CITIBANK N.A. MASTERCARD v. EFREN TEODORO (G.R. No. 150905.

September 23, 2003)

Facts:

Efren Teodoro owns a Citibank credit card and was billed by the company P191,693.25, inclusive
of interest and service charges. After several demands, Citibank filed a Complaint for collection before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and was transferred
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. During trial, Citibank presented several sales invoices or charge
slips, which added up only P24,388.36. The slips were mere photocopies but due to the fact that the copies
appear to bear the signatures of Teodoro, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with
the use of the credit card. The MTC ruled in favor of Citibank, ordering Teodoro to pay the amount of
P24,388.36. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision while the CA reversed, stating that the photocopies of the
sales invoices or charge slips were insufficient to prove any liability on Teodoros part, that while Citibank
was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it failed to prove the due execution or to
account for their loss or unavailability.

ISSUE:

Whether the photocopied Sales Invoices as evidence in this case are admissible?

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA and stated that the original copies of the sales
invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary
evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because Citibank, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of their
admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, Teodoros
obligation was not established. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
 In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies
and the testimony of Hernando, the assistant manager who testified to the existence and due execution of
the invoices. Citibank, however, failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in
court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them. Indeed, the loss of the originals and
reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices
might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from
Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request. Finally, when more than one
original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
LOON vs POWER MASTER (G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013)

FACTS:

Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the
petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against
Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin
(collectively, the respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum
wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further
averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets.

On June11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their
cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of
their original complaint. Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the
respondents behalf. The respondents counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on
July 5, 2001. The Labor Arbiter awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leaves and 13th
month pays. In awarding these claims the LA stated that the burden in proving the payment of these money
claims rests with the employer. However, they were not awarded back wages, overtime, holiday and
premium pays for failure to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on holidays. Moreover, it
was not decided that they were illegally dismissed for failure to show notice of termination of employment.
Both parties appealed to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

NLRC affirmed LAs ruling with regard the payment of holiday pay and attorneys fees but vacated
the awards of salary differential, 13th month pays and service incentive leaves. Moreover, NLRC allowed
the respondents to present pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal which includes the photocopied
and computerized copies of the list of employees with their ATMs on the ground that they have been
deprived of due process. It also ruled that petitioners were legally dismissed due to gross misconduct.
When the case was appealed to the CA, the ruling of the NLRC was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether the photocopied documents in the supplemental appeal can be used as an admissible
evidence in the case?

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court reversed the CA ruling and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the sole
purpose in computing the petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court stated that the respondents failed to
sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents photocopied and computerized
copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that
lends credence to the petitioners claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of
appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party
to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the
originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced.

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that "[i]t is of common knowledge that
there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial notice that
many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown the
signatures in the respondents assailed documentary evidence. The NLRCs position is unwarranted and is patently
unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that the employers cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the employees evidence.
DIMAGUILA vs. MONTEIRO (G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014)

FACTS:

On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro, along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa
and Clarita Nobleza filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against the Dimaguilas,
together with the Borlazas, alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The Monteiros anchored their
claim on a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila.

The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property had long been
partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, with Perfecto becoming owner of the southern half and
Vitaliano owning the northern half. The defendants claim that they are Vitalianos heirs and further averred
that the Monteiros claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the RTCs orders which denied
several of their motions and the proceedings were suspended while such petition was pending. The CA
upheld the RTCs orders and, upon resumption of the proceedings, the spouses Monteiro filed their Motion
for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which was granted by the RTC.

The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the defendants allegation of a partition and aver
that a third of Perfectos share was sold to them through a Bilihan; and that, upon their attempt to take
possession of that portion, they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it.

The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their original answer
that the subject property was actually divided into northern and southern halves, replacing it with a division
into two and share and share alike. This resulted to an admission of a co-ownership, contrary to their
original position. According to the Dimaguilas, the Bilihan also violated Article 1485 of the Civil Code for
not specifying the metes and bounds of the property sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale was still
void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of
Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been partitioned
into southern and northern portions. The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from denying
this partition and the Bilihan document was regular and authentic absent any evidence to the contrary.

The Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision. A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioners but it was denied, hence, this appeal under Rule
45.

ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition submitted by the respondents as an evidence is

admissible in this case?
HELD:

Yes.

The Supreme Court points out that to determine whether there was a partition and a sale of the 1/3
portion of the property requires an evaluation of the evidence. This entails a question of fact which is
beyond the ambit of Rule 45 upon which this petition is based. On this ground alone, the petition could be
denied. However, the Supreme Court delved into the concepts of evidence to put the case to rest.

Preponderance of evidence; definition

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case
by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side, synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Admissions; contradiction

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the
palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to
them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence.
Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppels

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners admission and so amended their original
complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the
petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property. Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would
actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent
spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners
admission.
Best Evidence Rule

Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section
7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Hearsay Rule

Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty
of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in
the course of his duty. The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of the
performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore,
clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.