F. Search of Moving Vehicles

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of
Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance
of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the
Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon.
Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment
of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under
date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by
petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever
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in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in
Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon
a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit
went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place
to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila
Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa
denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein
be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine
the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs;
that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure
under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another
person without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although
Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and
that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury.
Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining
the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the
goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral
and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from opening the
nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November
16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department,
an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with
Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and
detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses,
to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the
petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department
had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under
Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in
connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago
was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure
proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit
them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed
the court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the
goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13,
1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case,
and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture.
A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and
the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a
manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion
for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent
filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had
been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the
seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged, among
others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago
of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent
Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before
invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent
in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was
grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In
their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided
by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings
against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could
no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods
had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent
Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject
of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila
Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected without any
search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently
issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the
seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited
importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed before the
respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer
for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods
was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all
lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the
tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed
terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid,
at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated
that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had
not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in
the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles
found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties
collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the
"compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted
colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209
dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color),
and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's
handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2,
120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No.
9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530,
pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the
importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law
are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area
the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the
Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and
orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the
Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs
Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which
duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according
to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at
the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over
said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided
by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that
Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and
rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial
shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon
examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting
that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs
had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964,
Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to
release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction
over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and
taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer
nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of
Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner
of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and
forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending
decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and
mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the
resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered
them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an
additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this
Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods
and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November
12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to
verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,
1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from
the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to
have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and
forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to
Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the
Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To
permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render
ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court
of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,
supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively
upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the
Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that
the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs
authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs
actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over
the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January
12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an
attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by
respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed
before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967
releasing said goods.
releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not
seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the
Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs,
could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,
11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the
same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully
open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to
suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article
as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could
lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to
demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to
render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit,
made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina
Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search
warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court,
considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and
in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of
a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made
lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but
also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there
was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find
any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial
and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired.
The Act of February 28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441.
The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14
Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat. 5763, 2 Fed.
Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von
Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to
make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition,
in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18 All that
they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant
or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition
laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a
warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is
a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of
the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before
their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places
is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which
is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The
baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from
those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our
criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place
without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question
was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for
the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it
necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge
Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and1wph1.t
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
Footnotes
1Section 602, pars. a, b, and j, Tariff and Customs Code Republic Act 1937.
2Annex B to petition.
3Section 1202, Tariff and Customs Code.
5Annex N to petition.
6Annex H to petition.
7Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, L-11947, June 30, 1959; Capulong v. Aseron L-22989, May 14,
1960; Capulong v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, L-22990, May 19, 1960; Lazaro v. Commissioner of
Customs, L-22511, and L-22513, May 16, 1966.
8De Joya, et al. v. Lantin, et al., L-24037, April 27, 1967.
9This deputation is not disputed by respondents.
10Pacis, et al. v. Averia, et al., L-22526, November 29, 1966; Government of the Philippine Islands, et al. v.
Gale, et al., 94 Phil., 95.
11Section 2203 (c), Tariff and Customs Code.
15Annex A to the petition.
16Sections 2208, 2210 and 2211, Tariff and Customs Code.
18Records, pp. 26 and 43.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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lawphil

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY, presided by HON. ULPIANO
SARMIENTO, JESSIE HOPE and MONINA MEDINA, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Order dated August 20, 1975 issued by District Judge
Ulpiano Sarmiento in Criminal Case No. Q-3781 which stalled the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Jessie C. Hope
and Monina Medina for the alleged violation of section 3601 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The order declared
as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly smuggled articles obtained by apprehending agents in the course of a
warrantless search and seizure. Dispositively, the order decreed:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 4, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution, the
boxes and the watches and bracelets contained therein seized from the car of the accused Sgt.
Jessie C. Hope, are hereby declared inadmissible in evidence in this case; likewise, the pictures taken
of said items attempted to be presented as evidence in the instant case is hereby declared in
admissible as evidence against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The records disclose that one week before February 9, 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center
(RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported
to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and
Macario Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations Branch,
RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion
Road at Balintawak, Quezon City.
At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate No. 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope
who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away
towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle
and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road,
but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in
blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their
Identification cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC agents.
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt.
Hope answered "I do not know." Further, respondents were asked where they were bringing the boxes, to which
respondent Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos.
Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with respondents while Agent Manuel took their own car and both cars
drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who
according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off
the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M.
(Respondents' Memorandum, records, pp. 180-183).
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear seat
and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of
the intelligence officer, the boxes were opened before the presence of respondents Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and photographers of the
Department of National Defense. The contents of the boxes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches of
assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands" (based on a later inventory), supposedly
untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue
the same on February 12, 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents arrested
respondents and brought them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former
were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector of Customs, seizure proceedings
were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification No. 14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets
pursuant to Section 2530 (m) 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against
the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of the same Code. 2
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases, respondents disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership
was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor
testified that he bought the watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice certified
to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the
book of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but when
the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to transport back the boxes to Manila
for a consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which claimant simply represented as PX
goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he presumed that the corresponding duties have already
been paid, only to be surprised later on when he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of
taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge
of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed
commodities that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon request of his
girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he
ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did
was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a
certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not
reveal the contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents and the narration of claimant
Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on April 1, 1975 declaring
that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the subject motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859, Serial No.
W357348361, File No. 2B-1884, with Plate No. EH 21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No.
14281-A be, as it is hereby declared released to its registered owner, Jessie C. Hope, upon proper
Identification. Relative to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the
subject matter thereof to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted
brands of wrist bracelets and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they are hereby likewise declared released to
the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon payment of the levitable duties, taxes and other
charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes thereof. Furthermore,
should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the assessable duties, taxes and other charges owing from the
aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision becomes final and unappealable, the
same shall be deemed abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner
provided for by law.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding
the existence of a prima facie case against respondents Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case No. Q-3781 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on April 23, 1974, respondents pleaded not
guilty. Trial commenced on January 28, 1975 and while the prosecution through its first witness, Agent Macario
Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures of the eleven (11) boxes containing the assorted watches and
watch bracelets, counsel for respondents objected to the presentation of the pictures and the subject articles on
the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and therefore inadmissible in evidence under
Section 4(2), Article IV of the New Constitution. After the parties have argued their grounds in their respective
memoranda, respondent trial court issued the questioned order of August 20, 1975 as cited earlier. The
prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1975. Hence, this petition which was
treated as a special civil action in Our Resolution of May 5, 1976.
The substantive issue as urged in the petition is whether or not the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle
by authorized agents commissioned to enforce customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such merchandise are inadmissible in evidence.
Corollary to the issue is, has the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding the affirmative?
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure had been liberalized when a
moving vehicle is the object of the search and the necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground of
practicality, considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on impossibility in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. Petitioner vigorously contends that contraband may be seized without necessity of a search
warrant since the Constitution does not guaranty immunity to smugglers and that a warrantless seizure of
contraband in a moving vehicle is justified by the traditional exception attached to the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and such exception must be adopted in interpreting the relevant provision in the new Philippine
Constitution.
As counter argument, respondents maintain that the decision of the Collector of Customs in their seizure cases
which has now become final and unappealable has made no pronouncement that the subject articles are
smuggled items. More so, the decision has entirely cleared respondents of any liability or responsibility in the
alleged smuggling activity and as a consequence, the decision has the direct effect of deciding finally that the
watches and bracelets are not smuggled and that respondents have not violated the customs and tariff laws as
charged in the criminal complaint. Respondents argue further that the interception of accused Jessie Hope's car
by RASAC Agents while in the course of a normal trip without any order of the court and without having shown that
the interception was necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, is an impairment
of the liberty of travel under section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Finally, they claim that the agents had
one week's time before the date of apprehension to secure the necessary warrant but since they failed to get this
court order, the search of Hope's car and the spontaneous seizure of the boxes loaded therein and the contents
thereof is a violation of the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever
nature and for any purpose" under section 3, Article IV of the fundamental law.
We find for petitioner. The opposing counsel's attempt to draw an Identity between the seizure cases and the
present criminal action to the ultimate end that the decision in the former should be made decisive of the issue of
criminal liability must be overruled. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings that the
articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of
evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles (Pages 128 and 130 of Annex "E", Records, p.
109). In a general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. But if the aim of a
confirmation that the goods are indeed smuggled, is to draw an inference to tie up respondents' criminal liability,
the Collector is not duty bound, nor is there any need for him to arrive at such a conclusion. It is quite clear that
seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not
result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in section 3601 of the Code
3. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case,
are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or
forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is
distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor
and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. 4
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns the res
rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These
merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being assimilated in
lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the
form of fines or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The
importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an
inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply
because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to
forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and seized from
their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff
and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal action.
Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under
our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of persons duly commissioned to
enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of
goods suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws. This Court had occasion
to recognize this power granted to persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Code, who in order
to discharge their official duties more effecttively
... may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure of any warehouse, store or
other building not being a dwelling house. (Section 2208, emphasis supplied)
... (to) go aboard any vessel or aircraft within the limits of any collection district, and to inspect, search
and examine said vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope on board, and search
any person on board the said vessel or aircraft and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft
if under way. to use all necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear that any breach
or violation of the customs and tariff laws of the Philippines has been committed, whereby or in
consequence of which such vessels or aircrafts, or the article, or any part thereof, on board of or
imported by such vessel or aircrafts, is hable to forfeiture to make seizure of the same or any part
thereof.
The power of search herein above given shall extend to the removal of any false bottom, partition,
bulkhead or other obstruction, so far as may be necessary to enable the officer to discover whether
any dutiable or forfeitable articles may be concealed. (Section 2210)
or,
... (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid (Section
2211, emphasis supplied)
As enunciated in the leading case of Papa v. Mago 5, in the exercise of the specific functions aforecited, the Code
does not mention the need of a search warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace), upon swom
application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and person or thing to be
seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that case expressed the considered view that "except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v. United States 6 wherein an
imprimatur against constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such nature
as in the case at bar. On this stable foundation We refute the constitutional charge of respondents that the
warrantless seizure violated Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth
Amendment of the American Constitution 7
The Carroll doctrine arose from the indictment and conviction of George Carroll and partner for transporting in an
automobile intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. They assailed the conviction on the
ground that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the sixty-eight bottles found by searching the automobile
and eventual seizure of the same allegedly in violation of the 4th Amendment, and therefore that the use of the
liquor as evidence was improper. 8 To paraphrase the significant views of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, the legislative
history of the Act clearly established the intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a
search warrant in the search of private dwellings and that of automobiles and other road vehicles in the
enforcement of the Act. This distinction is consistent with the 4th Amendment since the latter does not denounce
an searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable. Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if
made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. 9
Similarly, other statutes of the Union such as the Act of 1789, Act of August 4, 1790, and Act of March 3, 1815,
among others, construed in the light of the 4th Amendment had recognized the distinctive feature of a warrantless
search of a ship motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. 10 In such a situation, what appears to the measure of legality of the seizure was formulated in this sense:
"that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops
and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. " Therein the guarantee of the 4th
Amendment was fulfilled. Where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and
at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause. 11
The counsel for the State is candid enough to admit that the Anti-Smuggling Action Center tries its best to follow-
up the more promising tips and information from informers, but ever often, the information proves false or the
smugglers are forewarned. 12 It is quite true the ASAC received one such information several days or a week
before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain a warrant in spite of the time allowance is not a
sign that they have been remiss in their duty. The records hardly reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the
report during the said period except the general knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported
from Angeles City to Manila in a blue Dodge automobile. Not even the trial court has made any findings that ASAC
has established with exactitude the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. Lacking this
essential determination, the agents could not have possibly secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its
compelling necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just another false alarm. Providentially,
however, things turned out differently when in the morning of February 9, 1974, the undisclosed Informer himself
went along with the agents to the rendezvous point where at the appointed time he positively Identified an
approaching car as the one described by him a week earlier to be the suspected carrier of untaxed merchandise.
Clearly therefore, the agents acted not on the basis of a mere hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of
belief and probable cause enough for them to adopt measures to freeze the fleeting event.
We need not argue that the subjective phase of the police action taken by the ASAC Agents to effect the
apprehension of the suspected violators can be anything less than the ensuing interception and stoppage of
respondents' vehicle after a short chase. Neither can We sustain the argument that in doing so, the agents
violated respondents' constitutional "liberty of travel". To recall again Mr. Chief Justice Taft: "(B)ut those lawfully
within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search
unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." 13 What followed next in the scene was a simple inquiry as to the
contents of the boxes seen inside the car. Respondents' baffled denial of knowledge thereof could not but only
heighten the suspicion of a reasonable and inquisitive mind. Thus, the probable cause has not been any less
mitigated.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations
of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. 14 The
right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. 15 The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is more
closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best of causes and reasons. We draw from the context of the Constitution that an
intended search or seizure attains a high degree of propriety only when a probable cause duly determined is
branded on a warrant duly issued by a judge or other responsible person as may be authorized by law. Not
invariably, however, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the interference is not wholly defendent on the
presence of a warrant or the lack of it. In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the
mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But
We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus, in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured. 16
The ultimate question then, if any, that should confront the actuations of the ASAC Agents in this case is whether
the warrantless search and seizure conducted by them is lawful or not. We have already seen that what they did
was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code directing them as authorized
agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or procured in violation of the
tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest. The official capacity of the agents has never been
questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise an issue on the constitutionality of the law giving the
agents the power to act as mandated. There 'is no question that the Agents have not exceeded their authority nor
have they acted so licentiously to bear upon respondents moral embarrassment or substantial prejudice beyond
what is necessary. The purpose of the search and seizure is more than clear to Us, hence, We rule out the
suspicion that the intention is only to elicit evidence to be used against respondents.
We do not see strong justification for the trial court's failure to recognize the circumstances at bar as among the
"rare cases" which it admittedly conceded to be exempted from the requirement of a warrant. 17 The lapse lies on
the dismal gap in the trial court's developmental treat- ment of the law on arrest, search and seizure. It missed the
vital distinction emphatically laid down in Boyd v. United States 18 which was cited in Carroll with "particular
significance and applicability." Thus, We quote Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd:
... The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private
books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as
evidence against him, The two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled
to the possession of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by
the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws or concealed to
avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries
past; and the like seizure have been authorized by our revenue acts from the commencement of the
government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July
31, 1789. 1 State at L. 29, 43, chap. 5, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by
the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the Constitution, it is
clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
'unreasonable' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the Amendment. So also the
supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture of custody of
excisable articles, and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are
necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures. So also the laws
which provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful for a person to
have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets,
implements of gambling, etc. are not within this category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met 329. Many
other things of this character might be enumerated. (Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in Viduya v. Berdiago 19 " this Court reiterated the controlling force of the Papa v. Mago ruling
hereinbefore cited and the persuasive authority of the leading decision in Carroll v. U.S., supra, and in explaining
the rationale of the doctrine significantly said that "(i)t is not for this Court to do less than it can to implement and
enforce the mandates of the customs and revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion must be stamped
out without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any constitutional right ...
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search and
seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the applicability
of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision must be upheld and
reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been violated and the respondent court
gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible evidence the items or articles
obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items
attempted to be presented as evidence against the accused.
Notwithstanding the reversal and setting aside of the order of respondent judge assailed herein, thereby allowing
the introduction and admission of the subject prohibited articles in the trial of the accused Jessie C. Hope and
Monina Medina for alleged smuggling, in the interest of speedy justice, the prosecution is directed forthwith to re-
assess and re-evaluate the evidence at its disposal, considering the lapse of time since the trial commenced on
June 28, 1975 and was thus delayed due to the filing of the instant certiorari petition and that on April 1, 1975,
after seizure proceedings initiated by the Collector of Customs, the said articles were ordered released upon
payment of the leviable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties
and taxes thereof. After such re-assessment and re-evaluation, the prosecution must promptly take the necessary
action on the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all parties concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded for further trial and
reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the prosecution
may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove directed.
This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:
This dissent is based on two aspects of the case at bar: I Firstly, as discussed in Part I hereof, I believe that the
case at hand does not fall, either pointedly or tangentially, under any of the recognized exceptions to the
constitutionally mandated warrant requirement, for the circumstances surrounding the apprehension, search and
seizure conducted by the RASAC agents show that they had ample time and opportunity for a week's time to
secure the necessary search warrant conformably with the constitutional requirement. The warrantless search and
seizure violated respondents' fundamental constitutional rights and rendered the goods so seized inadmissible in
evidence; and II. Secondly, I hold that the decision of the Customs authorities themselves, as cited in the majority
opinion itself (at page 4 to 9) wherein the seized articles (including the car of respondent Hope) were declared not
subject to forfeiture since said articles were found to have been purchased in good faith by the claimant thereof
Antonio del Rosario under a genuine purchase invoice from a trading firm and hence, the goods were ordered
released to said Antonio del Rosario upon payment of the corresponding duties and taxes and penalties "as the
rightful owner thereof" and Hope's car was ordered released to him as the registered owner in view of the finding
that he had been merely asked to bring the boxes back to Manila and had no hand in their importation nor
purchase, rendered moot the question of admissibility in evidence of the goods in question. The admission in
evidence of the said goods which have been determined by the Customs authorities themselves to have been
lawfully purchased in good faith by the claimant-intervenor would in no way established any criminal liability for the
importation or transitory possession by respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely bringing
them back to Manila on behalf of the owner.
Withal, I join and concur with the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with the respondents-
accused's right to speedy trial and justice that the prosecution forthwith reassess and reevaluate the evidence at
its disposal" and thereafter "promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the protection of the rights and
interests of all parties concerned" which, to my mind, means that the prosecution must as a simple matter of
fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the criminal case below as hereinbelow explained.
The opinion of the majority in effect stamps approval on the warrantless search for and seizure of the eleven (11)
sealed boxes containing wrist watches and watch bracelets of different trademarks, aboard the four-door blue
Dodge sedan owned by TSgt Jessie C. Hope of the United States Air Force by the agents of the Regional Anti-
Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), such approval being accorded on the strength of the Court's ruling in Papa v.
Mago 1 following, as the majority states, "the traditional doctrine in Caroll v. United States , 2 as enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court. An analysis and appreciation of the facts of the case at bar and the fundamental principles
on the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure, as laid down by this Court and the
precedents set by the United States Supreme Court in resolving Fourth Amendment issues, make it clear to me
that respondent judges' challenged Orders (1) dated August 20, 1975 holding the warrantless "apprehension,
search and seizure" 3 in question violative of the provisions of Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution and
consequently declaring the boxes and their contents seized from Sgt. Hope's car as well as the pictures taken of
the said items inadmissible in evidence in the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Hope and his companion in the car,
Monina Medina, for violation of the provisions of Section 3601 4 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philip-
pines; and (2) dated September 30, 1975 denying the State's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
August 20, 1975, should be upheld and the petition at bar accordingly dismissed.
1. I cannot accede to the majority's casual approach to the case at bar which in the main raises an issue of
constitutional dimension. The majority opinion simply and broadly applied judicial precedent was taking no heed of
the injunction that when the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is invoked, there is a need to
scrutinize the facts rigorously to preclude any infringement thereof. 5 This injunction should be given due regard
with greater reason where, as in the case at bar, the Court invokes the applicability of a judicially established
exception to a constitutionally protective rule. Indeed "[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search [and
seizure] is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case." 6
2. The majority validates the warrantless search and seizure in the case at bar as an exception to the warrant
requirement (spelled out by the second clause of Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution) pursuant to the ruling in
Papa, supra, which in turn relied on the doctrinal pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Carroll,
supra. Carroll set the ruling that "if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." 7 The
"necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought" 8 supplied the underlying rationale for the Carroll rule. Put
simply, Carroll declared "a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained." 9 thereby laying down the probable cause plus exigent circumstances
standard.
The following ultimate facts provided the basis for the aforementioned rule in Carroll. Three federal prohibition
agents and a state officer, while patrolling, on their regular tour of duty, the highway leading from Detroit to Grand
Rapids, Michigan, met and passed an Oldsmobile roadster in which rode Carroll and John Kiro, whom the said
agents recognized, from recent personal contact and observation, as having been lately engaged in illegal liquor
dealings (bootlegging).The government agents turned their car and pursued Carroll and Kiro to a point about
nineteen miles east of Grand Rapids "where they stopped them and searched the car." The agents found, stashed
inside the upholstered seats, sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and gin. Thereafter, the state officer and another took
Carroll and Kiro, the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids.
As could readily be seen, the "exigent circumstances" 10 which exist in connection with the ambulatory character of
the automobile provided the basic factor in the justification for the warrantless search and seizure in Carroll
Absent, thus, "these exigent circumstances," notwithstanding the presence of probable cause, a warrant must be
secured and used
The U.S. Supreme Court took this jurisprudential direction in the much later case of United States v. Joseph V.
Chadwick, et al." decided on June 21, 1977. The facts of the case were summarized as follows:
When respondents arrived by train in Boston from San Diego, they were arrested at their waiting automobile by
federal narcotics agents, who had been alerted that respondents were possible drug traffickers. A double-
locked footlocker, which respondents had transported on the train and which the agents had probable cause to
believe contained narcotics, had been loaded in the trunk of the automobile. Respondents, together with the
automobile and footlocker, which was admittedly under the agents' exclusive control, were then taken to the
Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrests the agents opened the footlocker without
respondents' consent or a search warrant and found large amounts of marijuana in it. Respondents were
subsequently indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it. The District Court granted their
pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker, holding that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within some established exception to the
warrant requirement, and that the footlocker search was not justified under either the 'automobile exception' or
as a search incident to a lawful arrest; the Court of Appeals affirmed. 12
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, responding to the Government's
argument that the rationale of the Court's automobile search cases applied as well to Chadwick, ruled that the
footlocker's mobility does not "justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant Clause" for, "[o]nce the
federal agents had seized it at the rail road station and had safely transferred it to the Boston Federal Building
under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been
removed before a valid search warrant 13 could be obtained. 13
As to the contention of the Government that the search fell within the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an
arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,...
or no exigency exists. Once lawful enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of
that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. 14 It was emphasized that "the search was conducted more
than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were
securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other
exigency. 15
I perceive no reason why the rationale in Chadwick should not find application to the case at bar. The record
shows the following undisputed facts: (1) A week before the actual interception of Sgt. Hope and Medina in the
former's Dodge sedan, the RASAC agents already knew, from an informer, that "a shipment of highly dutiable
goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City in a blue Dodge car 16 and that the goods, in "sealed
boxes with yellow tie 17 would consist of "watches"; 18 (2) After the interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the
Dodge car with respondents while Agent Manuel took [his] own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut
making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone"; 19 and (3) "Arriving at
the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who according to
Monina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad 'called off the mission' and
brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M. 20
In the case at bar, granting that the RASAC agents had probable cause to effect the search and seizure,
nonetheless, no exigent circumstances justified their proceeding to do so without the requisite warrant. The
RASAC agents, having known a week before they actually undertook the operation that they would be intercepting
a "blue Dodge car" transporting watches in "sealed boxes," had ample opportunity within the one-week period to
secure the necessary warrant for the search and seizure contemplated. Moreover, the RASAC agents had another
opportunity to obtain the search and seizure warrant on the day of the operation itself. The actual interception
took place "around 7:00 o'clock in the morning" 21 at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road and
the actual search and seizure occurred past 9:00 o'clock the same morning at Camp Aguinaldo. 22 During the
intervening period, Agent Manuel even had time to telephone Colonel Abad to ask for instructions and could have
taken up then with him the matter of securing the necessary search and seizure warrant. Colonel Abad, as well,
after learning from Agent Sabado that interception tion and apprehension had already been effected, could
himself, as RASAC Chief of Intelligence and Operations, have secured the necessary search and seizure warrant.
23
As stressed by respondent judge in his questioned order, "there was ample time and opportunity to secure the
necessary warrant" 24 and [j]ust because the RASAC-MBA agents have information to make them believe that a
certain person has contraband goods in his possession, does not give them the right to search him and seize
whatever contraband may be found in his possession. ASAC Agents are not by law empowered to determine
whether there exists a 'probable cause, and even if they have such power, assuming it to be so, the determination
of the probable cause should be made by examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing or person to be seized, and not simply on bare
information given by an unnamed informer, as in the instant case." 25
Respondent judge aptly added that
We cannot accept 'good faith' here, as an excuse to justify violation of the Constitution in making the
warrantless apprehension search and seizure in question when there was sufficient time one week within
which they could have procured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant in accordance with the proscriptions of
the present Constitution, had the ASAC Agents wanted to. Agent Sabado simply said 'it is not necessary.'
Furthermore, if subjective good faith alone was the test, the protection afforded the Filipino people by our
present Constitution against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure would evaporate and rendered its
provision nugatory, and our people 'would be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects only in the
discretion of the police'. And besides, what would they have lost if they secured a warrant first? Would it have
frustrated their efforts in enforcing the provisions of the Customs and Tariff Code if they secured the necessary
warrant before making the apprehension and search? Would it have thwarted the purposes of the Customs and
Tariff Code and would the results have been different if they had taken the trouble of securing the necessary
warrants, and made the apprehension and search in accordance with the Constitution? It would have hardly
made any difference These over earnestness and zealousness on the part of the officers in the discharge of
their function, is what we should guard against. We might impress on them the importance to our well ordered
society of the 'rule of law' which necessarily imply respect for and obedience to the Constitution and the
laws of the land. This we can do by making it clear to them that the fruits of such unreasonable searches and
seizures, are 'forbidden fruits' in admissible in evidence. 26
Granting arguendo that the RASAC agents had no opportunity after the apprehended respondents to secure the
necessary search and seizure warrant during the period prior to their arrival at Camp Aguinaldo, they certainly
could have delayed the actual search and seizure until the necessary warrant had been obtained, which would not
have taken them beyond mid-afternoon of the same day. The inconvenience which could be caused by the delay
to respondents Hope and Medina would at least be tolerable, for such inconvenience could be quantifiable only in
terms of hours spent while waiting, rather than the transgression of their rights through the warrantless search and
seizure which could be measured only in terms of fundamental constitutional values violated.
The case at bar offers no situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." As previously stated, after the
interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with the respondents" and directed Sgt. Hope the route he
should take. 27 Agent Sabado had, in effect, taken custody or control of Sgt. Hope's Dodge sedan, for, being in
there, on hand at all times from the moment he boarded it through the trip to Bonanza Restaurant, Tropical Hut
Foodmart and, finally, Camp Aguinaldo to guard against any deviation by Sgt. Hope from the route he had been
directed to take or against any attempt to run off with the car and its contents, his presence had neutralized, if not
eliminated, the said car's mobility. Moreover, the RASAC agents, by directing the Dodge sedan to Camp Aguinaldo
and retaining it within the premises of the said Camp, had effected its complete immobilization as well as of its
contents. Definitely under all these circumstances, there could not have been the slightest possibility that Sgt.
Hope and Medina could have either moved the car or removed its contents all securely within the custody of the
RASAC agents and the premises of Camp Aguinaldo before the necessary search and seizure warrant could be
secured.
Neither can the warrantless search in the case at bar be viewed as a search incident to a valid arrest so as to fall
within another recognized exception from the warrant requirement. In Preston v. United States, " 28 the U.S.
Supreme Court, in spelling out the rule regarding this exception and the rationale therefor, stated that:
Unquestionably when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make
a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to
commit the crime ... This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the
accused's immediate control ... and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place
where he is arrested ... The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to
seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime things which might easily happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are
absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in
custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. 29
Clearly, the search in the case at bar cannot be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, for, even
assuming the apprehension of Sgt. Hope and Medina as lawful, the "search was too remote in time or place to
have been made as incidental to the arrest. 30 Here, the RASAC agents intercepted and apprehended Sgt. Hope
and Medina "around 7:00 o'clock in the morning" at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road but
conducted the search of the sealed boxes loaded in the Dodge sedan past 9:00 o'clock of the same morning at
Camp Aguinaldo.
3. The majority opinion also cites Boyd v. United States, 31 with particular reference to the dissertation therein on
the distinction between the search and seizure of "stolen or forfeited goods or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof" and the search and seizure of "a man's private books and papers for the
purpose of obtaining information tion therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him" as well as on
an historic and statutory account of instances "excepted out of the category of unreasonable search and
seizures."
Boyd raised the matter of distinction aforementioned in connection with the resolution of whether or not "a search
and seizure or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in
evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws' 32 partook of
"an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?' 33 Mr.
Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the Court, "sought to determine the meaning of the fourth
amendment reasonableness clause by looking to those principles of the common law which defined the limits of
the state's power to search and seize the belongings of its citizens. Although it could seize stolen goods and
contraband, at common law the government could not search for and seize for and citizen's belongings in which it
could not assert superior property rights. 34 He "concluded that the owner's 'indefeasible' natural law property
rights, enshrined in the common law and protected by the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment placed
his private papers and other property absolutely beyond the reach of government agents seeking evidence of
crime. No matter how compelling the showing of probable cause or with what particularly the places to be search
and the things to be might be described, no warrant or subpoena could issue except for those items already
owned by or forfeited to the state. 35 In other words, the Court, in Boyd 36, ruled inter alia that the Constitution
permitted searches and seizures only of property in which the government could claim superior property rights at
common law like "goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof. "
The distinction excerpted in the opinion of the majority in the case at bar served, in Boyd, to underscore its
property oriented rationale. However, this distinction the very basis of the property-focused rationale had
already been explicitly abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Warden, Maryland and Penitentiary v. Bennie
Joe Hayden, 37 wherein it was stated that:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence'
and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ...,'without regard to the use to
which any of these things are applied This 'right of the people' is certainly unrelated to the 'mere
evidence' limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in
both situation and the requirements of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact.
Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private than property
seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed distinction is wholly
irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects' may be mere
evidence in one case and instrumentality in another.
xxx xxx xxx
The premise that property interest control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited. Searches and seizures may be 'unreasonable within the Fourth Amendment even though
the Government asserts a superior property interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts ... This shift in
emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and
procedural reform ...
xxx xxx xxx
... In determining whether someone is a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' we have refused
'to import into the law ... subtle distinctions developed and refiled by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical ... [W]e have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete
absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with
impunity: stolen goods 38 ... ; instrumentalities 39 ...; and contraband 40 ... 41
4. That necessity underlies the legislative grant of authority to certain functionaries 42 of the Government "to effect
searchches seizures and arrests" to secure the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws need not be belabored.
The scope of this authority, however, should be circumscribed by the procedural safeguards set forth by the
Constitution. Fealty to these constitutional guarantees requires that the Court, rather than accommodate extended
applications of the search seizure-and-arrest authority, should guard against shortcuts government
functionaries are prone to make which render nugatory the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. 43 This authority should, as a matter of principle, be subjected to the requirements of prior judicial inquiry
and sanction whenever possible and practicable. The Court should not leave entirely to the hands of government
functionaries discretionary determinations susceptible of abuse and misuse, for, indeed, "[p]ower is a heady
thing." 44
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we
sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit. We must remember, too,
that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in
that there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For example, any
effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a course
of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain an injunction.
Other rights, such as that to ... the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts
themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the taking of private property may be vindicated
after the act in terms of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by surprise, conducted in
haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment and
moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There is no
opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is quietly to
submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence.
And we must remember that the authority which we concede to conduct searches and seizures without
warrant may be exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible and
resorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies. 45
All told, I hold that the warrant less search and seizure conducted by the RASAC agents in the case at bar should
be invalidated and the constitutional sanction declaring the evidence obtained thereby "inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" 46 should be upheld.
II
The outcome of the seizure and detention proceedings instituted by the Collector of Customs against the goods in
question including Sgt. Hope's car, wherein the car and goods were ordered returned to Sgt. Hope and the
established claimant owner of the goods, Antonio del Rosario, respectively, (subject in the case of the latter to
payment of the leviable duties and taxes and penalties), as recited on pages 4 to 9 of the majority opinion, shows
clearly the lack of any criminal liability on the part of the respondents.
The separate seizure and detention proceedings were instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila
on February 13, 1974 and after hearing, the Collector rendered his decision of April 1, 1975 finding claimant
Antonio del Rosario to be the lawful owner and purchaser in good faith duly covered by an authentic sales invoice
issued by the trading firm which sold the same to him and Sgt. Hope to have been unaware of the contents of the
11 boxes which his girlfriend, his co-respondent Monina Medina, had asked him to bring to Manila in his car.
The majority opinion itself recites these established facts on pages 4-5, as follows:
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases [seizures and detention proceedings], respondents
disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del
Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor testified that he bought the
watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice certified to be authentic
by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the book
of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but
when the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to transport back
the boxes to Manila for a consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which
claimant simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he
presumed that the corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when
he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of apprehension, he had
no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew
that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to
Manila in his car upon request of his girl friend Monina Medina as a personal favor; that he was not
present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents on the way. On
the part of respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in compliance with the
agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the
Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the
contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp
Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents and the narration of
claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on
April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture.
The Collector's decision of April 1, 1975, itself, as affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs' endorsement of April
28, 1975, 47 establishes in detail the above facts which absolve respondents of any complicity in any smuggling
activity, as follows:
From the evidence thus adduced, it was established that the boxes found inside the subject car are
4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pcs of wrist bracelets likewise of assorted
brands and 100 pcs. tools, as evidenced by the inventory list dated Feb. 22, 1974, (Exhs. '3'- '3-L'
Hope) is the prosecutions' contention that these articles were imported without going through a
customhouse in violation of Sec. 2530 m) of the TCCP. As a consequence thereof, the vehicle which
was used in transporting the subject articles was likewise seized for alleged violation of Section 2530
(k) of the same code.
With respect to the charge against the subject car, the claimant thereof, TSgt Jessie C Hope asserted
that he merely accommodated Monina Medina, his girl friend who requested him to help her bring her
cargo to Manila by driving the car from Angeles City to Manila; that he was not present when the 11
boxes were loaded in his car which was then parked on its usual parking place which is a vacant cant
lot adjacent to the house where he lives. He further stated that Monina Medina has an access to the
key of his car which he usually put on a table in his house and that she did not tell him of the contents
of the 11 boxes. Moreover he asserted that he came to know of the contents of the 11 boxes when
they were opened at the RASAC C office at Camp Aguinaldo. Upon being asked by this Office why it
never occurred to him to inquire from Monina Medina about the contents of the 11 boxes, claimant
categorically stated ... 'because of the girl's honesty to me.' In a similar vien, claimant stated in his
sworn statement given to the RASAC that he had known Monina Medina for quite a time so that ... 'he
did not suspect her to carry anything against the law of the Philippines and for that reason I did not
bother to ask her.' (Exh. '5-A Hope') These assertions find support in the direct testimony of Col.
Antonio Abad, Chief, Intelligence and Operations, RASAC, who testified thus: (t.s.n., p. 104)
A. ... I asked him again, how come your car was loaded with foreign items?
And he said 'that is my lady companion's. I told him don't you know these
are hot items?
B. What did he say?
C. He was surprised
Both Col. Antonio Abad and Agent Macario Sabado, one of the apprehending agents admitted in
open hearing that during their initial interrogation of T/Sgt. Hope, he maintained and professed that
he did not know of the contents of the 11 boxes. Monina Medina, on the other hand, stated on direct
examination that TSgt Hope was not present when the subject 11 boxes were delivered to her at the
vacant lot in Angeles City by Antonio del Rosario. (tsn p. 169) Moreover, in her sworn statement given
to the RASAC, Monina Medina stated thus; (Exh. '4-A' Hope)
Q. When you told T/Sgt. Hope that you will load something in his car, did he
ask you what you were going to load?
R. No, sir.
Against the foregoing contentions, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence circumstantial or
otherwise that may even tend to disprove or controvert the same. Granting 'arguendo' that T/Sgt.
Jessie C. Hope was aware of the contents of the 11 boxes that were found in his car, it is still
incumbent upon the prosecution to at least establish that he has knowledge that the articles he was
conveying are untaxed and/or smuggled as contemplated in See. 2530 (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code. In the absence of evidence to prove such fact, which in this case there is none whatsoever, the
ground relied upon for the forfeiture of the vehicle in question remains unsubstantiated and therefore
will not lie.
Forfeiture works to deprive one's right to his property. Like the capital punishment which is the
supreme penalty for human beings forfeiture is the ultimate sanction imposable to property. However,
unlike the capital punishment which can only be imposed after the cause thereof has been
established beyond reasonable doubt, forfeiture should at least be made tenable only after the
grounds therefor have been established to a reasonable degree of certainty. It shall not lie if based
on mere bare presumptions and groundless conclusions. To hold otherwise would be arbitrary and
repugnant to the principle of judicial and/or administrative due process.
With respect to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is evident that the claimant-intervenor herein
Antonio del Rosario purchased the subject wrist watches and bracelets from Teresa Buenafe as
evidenced by the covering purchase invoice No. 2637 dated February 7, 1974 which was certified to
be authentic by Jeron L. Castillo of Revenue Region No. 6, BIR Quezon City (Exhs. '2', '3' & '4'). The
aforesaid business transaction was entered in the Columnar Book (Exh. '3') of claimant-intervenor
which fact is a manifestation that Antonio del Rosario was a buyer in good faith and that the business
transaction he entered into with Teresa Buenafe was not simulated nor clandestine.
It is a well settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed, it must be proven. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, which in this case none whatsoever was presented the claimant-intervenor
herein is presumed to be a buyer in good faith. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant-intervenor
herein to prove that the subject articles are tax-paid. Aside from the covering sales invoice, not a
scintilla of evidence was adduced to prove that the duties and taxes due on the said items were
satisfied. In this connection, this Office does not share the view of the herein claimant-intervenor that
it is not the practice in business circles to inquire whether or not the subject matter of a business
transaction are tax-paid. Considering the quantity of the articles in question and the big volume of the
amount involved, Mr. Antonio del Rosario was quite negligent in failing to inquire from the seller
herein whether the duties and taxes of the items he purchased were satisfied or not.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is the studied opinion of this Office that while the
claimant-intervenor herein is liable for the payment of the assessable duties and taxes owing from the
subject articles, the forfeiture thereof will not lie it appearing that the 'quantum' of evidence adduced
by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain
the charges levelled against the said articles. Moreover, this Office referred this case to the Central
Bank for the necessary Release Certificate. However, Mr. Cesar Lomotan, Deputy Governor, Central
Bank, in his letter to the Commissioner of Customs dated February 21, 1975 in effect stated thus:
Based on subject's manager Mr. Antonio del Rosario's representations that the items involved were
bought from a local dealer as supported by an alleged commercial invoice from Teresa M. Buenafe
Trading dated February 7, 1974 submitted earlier, this Office cannot issue the required release
certificate therefor considering that no proof has been submitted to indicate that subject imported
goods in question.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed that
the subject motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859, Serial No. W357348361, File No. 28-
1884, with Plate No. EH 21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it is hereby declared,
released to its registered owner, Jessie C. Hope, upon proper identification. Relative to Seizure Identification
No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the subject matter thereof, to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted
brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they
are hereby likewise declared, released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon payment of the
leviable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the assessable duties, taxes and other charges
owing from the aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision becomes final and unappealable,
the same shall be deemed abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner provided for
by law. 48
As pointed in the People's petition itself, the Collector's said decision "has long become final and executory" 49
Hope's car was duly released and returned to him since May 8, 1975. 50 And the goods were likewise presumably
released to the established claimant-owner Antonio del Rosario, because at the trial of the criminal case below,
only pictures of the 11 boxes containing the goods were sought to be presented by the prosecution.
The point is that the customs authorities, the Commissioner of Customs and the Manila Collector of Customs are
bound by their own above stated decision and findings in the seizure and detention proceedings that the goods in
question were lawfully owned by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario who had purchased them in good
faith in the regular course of business and that respondent Hope was completely innocent of any complicity in their
importation and purchase, having agreed merely to his girlfriend Monina Medina's request to bring the goods back
to Manila, without any knowledge of their contents, and they should accordingly direct the prosecution to move for
dismissal of the case below. As the majority opinion itself states:
The collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that
untaxed goods were transported in respondent's car and seized from their possession by agents of the law.
Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the
information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the
administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal
responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
51
Certainly, if respondent Hope were absolved by the customs authorities in the seizure and detention proceedings
because of the absolute lack of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would establish any complicity on
his part "to a reasonable degree of certainty" and justify the forfeiture of his car that was used in transporting the
goods to Manila, they must necessarily on the same evidence or absolute lack thereof as officially determined by
themselves move in all fairness and justice for and cause the dismissal of the criminal case below. If their evidence
in the seizure proceedings established that respondents had no part whatever in the importation or purchase by
the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of
innocence,
The main issue at bar as to the non-admissibility in evidence of the boxes and their photographs as ruled in
respondent judge's questioned order (which according to the petition has "the effect of acquitting the accused
[respondents] from the charges" in the criminal case below) has thus been rendered moot by respondents
customs authorities' decision and findings. The disposition of this case by the majority opinion of setting aside
respondent judge's order and ordering the case .remanded for further trial and reception of evidence without
excluding the articles subject of the seizure" has likewise been thus rendered moot. The admission in evidence of
the said boxes or their photographs whose contents have been found to be lawfully owned and purchased in good
faith by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario would in no way establish any criminal liability on the part of
respondents.
Stated in another way, assuming that the seized goods or photos thereof are admissible in evidence not-
withstanding the warrantless search and seizure (justified on the doctrine of "hot pursuit"), as held in the majority
opinion, still the People's petition should be dismissed since the admission in evidence of the said goods which
have been determined by the Customs authorities themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good faith by the
claimant-intervenor would in no way establish any criminal liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the
owner. If the prosecution's evidence in the seizure proceedings established that respondents had no part
whatever in the importation or purchase by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence cannot
possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge in the case before us
nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of innocence.
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero, however, reaches the conclusion that despite respondents'
exoneration in the administrative cases, the criminal- responsibility can be determined only in the separate criminal
action while conceding that such criminal responsibility "must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. 52
This posture of the majority that any dismissal of the criminal case should not be ordered outright by this Court but
by the court a quo, whether motu proprio or at the prosecutions instance, is nonetheless understandable.
I join the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with the respondents-accused's right to speedy trial
and justice that the prosecution forthwith "reassess and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and thereafter
promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all concerned.
This means, as indicated above, that if the prosecution's evidence (as supplied by the customs authorities) is
totally devoid of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would establish any complicity on the part of
respondents "to a reasonable degree of certainty", as determined in the very Collector's decision of April 1, 1975
itself as affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs, then the prosecution must as a simple people matter of
fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the criminal case below. The judgment has been made immediately
executory, so that the prosecution may comply with the Court's directive without further delay.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:
This dissent is based on two aspects of the case at bar: I Firstly, as discussed in Part I hereof, I believe that the
case at hand does not fall, either pointedly or tangentially, under any of the recognized exceptions to the
seizure conducted by the RASAC agents show that they had ample time and opportunity for a week's time to
secure the necessary search warrant conformably with the constitutional requirement. The warrantless search and
seizure violated respondents' fundamental constitutional rights and rendered the goods so seized inadmissible in
evidence; and II. Secondly, I hold that the decision of the Customs authorities themselves, as cited in the majority
opinion itself (at page 4 to 9) wherein the seized articles (including the car of respondent Hope) were declared not
subject to forfeiture since said articles were found to have been purchased in good faith by the claimant thereof
Antonio del Rosario under a genuine purchase invoice from a trading firm and hence, the goods were ordered
released to said Antonio del Rosario upon payment of the corresponding duties and taxes and penalties "as the
rightful owner thereof" and Hope's car was ordered released to him as the registered owner in view of the finding
that he had been merely asked to bring the boxes back to Manila and had no hand in their importation nor
purchase, rendered moot the question of admissibility in evidence of the goods in question. The admission in
evidence of the said goods which have been determined by the Customs authorities themselves to have been
lawfully purchased in good faith by the claimant-intervenor would in no way established any criminal liability for the
importation or transitory possession by respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely bringing
them back to Manila on behalf of the owner.
Withal, I join and concur with the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with the respondents-
accused's right to speedy trial and justice that the prosecution forthwith reassess and reevaluate the evidence at
its disposal" and thereafter "promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the protection of the rights and
interests of all parties concerned" which, to my mind, means that the prosecution must as a simple matter of
fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the criminal case below as hereinbelow explained.
The opinion of the majority in effect stamps approval on the warrantless search for and seizure of the eleven (11)
sealed boxes containing wrist watches and watch bracelets of different trademarks, aboard the four-door blue
Dodge sedan owned by TSgt Jessie C. Hope of the United States Air Force by the agents of the Regional Anti-
Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), such approval being accorded on the strength of the Court's ruling in Papa v.
Mago 1 following, as the majority states, "the traditional doctrine in Caroll v. United States , 2 as enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court. An analysis and appreciation of the facts of the case at bar and the fundamental principles
on the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure, as laid down by this Court and the
precedents set by the United States Supreme Court in resolving Fourth Amendment issues, make it clear to me
that respondent judges' challenged Orders (1) dated August 20, 1975 holding the warrantless "apprehension,
search and seizure" 3 in question violative of the provisions of Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution and
consequently declaring the boxes and their contents seized from Sgt. Hope's car as well as the pictures taken of
the said items inadmissible in evidence in the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Hope and his companion in the car,
Monina Medina, for violation of the provisions of Section 3601 4 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philip-
pines; and (2) dated September 30, 1975 denying the State's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
August 20, 1975, should be upheld and the petition at bar accordingly dismissed.
1. I cannot accede to the majority's casual approach to the case at bar which in the main raises an issue of
constitutional dimension. The majority opinion simply and broadly applied judicial precedent was taking no heed of
the injunction that when the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is invoked, there is a need to
scrutinize the facts rigorously to preclude any infringement thereof. 5 This injunction should be given due regard
with greater reason where, as in the case at bar, the Court invokes the applicability of a judicially established
exception to a constitutionally protective rule. Indeed "[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search [and
seizure] is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case." 6
2. The majority validates the warrantless search and seizure in the case at bar as an exception to the warrant
requirement (spelled out by the second clause of Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution) pursuant to the ruling in
Papa, supra, which in turn relied on the doctrinal pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Carroll,
supra. Carroll set the ruling that "if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." 7 The
"necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought" 8 supplied the underlying rationale for the Carroll rule. Put
simply, Carroll declared "a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile
stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained." 9 thereby laying down the probable cause plus exigent circumstances
standard.
The following ultimate facts provided the basis for the aforementioned rule in Carroll.- Three federal prohibition
agents and a state officer, while patrolling, on their regular tour of duty, the highway leading from Detroit to Grand
Rapids, Michigan, met and passed an Oldsmobile roadster in which rode Carroll and John Kiro, whom the said
agents recognized, from recent personal contact and observation, as having been lately engaged in illegal liquor
dealings (bootlegging).The government agents turned their car and pursued Carroll and Kiro to a point about
nineteen miles east of Grand Rapids "where they stopped them and searched the car." The agents found, stashed
inside the upholstered seats, sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and gin. Thereafter, the state officer and another took
Carroll and Kiro, the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids.
As could readily be seen, the "exigent circumstances" 10 which exist in connection with the ambulatory character of
the automobile provided the basic factor in the justification for the warrantless search and seizure in Carroll
Absent, thus, "these exigent circumstances," notwithstanding the presence of probable cause, a warrant must be
secured and used
The U.S. Supreme Court took this jurisprudential direction in the much later case of United States v. Joseph V.
Chadwick, et al." decided on June 21, 1977. The facts of the case were summarized as follows:
When respondents arrived by train in Boston from San Diego, they were arrested at their waiting automobile by
federal narcotics agents, who had been alerted that respondents were possible drug traffickers. A double-
locked footlocker, which respondents had transported on the train and which the agents had probable cause to
believe contained narcotics, had been loaded in the trunk of the automobile. Respondents, together with the
automobile and footlocker, which was admittedly under the agents' exclusive control, were then taken to the
Federal Building in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrests the agents opened the footlocker without
respondents' consent or a search warrant and found large amounts of marijuana in it. Respondents were
subsequently indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it. The District Court granted their
pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker, holding that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within some established exception to the
warrant requirement, and that the footlocker search was not justified under either the 'automobile exception' or
as a search incident to a lawful arrest; the Court of Appeals affirmed. 12
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, responding to the Government's
argument that the rationale of the Court's automobile search cases applied as well to Chadwick, ruled that the
footlocker's mobility does not "justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant Clause" for, "[o]nce the
federal agents had seized it at the rail road station and had safely transferred it to the Boston Federal Building
under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been
removed before a valid search warrant 13 could be obtained. 13
As to the contention of the Government that the search fell within the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an
arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,...
or no exigency exists. Once lawful enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of
that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. 14 It was emphasized that "the search was conducted more
than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were
securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other
exigency. 15
I perceive no reason why the rationale in Chadwick should not find application to the case at bar. The record
shows the following undisputed facts: (1) A week before the actual interception of Sgt. Hope and Medina in the
former's Dodge sedan, the RASAC agents already knew, from an informer, that "a shipment of highly dutiable
goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City in a blue Dodge car 16 and that the goods, in "sealed
boxes with yellow tie 17 would consist of "watches"; 18 (2) After the interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the
Dodge car with respondents while Agent Manuel took [his] own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut
making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone"; 19 and (3) "Arriving at
the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who according to
Monina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad 'called off the mission' and
brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M. 20
In the case at bar, granting that the RASAC agents had probable cause to effect the search and seizure,
nonetheless, no exigent circumstances justified their proceeding to do so without the requisite warrant. The
RASAC agents, having known a week before they actually undertook the operation that they would be intercepting
a "blue Dodge car" transporting watches in "sealed boxes," had ample opportunity within the one-week period to
secure the necessary warrant for the search and seizure contemplated. Moreover, the RASAC agents had another
opportunity to obtain the search and seizure warrant on the day of the operation itself. The actual interception
took place "around 7:00 o'clock in the morning" 21 at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road and
the actual search and seizure occurred past 9:00 o'clock the same morning at Camp Aguinaldo. 22 During the
intervening period, Agent Manuel even had time to telephone Colonel Abad to ask for instructions and could have
taken up then with him the matter of securing the necessary search and seizure warrant. Colonel Abad, as well,
after learning from Agent Sabado that interception tion and apprehension had already been effected, could
himself, as RASAC Chief of Intelligence and Operations, have secured the necessary search and seizure warrant.
23
As stressed by respondent judge in his questioned order, "there was ample time and opportunity to secure the
necessary warrant" 24 and [j]ust because the RASAC-MBA agents have information to make them believe that a
certain person has contraband goods in his possession, does not give them the right to search him and seize
whatever contraband may be found in his possession. ASAC Agents are not by law empowered to determine
whether there exists a 'probable cause, and even if they have such power, assuming it to be so, the determination
of the probable cause should be made by examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing or person to be seized, and not simply on bare
information given by an unnamed informer, as in the instant case." 25
Respondent judge aptly added that
We cannot accept 'good faith' here, as an excuse to justify violation of the Constitution in making the
warrantless apprehension search and seizure in question when there was sufficient time one week within
which they could have procured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant in accordance with the proscriptions of
the present Constitution, had the ASAC Agents wanted to. Agent Sabado simply said 'it is not necessary.'
Furthermore, if subjective good faith alone was the test, the protection afforded the Filipino people by our
present Constitution against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure would evaporate and rendered its
provision nugatory, and our people 'would be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects only in the
discretion of the police'. And besides, what would they have lost if they secured a warrant first? Would it have
frustrated their efforts in enforcing the provisions of the Customs and Tariff Code if they secured the necessary
warrant before making the apprehension and search? Would it have thwarted the purposes of the Customs and
Tariff Code and would the results have been different if they had taken the trouble of securing the necessary
warrants, and made the apprehension and search in accordance with the Constitution? It would have hardly
made any difference These over earnestness and zealousness on the part of the officers in the discharge of
their function, is what we should guard against. We might impress on them the importance to our well ordered
society of the 'rule of law' which necessarily imply respect for and obedience to the Constitution and the
laws of the land. This we can do by making it clear to them that the fruits of such unreasonable searches and
seizures, are 'forbidden fruits' in admissible in evidence. 26
Granting arguendo that the RASAC agents had no opportunity after the apprehended respondents to secure the
necessary search and seizure warrant during the period prior to their arrival at Camp Aguinaldo, they certainly
could have delayed the actual search and seizure until the necessary warrant had been obtained, which would not
have taken them beyond mid-afternoon of the same day. The inconvenience which could be caused by the delay
to respondents Hope and Medina would at least be tolerable, for such inconvenience could be quantifiable only in
terms of hours spent while waiting, rather than the transgression of their rights through the warrantless search and
seizure which could be measured only in terms of fundamental constitutional values violated.
The case at bar offers no situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." As previously stated, after the
interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with the respondents" and directed Sgt. Hope the route he
should take. 27 Agent Sabado had, in effect, taken custody or control of Sgt. Hope's Dodge sedan, for, being in
there, on hand at all times from the moment he boarded it through the trip to Bonanza Restaurant, Tropical Hut
Foodmart and, finally, Camp Aguinaldo to guard against any deviation by Sgt. Hope from the route he had been
directed to take or against any attempt to run off with the car and its contents, his presence had neutralized, if not
eliminated, the said car's mobility. Moreover, the RASAC agents, by directing the Dodge sedan to Camp Aguinaldo
and retaining it within the premises of the said Camp, had effected its complete immobilization as well as of its
contents. Definitely under all these circumstances, there could not have been the slightest possibility that Sgt.
Hope and Medina could have either moved the car or removed its contents all securely within the custody of the
RASAC agents and the premises of Camp Aguinaldo before the necessary search and seizure warrant could be
secured.
Neither can the warrantless search in the case at bar be viewed as a search incident to a valid arrest so as to fall
within another recognized exception from the warrant requirement. In Preston v. United States, " 28 the U.S.
Supreme Court, in spelling out the rule regarding this exception and the rationale therefor, stated that:
Unquestionably when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make
a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to
commit the crime ... This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the
accused's immediate control ... and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place
where he is arrested ... The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to
seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime things which might easily happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are
absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in
custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. 29
Clearly, the search in the case at bar cannot be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, for, even
assuming the apprehension of Sgt. Hope and Medina as lawful, the "search was too remote in time or place to
have been made as incidental to the arrest. 30 Here, the RASAC agents intercepted and apprehended Sgt. Hope
and Medina "around 7:00 o'clock in the morning" at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road but
conducted the search of the sealed boxes loaded in the Dodge sedan past 9:00 o'clock of the same morning at
Camp Aguinaldo.
3. The majority opinion also cites Boyd v. United States, 31 with particular reference to the dissertation therein on
the distinction between the search and seizure of "stolen or forfeited goods or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof" and the search and seizure of "a man's private books and papers for the
purpose of obtaining information tion therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him" as well as on
an historic and statutory account of instances "excepted out of the category of unreasonable search and
seizures."
Boyd raised the matter of distinction aforementioned in connection with the resolution of whether or not "a search
and seizure or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory production of a man's private papers, to be used in
evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws' 32 partook of
"an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?' 33 Mr.
Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who delivered the opinion of the Court, "sought to determine the meaning of the fourth
amendment reasonableness clause by looking to those principles of the common law which defined the limits of
the state's power to search and seize the belongings of its citizens. Although it could seize stolen goods and
contraband, at common law the government could not search for and seize for and citizen's belongings in which it
could not assert superior property rights. 34 He "concluded that the owner's 'indefeasible' natural law property
rights, enshrined in the common law and protected by the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment placed
his private papers and other property absolutely beyond the reach of government agents seeking evidence of
crime. No matter how compelling the showing of probable cause or with what particularly the places to be search
and the things to be might be described, no warrant or subpoena could issue except for those items already
owned by or forfeited to the state. 35 In other words, the Court, in Boyd 36, ruled inter alia that the Constitution
permitted searches and seizures only of property in which the government could claim superior property rights at
common law like "goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof. "
The distinction excerpted in the opinion of the majority in the case at bar served, in Boyd, to underscore its
property oriented rationale. However, this distinction the very basis of the property-focused rationale had
already been explicitly abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Warden, Maryland and Penitentiary v. Bennie
Joe Hayden, 37 wherein it was stated that:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence'
and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects...,'without regard to the use to
which any of these things are applied This 'right of the people' is certainly unrelated to the 'mere
evidence' limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in
both situation and the requirements of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact.
Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private than property
seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed distinction is wholly
irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects' may be mere
evidence in one case and instrumentality in another.
xxx xxx xxx
The premise that property interest control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited. Searches and seizures may be 'unreasonable within the Fourth Amendment even though
the Government asserts a superior property interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts ... This shift in
emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and
procedural reform ...
xxx xxx xxx
... In determining whether someone is a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' we have refused
'to import into the law ... subtle distinctions developed and refiled by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical ... [W]e have given recognition to the interest in privacy despite the complete
absence of a property claim by suppressing the very items which at common law could be seized with
impunity: stolen goods 38 ... ; instrumentalities 39 ...; and contraband 40 ... 41
4. That necessity underlies the legislative grant of authority to certain functionaries 42 of the Government "to effect
searchches seizures and arrests" to secure the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws need not be belabored.
The scope of this authority, however, should be circumscribed by the procedural safeguards set forth by the
Constitution. Fealty to these constitutional guarantees requires that the Court, rather than accommodate extended
applications of the search seizure-and-arrest authority, should guard against shortcuts government
functionaries are prone to make which render nugatory the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. 43 This authority should, as a matter of principle, be subjected to the requirements of prior judicial inquiry
and sanction whenever possible and practicable. The Court should not leave entirely to the hands of government
thing." 44
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we
sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit. We must remember, too,
that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in
that there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For example, any
effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a course
of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain an injunction.
Other rights, such as that to ... the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts
themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the taking of private property may be vindicated
after the act in terms of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by surprise, conducted in
haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment and
moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There is no
opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is quietly to
submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence.
And we must remember that the authority which we concede to conduct searches and seizures without
warrant may be exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible and
resorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies. 45
All told, I hold that the warrant less search and seizure conducted by the RASAC agents in the case at bar should
be invalidated and the constitutional sanction declaring the evidence obtained thereby "inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" 46 should be upheld.
II
The outcome of the seizure and detention proceedings instituted by the Collector of Customs against the goods in
question including Sgt. Hope's car, wherein the car and goods were ordered returned to Sgt. Hope and the
established claimant owner of the goods, Antonio del Rosario, respectively, (subject in the case of the latter to
payment of the leviable duties and taxes and penalties), as recited on pages 4 to 9 of the majority opinion, shows
clearly the lack of any criminal liability on the part of the respondents.
The separate seizure and detention proceedings were instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila
Antonio del Rosario to be the lawful owner and purchaser in good faith duly covered by an authentic sales invoice
issued by the trading firm which sold the same to him and Sgt. Hope to have been unaware of the contents of the
11 boxes which his girlfriend, his co-respondent Monina Medina, had asked him to bring to Manila in his car.
The majority opinion itself recites these established facts on pages 4-5, as follows:
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases [seizures and detention proceedings], respondents
disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del
Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor testified that he bought the
watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice certified to be authentic
by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the book
of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but
when the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to transport back
the boxes to Manila for a consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which
claimant simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he
presumed that the corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when
he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of apprehension, he had
no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew
that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to
Manila in his car upon request of his girl friend Monina Medina as a personal favor; that he was not
present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents on the way. On
the part of respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in compliance with the
agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the
Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the
contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp
Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents and the narration of
claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on
April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture.
The Collector's decision of April 1, 1975, itself, as affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs' endorsement of April
28, 1975, 47 establishes in detail the above facts which absolve respondents of any complicity in any smuggling
From the evidence thus adduced, it was established that the boxes found inside the subject car are
4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pcs of wrist bracelets likewise of assorted
brands and 100 pcs. tools, as evidenced by the inventory list dated Feb. 22, 1974, (Exhs. '3'- '3-L'
Hope) is the prosecutions' contention that these articles were imported without going through a
customhouse in violation of Sec. 2530 m) of the TCCP. As a consequence thereof, the vehicle which
was used in transporting the subject articles was likewise seized for alleged violation of Section 2530
(k) of the same code.
With respect to the charge against the subject car, the claimant thereof, TSgt Jessie C Hope asserted
that he merely accommodated Monina Medina, his girl friend who requested him to help her bring her
cargo to Manila by driving the car from Angeles City to Manila; that he was not present when the 11
boxes were loaded in his car which was then parked on its usual parking place which is a vacant cant
lot adjacent to the house where he lives. He further stated that Monina Medina has an access to the
key of his car which he usually put on a table in his house and that she did not tell him of the contents
of the 11 boxes. Moreover he asserted that he came to know of the contents of the 11 boxes when
they were opened at the RASAC C office at Camp Aguinaldo. Upon being asked by this Office why it
never occurred to him to inquire from Monina Medina about the contents of the 11 boxes, claimant
categorically stated ... 'because of the girl's honesty to me.' In a similar vien, claimant stated in his
sworn statement given to the RASAC that he had known Monina Medina for quite a time so that ... 'he
did not suspect her to carry anything against the law of the Philippines and for that reason I did not
bother to ask her.' (Exh. '5-A Hope') These assertions find support in the direct testimony of Col.
Antonio Abad, Chief, Intelligence and Operations, RASAC, who testified thus: (t.s.n., p. 104)
A. ... I asked him again, how come your car was loaded with foreign items?
And he said 'that is my lady companion's. I told him don't you know these
are hot items?
B. What did he say?
C. He was surprised
Both Col. Antonio Abad and Agent Macario Sabado, one of the apprehending agents admitted in
open hearing that during their initial interrogation of T/Sgt. Hope, he maintained and professed that
he did not know of the contents of the 11 boxes. Monina Medina, on the other hand, stated on direct
examination that TSgt Hope was not present when the subject 11 boxes were delivered to her at the
vacant lot in Angeles City by Antonio del Rosario. (tsn p. 169) Moreover, in her sworn statement given
to the RASAC, Monina Medina stated thus; (Exh. '4-A' Hope)
Q. When you told T/Sgt. Hope that you will load something in his car, did he
ask you what you were going to load?
R. No, sir.
Against the foregoing contentions, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence circumstantial or
otherwise that may even tend to disprove or controvert the same. Granting 'arguendo' that T/Sgt.
Jessie C. Hope was aware of the contents of the 11 boxes that were found in his car, it is still
incumbent upon the prosecution to at least establish that he has knowledge that the articles he was
conveying are untaxed and/or smuggled as contemplated in See. 2530 (k) of the Tariff and Customs
Code. In the absence of evidence to prove such fact, which in this case there is none whatsoever, the
ground relied upon for the forfeiture of the vehicle in question remains unsubstantiated and therefore
will not lie.
Forfeiture works to deprive one's right to his property. Like the capital punishment which is the
supreme penalty for human beings forfeiture is the ultimate sanction imposable to property. However,
unlike the capital punishment which can only be imposed after the cause thereof has been
established beyond reasonable doubt, forfeiture should at least be made tenable only after the
grounds therefor have been established to a reasonable degree of certainty. It shall not lie if based
on mere bare presumptions and groundless conclusions. To hold otherwise would be arbitrary and
repugnant to the principle of judicial and/or administrative due process.
With respect to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is evident that the claimant-intervenor herein
Antonio del Rosario purchased the subject wrist watches and bracelets from Teresa Buenafe as
evidenced by the covering purchase invoice No. 2637 dated February 7, 1974 which was certified to
be authentic by Jeron L. Castillo of Revenue Region No. 6, BIR Quezon City (Exhs. '2', '3' & '4'). The
aforesaid business transaction was entered in the Columnar Book (Exh. '3') of claimant-intervenor
which fact is a manifestation that Antonio del Rosario was a buyer in good faith and that the business
transaction he entered into with Teresa Buenafe was not simulated nor clandestine.
It is a well settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed, it must be proven. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, which in this case none whatsoever was presented the claimant-intervenor
herein is presumed to be a buyer in good faith. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant-intervenor
herein to prove that the subject articles are tax-paid. Aside from the covering sales invoice, not a
scintilla of evidence was adduced to prove that the duties and taxes due on the said items were
satisfied. In this connection, this Office does not share the view of the herein claimant-intervenor that
it is not the practice in business circles to inquire whether or not the subject matter of a business
transaction are tax-paid. Considering the quantity of the articles in question and the big volume of the
amount involved, Mr. Antonio del Rosario was quite negligent in failing to inquire from the seller
herein whether the duties and taxes of the items he purchased were satisfied or not.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is the studied opinion of this Office that while the
claimant-intervenor herein is liable for the payment of the assessable duties and taxes owing from the
subject articles, the forfeiture thereof will not lie it appearing that the 'quantum' of evidence adduced
by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain
the charges levelled against the said articles. Moreover, this Office referred this case to the Central
Bank for the necessary Release Certificate. However, Mr. Cesar Lomotan, Deputy Governor, Central
Bank, in his letter to the Commissioner of Customs dated February 21, 1975 in effect stated thus:
Based on subject's manager Mr. Antonio del Rosario's representations that the items involved were
bought from a local dealer as supported by an alleged commercial invoice from Teresa M. Buenafe
Trading dated February 7, 1974 submitted earlier, this Office cannot issue the required release
certificate therefor considering that no proof has been submitted to indicate that subject imported
goods in question.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed that
the subject motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859, Serial No. W357348361, File No. 28-
1884, with Plate No. EH 21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it is hereby declared,
released to its registered owner, Jessie C. Hope, upon proper identification. Relative to Seizure Identification
No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the subject matter thereof, to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted
brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they
are hereby likewise declared, released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon payment of the
leviable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the assessable duties, taxes and other charges
owing from the aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision becomes final and unappealable,
the same shall be deemed abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner provided for
by law. 48
As pointed in the People's petition itself, the Collector's said decision "has long become final and executory" 49
Hope's car was duly released and returned to him since May 8, 1975. 50 And the goods were likewise presumably
released to the established claimant-owner Antonio del Rosario, because at the trial of the criminal case below,
only pictures of the 11 boxes containing the goods were sought to be presented by the prosecution.
The point is that the customs authorities, the Commissioner of Customs and the Manila Collector of Customs are
bound by their own above stated decision and findings in the seizure and detention proceedings that the goods in
question were lawfully owned by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario who had purchased them in good
faith in the regular course of business and that respondent Hope was completely innocent of any complicity in their
importation and purchase, having agreed merely to his girlfriend Monina Medina's request to bring the goods back
to Manila, without any knowledge of their contents, and they should accordingly direct the prosecution to move for
dismissal of the case below. As the majority opinion itself states:
The collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that
untaxed goods were transported in respondent's car and seized from their possession by agents of the law.
Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the
information can only be determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the
administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal
responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
51
Certainly, if respondent Hope were absolved by the customs authorities in the seizure and detention proceedings
because of the absolute lack of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would establish any complicity on
his part "to a reasonable degree of certainty" and justify the forfeiture of his car that was used in transporting the
goods to Manila, they must necessarily on the same evidence or absolute lack thereof as officially determined by
themselves move in all fairness and justice for and cause the dismissal of the criminal case below. If their evidence
in the seizure proceedings established that respondents had no part whatever in the importation or purchase by
the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of
innocence,
The main issue at bar as to the non-admissibility in evidence of the boxes and their photographs as ruled in
respondent judge's questioned order (which according to the petition has "the effect of acquitting the accused
[respondents] from the charges" in the criminal case below) has thus been rendered moot by respondents
customs authorities' decision and findings. The disposition of this case by the majority opinion of setting aside
respondent judge's order and ordering the case .remanded for further trial and reception of evidence without
excluding the articles subject of the seizure" has likewise been thus rendered moot. The admission in evidence of
the said boxes or their photographs whose contents have been found to be lawfully owned and purchased in good
faith by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario would in no way establish any criminal liability on the part of
respondents.
Stated in another way, assuming that the seized goods or photos thereof are admissible in evidence not-
withstanding the warrantless search and seizure (justified on the doctrine of "hot pursuit"), as held in the majority
opinion, still the People's petition should be dismissed since the admission in evidence of the said goods which
have been determined by the Customs authorities themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good faith by the
claimant-intervenor would in no way establish any criminal liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the
owner. If the prosecution's evidence in the seizure proceedings established that respondents had no part
whatever in the importation or purchase by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence cannot
possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge in the case before us
nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of innocence.
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero, however, reaches the conclusion that despite respondents'
exoneration in the administrative cases, the criminal- responsibility can be determined only in the separate criminal
action while conceding that such criminal responsibility "must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. 52
This posture of the majority that any dismissal of the criminal case should not be ordered outright by this Court but
by the court a quo, whether motu proprio or at the prosecutions instance, is nonetheless understandable.
I join the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with the respondents-accused's right to speedy trial
and justice that the prosecution forthwith "reassess and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and thereafter
promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all concerned.
This means, as indicated above, that if the prosecution's evidence (as supplied by the customs authorities) is
totally devoid of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would establish any complicity on the part of
respondents "to a reasonable degree of certainty", as determined in the very Collector's decision of April 1, 1975
itself as affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs, then the prosecution must as a simple people matter of
fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the criminal case below. The judgment has been made immediately
executory, so that the prosecution may comply with the Court's directive without further delay.
Footnotes
1 Section 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines, or assist ill so doing any articles, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in
any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be
punished with:
xxx xxx xxx
In applying the above scale of penalties, if the offender is an alien and the prescribed penalty is not
death, he shall be deported after serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation. If
the offender is a government official or employee, the penalty shall be the maximum as hereinabove
prescribed and the offender shall suffer an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office, to vote and to participate in any public election.
When, upon trial for violation of the section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the
article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the
defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court; Provided, however, That
payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution
under this action. (As amended by R.A. No. 4712, approved on June 18, 1966).
2 Section 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws. Any vehicle, vessel or
aircraft, cargo, articles and other objects shall, under the following conditions be subjected to
forfeiture:
xxx xxx xxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to forfeiture under the tariff
and customs laws, with its equipment or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together with its
equipment and appurtenances including the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or propelling
the same. The mere conveyance of contraband or smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be
sufficient cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast or vehicle, but the forfeiture
shall not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of conveyance used as aforesaid
is engaged as common carrier and not chartered or leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time,
has no knowledge of the unlawful act;
xxx xxx xxx
m. Any article sought to be imported or exported:
(1) Without going through a customhouse, whether the act was consummated frustrated or attempted;
xxx xxx xxx
3 See Lazatin v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-19753, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 101 6.
4 Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-12219, April 15, 1962, 4 SCRA 1020.
5 G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.
6 69 L ed. (267 U.S. 131), p. 543 (1924).
7 PHIL. CONST (1973), Art. IV, Sec. 3.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
FOUR THE AMENDMENT, AMERICAN CONST
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall be issued, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
8 Carroll v. United States, supra at 544,
9 Id., at 549.
10 Id., at 551,
11 Id., at 553.
12 Records, p. 50.
13 Carroll v. United States, supra at 552.
14 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946).
15 Tanada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 (1962).
16 Cf. Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
17 See Records, p. 68.
18 29 Led.(116 U.S. 616)746, 748(1885).
19 G.R. No. L-29218, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 553,562.
* Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division.
Teehankee, J.:
1 L-27360, February 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 857.
2 69 L. Ed. 542; 267 U.S. 132: Decided March 2, 1925.
3 Although the Order dated August 20, 1975 rather amply discusses the arrest-aspect of the case at
bar guide Order, pp. 23-25, and Rollo, pp. 82-84, the majority opinion prescinds from passing upon
the matter.
4 Section 3601 declares "any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or
assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner
facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same
to have been imported contrary to law" guilty of smuggling and prescribes a scale of penalties for the
violation thereof.
5 Jose G. Lopez, et al., v. Commissioner of Customs, et al., L-27968, December 3, 1975; 68 SCRA
320, 321.
6 Nelson Sibron v. State of New York, 29 L. Ed. 2d 917, 932; 392 U.S. 40, 59. Vide also the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall with whom Messrs. Justices Wilham 0. Douglas and William
J. Brennan, Jr., join, in United States v. Willie Robinson Jr. (33 L. Ed. 2d 427: 414 U.S. 218). In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall takes exception to the majority's approach for, he reasons, it represents
a clear and marked departure from [the Court's] long tradition of case-by-case adjudication of the
reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. " He also states that the
majority's attempt to avoid case-by-case adjudication of amendment issues is not only misguided as a
matter of principle, but also doomed to f ail as a matter of practical application.
7 Carroll 69 L. Ed. at 549; 267 U.S. at 149.
8 Ibid., 69 L. Ed. at 551; 267 U.S. at 153.
9 Frank Chambers v. James F. Maroney 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 426; 399 U.S. 42,51.
10 Ibid.
11 53 L. Ed. 2d; 538. 433 U.S. 1.
12 Chadwick. 53 L. Ed. 2d at 542.
13 Ibid, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549 to 550; 433 U.S. at 13.
14 Ibid, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 550 to 551; 433 U.S. at 15.
15 Ibid, 53 L. Ed 2d at 551; 433 U.S. at 15.
16 Decision, p. 2.
17 Rollo p. 87, corresponding to page 28 Of the Memorandum for the Respondents wherein appear
quoted excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of Criminal Case
Q38 1 involved herein.
18 Rollo, pp. 186-187, corresponding to pages 27- 28 of the memorandum for the Respondents.
Parenthetically, the majority's opinion attaches no significance to the circumstance that the ASAC
agents knew beforehand that the highly dutiable goods which would be transported from Angeles City
of Manila "in sealed boxes" would be "watches." On the matter the opinion only states, to wit:
The records hardly reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the report during the said period
except the general knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported from Angeles
City to Manila in a blue Dodge automobile. (Decision, p. 12),
19 Decision, p, 3.
20 lbid.
21 Rollo, p. 62, corresponding to page 3 of the Order called August 20, 1975.
22 Ibid.
23 Vide Delfin Lim, et al. v. Francisco Ponce de Leon, L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299,
wherein the Court, regarding the claim of "lack of time to procure a search warrant as an excuse for
the seizure of the motor launch [involved therein] without one," held that "[T]he claim cannot be
sustained, The records show that on June 15, 1962 Fiscal Ponce de Leon made the first request to
the Provincial Commander for the impounding of the motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 another
request was made. The seizure was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
had all the time to prosecure a search warrant had he wanted to and which he could have taken in
less than a day , but he did not. Besides, there is no basis for the apprehension that the motor launch
might be moved out of Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was already
without its engine. In sum the fact that there was no time to secure a search warrant would not legally
justify a search without one.
24 Rollo. p. 68.
25 Ibid, p. 71.
26 Ibid, pp. 76-77.
27 Rollo, p. 186, corresponding to page 27 of the Memorandum for the Respondents.
28 11 L. Ed. 2d 777; 376 U.S. 364.
29 Preston 11 L. Ed. 2d at 780-781; 376 U.S. at 367, emphasis supplied.
30 Ibid, 1 1 L. Ed. 2d at 781; 376 U.S. at 368.
31 29 L. Ed. 746,116 U.S. 616.
32 29 L. Ed. at 748, 116 U.S. at 622.
33 Ibid.
34 Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 Harvard Law Review 945, 952-953.
35 Ibid, p. 953.
36 Boyd decided on February 1, 1886, predated Fremont Weeks v. United States (58 L. Ed. 652, 232
U.S. 383), decided on February 24, 1914, wherein the Court, indictum recognized the search-
incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception, and Carroll supra, decided on March 2, 1925, wherein the Court
first categorically established the search-of-automobile exception.
37 18 L. Ed. 2d 782; 387 U.S. 294.
38 Henry v. United States, 4 L. Ed. 2d 13.1, 361 U.S. 93.
39 Beck v. Ohio 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 379 U.S. 89; McDonald v. United States, 93 L. Ed. 153, 335 U.S.
451.
40 Trupiano v. United States, 92 L. Ed. 1663, 334 U.S. 699; Aguilar v. Texas, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 378
U.S. 108.
41 Warden 18 L. Ed. 2d at 789-791, 387 U.S. at 304- 306. 12 Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons authorized "to effect searches, seizures and
arrests," to wit:
a. Officials of the Bureau of Customs, collectors, assistant collectors, deputy collectors, surveyors,
security and secret-service , agents, inspectors, port patrol officers and guards of the Bureau of
Customs; b. Officers of the Philippine Navy and other members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and national law enforcement agencies when authorized by the commissioner;
c. Officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on all cases falling within the regular performance of
their duties, when the payment of internal revenue taxes are involved; and
d. Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests and execute processes of courts, when
acting under the direction of the collector.
43 Section 3, Article IV, Constitution of the Philippines.
44 McDonald, 93 L. Ed. at 158, 335 U.S. at 456.
45 Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Robert M. Jackson in Virgil T. Brinegar v. United States, 93 L. Ed.
1879, 1894, 338 U.S. 182,
46 Subsection (2), Section 4, Article IV, Constitution of the Philippines,
47 Annex C, memorandum for the Respondents, Rollo, p. 236.
48 Annex A, petition, Rollo, pp. 127-131, emphasis supplied.
49 Petition, par. 11, Reno, pp. 45-46.
50 Annex G, Memorandum for the Respondents, Rollo, p. 241.
51 At pages 8-9, emphasis supplied.
52 At pages 8-9, main opinion.
Search
lawphil

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005
TOMAS SALVADOR, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISIO N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision2 dated August 9,
2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then aircraft
mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for
possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a
million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with violation of
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and unlawful importation
of the following items:
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00
76 pieces of mens diving watches 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry. 322,000.00
with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency, without authority or permit from proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW."3
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
then ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, headed by Major Gerardo
B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac and Edwin
B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged
drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the second airplane parked
inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001. It arrived at the
NAIA at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311. After its passengers
disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground crew and parked at the ramp area of the
Domestic Airport terminal.
At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three (3) persons had boarded the
Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the
Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck with its
lights off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima Gate of
the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified himself and
asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio
Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow truck.
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a girdle. While
Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the
package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, "Positive!" Thereupon, the rest of the
team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without a fight. The team searched their
bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team
confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 oclock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived at
the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she
proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused. She then prepared an inventory of the
items seized and listed the weight of the packets.4 Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to the In-Board
Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents were identified and appraised. The Bureau of
Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as follows:
QTY. UNIT DESCRIPTION APPRAISED

VALUE
10 pcs. Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors 122.8 gms.
6 pcs. Bracelet with Charms Tricolors 52.4 gms.
8 pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) 64.2 gms.
5 pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor 155.3 gms.
Babys Bangles with charm 18.2 gms.
L-Bangles with charm 68.5 gms.
L-Bangles 112.3 gms.
L-Creolla Earrings 901.56 gms.
TOTAL GRAMS +P 299,052.00
1,495 x P200.00/gm.
Assorted Watches
204 pcs. Citizen M watches with black dial with $2,600.00
gold metal bracelet (-1) x $25
24 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue 600.00
dial with white metal bracelet (-1) x
$25
16 pcs. Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black dial 800.00
with rubberized bracelet (-1) x $50
4 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies watches with yellow 100.00
dial with gold metal bracelet (1) x
$25
4 pcs. Citizen L-watches with white dial (4) x 80.00
$20
62 pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with yellow 1,550.00
$25
34 pcs. Seiko 5 Mens watches with black 850.00
$25
____ pcs. $6,580.00
248
The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter recommended that petitioner and his co-
accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Accordingly, the Information,
mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and directed the accused to present their
evidence.
All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the military.
Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC-
3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then working on said aircraft. He was conducting a visual check of
the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior mechanics that he would
take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded the tow truck. When it was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with
four (4) men in civilian attire aboard approached him. The four pointed their firearms at him and, after searching
him for drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found. He was nonetheless brought by the men to the PAFSECOM
Office, then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol test. Thereafter, he was brought
back to the PAFSECOM Office. There, another military man arrived and brought out a box containing packets.
Then he and his companions were told to put on their mechanics uniforms and to wear girdles. The packets were
placed on their bodies, after which they were photographed. He further testified that he was asked to sign a
certain paper but was not allowed to read it thoroughly. During the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights
nor assisted by a counsel.
Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items seized from him. He testified
that during the incident in question, he only boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen. He saw a
box on the tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he was made to sign a document under
duress.
Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after his arrest, he was made to sign
a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of which he was not able to read. He signed it because he was
struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him with summary execution if he
would not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor given the services of counsel during the investigation.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the offense charged, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo Santos y
Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused to an indeterminate term of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture of the confiscated articles in favor of the
Government.
SO ORDERED."5
All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20186.
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision, thus:
"We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."6
They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001.7
Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant petition for review on certiorari.
He submits for our consideration the following assignments of error:
"I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION,
POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME,
WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS."8
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized items are admissible in
evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF operatives
is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,9 he maintains that at the time he and his co-accused were stopped by the PAF
law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law enforcers were actually
engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. Thus,
the seized items should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case at bar, there
was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions.
They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL personnel working
therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then
stopped and looked around and made apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable
suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was
conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding
a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport
which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions
agreed to the search after one of them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these circumstances,
the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body, personal effects or
residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution provide:
"SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
x x x."
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a
search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.10
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to
conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in
the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was
in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search
warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.11
In Papa vs. Mago12 involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any
article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been
introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless
search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers
who evade payment of customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling
cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been
paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individuals private papers and effects. Here, we see
no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm.13
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board a moving PAL
aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may
readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.14 Verily, we
rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the articles involved in the instant
controversy were validly seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence
against petitioner and his co-accused.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining the trial courts finding that the
witnesses for the prosecution were credible, notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring inconsistencies
which tend to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create serious doubt which
should have been resolved in his favor.
We are not persuaded.
After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that they do not
relate with the elements of the offense charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters as
for instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how the girdles (garters) were
removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.
It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members of the special PAF team who
conducted the search positively identified the petitioner and his co-accused as the same persons who boarded the
PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a manner which stirred suspicion from
the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate where they were
caught in flagrante delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and insignificant details do not
destroy their credibility.15 Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the
prosecutions case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating
any misgivings that the same were perjured.16
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:
"SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or
assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the
importation, concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling
xxx
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the article in
question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the
defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided, however, That payment
of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this section."
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines or assists in
importing or bringing into the Philippines any article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to
have been imported contrary to law.17 Importation commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes
and other charges due upon the articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has been issued, or where the articles
are duty-free, once the articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs.18
In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing evidence that petitioner and
his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in the
possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The contraband items were taken by
petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from Hong Kong on the night of June 3, 1994.
Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to bring out these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them
inside their uniforms. When confronted by the PAF team, they were unable to satisfactorily explain why the
questioned articles were in their possession. They could not present any document to prove lawful importation.
Thus, their conviction must necessarily be upheld. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial courts Decision convicting petitioner and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. (now Court Administrator) and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz; Rollo at 176-192.
3 Id. at 96.
4 Exh. "A" for the prosecution. The packets as labeled and weighed by Balatbat were as follows: Package #
1 1.8 kilos, # 2 2 kilos, # 3 2.1 kilos, # 4 1.9 kilos, # 5- 1.4 kilos, # 6 1.3 kilos, # 7 1.7 kilos, # 8
2.3 kilos, # 9-2.3 kilos, # 10 1.8 kilos, # 11 1.25 kilos, # 12 1. 15 kilos, and # 13-0.45 kilo.
5 Rollo at 131-132.
6 Id. at 191.
7 Id. at 194.
8 Id. at 41-42.
9 G.R. No. 69955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
10 People vs. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 478, 485, citing People vs. Chua
Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999); People vs. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 249 (2000); People vs. Fernandez, 372
SCRA 608 (2001).
11 People vs. CFI of Rizal, Br. IX, No. L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86.
12 G.R. No. 27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.

13 See Viduya vs. Berdiago, G.R. No. 29218, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 553; People vs. CFI of Rizal, Br.
IX, G.R. No. 41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86.
14 People vs. CFI of Rizal, Br. IX, supra, citing Caroll vs. United States, 267 US 131 (1924).
15 People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. 137989, March 27, 2001, 355 SCRA 458, 472, citing People vs. Castor,
215 SCRA 410 (1992); People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA 589 (1993); People vs. Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333
(1993).
16 People vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 133489 & 143970, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 134, citing People vs.
Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282 (1999); People vs. Ramos, 309 SCRA 643 (1999).
17 Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115218, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 288.
18 Llamado vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28809, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 118.
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OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
WHREN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Find a Lawyer
No. 95-5841. Argued April 17, 1996-Decided June 10, 1996
Legal Issue or Lawyer Name
Plainclothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked vehicle observed a Newark, NJ Search
truck driven by petitioner Brown waiting at a stop sign at an intersection for an
unusually long time; the truck then turned suddenly, without signaling, and sped off at Lawyers
near Newark, New Jersey
an "unreasonable" speed. The officers stopped the vehicle, assertedly to warn the driver
Philip A. Kahn
about traffic violations, and upon approaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack
Business Law, C ollections, Foreclosure Defense,
cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested. Prior to trial on federal PARSIPPANY, NJ
drug charges, they moved for suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop had Richard A. Gerbino Jr.
Bankruptcy, Foreclosure Defense
not been justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
Parsippany, NJ
petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers' traffic-
Vincent A. Antoniello
violation ground for approaching the truck was pretextual. The motion to suppress was Appeals & Appellate, C ivil Rights, Employment L
Roseland, NJ
denied, petitioners were convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Steven A. Loeb
Held: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he Business Law, Elder Law, Estate Planning, Forec
has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition Parsippany, NJ
against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the Dolores DeAlmeida
Bankruptcy, Foreclosure Defense, Real Estate La
motorist absent some additionallaw enforcement objective. Pp. 809-819. Parsippany, NJ
(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a See More Lawyers
traffic violation has occurred. See, e. g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 659.
Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring
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traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other laws, the Fourth
Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable officer would have
stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue. However, this
Court's cases foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct
justified on the basis of probable cause. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218, 221, n. 1,236. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis. Pp. 809-813.
(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether the officer's conduct deviated

materially from standard police practices-petitioners' proposed test is plainly designed
to combat the perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus inconsistent with this
Court's cases, which
807
make clear that the Fourth Amendment's concern with "reasonableness" allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. See, e. g.,
Robinson, supra, at 236. Nor can the Fourth Amendment's protections be thought to
vary from place to place and from time to time, which would be the consequence of
assessing the reasonableness of police conduct in light of local law enforcement
practices. Pp. 813-816.
(c) Also rejected is petitioners' argument that the balancing of interests inherent in
Fourth Amendment inquiries does not support enforcement of minor traffic laws by
plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles, since that practice only minimally advances the
government's interest in traffic safety while subjecting motorists to inconvenience,
confusion, and anxiety. Where probable cause exists, this Court has found it necessary
to engage in balancing only in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a
manner unusually harmful to the individual. See, e. g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S.
1. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an
extreme practice. pp. 816-819.
53 F.3d 371, affirmed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lisa Burget Wright argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs were A. J. Kramer, Neil H. Jaffee, and G. Allen Dale.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States.
On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney,
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Paul A. Engelmayer. *
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union
by Steven R. Shapiro and Susan N. Herman; and for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers by Natman Schaye and Walter B. Nash III.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the State of
California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Joan Killeen and Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and
Christina V. Kuo, Deputy Attorney General; and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
808
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police
have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable
officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a "high drug area" of the city in
an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder
truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the
driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained
stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time-more than 20
seconds. When the police car executed aU-turn in order to head back toward the truck,
the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an
"unreasonable" speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the
Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside,
and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver's door, identifying
himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in
park. When Soto drew up to the driver's
Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz of New
Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D.
Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles W Burson of
Tennessee, and Jan Graham of Utah.
Richard S. Michaels and Jeff Rubin filed a brief for the California District Attorney's
Association as amicus curiae.
809
window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack
cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several
types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.
Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment with violating various federal drug
laws, including 21 U. S. C. 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they
challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued
that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable
suspicion, that petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity; and that Officer
Soto's asserted ground for approaching the vehicle-to give the driver a warning
concerning traffic violations-was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression
motion, concluding that "the facts of the stop were not controverted," and "[t]here was
nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal
traffic stop." App. 5.
Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue here.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding with respect to the suppression
issue that, "regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the
occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic
stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have
stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation." 53 F.3d 371, 374-375 (CADC
1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1036 (1996).
II
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even
if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure" of "persons"
within the
810
meaning of this provision. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975). An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional
imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See Prouse, supra, at 659; Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam).
Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that various
provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been violated. See 18 D. C. Mun.
Regs. 2213.4 (1995) ("An operator shall ... give full time and attention to the
operation of the vehicle"); 2204.3 ("No person shall turn any vehicle ... without giving
an appropriate signal"); 2200.3 ("No person shall drive a vehicle ... at a speed greater
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions"). They argue, however, that "in
the unique context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause is not enough. Since, they
contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost
invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the
temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to
which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists. Petitioners, who are both
black, further contend that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based
on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants. To avoid
this danger, they say, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the
normal one (applied by the Court of Appeals) of whether probable cause existed to
justify the stop; but rather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have
made the stop for the reason given.
811
Petitioners contend that the standard they propose is consistent with our past cases'
disapproval of police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens as pretexts
for pursuing other investigatory agendas. We are reminded that in Florida v. Wells, 495
U. S. 1, 4 (1990), we stated that "an inventory search[l] must not be a ruse for a
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence"; that in Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 372 (1987), in approving an inventory search, we apparently
thought it significant that there had been "no showing that the police, who were
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation"; and that in New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987),
we observed, in upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative
inspection,2 that the search did not appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of
... violation of ... penal laws." But only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases
as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is
justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred.
In each case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of
probable cause. Our quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the
need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the
purpose of inventory or administrative
1 An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order to
ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed
car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage. See South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 369 (1976).
2 An administrative inspection is the inspection of business premises conducted by

authorities responsible for enforcing a pervasive regulatory scheme-for example,
unannounced inspection of a mine for compliance with health and safety standards. See
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 599-605 (1981).
812
regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes. See
Bertine, supra, at 371-372; Burger, supra, at 702-703.
Petitioners also rely upon Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980) (per curiam), a
case which, like this one, involved a traffic stop as the prelude to a plain-view sighting
and arrest on charges wholly unrelated to the basis for the stop. Petitioners point to
our statement that "[t]here was no evidence whatsoever that the officer's presence to
issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about the
occupants" of the car. Id., at 4, n. 4. That dictum at most demonstrates that the Court
in Bannister found no need to inquire into the question now under discussion; not that
it was certain of the answer. And it may demonstrate even less than that: If by
"pretext" the Court meant that the officer really had not seen the car speeding, the
statement would mean only that there was no reason to doubt probable cause for the
traffic stop.
It would, moreover, be anomalous, to say the least, to treat a statement in a footnote

in the per curiam Bannister opinion as indicating a reversal of our prior law. Petitioners'
difficulty is not simply a lack of affirmative support for their position. Not only have we
never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection
(discussed above), that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 584, n. 3 (1983), we held that
an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials was not
rendered invalid "because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state
policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was
thought to be carrying marihuana." We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive
might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification. In United States v. Robinson,
414 U. S. 218 (1973), we held that
813
a traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by the fact that
it was "a mere pretext for a narcotics search," id., at 221, n. 1; and that a lawful
postarrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was
not motivated by the officer-safety concern that justifies such searches, see id., at 236.
See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260, 266 (1973). And in Scott v. United
States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978), in rejecting the contention that wiretap evidence
was subject to exclusion because the agents conducting the tap had failed to make any
effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized acquisitions be
minimized, we said that "[sJubjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful
conduct illegal or unconstitutional." We described Robinson as having established that
"the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate
the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."
436 U. S., at 136, 138.
We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of
traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. We of
course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.
Recognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges

based on the actual motivations of individual officers, petitioners disavow any intention
to make the individual officer's subjective good faith the touchstone of
"reasonableness." They insist that the stand-
814
ard they have put forward-whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual
police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have
made the stop for the reasons given-is an "objective" one.
But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputably driven
by subjective considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police from doing
under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different
reasons. Petitioners' proposed standard may not use the word "pretext," but it is
designed to combat nothing other than the perceived "danger" of the pretextual stop,
albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases. Instead of asking whether the individual
officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect,
whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had
the proper state of mind.
Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such fashion that the court
cannot take into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be
explained by the fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option. If those
cases were based only upon the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent,
petitioners' attempt to root out subjective vices through objective means might make
sense. But they were not based only upon that, or indeed even principally upon that.
Their principal basis-which applies equally to attempts to reach subjective intent
through ostensibly objective means-is simply that the Fourth Amendment's concern
with "reasonableness" allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236 ("Since it is the fact
of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that
[the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not
himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed") (footnotes omitted); Gustafson, supra,
at 266 (same). But even if our concern had been only an evidentiary one,
815
petitioners' proposal would by no means assuage it. Indeed, it seems to us somewhat

easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective
consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a "reasonable officer"
would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation. While police manuals and
standard procedures may sometimes provide objective assistance, ordinarily one would
be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-
an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity.
Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a

judge, vary from place to place and from time to time. We cannot accept that the
search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable, cf. Gustafson,
supra, at 265; United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 755-756 (1979), and can be
made to turn upon such trivialities. The difficulty is illustrated by petitioners' arguments
in this case. Their claim that a reasonable officer would not have made this stop is
based largely on District of Columbia police regulations which permit plainclothes officers
in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws "only in the case of a violation that is so
grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others." Metropolitan Police
Department, Washington, D. C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies
(A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992), reprinted as Addendum to Brief for Petitioners. This basis of
invalidation would not apply in jurisdictions that had a different practice. And it would
not have applied even in the District of Columbia, if Officer Soto had been wearing a
uniform or patrolling in a marked police cruiser.
Petitioners argue that our cases support insistence upon police adherence to standard
practices as an objective means of rooting out pretext. They cite no holding to that
effect, and dicta in only two cases. In Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960), the
petitioner had been arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), on
the basis of
816
an administrative warrant that, he claimed, had been issued on pretextual grounds in

order to enable the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to search his room after his
arrest. We regarded this as an allegation of "serious misconduct," but rejected Abel's
claims on the ground that "[a] finding of bad faith is ... not open to us on thee] record"
in light of the findings below, including the finding that "'the proceedings taken by the
[INS] differed in no respect from what would have been done in the case of an individual
concerning whom [there was no pending FBI investigation],'" id., at 226-227. But it is a
long leap from the proposition that following regular procedures is some evidence of
lack of pretext to the proposition that failure to follow regular procedures proves (or is
an operational substitute for) pretext. Abel, moreover, did not involve the assertion
that pretext could invalidate a search or seizure for which there was probable cause-and
even what it said about pretext in other contexts is plainly inconsistent with the views
we later stated in Robinson, Gustafson, Scott, and Villamonte-Marquez. In the other
case claimed to contain supportive dicta, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218
(1973), in approving a search incident to an arrest for driving without a license, we
noted that the arrest was "not a departure from established police department
practice." Id., at 221, n. 1. That was followed, however, by the statement that "[w]e
leave for another day questions which would arise on facts different from these." Ibid.
This is not even a dictum that purports to provide an answer, but merely one that
leaves the question open.
III
In what would appear to be an elaboration on the "reasonable officer" test, petitioners

argue that the balancing inherent in any Fourth Amendment inquiry requires us to
weigh the governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as we
have here. That balancing, petitioners claim, does not support investigation of minor
traffic in-
817
fractions by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles; such investigation only minimally

advances the government's interest in traffic safety, and may indeed retard it by
producing motorist confusion and alarm-a view said to be supported by the
Metropolitan Police Department's own regulations generally prohibiting this practice. And
as for the Fourth Amendment interests of the individuals concerned, petitioners point
out that our cases acknowledge that even ordinary traffic stops entail "a possibly
unsettling show of authority"; that they at best "interfere with freedom of movement,
are inconvenient, and consume time" and at worst "may create substantial anxiety,"
Prouse, 440 U. S., at 657. That anxiety is likely to be even more pronounced when the
stop is conducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars.
It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a
"reasonableness" determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare
exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt
where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause. That is why petitioners must
rely upon cases like Prouse to provide examples of actual "balancing" analysis. There,
the police action in question was a random traffic stop for the purpose of checking a
motorist's license and vehicle registration, a practice that-like the practices at issue in
the inventory search and administrative inspection cases upon which petitioners rely in
making their "pretext" claim-involves police intrusion without the probable cause that is
its traditional justification. Our opinion in Prouse expressly distinguished the case from
a stop based on precisely what is at issue here: "probable cause to believe that a driver
is violating anyone of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations." Id.,
at 661. It noted approvingly that "[t]he foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle
safety regulations ... is acting upon observed violations," id., at 659, which afford the
"'quantum of individualized suspicion'" necessary to ensure that police
818
discretion is sufficiently constrained, id., at 654-655 (quoting United States v. Martinez-

Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 560). What is true of Prouse is also true of other cases that
engaged in detailed "balancing" to decide the constitutionality of automobile stops, such
as Martinez-Fuerte, which upheld checkpoint stops, see 428 U. S., at 556-562, and
Brignoni-Ponce, which disallowed so-called "roving patrol" stops, see 422 U. S., at 882-
884: The detailed "balancing" analysis was necessary because they involved seizures
without probable cause.
Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary
actually to perform the "balancing" analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in
an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical
interests-such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, see Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), unannounced entry into a home, see Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U. S. 927 (1995), entry into a home without a warrant, see Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U. S. 740 (1984), or physical penetration of the body, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.
S. 753 (1985). The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as
such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to
believe the law has been broken "outbalances" private interest in avoiding police contact.
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the "multitude of applicable
traffic and equipment regulations" is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that
virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost
whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to
decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated
that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of
enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by
what standard (or what right) we would decide, as
819
petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to
merit enforcement.
For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, we think there is no realistic
alternative to the traditional commonlaw rule that probable cause justifies a search and
seizure.
***
Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that
petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of
the convictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct. The
judgment
is
Affirmed.
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not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties
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Today is Friday, August 30, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

3Section 1202, Tariff and Customs Code.

4Section 1204, Tariff and Customs Code.

8De Joya, et al. v. Lantin, et al., L-24037, April 27, 1967.

9This deputation is not disputed by respondents.

11Section 2203 (c), Tariff and Customs Code.

12Section 2205, Tariff and Customs Code.

13Section 2211, Tariff and Customs Code.

14Section 2207, Tariff and Customs Code.

15Annex A to the petition.

16Sections 2208, 2210 and 2211, Tariff and Customs Code.

17Section 2209, Tariff and Customs Code.

18Records, pp. 26 and 43.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

This judgment is immediately executory.

Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:

Respondent judge aptly added that

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

B. What did he say?

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:

Respondent judge aptly added that

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

m. Any article sought to be imported or exported:

xxx xxx xxx

5 G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857.

6 69 L ed. (267 U.S. 131), p. 543 (1924).

7 PHIL. CONST (1973), Art. IV, Sec. 3.

FOUR THE AMENDMENT, AMERICAN CONST

8 Carroll v. United States, supra at 544,

13 Carroll v. United States, supra at 552.

16 Cf. Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).

17 See Records, p. 68.

18 29 Led.(116 U.S. 616)746, 748(1885).

19 G.R. No. L-29218, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 553,562.

1 L-27360, February 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 857.

2 69 L. Ed. 542; 267 U.S. 132: Decided March 2, 1925.

7 Carroll 69 L. Ed. at 549; 267 U.S. at 149.

8 Ibid., 69 L. Ed. at 551; 267 U.S. at 153.

11 53 L. Ed. 2d; 538. 433 U.S. 1.

12 Chadwick. 53 L. Ed. 2d at 542.

13 Ibid, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549 to 550; 433 U.S. at 13.

14 Ibid, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 550 to 551; 433 U.S. at 15.

15 Ibid, 53 L. Ed 2d at 551; 433 U.S. at 15.

26 Ibid, pp. 76-77.

27 Rollo, p. 186, corresponding to page 27 of the Memorandum for the Respondents.

28 11 L. Ed. 2d 777; 376 U.S. 364.

29 Preston 11 L. Ed. 2d at 780-781; 376 U.S. at 367, emphasis supplied.

30 Ibid, 1 1 L. Ed. 2d at 781; 376 U.S. at 368.

31 29 L. Ed. 746,116 U.S. 616.

32 29 L. Ed. at 748, 116 U.S. at 622.