The war in Chechnya has lasted for eight years.

The experience of the

second military campaign that began in1999 indicates that the necessary
conclusions to improve the operations of the armed forces in such a
specific theater had not been drawn after the end of the first Chechen
war. In addition, the weaponry of the federal troops involved in the
counter-terrorist operationwas not changed, either. The federal side has
been using the same weapons and military equipment as in the first war.

The second Chechen war can be divided into two stages:

Stage 1 - August 1999 (the invasion in Dagestan) through March 2000

(the siege of Komsomolskoye village) - was marked by large-scale
hostilities.

Stage 2 - begun in April 2000 and continuing to this day. The number
of major hostilities sharply declined and active guerilla warfare
began.

Stage 1

Key operations

The second Chechen war began in August 1999. In the very first days of
August the situation sharply deteriorated in the mountainous Tsumada
and Botlikh districts of Dagestan bordering on Chechnya. In the early
hours of August 2, groups of militants crossed the Snegovoy Range pass
separating Chechnya from Dagestan to the Tsumada district, entered the
village of Agvali and attempted to establish control and Islamic order
there. After an armed clash with the local police supported by the
population they were forced to withdraw from the district capital and
entrench in three other villages: Echeda, Gigatl and Gakko. Meanwhile,
other rebel groupings started infiltrating other villages in Tsumada and
the neighboring Botlikh districts and entrenching themselves there.
Prominent field commanders Shamil Basayev and Ibn ul-Khattab assumed
control over the operations of the Wahhabis.

Armed units of Dagestani and Chechen Wahhabis, who had the objective
of separating Dagestan from the rest of Russia and forming a united
Islamic state, started building up a bridgehead in the remotest mountain
districts of Dagestan. The rebels assumed control over two mountain
passes linking Dagestan and Chechnya (Gigatlinsky and Yagodak) and
started transferring forces. By August 10 up to 2,000 rebels had assumed
control of 10 villages in the districts of Tsumada (Echeda, Gakko, Kedi,
Kvanada, Gadiri, Gigatl) and Bolikh (Godoberi, Miarso, Shodroda,
Ansalta, Rakhata, Inkhelo).1 There were reports that they had also
entered Gumbeta and Akhvakh districts.

The efforts of federal troops against separatists in Dagestan were

characterized by the large-scale use of all types of conventional arma-
ments. At that time large groups numbering from 500 to 800 rebels
constituted the core of the rebel force in Dagestan and Chechnya. Such
a concentration of rebels in a relatively limited territories allowed federal
troops to benefit from their overwhelming superiority in firepower.

By August 24, 1999 the federal side regained control over all villages in
Botlikh district. On August 29 units of the Armed Forces, Interior
Troops, task forces of the Dagestani police and other law enforcement
bodies launched an offensive against the rebellious villages of Karamakhi
and Chabanmakhi in Buinaksk district of Dagestan.
The operation against the insurgent villages, initially planned as a police
action, developed into full-scale hostilities. The invasion of Chechen
rebels in the Novolakskoye district of Dagestan at the height of the
hostilities in the Karamakhi zone on September 5 came as unpleasant
surprise to Moscow and Makhachkala. According to field commander
Shamil Basayev, the purpose of the invasion was to distract federal forces
attacking Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. The hostilities in Novolakskoye
district were intensive until September 12 when the zone was cleared of
rebels, even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time
afterwards.

The outcome of the hostilities in Dagestan was saddening: 275 federal

servicemen were killed and 937 wounded in action between August 2
and September 20, 1999. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the
losses of army units were 104 men killed, 24 of them officers, and 291
wounded, 74 of them officers. As for the Interior Ministry, Interior
Troops and police units, lost 171 men were killed and 646 wounded. In
addition, there were 15 missing in action.2 Dagestani law enforcement
bodies and home guards also suffered significant losses. Over 20,000 lo-
cal residents fled from the zone of hostilities, but by the end of
September most of them returned to their home places.

The storming of the capital Grozny became the biggest army operation
in Chechnya itself. After the storming of the city during the first Chechen
war in January 1995 that had cost the federal side enormous losses, the
second attempt was looked forward with mixed feelings. According to
the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily, over 1,800 Russian soldiers and
officers died in the first storming. There are still no accurate official
figures of the losses. It is known that the 131st Maikop brigade was
almost fully annihilated in the area of the railway station.3 Paratroopers
and marines also suffered heavy losses. For instance, a Northern Fleet
marine battalion that stormed the government compound - Lassau and
Kavkaz hotels, the National Bank and the presidential palace - lost over
50 men.4

This time the mistakes of the previous storming were taken into account
in the process of planning the operation. First, Grozny was completely
besieged. Then mop-ups of separate districts began. Unlike the first
storming, this time artillery fire was opened at the slightest sign of resis-
tance. All dominating heights around the city were occupied by artillery
and tanks that sometimes opened direct fire. 240-millimiter Tyulpan self-
propelled mortars and Smelchak advanced guided rounds for them were
used for the first time in urban combat.5 Assault detachments armed with
Shmel infantry rocket flame-throwers, AGS-17 Plamya automatic gre-
nade launchers, Kalashnikov machine guns and AK-74 Kalashnikov assault
rifles with GP-25 underbarrel grenade launchers also proved effective.
Such detachments always contained snipers armed either with the
Degtyaryov sniping rifle or the Vintorez low noise special sniper rifle. In
addition, these groups were supported by tanks supplied with so-called
dynamic protection that enabled them to sustain several hits from man-
portable grenade-launchers.

The operation: codenamed Wolf Trap, on the night of January 29, 2000,
however, was the greatest success.6 Thanks to the concerted actions of
intelligence agents, radio intercepting detachments and radioelectronic
security, a plan of retreat from the city was imposed on the rebels.
Numerous minefields were created on the expected flight routes of the
rebels at the last moment. In addition, the artillery had ranged the area.
As a result two thirds of the 600 rebels who attempted to flee died or
were severely wounded. A key rebel figure, Shamil Basayev, lost his leg.
On February 6, 2000, federal troops assumed full control over Grozny.

The storming of the village of Komsomolskoye completed the first stage

of the second Chechen war. As soon as rebels were besieged in it, the
operation became simple from the military viewpoint. The main reason
for the unjustifiably high losses, however, was the lack of coordination
between formations of different subordination. The storming involved
units of the Armed Forces, the Main Intelligence Department, the
Federal Security Service, Interior Troops and the Interior Ministry. The
mass use of the UR-77 Zmei Gorynych line-charge minefield breaching
vehicle can be singled out among the technical innovations used in the
storming. The weight of a charge exceeds one tonne and the power of
the explosion is such that houses in Komsomolskoye were simply wiped
off from the face of the earth. Nevertheless, part of the rebels led by
Ruslan Gelayev managed to break away from the encirclement, a
situation quite typical of many operations in Chechnya.

Analysis of Russian army actions and armaments

Russian Defense Ministry General Staff chief Anatoly Kvashnin actually

assumed command of the forces in the North Caucasus. During the
previous war he also planned the ill-famed storming of Grozny in the first
days of January 1995. As a result the main mistake of the first Chechen
war was repeated in Dagestan, namely the use of formations of different
subordination in the same operation. Already after the first war many
officers expressed the opinion that at least two rapid reaction divisions
staffed and equipped according to wartime standards should have been
set up and used in hostilities first of all. Nothing of the kind had been
done, however, in the three years between 1996 and 1999. And from
the very first days of the hostilities troops from all over the country were
flow to Dagestan. In addition to regular units of the North Caucasian
military district, there were air-borne formations, marines from three
fleets, OMON and SOBR special police forces from two dozen
territories, task forces from the Main Intelligence Department, the
Federal Security Service, Interior Troops and Interior Ministry
formations. It was impossible to coordinate the efforts of such a diverse
mass of troops, especially considering the state of the means of
communication. As a result, the experience of the first Chechen war
recurred with federal aviation and artillery pounding their own forces
and units belonging of different ministries shooting at each other.

An analysis of the developments in Dagestan and Chechnya indicates that

it is possible to localize seats of hostilities with immediate and strong
reaction which, however, require the existence of control bodies and
well-trained, fully staffed units kept in constant combat readiness. The
control system should be deployed before a military grouping is formed.
For instance, during the anti-terrorist operation, rocket troops and
artillery were deployed simultaneously along with their control bodies
which reduced the quality, reliability, swiftness and stability of command
and in a number of cases required adjustments in their entire structure.
In addition, the control bodies of the rocket troops and artillery had only
50-60% of properly trained staff, which obstructed effective decision-
making in planning and organizing attacks and in controlling and
commanding units and formations. In order to guarantee its round-the-
clock operation, the fire destruction planning and coordination group
with the headquarters of the federal force in the North Caucasus had to
be supplemented by officers from the Rocket Troops and Artillery
research center and the Military Artillery University.7

Ideally permanent readiness rocket and artillery formations should have

such personnel and materiel that they can immediately fulfill combat
tasks on a full scale. Out of the artillery batteries involved, however, only
48% were units of permanent readiness while others were formed out
of reduced units. The hostilities in Chechnya showed that a permanent
readiness artillery battery spends four to five times less on preparations
for firing, has higher fire accuracy and lower injury rates than a newly
formed, though trained battery.

The core of the arsenal of the federal force in the North Caucasus
consisted of T-72 main battle tanks, BMP-2 AIFVs, Su-25 ground attack
aircraft, Su-24 frontline bombers, Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8
transport helicopters. Rocket and artillery strikes were delivered by
Grad and Uragan MLRS, D-80 howitzers and Msta-S self-propelled
artillery systems. Troops moved on BTR-70 and BTR-80 wheeled
armored personnel carriers. All of the weapons were quite old but have
gained a good reputation in local conflicts. The use of these weapons and
ammunition cost virtually nothing to the Russian taxpayers because they
had been manufactured in Soviet times.

The use of T-90S tanks in Dagestan deserves mention. A group of these

vehicles consisting of 8 to 12 units according to different sources was
supposed to be delivered to India. Following a sharp aggravation of the
situation in the Caucasus, however, the tanks were transferred to
Dagestan. In the Kadari zone one T-90 was hit by seven RPG anti-tank
rockets8 but remained in action. This indicates that with regular equip-
ment T-90S is the best protected Russian tank, especially if Shtora and
Arena defensive protection systems are integrated in it.

The use of 1,500-kg aircraft vacuum bombs was another innovation of

the hostilities in Dagestan. There are practically no official reports of the
use of vacuum bombs. According to diverse sources, the bombs were
used any where from two to six times.

The role of frontline aviation and helicopters should be singled out.

During the developments in Dagestan federal aircraft and helicopters op-
erated as intensively as ever. At that time over 80% of targets were
destroyed from the air. The Air Force, though, suffered serious losses as
well. In the three months of fighting in Dagestan, five pilots and two
aircraft gunners were killed. The rebels managed to destroy five
helicopters: four Mi-8 and one Mi-24.9

There has been little difference in the aircraft fleet compared to the first
Chechen war. Like in 1994-1996, Su-24M frontline bombers have been
playing the role of an all-weather and round-the-clock weapon while Su-
25 ground attack aircraft operate in ordinary weather conditions. The
wars in Chechnya have demonstrated the acute need for war planes
capable of discovering and classifying small ground targets and destroying
them with high-precision weapons at any time of the day and in any
weather. The successful use of upgraded all-weather Su-25T assigned to
a separate air group was the main novelty. Fire accuracy from such
aircraft has proved quite high. For instance, with Kh-25ML (AS-10) air-
to-surface missiles, the Su-25T destroyed several small targets, such as
satellite communication stations and an An-2 airplane on the
ground.10 Unfortunately, neither Su-25TM ground attack aircraft having
such capabilities, nor modernized Su-30 multirole fighters, MiG-29SMT
or MiG-29UBT air superiority fighters were tested in combat. Neither is
there any information available about the use of receivers of the
GLONASS satellite navigation system, which could significantly improve
the interaction between aviation and ground forces. Unguided bombs
and missiles were mainly used in air attacks. Among the high precision
weapons the federal side used were air-to-surface missiles, KAB-500
steerable bombs, and also KAB-1500L and KAB-1500TK heavy bombs
with laser or television guidance. On the whole the correlation between
unguided and high precision weapons did not change insignificantly
compared to 1994-1996.

Traditionally the Russian army has paid more attention to building up fire
power than to means of control, intelligence or communications (C3I) in
which it lags behind Western countries by some 10-15 years.

For instance, NATO armies, especially in the US, are actively using
unmanned aircraft from strategic to special miniature ones.11 The Russian
army so far has only one Stroi-P system with the unmanned aircraft
Pchela. In 1995 five Pchela-1T were used in Chechnya that flew 10
missions, eight of them combat missions. Their combined flying hours
were 7 hours 25 minutes. The maximum distance of the aircraft from
the ground control station was 55 kilometers with the flight altitude
ranging between 600 and 2,200 meters.12 The aircraft, however, have a
number of drawbacks. Firstly, they are launched from catapults and use
parachutes for landing. As a result, each Pchela may be used no more
than 10 times. It would have been more logical in the conflict in
Chechnya to use remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) taking off according to
the airplane principle because Russia has no shortage of airfields around
Chechnya. The service life of such aircraft would grow 10-fold or more.
Russia does not, however, have such RPV. Secondly, it has been clear for
a long time that up-to-date RPV should carry night vision equipment.
Military experts believe that only in this case can rocket and artillery
strikes be delivered at rebel groups round-the-clock. The Defense
Ministry does not have the money to acquire such equipment, however.
Thirdly, we must single out the very short range of Pchela actions and
their low ability to survive combat conditions. During the first war two
Pchelas were shot down by Chechen rebels who managed to organize
intensive defensive fire from small arms and anti-aircraft installations
along the RPV flight route.13

Generally speaking, however, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive

system of reconnaissance, control and communications beginning from
surveillance satellites which Russia has only two to unmanned aircraft
instead of individual elements. All the forces and means of intelligence
and attack that the headquarters of the grouping has at its disposal should
be linked in a single automated reconnaissance and firing system. It is
clear that at present the absence of such complexes or an automated
control system has to be compensated by operations of land forces in
close combat in which combat losses cannot be fully ruled out.

Analysis of Chechen separatists' actions and armaments

Like during the first war this time virtually all anti-aircraft means of
Chechen rebels are mobile: the ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled air de-
fense gun system, the ZU-23 air defense gun on a Kamaz truck chassis
and DShK machine guns and grenade launchers mounted on off-road
cars. In addition, they were armed with Strela-3 (SA-14) and Igla-1 (SA-
18) and Stingers MANPADS. All sources, including official, confirm their
presence. It has been reported that even during the first war Chechens
"captured depots with large quantities of these rockets." Intelligence has
estimated the combined number of portable anti-aircraft systems on the
rebel side at 70 to 100 units.

Nevertheless, they have not been so widely used in combat. Firstly, the
experience accumulated by aircraft and helicopter pilots in Afghanistan
has helped them avoid being hit by them. The simplest way to reduce
losses from man-portable anti-aircraft rockets is to fly at altitudes beyond
their reach. It is true that attacks from the altitude of 4,000-4,500 meters
are less accurate and as a consequence increase the spending of am-
munition and destruction in the target area. The other option is to fly at
minimal altitudes with maneuvers against air defense weapons which
only top pilots are capable of. The most radical solution is the jamming
of the self-homing device of the missiles.

The other reason for the limited use of man portable missiles was that
rebels are not trained to use Stingers. The rockets' batteries are one
problem because as their active life is very short: some 40 seconds
between the discovery of the target to launching after which they go out
of order. The angle of the Stinger's homing head is small and it is a difficult
task for a poorly trained operator to bring a Stinger into combat
readiness and capture a target in such a short time. Besides, the power
unit of a Stinger has a service life of two years and the United States long
ago stopped their deliveries to Afghanistan from where Chechen rebels
received them. It should also be noted that Russian intelligence services
evidently managed to prevent the large-scale transfer of the latest
weaponry to Chechnya which reduced the effectiveness of the rebels' air
defense. Experts believe only one Su-24MR was shot down with a Stigner
in the area of Urus-Martan.

The Igla-1 used by rebels is superior to the Stinger in reliability and

simplicity, flight speed and the power of its warhead - 600 grams com-
pared to 500 grams of the Stinger. There have been reports, however,
that the Igla cannot be applied against Russian aircraft because its guid-
ance system contains IFF.

Simpler weapons have been used much more frequently against low
flying aircraft and especially helicopters, specifically anti-tank guided
missiles, RPG-5 and RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and heavy machine guns.
The technical weakness of the rebel air defense was compensated by
good organization and certain specific features of application. The actions
of all mobile air defense weapons have been accurately coordinated with
the help of well-organized radio communications, which the federal
forces did not jam but in many cases intercepted. Rebels were skillfully
camouflaged and constantly changed their firing positions, making it
difficult to discover and destroy them. The use of ambushes was one of
the means of using air defense weapons. The Chechen firing teams tried
to stay hidden up to the moment when an airplane or helicopter entered
their effective firing zone and only then opened massive fire for effect
from several positions. Often they stationed their air defense weapons
in the directions of flight routes of attack aircraft, near the possible air
attack targets and opened fire for effect at a favorable moment. The den-
sity of anti-aircraft fire simultaneously opened from the entire range of
the existing weaponry - small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft
guns and grenade launchers - was another specific feature. Not a single
helicopter that was shot down or damaged had been hit by only one type
of weapon.

By January 1, 2000 the losses of the federal side caused by air defense
fire and technical failures were 3 Su-25 (September 9, November 3 and
December 13) and 1 Su-24MR (November 4). Between the beginning of
the second Chechen war and September 5, 2000 11 Mi-24 assault
helicopters and 12 Mi-8 multi mission helicopters had been put out of
action. Half of the aircraft were shot down in combat, approximately the
same number were lost due human errors.14 The ratio of losses was
approximately the same as during the first war in Chechnya.
Stage 2

The second stage of the anti-terrorist operation was marked by the

transition of Chechen separatists to guerilla warfare. Open confrontation
with regular troops became useless due to their greater manpower,
better organization and overwhelming firing superiority. The hopes of
the separatists for political support from foreign countries did not
materialize and in order to survive they radically changed their tactics.
Rebel formations were split into smaller groups. Each group was assigned
an operating area and bases. Already in summer 2000, however, it be-
came clear from intercepted radio communications and the
interrogations of captured rebels that the separatists were facing serious
shortages of arms and ammunition, especially high quality mines. Federal
convoys daily moving around Chechnya became the main target of the
rebels who widely used home-made land mines concocted on the basis
of 152 or 122 mm shells.

Under these circumstances, the tactics of federal troops have had to be

altered. Now the main responsibility lies with helicopters and the
personnel of district commandants' offices, task forces of the Main
Intelligence Department and the Federal Security Service. Large army
formations, Interior Troops, OMON and SOBR police forces are
responsible for enforcing the control system, conducting mop-ups in
towns and villages and identity checks. They are also called to reinforce
task forces, whenever there is such a need. Regular checkups, mop-ups
and also tight control on the roads significantly hinder rebel operations.

Analysis of Russian army actions and armaments

In the new conditions, the main role belongs to the task forces of the
Main Intelligence Department and the Federal Security Service. Already
one can say that their efforts have proved quite effective. Firstly, they are
always better trained than regular army formations. Secondly, they are
much better equipped and armed with more advanced weaponry.

Each group has been assigned a strictly defined zone of responsibility.

Some formations specialize only in operations outside populated areas.
They block the foothills and set up ambushes against rebel units that try
to change their positions. Many more task forces operate inside
populated areas. The responsibility zones of such groups have remained
unchanged since the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation.15 Thanks
to this, each has a perfect knowledge of the situation in its area which
significantly increases their efficiency. As a rule, most of the special
operations are conducted at night. Hence, there are the special
requirements to their equipment.

The task units, however, suffer from a shortage of effective Russian-

made night vision instruments and night sights for sniper rifles. The latest
Russian inventions in this sphere are not reaching the troops and they
have to use what was developed decades ago. The early night vision
instruments, which the military have to be content with for now, operate
only with power sources made especially for army purposes. Sights that
can operate on regular household batteries were developed much later.
Neither do troops have light and mobile IR imagers though according to
foreign military experts, the IR imagers are a crucial element of anti-ter-
rorist equipment.16
The 12.7 mm V-94 rifle won a high reputation in mountain warfare.17 Its
large caliber and firepower allows snipers to remain outside the rebel
firing zone while shooting. In addition, the V-94 proved effective in firing
at vehicles with no armored plating. The 9 mm Vintorez low noise special
sniper rifle has been praised as being highly effective in urban combat.
The Russian 7.62 mm SV-98 sniper rifle has also been successfully used.
The quality of the existing Russian sniper sights, however, leaves much
to be desired. For instance, the adjustment knob of practically all Russian
optical sights is unprotected, therefore during transportation the sight is
distorted and precision fire is impossible without additional adjustment.
As a result, task forces of the Main Intelligence Department and the
Federal Security Service have started using foreign weaponry: rifles made
by SAKO (Finland) and AVS (Britain), sights made by Zeiss,
Schmidt&Bender etc.18

As for small arms, task forces almost never use 5.45 mm AK-74
Kalashnikov rifles. Those with the underbarrel grenade launcher GP-25
constitute the sole exception. For missions task units usually take trophy
7.62 mm AK-47 assault rifles because their more powerful cartridges
have a longer range and puncturing capacity. Low flame and low noise
weapons are also actively used. They are ordered in small batches and
paid for from one's own pocket, though. Among grenade-launchers one
should single out the Shmel infantry rocket flame-thrower. Despite its
great weight (12 kilos), groups take one or two of them for a mission as
a rule. In case of an armed clash, especially in urban conditions, the Shmel
increases the firing power of the group. The power of its thermobaric
round is equivalent to the power of a 122 mm howitzer shell.
Despite the enormous experience gained during the two Chechen wars
the traditional shortcomings inherent in Russian armed forces remain.
Neither the ground forces, nor the task groups have mobile radars,
hydrophone listening gear or convenient night sights. The available
means of radio communication are incapable of guaranteeing reliable
communications in combat conditions. In addition they are fully scanned
and intercepted by the rebels.

The heavy Mi-8MTKO round-the-clock night vision helicopter has been

actively used during the second war. Thanks to its onboard equipment
the crew easily discovers and destroys small rebel groups, dugouts,
automobiles and other equipment at any time of the day with high
precision. The night computing devices and adapters guarantee the use
of digital maps and navigation support for nighttime shooting. An IR
imager facilitates high-precision targeting. It "sees" objects emitting heat
from +0.3oC or more relative to the surroundings, and its powerful
radar discovers the enemy firing positions even through the foliage. All
the helicopter systems are connected so that the pilot has a good picture
of the space outside the cockpit and the data on the indicators. The new
avionics permits the helicopter to operate effectively in any weather
conditions at minimal heights (30-50 meters) using high precision and
conventional arms. It is also equipped with a more powerful engine
resistant to overloads. Over 20 such helicopters were expected to
appear in the North Caucasus by the end of last year, but only two were
built and one of them crashed.19
There have also been reports of the use of Ka-50 Black Shark helicopters
in Chechnya. The absence of night vision equipment has hindered their
effective operation, however. Immediately after the Ka-50 was
introduced in Chechnya many rebel groups started appearing in relatively
open spaces only at night. The helicopters of the Kamov Design Bureau
capable of operating at night, for instance Ka-52, have not been used in
Chechnya.

The heavy flame-throwing system TOZ-1 Buratino is another novelty.

Experts say it demonstrated excellent qualities but was used rarely due
to the prohibitive price of its ammunition.

Conclusions

On the whole it can be said that the Russian army has proved quite
combat capable during the second war in Chechnya. Different tactics and
tricks were widely applied: using disinformation against the adversary,
landing operations and ambushes. Whenever there was a chance, the
superiority in firepower and domination in the air were used to the
utmost.

There remained the shortcomming inherited from the first war - the
disasterous application of units subordinate to different agencies in the
same operations. The Russian leadership tried to reduce the negative
consequences of such a policy to the minimum by placing the Federal
Security Service in charge of the anti-terrorist effort as a whole.
Overlapping has not been fully eliminated, however. In addition, one
should admit the very strong influence of temporary political consid-
erations on the course of the hostilities.
Still the biggest problem of the federal side in the Chechen war has been
the use of outdated arms systems. The army has not received anything
new from the Russian defense industry, except several upgraded models
of old weaponry. Evidently, the entire system of arms procurements
should be changed in principle.

It is time to give up the concept that Russia should manufacture all

weapons and equipment for its armed forces by itself. The priority direc-
tions of the domestic defense industry should be defined and priority
given to companies involved in large scale exports, R&D, especially in
science-intensive technologies and also those having strategic
importance for the country.

The output of all others should be compared in cost effectiveness with

foreign analogs. If some foreign systems or others are better, they should
be bought, naturally on a competitive basis and under close control from
experts. For instance, this applies to field radio stations and scanners that
the Russian defense industry will never be able to manufacture even close
to Western analogs and also to special clothing and equipment.

Another possible step could be the priority development of the systems

already taken into service or the upgrading of the existing types of
military hardware. For example Ka-50 attack helicopters with more
advanced avionics giving them all-weather and round-the-clock ca-
pabilities. Even a relatively small grouping of 15-20 such helicopters could
deliver fairly effective strikes at rebels and reduce the losses of the
Russian army in Chechnya. Such helicopters have already been adopted
by the Armed Forces: about a dozen are deployed at the aviation training
center in Torzhok. But they are used solely for training pilots and
developing instructions on their future use. Two years ago the Russian
army placed an additional order for 10 Ka-50 helicopters but later the
order was cancelled due to the absence of funding.

The integration of new avionics in Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters would

permit their more effective operation at night and in bad weather. Su-25
ground attack planes have been criticized in Chechnya even though they
are generally reliable. The Sukhoi Design Bureau has developed a
fundamentally upgraded version of it - Su-39 Supergrach. The Russian
army still cannot afford to buy it, however. At the moment there are only
a few units in Moscow and at the plant in Ulan-Ude.

Currently the main losses of the federal forces in Chechnya are caused
by land mines, 90% of which are radio controlled. Vehicles operating in
Chechnya should be supplied with what are known as white noise
generators, which reliably jam all radio signals over the range of 100 me-
ters. It is much more difficult to blast a vehicle equipped with this
generator. Vehicles with such equipment have started appearing in
Chechnya but there are very few of them.

The procurements of new armaments and the upgrading of the existing

models of military hardware require the revision of the military policy for
the benefit of developing smaller but more mobile armed forces. The
presence of up-to-date equipment in the troops will increase their
effectiveness as well as reduce casualties in hostilities.