirations of A1 Qaeda leaders to conduct
even more horrendous attacks, evoked a new willingness to confront these threats on the
part of NATO governments. A1 Qaeda was deemed to be a threat to the security of the
United States and its allies, as was the Taliban government in its role as collaborator and
protector of terrorist leaders. The boldness of these attacks led member governments to
invoke the collective defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the
history of the Alliance. This decision demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO member
149 German Marshall Fund o f the United States, German Chancellor Stresses Importance o f Relationship
with United States, http://www.gmfus.org/press/article.cfm?id=58.
150 Andrew Borow iec, Funding Shortage Threatens EU Force, Washington Times, February 16, 2006.
268
governments and made Alliance assets available for military operations in Afghanistan.
NATO member states made numerous military and non-military contributions to
operations in Afghanistan, culminating in the NACs agreement to assume command of
ISAF in the fall of 2003. Enlarging the GWOT to include the removal of Saddam
Husseins government in Iraq was much more controversial and led to a breakdown in
consensus among NATO member states. Division within the Alliance between states
aligning themselves with the United States and those opposed to the use of force to
coerce Iraqi disarmament prevented NATO from facilitating collective action. Just as
during the previous two periods of study, the behavior of member states toward the
practice of collective defense and collective security can be attributed to various factors
associated with the three dominant approaches to regime analysis.
The United States status as the sole global superpower and the its preponderance
of military power relative to its NATO allies strongly influenced the organization of
forces for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as is commonly emphasized in a
power-based approach to regime analysis. The United States status as the dominant
international power gave American leaders a global perspective, while European leaders
generally remained focused on events in Europe. American military, diplomatic, and
commercial entities maintained a higher profile in most regions of the world than their
European counterparts. While this global presence gave the United States an opportunity
to influence many security issues, it also increased the likelihood that the United States
would be the target of international terrorist groups. The GWOT resulted from an attack
on the United States, and American leaders actively shaped the collective response.
Allied participation was encouraged by the United States, expressed through the
269
invocation of Article Five and solicitations for both military and non-military assistance.
The conduct of both OEF and OIF reflected the preferences of American war planners,
who operated from an assumption that while the contributions of NATO allies were
desirable, allied participation should not be pursued under conditions that would unduly
constrain the United States.
A NATO-led CJTF was one option for the organization of multinational
coalitions to conduct the GWOT. Due to concerns over the need for a timely response
and an unwillingness to accept additional constraints on their use of force, American
leaders elected to conduct OEF as a coalition operation under the direction of U.S.
Central Command. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained, Every
nation is different, with different cultures and geographies, and the thought that they
should all agree at the same moment how to contribute to this war is nonsense. That will
never happen, and it never has. Countries ought to decide individually what they can do.
Thats not a blow to NATO.151 Rather than exercising leadership to further encourage
the practice of collective security within the Alliance, the United States took the more
expedient route of forming an ad-hoc coalition for both OEF and OIF.
Alliance officials hoping to see NATO pursue a wider role in international affairs
could not help viewing the American approach to coalition building as a setback to
NATOs further embrace of a collective security regime. General Klaus Naumann,
former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, noted While individual allies are
contributing to the U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, NATO has been unable to offer
151 James Kitfield, U.S. to NATO: Change or Else, National Journal 2, (October 2002): 2978-9.
270
much more than political support. Nor has the U.S. Administration asked for much more,
implying that they do not need, or do not wish to use, NATO.152 The American decision
to opt for an ad-hoc coalition resulted in lingering resentment in some quarters of Europe.
In the months following OEF, one observer noted The phrase used in Europe - only
partly tongue-in-cheek - is that the United States is not looking for coalitions of the
willing and able but of the willing and compliant.153 EU High Representative Solana
strongly criticized the American approach to OEF, defending the principle that the
alliance should determine the coalition and not vice versa.154 Solana also remarked, I
dont like this principle that the mission defines the coalition. NATO invoked its most
sacred covenant that no one had dared touch in the past, and it was useless! Absolutely
useless! At no point has General Tommy Franks even talked to anyone at NATO.155
Collective security was not practiced during OEF primarily due to the absence of support
from the United States, whose leaders were unwilling to compromise on the timing and
scope of offensive military operations.
As the need for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts operations
became apparent, the United States was more receptive to NATO leadership and
American leaders succeeded in convincing other NATO member states to assume lead
nation responsibility for the ISAF mission. President Bush and other senior American
152 Naumann, Crunch Time for the A lliance, 9.
153 Steven Everts and Gary Schmidt, Is Military Power Still the Key to International Security? NATO
R eview 50, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 17.
154 James Kitfield, Pox Americana?, N ational Journal 34, (April 6, 2002): 986.
155 Ibid, 984.
271
officials expressed a desire to limit the role of the United States military forces in
peacekeeping operations. NATOs eventual leadership of ISAF was consistent with the
interests of the United States in that it supported ongoing counter-terrorism operations
without requiring the participation of more than a few American troops. NATOs
command of ISAF furthered the American reliance on European forces as peacekeepers,
as had increasingly become the case in the Balkans. This marked the continuation of a
division of labor that would later be colorfully described as the Americans making the
dinner and Europeans doing the dishes.156 While the division of responsibilities
between OEF and ISAF satisfied the immediate desires of the United States, it would
become a source of tension with implications for future collective efforts.
The disinclination of American leaders to encourage the further empowerment of
international organizations was even more evident in the run-up to the Iraq War. One set
of analysts claims the lesson learned by American leaders in OEF to be that Europeans
will whine and complain about any military operation, but victory will obviate such
complaints and the Europeans will jump on the bandwagon. The process through which
the coalition was created would not matter in the end. Because preeminent U.S. military
power alone could produce a victory, there was little reason to endure the trials and
tribulations of multilateral negotiations. In the end, all that is necessary to achieve
support is to be clear, to be consistent, and to be America.157 These leaders once again
156 European Union O ffice o f External Relations, Speech by the Honorable Dimitris Platis at Columbia
University, May 15, 2003, http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/hu/article_2375_hu.htm.
157 Gordon and Shapiro, A llies a t War, 65.
272
sought allied assistance in their upcoming confrontation with Iraq, but did not wish to
accept unnecessary constrains on their freedom of action.
American leaders sought to take advantage of opportunities created by favorable
balance of power. In their view, the combination of military and moral superiority
entitled the United States to take the actions necessary to achieve a more peaceful
international order without placing a great deal of emphasis on the desires of other
governments. Luck points out that Given its singular power, the United States has been
more prone than most countries to question the legitimacy and fairness of institutions
whose rules and procedures do not take into account the distribution of power in the real
world outside. 158 Keegan similarly observes a sense of particularism among
American leaders during this period that he characterizes as a belief in the superior
principles of public and interstate behavior embodied by the United States.159 The
neoconservative views of many in the Bush administration argued that the United States
status as the preeminent global power granted them exceptional rights and privileges.
Rather than seeking to develop an international response to the threat posed by Iraq
through substantive exchanges and collective decision-making, the United States
preferred to choose a course of action and then solicit international support.
American leaders publicly challenged the need for the United States to adhere to
the practice of obtaining an international consensus as part of a collective security
regime. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked on the administrations limited
158 Edward Luck, The United States, International Organizations and the Quest for Legitim acy, in
A m ericas War on Terror, Patrick Hayden, Tom Lansford and Robert P. Watson, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2002), 55.
159 Keegan, The Iraq War, 97.
273
willingness to compromise on its Iraq policy during discussions with European leaders in
May 2002. Powell observed that when the administration develops a principled
position, what we do is explain that principled position to our friends, try to see if we can
find compromises, so we can join consensus. But where we cant join consensus because
of our own beliefs, or because we believe a particular issue and the direction its going
with others does not serve the purpose intended by that action, the United States will stick
to its principled position.160 A disregard for allied input was apparent in the manner in
which NATO was asked to support American preparations for war with Iraq in the fall of
2002, without any suggestion that the Alliance be given command of the operation. Vice
President Dick Cheney questioned the necessity of achieving a consensus among all of
the United States allies prior to taking military action in Iraq. He noted in a 2003 speech
that the process of achieving consensus though often couched in high-sounding terms of
unity and cooperation, is a prescription for perpetual disunity and obstructionism. In
practice, it would prevent our own country from acting with friends and allies, even in the
most urgent circumstance.161 Unable to sway the members of the UN Security Council
to support its position toward Iraq, the United States made it abundantly clear that it was
willing to act unilaterally in defense of its interests. As hope faded for a UN Security
Council resolution overtly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, an American official
reportedly warned a member of another UN delegation, You are not going to decide
whether there is war in Iraq or not. That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It
160 U.S. Department o f State, Press Briefing on the Presidents trip to Europe, May 28, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10516.htm.
161 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Remarks by the V ice President to the Heritage Foundation,
October 10, 2003, http://w w w .w hitehouse.gov/new s/releases/2003/10/20031010-l.htm l.
274
is already final. The only question now is whether the Council will go along with it or
not.162 The practice of collective security throughout this period was hampered by the
absence of support for the regime among American leaders who placed greater emphasis
on clearing the way for an invasion of Iraq than on achieving a clear international
mandate.
An organization-based approach to regime analysis concentrates on the ability of
NATO rules and procedures to encourage collective responses to the threats posed by
international terrorism and WMD proliferation. Neoliberal institutionalists emphasize
that the organizations resulting from international regimes can bolster the capabilities of
any individual state, even a powerful hegemon, by pooling resources of a collective body.
The advantages of cooperation allow states to achieve more optimal outcomes by
providing access to information and resources that encourage participants to pursue long
term cooperation over short term gains.
The threats of international terrorism and WMD proliferation seem particularly
well suited to a collective response through an international regime. The nature of these
threats is such that collective efforts are strongly favored over unilateral action. Terrorist
attacks are generally very difficult to deter, as these groups are often characterized by
high levels of secrecy, making it difficult to identify personnel or infrastructure that can
be placed at risk. Deterrence is particularly difficult for a single state acting unilaterally,
because terrorists can attempt to stay out of reach of counter-terrorism efforts by seeking
refuge within the borders of other states or in parts of the world with little effective
162 Karen DeYoung, U .S. Officials Say U N Future at Stake in Vote; Bush M essage Is that a War Is
Inevitable, Diplomats Say, The Washington P o st, February 25, 2003.
275
governance. Counter-proliferation efforts must be focused on both potential sources of
restricted materials and technology as well as the groups seeking them. These conditions
mean that cooperation is needed among as many states as possible to monitor and take
action against emerging threats.
Despite the suitability of collective responses to the threats of international
terrorism and WMD proliferation, NATO failed to demonstrate considerable utility in
these areas. Although numerous organizational changes were introduced in the decade
following the Cold War, the vast majority of Alliance organizational structures were
designed for a threat and a world that no longer exists. They are not ideal for dealing with
post-Cold War threats that are transnational and global rather than intergovernmental and
European.163 The characteristics of NATO organizations that made the Alliance
essential to the conduct of ODF and OAF in the Balkans were less well suited to counter
terrorism operations. As Francois Heisbourg, the Director of Frances Foundation for
Strategic Research, recently observed, A political-military alliance designed to cope
with a state-centered threat is not well geared to deal with non-state menaces such as A1
Qaeda. Police work, non-military intelligence sharing, financial monitoring, and social
and economic initiatives are not core competencies of NATO.164 The Alliances core
competency lay in its ability to organize and command multinational forces. This
capability was only partially exploited in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the preferences of
American leaders to act through an ad-hoc coalition.
163 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, 199.
164 Steven Larrabee and Francois Heisbourg, How Global a R ole Can and Should NATO Play? NATO
Review 51, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 17.
276
The rejection of NATOs standing arrangements in favor of an American-
dominated command structure presents a challenge to the claims of many liberal
institutionalists. Much of the Alliances appeal to member states is based on the
assumption that it is important to establish existing command relationships in advance of
a crisis. These arrangements are intended to improve the responsiveness of NATO forces
and improve their interoperability and effectiveness. The adaptation of the regimes
established rules and procedures to cope with new threats is often more desirable than the
creation of an ad-hoc coalition. The United States opted for the latter in the case of OEF,
and the lack of consensus in advance of OIF prevented any other option from being
pursued. Gordon and Shapiro conclude that Europes preoccupation with internal issues
and its unwillingness to develop deployable military power lessened the perceived value
of placating European opinion in ways that would have been given much higher priority
in the past.165 The fact that NATO leaders did not view the Alliance as providing a
superior alternative to an ad-hoc coalition for the organization and command of combined
military forces makes it difficult to characterize NATO as an independent international
actor during this period.
The NAC authorized and directed supporting operations during OEF and OIF that
were of a limited nature and somewhat independent of the primary counter-terrorism and
counter-proliferation missions. Operations Eagle Assist and Operation Active Endeavor
complemented coalition operations, but were not central to the objective of neutralizing
A1 Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Several NATO bodies
277
contributed to the GWOT by promoting intelligence sharing through the NIWS and by
establishing a Civil-Military Planning Directorate with responsibilities for consequence
management. NATOs WMD Center also enhanced information-sharing among both
member and non-member states on numerous proliferation matters, but did not serve as
an independent source for intelligence-gathering or enforcement operations. NATO
organized no supporting operations during OIF, remaining absent from the theater until
later organizing a small training contingent to assist in the reconstitution of Iraqs
military and security forces. When compared to other aspects of GWOT that were
carried out through other international regimes or bilateral agreements, NATOs
contributions remained rather minor.
NATO was most successful in demonstrating its utility through its eventual
leadership of post-war stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Existing organizational
capabilities and procedures were well suited to the post-Taliban stabilization effort,
which resulted in NATO playing a leading role in this portion of the campaign. NATO
procedures and consultative bodies helped prepare Alliance member and partner states
for their role in ISAF. The Alliances experience overseeing peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans also resulted in well-tested rules and procedures that enabled NATO
militaries to work alongside each other and gave their leaders a firm understanding of the
demands likely to be placed on their forces. Exercises organized through NATOs PfP
had prepared member and partner militaries to successfully conduct peacekeeping
operations. As a result, ISAF was dominated by NATO member and partner states from
its very inception in January 2002, and the NAC and SHAPE staffs were eventually
278
called upon to coordinate the efforts of ISAF participants and perform vital command
functions.
NATOs internal procedures requiring a full consensus among member states in
advance of collective action meant that the Alliance was unable to unite either in support
or opposition to the efforts of the United States to intervene in Iraq. Lord Robertson
often reminded his peers that Difficult, consensus-building negotiations are the essence
of NATO.166 However, the practice of collective security in accordance with existing
rales and procedures allows all member states to exercising veto authority over the
conduct of combined military operations. The intergovernmental nature of the Alliance
meant that the NAC can facilitate existing agreements, but cannot institute an agreement
among member states and NATO bodies have no means of preventing a minority of
states from acting on their own. The ability of the United States to disregard the desires
of its allies and proceed with military action in the face of strong allied opposition
undermines the practice of collective security. European support for NATO is reduced as
the allies realize that they have little input into the policies of the hegemon and that the
Alliance has been reduced to a joint training and exercise organization from which the
United States can cherry pick coalitions of the willing to participate in U.S.-led
operations.167
The reluctance of American leaders to comply with established norms of
consultation and compromise added to divisions between the U.S. and Europe. Many
166 George Robertson, Transforming N A TO , NATO R eview 51, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 2.
167 Kitfield, U.S. to NATO: Change or Else, 2979.
279
European officials expected that the invocation of the Alliances collective defense article
would result in extensive consultations within the NAC and elsewhere. Decisions
regarding the structure of a combined military force would be reached collectively, rather
than from within the United States. A number of Europeans noted the United States
disregard for this fundamental aspect of diplomacy. According to one senior NATO
official, Part of the problem was that no one had ever done this before, and all of us had
an image from our schoolboy days that after Article Five was invoked, the collective
armies of the United States and Europe would march off together to slay a common foe.
But this conflict is so unconventional that it didn't fit any of those stereotypes of what
NATO was all about.168
Instead of holding extensive consultations in advance of collective action,
American leaders preferred to make specific requests for assistance under the condition
that the United States maintain exclusive control over the pace and scope of military
operations. The administrations disregard for meaningful consultation is apparent in
President George W. Bushs recollection of a conversation he had with a European leader
who advised him that the best way to maintain the coalition was to have lots of
consultation, for the U.S. to show responsiveness, take account of the views of others and
understand their reasoning. President Bush responded, Well thats very interesting.
Because my belief is the best way that we hold this coalition together is to be clear on our
objectives and to be clear that we are determined to achieve them. You hold a coalition
168 James Kitfield, NATO Metamorphosis, N ational Journal 34, no. 6 (February 2002): 376-380.
280
together by strong leadership and thats what we intend to provide.169 The policy
positions of the United States and several key NATO allies were inflexible and NATO
rules and procedures were ineffective at overcoming the resulting disagreements.
Different expectations regarding the conduct of the GWOT among the United
States and many of its European allies were symptomatic of increasingly diverse
expectations of international regimes in general. The process of European integration
encouraged EU member states to develop high expectations for the potential
contributions of international regimes. The success of the EU in stemming conflict
among member states provided many Europeans with greater confidence in the ability of
international regimes to contribute to international order. The EU increasingly behaved
as a supranational actor, placing greater constraints on member states than the
intergovernmental rules and procedures of NATO. The collection of regimes making up
the EU emphasized the supremacy of community decisions over state sovereignty. The
EU practiced qualified majority voting and member states were subjected to a variety of
enforcement mechanisms qualitatively stronger than those of other international regimes.
NATOs internal organizations had no such authority, with all proposals for collective
action remaining subject to veto by a single member state. The need for consensus on
even the more mundane aspects of campaign planning made American leaders reluctant
to give NATO a larger role in OEF. The exclusion of the United States from the process
of European integration served as another source of division within the Alliance that
threatened to make the practice of collective security less likely.
281
A norm-based approach to regime analysis contributes to an understanding of the
process of regime change by emphasizing the significance of a sense of community
among states participating in the regime along with a shared perception that this
community was under threat. The boldness of the September 2001 attacks provided an
incentive for Alliance members to overlook emerging differences and cooperate to
disrupt A1 Qaedas ability to execute future attacks. The particular nature of the threat
posed by A1 Qaeda reinforced a common identity in a manner similar to the transatlantic
identity formed in response to the shared threat of Soviet aggression. Osama Bin Ladens
1998 fatwah was directed not just at the United States, but its NATO allies as well.
NATO member states recognized that A1 Qaeda posed a fundamental threat to their
sovereignty, as well as the shared values that defined their community. As liberal
democracies, the United States and its European allies stood as open societies that were
particularly vulnerable to international terrorism. The economic, military and political
interdependence of NATO member states was such that a crippling terrorist attack on any
NATO member states could be expected to have significant implications for all member
states. A1 Qaedas decision to include the World Trade Center in its choice of targets
also underscored the collective nature of the threat, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of
foreign nationals from nearly 90 countries in addition to the devastating number of
American casualties.
NATO leaders frequently acknowledged the persistence of a sense of community
that enabled Alliance member states to view a terrorist attack on the United States as an
attack on them. The A1 Qaeda attacks gave the allies a temporary reprieve from the
forces that were allowing the United States and Europe to drift apart and reinforced a
282
perception of a collective identity rooted in shared values. General William Kernan,
serving as SACLANT during OEF, referred to the common identity binding members of
the Alliance, stating It is as critical now to have a cooperative of democracies as it was
during the Cold War. The threat to our collective security may have changed forms but
the instability caused by nascent threats arguably places NATO nations at even greater
risk than before.170 President George W. Bush sought to build international support for
OEF both within NATO and elsewhere by emphasizing the role of common values.
Following NATOs invocation of Article Five, he observed, Many nations understand
what NATO expressed, that an attack on us is really an attack on legitimate governments

171
and on freedom. The invocation of Article Five and the wide range of both military
and non-military actions undertaken by the Alliance were enabled by the existence of
common values and interests among the United States and its European allies. As
Secretary General Robertson stated, Indeed, one of the clearest results of those tragic
events has been a total affirmation that Europe and North America remain what they have
been for over five decades: a rock-solid community of shared values.172
A norm-based approach to regime analysis also underscores the general
agreement among regime participants regarding the legitimacy of the proposed collective
course of action. The international norms shared by NATO member states viewed
170 Interview with General W illiam F. Kernan, Military Modernizer, NATO R eview 50, no. 3 (Fall 2002):
21.
171 White House O ffice o f Press Secretary, Remarks by the President and NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson in Photo Opportunity, October 10, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/10/20011010-6.htm l.
172 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Speech by the Secretary General at the Annual Conference o f
the D efence and Society, January 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020121a.htm .
283
terrorism as an illegitimate form of political violence. These states agreed on
international norms giving states a monopoly on the use of force, and collectively
opposing the use of force by non-state actors. The use of military power either
unilaterally or collectively was viewed as a legitimate means of retaliating against
terrorists and their sponsors. The willingness of NATO member states to participate in
both the military offensive and post-conflict operations was the result of an implied
consensus on the proposed course of action that existed in spite of the absence of formal
debate within the NAC. The European public also demonstrated a strong commitment to
collective defense. European public opinion solidly supported military action in
Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks. Even in the midst of a
divisive debate over the necessity for war with Iraq in the fall of 2002, the majority of
Europeans surveyed in 11 out of 15 EU states agreed with the U.S. military action in
Afghanistan.173 European support for war with Iraq was much smaller, in part reflecting
the difficulty in perceiving a threat in advance of an Iraqi attack or clear evidence of a
renewed Iraqi WMD program.
The perception of a threat posed by Iraq to the community of NATO states was
not shared among American leaders and many of their European counterparts. In contrast
to the clear act of aggression performed by A1 Qaeda, there was no clear evidence of the
existence of Iraqi WMD programs, nor was there a consensus over whether the existence
of such weapons would pose an imminent threat to NATO member states. The practice
of collective security is greatly complicated by the absence of a clear act of aggression, as
284
discussed in previous chapters. With American vulnerability heightened in the wake of
the September 2001 attacks, American leaders perceived Iraqs reluctance to cooperate
with its disarmament obligations as a significant act of aggression. According to one set
of analysts, For Americans, September 11 changed the world; for Europeans, it changed
America. Henceforth, Americans tended to see the world almost exclusively through the
prism of international terrorism, whereas Europeans were still focused on the
consequences of the end of the Cold War.174 During the run-up to the Iraq War, French
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin cautioned, The problems of the world cannot be reduced to
the struggle against terrorism, however vital that struggle may be.175 American leaders
were more inclined to perceive links between Iraq and international terrorism. President
George W. Bushs declaration of an axis of evil consisting of Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea emphasized his perception that the problems of rogue states and international
terrorism were closely linked. European leaders pointed out the lack of clear evidence
that Iraq had any direct links to A1 Qaeda, noting the implausibility of close cooperation
between the secular Iraqi government at the radical Islamists that controlled A1 Qaeda.
While both groups shared an antipathy toward the United States, they had little else in
common.
American leaders were less tolerant of the status quo in the Middle East and
expressed confidence that Iraq could be transformed into a stable, democratic state.
Europeans familiar with the historical difficulties encountered by their governments
174 Gordon and Shapiro, A llies at War, 84.
175 Judy Dem psey, Washington Turns D eaf Ear to Europes Divided V oices, Financial Times, February
13, 2002.
285
attempts to influence Middle Eastern politics throughout the 20th century often felt that
American leaders did not fully appreciate the difficulties inherent in the democratization
of Iraq. British experiences with Iraqi rule in the early 20th century along with Frances
experience in Algeria during the 1950s justified some skepticism regarding American
ambitions in Iraq. European critics dismissed the idea that Western troops would be
greeted as liberators by the Iraqi public and that Western forces could quickly succeed in
rebuilding Iraqi society in the manner of post-World War II Japan and Germany.
Frances ambassador the United States, Jean-David Levitte, warned, We see Iraq as a
very complex country, with many different ethnic groups, a tradition of violence, and no
experience with democracy. You cant create democracy with bombs.176 An alternative
view of history introduced concerns that an Iraq dominated by foreign powers would
implode into civil war and resemble Lebanon more than Germany or Japan. Even
without this level of violence and chaos, critics pointed out that the invasion of Iraq
would likely encourage more acts of international terrorism and therefore be
counterproductive to the overall GWOT.
American leaders found themselves disagreeing with many European leaders on
fundamental normative issues such as their understanding of international law and the
legitimate use of force. European integration increasingly led European leaders to
reconceptualize their view of security in a manner that emphasized non-military
instruments of power, a contemporary view of security consistent with Buzans new
framework for security. The emerging view of security included issues of justice,
176 Jean-David Levitte, A Warning on Iraq, from a Friend, The N ew York Times, Februrary 14, 2003.
286
ethnicity, economic development, and transnational crime, in contrast to simply military
views of security. One French diplomat characterized his American peers as tending to
emphasize military, technical and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly
at the expense of cooperative and political ones.177 In the case of Iraq, this yielded an
American preference for military coercion, while many European leaders expressed a
preference for trade, technical, and financial incentives aimed at encouraging Iraq to
comply with existing agreements.
The American strategy of preemption grew out of a growing willingness to
employ military power to confront emerging threats. The relatively successful
application of military power to foreign policy dilemmas in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and Afghanistan convinced American leaders of the utility of military force.
Preemption had long been recognized as legitimate as long as there was a reasonable
expectation of an imminent attack and strikes were proportional to the perceived threat.
However, American leaders were widely accused of misapplying this doctrine toward
Iraq and executing a preventive war against a remote and uncertain threat. One set of
analysts described European reactions to the implementation of this doctrine as the death
notice of a rules-based international system and an end to their already limited ability to
influence the American superpower.178 Applying a strategy of preemption in this
manner risked setting a dangerous precedent for conflicts in other regions and had
potentially devastating consequences for the overall stability of the international system.
177 Gilles Andreani, The Disarry o f U.S. Non-Proliferation P olicy, Survival 41 (Winter 1999-2000): 42-
61.
287
The United States might set a precedent that would encourage other states to resort to
force more often to resolve international disputes. As Hanlon notes, Countries already
on the brink of war, and leaning strongly towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an
action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may make it harder
for the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay
179
and diplomacy. These concerns undermined support for American foreign policy
both domestically and internationally.
A declining sense of transatlantic community was accompanied by an increasing
sense of a European identity among a subset of European actors. Some scholars have
observed significant differences between the emerging European identity and that of an
American-dominated NATO. Manners and Whitman argue that while many international
actors share a commitment to liberal-democratic principles, the identity of the EU is
constructed around particular interpretations of these principles such as social solidarity,
anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.180 These scholars
view the EU as pacific, which results in an identity that is different from the aggressive
identity of NATO. Manners and Whitman claim that the EU does not seek the ability to
wield military power to intervene in regional conflicts, rather it seeks to moderate
conflict in a more structural way by encouraging norms, which renders conflict not
179 M ichael O Hanlon, Susan Rice and James Steinberg, The N ew N ational Security Strategy and
Preem ption: P olicy B rief #113 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002), 7.
180 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, The Difference Engine: Constructing and Representing the
International Identity o f the European Union. Journal o f European Public P olicy 10, no. 3 (June
2003):392.
288
i o i
merely unthinkable but materially impossible. Kagan similarly observes differences
among European and American leaders on important normative issues such as how the
world should be governed, about the role of international institutions and international
law, about the proper balance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in
international affairs.182 These differences became more apparent as the European
members of the Alliance expressed concern over U.S. foreign policy and determined how
they would cope with the crisis over Iraq.
Many NATO governments found themselves pulled in different directions as a
result of their allegiance to both the United States and their European neighbors.
Europeanist governments, such as Belgium, France and Germany promoted a more
distinct European identity and an active European foreign policy. These states had long
been at the center of the European integration effort, although the EUs expanding
membership threatened the influence of the founding governments. Europeanist leaders
characterized their opposition to the use of force in Iraq as a united European position
and used this issue to emphasize their special status within the EU. French President
Jacques Chirac claimed wide public support among Europeans for his governments
decision to challenge American ambitions in Iraq, and remarked to Latvian President
Vaira Vike-Freiberga that NATO was no longer relevant to such disagreements.183
These and other attempts to establish a clear European position on Iraq under the
181 Ibid, 390.
182 Robert Kagan, O f P aradise and Power: Am erica and Europe in the N ew W orld O rder (New York:
183 William Shawcross, Allies: U.S., Britain, an d Europe, and the War in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs,
2003), 129.
289
leadership of a handful of Europeanist governments were resisted by states concerned
with the distribution of influence within the EU.
Concern over the consequences of French and German dominance within the EU
along with a sense of obligation to the United States prompted a number of European
governments to support American policies toward Iraq. Traditionally Atlanticist
governments, such as Great Britain, Italy, and Poland welcomed a continued American
role in European security affairs and were wary of EU incursions into security affairs
traditionally reserved for NATO. Small countries, such as Luxembourg and Denmark
viewed the United States presence as a means of balancing the influence of their larger
and more prosperous neighbors. Those European states that were new or aspiring
members of NATO and the EU also generally supported the U.S. position. As Polish
Defense Minister Radek Sikorski explained, We supported the war in Iraq and have our
troops there now not because we felt threatened directly by Saddam Hussein. We are
there because of our investment in a strong U.S.-Polish relationship. We want to show the
United States we will be with them when we are needed.184 Asmus finds that for many
of these governments their instincts on how Europe should be structured and governed
will tend not to be federalist but inter-governmental. Having just joined the European
Union, they will be reluctant immediately to embrace far-reaching, integrationist schemes
that force them to cede more sovereignty to Brussels. Above all, they will want to
maintain an American presence and influence in European affairs. Many of them still
184 David Sands, A llies See Benefits in Iraq M issions, Washington Times, December 9, 2005.
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want more America in Europe, not less.185 Division within Europe combined with the
unilateralist tendencies of the United States contributed to a breakdown in a sense of
community and lessened the willingness of NATO member states to broaden their
commitment to the practice of collective security.
Conclusion
This study has examined how NATO contributed to the GWOT and the utility of
various approaches to regime analysis to gaining an understanding of the Alliances
changing commitment to collective action. NATO member states remained committed to
their collective defense pledge while expressing numerous reservations to the extension
of a collective security regime to threats emerging outside of Europe. Shortfalls in many
of the factors associated with the various approaches to regime analysis can be associated
with the difficulties encountered by the Alliance as it attempted to extend its commitment
to a collective security regime. NATO allies expressed solidarity with the United States
through the invocation of the Alliances collective defense clause following the attacks
by A1 Qaeda, based on a continued sense of community and a shared perception of the
threat posed by international terrorism. However, American leaders found NATOs
consensual decision-making processes too cumbersome to deliver satisfactory results in
the desired timeframe, sidetracking efforts to gain a larger role for the Alliance. In
contrast to earlier military interventions in Europe, the Alliance ended up playing a
supporting role to the American-led coalition conducting counter-terrorism operations in
Afghanistan. Shortly after the fall of the Taliban, the allies failed to reach a consensus on
185 Ronald Asmus, Great Expectations, NATO R eview 51, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 30-2
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the necessity of a military confrontation with Iraq. American leaders failed to advocate a
leadership role for the Alliance, once again expressing dismay for the inability of NATO
bodies to quickly assemble determined and capable forces. In turn, Europeans felt less of
an obligation to lend support on American terms due to the absence of persuasive
evidence of Iraqi violations of international agreements or a clear act of aggression that
would once again justify an appeal to a collective defense regime. Intra-alliance disputes
were accompanied by a breakdown in the sense of community among NATO member
states brought about by American views of exceptionalism and continued efforts among
some EU member states to promote a distinct European identity. The recent difficulties
encountered as NATO leaders struggled to define the conditions under which it would
practice collective security further demonstrate the utility of the various approaches to
regime analysis. The final chapter of this dissertation will review these findings and offer
recommendations for future reforms aimed at overcoming some of the recent obstacles to
collective action and enhancing the Alliances role as a source of international stability
and security.
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There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful o f success, nor more
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order o f things.
- Niccold Machiavelli (1513)
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion
This research has examined the evolution of NATO as an international security
regime both during and after the Cold War. NATOs commitment to a collective defense
regime after World War II provided for the peaceful rearmament of former enemies for
the common purpose of countering Soviet expansionism. Along with organizing allied
forces for the credible defense for Western Europe, the Alliance developed many
mechanisms to promote transparency, cooperation and collective action, thus reducing
the reemergence of security dilemmas among former enemies. Changes in the
international security environment following the dissolution of the Soviet Union provided
the impetus for the Alliance to adopt additional characteristics of a collective security
regime while maintaining its commitment to collective defense. This research has
examined the process of regime change as NATO attempted to introduce collective
security functions in addition to its collective defense responsibilities. NATO member
states accepted new missions and emphasized new capabilities in the aftermath of the
Cold War as they worked together to expand the level of cooperation among themselves
and neighboring states. The allies commitment to collective security differed during this
period between security challenges emerging from within Europe and those emerging
outside of Europe. A common commitment to preserving peaceful relations among
regional actors encouraged NATOs increased engagement with non-member states and
the Alliances command of several military interventions to restore peace within Europe.
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While NATO successfully carried out two military interventions in the Balkans in
accordance with the collective security ambitions espoused by many NATO leaders, the
Alliance played much less of a role in out-of-area military operations associated with the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The support provided to the United States in
Afghanistan was in great part due to the allies interest in preserving a collective defense
regime rather than a wholesale commitment to extending the practice of collective
security beyond Europe. Disregard for the practice of collective security toward out-of
area threats was evident in events related to Iraqs alleged development of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD). The lack of consensus among Alliance members prevented
NATO from playing a significant role before, during, or after the invasion of Iraq. This
research offers insights into the nature of international regimes and the process of regime
change, and has yielded recommendations aimed at increasing NATOs viability as a
source of greater security and more meaningful international cooperation.
Overview o f Findings
This research has resulted in a number of findings related to the behavior of states
toward international regimes and the process of regime change within NATO. Each of
the three approaches to regime analysis identified in my typology of power-based,
organization-based and norm-based approaches to regime analysis contribute to an
understanding of these topics. These approaches have been utilized to identify several
factors that appear to have some influence on the process of regime change. These
factors include hegemonic leadership, access to relevant capabilities, and a sense of
community. The Alliances disposition towards the regimes of collective defense and
collective security can be viewed through the interplay of these factors. My analysis of
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NATO both during and after the Cold War has shown a correlation between the presence
of these factors and a shared commitment to collective action. The absence of these
factors is correlated with internal conflict and inaction, as observed most recently during
the debate over the Alliances role in the GWOT.
This research provides support for the utility of a power-based approach to regime
analysis and the necessity of hegemonic leadership to the process of regime change. The
United States bore much of the responsibility for the defense of Europe both during and
after the Cold War, providing assurances to its European allies that allowed for some
moderation of the security dilemmas that had led to recurring conflict among these states.
As the alliance hegemon, the military capabilities of the United States greatly exceeded
those of its allies and gave American leaders a large voice in determining Allied strategy.
Periods of indecision and inaction on the part of the Alliance can be associated with an
absence of American leadership while many of the initiatives embodying regime change
were sponsored by American leaders. The interests of the United States, which continues
to play the role of alliance hegemon, have remained compatible with a collective defense
regime and the practice of collective security within Europe. In the case of out-of-area
operations, American leaders have shown that they are not always interested in
compromising on the objectives or pace of military operations for the sake of preserving
alliance cohesion. The United States seeks to preserve its access to European forces and
facilities, but does not want the conduct of its operations constrained. These unilateralist
tendencies serve as one obstacle to the extension of NATOs commitment to collective
security. The hegemonic power of the United States depends in no small part on its
ability to sustain an international order and to commit itself to the rules of that order. The
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United States must make efforts to assure that the appropriate rules and procedures are in
place, and that suitable capabilities are present to ensure the success of collective
endeavors.
This research also provides support for the utility of an organization-based
approach to regime analysis and the ability of international organizations to influence the
process of regime change by providing access to relevant capabilities. American
leadership has been crucial to persuading the rest of the allies to act, although this
leadership alone is not a sufficient condition for collective action. Organizational
capabilities greatly determine the amount of influence that an international institution will
have in a particular issue area. Security is a particularly challenging task for the creation
and enforcement of international regimes due to concerns over sovereignty and relative
gains. The intragovernmental nature of NATO decision-making structures is important to
preserving sovereignty, but has made it all the more difficult for the Alliance to act. An
international security organization must demonstrate the ability to summon relevant
capabilities in order to make multilateral responses favorable over unilateral action.
From an organizational perspective, NATO made a number of important
contributions to transatlantic security during the Cold War, even if it did not substantially
alter the hegemonic status of the United States. NATOs role in shaping questions of
strategy has been directly proportional to the perceived advantages of collective action to
various threats. The military capabilities of NATO member states and the effectiveness
of NATO command structures greatly influenced the adoption of a collective security
regime within Europe in the post-Cold War era. More than forty years of experience
developing plans for the defense of Western Europe resulted in a close integration of
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national military staffs and the NATO staff assembled at Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE). NATO member states also maintained relationships with
regional actors and non-member governments that could be exploited to support
diplomatic initiatives aimed at avoiding armed conflict or successfully executing military
interventions in territory within or contiguous to that of NATO member states.
This final element of international cooperation is explored in this research through
the application of a norm-based approach to regime analysis emphasizing the importance
of a shared sense of community to the maintenance of existing international regimes and
the process of regime change. The perception of a transatlantic community has suffered
setbacks both within the United States and Europe. The United States preponderance of
military power and its global presence have contributed to the emergence of a unique
identity based on claims of American exceptionalism. This phenomenon is characterized
by one observer as a firm belief among American leaders in the superior principles of
public and interstate behavior embodied by the United States.1 American leaders sought
to take advantage of opportunities created by the fall of the Soviet Union and secure the
United States status as the sole global power. The perception among American leaders
that they hold unique global duties and responsibilities has made them less willing to
acknowledge the viability of its allies views and the unquestioned military superiority of
the United States has given them a preference for military solutions to security problems.
The rise of the EU and efforts to promote a distinct European identity have contributed to
a breakdown in the perception of a transatlantic community within Europe. To some
1 John Keegan, The Iraq War (N ew York: Alfred A. Knopf: 2004) 97.
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European leaders, a more united Europe offers the possibility for a rebalancing of power
across the Atlantic, with an independent Europe acting on more equal terms with the
United States. The EUs efforts to promoted greater social and economic integration
have led some Europeans to conclude that such nonmilitary initiatives hold great promise
for a more peaceful international order. Self-interested EU bureaucrats tend to reinforce
the concept that the EU must succeed NATO as the guarantor of European security,
claiming that NATO is no longer able to provide Europeans with sufficient opportunities
to influence the security of Europe and other important regions.
Despite the claims of some practitioners and theorists, there is little evidence of a
single European identity that can be easily contrasted with a clearly defined transatlantic
identity. According to Hodge, The Iraq crisis had demonstrated further that a common
European foreign policy would remain a vain hope for the next twenty years.2 Europe
remains divided between those governments that view the EUs transition into security
affairs as a means of gaining greater influence over important security issues and those
states that are reluctant to abandon the NATO security structure. Many NATO
governments, including NATOs newest members, tend to free ride on the efforts of the
United States, and do not wish to exchange NATOs current security arrangements for an
untested arrangement dominated by a handful of their larger neighbors. Divisions
remain over the role of military and nonmilitary instruments of power, with several
governments tenaciously defending their support for the American-led invasion of Iraq.
The leaders of many smaller European NATO states are wary of ceding NATO authority
2 Carl Hodge, Atlanticism fo r a N ew Century: The Rise, Triumph, and D ecline o f NATO (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), 96.
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to the EU for fear that they will be underrepresented in a regime that does not practice
decision-making through consensus. Their leaders do not want to have to choose
between NATO and EU and wish to find a way for the two regimes to coexist in a
complementary manner.
The conditions of hegemonic leadership, access to relevant capabilities, and a
sense of community were adequately fulfilled toward the maintenance of a collective
defense regime both during and after the Cold War. The defense of Western Europe from
the threat posed by Soviet aggression was considered vital to the security of the United
States as well as its European allies. This task demanded the close cooperation between
NATO militaries and the development of complementary capabilities. NATO came to
embody a sense of transatlantic community, with a collective identity largely defined as a
shared opposition to the Soviet threat and an adherence to democratic norms. European
leaders recognized their dependence on the United States during the Cold War and
accepted American leadership. The United States continued to reassure its European
allies of its commitment to the practice of collective defense even after the end of the
Cold War, which served as the primary motivation for the eastward expansion of the
Alliance among states seeking security assurances and better relations with the rest of
Europe.
The practice of collective security in Europe following the end of the Cold War
was a result of American leadership utilizing the residual capability developed for the
purpose of collective defense. The United States could not effectively act within Europe
without the participation of its European allies, thus making collective action through
NATO a desirable option to American leaders. The shared desire of the allies to bring an
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end to the violence in the Balkans presented an opportunity for NATO to expand its
mandate into collective security. American leadership made military operations through
NATO possible, while European militaries made crucial contributions in the form of
troop contributions, access to key facilities, and support for diplomatic initiatives. NATO
member states maintained a sense of community based on their commitment to
maintaining stability throughout the European continent while encouraging continued
democratic reforms in former Warsaw Pact states. A combination of these enabled
NATO to successfully adopt a collective security regime in response to a breach of the
peace within Europe.
The conditions favoring the practice of collective security within Europe could
not be uniformly applied to threats originating from other regions. The capabilities of
European members of NATO were not as well-suited to operations outside of Europe,
which reduced both their willingness to participate in out-of-area collective security
mission and reduced the desirability of acting through the Alliance to American leaders.
Capabilities shortfalls exposed during NATOs operations in the Balkans demonstrated
that European military forces remained optimized for operations within their own
borders. These states could not project military power as effectively as the United States
and European governments failed to follow through with reforms aimed at closing the
capabilities gap among NATO military forces. Crises resulted from both a lack of
collective military power as well as a political disagreement over the use of military
power. Differences in the perception of the threat posed by the nexus of international
terrorism and WMD proliferation also contributed to a breakdown in the sense of
community among NATO member states. American leaders felt a sense of urgency
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following the A1 Qaeda attacks of September 2001 that was not shared by their European
allies. A perception of increased vulnerability contributed to unilateralist tendencies
already emerging from the differences in military capabilities. American leaders began
to view NATO participation as less than essential to the successful outcome of military
interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, while many European governments expressed
a preference for nonmilitary courses of action. While many European governments were
pursuing greater economic and social integration through an increasingly competent
European Union, a decreased sense of interdependence emerged among American and
European leaders that further limited compliance with the norms of consultation and
compromise that had historically characterized relations among NATO governments.
The difficulties encountered by NATO in the adoption of a collective security
regime are consistent with many of the forecasts of some regime theorists. As noted in
Chapter One, Claude and other theorists have contrasted the rather straightforward view
of international aggression enshrined in many collective defense arrangements with the
more uncertain judgments of international aggression necessitated by the practice of
collective security. The disparate roles of the Alliance in the 2001 Afghanistan War and
in the 2003 Iraq War were determined in no small part by the ease in which an overt act
of aggression could be perceived. The Alliance was much more decisive and effective in
response to a security crisis that could be portrayed as meeting the criteria of a collective
defense scenario than one that involved the more subtle determinations of aggression
commonly associated with the practice of collective security. NATO member states have
struggled with issues similar to those undermined earlier attempts to practice collective
security throughout history. Although states may agree in general about the desirability
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of a peaceful international order, the specific circumstances surrounding attempts to
enforce such an order offer many opportunities for disagreement. Rival views on the
necessity for collective action can become even more disparate when the events in
question occur far away and involve less than vital interests.
In many ways, the disposition of member states toward the practice of collective
security outside of Europe has not changed greatly since the end of the Cold War. Some
observers view the lack of concurrence over Iraq as evidence that the Alliance has not
undergone a fundamental transformation since the end of the Cold War. A comparison of
member state behavior during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 and the conflict preceding
the 2003 Iraq war demonstrates the difficulties NATO continues to experience regarding
the practice of collective security outside of Europe. Kissinger notes a number of
similarities between the rationale used by Europeans leaders opposing the use of force in
Iraq to the rationale used by American leaders opposing France and Great Britains use of
force during the Suez Canal Crisis. In each instance, NATO member states opposing the
use of force argued that allied obligations were circumscribed by a precise legal charter
[and] that recourse to force was admissible only in strictly defined self-defense.3 He
also observes a willingness among NATO governments both then and now to improve
their relations with a strategically important Middle Eastern state at the expense of a
fellow NATO ally.
NATOs continued commitment to a collective security regime faces an uncertain
future. While many European states wish to pursue long-term gains associated with the
3 Henry Kissinger, Role Reversal and A lliance Realities, The Washington Post, February 10, 2003.
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continued engagement of the United States, others wish to explore greater independence
in security affairs. NATOs collective defense pledge is commonly cited by NATO
leaders as the most valuable aspect of alliance membership, driving both the desire to join
the Alliance and the willingness to support the policies of the hegemon. While there is a
general interest in preserving the Alliances collective defense regime, the United States
and its European allies are less certain regarding the practice of collective security.
American leaders recognize the value of allied contributions to military interventions and
peacekeeping operations both within Europe and elsewhere, but remain concerned
regarding undue limitations on their freedom of action. Most European governments
desire access to American military and diplomatic capabilities, but have made it clear that
they will not accept an unconditional obligation to participate in military interventions
outside of Europe. While NATO has managed to adapt to changing circumstances in the
past, the Alliance cannot be expected to withstand a wholesale divergence of interests
among its members.
International regimes must continually demonstrate their value or risk becoming
outmoded and irrelevant. Just as military alliances can be reformed or broken,
international regimes may reach a breaking point where the termination of the regime is
determined to be in the best interest of its members. Once flourishing regimes have been
abandoned in the past as the relationships between participants change or the entities
emerge. NATOs survival depends on the Alliances ability to overcome limitations
imposed by materiel, territorial, and ideational differences among its member states.
Material differences are embodied in the growing capabilities gap that has been
observed between the United States and the rest of its NATO allies. The expeditionary
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nature of American military forces emerging from the Cold War allowed them to be
quickly realigned in response to international events. In contrast, Allied militaries
lacked key capabilities to make their forces easily transportable and supportable well
outside their borders. Greater investment by the United States in military technology
throughout the post-Cold War era further aggravated the differences between American
and Allied military forces. Interoperability problems observed during NATO operations
in the Balkans reduced the perceived utility of combined force structures. Differences in
the relative capabilities of NATO militaries shaped both American and European views
toward to use of force and fueled American views of exceptionalism along with a
growing disdain for combined operations.
Territorial limitations have been apparent in the Alliances inability to extend the
practice of collective security outside of Europe. The capabilities of European member
states and NATO organizational bodies meant the Alliance played a unique role in the
execution of military interventions within Europe. The combined military, diplomatic,
and economic efforts of the United States and its NATO allies gave the Alliance a unique
standing within Europe. However, the Alliances ability to actively address the outbreak
of conflict in Europe was less relevant to conflicts originating from outside of Europe.
Many European member governments are unable or unwilling to invest in more
expeditionary militaries and face public opposition to military endeavors that do not
impact their vital interests. Despite many external and internal reforms, NATO has
struggled to achieve the unity of will necessary to allow member states to collectively
address out-of-area threats.
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Ideational differences have manifested themselves in the debate over the future
role of the United States in Europe and the desirability of an independent European
security regime. During the Cold War, the overt threat posed by the Soviet Union helped
to sustain NATOs collective defense regime along with the formation of a sense of
community rooted in a shared commitment to the expansion of liberal values. In a more
complex and multifaceted security environment, differences in the perception of threats
and the absence of a common identity have made the practice of collective security less
practical. The absence of a clear sense of identity either exclusive or inclusive of the
United States has presented another barrier to the practice of collective security. As
Erlanger observes, The use of force will always be controversial in a European Union
that has no clear identity, no single citizenship or army, and no larger European
patriotism for which, so far, any young European man or woman is likely to want to die
in battle.4 The United States and its European allies continued to adhere to long
standing norms of consultation and compromise regarding traditional military planning,
but have encountered difficulties expanding these norms to emerging threats. While
NATO member states have consistently demonstrated their interest in preserving a
collective defense regime, there is less certainty regarding the Alliances further
extension of a collective security regime.
NATO must overcome these material, territorial, and ideational challenges if it is
to continue to play a meaningful role in the preservation of transatlantic security. While
one cannot rule out the possibility that chronic differences among NATO member states
4 Steven Erlanger, Anatomy o f a Breakdown, in Beyond P aradise and Power: Europe, Am erica and the
Future o f a Troubled Partnership, ed. Tod Linberg (N ew York: Routledge, 2005), 15.
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may eventually lead to the dissolution of the Alliance, the implications of this research
suggest that transatlantic cooperation may be sustained and even expanded in the future
through a process of reform addressing key factors associated with power-based,
organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis.
Implications o f research
This research supports a number of policy recommendations for both member
state governments and NATO leaders wishing to increase the present level of
transatlantic cooperation while recognizing NATOs present capabilities and limitations.
The preservation and expansion of collective security regime within and beyond Europe
requires NATO leaders to address factors associated with all three approaches to regime
analysis. NATO must seek to overcome the skepticism of American leaders who
question the need for the United States to act through the Alliance by improving its
access to relevant capabilities. NATO must demonstrate the ability to foster
commitments to collective action and carry out these decisions through an effective
command structure. The United States and its European allies need to explore ways of
improving their existing security dialogue and restore a shared sense of community, in
order to aid the formation of common security policies and greater consensus regarding
the perception of emerging threats.
The abandonment of NATO is not an attractive option for the United States or its
European allies. The loss of NATO would eliminate a useful transatlantic bridge that
promotes an important dialogue that helps member states understand each others
security needs and identify opportunities for cooperation. An end to this dialogue could
trigger security dilemmas and the resumption of overt power balancing within Europe.
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European states could find their efforts at further integration slowed by an erosion of trust
among member governments. The United States might find it more difficult to act in the
region, since its presence is dependent on the concurrence of its allies and their
willingness to provide access to important facilities along with transit rights. Any efforts
to quickly organize and deploy combined military forces would be hindered by the
absence of standing forces or the maintenance of common standards and procedures for
such missions. The termination of efforts to assure the interoperability of American and
European military forces would increase the risk of future combined operations failing to
fulfill their mandate.
The United States current preference for acting through coalitions of the
willing reflects dissatisfaction with the procedural characteristics of existing
international organizations rather than a uniform desire to pursue its interests in isolation.
The key to reviving NATO as a suitable vehicle for the pursuit of multilateral policies is
to improve the Alliances ability to reach agreement on the necessity for collective action
and to make suitable forces available to carry out the resulting decisions. NATO may
find it possible to extend its commitment to collective security outside Europe by
addressing chronic problems with its command structures and the distribution of military
capabilities.
Improvements in the capability of NATO military forces is one clear way of
reversing the division of labor where American forces provide the bulk of combat forces
while Europeans are later tasked with peacekeeping responsibilities. This division of
labor has introduced frustration and resentment among European leaders that feel they are
not given an opportunity to provide sufficient input regarding operations that affect their
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security. The ability of European states to influence American foreign policy will
continue to be closely tied to the perception that these states can provide crucial
assistance to the United States. NATO can retain its relevance only if its member states
obtain military capabilities that are demanded in the event of a crisis. As General Jones,
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) observed, NATO has too much
capacity for what it used to do in the past and not enough capacity for what it must do in
the future. In order to retool effectively, tough decisions must be made in order to free up
resources to invest for the future.5 Despite a European gross domestic product that far
exceeds that of the United States, the combined defense spending of the European
members of NATO is less than half of that of the United States. If European leaders do
not have the political will to significantly increase defense spending, they should work to
develop agreements on how their limited resources can best be allocated to reduce the
capabilities gap between their military forces and those of the United States. An increase
in the number of combined weapons systems development programs, an elimination of
unnecessary duplications in the European defense industrial base, and reductions in the
numbers of non-deployable support personnel are just some of the ways to increase the
effectiveness of European military forces with little or no spending increases.
NATO leaders should seek new ways of enforcing existing agreements regarding
defense spending and capability improvements. A majority of NATO member states
have regularly failed to sustain defense budgets at the minimum level of 2% of Gross
5 James Jones, Military Matters: Transforming N A T O s Military Structures, NATO R eview 52, no. 1
(Spring 2 0 0 4 ) http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issuel/english/m ilitary.htm l.
308
Domestic Product (GDP) over the past several years.6 While joint force structure goals,
such as those announced during the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, help to specify the
direction of future reforms, these goals have rarely been met.7 NATO does not currently
have a means of enforcing past agreements and the intragovernmental nature of the
Alliance makes it unlikely that penalties can be effectively applied. An alternative may
lie in an incentive structure where small NATO states are encouraged to develop niche
capabilities that help the Alliance meet their force projection objectives. These states
should be discouraged from attempting to develop military forces capable of conducting
the full spectrum of military operations, recognizing that such a capability can only be
affordably attained through the combined deployment of NATO forces. A number of
NATO allies have already reshaped their forces to eliminate redundancies and focus on
providing capabilities less commonly available within the Alliance. In recent years,
Denmark abolished its submarine force, greatly reduced the size of its air defense system
and eliminated the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) from its inventory.
According to the Danish Minister of Defense, these decisions were reached with a view
to what NATO needed and what was most required for international operations.8 The
6 A review o f 2004 defense spending shows that Belgium , Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Spain remain below the 2% o f GDP. NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Statistics: D efense
Spending and Military Personnel, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/statistics.htm l.
7 During this summit, NATO defense ministers agreed that 40% o f each member states land forces should
be capable o f being deployed as part o f combined operations under NATO or other auspices, and that 8%
o f these forces would either be engaged in or earmarked for such operations at any time. These targets
have yet to be met by most NATO governments.
8 NATO O ffice o f Information and D efense, Speech by H.E. Mr Spren Gade Minister o f D efense,
Denmark, The Danish Response to the Transformation Challenge, April 14, 2005,
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050414c.htm .
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Danish example should be followed by other European member states that wish to field
forces that are capable of operating alongside each other under a range of combat
conditions
Another promising area of improvement relies on increasing the size and
capability of the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). Current plans for the NRF will give
NATO the ability to deploy a brigade-size force capable of high-intensity combat
operations at short notice. NRF assets are identified in advance along with procedures for
transport, communications, logistics, and intelligence related to operations within or
outside of Europe. Once these initial goals are reached, the NRF could be expanded to
multiple brigades or potentially larger troop formations. The NRF should also be
expanded to include personnel and assets required to address the multitude of non
military tasks that accompany peacekeeping and reconstruction operations. In both
Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition forces demonstrated impressive war-fighting capabilities,
but were less successful in post-conflict stabilization efforts. NATOs limited expertise
in civil functions may require close coordination with other state agencies or international
organizations. Regardless of where these capabilities are found, the emphasis on
advanced planning that accompanies NRF operations can help assure that the right mix of
resources are available to ensure that both combat and post-conflict operations are
successful.
An increased emphasis on the organization of standing military forces such as the
NRF could be complemented by the creation of a common fund for NATO operations.
NATOs annual budget is presently limited to the costs associated with the NATO
headquarters staff along with the costs of acquiring and maintaining common equipment
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and facilities. This budget is on the order of only one percent of combined defense
spending because the vast majority of troops and equipment for NATO operations are
provided directly by participating states. The current arrangement discourages the poorer
members of NATO from contributing troops even in the event that the forces are
available and the government fully concurs with the objectives of the operation. A
common operations fund would facilitate greater overall participation by allowing those
member states willing to deploy forces to be subsidized by other states that are either
unwilling or unable to deploy their own forces in support of a particular mission. This
initiative not only has the benefit of making more forces available for deployment, but it
has the potential to improve the training and interoperability of NATO forces by giving
less-capable member states the opportunity to gain more experience employing NATO
doctrine and complying with NATO standards.
Common funding has long been practiced as a means of funding UN
peacekeeping operations, and is worthy of further consideration by NATO member
states. Common funding has been practiced within NATO on a limited scale with the
creation of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force. As General Jones, SACEUR,
recently observed, We have a good example in the Alliance of success in common
funding operational deployments, and that is you have to look no further than NATO
AW ACS.. .We don't spend a lot of time worrying about using NATO AW ACS with
regard to who's going to pay for it, because it's already resourced. And so it does a lot of
311
things, it goes a lot of places.9 NATO operations, along with key capabilities such as
strategic airlift and ballistic missile defense are all attractive candidates for common
funding. Polands role in Iraq provides one example of why this arrangement is
desirable. According to the Polish Minister of Defense, Radek Sikorski, operations in
Iraq since 2003 have cost Poland $600 million to date, and has forced Poland to delay
some of the modernization of its military forces it had agreed to in previous NATO
summits.10 Polish leaders are concerned about having to commit as much as 10% of their
annual defense spending to Iraq, and have asked the United States to increase its military
aid to Poland to help offset this expense. Common funding can help reduce the
competition between modernization and current operations that plague the Polish
government along with those of other NATO member states.
Even with more capable and interoperable military forces, NATOs continued
evolution toward the practice of collective security will remain stalled until significant
changes take place reflecting the organizational and normative characteristics of the
Alliance. NATO leaders desiring the Alliance to have a more active role in global
security affairs should pursue streamlined decision-making procedures and the ability to
quickly field large numbers of combat-ready forces operating under effective command
arrangements. The goals of these reforms are to help NATO member states make
decisions and to take the necessary action necessary to carry out these decisions. As
9 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, Remarks by General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, What has NATO learned from its operations? April 14, 2005,
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050414i.htm .
10 Christopher Cavas, Polish Minister, Rumsfeld D iscuss NA TO Issues, D efense N ew s, Decem ber 12,
2005.
312
Bulgarias Minister of Defense, Nikolay Svinarov, recently observed, The real test for
the success of our policy is the compatibility of the declarations and their practical
realization, the synergy of words and actions, which practically means our capacity and
skill to successfully translate the political declarations and the intentions into a clear,
practical language, followed by concrete and adequate actions.11
The reform of NATOs decision-making procedures should be considered in the
interest of allowing the Alliance to become more active in world affairs. The North
Atlantic Council (NAC) and other internal bodies have long operated on the principle that
a consensus must be achieved among all member states in order for the Alliance to act,
and all members have a veto. Collective action problems stem from the need for
consensus among all 26 member states prior to the Alliances involvement in an issue
area. Achieving unanimity is within the NAC is a time-consuming process that limits the
responsiveness and flexibility of NATO forces. A larger membership introduces more
opportunities for dissension and the possibility that the concerns of a small minority of
states will prevent the majority from taking action they deem necessary for their security.
NATO has faced a number of such deadlocks, including the initial refusal of aid for the
defense of Turkey in the run-up to war with Iraq. NATO leaders should consider
introducing procedures for the initiation of operations based on the will of the majority.
Procedural changes permitting decision-making through a simple majority rule, or a
weighted majority based on monetary or troop contributions are worth scrutinizing. One
solution might lie in the concept of constructive abstention practiced within the EU,
11 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. Address by N ikolay Svinarov, Minister o f Defence, Bulgaria
Transforming N ATO - A Political and Military Challenge? April 14, 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/
speech/2005/s050414g.htm
313
wherein a state can elect not to implement a decision reached by the majority while
agreeing not to impede the actions of the majority. Democratic leaders are well-versed in
the practice of compromise and adhering to the will of the majority, which makes it all
the more likely that a suitable arrangement could be crafted.
NATO leaders may also look to the United Nations as a model for how to oversee
ongoing operations. The NAC is much more actively involved in the management of
military operations than the UN Security Council. James Dobbins, a former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, observes that while the [Security] Council
normally makes only one decision respecting any particular operation every six months,
leaving the UN Secretary-General relatively unconstrained in carrying out that mandate
during the intervals, the North Atlantic Councils decision-making is more
incremental.12 While this level of involvement is intended to give member state the
necessary reassurance to allow them to commit to more high-risk operations, it has
instead resulted in slow responsiveness, frequent redirection and the restrictive rules of
engagement (ROE). Numerous national caveats on the use of forces place unnecessary
constraints on operational commanders. Security assistance operations in Kosovo were
recently disrupted when several participating governments imposed restrictions on the
use of their forces in riot control. Other member states imposed a requirement that their
governments be given twelve hours notice before their troops could be deployed outside
of a designated geographical area. Describing the impact of inconsistent ROE, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld observed, It's kind of like having a basketball
12 James Dobbins, N A T O s role in nation-building, NATO R eview 53, no. 2 (Summer 2005)
ttp://w ww.nato.int/docu/review /2005/issue2/english/artl.htm l.
314
team, and they practice and practice and practice for six months. When it comes to game
time, one or two say, We are not going to play.13 In order to assure the successful
outcome of future operations, NATO commanders must be given the authority and
flexibility to make operational decisions without undue interference from the NAC or
other political bodies.
NATOs effectiveness as an international security regime can also be enhanced by
a more productive relationship with the other similar regimes, such as the EU. Some
American officials have advocated a division of labor through which the United States
shifts its attention to threats outside of Europe while transferring the responsibility for
European security to the EU or another international organization with exclusively
European membership.14 In practice, such a division of responsibilities along geographic
boundaries could introduce innumerable difficulties. Many contemporary security
challenges are transnational and cannot be contained to single region. This approach fails
to recognize that out-of-area threats quite often affect the interests of European states,
sometimes to an even greater extent that those of the United States. Since so many of
these threats can be more effectively countered with collective action, a more productive
approach is to seek a way to reform existing relationships to draw on the combined
resources of all like-minded states rather than imposing barriers to action. Blanket
opposition to European integration among American or NATO leaders will simply
encourage call for the emergence the EU as a counterweight to American power.
13 Philip Shishkin, NATO's Peacekeeping Problem, Wall S treet Journal, August 8, 2005.
14 Stephen Larrabee, N A T O s Eastern Agenda in a N ew Strategic Era, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003),
177.
315
American officials should avoid trying to highlight differences between old Europe and
new Europe because any unresolved differences among European states weakens the
commitment to collective action. While the Central and Eastern European states are
strong Atlanticists, they should not be forced into the position of choosing between
NATO and the EU. Differences should be discussed and overcome, not exploited by
individual leaders for short term political gains.
Rather than encouraging transatlantic competition for global influence, EU and
NATO officials should seek to define a new partnership designed to address future
security challenges. Even without the military prowess of the United States, these allies
can contribute to the creation of a peaceful international order. Recent operations in the
Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the exploding demand for both military
and civilian functions related to security and reconstruction assistance. Many European
states and the EU have developed capabilities that can be employed during this phase of
an operation. NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea envisions a process through which NATO
and the EU would gradually merge almost into twin sister institutions, in much the same
way that we consider the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as twin
institutions, having nonetheless each a specialized role but with a large degree of overlap
in a common policy.15 A partnership between NATO and the EU seems appropriate
based on the relative strengths of each regime.
NATO serves important functions related to the development and employment of
military forces, while the EU performs a number of non-military functions that are
15 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, V ideo Lecture: NATO-EU Relations, February 12, 2004,
316
important to facilitating international cooperation. The EU provides a body of common
law that reduces the differences among member states, thus eliminating potential sources
of conflict. The economic policies of the EU increase the interdependence of member
states while making them more competitive in a global marketplace. The EU has
overseen civilian policing and judicial measures that have complemented NATOs
military capabilities during recent peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and elsewhere. The EU has made important contributions to the GWOT by
helping to identify and restrict source of funding to international terrorist groups and to
coordinate policing activities within Europe. The EU has improved the cooperation
among European court systems and police forces through its Eurojust and Europol
programs. Recent initiatives such as adopting a common European arrest warrant, and
cracking down on financial crimes such as money laundering have contributed greatly to
global counter-terrorism efforts. As the EU develops new capabilities related to security
and defense, these initiatives should be coordinated with NATO to avoid duplication and
ensure compatibility with existing standards and doctrine. The well-orchestrated
evolution of both NATO and the EU offers the greatest hope for establishing a foundation
to encourage stability and peace within Europe that can be spread to other regions.
In addition to reaching out to other international security regimes, NATO leaders
should increase their interaction with democratic states located well outside its traditional
European area of operations. Post-Cold War initiatives such as the organization of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) were a key
part of NATOs practice of collective security. These efforts contributed to improved
relations among former adversaries and helped sustain a dialogue that paved the way for
317
two rounds of expansion and the addition of ten new member states. While these
initiatives have thus far been limited to European and Central Asian states, there is an
opportunity to expand them to other regions. NATOs further embrace of a global
collective security mission justifies a truly global membership. Australia and Japan have
consistently expressed a commitment to the same liberal democratic values that form the
basis of the transatlantic alliance and their contributions to the coalitions conducting the
GWOT clearly justify their consideration for membership. Other democratic states such
as India, South Africa, South Korea and Israel have capabilities that would be invaluable
to future NATO operations in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The expansion of the
Alliance outside of Europe can help NATO overcome the shortcomings resulting from
the limited geographic reach of many European allies. When combined with internal
reforms giving the NAC the ability to direct collective action with less than full
unanimity, NATO could increase its influence in world affairs while working to expand a
peaceful, liberal order to more volatile regions such as the Middle East and Africa.
An alliance that is more active in global affairs can be somewhat self-sustaining
by generating more interest in frequent and meaningful combined operations. Krebs
argues that participation in combined operations is crucial to sustaining alliance cohesion
and encourages further cooperation. He notes, Participation in alliance functions
generates increasing knowledge of and trust in emerging motives, decreasing concerns of
relative gains and perceptions of intra-alliance threat...Joint force structures and planning
reshape each members military posture to reflect alliance interests, reducing the fear of
attack and obviating security dilemma dynamics. NATO diplomats that interact
regularly with their Allied colleagues are socialized into a shared culture, transcending
318
their national interest. These diplomats are able to directly and indirectly shape their
states preferences accordingly.16 Although NATO has carried out a number of
supporting missions associated with the GWOT, there has been a division between
American-led coalition operations and operations under NATO command. United States
forces have dominated coalition operations while making up only a small portion of the
forces participating in NATO operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans. This division
of responsibilities is preventing NATO officials from working through the differences
that can lead to greater confidence and trust among member states. If American leaders
expect NATO to play a greater role in future out-of-area crises, the United States must
agree to increase the Alliances role in ongoing stabilization and reconstruction
operations. American leaders must accept the principle that short-term compromises and
constraints may encourage the long-term benefits of a more multilateral approach to out-
of-area operations.
One immediate way in which NATO leaders can assume a larger role in the
GWOT is by reexamining the division of responsibilities in Afghanistan. The decision of
European member states to increase their troop deployments to Afghanistan is a positive
step, but should be accompanied by further integration with ongoing counter-terrorism
operations. The expansion of ISAF to some 16,000 troops demonstrates the continued
willingness of European governments to bear the expense and risk of global
peacekeeping deployments. However, these leaders are reluctant to commit to more
direct participation in offensive counter-terrorism operations, which prevents NATO
16 Ronald Krebs, Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish C onflict International
O rganization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 351.
319
forces from assuming all of the responsibilities of the American-led coalition still
operating in southern Afghanistan. The merger of ongoing operations in Afghanistan
would demonstrate a renewed commitment to collective security involving more
extensive consultations and an opportunity to improve transatlantic relations. This
merger could encourage more equitable American participation in NATO-led operations
and present opportunities to resolve lingering interoperability and command issues.
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently expressed his support for
combining the two Afghanistan missions, proclaiming NATO needs one set of rules of
17
engagement in Afghanistan. If executed along with a renewed commitment to
collective security on the part of member states, this initiative may become an important
step to reinstituting one set of rules of engagement in other regions.
NATO leaders should also strive to obtain a greater role for the Alliance in
peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The experience of the United States in
Iraq has demonstrated the high cost and risk associated with its refusal to transfer any
significant degree of control to NATO or any other international organization. Despite
earlier disagreements over the threat posed by Iraqs alleged links to terrorist groups and
development of WMD, NATO member states all share an interest in the successful
creation of a democratic government in Iraq. Insurgent forces opposing this process have
clear ties to A1 Qaeda and other international terrorist groups and are employing methods
that violate the most fundamental principles of international law. Neither the United
States nor its European allies want to see Iraq decline into anarchy or come under the
17 Carlotta Gall, NA TO to Expand Force and Task in Afghanistan, The N ew York Times, October 7, 2005.
320
control of these groups. A lasting peace in Iraq is contingent upon the ability of a
responsible Iraqi government to gain control of the country and provide adequate security
along with other essential services. As demonstrated by the past decade of reconstruction
and reform in the Balkans, international economic and diplomatic initiatives can do much
to bring this about. Divisions within NATO have prevented a similar commitment to
improving the conditions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and member states need to
consider the potential impacts to their own security. Europe can contribute a great deal to
the process of reconstruction and stabilization, and a reinvigorated NATO is in many
ways the most suitable forum for this effort.
A meaningful and focused discussion of the benefits to be obtained through
NATOs increased contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be just one
part of an effort to increase the current level of dialogue within the Alliance. While
differences may persist regarding views on the use of force and the relationship between
national sovereignty and international law, these differences should not prevent pressing
global issues from being discussed within the NAC. During at February 2005 security
conference in Munich, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder remarked that NATO was
no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate
strategies.18 He pointed out that the NAC had failed to address such issues as preventing
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or the EUs interest in lifting the post-Tiananmen
arms embargo on China. These and other security challenges have important
18 German Embassy to the United Kingdom, Speech by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroder at the
opening o f the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 12, 2005, http://www.german-
em bassy.org.uk/speech_by_federal_chancellor_gl.html.
321
implications for all members of the Alliance and justify a more thorough review within
the NAC.
NATO should strive to regain its status as the primary forum for a transatlantic
dialogue regarding global security issues. NATO is the only international organization
that brings leaders from North America and Europe together to consult on strategic issues
and take collective action through an integrated military structure. NATOs current
Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has recently called for a repoliticization of
NATO, noting that military capabilities are only one part of transformation. They will
be worthless if allies cannot agree on how, when and where to use them.19 Lithuanias
Minister of National Defense, Gediminas Kirkilas, supports this request, stating We
believe that military transformation can be enhanced by NATOs political transformation,
that political dialogue on strategic questions will bring us closer to shared perceptions,
which are fundamental for building consensus and a sense of common principles.20
Updating NATOs Strategic Concept could serve as a vehicle for encouraging a more
meaningful dialogue regarding the Alliances future role. NATOs Strategic Concept has
not been updated since 1999, well before the outbreak of the GWOT and the debate over
the American strategy of preemption. The current Strategic Concept acknowledges the
threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, but gives little
concrete guidance to NATOs Military Committee or other subordinate bodies. Among
19 NATO Office o f Information and Press Address by Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
Transforming NATO - A Political and Military Challenge, April 14, 2005,
20 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press. Address by H.E. Mr. Gediminas Kirkilas Minister o f National
Defence o f Lithuania on National Approaches to NATO Transformation at the NA TO Annual Conference,
April 14, 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050414b.htm
322
the revision to the Strategic Concept, there needs to be a call for in-depth consultations
aimed at resolving the differences that lead to foreign policy conflicts. A more
meaningful role for NATOs political forums would likely mean more frequent and
longer meetings among NATO heads of state and defense ministers, but could result in
greater unity and a more thorough understanding of each others interests and policy
positions.
Despite the well-publicized differences that have emerged in the recent past,
fundamental economic, military, and social links continue to exist between the United
States and its NATO allies that offer great promise for a reinvigoration of the Alliance.
According to James Cloos, the Director of Transatlantic Relations for the EU Council,
Economic interdependence between the United States and Europe is absolutely
staggering. Mutual investment is $2.8 trillion. Mutual trade is $550 billion...Investment
of the United States in Holland alone is ten times U.S. investment in China.21 NATO
member states are in full agreement regarding fundamental principles such as the
importance of democratic governance, free trade, and respect for human rights. NATO
has struggled throughout its history with questions of grand strategy, interoperability and
burden-sharing, and yet the Alliance has continued to thrive. NATO remains unique
among existing international regimes in its ability to conduct combined military
interventions under a wide range of conditions and has demonstrated the ability to
successfully accept new roles and responsibilities. By pursuing reforms attentive to the
factors identified throughout this study, NATO leaders can build upon the long tradition
21 NATO O ffice o f Information and Press, NATO Stopwatch: The Transatlantic Link, May 17, 2005,
323
of transatlantic cooperation that has made this alliance among the most successful in
history and someday bring the rhetoric of collective security into reality.
Recommendations fo r further research
Although this research has been limited to the behavior of the transatlantic allies
participating in NATO, these findings support some speculation regarding the behavior of
states toward international regimes in general. The approaches to regime analysis that are
utilized throughout this study can and should be applied to other international regimes.
Future research could be undertaken to demonstrate the relevance of the factors of
hegemonic leadership, access to relevant capabilities, and a sense of community to other
international regimes, whether they deal with issues of security, economics, or other
social phenomena. It is also important to note that every international regime coexists
and interacts with others. Exploring the linkages between these regimes and the resulting
process of regime change offer new opportunities for research. These findings may be
generalized to other instances of international cooperation to gain a better understanding
of the conditions that must be fulfilled to enable an existing regime to be maintained or to
allow new regimes to be adopted.
Future research should also look at other emerging opportunities for collective
action in response to out-of-area security challenges on the part of NATO member states.
This research may confirm the importance of the factors identified in this dissertation as
well as identifying additional factors for consideration. Transatlantic efforts to resolve
the chronic Israeli-Palestinian conflict will likely present an opportunity for NATO to
practice collective security outside of Europe. While the Israeli governments 2005
withdrawal from Gaza generated increased optimism, the level of support for Hamas in
324
recent Palestinian parliamentary elections demonstrates the lingering distrust that
threatens to limit further progress toward a peace accord. Formal recognition of Israel
and the peaceful coexistence of both communities may eventually be negotiated in
exchange for Israels withdrawal back to its pre-1967 borders, but much work remains to
bring this about. NATO member states recognize the need to coordinate their efforts to
encourage a settlement of these issues and coordinate the military, diplomatic, and
economic efforts necessary to a peaceful settlement. One analyst notes, An honest
broker is needed, trusted by both sides, which can help negotiate and then enforce a
sophisticated security package. The United States cannot do this, nor can Europe, as
neither is seen as impartial. However far-fetched this might seem at the moment, NATO
is probably the only institution that could tackle this problem in the next few years.22 If
requested, NATO forces could be organized to monitor the terms of a future Israeli-
Palestinian peace accord and to aid its enforcement. The role of NATO and other
international security regimes is a potentially valuable research topic as the United States
and its European allies continue to seek the resolution of remaining disagreements and
promote stability throughout this troubled region.
Another opportunity for the United States and its European allies to employ
international security regimes in response to an emerging threat is likely to come from
Irans resumption of uranium enrichment activities following a two year suspension. The
Iranian government continues to oppose American and European influence in the region
and exploits its long-standing ties with international terrorist groups to that end. After
22 Donnelly, Chris, Building a NATO Partnership for the Greater Middle East, NATO R eview 52, no. 1
(Spring 2004) http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issuel/english/art3.htm l.
325
remaining conspicuously absent from negotiations aimed at convincing the Iranian
government to voluntarily limit its nuclear research, American officials have recently
joined representatives from Germany, France and Great Britain in calling for stronger
penalties against Iran. The United Nations Security Council is likely to consider ordering
sanctions in addition to those already imposed by the United States. While NATOs role
in this crisis has yet to be determined, research examining both the incentives and
obstacles to collective action will improve our understanding of the inclinations of
member states within such a regime and add valuable insights to those emerging from an
examination of NATOs evolution to date.
326
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355
VITA
BARAK CARLSON
May 24, 1966 Bom, Pueblo, Colorado
1988 B.S., Aerospace Engineering

University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
1989-Present Commissioned Officer, United States

Air Force
1993 M.S., Systems Management

Air Force Institute of Technology
Dayton, Ohio
2001 M.A. Military Operational Art and Science

Air Command and Staff College
Montgomery, Alabama
2001-2003 Instructor, National Security Studies

Air Command and Staff College
Montgomery, Alabama
2003 M.A., International Relations

Auburn University
Montgomery, Alabama
356

Regime Change in Nato

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FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

EXAMINING THE PROCESS OF REGIME CHANGE IN THE

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:

THE DIVIDE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

Ralph S. Clem, Major Professor

Date of Defense: April 17,2006

The dissertation of Barak Carlson is approved.

Interim Dean Mark D. Szuchman

IntertnrDeSh Stephan L. Mintz

Florida International University, 2006

Organization, was initially piqued during my participation in a number of NATO Steering

undergoing continuous scrutiny and coordination among Alliance member governments.

I was fortunate to be surrounded by top-notch academicians who offered further insights

continues to do to make me cherish her more each day.

EXAMINING THE PROCESS OF REGIME CHANGE IN THE

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:

THE DIVIDE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY

Florida International University, 2006

Professor Ralph S. Clem, Major Professor

defense against the common threat of Soviet-backed aggression. Employing the

preserved their commitment to mutual defense while increasingly engaging in activities

introduced elements o f a collective security regime by expanding its mandate to address

This research involves an interpretive analysis of NATOs evolution applying ideal

research involves a review of regime theory literature, consisting of an examination of

primary source documentation, including official documents and treaties, as well as a

review o f numerous secondary sources. This review is organized around a typology of

power-based, organization-based, and norm-based approaches to regime analysis. This

of regime change, while offering recommendations aimed at increasing NATOs viability

as a source o f greater security and more meaningful international cooperation.

I. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................1

II. NATO DURING THE COLD WAR....................................................................... 67

III. POST-COLD WAR NATO...................................................................................... 113

IV. NATOS ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM..............................186

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION..................................................................... 293

VITA .................................................................................................................................... 356

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACO Allied Command Operations

ANO Abu Nidal Organization

AFNORTH Allied Forces North

AFSOUTH Allied Force South

ANA Afghan National Army

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

CFE Conventional Forces Europe

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CINCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

COMAIRSOUTH Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe

COMNAVSOUTH Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe

COMSTRIKFORSOUTH Commander Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSBM Confidence and Security-Building Measures

CSCE Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative

DPC Defense Planning Committee

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EDC European Defense Community

EEC European Economic Community

EPAF European Participating Air Forces

ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force