BARREDO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-17863, November 28, 1962)

FACTS:

On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their
claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its
first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the
intestate estate of Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face
value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees against the said
estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the
leasehold rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage
were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial
partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of
the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of
Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month
period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the
one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular
6-month period.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the tardy claim will be allowed.

HELD:

No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A
tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure
to present said claim on time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same
is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the
extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for
the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing
claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent
merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners
alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto
Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient,
due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of
the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim,(as well as the payment
of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under
Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim
for no cause or for an insufficient cause.
 BELAMALA vs. POLINAR
(G.R. No. L-24098, November 18, 1967)

FACTS:

On May 24, 1954, a complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed againts Mauricio Polinar, et al,
in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol. Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of
serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura
Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as
indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. On June 18, 1956, Mauricio appealed
and while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he
died and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and said
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958 wherein said Mauricio
Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956. Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife, Balbina
Bongato and his children and the parties have reserved to present in Court evidence on facts
not agreed to herein by the parties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
civil liability?

HELD:

The Supreme Court see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court
below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Assuming that for
lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be
enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that
imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter
acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil
Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately
becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

Judgment reversed and set aside. No Cost.

 DE VILLANUEVA vs. PNB
(G.R. No. L-18403, September 30, 1961)

FACTS:

For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow
Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and
Notice thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily
Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under
administration opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte,
suggested and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte
entered upon the performance of his duties. The defendant-appellant Philippine National
Bank filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva, deceased,
respectfully presents its claim against the estate of the said deceased.

The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. The appellant
PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim
presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time
within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec.
2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to
creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to
present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of
administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the
employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the
Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the question is already barred.

HELD:

The claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within
which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed or about 1
year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of
such administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City,
Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to
Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times,
respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the
supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees
had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an
amount of money by the administrator of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). It is quite
true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims against the estate,
even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under
special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and
for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.

WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed.

GERONA vs. DE GUZMAN

 (G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964)

FACTS:

Petitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of
Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first
wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children.

That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945 and on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Although
they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs respondents succeeded
fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in
the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued
in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. Such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. They
demanded from respondents their share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest
thereon.

The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra- judicial
settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in
litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to them their aforementioned share. The
trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first
marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and that petitioners'
action has already prescribed, Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-
heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's
estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner contention is tenable.

HELD:

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition

among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold
the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in
other cases; from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property.

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial

settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world.
 SIKAT vs. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA
(G.R. No. L-35925, November 10, 1932)

FACTS:

Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the intestate
estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and
appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the
credit of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as
judicial administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal
interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.

In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set
up a special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges
the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed
for judgment absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said
amount with interest and costs.

The plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon
appeal the Supreme Court decided that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the said intestate proceedings. In view of this decision of the Supreme
Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take cognizance of the
intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva, these proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial
administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva upon the ground that when
Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92,
with legal interest from June 15, 1919.

After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva,
administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas as
commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on
September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present complaint. The said
committee on claims and appraisal, composed of Mamerto Roxas and Nicanor Roxas,
admitted
the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report with
the court accordingly.

ISSUES:

Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate to
collect the credit against him has already prescribed.

HELD:

The court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No.
190. This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190,
"means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to
this definition, the proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding,
which, according to the same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very
reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death clearly means
ordinary actions and not special proceedings.

In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs.
Manarang, this court laid down the following doctrine: The purpose of the law, in fixing a
period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property, to
the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed
administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in
that direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been
appointed to fix the time for filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of
Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate
could not prescribe.

The plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in
not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of
Manila until after the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate
proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the
place where the decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18,1925.

Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates, and
the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro
Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it,
which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction,
the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same
proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three
years had elapsed, and applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure
by analogy, we declare the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold
otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the
latter's estate in suspense.