Westbrook: Evolutionary Pleading

WESTBROOK_FINALPG205243PROOFED(DONOTDELETE) 1/10/20119:43:56AM
EvolutionaryPleading:ShouldCongress
OverridetheSupremeCourtsUnnatural
SelectioninAshcroftv.IqbaltoPreventthe
ExtinctionofCivilRightsCases?
GEOFFREYC.WESTBROOK*

ABSTRACT
Therearefewissuesincivilprocedurejurisprudencemoresignificant
thanpleadingstandards,whicharethekeytoaccessingthecourts.Inthe
last three years, the United States Supreme Court revolutionized civil
practice and procedure in federal courts. First in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Supreme Court introduced the nowfamous plausibility test
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint, causing widespread
speculation as to whether the era of notice pleading had come to an end.
However,theSupremeCourtdidnotleavethepublicquestioningforlong,
as Ashcroft v. Iqbal ended all subsequent debatethe seventyyearold
noticepleading regime is officially over. In its stead, the Iqbal majority
instituted an entirely new standard that places additional barriers before
claimantsatthestepsoffederalcourt.
Almost immediately, a flood of doomsday predictions ensued
concerning the future of civil actions under the new heightened pleading
standard announced in Iqbal. Among these predictions were claims that
specifictypesofcaseswouldbetargetedanddismissedmoreeasilyunder
the Iqbal pleading standard. Recent scholarship has paid particular
attention to how Iqbal will impact civil rights cases considering the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England School of Law (2011). B.A., Theology, Azusa
PacificUniversity(2006).IwouldliketothankProfessorCharlesSorensonforhisinputand
guidanceinaddressingthemanycomplexissuespresentedbyAshcroftv.Iqbal.Iwouldalso
liketothankmycolleaguesontheNewEnglandLawReviewfortheiradviceandsuggestions
fromwhichthisNotehasgreatlybenefitted.Mostofall,IwouldliketothankmywifeKyle
Westbrook for her unconditional love and support that continually inspires me to dream
biggerandtoattempttheimpossible.
205
206 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205
enhanced role given to judges under Iqbal, the increased likelihood of

meritorious civil rights claims being dismissed, the consequent reduction
of court access to civil rights plaintiffs, and the potential windfall
discriminatorswillenjoyduetoIqbalsheightenedpleadingstandard.One
scholarhasevendeemedIqbalunconstitutional.
In light of Iqbals dramatic impact on civil rights cases, thisNotecalls
for congressional action. Using case law and recent empirical data, this
Noteillustrateshowcivilrightscasespresentlyfacethethreatofextinction
due to the new strict requirements of the Iqbal standard. Because of the
importance of civil rights claims as the enforcement mechanism for
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection,
congressionalactiontoensuretheirsurvivalisimperative.
As a separate justification for congressional override, this Note also
takes issue with the Iqbal majoritys unnatural selectionthe Supreme
Court drafted an entirely new rule to govern pleadings instead of going
throughtherulemakingprocessestablishedbytheRulesEnablingAct.As
aresult,theIqbalCourtcircumventedthebenefitsandsafeguardsprovided
by the Rules Enabling Act. Moreover, the Iqbal majority abrogated over
fifty years of Supreme Court precedent in order to make room for their
new rule. This Note thus calls for congressional action to reverse the
fundamentalerrorspermeatingtheIqbaldecision,astheCourtexceededits
judicial power to interpret federal rules and unjustifiably abandoned
SupremeCourtprecedentandthedoctrineofstaredecisis.
INTRODUCTION
A
ccording to Charles Darwins theory of Natural Selection,
organisms in competition with one another engage in a struggle
for survival resulting in a progressively more advanced species.1
Darwin hypothesized that this struggle is the inevitable result of limited
resourcesandaneverincreasingpopulation.2Sincethefinalresultofthis
struggle can be quite severe, the extinction of an entire species, every
advantageissignificant.3Atleastsuperficially,thissystemofcompetition
appears just and fair because all must compete with the same access to
resources and chances of survival.4 However, the process of natural
selection would be very unnatural if, for example, nature suddenly gave
1MichaelRuse,CharlesDarwinsTheoryofEvolution:AnAnalysis,8J.HIST.BIOLOGY219,219
20(1975).
2Seeid.at22021.
3SeeCHARLESDARWIN,THEORIGINOFSPECIES108,112(RandomHouse1993)(1859).
4Seeid.at10912.
2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 207
one organism an advantage to the significant detriment of a different

speciesultimately leading to its extinction. Although nature does not
tendtobehavethisway,mankindhasbeenknowntomakesuchformsof
selection.5
In the last three years, the U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized civil
practice and procedure in federal courts.6 First, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,7theSupremeCourtintroducedthenowfamousplausibilitytest8
to determine the sufficiency of a complaint, causing widespread
speculationastowhethertheeraofnoticepleading9hadcometoanend.10
However,theSupremeCourtdidnotleavethepublicquestioningforlong,
as Ashcroft v. Iqbal11 ended all subsequent debatethe seventyyearold
noticepleading regime is officially over.12 In its stead, the Iqbal majority
instituted an entirely new standard that focuses on the factual basis of a
complaintratherthanwhetheritgivesnoticetothedefendantofthelegal
claims involved.13 Unfortunately, Twomblys plausibility test was just the
beginning; the Iqbal Court further heightened pleading such that the
meaningofRule8oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure14(CivilRules)
5Seeid.at4950.
6See Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of Plausible Pleadings: An Introduction to the
SymposiumonAshcroftv.Iqbal,14LEWIS&CLARKL.REV.1,2(2010).
7550U.S.544(2007).
8SeeRuthBaderGinsburg,Assoc.Justice,SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,Remarksfor
Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009) (Under Twombly, a plaintiff must allege
factsthat,takenastrue,stateaplausiblebasisforrelief.).
9SeeConleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,47(1957)(providingthatRule8(a)oftheFederalRules
of Civil Procedure only requires a plaintiff to give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffsclaimisandthegroundsuponwhichitrests).
10SeeScottDodson,FederalPleadingandStatePresuitDiscovery,14LEWIS&CLARKL.REV.43,
44(2010).
11129S.Ct.1937(2009).
12See Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 143, 143 (2010); Tony Mauro, Ashcroft Ruling Adds Hurdle for Plaintiffs: U.S.
SupremeCourtDecisioninIqbalCouldMakeitEasierforDefendantstoDismissCivilComplaints,
NATLL.J.,May25,2009,at11.
13See Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution,CivilRights,andCivilLibertiesoftheH.Comm.ontheJudiciary,111thCong.6(2009)
(statement of Debo P. Adegbile, Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund,Inc.)(IncontrasttoConleysfairnoticerequirement,thestricterplausibilitypleading
standard in Iqbal and Twombly compels plaintiffs to provide more of an evidentiary
foundation to substantiate their claims in order to withstand a defendants motion to
dismiss.).
14FED. R. CIV. P.8(a)(2)(requiringashortandplainstatementoftheclaimshowingthat
thepleaderisentitledtorelief).
has been effectively revised to a much stricter rule that demands more
factualsupportunderthethreatofdismissal.15
Almost immediately, a flood of doomsday predictions ensued
concerning the future of civil actions under the new heightened pleading
standard announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.16 Among these predictions were
claims that specific types of cases would be targeted and dismissed more
easily under the Iqbal pleading regime.17 Recent scholarship has paid
particularattentiontohowIqbalwillimpactcivilrightscases18considering
the relatively recent trend in limiting access to the federalcourt system.19
Morespecifically,academicsareconcernedwiththeenhancedrolegivento
judgesunderIqbal,20theincreaseddismissalofpotentiallymeritoriouscivil
rights claims,21 the consequent reduction of court access and trial to civil
rightsplaintiffs,22andthepotentialwindfalldiscriminatorswillenjoydue
to Iqbals heightened pleading standard.23 One scholar has even deemed
15SeeinfraPartII.A.
16See Mauro, supra note 12. The Iqbal decision has drawn criticism from numerous legal
experts and scholars. Id. For example, Carl Tobias, professor at the University of Richmond
School of Law commented, Judges will have more discretion to dismiss cases earlier. Id.
BrooklynLawSchoolProfessor ElizabethSchneideragreedbycallingtheIqbal decision,an
opendoortojudicialbias.TonyMauro,GroupsUnitetoKeepCasesonDocket,NATLL.J.,Sept.
21,2009,at1.Thealarmisreal,saidJohnPayton,thePresidentandDirectorCounselofthe
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. Civil Rights Groups Respond to High Court
Decisions on Pleading Standards, ACSBLOG (Sept. 22, 2009, 12:18 PM), http://www.acslaw.
org/node/14181; see also Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil
Lawsuits,N.Y.TIMES,July21,2009,atA10,availableat2009WLNR13880558.
17See,e.g.,RobinJ.Effron,ThePlaintiffNeutralityPrinciple:PleadingComplexLitigationinthe
EraofTwomblyandIqbal,51WM. & MARY L. REV.1997,202223(2010)(classactions);Joseph

A.Seiner,AfterIqbal,45WAKEFORESTL.REV.179,17980(2010)(employmentdiscrimination).
18Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2006), an individual may sue a state official for violating his
rights under the United States Constitution or federal law while acting under color of state
law.ERWINCHEMERINSKY,FEDERALJURISDICTION8.1,at480(5thed.2007).
19See,e.g.,Levin,supranote12,at146;ArthurR.Miller,FromConleytoTwomblytoIqbal:
ADoublePlayontheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,60DUKEL.J.1,14(2010)(identifyingIqbal
aspartofarecenttrendinSupremeCourtjurisprudencelimitingaccesstofederalcourt).
20See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS &
CLARKL.REV.185,197201(2010).
21See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 10, at 5253; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy
Lifting: How PreDismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights
Cases,14LEWIS&CLARKL.REV.65,101(2010).
22See,e.g.,Levin,supranote12,at145,148.
23See,e.g.,HowardM.Wasserman,Iqbal,ProceduralMismatches,andCivilRightsLitigation,
14LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.157,161(2010)(arguingthatcivilrightsenforcementwilldecrease

afterIqbal).
Iqbalunconstitutional.24
Federal judges have also recognized Iqbals chilling impact by
dismissingcivilrightsclaims,whichtheyadmitwouldhavesurvivedpre
Iqbal.25 Taken as a whole, Iqbals adverse impact on civil rights claims has
thepotentialtocallintoquestiontheinstitutionallegitimacyofthelegal
systembecause[s]huttinglegitimateclaimsandblamelessplaintiffsout
ofthelegalprocesscreatesdisaffectionanddisillusionmentwiththelegal
process....26
Itisthusnotsurprisingthatmanyarecallingforcongressionalaction
to override Ashcroft v. Iqbal.27 These efforts are supported by some of the
biggest and most influential groups in America, including the Center for
Constitutional Litigation, the American Association for Justice, and the
Legal Defense Fund.28 This Note calls for congressional override as well.
Part I summarizes Ashcroft v. Iqbal by way of background. Part II argues
thatCongressshouldoverrideIqbalbecausetheSupremeCourtinstituteda
newharshpleadingstandardthatcannotbereconciledwiththelanguage
ofRule8andbecause,inapplication,civilrightscasesarebeingdismissed
at an unprecedented rate. As such, Part II.A discusses the new pleading
ruleandPartII.BillustratesIqbalsimpactoncivilrightscasesusingrecent
24Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal
andTwombly,14LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.15,38(2010);seeKennethS.Klein,Ashcroftv.Iqbal

Crashes Rule 8 Pleading onto Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 27475, 28183, 287
(2009)(reviewingtheconstitutionalityoffederalpleadingsjurisprudenceandarguingthatthe
holding in Iqbal renders Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unconstitutional in
certaincircumstances).
25See,e.g.,Ararv.Ashcroft,585F.3d559,61516,619(2dCir.2009)(Parker,J.,dissenting)
(noting that Iqbal endangers a broad swath of civil rights plaintiffs as it is an impossible
pleading standard inconsistent with Rule 8); Ibrahim v. Dept of Homeland Sec., No.C 06
0054WHA,2009WL2246194,at*10(N.D.Cal.July27,2009)(Agoodargumentcanbemade
thattheIqbalstandardistoodemanding....Districtjudges,however,mustfollowthelawas
laiddownbytheSupremeCourt.).
26SeeSuzetteM.Malveaux,StatutesofLimitations:APolicyAnalysisintheContextof
ReparationsLitigation,74GEO.WASH.L.REV.68,8384(2005).
27See,e.g.,OpenAccesstoCourtsActof2009,H.R.4115,111thCong.2(a)(2009);Notice
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. 2 (2009); Hearing on Whether the
SupremeCourtHasLimitedAmericansAccesstoCourtBeforetheS.Comm.ontheJudiciary,111th
Cong.1(2009)[hereinafterHearing](statementofStephenB.Burbank,DavidBergerProfessor
for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/120209%20Burbank%20Testimony.pdf; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell,InventingTests,DestabilizingSystems,95IOWAL.REV.821,85759(2010).
28See Letter from Alliance for Justice et al., to the Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
SenateJudiciaryComm.(Oct.26,2009)(onfilewithauthor).
caselawandempiricaldata.
As a separate justification for congressional override, Part III takes
issue with the Iqbal majoritys unnatural selectionthe Supreme Court
draftedanentirelynewruletogovernpleadingsinsteadofgoingthrough
the rulemaking process established by the Rules Enabling Act. With this,
the Iqbal majority selected to abrogate over fifty years of Supreme Court
precedent in order to make room for their new rule. Part III.A therefore
argues that Congress should override Iqbal because the Supreme Court
exceeded its judicial power in drafting a new pleading rule itself rather
than through the Enabling Act process. As a result, the Iqbal Court
circumventedthebenefitsandsafeguardsprovidedbytheRulesEnabling
Act.29 Part III.B illustrates how the Iqbal decision is an unjustifiable
abandonment of Supreme Court precedent worthy of congressional
override.
I. Background:ASummaryofAshcroftv.Iqbal30
A. FactsandProceduralHistory
1. Facts
Following a criminal arrest and detention by federal officials in the

wakeoftheSeptember11,2001terroristattacks,Mr.JavaidIqbal(Iqbal),
acitizenofPakistanandaMuslim,filedaBivensaction31againstnumerous
federalofficials.32TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticehadlauncheda
vastinvestigationcomposedofmorethan4,000agentstoidentifypotential
threats within the country, and due to their efforts and leads from the
public,184individualsincludingIqbalwereclassifiedaspersonsofhigh
interest.33TheseindividualsweredetainedintheMetropolitanDetention
Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York, specifically within the
29SeeinfraPartIII.A.
30For brevitys sake, this Note will not provide a history of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For an excellent historical account of the Civil Rules, see Richard L. Marcus, The
RevivalofFactPleadingUndertheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,86COLUM. L. REV.433,43745
(1986).ForadiscussionofSupremeCourtdecisionsprecedingAshcroftv.Iqbal,seeinfraPart
III.B.1.
31SeeBivensv.SixUnknownNamedAgentsofFed.BureauofNarcotics,403U.S.388,389
90, 395 (1971) (holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting
undercoloroflawgivesrisetoacauseofactionfordamages).
32Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,194243(2009).
33Id.at1943.
AdministrativeMaximumSpecialHousingUnit(ADMAXSHU).34
The complaint, containing twentyone counts, focused specifically on
Iqbals35 treatment while detained at ADMAX SHU including claims of
cruel and inhumane treatment, use of excessive force by MDC staff, strip
and bodycavity searches, and denial of essential medical care.36
Furthermore, Iqbal alleged numerous constitutional claims including
violations of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion (jailors
unjustifiably interfered with Iqbals religious expression), Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches (unwarranted
strip and bodycavity searches), Fifth Amendment right to due process
(continued confinement without subsequent hearings), Sixth Amendment
righttocounsel(prisonofficialspreventedIqbalfromcommunicatingwith
hiscriminalattorney),andEighthAmendmentrighttobefreefromcruel
and unusual punishment (assault and battery, serial strip and body
searches).37
The defendants in the underlying case included thirtyfour federal
officials and nineteen unknown federal correctional officers.38 However,
Iqbals allegations against Robert Mueller (Mueller), the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John Ashcroft (Ashcroft), the
United States Attorney General, for their supervisory role in his
incarceration,werethesoleissuesbeforetheSupremeCourtinAshcroftv.
Iqbal.39
2. ProceduralHistory
In response to Iqbals complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),40 asserting the defense of
qualifiedimmunityandarguingthatIqbalfailedtoallegeenoughfactsto
34Id.
35Originally, Mr. Ehab Elmaghraby filed suit with Iqbal but later settled with the United
Statesfor$300,000.Iqbalv.Hasty,490F.3d143,147(2dCir.2007).Thus,Iqbalwastheonly
remainingclaimantonappeal.Seeid.
36See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 194344; Complaint and Jury Demand at 1013, 1517, 1921,
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2004) (No. 041809) [hereinafter
Complaint].
37SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at194344;Complaint,supranote36,at1013,1517,1921;RobertG.
Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE
DAMEL.REV.849,854&n.22(2009).
38Iqbal,129S.Ct.at1943.
39See id. at 1944; First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 1718, Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft,2005WL2375202(E.D.N.Y.Sept.30,2004)(No.041809)[hereinafterFirstAmended
Complaint].
40Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to state a claim upon
whichreliefcanbegranted.FED.R.CIV.P.12(b)(6).
support a claim of unconstitutional conduct.41 The U.S. District Court for

the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants motion by
rejecting their argument for imposing a heightened pleading standard
whenresolvingclaimsoffederalimmunity,andheldthatIqbalscomplaint
wassufficientpursuanttoConleyv.Gibson,Swierkiewiczv.SoremaN.A.,and
Leathermanv.TarrantCountyNarcoticsIntelligenceandCoordinationUnit.42
Thedefendantsfiledaninterlocutoryappealunderthecollateralorder
doctrine43 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.44
While the defendants awaited appeal, the Supreme Court decided
Twombly,andaccordingly,theSecondCircuitaddressedatgreatlengthits
applicability to Iqbals claims.45 First, the Second Circuit noted that
Twombly created [c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for
assessing the adequacy of pleadings.46 Secondly, in an effort to reconcile
TwomblywithLeathermanandSwierkiewicz,thecourtheldthatTwomblydid
notestablishanewuniversalheightenedpleadingrequirement,butinstead
instituted a flexible plausibility standard calling for a pleader to
amplify a claim with additional facts only in specific contexts such as
antitrust lawsuits.47 In application, the Second Circuit determined that
Iqbals claim did not require amplification, and consequently, his
complaint sufficiently alleged Ashcroft and Muellers personal
involvementindiscriminatorydecisionsinvolvingIqbalsdetainment.48
Judge Jos Cabranes wrote a concurring opinion requesting the
SupremeCourttoconsider,atthe[ir]earliestopportunity,addressingthe
discord between recent Court precedents involving Rule 8.49 In reply, the
SupremeCourtgrantedcertiorari.50

41SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1944.
42Elmaghrabyv.Ashcroft,No.04CV01809JGSMG,2005WL2375202,at*1112(E.D.N.Y.
Sept.27,2005);seeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1944.ThecourtappliedConleybecauseTwomblyhadnot
yet been decided. Bone, supra note 37, at 855. For a discussion of these Supreme Court
decisionsseeinfraPartIII.B.1.
43The collateralorder doctrine allows a small class of lower court decisions immediate
appealeventhoughtheyarenotfinaljudgments.Behrensv.Pelletier,516U.S.299,305(1996).
45SeeIqbalv.Hasty,490F.3d143,15557(2dCir.2007),revdsubnom.Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129
S.Ct.1937(2009).
46Id.at155.
47Seeid.at15558;THOMASD.ROWE,JR.ETAL.,CIVILPROCEDURE57(2ded.2008).
48Hasty, 490 F.3d at 17576. The Second Circuit did, however, reverse the district courts
decisionregardingIqbalsproceduraldueprocessclaim.Id.at17778.
49Seeid.at17879(Cabranes,J.,concurring).
B. MakingHistorybyMakingaNewRule:TheSupremeCourts
Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a fivetofour

decision.51ThemajoritybeganbynotingtheelementsIqbalmusthavepled
in order to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against
governmentofficialswhowereentitledtoassertqualifiedimmunity.52For
claims brought under Bivens or 1983 against highlevel government
officials, like Ashcroft and Mueller, the Court held that the doctrine of
respondeat superior53 did not apply, and consequently, claimants must
plead facts showing that each individual defendant purposely
discriminated.54
The Court then laid out federal pleading requirements under Rule
8(a)(2)andTwombly55inatwoprongedapproach.56Thefirstpartofthe
analysis is to identify and distinguish the factual allegations from the
legal conclusions.57 Legal conclusions are those threadbare
allegations or formulaic recitations of legal elements without factual
enhancement;thesearenotentitledtotheassumptionoftruth.58Afterall
legalconclusionsareextrapolated,theremainingfactsaretakenastrue
for the purposes of determining whether the claimant has sufficiently
pleadedallelementsofthelegalclaim.59
Thesecondprongofthetestanalyzestheremainingfactualallegations
to determine whether the claimant alleged a plausible claim.60 This
assessment is performed by a court drawing from judicial experience
and common sense as to whether there is enough factual material to
plausiblyshowthatthedefendantisliablefortheallegedconduct.61Mere
possibilityisnotenough.62
In application, the Court held that Iqbal failed to nudge his
constitutional claims against Ashcroft and Mueller across the line from
51SeeAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1941(2009).
52Id.at1947.
53Respondeat superior is [t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the
employees or agents wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or
agency.BLACKSLAWDICTIONARY1426(9thed.2009).
54Iqbal,129S.Ct.at194849;seeBone,supranote37,at85657.
56Bone,supranote37,at857.
57Id.at859;seeIqbal,129S.Ct.at194950.
59Seeid.
60Seeid.at1950.
61Id.at194950;seeBone,supranote37,at873&n.115.
possible to plausible.63 Under the first prong of the test, the Court found
thattwoofIqbalsallegationswereconclusory64:(1)DefendantsAshcroft
[and] Mueller... each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreedtosubject[Iqbal]to[harsh]conditionsofconfinementasamatterof
policy,solelyonaccountof[his]religion,race,and/ornationaloriginand
for no legitimate penological interest;65 and (2) Defendant John
Ashcroft... [was the] principal architect of the[se] policies...66 and
Mueller... was instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and
implementationofthe[se]policies....67
As a result, these statements were not entitled to the assumption of
truthandwerethusexcludedfromtheCourtsanalysisofwhetherIqbals
claims against Ashcroft and Mueller were plausible.68 The remainder of
Iqbals allegations were deemed factual and assumed to be true.69 With
Iqbals essential allegations expunged,70 the majority held that Iqbals
complaint did not contain enough facts to plausibly show that Ashcroft
and Mueller purposely arrested and detained individuals based on their
race,religion,ornationalorigin.71
In closing, the majority addressed and struck down Iqbals chief
arguments.72 Iqbal asserted that the plausibility test should be reserved
solely for antitrust lawsuits or cases involving potentially high discovery
costs because Twombly appeared to depart from prior precedent.73 The
Court disagreed and held that the plausibility test, rooted in Twomblys
interpretationofRule8,andexpoundeduponinIqbal,appliestoallcivil
actionsandproceedingsintheUnitedStatesdistrictcourts.74
Iqbal also argued that the Civil Rules allow him to plead
discriminatory intent generally pursuant to Rule 9(b) and therefore his
63Id.at195051.
64Id.at1951;Bone,supranote37,at857.
65FirstAmendedComplaint,supranote39,at1718.
66Id.at4.
67Id.at45.
69See id. Iqbal additionally alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller approved and adopted a
policy of arresting and detaining thousands of Arab Muslim men after the 9/11 attacks. Id.;
FirstAmendedComplaint,supranote39,at10,1314.
72Seeid.at195254.
73Seeid.at1953;BriefforRespondentat3738,Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937(2009)(No.
071015)[hereinafterBriefforRespondent].
74Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; see also Andre Sophia Blumstein, Twombly Gets Iqbaled, 45
TENN.B.J.23,24(2009).
complaintwassufficientlywellpleaded.75Again,themajorityrejectedthis
argument and held that although Rule 9 permits pleading discriminatory
intentgenerally,aclaimantmaynotpleadconclusoryallegationscontrary
toRule8.76Thus,theCourtheldthatIqbalfailedtopleadsufficientfactsto
stateaclaimofunconstitutionaldiscriminationandremandedthecaseto
the Second Circuit to decide whether to grant Iqbal leave to amend his
complaint.77
II. SurvivaloftheFittest:TheNeedforCongressionalOverrideto
EnsuretheSurvivalofCivilRightsCasesAfterAshcroftv.Iqbal
A. TheIqbalMajorityDraftedaNewHeightenedPleadingRule.
Based from the support of only five justicesthe slimmest

majoritythe Iqbal Rule was established.78 Justice Souter, joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented.79 Tellingly, Justices
SouterandBreyerwerealsobothintheTwomblymajority.80Infact,Justice
Souter wrote the majority decision in Twombly.81 The composition of the
Iqbal dissent alone suggests that Iqbal is not simply a straightforward
applicationofTwombly,buttheinstitutionofanentirelynewCivilRule.82
UnderIqbal,pleadingashortandplainstatementisnolongersimple.83
Contrary to the popular mantra, judges should interpret the law, not
legislatefromthebench,84theIqbalmajorityinstitutedanew,twoprong
pleading standard.85 In doing so, the Court brought about a major
evolutionary change in Rule 8, a hybrid test that utilizes ancient code
pleading analysis and the Twombly plausibility test.86 More than this, the
Iqbal majority heightened the Twombly plausibility test by implementing
75SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1954;BriefforRespondent,supranote73,at32.
76SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1954;Blumstein,supranote74,at24.
77Iqbal,129S.Ct.at1954.TheSecondCircuitCourtofAppealsremandedIqbalscasetothe
districtcourtonJuly28,2009.Iqbalv.Ashcroft,574F.3d820,822(2dCir.2009).
78HastheSupreme CourtLimitedAmericans AccesstoCourts?: HearingBeforetheS. Judiciary
Comm.,111thCong.2(2009)[hereinafterHearing](statementofSen.Leahy,Vermont).
79Iqbal,129S.Ct.at1954(Souter,J.,dissenting).
81Id.
82Id.
83See Levin, supra note 12, at 143 (predicting interpretative problems with the new Iqbal
rule).
84Ruth Marcus, Obamas Nuanced Understanding of Judges, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (May 6,
2009),http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/06/behind_the_blindfold_96349.html.
85SeeAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1955(Souter,J.,dissenting);infraPartII.A.13.
86SeeBone,supranote37,at859;Dodson,supranote10,at50.
newbarriers87forclaimantstoovercomebeforegainingaccesstocourt.88
1. TheSupremeCourtRevisedRule8byReinstitutingCode
Pleading.
The Iqbal test begins by inquiring as to which allegations in the

complaintarelegalconclusionsandwhicharesubstantivelyfactual.89This
determination is distinctively original to Iqbal and is not found in
Twombly.90Knownascodepleading,thismodeofanalysisisnot,however,
unprecedented; it is deeply rooted in historyas oneof Americasoriginal
pleading standards.91 However, due to difficulties with application, the
draftersoftheCivilRulesultimatelyabandonedthissystemaltogether.92
Thedraftersrejectedcodepleadingbecauseoftwoseriousflaws:itis
virtually impossible to distinguish between legal conclusions and factual
allegations in practice, and secondly, the primary focus of the code
pleading system is to keep litigants out of court.93 Iqbals complaint, for
example,alleged that federal officials discriminatedagainst himbased on
his race, religion, and national origin and further, that Ashcroft and
Mueller were knowingly and deliberately indifferent to the
discrimination.94 Without explaining how to distinguish between factual
allegations and legal conclusions, the majority decided that these
allegations were conclusory.95 Justice Souter, however, found them to be
sufficiently factual.96 Moreover, Justice Souter found the majoritys
determination illogical and plainly contradictory to their treatment of
87Professor Robert G. Bone refers to Iqbals insistence on great factual specificity as the
thickscreeningmodel.SeeBone,supranote37,at852.
88See Taylor Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 531, 538 n.2 (2009) (Iqbal . . .
place[s]ahighburdenonaplaintiffatthepleadingstage....);Bone,supranote37,at869
(The twopronged approach facilitates overly aggressive screening at the pleading stage.);
infraPartII.B.
89Bone,supranote37,at857;seeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1960(Souter,J.,dissenting).
90SeeBone,supranote37,at859.
91SeeBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,57475(2007)(Stevens,J.,dissenting).
92See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 187 (5th ed. 2001) (The [drafters]
intention was to . . . avoid the semantic quibbling [the code pleading system] had
engendered.); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1216, at 207 (3d ed. 2004) ([The drafters intended] to avoid the distinctions
drawnunderthecodesamongevidentiaryfacts,ultimatefacts,andconclusions....).
93SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1961(Souter,J.,dissenting);Twombly,550U.S.at57475(Stevens,J.,
dissenting);CHARLESE.CLARK,HANDBOOKOFTHELAWOFCODEPLEADING231(2ded.1947).
95Seeid.at196061;Dodson,supranote10,at50.
Iqbals other allegations.97 For instance, the majority determined that the
followingallegationwasfactual,ornonconclusory:Thepolicyofholding
postSeptember11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by
Defendants [Ashcroft] and [Mueller] in discussions in the weeks after
September11,2001.98
As noted by Justice Souter, this statement makes essentially two
claims: first, that federal officials held certain individuals in highly
restrictive conditions after September 11, 2001; and second, that Ashcroft
andMuellerknewandapprovedoftheseconditions.99Ontheotherhand,
the majority found Iqbals allegation that FBI agents designated Arab
Muslimsasindividuals of highinterest based on their religion, race, or
nationaloriginasconclusory.100Thedifferencebetweentheseallegationsis
extremely unclear, and unfortunately, the Court did not provide any
guidanceonhowtomakethisdistinction.101
Form11intheappendixtotheCivilRules,asamodelcomplaint,has
the sole purpose of illustrating sufficiency requirements under Rule 8.102
Form 11 is a basic negligence complaint arising from an automobile
accident.103 Importantly, Form 11 does not allege any facts as to how the
defendant negligently drove, but in a quite conclusory fashion, alleges
[o]ndate,atplace,thedefendantnegligentlydroveamotorvehicleagainst
theplaintiff.104IncomparisontoIqbalsfailedallegations,itisdifficultto
seehowtheForm11allegationsmeettherequirementsofRule8underthe
new Iqbal standard.105 Iqbals allegations appear even more factually
detailedthanthoseinForm11.106

97Seeid.at1961.
98Id.at1960.
99Id.
100Id.
101Bone,supranote37,at861;seeMalveaux,supranote21,at82;Marcus,supranote30,at
438.
102SeeFED.R.CIV.P.,Form11;seealsoFED.R.CIV.P.84(TheformsintheAppendixsuffice
undertheserulesandillustratethesimplicityandbrevitythattheserulescontemplate.).
103SeeFED.R.CIV.P.,Form11.
104Seeid.;Bone,supranote37,at861.
105Bone,supranote37,at861;seeWasserman,supranote23,at161.
2. TheSupremeCourtRevisedRule8byInstitutingan
AdditionalStepthatScrutinizesEachAllegationBefore
AnalyzingtheEntireComplaint.
The Iqbal decision further raised pleading standards by scrutinizing a

claimants allegations in isolation rather than examining them in the
context of the complaint as a whole.107 This step in the Courts analysis
significantly lowers a complaints chance of surviving the pleadings
stage.108 The majority, for example, analyzed Iqbals allegations and
determinedthemtobeconclusory,withtheexceptionoftwo.109Asaresult,
the Court did not consider Iqbals key allegations when it concluded that
Iqbals complaint failed to state a plausible claim of unconstitutional
discrimination.110 A complaint is more than simply a mere recitation of
individual claims, but rather, a complaint is a coherent story written as a
whole to relay the important events concerning a dispute.111 In addition,
legal conclusions in a complaint help to provide a framework so that
factualallegationssupportaclearlegalrightofaction.112Byfirstremoving
legal conclusions when determining a complaints sufficiency, a court is,
forallpracticalpurposes,readingrandompiecesofatornupcomplaint.113
JusticeSouterrecognizedthisinhisdissentwhenhecalledonthemajority
to examine all of Iqbals allegations rather than merely two.114 Justice
Souter particularly criticized the majoritys isolated examination as the
fallacy of the majoritys position and further, as a departure from their
priorholdinginTwombly.115

107Id.at869(Ajudgebentonscreeningaggressivelydoesnothavetoworkashard...if
shecanclassifyproblematicallegationsaslegalconclusionsandeliminatethemattheinitial
stage.).
108SeeinfraPartII.B.
109Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1960(2009)(Souter,J.,dissenting).
110Id.;seeBone,supranote37,at86869.
111See
generally Bone, supra note 37, at 86869 (discussing the roles legal and factual
allegationsshouldplayindecidingthesufficiencyofacomplaint).
112SeeMalveaux,supranote21,at81(citingIqbal,129S.Ct.at1950).
113Seeid.
115Id.
3. TheSupremeCourtRevisedRule8byEssentially
RequiringSmokingGunEvidenceofDiscriminatory
Intent.116
The Iqbal decision thirdly instituted a new pleading rule by requiring

IqbaltoallegeAshcroftsandMuellersdiscriminatoryintentwithgreater
factualspecificity,ratherthanpleaditgenerallypursuanttoFederalRule
of Civil Procedure 9(b).117 This requirement violates the clear language of
Rule9.118Moreover,itcreatesaspecialproblemforasubclassofclaimants
whomustpleadadefendantsstateofmindinordertosurviveamotionto
dismiss.119 Corroboration of a defendants state of mind often requires
documentationthatisexclusivelyinthepossessionofthedefendant,such
aspersonalemails,companymemoranda,orpersonnelfiles.120Inaddition,
it may require personal knowledge of private conduct, such as a
conspiracy, that cannot be easily verified at this stage in the litigation.121
ThisspecificproblemaroseinbothIqbalandTwombly.122Bothclaimantsin
these cases were required to obtain factual support of intent or conduct
that was nearly impossible to obtain without the benefit of compulsory
discoverydevices.123Thisisproblematicbecauseitforcesaclaimant,atthe
timeoffiling,topleadfactualdetailsthatoftencannotbeobtainedwithout
discovery tools, yet discovery is not available until a claimant passes the
pleading stage.124 Lisa Bornstein, senior counsel at the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights, referred to this problem as a Catch22.125
However, the Supreme Court in Iqbal ignored this problem and held that
116SeeOcasioHernandezv.FortunoBurset,639F.Supp.2d217,225,226n.4(D.P.R.2009)
(acknowledgingthatIqbalessentiallyrequiredsmokinggunevidence).
117Iqbal,129S.Ct.at1954;seeHearing,supranote27,at11(statementofStephenBurbank);
Bone,supranote37,at871.
118Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a persons mind may be alleged
generally. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORES FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE9.03(3),at932(3ded.2009)([A]pleadercannotbeexpectedtoknowthe
adversepartysstateofmind.).
119See Bone, supra note 37, at 873. Ordinary negligence or breach of contract suits, for
example,donotrequirepleadinganyformofintent.Id.at874.Asaresult,onlysubclassesof
claimsthathaveintentasanelementoftheactionareimpactedbythisaspectoftheIqbalrule.
Seeid.at873;infraPartII.B.
120SeeBone,supranote37,at873;Mauro,supranote12.
121SeeBone,supranote37,at873;Malveaux,supranote21,at89.
123Seeid.at87374,874n.117;seeMauro,supranote12;AnthonyF.Renzo,ALawFreeZone
forAlltheKingsMen,ACSBLOG(May28,2009,3:57PM),http://www.acslaw.org/node/13479.
124SeeBone,supranote37,at874n.117;Malveaux,supranote21,at8283;Miller,supranote
19,at45(referringtothisastheproblemofinformationasymmetry).
125Mauro,supranote16;seeBone,supranote37,at874n.117.
future claimants essentially have to get inside the head of government

officials in order to survive a motion to dismiss and gain access to
discovery.126 The Supreme Court, consequently, purchased their new
pleading rule at a significant costthe screening ofmeritorious suits that
cannot obtain private informationat the filingstage.127 Constitutionaland
civilrightsclaimsareparticularlythreatenedbytheIqbaldecisionbecause
of the difficulty in obtaining information from public officers that shows
their state of mind or personal involvement in the alleged discriminatory
conduct.128
The pleading rule announced in Iqbal places significant new hurdles
beforeclaimantsatthestepsoffederalcourts,andisespeciallydetrimental
to those with claims like Iqbaland Twombly.129 From the language of the
Iqbaldecision,itappearsthattheSupremeCourtintendedthisresult,only
permitting claims that are likely to succeed at trial based on the face of a
complaint.130 The majority in Iqbal, for instance, held that the plausibility
testrequiresapleadingtocontainenoughfactualmaterialsothatajudgeis
able to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable based on judicial
experience and common sense.131 This language evokes the expected
analysis of a jury at the end of trial rather than a Rule 8 analysis of a
claimants short and plain statement.132 If the Iqbal Court indeedintended
this result, they succeeded.133 In just a few months after the Courts
decision, the immediate and detrimental impact on civil rights cases is
readily observable.134 This begs the question of whether constitutional
claims will be able to survive the evolutionary change in Rule 8 by Iqbal
withoutcongressionalintervention.
B. TheAftermathofAshcroftv.Iqbal:RecentDecisionsandEmpirical
DataSuggestthatCivilRightsCasesFareWorseUndertheNew
PleadingRule.
TheremarkableimpactofIqbalonthefederaldocketisobservedinthe
speed and success of motions to dismiss under the newly minted Iqbal
126Mauro,supranote16;seeRenzo,supranote123.
127Bone,supranote37,at87879;seeChristopherM.Fairman,TheMythofNoticePleading,45
ARIZ.L.REV.987,1029(2003);Malveaux,supranote21,at101.
128Bone,supranote37,at879;Miller,supranote19,at4546;seeinfraPartII.B.
129SeeMalveaux,supranote21,at87;supraPartI.A.13.
130SeeBone,supranote37,at87374.
132See Bone, supra note 37, at 875; Malveaux, supra note 21, at 8283 (arguing that judicial
factfindingisprohibitedatthepleadingstage).
standard,135whichhaveamountedtomorethan1500districtcourtand100
appellate court decisions within a few months of the decision.136 Within
thesebarredclaimsarenumerousclaimantswhohavebeenthrownoutof
court for failing to plead sufficient facts to support their civil rights
claims.137 One explanation for the increase in dismissals is that Iqbal
provides federal judges with the means to dismiss claims from the start,
should they be inclined, based particularly on their policy stances138 or
prejudice toward a particular breed of case.139 For instance, judges who
value protecting highlevel government officials from the diversion of
participating in litigation more than guaranteeing racial minorities like
Iqbalanopportunitytohavetheircasedecidedonthemerits,nowhavea
blueprint for quashing claims before they have a chance to develop.140
Accordingly, the Iqbal decision essentially provides a judicial bypass to
constitutional and civil rights claims that federal judges find implausible
duetotheirjudicialexperienceandcommonsense.141
The increase in dismissals may also be explained purely by the
135Tony Mauro coined the term Iqbal Motion as a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failuretosufficientlystateunlawfulconductunderRule8andIqbal.SeeMauro,supranote16.
136Mauro,supranote16;seealsoLiptak,supranote16(notingthatIqbalwascitedover500
timesinthefirsttwomonthsafteritsholding).
137See,e.g.,Lawsonv.NatlContlProgressiveIns.Co.,347F.Appx741,74344(3dCir.
2009) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint due to conclusory allegations of

unconstitutional conduct); Bhatia v. Yale Sch. of Med., 347 F. Appx 663, 665(2d Cir. 2009)
(affirmingthedismissalofa1983complaintbecauseofconclusoryallegationsofconspiracy
to violate civil rights); Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 F. Appx 684, 687 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of civil rights claims for failing to allege intent to racially discriminate with
supportingfacts);Sinaltrainalv.CocaColaCo.,578F.3d1252,1270(11thCir.2009)(affirming
dismissal of torture claim because of vague and conclusory allegations of conspiracy);
Brownv.JPMorganChaseBank,334F.Appx758,75960(7thCir.2009)(affirmingdismissal
of civil rights claim and reasoning that Browns allegations are at least as deficient as
Iqbalsbarebonesallegations).
138Renzo,supranote123;seeMalveaux,supranote21,at93;Spencer,supranote20,at198
([T]he Courts experience and common sense is not universal but rather is shaped by
their...biasassocietaleliteswhosupposethatsuchdiscriminationisrare.).
139SeeDouglasA.Blaze,PresumedFrivolous:ApplicationofStringentPleadingRequirementsin
CivilRightsLitigation,31WM. & MARY L. REV.935,95051,95657(1990)(civilrightsclaims);

KevinM.Clermont&StewartJ.Schwab,EmploymentDiscriminationPlaintiffsinFederalCourt:
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 103, 10405 (2009) (employmentdiscrimination
cases).
140Renzo,supranote123;seeAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1953(2009).
141See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Liptak, supra note 16 (interviewing a civil procedure
professor who explained: This is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases they
disfavor);IqbalandthePlausibilityTestinConstitutionalCases,SECOND CIRCUIT CIVIL RIGHTS
BLOG (May19,2009,5:58AM),http://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2009/05/iqbaland
plausibilitytestin.html.
strictnessoftheIqbalpleadingstandard.142TheNinthCircuitsdecisionin
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service best illustrates the strictness of Iqbal in
application.143 Similar to Iqbal, antiBush protestors filed a Bivens action
claiming that the United States Secret Service and a number of other
federal and state officials violated their First Amendment rights by
relocating their demonstration specifically because of the nature of their
message.144Grantingthedefendantsqualifiedimmunitydefense,thecourt
dismissed the protestors claims with the exception of those against
individualSecretServiceAgents.145Theagentsappealed.146
The issue before the Ninth Circuit, therefore, was whether the
protestorshadsufficientlyallegedaconstitutionalviolationundertheIqbal
pleadingstandard.147Thecourtfirstexaminedtheclaimantsspecificlegal
claim, unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and whether the claim
wasplausibleafterremovingalllegalconclusionsfromtheanalysis.148Just
like in Iqbal, the Moss court marginalized claimants key allegations,
deemed them conclusory, and left only two allegations to be analyzed
under the plausibility prong.149 Unsurprisingly, the claimants complaint
wasdeterminedinsufficient.150Thecourtidentifiedtheprotestorsclaimsof
unconstitutionalmotiveandtheexistenceofasecretpolicyofsuppressing
speechcriticalofPresidentBushasconclusoryallegations.151Furthermore,
the claimants allegation of systematic viewpoint discrimination from top
officialsintheSecretServicewasidentifiedasjustthesortofconclusory
allegation that the Iqbal Court deemed inadequate without additional
factualcontenttosupportit.152
TheMosscaseisaprimeexampleofhowconstitutionalandcivilrights
claims fare worse than many other types of legal claims under the new
Iqbal rule.153 Like the claimants in Iqbal, it is difficult to discern how the
Moss claimants were supposed to obtain additional factual support of a
142SeesupraPartII.A.
143SeeWasserman,supranote23,at17883.
144Mossv.U.S.SecretServ.,572F.3d962,96566,96970(9thCir.2009).
145Id.at967.
146Id.
147Seeid.at968.
148Id.at96970.
149CompareAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1960(2009)(Souter,J.,dissenting)(notingthat
themajoritydiscardedallofIqbalskeyallegations),withMoss,572F.3dat97071(identifying
alloftheclaimantsessentialallegationsasconclusoryandthenanalyzingtheremainingtwo
nonconclusoryallegations).
150Moss,572F.3dat97072.
151Id.at970.
152Id.
153SeeWasserman,supranote23,at17883.
secret policy of suppressing critical speech without access to discovery

tools.154 The unfortunate reality is that, although the protestors were
grantedleavetoamendtheircomplaint,155theymostlikelywillnotbeable
toobtainthefactualsupportnecessarytogetpastthenewhurdlesposed
byIqbal.156Thus,Mossv.UnitedStatesSecretServicerepresentsyetanother
constitutionalcasedismissedwithoutmuchhopeofsurvival.157
Judge Gelp Gustavo, a district court judge in Puerto Rico, has
specificallynotedthedraconianeffectIqbalishavingoncivilrightscases.158
In a case before him, the plaintiffs brought a 1983 claim alleging due
process, equalprotection, and freedomofpoliticalexpression violations
undertheConstitutionsofboththeUnitedStatesandPuertoRico,aswell
asviolationsofvariousPuertoRicanlaws.159Afteranalyzingtheplaintiffs
allegations,JudgeGustavodismissedallofplaintiffsclaimsandnoted:
Thecourtnotesthatitspresentruling,althoughdraconianly
harsh to say the least, is mandated by the recent Iqbal decision
construing Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6). The original complaint
(Docket No. 1), filed before Iqbal was decided by the Supreme
Court, as well as the Amended Complaint (Docket No. 61),
clearly met the preIqbal pleading standard under Rule 8. As a
matter of fact, counsel for defendants... did not file a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the original complaint because the same was
properlypleadedunderthethenexisting,preIqbalstandard.This
case was, in fact, fasttracked... and discovery had just
commencedwhenIqbalwasdecided.
As evidenced by this opinion, even highly experienced

counsel will henceforth find it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to plead a section 1983 political discrimination suit
without smoking gun evidence. In the past, a plaintiff could
file a complaint such as thatin thiscase, and through discovery
obtain the direct and/or circumstantial evidence needed to
sustain the First Amendment allegations. If the evidence was
lacking, a case would then be summarily disposed of. This no
154Cf.supranotes12026andaccompanyingtext.
155Moss,572F.3dat972.
156See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 17883; cf. Renzo, supra note 123 ([T]he majority . . .
required Iqbal to do the impossible and include behindthescenes factual detail in his
complaint .. . .); David Ingram, Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, BLOG OF
LEGAL TIMES (July 23, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/07/specter
proposesreturntopriorpleadingstandard.html (reporting that the more specific facts
requiredbytheCourtinIqbalarenotoftenavailableuntilafterdiscovery).
157Cf. Ingram, supra note 156 (The effect of the Courts actions will no doubt be to deny
many plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any legal
redressfortheirinjuries.)(quotingSen.ArlenSpecter).
158SeeOcasioHernandezv.FortunoBurset,639F.Supp.2d217,226n.4(D.P.R.2009).
159Id.at220.
longer being the case, counsel in political discrimination cases

will now be forced to file suit in Commonwealth court, where
Iqbal does not apply and postcomplaint discovery is, thus,
available. Counsel will also likely only raise local law claims to
avoid removal to federal court where Iqbal will sound the death
knell. Certainly, such a chilling effect was not intended by
CongresswhenitenactedSection1983.160
OcasioHernandez and Moss are just two examples of numerous civil

rights and constitutional cases that are being dismissed under the Iqbal
rule.161EarlyempiricaldataalsosuggeststhatthenewIqbalruleishelping
defendants dismiss civil rights claims in greater numbers.162 Professor
160Id.at226n.4.
161See,e.g.,Batesv.PaulKimballHosp.,346F.Appx.883,886(3dCir.2009)(holdingthat
thecomplaintfailedtostateaconstitutionalviolationduetolackoffactualsupport);Guirguis
v.MoversSpecialtyServs.,Inc.,346F.Appx.774,776(3dCir.2009)(holdingthatacomplaint
for racial discrimination failed to allege enough facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); El
Hewie v. Bergen Cnty., 348 F. Appx. 790, 796 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of
employmentdiscriminationcomplaintduetobareassertionsandlegalconclusions);Panther
PartnersInc.v.IkanosCommcns,Inc.,347F.Appx.617,622(2dCir.2009)([W]erecognize
that Iqbal and Twombly raised the pleading requirements substantially while this case was
pending.); AlKidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (providing that plaintiffs
nowfaceahigherburdenofpleadingfacts);Fowlerv.UPMCShadyside,578F.3d203,210
(3dCir.2009)(notingthenewheightenedpleadingrequirementunderIqbal);Athertonv.D.C.
Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 68889 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (dismissing racial discrimination
claim for failing to plead enough facts to support that claimant was illegally removed from
grand jury service); Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 0911754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (The Court has no doubt Plaintiffs Complaint would have survived a
motiontodismissbeforeIqbalexpandedTwomblytoallcivilactions.);Mitchellv.Sosa,No.
06cv00763CMABNB, 2009 WL 3158139, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2009) (It is possible
PlaintiffsclaimwouldsurviveiftheCourtwereoperatingunderConley....);McClellandv.
CityofModesto,No.CVF091031AWIdlb,2009WL2941480,at*5(E.D.Cal.Sept.10,2009)
([T]he fact remains that, since Twombly, the requirement for fact pleading has been
significantly raised.); Coleman v. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commrs, No. 08CV0081CVE
FHM, 2009 WL 2513520, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2009) (stating that claim might have
survived under the Conley standard); Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. v. Kia
Enters.Inc.,No.09116,2009WL2152276,at*3(E.D.Pa.July15,2009)(Iqbalhasraisedthe
bar for claims to survive a motion to dismiss . . . .); Ansley v. Fla. Dept of Revenue, No.
4:09cv161RH/WCS,2009WL1973548,at*2(N.D.Fla.July8,2009)(Theseallegationsmight
have survived a motion to dismiss prior to Twombly and Iqbal. But now they do not.);
Argeropoulosv.ExideTechs.,No.08CV3760,2009WL2132443,at*6(E.D.N.Y.July8,2009)
(opiningthatplaintiffsallegationswouldhavemettheConleystandardbutdismissingunder
Iqbal);Fulkv.Vill.ofSandoval,No.08843GPM,2009WL1606897,at*2(S.D.Ill.June9,2009)
(grantingleavetoamend[b]ecauseoftherecentchangeinfederalpleadingstandards).
162See generally Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?,59AM. U. L. REV.553(2010)(reviewingtheevolutionofpleadingjurisprudence
andstudyingtheeffectsofIqbal).
PatriciaHatamyaranalyzedarandomsamplingof1,200casesinorderto
determine whether Iqbal had an empirical impact on federal cases.163 The
sampleincluded:500casesbeforeTwomblywithcourtsapplyingthenotice
pleading standard; 500 cases after Twombly with courts applying the
Twombly plausibility test; and 200 cases decided on 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss under the Iqbal rule during the first four months of its
application.164 According to the study, not only are 12(b)(6) motions to
dismissgrantedmorefrequentlyunderIqbal48%grantedbeforeIqbalto
56%grantedafterbutcivilrightscases165aretargetedby12(b)(6)motions
morethananyothertypeofcase,comprising44%ofallcasessampled.166
More than simply being targeted, Professor Hatamyars study shows that
12(b)(6)motionsaremoresuccessfulunderIqbalatarateof58%,compared
with 53% under Twombly and 50% under Conley.167 Constitutional civil
rightsclaims,likeinIqbal,OcasioHernandez,andMoss,havejumpedfroma
50%dismissalrateunderConley,to55%underTwombly,toa60%dismissal
rate under the new Iqbal rule.168 This study thus illustrates that the
heightened design of the new Iqbal rule169 is resulting in an increase of
dismissals for all cases, with civil rights cases suffering the greatest
impact.170 Accordingly, with civil rights cases added to the endangered
species list, the only hope of eliminating their extinction is congressional
override.171
163Id.at555.
164Id.at55556,585.
165CivilrightscasesincludedallegedviolationsoftheU.S.Constitutionbroughtunder42
U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 or by Bivens actions, employment discrimination, age

discrimination,andsexdiscrimination.Id.at59192.
166Id.at602,604.ProfessorHatamyarnotedthattherewerefewtonocasesinvolvingReal
Property, Forfeiture/Penalty, Immigration, Bankruptcy, Social Security, and Federal Tax

resultingindecisionson12(b)(6)decisions.Id.at590(internalquotationmarksomitted).The
study included six major categories: contracts, torts, civil rights, labor, intellectual property,
andallotherfederalandstatestatutes.Id.at59192.
167Id.at607.
168Hatamyar,supranote162,at608.
169SeesupraPartII.A.
170Hatamyar,supranote162,at624.
171SeeinfraPartIII.A;seealsoDodson,supranote10,at64(recognizingthataproposalto
amendtheIqbaldecisionwouldlikelyfailbecausetheSupremeCourtishighlyskepticalof
currenttoolstocontroldiscoverycosts);Mauro,supranote16(notingthattheSupremeCourt
isinchargeoftherulemakingprocessandisthusunlikelytooverruleitself).
III. UnnaturalSelection:TheNeedforCongressionalOverrideAfterthe
IqbalMajorityExceededTheirJudicialPowerandIgnored
EstablishedSupremeCourtPrecedent
A. CongressionalOverrideisWarrantedBecausetheSupremeCourts
RevisionofRule8inAshcroftv.IqbalExceededItsJudicialPower
toInterpretFederalRulesUndertheRulesEnablingAct.
1. TheRulesEnablingActEnsuresEffectiveandImpartial
RulemakingthroughaDeliberativeProcesswith
ParticipationfromtheFederalJudiciary,LegalAcademia,
andCongress.
Since 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were

promulgated,thefederaljudiciaryandCongresshavesoughtaconsistent,
predictable,andtransparentsystemofruleformationandamendment.172
TheproceduresbywhichtheCivilRulesmaybeamended,abrogated,or
replaced are established by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (Enabling
Act).173 This system of amending federal rules has thereafter been
supplemented by custom, informal practice, congressional amendment,
and Supreme Court orders.174 Presently, a proposed new Civil Rule or
amendment undergoes at least seven stages of formal comment and
review, involving five separate institutions, beginning with the Advisory
Committee.175 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court selects the Chair of
the Committee, typically a respected jurist, and a Committee Reporter,
usually an academic, who will then lead discussions as to whether
172Clermont&Yeazell,supranote27,at846.
173JeffreyW.Stempel,ADistortedMirror:TheSupremeCourtsShimmeringViewofSummary
Judgment,DirectedVerdict,andtheAdjudicationProcess,49OHIO ST. L.J.95,181(1988);seeRules

EnablingActof1934,48Stat.1064(1934)(codifiedat28U.S.C.2072(2006)).
174Stempel, supra note 173, at 18182. The institutional structure that exists for amending
theRulespermitsmultipleentitiestocompeteforrulemakingpower.SeeCatherineT.Struve,
TheParadoxofDelegation:InterpretingtheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,150U.PA.L.REV.1099,
1115(2002).
1754WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote92, 1001, at7n.18;Struve,supranote174,at1103;see
Stempel, supra note 173, at 182; see also Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Unfortuneate
Illustration of the Supreme Courts Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720,728(1988)(describingtherulescommitteesandprocessesinvolved
in supplementing or amending the Rules). The Advisory Committee was designed by the
Supreme Court as a continuing body to advise the Court with respect to proposed
amendmentsoradditionstotheRulesofCivilProcedure.LaurensWalker,AComprehensive
ReformforFederalCivilRulemaking,61GEO. WASH. L. REV.455,465(1993)(citingContinuance
ofAdvisoryCommittee,OrderofJanuary5,1942,314U.S.720(1942)).
amendments to the Civil Rules are needed.176 If the Committee accepts a

proposal,theReporterpreparesadraftamendmentandexplanatorynote,
whichisvotedonandsenttotheStandingCommitteeonRulesofPractice
and Procedure for publication if approved.177 Thereafter, the proposed
amendmentandnotearesentoutforpubliccommentandthenbacktothe
Advisory Committee with any suggested changes.178 If the changes are
approved,theyaresenttotheStandingCommitteeforapprovalandthen
totheU.S.JudicialConference,whichwillultimatelysendafinalproposal
to the U.S. Supreme Court for review.179 Assuming the Supreme Court
adopts the changes, the rule amendments will be presented to the U.S.
CongressunderthedictatesoftheEnablingAct,whichhassevenmonths
to review the proposal, make additions or deletions, or postpone the
effectivedateoftheamendments.180Finally,ifCongressdoesnotactwithin
thattimebyeitherdelayingtheeffectivedateoftheproposedrulesorby
rejectingtheproposal,itbecomeseffectivewiththefullforceoflaw.181
During the last seventyfive years, the Enabling Act has been
extensivelyacclaimedasanefficientandeffectiveprocedure,unitingthe
wisdom and expertise of the judiciary with the democratic protections
afforded by an elected body and its more public deliberative process.182
Essentially, the Enabling Act bridges the perspective that the Civil Rules
are best made by those who use them, the federal judiciary, and the
positionthat,becausefederalrulespossessthelegalforceofstatutes,they
mustpassthroughCongressinordertobelegitimate.183TheEnablingAct
isthusaneffectiveblendoflegalexpertiseandcongressionaloversight;the
176Stempel,supranote173,at182.
177Struve,supranote174,at110304;see4WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote92,1001,at7&
n.18. The Standing Committee was created to help coordinate the work of the advisory
committees,tomakesuggestions,andtotransmittheproposalswithrecommendationstothe
judicial conference or to send them back to the appropriate advisory committee for further
study.JUDICIAL CONFERENCEOFTHE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORTOFTHE PROCEEDINGSOF
THEJUDICIALCONFERENCEOFTHEUNITEDSTATES67(1958).
178Struve,supranote174,at1103.
179Id.;
see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy,andProceduralEfficacy,87GEO. L.J.887,892(1999);Stempel,supranote173,at182.
TheJudicialConferencewasestablishedbyCongresstoassist theChiefJusticein managing
thefederalcourts.SeeActofSeptember14,1922,ch.306,2,42Stat.837,838(codifiedat28
U.S.C.331(2006)).
18028U.S.C.2074(a)(2006);Stempel,supranote173,at182;see4WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note92,1001,at7&n.18.
181Bone,supranote179,at892;Stempel,supranote173,at182.
182Stempel, supra note 173, at 182; see Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in
FederalRuleMaking,46J.AM.JUDICATURESOCY250,25455(1963).
183Stempel,supranote173,at182;see4WRIGHT&MILLER,supranote92,1001,at6.
Advisory Committee, with the assistance of the Standing Committee,

Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, drafts the proposed rule
changes from a practical standpoint, and then Congress reviews the
Committeesworktoensurethatitcomportswiththediverseneedsofthe
nation.184
2. InAshcroftv.Iqbal,theSupremeCourtCircumventedthe
BenefitsandProceduralRequirementsProvidedbythe
RulesEnablingAct.
The Rules Enabling Act, by Act of Congress, imposes significant

procedural requirements on the promulgation or amendment of a federal
ruleallofwhichseriouslyrestricttheSupremeCourtsabilitytoamend
rules through interpretation.185 Moreover, these procedural safeguards
provide significant benefits to the rulemaking process as they carve up
responsibility, ensure broad representation, provide notice to the public,
and guarantee congressional review.186 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the majority
circumventedthesafeguardsandbenefitsprovidedbytheEnablingAct.187
Instead, the Supreme Court wholly revised Rule 8188 despite decades of
practiceandunderstandingofRule8tothecontrary,189andthecommands
of the Enabling Act.190 An amendment to Rule 8 would have been best
accomplishedbyfollowingthesystemofrevisingfederalrulespursuantto
the Enabling Act, especially considering the potential impact of changing
pleadingstandards.191Ratherthansidesteppingthesafeguardsprovidedin
theEnablingAct,theIqbalmajoritycouldhavebeguntheruleamendment
184Stempel,supranote173,at18283;see4WRIGHT&MILLER,supranote92,1001,at67.
185Struve,
supra note 174, at 1103; see Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B.
Burbank,Debate,PlausibleDenial:ShouldCongressOverruleTwomblyandIqbal?,158U. PA. L.
REV.PENNUMBRA141,160(2009),www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf.
186SeeStruve,supranote174,at1103.
187See Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1012 (2010); cf.
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993) (Perhaps if Rule[] 8 . . . were rewritten today, claims . . . under 1983 might be
subjectedtotheaddedspecificityrequirementofRule9(b).Butthatisaresultwhichmustbe
obtainedbytheprocessofamendingtheFederalRules,andnotbyjudicialinterpretation.).
188SeeBauer,supranote175,at72629([TheSupreme]Courtadmittedlyshouldnotusea
litigateddisputeastheoccasiontorewriteoneoftheFederalRules....);Herrmann,Beck&
Burbank,supranote185,at161(callingTwomblyandIqbalawhollynewgeneralrequirement
ofplausibilityandjudgemadelaw);supraPartII.A.
189SeeinfraPartIII.B.1.
190SeeinfraPartIII.A.3.
191Stempel, supra note 173, at 184; see Hatamyar, supra note 162, at 625 (arguing that a
changeinpleadingstandardsshouldbedonebythenormalruleamendmentprocess).
processwithrelativeease192and,indoingso,addressedtheseriouspolicy
concerns at issue193 and avoided national criticism,194 as well as potential
congressional override.195 Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the
IqbalmajorityrefusedtoacknowledgethepropermodeofamendingRule
8, especially in light of recent Supreme Court precedent that explicitly
refused to raise pleading standards without undergoing the Enabling Act
process.196
Whetherdeliberateorunintentional,theIqbalmajoritysevasionofthe
Rules Enabling Act precluded the revision of Rule 8 from the many
advantages of the proper rule amending process.197 For example, the
rulemaking process under the Enabling Act helps to ensure that diverse
perspectives are involved when amending a federal rule.198 The relatively
unvaried professional backgrounds of the Justices in the Iqbal majority,
including their law clerks and staff, are simply no substitute for the
teamworkoffiveseparateinstitutionsandpublicparticipation.199 Whena
rule amendment proceeds by the Enabling Act process, as opposed to
judicial decision, there are significantly more diverse perspectives
involved, which increases the likelihood that the rule amendment will
accomplishitspurpose.200TheAdvisoryCommittee,forexample,ismade
up of trial and appellate judges, bar groups and associations, seasoned
practitioners, and learnedacademics.201 As such, theAdvisory Committee
192Stempel,supranote173,at184;seeStruve,supranote174,at1133.
193Ashcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937,1953(2009)(addressingqualifiedimmunity,discovery
abuse,andjudicialcasemanagement).
194See,e.g.,sourcescitedsupranote16.
195See,e.g.,sourcescitedsupranote27.
196See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 51415 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cnty.NarcoticsIntelligence&CoordinationUnit,507U.S.163,168(1993).
197See4WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote92,1005,at31(attributingthecreationandsuccess
of the Civil Rules to the diverse experience brought by the members of the Advisory
Committee and to the fact that the entire profession was represented in its making); Struve,
supranote174,at110519.
198Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 27, at 847 (arguing that the Supreme Courts
interpretation of Rule 8 substantially altered a systemic design choice and that a design
changeofthismagnitudeshouldonlyoccurafterathoroughairingofthechoices).
199See Spencer, supra note 20, at 199 & n.80; Stempel, supra note 173, at 184; Struve, supra
note 174, at 110310; cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice:TheDisparateImpactonCivilRightsandEmploymentDiscriminationCases,158U. PA. L.
REV.517,56364(2010)(describingthelackofdiversityofthefederaljudiciaryandtherecent
tendencytorefrainfromcivilrightsandemploymentcases).
200SeeHerrmann,Beck&Burbank, supranote185,at151;Stempel,supranote173,at184;
Struve,supranote174,at110519.
201JudicialImprovementsandAccesstoJusticeAct,Pub.L.No.100702,2073(a)(2),102
Stat.4642,4649(1988)(codifiedat28U.S.C.2073(a)(2)(2006));MarkR.Kravitz,ToRevise,or
contains a great deal more experience in everyday litigation, as well as

moderntrendsinthelaw,thantheJusticesoftheSupremeCourtwhoare
relativelyisolated.202
TheAdvisoryCommitteealsohasgreatercapabilityofassemblingand
analyzing empirical data relevant to a potential rule change, such as a
rulesabilitytoimpactcertainbreedsofcases.203Withthiskindofdata,the
Committee would likely produce a more effective rule that would
accomplish its desired effect without unforeseen results.204 The Supreme
Courtwouldstillbegiventheopportunitytoreviewanyandallfindings
made by the Advisory Committee, as well as its ultimate product, and
makechangesifdesired.205Thedifferencebetweenthisprocessofrevising
afederalruleandtheIqbalmajoritysunilateralrevisionbyadjudicationis
significantthe Supreme Court is given considerably more information
from more diverse sources through the Enabling Act process.206 Thus,
instead of revising a rule in a relatively isolated setting,207 the Iqbal Court
could have, under the Enabling Act, maintained a central role in
developinganamendmenttoRule8butwithasignificantlybroaderbase
ofinformation.208
NottoRevise:ThatIstheQuestion,87 DENV. U. L. REV.213,21617(2010);Stempel,supranote

173,at184;seealsoMiller,supranote19,at94n.360(referringtotheAdvisoryCommitteeas
anallstarteamofproceduralists).
202Stempel, supra note 173, at 184 & n.424 (stating that Supreme Court Justices are
somewhatremovedfromtheirpeersbecauseoftheirgeographicconcentrationandisolation
while having to manage a crushing workload that leaves little time for anything else but
Courtbusiness.).
203Id.at185;Struve,supranote174,at110540.
204Stempel, supranote 173, at 185 n.426; see Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 27, at 847
(noting that the complex issues involving pleading standards were not sufficiently
developed by lowercourt percolation, by academic or empirical studies, or even by parties
positiontakingbeforeIqbalwasdecided);supraPartII.B.
205Stempel,supranote173,at185;see4WRIGHT&MILLER,supranote92,1001,at7n.18.
206Stempel,supranote173,at185;see28U.S.C.2073(c)(2006)(requiringeachCommittee
meetingaswellastheminutesofeachmeetingtobeopentothepublic);Clermont&Yeazell,
supranote27,at847([T]hisprocess...guaranteesthatnotice,comment,andagooddealof
consultationamongbenchandbarwillprecede...proceduralchange.).
207See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 27, at 848; Preview of United States Supreme Court
Cases:Ashcroft,Fmr.AttorneyGeneralv.Iqbal,DocketNo.071015,ABA,http://www.abanet.
org/publiced/preview/briefs/dec08.shtml#ashcroft (last visited Dec. 13, 2010) (listing amicus
briefsinIqbal).
208SeeMiller,supranote19,at78([C]hangeofthatmagnitudeshouldhavebeenbasedon
amuchgreaterunderstandingof...theutilityofpleadingpracticeandtheactualqualityof
pretrialmanagement.Dataofahighlysophisticatedcharacterneedbegatheredandanalyzed
....);Miller,supranote187,at1006(TheIqbalCourtengineeredanewruleofpleading,but
without the help and investigation vital to determine whether in fact its new standard
accomplishesitsavowedpurpose.);Stempel,supranote173,at185;Struve,supranote174,at
3. InAshcroftv.Iqbal,theMajorityExceededTheirJudicial
PowertoInterpretRulesofProcedureUndertheRules
EnablingActbyRevisingRule8.
The Iqbal majority, in raising pleading requirements contrary to the

plain language of Rule 8, exceeded its limited judicial power to interpret
and promulgate federal rules.209 Congress, under the Enabling Act,
delegated the power of amending and interpreting federal rules to the
SupremeCourt,butindoingsoCongressinstitutedsignificantrestrictions
totheprocess.210Accordingly,theSupremeCourtspowertointerpretand
amendfederalrulesislimitedbythespecificrequirementsoftheEnabling
Actandtherulemakingprocess.211TheSupremeCourtspowertoamend
federal rules is thus not endless; it is specifically limited by the
requirements of the Enabling Act, such as working with the Standing
Committeeandsubmittingtocongressionaloverride.212
Ininterpretingafederalrule,theSupremeCourtisadditionallylimited
by the specific language of the rule at issue and is not free to strain the
Rules text and ignore relevant Notes.213 The Supreme Court, for
example,cannotignoretheplaintextofaruleinitsinterpretationinorder
to serve its own views of purpose and policythis would exceed the
Courts limited power given by Congress.214 Furthermore, this form of
judicialactionviolatesthebasicrulemakingstructureoftheEnablingAct,
which is designed to open the process to multiple decisionmakers,
including the legal profession asa whole and the general public.215 In the
samemanner,theIqbalmajorityexceededitsjudicialpowerwhenitraised
110540.
209Seeinfranotes21315andaccompanyingtext.
210Struve,supranote174,at1103;seeHerrmann,Beck&Burbank,supranote185,at160.
2124WRIGHT&MILLER,supranote92,1001,at7&n.18;seeStempel,supranote173,at182
83;Struve,supranote174,at111920.
213Struve,supranote174,at111920;seePavelic&LeFlorev.MarvelEntmtGrp.,493U.S.
120,126(1989)(respondingtotheargumentthatRule11shouldbeinterpretedtoapplytolaw
firmsaswellaslawyers:[W]ewouldnotfeelfreetopursuethatobjectiveattheexpenseofa
textualinterpretationasunnaturalaswehavedescribed.Ourtaskistoapplythetext,notto
improveuponit.);Harrisv.Nelson,394U.S.286,298(1969)(Wehavenopowertorewrite
the Rules by judicial interpretations.); Bauer, supra note 175, at 72629 (arguing that the
SupremeCourtshouldnotusealitigateddisputeasanopportunitytorewriteoneoftheCivil
Rules); cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163,168(1993)(refusingtointerpretRule8contrarytoitsplainlanguage).
214Struve,supranote174,at1126.
215See Wasserman, supra note 23, at 161 (predicting that Iqbal will result in a significant
decreaseintheenforcementandvindicationoffederalconstitutionalandcivilrightsclaims
anoutcomeonewouldexpectfromasubstantivelawchangeratherthanprocedural).
pleading standards contrary to the plain meaning of Rule 8 and the

commandsoftheEnablingAct.216
Beyond the necessity of complying with the congressionally
determinedlimitsoftheSupremeCourtspowertointerpretfederalrules,
there are also numerous reasons for having amended Rule 8 through the
Enabling Act process rather than by adjudication.217 The Enabling Act
provides for congressional review of proposed rule amendments, which
helpstoensurethatallsegmentsofsocietyaffectedbyarulechangehave
sufficient representation in the process.218 Under the Enabling Act, the
AdvisoryCommittee,whosemembersareappointedbytheChiefJusticeof
theU.S.SupremeCourt,andtheSupremeCourtworktogethertocreatea
rule amendment but are not required to implement the suggestions of
outsiders.219 This is why congressional oversight is a significant benefit
Congress,whichisgenerallysubjecttothedemandsofitsconstituents,is
likelytoacttovoicetheconcernsoftheprofessionandthepublicthatmay
havebeenignoredoroutrightrejectedbytheCommitteeandtheSupreme
Court.220 Members of Congress must be reelected, unlike Supreme Court
Justices,soalthoughtheypossessaconsiderableamountofindependence,
they must at the very least listen to their political base.221 Accordingly,
when proposed rule amendments make their way to Congress, the
plaintiffs bar, the defense bar, the insurance industry, subject matter
interestgroupssuchasthecivilrightslobby,stateandlocalofficials,and
elites of the profession... may make their cases to the Congress.222 In
sum,congressionalinvolvement,althoughinfluencedbypowerfulinterest
groups and selfinterest in reelection, provides a check to the potential
selfinterestthatmaybeinfluencingtheSupremeCourtandtheappointed
membersoftheAdvisoryCommittee.223
The policy concerns underlying Ashcroft v. Iqbal provide a prime
example of why congressional involvement is needed before revising a
216See supra notes 21315 and accompanying text; cf. Struve, supra note 174, at 112728
(explaining that the Supreme Court rarely utilizes its veto power over proposed Rules and
more regularly facilitates the creation of them by functioning as a mere conduit from the
rulemakerstoCongress).
218See Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 185, at 163 (recognizing that the usual
victimsofproceduralreformarecivilrightsandemploymentdiscriminationcases).
220Stempel,supra note 173, at 185; see Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The
FragmentationofFederalRules,46MERCER L. REV.757,77576,792(1995);Miller,supranote19,
at86(notingtheSupremeCourtslackofdemocraticaccountability.).
221Stempel,supranote173,at185.
222Id.
223Id.at186;seeHerrmann,Beck&Burbank,supranote185,at164.
federal rule.224 After the district court denied federal officials qualified
immunityclaims,225andtheSecondCircuitaffirmedbygrantingalimited
discovery order to Iqbal,226 the Supreme Court reversed, finding that trial
judges could not sufficiently protect highlevel government officials from
overburdensome discovery requests while granting civil rights litigants
theopportunitytogainfactualsupport.227BecausetheSupremeCourthad
littletonoempiricalsupportfortheirbeliefthatfederaltrialjudgescould
noteffectivelymanagelimiteddiscoveryorders,itispossiblethatthereare
othermotivatorsbehindtheirdecision,suchasthedesiretoprotecthigh
levelgovernment officials, or to reduce the federaldocket by heightening
pleading standards.228 At the very least, it is not illogical to imagine the
Supreme Court instituting a heightened pleading standard to reduce the
burden on the federal docket, especially in light of the Supreme Courts
current workload.229 Furthermore, even if an Advisory Committee were
establishedtoconsiderredraftingRule8,thesameselfinterestmotivators
may potentially creep in the rulemaking process because the members of
thecommitteeareappointeesoftheSupremeCourt.230Thisrealpossibility
illustrates why congressional review is a significant benefit to
rulemakingtheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenatedonotworkin
federalcourtsandconsequentlyarenotdirectlyaffectedifarulerevision
increasesfederalfilings.231TherevisionofRule8inIqbal,accordingly,did
not benefit from the more neutral review of Congress, or at least its non
judicial perspective, to ensure that unintended consequences such as the
weedingoutofcivilrightscasesdonotoccur.232Thus,whentheSupreme
224See129S.Ct.1937,1953(2009)(discussingpolicyconcernsofprotectingthedefenseof
qualifiedimmunity,curbingdiscoveryabuse,andfailingjudicialcasemanagement).
225Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft,No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *35 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept.27,2005).
226TheSecondCircuitaffirmedexceptforIqbalsclaimallegingaproceduraldueprocess
violation. Iqbal v. Hasty,490 F.3d 143, 17778(2d Cir. 2007). For a discussion on limited
discoveryordersseeMalveaux,supranote21,at10640.
227See Iqbal,129 S. Ct. at 1953 ([T]he common lament that the success of judicial
supervisionincheckingdiscoveryabusehasbeenonthemodestside.(citingBellAtl.Corp.
v.Twombly,550U.S.544,559(2007))).
228SeeHerrmann,Beck&Burbank,supranote185,at151;Spencer,supranote20,at192.
229Cf. Struve, supra note 174, at 112728(noting that some Justices of the Supreme Court
haveclaimedthattheyweretoobusytoreviewthetextofproposedruleamendments).
230Cf.Stempel,supranote173,at186(recognizingthatthetendencytorevisefederalrules
basedonselfinterestmotivatorsmayexistonasubconsciouslevel).
231Id.; see, e.g., OcasioHernandez v. FortunoBurset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226 n.4 (D.P.R.
2009) (arguing that the impact of Iqbal on civil rights cases was not intended by Congress
whenitenacted1983).
232SeeHatamyar,supranote162,at608(highlightingthegreaternumberofdismissalssince
Iqbal was decided); supra Part II.B; cf. Hearing, supra note 27, at 14 (statement of Stephen
CourtdecidedtorewriteRule8inAshcroftv.Iqbal,theynotonlyexceeded
theirjudicialpowerbutalsoneglectedthesignificantbenefitsaffordedby
theRulesEnablingAct.233
B. CongressionalOverrideisWarrantedBecausetheSupremeCourts
RevisionofRule8inAshcroftv.IqbalUnjustifiablyViolatesthe
DoctrineofStareDecisis.
1. OvertheLastFiftyYears,theSupremeCourtUniformly
UphelditsInterpretationofRule8PleadingStandards.
ThedrasticrevisionofRule8pleadingstandardsinAshcroftv.Iqbalis
furthermore inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and the doctrine
ofstaredecisis.234Ordinarily,theSupremeCourtshouldfollowprecedent
unless there is a special or compelling justification.235 Otherwise, the
Supreme Court has only overruled prior precedent when the earlier
decision was deemed to be unworkable or badly reasoned.236 The
principle of stare decisis is thus not an inexorable command,237 but
should be followed since the doctrine promotes stability, predictability,
and respect for judicial authority.238 Other factors, such as what type of
law is at issue,239 how long the precedent has been in place, and whether
Burbank) (Congress was wellpositioned institutionally to evaluate the social costs and
benefitsofsettingahighbarforcomplaints....).
233Struve,supranote174,at1136(Comparedwiththeotherrulemakingbodies,however,
the[Supreme]Courtappearslessrepresentative,lessknowledgeable,andperhapsmoreliable
toengrafterroneouspolicychoicesontheRules.);seeHearing,supranote27,at1(statement
of Stephen Burbank) (referring to Iqbal as a rule change lacking technical expertise, policy
judgmentanddemocraticaccountability);Herrmann,Beck&Burbank,supranote185,at164
(arguing that the Courts decision to rewrite Rule 8 themselves undermines democratic
values).
234See infra Part III.B.2. The doctrine of stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent, under
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009); see also Douglas J. McNamara,
Buckley,ImblerandStareDecisis:ThePresentPredicamentofProsecutorialImmunityandanEnd
to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1154 (1996) (noting that stare decisis ensures
evenhandedapplicationofthelawandlimitsbiasedjudicialdecisionmaking).
235SeeHiltonv.S.C.Pub.Rys.Commn,502U.S.197,20102(1991)(decliningtooverrulea
twentyeightyearoldprecedent withoutacompellingjustification); Arizonav.Rumsey,467

U.S.203,212(1984).
236Paynev.Tennessee,501U.S.808,827(1991).
237Id.at828.
238Hilton,502U.S.at202.
239See,e.g.,Morsev.Frederick,551U.S.393,432(2007)(Breyer,J.,concurringinpartand
dissenting in part) ([S]tare decisis concerns supporting preservation of [a judgemade

procedural] rule are weak.); Hohn v. United States,524 U.S. 236, 251 (1969) (breaking with
the decision has been significantly criticized, play a role in the Supreme
Courts analysis of whether to abrogate precedent.240 Accordingly, one
must ask first whether the Supreme Court in Iqbal departed from prior
precedentinitsinterpretationofRule8(a)(2)oftheCivilRules,andifso,
whether the Courts basis for overruling precedent was justified
notwithstandingitspriordecisionsandthedoctrineofstaredecisis.241
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court officially put to rest the
uncontested understanding and interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2)s text: a
shortandplainstatementoftheclaimshowingthatthepleaderisentitled
to relief.242 For more than fifty years, Conley v. Gibson remained the
precedential authority on what was required to state a claim under Rule
8.243 The Conley plaintiffs were AfricanAmerican members of the
BrotherhoodofRailwayandSteamshipClerks,arailroadunion,aswellas
other railroad employees.244 The defendants were the BrotherhoodUnion,
its Local Union No. 28, and specific officers of both.245 In their complaint,
theplaintiffsallegedthattheywereterminatedordemotedbecauseoftheir
race and that the union failed to represent them in good faith.246 In
response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.247
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that Rule 8(a) only
required the plaintiffs to give the defendant fair notice of what the...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.248 The Court, furthermore,
heldthataclaimantisnotrequiredtoprovidedetailedfactsinsupport.249
Consequently, under Conley, federal courts were prohibited from
dismissingaclaimunlessitwasapparentthattherewasnosetoffacts
pastprecedentintheconsiderationofaproceduralrule).
240See,e.g.,IBP,Inc.v.Alvarez,546U.S.21,32(2005)(upholdingprecedentbecauseitwasa
unanimousdecisionthathadbeenlawfordecades).
241Cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 46263(2008)
(analyzingtheSupremeCourtsdeparturefromstaredecisisinTwombly).
242FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009)
(Iqbal...providesthefinalnailinthecoffinforthenosetoffactsstandard[ofConley].);
Hearing,supranote78,at23(statementofSen.Leahy).
243See
Miller, supra note 19, at 19 (Conleys noticepleading approach remained the
accepted, articulated benchmark.); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly,
PleadingStandards,andProceduralUniformity,108COLUM.L.REV.1431,1431(2008).
244Conleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,42(1957).
245Id.
246Id.at4243.
247Id.at43.
248Id.at47.
249Id.
that the plaintiff could prove to establish the claim.250 In accordance with
the basic vision of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Conley enshrined the concept of Notice Pleading, which dictates that the
primary function of pleadings is to provide notice to the court of all
relevantclaimsanddefenses.251Moreover,Conleywasintendedtoofficially
silence any and all claims that pleadings should be used to decide cases
ratherthansimplygivenotice.252
Duringsubsequentdecades,theSupremeCourtuniformlyupheldand
appliednoticepleadingasprovidedinConley.253Howeverin1993,duetoa
rising practice among federal trial courts of applying a heightened
pleading standard specifically for civil rights claims, the Supreme Court
took up the question of whether Rule 8 may be interpreted in this
manner.254 In a relatively short but clear and unanimous opinion, Justice
RehnquistwrotethatRule8wouldnotallowsuchaninterpretation.255The
defendantsarguedthatinthiscasemorespecificityshouldberequiredof
the plaintiffs complaint because their case involved complex issues of
municipal liability.256 Recognizing this as an attempt to impose a
heightenedpleadingstandard,JusticeRehnquistheldthatthisargument
isimpossibletosquarewiththelanguageofRule8andConley.257After
reversing for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded its decision by
reminding the defendants that if they desired a heightened pleading
standard,itwouldneedtobeobtainedthroughtheEnablingActprocess.258
Almost ten years later, the Supreme Court took up an employment
discrimination claim that had been dismissed for lacking specific facts to
support an inference of discrimination.259 In another unanimous decision,
250Spencer,supranote241,at435(citingConley,355U.S.at4546).
251See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 3738 (2d ed. 2008); A. BENJAMIN
SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 408 (2d ed. 2008); Christopher M.
Fairman,HeightenedPleading,81TEX.L.REV.551,556(2002).
252SeeRichardL.Marcus,ThePuzzlingPersistenceofPleadingPractice,76TEX. L. REV.1749,
1750(1998).
253See,e.g.,Neitzkev.Williams,490U.S.319,327(1989);Browerv.Cnty.ofInyo,489U.S.
593,598(1989);Hishonv.King&Spalding,467U.S.69,73(1984);Blockv.Neal,460U.S.289,
29798(1983);Scheuerv.Rhodes,416U.S.232,236(1974);Hainesv.Kerner,404U.S.519,520
21 (1972) (per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v.
McKeithen,395U.S.411,422(1969)(Marshall,J.,announcingjudgment).
254Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
164(1993);seePaulStancil,BalancingthePleadingQuestion,61BAYLORL.REV.90,112(2009).
255Leatherman,507U.S.at164.
256Id.at167.
257Id.at168.
258Seeid.
259Swierkiewiczv.SoremaN.A.,534U.S.506,509(2002).
JusticeThomaswrotethatanemploymentdiscriminationcomplaintlike
allcivilcomplaintsdoesnotrequiregreaterparticularitybutsimplya
shortandplainstatementgivingnoticetothedefendantofallclaimsand
possible defenses.260 According to the Court, this simplified and liberal
approachtopleadingreliesontheoverallstructureoftheFederalRulesof
Civil Procedurepleadings give notice while discovery and summary
judgment motions define disputed issues as well as dispose of meritless
claims.261 Furthermore, Justice Thomas rejected the defendants claim that
plaintiffs allegations were conclusory and that courts would be
burdened with frivolous discrimination claims if the Court does not
require greater specificity.262 The Supreme Court refused to heighten
pleading and held that a change in Rule 8 must be obtained by the
Enabling Act process.263 Swierkiewicz is thus another example of the
Supreme Courts fidelity to longstanding precedent holding that notice
pleading should apply in all civil cases including civil rights and
employmentdiscriminationcases.264
2. BeginningwithBellAtlanticCorp.v.Twomblyand
CulminatinginAshcroftv.Iqbal,theSupremeCourt
UnjustifiablyAbandonedEstablishedPrecedent.
Making official its abandonment of simplified notice pleading in

Ashcroftv.Iqbal,theSupremeCourtbeganitsdeconstructionoffiftyyear
old precedent in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.265 This case involved an
antitrust class action brought by local and or high speed internet service
subscribers against regional telephone service monopolies.266 In sum,
plaintiffsallegedthatdefendantsconspirednottocompetewitheachother
over a sevenyear period of time in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.267ThedistrictcourtdismissedthecomplaintunderRule8andConley,
theSecondCircuitreversed,andtheSupremeCourtgrantedcertiorari.268
In a seventotwo decision written by Justice Souter, the Supreme
Court held that the complaint failed to meet Rule 8 requirements.269 In
doing so, the Twombly majority made some significant changes to the
260Id.at51112(citingFED.R.CIV.P.8(a)(2);Conleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,47(1957)).
261Id.at51213;see5WRIGHT&MILLER,supranote92,1202,at95n.22.
262Swierkiewicz,534U.S.at51415.
263Seeid.(citingLeatherman,507U.S.at168).
264SeeMalveaux,supranote21,at72.
265SeeHearing,supranote78,at2(statementofSen.Leahy).
266BellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,54950(2007).
267Id.at55051.
268Id.at55253.
269Id.at549.
noticepleading paradigm, while keeping it intact along with Conley v.

Gibson.First,JusticeSoutergavetributetoConleyandwrotethatapleading
must givefair notice of the claimand that detailed factualallegationsare
not needed.270 However, the Court retired the Conley no set of facts
standardthathadforsomanyyearshelpedtodeterminethesufficiencyof
a pleading.271 In its place, Justice Souter instituted a plausibility
requirement;theremustbeenoughfactsinacomplainttoraisearightto
reliefabovethespeculativelevel.272Ratherthanfocusingongivingnotice,
theplausibilitystandardaskswhetheracomplaintcontainsenoughfactual
supporttomaketheclaimplausible,notmerelypossible.273Usingthenew
plausibility test, Justice Souter wrote that plaintiffs allegations of a
conspiracy did not amount to a plausible claim because bare or
conclusory allegations of parallel conduct, without facts to tie the
conducttoanillegalagreement,didnotbringtheplaintiffscomplaintpast
thelineofpossibilityintotherealmofplausibility.274
TheTwomblymajoritysupporteditspartialdeparturefromConleyand
thecreationoftheplausibilitystandardonthelanguageofRule8andthe
practical need of keeping out meritless claims.275 Tying the new
plausibilitystandardtoRule8,JusticeSouternotedthatthetextofRule8
requiresashowingthatthepleaderisentitledtoreliefwhichimplicitly
requires enough factual support to give fair notice.276 According to the
majority,theplausibilityrequirementisthuspartandparcelwithRule8s
threshold requirement of a plain statement showing entitle[ment] to
relief.277
TheTwomblymajorityalsotiedtheplausibilitystandardtothepractical
need of weeding out groundless lawsuits early, thereby protecting the
resources of federal courts as well as protecting litigants from abusive
tactics which may coerce a defendant to settle early.278 Justice Souter,
relying greatly on Judge Frank Easterbrooks essay on discovery abuse,
rejectedthenotionthattrialjudgescouldpreventtheseabusesbycareful
270Id.at555(citingConleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,47(1957)).
271Id.at56263;seeScottDodson,PleadingStandardsAfterBellAtlanticCorp.v.Twombly,
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 135 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/

07/09/dodson.pdf.
272Twombly,550U.S.at555;seeMOORE,supranote118,8.04(1)(b),at826;Blumstein,supra
note74,at23.
273SeeTwombly,550U.S.at557.
274Id.at55657.
275Seeid.at55758.
276Id.at555n.3.
277Seeid.at557.
278Seeid.at55759.
casemanagement.279
It is no surprise that many scholars deem Twomblys plausibility
standard as heightening federal pleading from the longstanding notice
regime,280 however, Twombly did not completelyabrogate the language of
Rule8andConley.281Onthecontrary,Ashcroftv.Iqbalisacompleterevision
of Rule 8 and an abandonment of the last fifty years of Supreme Court
precedent.282Forinstance,theIqbalmajorityoddlydidnotmentionnotice
pleading once in their entire decision, not even by way of background.283
Because all of the Supreme Courts prior precedents specifically discuss
noticepleading,284itissafenotonlytoinferthattheIqbalmajorityintended
thisomission,butalsothatIqbalwasintendedtoinstituteanentirelynew
pleadingregime.285
Under the new Iqbal pleading system, the Supreme Court abandoned
precedentbyinstitutingadditionalheightenedrequirementswiththefocus
on factual sufficiency286 rather than whether a complaint gives notice.287
279Twombly,550U.S.at559(citingFrankH.Easterbrook,DiscoveryasAbuse,69B.U.L.REV.
635,638(1989)).
280See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 162, at 556 (recognizing that Twombly resulted in an
increaseindismissals,althoughnotsignificantly);KendallW.Hannon,Note,MuchAdoAbout
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83
NOTREDAMEL.REV.1811,1824(2008).
281See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 9394 (2007) (per curiam) (affirming Conley and
SwierkiewiczafterTwombly);Hatamyar,supranote162,at624(concludingthatnoticepleading
survived Twombly); Spencer, supra note 20, at 192 (noting that Twombly did not overrule the
assumptionofthetruthrulefromConley).
282See Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 09245 WBS CMK,
2009WL2424608,at*8(E.D.Cal.Aug.6,2009)(notingthatIqbalcreatesdoubtastowhether
theFormsattachedtotheCivilRulesarestillvalid);Malveaux,supranote21,at82(arguing
that Iqbals factual sufficiency requirement encourages long, repetitive, [and] unwieldy
complaints contrary to the plain language of Rule 8); Thomas, supra note 24, at 38 (calling
intoquestionwhetherIqbalwasdecidedproperly);supraPartII.A;cf.Kylev.Holinka,No.09
cv90slc,2009WL1867671,at*1(W.D.Wis.June29,2009)(describingIqbalasoverturn[ing]
decadesofcircuitprecedent).
283SeeAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937passim(2009).
284SeeTwombly,550U.S.at555n.3,565n.10;id.at575(Stevens,J.,dissenting);Swierkiewicz
v.SoremaN.A.,534U.S.506,511(2002);Leathermanv.TarrantCnty.NarcoticsIntelligence&
CoordinationUnit,507U.S.163,168(1993);Conleyv.Gibson,355U.S.41,47(1957).
285See
Hearing, supra note 27, at 17 (statement of Stephen Burbank) (arguing that Iqbal
cannotbereconciledwiththeworksofCharlesClark,thechiefarchitectofthepleadingrules);
Hatamyar,supranote162,at624;Malveaux,supranote21,at82(arguingthatfairnoticeis
the objective of pleadings for over halfacentury);ScottDodson, BeyondTwombly, CIVIL
PROCEDURE & FEDERAL COURTS BLOG (May 18, 2009, 6:42 PM), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyondtwomblybyprofscottdodson.html (recognizing Iqbals
newerainpleading).
286Compare Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
TheIqbalmajoritynotonlyadoptedtheTwomblyplausibilitystandard,but
alsoheighteneditbyreinstitutingcodepleading,288scrutinizingindividual
allegations based on an ambiguous and subjective test of whether the
allegation is conclusory or factual,289 and by requiring additional factual
supportofdiscriminatoryintent.290Inaddition,theageoldassumptionof
thetruthdoctrine,establishedbyConleyandmaintainedbyTwombly,may
havealsobeenabrogatedbyIqbal.291
Furthermore,theIqbalmajorityprovidednoguidanceastohowthese
newpleadingrequirementsaretobeappliedexceptbyjudicialexperience
andcommonsense.292Consequently,Iqbalisanovelinvitationtofederal
courtstomakeadhocdecisionsbasedontheircommonsense,whichis
certainlysubjecttoabusebytrialjudgeswhodesiretodismissacasebased
ontheirintuitionorpolicystances.293Lastly,theIqbalmajoritycementedits
new pleading rule by holding that it is transsubstantive, applying to all
Rule 8 cases no matter the type of action or potential cost of discovery.294
Taken together, the pleading standard under Iqbal represents an absolute
abandonmentofSupremeCourtprecedent.295
TheSupremeCourt,however,hastheauthoritytoabandonprecedent
if it was based on error,296 inconsistently applied,297 or fundamentally
unworkable.298 While fidelity to stare decisis is weaker in the context of
consistent with a defendants liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ([I]t is well established that, in passing on a motion to
dismiss,...theallegationsofthecomplaintshouldbeconstruedfavorablytothepleader.).
287Dodson,supranote10,at4950.
288SeesupraPartI.A.1.
291SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1949;Spencer,supranote20,at192.
292SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at1950;Hatamyar,supranote162,at624;Miller,supranote19,at29.
293SeeHearing,supranote27,at12(statementofStephenBurbank);supranotes13839.
294Iqbal,129S.Ct.at195354;Dodson,supranote10,at4950;seeWasserman,supranote23,
at 159, 163 (arguing that the Iqbal rule reflects an effort by the Court to unilaterally fix
perceivedproblemswithdiscoveryandoverburdenedfederaldocketsinasinglemove).
295SeeFowlerv.UPMCShadyside,578F.3d203,211(3dCir.2009)(concludingthatConley
has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least
insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley); supra notes 28291 and
accompanyingtext.
296UnitedStatesv.Gaudin,515U.S.506,521(1995).
297SeeHohnv.UnitedStates,524U.S.236,253(1998).
298Paynev. Tennessee,501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the
SupremeCourtsCurrentDoctrineofStareDecisisRequireAdherencetotheSupremeCourtsCurrent
DoctrineofStareDecisis?,86N.C.L.REV.1165,117277(2008).
proceduralrulings,299suchasAshcroftv.Iqbal,specialfactorsstillneedtobe
presentedtojustifyabandonment.300
TheIqbalmajorityprovidednodirectjustificationfortheirrevisionof
Rule 8 and abandonment of Supreme Court precedent.301 There was no
discussion of error, inconsistent application, or unworkable precedent.302
Instead,theIqbalCourtprovidedashortsummaryoftheTwomblydecision,
followed by its interpretative advancements,303 and a brief discussion of
qualified immunity, discovery abuse, and judicially supervised case
management.304Importantly,theIqbalCourtsrelianceonTwomblydoesnot
provide it with a justification because Twombly too is an unjustifiable
abandonmentofprecedentTwomblyoverruledtheConleynosetoffacts
test without showing that it was unworkable or inconsistently applied.305
The only conceivable grounds the Iqbal majority had for rewriting Rule 8
and abandoning Supreme Court precedent was the need to protect
government officials from the substantial diversion that is attendant to
participatinginlitigation.306
The Court reasoned that government officials will be inhibited from
performingtheirdutiesiftheyaresubjecttolitigationwhichexactsheavy
costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
resources that could otherwise be directed to government work
especially in the situation of a national emergency.307 While these are
important issues, the Supreme Court has held that these kinds of policy
concerns do not make a precedent unworkable so as to justify overruling
ageold precedent.308 On the contrary, the Supreme Court deems a prior
decision unworkable when the intervening development of the law has
removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior
decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable
withcompetinglegaldoctrinesorpolicies.309Withthisinmind,theIqbal
decision failed to provide any showing that Conley and its predecessors
299Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 43132 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissentinginpart).
300Hohn,524U.S.at259(Scalia,J.,dissenting).
301SeegenerallyAshcroftv.Iqbal,129S.Ct.1937(2009).
302Seegenerallyid.
303Seeid.at194950;supratextaccompanyingnotes28891.
305Spencer,supranote241,at46669.
307Id.
308SeeHohnv.UnitedStates,524U.S.236,253(1998);Nealv.UnitedStates,516U.S.284,
295(1996);UnitedStatesv.Gaudin,515U.S.506,521(1995).
309Neal, 516 U.S. at 295 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173
(1989)).
hadbecomeunworkable,orbroughtintoquestionbynewdevelopmentsof
thelaw,sincetheSupremeCourthaspersistentlyandconsistentlyaffirmed
Conley for over fifty years.310 The only challenge during this period to
notice pleading came from Twombly, which also did not provide any
legitimatejustificationfordoingso.311
It therefore appears that the Iqbal majoritys only motivation for
rewritingRule8andoverrulinglongstandingprecedentwasthedesireto
protect government officials from potentially frivolous litigation and the
desiretofixperceivedproblemswiththeCivilRulesregardingdiscovery
abuseandoverburdeneddockets.312However,theCourtspolicyconcerns
donotamounttoasufficientjustificationtooverturnthelegacyofnotice
pleadingsuchconcernsshouldbeaddressedbyCongressorthroughthe
Enabling Act process.313 The doctrine of stare decisis exists to promote
stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority.314 The Iqbal
majority,byunilaterallyandunpredictably315rewritingRule8anddecades
of precedent, caused considerable instability316 and a reduced respect for
judicial authority.317 As a result, the Supreme Court has not only
abandoned a halfcentury of pleading jurisprudence, but also the
fundamental underpinnings of stare decisis and the rule of law.318 The
Supreme Courts interpretative power319 is not broad enough to
accommodate the abandonment of the almost seventyyearold notice
pleadingsystemthattheCourthasrepeatedlyendorsed;thecreationofa
310Seecasescitedsupranote253.
311Spencer,supranote241,at46869.
312SeeIqbal,129S.Ct.at195354;Wasserman,supranote23,at159,163.RobertKohn,Co
Chair of the Federal Civil Procedure and Trial Practice Committee of the FBA Federal
LitigationSection,hasnotedthatIqbalhas,contrarytotheapparentintentionsoftheSupreme
Court, made litigation less predictable and more costly. Robert E. Kohn, Why Iqbal and
TwomblyWontFixtheRealDisaster,FED.LAW.,May2010,at39,39.
313See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) ([W]e are bound to follow [a
Civil Rule] as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are not free to alter it except
throughtheprocessprescribedbyCongressintheRulesEnablingAct.);supraPartIII.A.
314Hiltonv.S.C.Pub.Rys.Commn,502U.S.197,202(1991);seeClermont&Yeazell,supra
note 27, at 846 (arguing that the courts should be especially deferential to stare decisis);
McNamara,supranote234,at1154.
315Seesourcescitedsupranote16.
316See supra Part II.B.; see also Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H.
Friedenthal:TheViewsofTwoCoAuthors,78GEO.WASH.L.REV.9,28(2009)([A]mendmentby
judicial fiat is a piecemeal process of revision that threatens to undermine the overall
coherenceoftheFederalRulesandtocreateinconsistenciesofapplication.).
317SeeSpencer,supranote20,at197201;sourcescitedsupranote27.
318See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey,DickersonandtheConsequencesofPragmaticAdjudication,2002UTAHL.REV.53,54.
319Seesupranotes21014andaccompanyingtext.
new, strict, and ambiguous pleading rule that violates the plain language
of Rule 8; and the institution of a new pleading regime by unilateral
adjudication rather than by congressional action or the Rules Enabling
Act.320CongressshouldthusacttoreversetheIqbalmajoritysmanyerrors
andrestoreconfidencetotheAmericanjusticesystem.321
CONCLUSION
Fewissuesincivilprocedurejurisprudencearemoresignificantthan
pleadingstandards,whicharethekeythatopensaccesstocourts.322The
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal changed history by unilaterally
instituting an entirely new pleadings rule and, in just about a year, its
impactisclearcivilrightscasesarebeingshutoutofcourtandfacingthe
threat of extinction. The importance of civil rights claims cannot be
understated as their enforcement helps to protect the basic American
values of equality and fairness and constitutional guarantees of due
processoflawandequalprotection.DuetoIqbalsnewproceduralbarriers,
the federal court system may no longer be a viable option for the private
enforcementofpubliclawandpolicy.323Asaresult,congressionalactionis
warranted to prevent such injustice, but furthermore justified because of
the fundamental errors permeating the Iqbal decision. Iqbal lies in stark
contradiction: (1) to the basic principles underlying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; (2) with Supreme Court precedent and stare decisis; (3)
withcongressionalcommandthroughtheRulesEnablingAct;and(4)with
the fundamental limitation of the Supreme Courts interpretative powers.
Therefore, this Note implores Congress to act not only for the sake of
protecting the viability ofcivil rights, but also to ensure the legitimacy of
thedemocraticprocessofrulemakingandlegislation.
320SeeHearing,supranote27,at18(statementofStephenBurbank)(Iunderstandthatthe
difference between interpretation and judicial lawmaking is one of degree rather than kind,
butherethedegreesofseparationapproachonehundredandeighty.).
321Cf. Malveaux, supra note 26, at 8384. Congressional override would halt Iqbals harsh
impact on civil rights cases while providing an opportuntity for the Civil Rules Advisory
CommitteetoconsiderchangestoRule8inlightofthepolicyconcernsraisedinTwomblyand
Iqbal. Contra Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule
Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 443 (2010) (arguing that if legislative action is
takenitshouldbeundertheRulesEnablingActratherthanCongressionaloverride).
322Phillipsv.Cnty.ofAllegheny,515F.3d224,230(3dCir.2008).
323Miller,supranote19,at71.

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WESTBROOK_FINALPG205243PROOFED(DONOTDELETE) 1/10/20119:43:56AM

206 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

enhanced role given to judges under Iqbal, the increased likelihood of

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 207

one organism an advantage to the significant detriment of a different

208 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

EraofTwomblyandIqbal,51WM. & MARY L. REV.1997,202223(2010)(classactions);Joseph

14LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.157,161(2010)(arguingthatcivilrightsenforcementwilldecrease

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 209

andTwombly,14LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.15,38(2010);seeKennethS.Klein,Ashcroftv.Iqbal

210 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

Following a criminal arrest and detention by federal officials in the

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 211

In response to Iqbals complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss

212 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

support a claim of unconstitutional conduct.41 The U.S. District Court for

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 213

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a fivetofour

214 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 215

Based from the support of only five justicesthe slimmest

216 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

The Iqbal test begins by inquiring as to which allegations in the

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 217

218 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

The Iqbal decision further raised pleading standards by scrutinizing a

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 219

The Iqbal decision thirdly instituted a new pleading rule by requiring

220 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

future claimants essentially have to get inside the head of government

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 221

2009) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint due to conclusory allegations of

CivilRightsLitigation,31WM. & MARY L. REV.935,95051,95657(1990)(civilrightsclaims);

222 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 223

secret policy of suppressing critical speech without access to discovery

As evidenced by this opinion, even highly experienced

224 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

longer being the case, counsel in political discrimination cases

OcasioHernandez and Moss are just two examples of numerous civil

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 225

U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 or by Bivens actions, employment discrimination, age

Property, Forfeiture/Penalty, Immigration, Bankruptcy, Social Security, and Federal Tax

226 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

Since 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were

Judgment,DirectedVerdict,andtheAdjudicationProcess,49OHIO ST. L.J.95,181(1988);seeRules

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 227

amendments to the Civil Rules are needed.176 If the Committee accepts a

177Struve,supranote174,at110304;see4WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote92,1001,at7&

228 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

Advisory Committee, with the assistance of the Standing Committee,

The Rules Enabling Act, by Act of Congress, imposes significant

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 229

230 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

contains a great deal more experience in everyday litigation, as well as

NottoRevise:ThatIstheQuestion,87 DENV. U. L. REV.213,21617(2010);Stempel,supranote

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 231

The Iqbal majority, in raising pleading requirements contrary to the

232 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

pleading standards contrary to the plain meaning of Rule 8 and the

2010 Evolutionary Pleading Standards 233

234 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|205

twentyeightyearoldprecedent withoutacompellingjustification); Arizonav.Rumsey,467

dissenting in part) ([S]tare decisis concerns supporting preservation of [a judgemade