Case No.

13
Dimatulac vs Villon
G. R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998

Facts:

On November 3, 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Pampanga. On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe,
Pampanga, against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut,
Servillano Yabut, and other accused. On 1 December 1995, after appropriate
proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution finding reasonable ground to believe
that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were probably
guilty thereof and warrants of arrest were then issued against the accused with no bail
recommended. However, the Yabuts were not arrested and were not brought to the
custody of the law, yet, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso - Flores conducted a
reinvestigation and found that the YABUTs were in conspiracy with one another, but
that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. On 23 February 1996,
before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners,
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). An information for Homicide was then filed against the accused before
Branch 55 of RTC Pampanga. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso - Flores
recommended a bail bond for 20k for the Yabuts and the same was approved by Judge
Roura and the same judge recalled the warrants for their arrest. Petitioners, through a
private prosecutor, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura on the ground that he: (a)
hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in the DOJ was still
pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that
there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into Murder."
Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the trial
court wherein he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura and announced that he
"will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of
the case". Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred
to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando
Villon. Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May
1996. On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. Alarmed by
the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment. In a later date, the Secretary of Justice resolved the appeal and ruled that
the case should be murder, not homicide, however, the appeal was rendered moot and
academic by the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having entered
their pleas of not guilty.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion for filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the appeal
from said prosecutors resolution to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

2. Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with

the arraignment despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The proceedings were replete with procedural irregularities. Alfonso-Reyes
was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her resolution.
She could not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her
finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing, and that the
private prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent
resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private
prosecution's stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes. As if to show
further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga did not even bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private
prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with
all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an information for murder. Unsatisfied with
what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor did not even have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its
continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of
the DOJ's power of control and supervision over prosecutors. Indubitably then, there
was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the
information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.

2. Yes. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the
appeal, as he had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any
disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, his judicial instinct should have led
him to peruse the documents submitted and to initially determine, for his own
enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder
was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure
a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances,
Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo that prudence, if not
wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that
he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ.
All told, Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public
prosecutor.

In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges
Roura and Villon was gross, grave and palpable, denying, the State and the offended
parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due process.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked
by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and
plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.