90EH0310-3-PWR

IEEE TUTORIAL COURSE

DETECTION OF DOWNED
CONDUCTORS
ON
UTILITY DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEMS

Course Organizer: Dr. B. Don Russell

Texas A&M University

Sponsored by
POWER ENGINEERING EDUCATION COMMITTEE
in cooperation with
POWER SYSTEM RELAYING COMMITTEE
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE
SUBSTATIONS COMMITTEE
of the
IEEE POWER ENGINE,E,RING SOCIETY
Available from
Publication Sales Department
IEEE Service Center
445 Hoes [-ane
P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331

Copyright O 1989 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. For copying, reprint, or republication
permission, write to Staff Director, Publishing Services, IEEE, 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017-2394 USA
 Foreword

Utilitie.s strive to provide electric service to the puAHc in a safe and reliable manner. However, the very
nature of distribution systems means that accidents will occur resulting in downed electrical conductors. Th!
detection of these downed conductors is a vexing problem for which a solution has long been sought.

_. P_rotection enginee!\, using various methods, successfully detect the vast majority of faults on electric
distribution systems. However, a certain percentage of these faults, typically refeired to as high impedance
faults, cannot be detected by conventional detection devices. For many years, specifically thE last'decade,
researchers have sought improved protection methods in an attempt to detect a trlgtrer percentage of the
downed conductors, thereby reducing t -q4r to the public. These investigations hive mor-e clearly
.
documented the nature and characteristics ofhigh impedance, low current faults and have resulted in several
theoretical methods for improved detection.

The- prrrpose of this tutorial is to inform and educate engineers and utility leaders concerning the current
state-of-the-art of research in downed conductor detection. The results of-many years of inveitigation are
documented_and,presented including attempts by utilities, manufacturers, and university reseirchers to
describe fault behavior and discover new detection approaches. Additionally, non-electrical means and
improved operating methods for mitigating the problem of downed conductors are discussed.

All faults will never be detected. Yet, it is the hope of the authors of this document that the information
presented.will encourage indepth investigations and discussion among technical experts resulting in further
advances in the detection of downed conductors.

Dr. B. Don Russell

Tutorial Organizer

Authorshin and Acknowledgements

A document of this maglritude is not prepared without considerable sacrifice of time by dedicated
volunteers. The following individuals have selflessly given their time and experience to organize, write, edit,
and.present this material.- Their.only reward,is the knowledge that the utility industryls weil served by
solving this problem and the public is made safer if more downed conductors can be deiected. The efforti
of the following individuals have greatly contributed to these goals.

Tutorial Orgatizer: Dr. B. Don Russell

Texas A&M University

Tutorial Text Co-editors: Dr. Michael Aucoin Dr. B. Don Russell

Texas A&M University

Tutorial Text Authors: Michael Aucoin Robert H. Jones

Carl L. Benner Robert E. Ire
Jan Carr Robert M. Reedy
Walter A. Elmore B. Don Russell
Clayton H. Griffin Donald R. Volzka

Technical Editors and

Contributors: Carl L. Benner Robert E. I-ee
John R. Boyle John T. Tengdin
Robert H. Jones

Technical Committee
Contributors: High Impedance Fault Detection Working Group
Power System Relaying Committee

Task Group on High Impedance Faults and Open Conductors

Transmission and Distribution Committee

Application of New Technologies in Substation Control

Working Group
Substations Committee

Document Preparation: Beth Martin, Lisa Lister, Janet Wheeler

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

FOREWORD 2

1 INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 5

2 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRIBUTION FEEDER FAULTS 7

J REVIEW OF CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTION PROTECTION PRACTICES . . . . . . 12

4 UTILITY HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

EFFORTS 18

5 RESEARCH ON DETECTION METHODS ... 24

6 REI-ATED TECHNOI-OGIES AND AVAIT ARLE IMPROVEMENTS . 28

1 APPLICATION AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF HIGH IMPEDANCE

FAULT DETECTION 33

8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 38

REFERENCES .. 39

APPENDIX A . SUGGESTED SOURCES FOR FURTHER READING . . . . 41

APPENDIX B - PHOTOGRAPHS OF REPRESENTATIVE DOWNED CONDUCTOR

TESTS

APPENDIX C- REPRESENTATIVE CURRENT PLOTS DURING DOWNED

CONDUCTOR TESTS 46
 CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
The subject of this tutorial is the detection of downed
conductors on distribution systems. More specifically, the
discussion will corcentrate on detection of downed conductors
which do not make continued contact with other power
conductors or which draw very low fault current.
The distribution system primarily considered here is the
four wire, multigrounded system serving distribution load
directly. The distribution circuit main lines include three
phase conductors and a neutral conductor which is grounded
iegularly along its entire length and is connected to the
distribution substation transformer neutral. On these systems,
a significant portion of the load is connected from phase to
neutral and is fed from single-phase laterals which connect to
the main line.
Detection of short circuits on distribution systems is
typically done by relays, fuses, and other devices which
respond to excess current flow. These "overcurrent"
techniques are virtually the only methods available for
protection of existing power systems. Their characteristics will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
The longstanding problem for electric utilities is that short
circuits on distribution systems not involving normal power
carrying conductors frequently cannot be reliably detected.
These short circuits or faults are characterized by high
impedance at the point of fault. This impedance is often
sufficient to restrict current flow to values which correspond
to "normal load" rather than to fault levels.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the problem ofprotecting distribution
feeders from low current faults using conventional overcurrent
protection devices. When viewed from substation phase
ielays, the feeder is protected for all fault currents whose level
exceeds the settings of the phase relays. These relays must be
set higher than the maximum anticipated loads on the feeder.
Obviously, faults which draw lower current than the phase
relay settings will not be detected by these devices. This
leaves an unprotected region for the feeder which is typically
visited by high impedance faults.
Maximm
Anticipated Phxe RelaY
Load Settings
Feeder
Curent
Levels
Figure L-1. Feeder protection levels.
While the addition of ground overcurrent devices mitigates
the above problem, many utilities have found that wide
variations in system load and extreme system load imbalance
make it impossible to use very sensitive ground protection.
Hence, ground relays are typically set at 5070 of phase relay
settings or higher. This still leaves the feeder exposed to the
high impedance, low current faults.
1
From the above example, it should be obvious that even
the most intelligent use of overcurrent protection devices by
electric utilitiei will not solve the high impedance fault
problem. It will also be shown that some high impedance
iaults draw virtually no current and there is currently no
commercial or even anticipated research method which will
detect these faults. In short, some faults will always remain
undetected. However, the last ten years has brought much
research into the characteristics and nature of high impedance
faults. From this research, new detection approaches have
been theorized and are currently under study.
The use of non-fundamental current signals such as the
higher frequencies generated by arcing faultsand other unique
characteristics of these faulted conductors offers potential for
new protective relays in the future. While none of these
techniques have been developed sufficiently for safe use by
electriC utilities, research is ongoing and researchers are ever
hopeful for breakthrough solutions to this vexing problem.
Downed conductors on distribution systems are the subject
of the tutorial primarily because of public safety. People
become involved with such faults through vehicular accidents
with power poles and through incidental contact or proximity
in a wide variety of situations. This tutorial is not being
presented to broadcast a solution to the problem; however, it
is motivated to facilitate the education of engineers into the
technical aspects of the problem, to focus on ongoing fault
detection research, and to encourage discussion of ways in
which incidents involving the public can be minimized.
The Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power
Engineering Society has been vitally interested in this subject
for many years. Recognizing this interest, the PES Technical
Council authorized the preparation of a document intended
to discuss all aspects of this problem in terms reasonably
educated non-technical persons could understand. This
document was to educate utility personnel, teachers,
legislators, and the judiciary with the ultimate goal of
improving public safety. "Downed Power Lines: Why They
Can't Always be Detected," published February 22, 1989,was
a result of this assignment [i]. The conclusions reached in
this report are as follows:
"Detection of high impedance faults on overhead
distribution systems continues to be an unsolved problem for
electric utilities. This is true in spite of the continuing efforts
of some of the foremost engineers and scientists in the
country. The root problem is that a high impedance fault
does not cause a detectable change in current flow on a
circuit. The much more common low impedance faults cause
substantial fault current to flow and are easily detectable.
Downed conductors are of major concern to electric utilities
because they may result in public involvement in a hazardous
situation. Downed conductors may not contact a conductive
object and, therefore, have good probability of remaining
energized. When lying on certain surfaces, they may look
quite harmless. A person touching an energized power line
cbnductor faces substantial risk, since no detection device
known today can react fast enough to prevent injury.
 !he^onfy available solurion to this problem today is an alert
and informed public. Electric utilitiet continue toemphasize
this danger in their public affairs campaigns. public ipirited
citizens must call the police when tliey see a dbwned
conductor and wnrn anyone approaching to itay away from the
wire."

The number of fault incidents which involve downed

conductors and are not cleared properly is small, perhaps one
incident in a hundred faults. How!ve;, industry-concern for
these situations is great because the public may be involved.

O_ne can clearly see the need for wide exposure of this
problem to the public and the continued need for research
toward improved protection by concerned engineers. It is the
intent of this tutorial to summarize and preient the current
understaadings of high impedance, low currlnt faults, including
their nature and characteristics, their physical behavior, ani
their effect on the power system. Tlie-inability of existing
protection systems to detect such faults will be -discussed ii
detail along with the efforts by electric utility engineers to
mitigate the downed conductor problem. pait research on
detection methods will be described including the proposed
use of new time domain and frequency domairisolutibns. I't e
use of mor-e sophisticated, computer ielalng devices and the
potential for algorithms implemented on ihese devices to
detect the faults is discussed.

- It is the [of of the authors and sponsoring committees of

the Power Engineering Society thai this doJument will not
only pla-ce the. probJem in perspective, but encourage wide
spread discussion of the technical issue. It is ever oir hope
that the intelligence and innovation of researchers will yieid
improved detection methods and it is toward this end thai this
volume is directed.
 CHAPTER 2
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRIBUTION FEEDER FAULTS
INTRODUCTION
It is appropriate to begin an analysis of the high impedance
fault piobtem with a discussion of experiences and
observations offaults on distribution feeders' This discussion
of distribution faults will provide information on the
characteristics of these faults to help identifu the design goals
of a fault detection system which is developed. Much of the
information provided in this chapter has been gained from
extensive studies of distribution faults, for high current as well
as low current faults.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH CURRENT FAULTS
High current faults in distribution systems cause protective
devices to operate and stress system components beyond their
continuous current-carrying capability. While overcurrents
can be calculated, in many cases little has typically been
known about the correlation between actual current levels
and calculated values. The selection of overcurrent device
characteristics has often been based on worst-case or highly
conservative calculations. Because this approach can have an
adverse effect on the ability to detect many faults, a better
knowledge of actual fault currents would provide direction
regarding the application of more sensitive fault detection.
One must also consider coldload pickup as this phenomenon
must be allowed rvith the protective device characteristics
which are chosen.
Distribution Fault Current Study
This discussion ofhigh current faults on distribution feeders
is based primarily on an EPRI study concerning ananalysis of
distribution faults [2]. EPRI project RP 1209-1 was
undertaken to provide an accurate description of the
magnitude and characteristics of fault currents otrserved on
distribution feeders.
The study consisted of monitoring fifty multi-grounded,
wye-connectLd distribution circuits at thirteen utility
companies over a two year period. The utilities and the
feedlrs chosen provided a representative sampling of the total
utility distribution system in the United States, encompassing
a vaiiety of geographic regions and customer loads. Actual
fault daia was recorded by digital fault recorders, and the data
was analyzed by computer. Comparisons were made between
recorded data and calculated values for several parameters
including fault current. The data was studied in light of
surveys tompiled from the participating utilities on their
operating practices and fault records. Other high current
conditions such as cold-load pickup were studied. No attempt
was made to record low current, high impedance faults. While
the investigation provided in-depth analysis of many factors
regarding fault behavior, only those characteristics relevant
to-high lmpedance fault detection are highlighted for the
purpose oflhis discussion. This project has led to a better
undirstanding of the nature of high current faults on
distribution feeders.
Distribution Fault Survey Data
The majority of feeders monitored in the study were
primarily ii ttre tS kV voltage class-. Circuit voltages-ranged
irom 4.16 to 34.5 kV. The average feeder was 10.8 miles long
with 93 percent of the circuit length consisting of overhead
construciion. The typical feeder served loads characterized
as indicated in Table 2-1.
Type of l-oad Percent
Industrial 13
Urban/commercial 18
Rural 12
Suburban 56
Other 1
Table 2-1. Typicalloadcharacteristicsofmonitoredfeeders'
In the project, the utilities were asked to provide
informationioncerning faults on their systems' The responses
of the utilities provide significant insights for the study of
distribution faulis, particularly, high impedance faults. Some
of the results are summarized as follows:
. Outages were distributed fairly uniformly over the
entire length of the feeder.
. Most faults occur on laterals rather than on the
primary feeder.
. Faults involving only one phase accounted for
approximately 79 percent of all reported faults.
. About 81Vo of the single phase faults involved
neutral and about 197o involved a conductor on the
ground.
. The primary causes of permanent faults were
lightning, tree contact and equipment failure.
. Approximately 40 percent of all faults occurred
during periods of adverse weather, such as rain,
snow or ice.
.
The average outage time for a fault was about 1.57
hours.
. The average phase-to-ground fault current
magnitude was 1530 amPeres rms.
. Approximately one-half of all faults required circuit
breaker operation and, of these faults, 70 percent
required only one recloser operation.
. Less than two percent of the respondents reported
difficulty in picking up cold load, possibly because
the aveiage percent oi load picked up after a fault
was about 32 Percent.
 Analysis of Recorded Data
Data from numerous events was recorded for the project.
Of the events recorded, about 200 data records involving
faults, inrushes and cold load pickup, were analyzed. Th;
remainder of records involved transient phenomena, such as
switching evenls. The results of thi analysis can be
summarized as follows.
One of the most significant findings of the study is that the
vast majority of fault currents are quite low. The average
fault current was less than 2100 imperes rms, with tf,e
maximum current recorded about 6100 amperes rms.
Significantly, calculated fault currents compared very closely
with measured values, a finding which indicates ilat th6
majority of faults involve little or no fault impedance.
However, the recordings for this study were triggered only
when a preset current level was excleded o.6!
"*t"rrrul
trigger, such as a breaker operation. For this reason, only
overcurrent faults comprise the data base. As all the involved
utilities used zero fault impedance in their fault current
studies, one could conclude that these faults probably involve
a direct path to neutral or a solidly grounded objeci for the
fault impedance to be near zero. As will be disiussed later
in this chapter, the fault impedance can be very high for a
large number of faults which do not involve direct-contact
with the system neutral or ground. These considerations must
be remembered in studying the recorded data for this project.
. Other findings which are important
impedance faults were the following:
to the study of high
. Eighty-five percent of the recorded faults were
temporary.
. The average duration of all faults was about eight
cycles.
. Si*ty percent of the faults occurred within five
percent of the peak voltage.
. Very few miscoordination problems were noted.
- O4y seven coldload pickup events were recorded during
the duration of the project, a factot which tends to indicat6
that severe cold-load pickup events are not as frequent as
may have been expected. In fact, the characteristici of the
cold-load pickup events appeared very similar to that of inrush
events. Peak coldJoad pickup currents averaged roughly 2600
amperes with the maximum measured at 5000 amperes.
CHARACTERISTICS OF I.,OW CURRENT FAULTS
Much has been learned about the nature of high impedance
faults in the last fifteen years because of exterisive iesearch
efforts during this period. Much of the information discussed
in this section is the result of numerous staged faults
conducted for research purposes by Texas A&M University.
The study of the characteristics of downed conductor faulis
has led, to a greater awareness of their significance for utilities,
as well as to identify potential means for detecting these
faults.
Rate of Occurrence
There is substantial disagreement in the utility industry on
the degreelo_which high impedance faults occur. Many relay
engineers believe that only a small percentage of-fallen
conductors are not cleared by installed overcurrent protection.
However, line crews typically state that about one-third to
one-half of fallen conductors are not cleared by installed
protection. It is likely that the actual rate of occurrence is
near to that observed by the line crews. Relay engineers
often make their estimates based on trouble reports which
typically do not report all downed conductor occurrerces.
Little data on high impedance faults is kept in practice, partly
because the records of many utilities do not track daia on
faults which do not cause the operation of a circuit device.
,In research performed by Texas A&M University [3],
substantial investigation has been performed on the nature of
high impedance faults through the staging of downed
conductor faults over the last eleven years. Photographs of
typical staged faults may be found in Appendix B. Conductors
remained energized on the ground for periods of up to five
minutes. A fuse at the site offered protection for high current
faults.
A total of over 200 faults were staged at five different
utility companies on ten different feeders at seventeen
different locations. Of these 200 faults, only 35 have been
cleared by conventional overcurrent protection. The high
current faults occurred when a conductor was lowered to a
ground rod in the earth. Typically, the faults on a ground rod
were cleared by an upstream protection device which
consisted of an unusually small fuse (often ruted at 20
amperes). It is believed that most of the faults which were
cleared would not have been had they not been on a ground
..o-d, ol if standard protection had been used at the fault point.
Also, instantaneous relaying had been taken out of sirvice
during the tests. This practice does not bias the results
because reclose operations would have placed the fault on the
time delay relay curves stiil in service. In no case did the
substation relaying operate.
Other utiiities and research groups have staged faults for
the purpose of gathering further information on their
characteristics. These groups have reported similar results
from their tests.
One must consider that other factors may influence the
rate of occurrence of high impedance faults. No faults were
staged in the rain, and very wet conditions may tend to
increase fault currents. A more likely factor is that fallen
conductors will often contact the neutral as they fall, causing
an overcurrent fault. Staged faults for research were
controlled in a manner such that line to neutral faults did not
occur.
Magnitude of Fault Current
Current levels observed during high impedance faults may
range from zero up to the operation level of installed
overcurrent devices. During the Texas A&M fault tests, fault
cuffent during most tests tended to remain between about 10-
50 amperes. Waveforms from typical staged fault tests are
provided in Appendix C.
Research has shown that the predominant influences on
fault current for a given location are local conditions such as
soil type, soil moisture, and the presence of serendipitous
ground paths, such as water pipes, metal fences or extensive
tree roots. There is little correlation between available fault
current at the location and actual fault current when the fault
does not involve a solid contact between the phase conductor
and a solid electrical path such as neutral.
 SURFACE FAULT CURRENT (A)

Dry asphalt 0
Concrete (non-reinforced) 0
Dry sand 0
Wet sand 15
Dry sod. 20
Dry grass 25
Wet sod 40
Wet grass 50
Concrete (reinforced) 75

Table 2-2. Typical fault currents on various surfaces.

There is some relatiorship between the magnitude of fault

current and the surface involved in the fault. Table 2-2
provides a listing of typical fault currents which have been
observed in fault tests according to the fault surface.
Presence of Arcing
Experience has indicated that arcing often occurs with
downed conductor faults. For fallen conductor faults, the
energized conductor will come in close proximity with ground
or a grounded object. Typically, solid electrical contact is not
made. In particular for faults involving contact with ground,
the contact point may include small air gaps between the
conductor and ground. Additionally, there are air gaps in the
soil itself. The high potential difference over a short distance
causes the air gaps between the conductor and ground to
break down, resulting in arcing.
Voltage - Current Characteristics
For downed conductor faults which exhibit arcing, the
mechanism of the arcing is the predominant factor in
determining the characteristics of the fault.
Figure 2-1. Relationship of arc current to arc voltage.
Evidence indicates that the problem is less severe at higher
distribution voltages such as 25 or 34 kV. However' high
impedance faults still occur at such voltages. There is even
that in some circumstances, high impedance faults
"uid"nce
can occur at transmission voltages such as 115 kV.
It is believed that the relation to voltage level for the
occurrence of high impedance faults has to do with the
mechanics of arc formation as shown in Figure 2-2' For a
conductor on the ground, small gaps of air are Present
between the conductor and ground. These air gaps break
down at a given voltage defined by the length of the air gap'
At a lower-voltage class, current can flow for only a-.smaller
percentage of th; half cycle, thus restricting the amplitude of
iurrent. et trigirer voltages, the arc can persist for a longer
Dercentage of ihe half cycle, allowing a higher total current'
While thls explanation does not account for all cases, it does
describe a general pattern of relationship between the level
of fault curient andvoltage class, and the occurrence of high
impedance faults.

The characteristics of arcing have been extensively

investigated in laboratory studies, typically with a sparkgap
apparatus, and this model provides significant insight into the
understanding of distribution high impedance faults' Kaufman
and Page and Dunki-Jacobs [4,5] have described the voltage-
current relationships for a 60 Hz AC sparkgap as follows. As
indicated in Figure 2-L, the sparkgap will conduct as the
applied voltage reaches the breakdown or restrike voltage.
The arc forms at time To when the applied voltage equals the
restrike voltage. Immediately, the voltage across the arc
drops to Eo*. and remains constant as long as the current
flows. The arc voltage drops to a constant En*. and current
flow begins. Current reaches a maximum when the applied
voltage equals the arc voltage. After this time, the current
decreases but the voltage across the arc remains constant. Figure 2-2. Relationship of fault current magnitude to
The current returns to zero when the volt-time area Y equals voltage class.
the area of X. Depending on the conditions of the air gap,
the arc may restrike in the next half-cycle. When one
observes the current associated with arcing the resultant
waveform consists of distorted, non-sinusoidal bursts each Time Domain Characteristics
half-cycle.
The time domain characteristics of arcing faults are heavily
Experience has shown that the majority of high impedance influenced by the physical and mechanical characteristics of
faults occur at typical distribution voltages of 15 kV class. the particular fault in question. In general, one may observe
The problem becomes more severe at lower voltages, highly random behavior in the current associated with a
particularly 2-4 kV. In low voltage wiring, the problem can downed conductor fault [6]. Faults may last indefinitely with
be acute. the current magnitude either generally increasing or

TI'E (SECONDS)
Figure 2-3. Randomness of current magnitude during a
high impedance fault.
decreasing over the course of the fault. Typically, little effect
on,the voltage waveform is observed-L*"ept-for larger
magnitude faults. A trace of such a current waveform fr6m
an actual downed distribution conductor fault showing the
random nature of these faults is provided in Figure 2-3.-
It has been observed from numerous staged faults that the
magnitude of fault current may vary greatly from one
rycle to
the next, and even from half-cycte io tratt-cvcte. The iurrent
over the duration of a fault exhibits whit are apparently
random variations in current magnitude. There may even be
long quiescent periods in which no fault current flows while
a conductor is on the ground. This behavior can be readily
explained by how the physical characteristics of the fault vary
over time.
.When an arc forms, itcreates a great deal of heat at the
point of the fault. This heat acts to rapidly convert any
moisture in the soil into steam. As the steam quictty expandg
it displaces soil which rearranges the characteiisticiof ihe aii
gaps surrounding the energized conductor. As a result, the
magnitude of current in the next arc which forms may
substantially different from that of the previous arc.
be
In a related manner, the heat from the arc is often great
enough to fuse sand and silica in the soil into a glass--like
substance. As a result, such glassJike material rn'ay UuitO
around the conductor in such a manner to effectivelv insulate
the conductor from ground. This process may tend to cause
the fault current to generally reduce in magniiude over time.
However, fused material is impure and may conduct current.
In fact, this same process may iause to generally increase the
current magnitude in a high impedance fault over time. The
fusion of soil materials into a solid object provides a solid
path for current flow over the surface of tle fusert material,
as compared with the path through soil which has numerous
small air gaps.
It has been observed in some locations that the magnitude
of fault current for a fault may be generally greater-in the
positive- half-rycles of current as compared witfi the negative
half-cycles, or vice versa. It is believed that some soits eitribit
somewhat of a rectifuing effect in this manner.
Frequency Domain Characteristics
The mechanism of arc formation as described above
provides the basis for understanding the frequency domain
characteristics of arcing faults. This approach'has assisted in
the development of new techniques foiitre detection of these
faults. Because of the random nature of the arcing associated
with these faults, it
is not possible to obtairi a precise
frequency
_spectrum of an arc and generalize the spectrum to
all cases. However, it is helpful to analyze an approximate or
typical spectrum.
In the time domain, an arcing fault can be modelled as a
train of periodic pulses. Although this model is not precise
_
because of the random characteristics of the arc, it does shed
light on the frequency domain model. The Fourier transform
of.a train of pulses corresponds to a (sin x)/x function
[7]. In
this manner, arcing generates frequency components at; wide
band of frequencies throughout the spectrum.
. The duration and magnitude of each ',pulse" may-When
the course of a particular downed conducior fault.
vary over
one
averages the various spectra [8] over several seconds, the
result-js a smooth plot which diminishes with frequency
according to a 1/f distribution as depicted in Figure 2-4 whicir
is a spectral estimate of an arcing fault over a period of
approximately five seconds. In this spectral estimate, the
frequencies below 2 kHz have been rejected.
05.t0 1520
FREOUENCY (r(HZ)
2-4.
Figure Spectral estimate of an arcing fault.
(Components below 2 kHz have been
rejected.)
The current waveform in Figure 2-3 which is typical of
arcing faults has significant odd harmonic components. This
factor has led several research teams to focus on third
harmonic behavior as an indication of a fault. However, the
odd harmonics have highly variable behavior for normal
connected loads as well.
Substantial activity has been measured for arcing faults at
non-harmonic frequencies as predicted by the m-odet. In
addition to the fundamental and harmonic components, fault
components can be observed between harmonics and at
higher frequencies into several tens of kilohertz. Because the
fault enerry is concentrated primarily in the fundamental and
harmonics, the off-harmonic and high frequency components
are much smaller in magnitude, but still easily measurable
with proper signal conditioning.
 OPEN CONDUCTOR FAULTS

A broken conductor on a distribution feeder often

constitutes an unsafe condition because it may mean that a
high voltage conductor falls near the ground where it may be
touched by passers-by. It is desireable to detect broken
conductor conditions, but in many instances this task is
difficult for a detector at the substation because of the many
normal system conditions which may mimic the characteristics
of a broken conductor. In particular, it is very difficult to
discriminate between a broken conductor and a lateral fuse
operation. Nevertheless, it is helpful to arralyze the nature of
bioken conductor faults as part of the total picture for
detecting and classifying high impedance fault events'

The most obvious characteristic of a broken conductor is

loss of downstream load. Concurrently, the circuit unbalance
changes accordingly, In some cases the broken conductor may
contact an underbuilt neutral in which case an overcurrent
fault occurs. The conductor then may or may not fall clear of
the neutral to the ground. If the conductor falls clear to the
ground, and if a utility uses fuse saving techniques, the circuit
may reclose into a high impedance fault. Such a sequence
can be identified by an intelligent detector.

Where it is possible to install monitoring devices at

multiple points on a feeder, a means of detecting a broken
conductor is by measuring loss of potential downstream of the
break. Unique changes in the sequence voltages can also be
identified [9]. However, this approach alone is insufficient
because it is unable to discriminate broken conductors from
fuse operations. Additional information is needed to securely
identifu a downed conductor fault.

CONCLUSIONS

Substantial research in recent years has led to a significant

understanding of the characteristics of distribution faults, both
high current and low current faults. Identifuing these
characteristics has assisted in the development of potential
fault detection techniques.

REVIEW OF CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTION PROTECTION PRACTICES
INTRODUCTION
For understanding the problem of high impedance faults,
it is essential to have knowledge of the existing protection
practices on distribution feeders. This subject is discussed
through a description of typical distribution circuits and their
protection, as well as a survey of utilities to identify the range
of actual practices in use at these companies. The review of
present protection practices provides a framework for
discussing the improvements in fault detection which can be
provided by sensitive high impedance fault detection.
TYPICAL DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT DESCRIPTION
The majority of electric utility customers in the United
States receive service from single-phase transformers
connected to three-phase, four-wire, solidly grounded
distribution circuits. These circuits usually have only one
source and are fed by substation transformers connected as
shown in Figure 3-1. The phase-to-phase voltage on these
circuits generally ranges from 4160 to 13,800 volts, with a
large number operating at 12,470 volts. Other distribution
circuits operate at higher voltages, including particularly
24,900 and 34,500 volts. Also, ungrounded delta circuits still
exist in certain areas, most often at the 2400 volt level, but
this type represents a very small percentage of the total.
q2
+3
DETTNBUTION
LNE
Figure 3-1. Substation transformer connection.
Most distribution substation transformers are connected
so as to block the flow of zero-sequence current between the
high-voltage (supply) side and the low-voltage (distribution)
side. The delta/wye connection shown in Figure 3-1 is the
most commofl arrangement, but deltaf zig-zag
ungrounded-wyefdeltafgrounded-wye connections are also
employed. With these connections, the substation transformer
generally provides the only source of zero-sequence current,
except in certain cases noted below. A few utilities serve
distritrution substations with autotransformers, both with and
without delta tertiaries. With this connection, it is usually
necessary to coordinate the transmission line ground relays
with the ground relays protecting the autotransformer and the
distribution circuits.
CHAPTER 3
Most load on four-wire distribution circuits consists of
single-phase distribution transformers, conaected between
one
of the phase wires and the neutral conductor (Figure :-Z;.
The neutral conductor is connected to earth at the zubstation
and at frequert intervals throughout the length of the circuit.
Becatse it is impossible to exaitly balance iLe load between
the three phases, there is usually a continuous flow of residual
current in,the neutral, but this normally presents no hazard,
because this conductor is maintain.d it o. near ground
potential. AJthough the load unbalance may be quitE Ugn,
and even approach the loading on one o, ,o." ofihe ph;;
conductors, the neutral conductor is frequently sized at ibout
one-half the current-carrying rating ;f tne phase wires,
because a large amount oi current i,ill return in the
earth.
The size of the neutral conductor should theoretically have
some effect on the ability of protective devices to detect
a
downed phase wire; as a praciical matter, however. it does
not appear to be a significant factor in most instances.
TRANSFOBMER
Figure 3-2. Distribution transformer connection (single
LOAD phase).
Three-phase loads are connected to four-wire distribution
circuits using a variety of transformer connections. Some of
the more common methods are:
1. Primary in ungrounded wye, secondary in delta.
2. Primary in grounded wye, secondary in delta.
3. Primary and secondary in grounded wye.
4. Primary in delta, secondary in grounded wye.
5. Primary and secondary in delta.
The method used may have a significant effect on circuit
protection. For example, transformers connected as in
Method 2 will serve as zero-sequence current sources when
and a ground fault occurs on the primary circuit. For wye-
grounded circuits, this will reduce the zero-sequence current
available at the source substation and will result in
desensitizing the substation ground-fault protective devices.
Method 3 is commonly used to connect overhead and
underground distribution transformers serving large loads,
such as shopping centers, apartments, and small industries.
Transformers connected as in Method 3 provide a path for
zero-sequence current from the primary to the secondary, so
that all line protective devices must be coordinated with the

01
+2
SOURCE LOAD
+3
LOAD
3+ BANK KEEPS BROKEN PHASE ENERGZED
Figure 3-3. Distribution transformer connection (three
phase).
distribution transformer primary fuses. This may tend to force
up the settings on some ofthese devices, and thus reduce their
sensitivity. In addition, three-phase transformer banks may
energize broken phase wires that are grounded on the load
side only if the three-phase bank is located on the same side
as the ground. (See Figure 3-3.)
There are a variety of other arrangements for connecting
distribution loads. Some utilities connect distribution
transformers as shown in Figure 3-2 but use an insulated
neutral, grounded only at the substation. Others do not bring
the neutral out of the substation at all but use single-phase
transformers connected line-to-line.
Feeder and main sections of modern distribution circuits
are generally constructed of large conductors, with ampacity
ratings ranging from 500 to 800 amperes, or more. However,
a considerable number of circuits are still in service,
particularly on branches off the main trunk, that are built
with small conductor, such as 1/0 aluminum or #6 copper.
These lines have limited load capacity and tend to anneal and
melt quickly when faulted; and for this reason they are
normally protected by small line fuses that must be
coordinated with the distribution transformer cutouts. Circuit
lengths vary considerably, from one or trvo miles in dense
urban areas, to as much as 20 miles or more in sparsely
populated rural locations.
A large percentage of distribution customers in the United
States are served from single-phase lines, and some are many
miles from the nearest three-phase supply. Many customers
are connected to radial underground distribution circuits,
which are tapped to overhead lines. These customers are
served from so-called "padmount" transformers, which are
sited at ground level near the load.
In general, most of the various service methods presently
employed in this country will permit overhead distritrution
customers to install dispersed storage and generation, and
these devices may have an important effect on circuit
protection and coordination.
13
DISTRIBUNON FAULTS
Fault currents on distribution circuits in the United States
range from over 20,000 amperes to values less than one
ampere for high impedance single-phase-to-ground faults'
The maximum fault current can be controlled by system
design, and most utilities set an upper limit of approximately
10,000 amperes, so as not to exceed the rating of certain types
of distribution line equipment. Maximum faults are limited
by restricting substation transformer size and/or impedance,
by installing bus or circuit reactors, or by inserting.reactance
oi resistance in the transformer neutral. On most circuits, the
maximum fault is a bolted single-phase-to-ground fault at the
substation; but since the zero-sequence impedance of a
tlistribution circuit is about three times the positive-sequence
value, a three-phase short circuit becomes the higher
magnitude fault after moving down the circuit a few thousand
feet. Minimum fault magnitude cannot be controlled, as this
value is largely dependent on fault resistance; these faults are
the most dangerous and difficult to detect.
Clearing times for short circuits on distribution circuits vary
widely, depending on fault magnitude and the type of
protective equipment installed. In general, on most circuits,
iaults above about 3000 amPeres will be cleared in 0.1 second
or faster. [-ow current faults frequently require clearing times
of five to 10 seconds or longer; and some very low level but
potentially dangerous ground faults may not be cleared at all,
ixcept by manual disconnection of the circuit.
CIRCUIT PROTECTION
A one-line diagram of a typical distribution circuit, showing
some of the protective devices commonly employed, is shown
in Figure 3-4. The circuit is normally supplied through a
single power circuit breaker located at the supply substation
and is divided into various zones by automatic sectionalizing
devices. These devices are all carefully coordinated, so that
a fault in any section can be quickly isolated with minimum
or no interruption to other portions of the circuit. Of course,
a fault in the main trunk section, near the source breaker, will
require that the entire circuit be interrupted. However, if
automatic reclosing is employed, the duration of outages due
to transient faults in this zone will be limited to a brief
interval, often considerably less than one second.
POWEn CnCUr (3) CrRCUrr
BREAKEF
3+
RECLOSEHg
= (3) clRCUfi
NECLOgERS
CIRCUIT
BECLOSER
or3T. TRAXSF.
DIST. THANSF
Figure 3-4. Distribution circuit diagram'
 Most electric utilities depend upon phase overcurrent relays GROUND RELAY SET ON 24OA. WILL
and a residually connected overcorrerit relay, usually referrJd TRIP SOURCE PCB WHEN LINE OCR OPERATES
to as a 'ground" relay, to detect faults on the m-ain trunk
portion of distribution circuits. These relays may be installed
in the control cabinet of the substation power circuit breaker UNBALANCED
LOAOS
protercting the circuit, and are connected as shown in Figure uJ
3-5. The phase relays are re_latively insensitive to single-ph"ase_ ()
tL
to-ground faults, because they must be set to operate-above f
o
the o
,maximum expected load current undei emergency
conditions. As a result, phase relay settings of 600 to"120tl
amperes are not uncofllmon, particularly in urban areas. The
CURRENT lN
circuit ground relay receivesltre phasoi sum of the currents GROUND RELAY
in the. three phase relays, and both types of relays must be BEFORE OCR
4 !OA
coordinated with all protective devicei-on the circuit. OPERATES
-

CURRENT
TRANSFORMERS

GURRENT IN
GROUND RELAY
AFTER OCR
OPERATES

Figure 3-6. Incorrect trip caused by unbalance.

103

Very lnverse Ground Rlay

24O A.,72 Cy. at lOOto
12_5 kV
SUBSTATION
BUS
Very lnverse Phase Relavs
600 A., 35 Cy. ar 5OO%
PHASE POWER
BELAYS CIRCUIT
BREAKEB 102
CONTROL
CABINET
ALL RELAYS TRIP
POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER

Figure 3-5. Overcurrent relay connection diagram.

o
o
o
v10
IJJ
The--sensitivity.of a residually connected ground relay is
generally limited by the fact that it must be sit high enough =
so as to coordinate with all downstream protective devices,
and high enough to prevent incorrect tripping due to the large
inrush currents that may occur during cbld-load pickup. 1t Type'L' OCR
must also be set high enough to prev-ent accidental triirping 110t2EO A-,2A-2D
on load unbalance, and it should be noted that this unlaiince
may be greatly increased upon the operation of a fuse or oil
circuit_recloser serving a single-phase tap. Consider Figure
3-6. If the largest recloser on a particular circuit his a
1401280 A rating, a ground relay sei at 240 A will properly
coordinate with this recloser. However, operatioi oi th;
recloser will cause a change in the residual load current
measured by the ground relay. This may result in a current
higher than the relay setting, in which case the entire circuit
would be incorrectly tripped (Figure 3-7). To overcome this
-11
problem, it is frequently necessary to set the circuit ground 10L
relay as trigh as one-half the setting on the phase relays; some -^2
10 A
companies have found it necessary to remove all risidually
103 ro'
connected relays from their distribution circuits. CURRENT (A.)
Figure 3-7. Feeder coordination with recloser.
 The detection of downed conductors on single-phase taps
mav be sreatly improved if a fuse or recloser is installed at
the'poiniwheie tti tap is connected to the main line' These
deviies witl usually operate at considerably lower fauit current
levels than the relays in the station breaker; however, their
sensitivity is still limited by the amount of load current that
must be carried on the tap, and the flct that they must
coordinate with the fuse protecting the lrrrgest transformer
connected to the tap. Protection may also be improved by
providing properly coordinated protective devices on the
various Jrrt-Utitcfres. Experience has shown, however, that
even lightly fused sub-branches may \: subject to downed
conduciors-that are not deenergized' This generally occurs
in those cases where a high resistance at the point of fault
has limited the ground fault current to a very few amperes.
It should also be'noted that the sensitivity of any overcurrent
protective device will always be limited by the need to survive
ih" h"u.ry inrush and coldload pickup currents which will
occur when the circuit is reenergized after a long outage'
These currents have increased markedly in recent years,
particularly with the advent of large numbers of residential
and commercial electric heating and cooling units now
installed in most areas.
AUTOMATIC RECLOSING
Prompt clearing of certain types of faults may be affected
by the automatic-reclosing schedule adopted by individual
,riititi". for their distribution circuits. Some companies do
not reclose the substation power circuit breaker after a
protective relay operation under any circumstances, but prefer
io rely on superviiory control or manual restoration of service'
Oth"i companies piefer one-shot, ultra-high-speed recloslng
on all overhead circuits. Most utilities, however, use multiple-
shot reclosing for their distribution station breakers' The
initial rectosure can be high-speed (0.2 - 0.5 second), or
delayed for three to five seconds. Then, one or two additional
time-delayed reclosures are programmed on the reclosing
relay. Typical schedules might be "instantaneous", foliowed by
15 ieconds, followed by 60 seconds; or "instantaneous",
followed by 30 seconds; or 3 seconds followed by 15 seconds'
In general, automatic reclosing is not used on underground
cables.
Three-phase and single-phase oil or vacuum circuit
reclosers ire widely used on overhead distribution lines' Most
of these devices are set to provide "three shots to lockout"'
That is, after a fault is detected by the overcurrent sensing
element, the recloser will open to de-energize the circuit and
reclose after about 1.5 seconds. This sequence will be
repeated two more times, unless the fault has been cleared'
Ifihe fault is "permanent", the recloser locks open after the
fourth trip operation.
It is standard practice for utilities to design the overall
reclosing system on a distribution circuit to be compatible
with thJciicuit design and the environment in which it must
operate; and, most important, to provide reliable service to
ii customers. Note that it is frequently necessary to modify
the automatic reciosing schedule on a circuit when certain
types of customers are added to an existing line; and this may
alio .equire major changes in the circuit protective devices'
STANSTICAL SUMMARY OF PRACTICES
As previously stated, to fully understand the difficulties
utilitiei face in detecting downed conductors, it is necessary
to have a complete understanding of existing distribution
.15
feeder protection practices' The fundamental prote.ction
concepts utilized aie relatively consistent across the utilities
with 'only minor variations to fit local conditions and
circumstances. The practices of phase overcurrent protection,
fusing, and reclosin[ previously described, are pervasive and
g"n"Iitty vary only by degree in such areas as settings and
coordination methods.
When one studies ground fault protection practices,
however, a different picture emerges. The wide diversity of
Dractices among utililies is the best evidence that no clear
lnd distinct solition exists to the detection of low grade, low
current faults on distribution feeders. Downed corductors
are a persistent problem that utilities have sought to solve by
numeious techniques.. It is evident today that no clear and
distinct method using conventional technology exists to provide
consistent and reliable detection.
Both formal and informal surveys of distribution practices
have been conducted to document the consistency among
utilities in the protection of distribution feeders. The survey
periodicatly run by the Power System Relayflg Committee is
in excellent summary of current practice [10]. This survey'
published twice in the last seven years,-documents general
consistency in protection practices, while pointing out the
diversity of ."tt odt used by utilities to detect grounded
conduc;ors. The following statistical comments on utility
practice are derived from several sources including the PSRC
iu*"y, independent surveys conducted by researchers at Texas
aAM Univirsity, and the general knowledge of the authors
of this document based on their own experience.
Almost 80% of the energy distributed by electric utilities
is done on 15 kV class systems. The practice of most utilities
is to use multi-grounded neutrais regardless of voltage class.
Over 90Vo of all utilities apply phase overcurrent protection
devices with instantaneourtripping for the purpose of "fuse
saving". The use of one instantaneous trip is most common,
but many utilities use two instantaneous trips.
Utility practices vary as to the use and purpose of
instantaneous tripping. Generally, a low set instantaneous trip
-saving,
is used for fuse whiie a high set trip is used to
minimize equipment damage and inhibit reclosing. One can
see the strong consistency in practice among utilities with
respect to
phase overcurrent protection ?ld reclosing
praitices. This can be attributed to the significant success
bxperienced by utilities in applying these methods to detect
.uih tt ai phase-to-phase and high current faults. The
same"u"t
uniformity of practice does not exist in the area of
feeder ground protection.
Aboutl5Vo of utitities use TOC trip for ground protection.
About 657o of all utilities apply an instantaneous or fast trip.
While this may seem a significantly high number, implying
consistent praitice, it must be interpreted in light of the
settings used on these devices.
Unlike phase overcurrent protection, there is wide variation
among utilities in how ground protection devices are set.
WhilJfew utilities attempt low ground settings with respect to
phase settings, the trend among utilities is. to-increase ground
protection settings. In many cases, ground relays are set at or
near the same levels as the phase relays. Table 3-1 shows the
basis of TOC pick up settings for those utilities using such
devices. One can see that most ground relays are set as a
percentage of the phase trip setting. It is also common
practice 1o set such relays as a given percentage- abov.e
lstimated normal load unbalance or normal load level' In all
cases, this means that load unbalance must be carefully
 OVERCURRENT GROUND PROTECTION Open Interval
Time, Seconds 5 kV 15 kV o( I-\/
LW
eE t-\r
OrJKv
Main Fcr:clcr Initiate to 1st:
A. Apply TOC Trip Ycs 6e% 87% 0-1 37 53 28 13
Ncr 31.% 1 n(t7 1-5 20 30 13 74
B. Apply Instantaneous Ycs 80% 6-10 1 3 2
or Fast Trip Ncr 20% 11 -20 2 3 11
C. Basis of TOC Pickup Setting Whcn 21-60 4 2 1
Applic<1: 1st and 2nd:
(ovcr 100% : rnulitl>Ie rncthods used) 0-1 4 2
1. Pcrccnttrge abovc cstimatcd 1-5 72 15 106
nonnill load unbalance. 2J% 20% 6-10 3 5 31
2. Pcrccnt:rgc abovc cstirn;r,tcd 11-20 26 43 19 15
load unl:alance due to switchirrg. g% 9o/o 21-60 13 17 oo
3. PcrccrrtiLgc of tlrc phasc 2nd to 3rd:
trip pickup. lb%
4. Perccrrtag<l of thc basc
50t/o <10 8 10
trarrsforrncr full lo;id. 10-30 16 22 10 10
5. Pcrccntagc of thc fccdr:r
25% 3i-50 5 11 47
crrcrgcncy load ra.tirrg. 1A%
>50 10 13 4t
6. Pcrt r'111l1gp of tL,' f.t',I.r' 3rd to 4th
rrorrrrirl loirrl 1;11i11g. 20(lo <10 1 5
+ Of 95 utilitir:s, 93 provi<[c 10-30 3
aurttlrnatic r.cc]osiuq orr
()\1'r'lr('ir(l Iirrcs following a rt'l;ry tlip. 31-50 1
>50 1

.Of 95^ utilities, 93 provide autorratic reclosing on overhead

lincs followirrg a relay trip.

Table 3-1. Overcurrent ground protection practices.

(PSRC survey data, in percent)
Table 3-2. Reclosing practices.
(PSRC survey data, in number of responses)'

considered when applying such devices.

Since the majority of utilities consider tripping on load
unbalance an unacceptable practice, it is necessary that load
unbalance be carefully monitored andfor ground relays set
high enough to avoid unnecessary tripping, resulting in service
interruption. Herein lies the most significant practical
limitation in the detection of low current faults on distribution
feeders. If load unbalance were eliminated as a practical
constraint, ground relays with low settings would reiult in a
very significant improvement over phase relays for the
detection of high impedance faults. While some faults would
remain undetected, certainly the majority would be found by
this method. But, for the most part, utilities have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to control load unbalance so
that low ground overcurrent relay settings could be used.
Attempts have been made to continually adjust settings as a
function of load unbalance. These attempts are discussed in
Chapter 4. White in theory this merhod holds promise,
commercial implementations of this methodolory have not
proven completely successful. It is likely that future relaying
devices will take load unbalance into account and, by adaptive
means, will adjust their settings accordingly. Such variable
sensitivity devices would serve to improve ground protection
during periods of low load unbalance.
Most utilities believe that instantaneous or fast trip ground
protection is very effective for "fuse saving". Virtually all
utilities use automatic reclosing following a relay trip.
Predominant practice is for two or three reclosing attempts
with three being most prevalent. 'fable 3-2 shows the time
intervals typically used by utilities in applying reclosing on 15
kV class feeders. The typical practice would be three open
intervals between reclosings of less than 1 second, 15 seconds,
and 15 to 120 seconds respectively. Ninety percent of all
utilities use a reset after successful reclosing. Reset time may
vary from instantaneous to 180 seconcls or more. Typical
settings of 10-30 seconds are used.
Reclosing practices are under constant review by utilities.
While there is certainly no consensus, it is felt by some
utilities that the third reclosing attempt has a relatively low
incremental success rate and might well not be needed if
SCADA systems are in place to allow remote manual closing.
Some utilities are experimenting with longer reset times for
the reclosing relay to give tripping equipment more
opportunity to trip for random behavior, low current faults.
It remains to be seen what these changes and trends will
accomplish in terms of protection effectiveness. The data
available from utilities to document protection improvement
due to such changes is poor. It is hoped that such data will
be more available in the future and the effectiveness of such
practices can be better evaluated.
Given the above practices, it is useful to note the statistics
reported by utilities with respect to fault occurrence and
behavior and the steps taken to improve detection. While
very few utilities keep quantitative records of fault statistics,
many utilities can provide general information about faults on
their systems. Most utilities report difficulty in detecting some
percentage of ground faults. Reports of conductor burn down
are also frequent on some systems. Where faults occur due
to conductors down on macadam, dry ground, and trees, the
incidence of undetected faults increases.
Utilities report trying numerous modifications to their
protection practices to improve the detection of low grade
faults. Actions tried in recent years include reducing the low
set instantaneous and fast trip settings and reducing ground
protection settings. Other actions include reduction of feeder
fuse sizes and, where not previously used, adding ground
protection. Again, considerations of load level, overall
coordination, and system unbalance must be carefully studied.
Some utilities have completely removed instantaneous
reclosing, extended reclose intervais, and reduced the number
of reclose attempts in an attempt to improve protection.
 The present system of overcurrent protection does an
excelleni job of detecting and removing most faults with
minimal sirvice intemrption. Presently available equipment
and practices have inherent limitations with regard to
deteciion of low current faults. The following chapters discuss
new methods to augment present practices to improve the
detection of high impedance faults.
 CHAPTER 4
UTILITY HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on research and development efforts
on high impedance fault detection initiated by utility
companies. . M?lV companies have experienced problemi
associated with high impedance faults on their systbms, and
have .closely examined and studied the probiem. Two
investigations are presented here. The first ii research begun
by Rochester Gas and Electric which was sutrsequeitly
continued by Nordon Research and Development. The iecond
is an investigation originating with Pennsylvania power and
Light Company which led to a collaborative project with
Westinghouse.
RESEARCH BY ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation has had an interest
in the detection of high impedance ground faults for a number
of years. Statistics on the number and types of uncleared
ground faults are difficult to obtain; however, informal
interviews with line people make it clear that the problem is
significant. .The problem may or may not be significant from
an economic standpoint. It is certainly significant from a
moral standpoint. Unless it can be proven that it is impossible
to.detect high impedance faults, the electric industry has an
obligation to its employees and the public to searth for a
solution.
Rochester Gas and Electric recognized in 1975 that
technology had advanced to a point where the detection of
high impedance faults could be feasible. Specifically, active
filters, personal computers, and digital techniques provided
new tools to study an old problem. A test site was-built on
the Rochester Institute of Technology campus in the spring of
that year, and a series of fault tests wera recorded usin-g a
magnetic tape recorder and a spectrum analyzer, and a digital
fault recorder. Significant changes in the raiio ofodd to Jven
harmonic currents were noted during these tests and it soon
became evident that the harmonic behavior of a circuit during
normal conditions had to be well defined first. The followin!
yeat, a hardware package was built containing a set of filtersl
each tuned to a specific harmonic from the fundamental to the
sixteenth to study the ambient harmonic levels of several
operating circuits. Over the next two years, several
improvements were made to this system so thai data could be
collected over long periods of time and stored digitally.
In 1978,it was noticed that when harmonic phase currents
and phase voltages were displayed on a dual trace
oscilloscope, the oscilloscope would loose synchronization
during a fault. This led to the discovery that there were
significant phase shifts in the phase angle of the harmonic
currents relative to the fundamental voltage, particularly the
third harmonic. A prototype protective device was buili and
demonstrated as a method of fault detection later that year.
This device provided the,incentive to design new monitoring
gquipmnt to study_the relationships of harmonic phase anglei
during both normal and abnormal conditions.
By 1979, several conclusions concerning
.harmonics were formed:
the behavior of
l. Harmonic currents as high as 5 percent are
common under normal operating conditions,
particularly during light load periods.
2. The phase angle of the third harmonic current
relative to the substation bus voltage on a 1g0
Hz basis varies over a wide range, but varies
slowly under normal conditions except during
capacitor switching.
3. Distribution transformers generate differing
amounts of third harmonic current; however, the
harmonic angle seems to remain stable.
4. Although instrumentation was not available to
measure the absolute phase angle shift of the
third harmonic, data indicated that during a high
impedance ground fault, the angle of th; thi;d
harmonic shifts rapidly as much as 100 degrees
on a 180 Hz base and the average shift is about
60 degrees.
. The problem now seemed to be in designing equipment
that could measure the absolute angular sf,itit tt" ti,l.O
harmonic current with re-spect to the fundamental phase
voltage. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to develop
instrumentation for this function. One attempt resulted in ;
method that could be used to measure the absolute phase
angle of the fundamental phase voltage of a transmission line
over long distances using LORAN C as a time base,
Unfortunately for high impedance fault detection, the LORAN
C project received priority and funding for the next three
years.
In 1985, Nordon Research and Development built
instrumentation to measure the absolute phase'angle of the
third harmonic relative to the fundamental voltagel RG&E
provided Nordon with test facilities and minimil financial
support. The techniq,L.e developed by Nordon is proprietary
and has not been duplicated by other researchers.
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation continues to
research in the detection of high impedance faults.
Ipport
The test facility at Rochester Institute of Teihnology is still
functional and is made available to researchers.
PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT RESEARCH
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company,s (pp&L) active
research on high impedance faults spanned 13 years
-effort
from 1972 through 1985.
 The initial motivation for investigating high impedance
faults resulted from experience with installed cross-linked
polyethelene (XLP) covered aluminum and ACSR conductors.
During storms, if lightning strikes XLP covered conductors, a
phenomenon occurs where conductors break or burn offwhere
attached to a support insulator on a pole. Other research
[11,12] has explained the nature of this phenomenon. On
many occasions, covered wire remained energized while in
contact with earth or other surfaces it touched, because XLP
acted as insulation. Necessary and sufficient fault conditions
were not present for overcurrent protection schemes to de-
energize distribution circuits to isolate problems of this nature.
Because no techniques were known for relay protection which
might be sensitive to such faults, PP&L proceeded with a
more significant investigation into high impedance faults.
Stased Fault Tests
Because little was known about the characteristics of high
impedance faults, staged tests were organized at PP&L s East
Allentown substation in 1913 to determine typical fault current
magnitudes for different types of conductors and to develop
a method for detecting covered conductor faults [13].
The results of the test were entirely unexpected. Although
available fault current on the substation property was 8800
amperes and 8300 amperes for bolted 3 phase and single
phase faults, respectively, there was never sufficient fault
iurrent to trip the substation circuit breaker with either bare
or XLP covered conductors lying on the ground surfaces'
PP&L concluded that a ground relay setting of 50 amperes or
less would be required to reliably detect and clear faults on
dirt or grass. It was also concluded that covered conductors
on damp sand and both covered and bare conductors on dry
asphalt could not have been detected by ground relays'
Study of Downed Conductor Faults
PP&L proceeded to gather additional information
concerning the nature of the problem on their distribution
system. High impedance fault data on the PP&L distribution
system was collected between April 1974 and December 1975
[14]. In total, data on 390 faults was recorded. The 390 cases
of broken conductor faults represented about '1,1,% of 3605
total faults during an equivalent period. Downed conductors
remained energized in about 113 or 123 out of 390 cases of
broken conductor faults recorded. These 123 cases
represented about 3.4Vo of all faults.
PP&L s overhead distrilrution system, at the time, consisted
of approximately 957o bare conductor and 57o XLP covered
conductor. Bare conductors were involved in 83.57o and XLP
conductors in1.6.57o of the 390 high impedance faults. Of the
uncleared faults, bare conductor accounted for 62Vo and XLP
covered conductor for 38Vo. This documented an existing
problem with bare as well as XLP covered conductors. There
was no apparent correlation between the ability of a protective
device to operate and factors such as contacted surface,
proximity of pole grounds, size and type of conductor, and
available fault current. Fault current was proven to be an
unreliable fault characteristic to detect high impedance faults'
More than 50% of the cases of covered conductor
burndown were caused by lightning, with tree contact the
second leading cause. Ughtning and tree contact accounted
for over 75Vo of. all burndown cases. No single cause in the
remaining 2570 was accountable for more than 5Vo.
Surveys of Utilities
During this period, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
circulated questionnaires to member companies about high
impedance faults [15]. Of the respondents,T3To indicated that
they encountered difficulty in fault interruption while 27Vo
reported infrequent failures to interrupt. Not only did the
reiponses indiiate that many problems existed with high
impedance faults, but the responses also confirmed that there
*eie many myths concerning high impedance faults. Realizing
that industry research was required, IEEE and EPRI began
investigations based in part on information supplied by PP&L.
Downstream Voltaue Measurements
In October 1975 another series of tests were conQucted to
investigate voltage unbalance during high impedance fault
conditions [16]. Calculations indicated that significant voltage
unbalances occur during fault conditions. In particular, it
appeared that zero sequence voltage (E'.) should be
investigated as an indicator of high impedance fault5.
For the tests, a circuit was arranged to simulate single-
phase, open conductor faults on a 12kY three phase circuit.
Measurements indicated that calculated zero sequence
voltages could be verified by test data. The data gathered
indicated that, for the test conditions, a voltage relay could be
set to detect the change in zero sequence voltage between
system normal and faulted conditions, and initiate interruption
of the circuit. Changes in the magnitudes of frequency
components, changes in the relation of current phase angles,
and changes in magnitude of residual current were also
observed.
Modelling of High Impedance Faults
To assist in the research on high impedance faults, PP&L
developed a Distribution Fault Analysis Program [17,18] which
provided a computer model of a distribution circuit. The
p.og.a- allowed complete modelling of a feeder, and allowed
calculation of steady-state circuit Parameters under a variety
of faulted and unfaulted conditions. Using a "typical line"
model, a variety of calculations were performed to gain
experience with the program, investigate sensitivity to fault
impedance and various circuit parameters, as well as to
acquire a feel for characteristic circuit changes during fault
conditions. Operation of the model indicated that obvious
changes were present in the negative and zero sequence
voltage beyond the open conductor fault, and negative and
,ero iequence current at the protective device responsible for
detecting the open conductor fault.
Collaborative Research with Westinghouse
ln 1977 PP&L began a joint study with the Advanced
Systems Technology Division of Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (AST) to assess various relay schemes for the
detection of high impedance faults and in 1979 additional
work was started to investigate the mechanism of XLP
covered conductor burndown [19,20,211.
Based on the results of the 1974-75 data on 390 cases of
fallen conductors, it was apparent that the problem with
clearing high impedance faults was concentrated on the three
phase portion of the feeder. Efforts were focused on
developing techniques to detect faults in this area.
 Several criteria were identified for use in evaluating various
Results of Relay Evaluation
technologies for high impedance fault detection. It was
identified that a high impedance fault detection system should
The conclusions of the overall evaluation were:
be: sensitive, discriminative, reliable, secure, economical,
rugged, relatively simple, easy to apply, capable of fast .
installation, and easily maintained. Phase overcurrent devices are ineffective in
detecting high impedance faults.
Six relay schemes and ground overcurrent relays were . Solidly grounded phase conductors, broken or
evaluated against phase overcurrent relays for their ability to
detect high impedance faults. Each scheme was evaluated, by
not, produce detectable voltage unbalance
downstream of the fault location.
computer simulation in terms of its technical performance
under simulated fault conditions and its estimated installed .
cost. Comparison with PP&L's existing protective scheme was
Ungrounded broken conductors produce
detectable voltage unbalance downstream of the
made to estimate the cost effectiveness of the proposed relay
schemes.
fault location.

The relay schemes selected for evaluation were:

. Broken and/or solidly grounded conductors will
cause current unbalance upstream of the fault
. Ratio Ground Relay (CGR) - a device in which
location.
the sensitivity of a ground relay varies inversely .
proportionally to feeder loading.
Ground overcurrent relays would detect only
about 40Vo of the high impedance fault types
. Undervoltage Relay - loss of voltage occurs at
studied.
the end of a three phase line section from most , Ze.ro or nega-tive sequence line-end overvoltage
high impedance faults; an undervoltage relay at
relays are effective, but there are limitations to
the end of the line section could be set to pick
these alternatives and applications.
up on low voltage and initiate communications
to trip the appropriate protective device. . The Ratio Ground Relay concept could be used
. with a detection effectiveness of approximately
Zero and Negative Sequence Overvoltage Rela),s
80Va.
- abnormal zero ar,d, negative sequence voltages
occur downstream from a high impedance fault
due to unbalanced voltage conditions; azeto ot
Research on Ratio Ground Relay
negative sequence overvoltage relay could be
used to detect abnormally high sequence
Based on the positive results of the relay evaluation, further
voltages at the end of the line section to initiate
research was conducted to refine these concepts and construct
tripping of an interruption device through an
and test a Ratio Ground Relay.
appropriate communications link.

. Zero and Negative Sequence Overcurrent Relays
- a high impedance fault may cause heavy
current unbalance which could be detected by
zero ot negative sequence overcurrent relays
located at the protective device.
Evaluation of Downstream Voltage Techniques
A relay evaluation program evaluated the behavior of the
six proposed relay schemes and ground overcurrent relays.
Negative and zero sequence overvoltage sensing at the ends
of the three phase line sections and branches would be the
most effective method to detect high impedance faults.
However, the end-of-the-line sequence overvoltage schemes
have several disadvantages:
. Multiple sensing locations are required, each
with a communications system.
. Receiver equipment will be necessary at the
protective device.
. The total reliability of the scheme may be lower
than required.
. The ends of three phase line sections or
branches are dynamic positions that may require
regular relocation of the relays and related
equipment.
. Total cost per circuit is presently high.
A Ratio Ground Relay design was initiated as an
electromechanical device. The selected scheme had to be
economical, permit construction in a standard relay case size,
present low burden to existing substation current trinsformeri
and be simple to. apply, test and set. As with any relay, it
must be dependable, secure, selective and sensitivl. In'ihe
PP&L .application of the concept, high speed is not a
constraint. provided reliable operation takis place with proper
coordination with existing overcurrent deviies.
Studies were conducted on four possible Ratio Ground
Relay designs. Each scheme used the induction disc concept
with.operating and restraint windings. Contact closing torque
in all schemes,.is produced by residual current (3t) in ihe
operating.rvinding. Contact opening torque is produled by a
combination of phase, positive aia/or' negaiiue sequence
current in the restraint winding. The designi were modelled
with digital techniques and prototypes weie constructed for
testing on the Westinghouse ANACbM III analog compurer
which modelled one of PP&Us circuits.
Specification of tap settings for the CGR require an
examination of normal load unbalance. Tripping thL circuit
on an unbalance because of a blown single phasJ tap fuse is
undesirable. Therefore, the unbalance setiings allowed normal
load unbalance with the tap fuse blown thatireated the worst
circuit unbalance.
From these studies one CGR scheme was chosen to fit the
various requ.irements. A restraint element responsive to
ll, l,
- I,I, l'. cotrp.led with a l3lolr operating elemint on a singl'e
induction disc was chosen for prototype construction. fle
 prototype CGR was an electromechanical induction disc unit The covering increased the fault impedance for a contact with
with operating and restraint elements to be installed in grass substantialiy, yielding a value of about 270 ohms versus
existing distribution substation switchgear and driven by the 80 ohms for bare conductor.
existing phase current transformers andwill not require any
additional substation equipment. The prototype was
constructed and installed in a standard directional overcurrent Results of Relav Tests
relay case. Based on tests on the Westinghouse ANACOM III
computer with simulated faults and circuit operation, the relay Observations were noted on the operation of the relay
operation substantiated the previous analytical work. methods during the above fault tests. The results of these
relay tests are as follows:
Tests of Relays with Staged Faults . The Ratio Ground Relay detected 9 out of 19
single phase-to-ground faults. It was unable to
In 1981, staged fault tests were conducted to substantiate detect the phase-to-tree fault with either bare or
the analytical work that had been completed through exposure XLP covered conductors. It did detect all of the
of the several relay schemes to high impedance fault open conductor faults.
conditions on an operating 12 kV circuit [22]. The test
configurations included: . The conventional Ground Overcurrent Relav did
not detect any of the phase-to-ground faulti. It
. Open conductor tests detected all but one of the open conductor
faults.
. Single phase-to-ground faults using bare and
XLP covered conductors in contacfwith grass, . The downstream Negative Sequence Ovewoltage
gravel, asphalt, concrete and an evergreen tree Relay was unable to detect any of the faults
because of voltage support equipment installed
. Open conductor tests with the source or load to support customer voltage during the tests.
side conductor on the ground
. The downstream Zero Sequence Overvoltage
Relay detected 13 out ofthe 15 open conductor
The test data is shown in Table 4-1. faults, even though the voltage support
equipment substantially reduced the zero
sequence voltage on the load side of the open
No. of Avg. Fault phase.
Conductor and Surface Cases Current (A)
. No voltage activated relay detected any single
Covered to grass 4 26 phase-to-ground fault.
Covered to gravel 3 55
Covered to asphalt J 0
Covered to concrete 3 61 Fault current and voltage data recorded during the tests
Covered to tree 1 0 compared favorably with output from the Distribution Fault
Bare to grass 4 86 Analysis Program and ANACOM III studies. The operation
Bare to gravel 3 87 of the several relay schemes performed as expected within the
Bare to asphalt 4 0 restrictive requirements of the test scenario and further
Bare to concrete 3 97 substantiated earlier analvses.
Bare to tree 1 1

l-ong-term Tests of Ratio Ground Relay

Table 4-1. Measurements from fault tests.
The asphalt pad presented an infinite impedance to both
bare and XLP covered conductors. The asphalt pad was even
coated with several gailons of water for one of the tests and
no measurable fault current was present in the faulted
conductor.
- The tree also presented an e,rrremely nigh impedance to
the faulted conductor. The covered condultor io the tree
represented an infinite fault impedance with no perceptible
fault current. f'he bare conductor in the tree reiulted in a
very small fault current which was estimated to be 1 ampere.
The bare conductor faults to grass, gravel and concrete
produced fault currenr of approxi-mateli90 amperes for ali
three surfaces. This indicated a iaulr impedance of
approximately 80 ohms for each of the three ,rr.L..r.
The XLP covering tended to increase the fault impedance.
_
The resulting fault impedance for an XLp covered cbnductor
contacting gravel or concrete was approximately 125 ohms.
Long-term field installation of the Ratio Ground Relay was
needed to analyze the operation ofthe relay. This instaltation
was assisted by monitoring with a microcomputer-based data
acquisition and communications system to permit storage of
data records associated with the performance of the relaa[23].
The Ratio Ground Relay and s6nyts{tio.nal Ground
Overcurrent Relay were installed on six circuits for long-terrl
testing. Neither relay type was wired into the station bieaker
trip circuit. The data gathered consisted of the three phase
currents, zero sequence current, backstop and trip contacts on
each relay, and the station breaker status. Records from the
Local System Operator's Report Summary were reviewed for
faults, protective device operations, and abnormalities which
could provide clues or indications of circuit problems for
comparison to the microcomputer data.
Recording of the phase and neutral (zero sequence)
currents provided knowledge of the time variance of each
circuit's unbalance. Unbalance is crucial to accuratelv
determine the setting of the Ratio Ground Relay and thii
knowledge is virtually non-existent. To judge the ability of
each type of relay to function on a 12 kV circuit and detect Figure
- 4-2. Benefit of CGRS over 3l"-only relay for
Broken Conductor detection.
high impe<lance faults, the relative times of operation of each
retay must be known. For that reason, date and time were 31 o Rclay
recorded with each data record. Can't

Data was collected for approximately 18 months through

the summer of 1985. No high impedance faults occurred on o
1
t'"='l
any of the three circuits during the monitoring p-eriod- Some o I

faults did occur which created documentation of the currents o |

I

1001 Load Lot!

Oo - tor 31o Roley
ancl times associated with breaker activity. Both relays E |
performed anil reacted properly to normal system unbalances lmgrovcm.nl /
ind those associated with faults that were recognized by the by CORS: /
62 -r l,/
phase overcurrent relaYs. !,c 3'r o B'r'Y

ffi
\ ir/ 1.5 Amp.ro Srtllng
o
o
o.
Advantages of the Ratio Ground Relav ol
o
Figure 4-1 illustrates the typical load variations experienced
(?
durirlg the lifetime of a feeder- Because of these wide Ol 234
variatlons at different times in the feeder's life, a conventional
3l.,-only relay must be set high enough to ignore maximum
la (Load Currsnt, Amperes)
n<i.ma[ excursions. Thus, for the rest of the time, a
substantial peritld, the feeder is underprotected. (a)

PEAK ULTIMATE
3 (FULLY MATUBE)
o 100
x= llt,
-o
e5 75
o,
lr
o 5eo n3'u"
ut
o Eo
E@ 50
F
z
LIFETIM AVEFAOE Frr
ul E'O
o 6f 25
tr
IJJ OFF.PEAX J@
Qu
o. sEAgoil
Etc o
123
ao la (Load Current, AmPeres)
M 6
nME oF DAY
(b)

Figure 4-1. Typical load pattern over the lifetime of a

The fault resistance values of shown are in per unit based on
feeder.
feeder full load current. For example, a 12,470 volt, 480
ampere circuit (600:5 ct and 4 ampere secondary current at
full load) wotrld manifest 1 per rnit at72001480 = 15 ohms.
Since 3I. for an open conductor condition is dependent on A ground fault having 8 per unit or 120 ohms or less fault
the load level in thi two unaffected phases (as well as the resistance would be detectable by the CGRS while a fault
noln ohase if onlv partial load loss occurs), the ratio-ground having2.66 per r.rnit or 40 ohms or less would be detected by
.Jtuu L expected io'detect many open and ungrounded cases
-circuit a conventional 3I" relay. The 3l.-only relay is inherently
ihui.onuintional distribution ground relays would somewhat more sensitive than the CGRS at full load.
isnore. Fisure 4-2, for exan'$re, shows the improvement
p"ossible usi"no.t"ry; ratio ground relay (type CGRS) fcr- oy'r' C-cnrclination o@
-Assuming a currert transformer
tOniiuctor dltection.
;;;J;t .urr"nt of four amperes, full load., and adequate The ratio-ground relay would be ideal\ coordinated with
6iru".e (undenotmal unbalanced load conditions other devices if it would operate only for those oPens andfor
"i.*ii
il7; *itr, itt"'ru.gest lateral fuse blown)- to- permit a 3I" grounds that would not be detected by the qher devices [24].
,".o ,"qr"n.e currJnt setting.for the.residual relay of 15 The CGRS relay will, in the usual application, block reclosing
;;";;i;. CGRS tap 2 set-ting could be selected' At this through an external auxiliary relay. It should, then, allow
r"iiirg, eigr." 4-2 shows the greiter sensitivitiy of the CGRS other devices to detect all malfunctions they are able to
*t to a conventional 3l"-only relay' detect. Co<lrdination is complicated somewhat by th rrature
""'i"-"pu.ed of the time variation of the CGRS relay produced by the
Another inherent benefit that accompanies the application restraint effect of tlifferent load levels. Conventional residual
of in" .rtin-gror.rnd relay is its ability to recognize very high relays are not influenced by load level, but are responsive to
.".irron." gr6unrl faults. Figure 4-3 demonstrates this effect' zero sequence current only.

22
 switching; others were caused by blown capacitor bank fuses.
10 One utility experienced problems in maintaining balance on
^.=
L
a mixed residential/industrial feeder on weekends, although
f the feeder was balanced on weekdays.
o
gE Due to an unacceptatrle number of false operations, many
of the utilities have completely removed their CGRS relays.
!, The City of l^akeland has placed all of their CGRS's in an
o
o alarm-only mode; several other utilities are also continuing
o their evaluations of the CGRS in an alarm-only mode.
6o
o Based on the experience gained by trial utilities, it can be
o
(, said that use of this relay, even as a monitor, requires: a)
c,
6 frequent balancing of phase currents, b) aggressive tree
fr4
o
trimming schedules, and c) a very structured and effective
response by operators when a trip or alarm occurs. Since
o these practices have other benefits to a utility, however, their
t implementation should not be charged entirely against down-
=H2 31o Relay wire protection. It should also be noted that this device is
l.l. most effective when used as part of a composite protection
x(0 plan.

=
12 3
!L (Load Current, Amperes)
(a)

86
o
CIE
E

q,
lnprov.m.il Dy CGRS
!,
c3
o
o
o
o2
o
2
car tre

12
l1 (Load Current, Amperea)

(b)

Figure 4-3. Benefit of CGRS relay over 3l"-only relay for

High Resistance Ground Fault detection.

Utilitv Experience with the Ratio Ground Relay

Westinghouse introduced the CGRS as a commercial

product in 1981. Since being introduced, the CGRS has been
purchased and installed by approximately 25 utilities
[25]. Of
the 14 utilities contacted in an August 1988 telephone survey,
gnly one (City of I-akeland, Florida) had put its CGRS relays
into full operation to trip and lockout; the others hid
purchased the relay for evaluation only.

.
The problem of maintaining phase balance caused many
misoperations of the CGRS relays, both at the City oi
I-akeland and at other installations. These unbalances had a
variety of causes. Some were caused by single phase
23
 CHAPTER
RESEARCH ON DETECTION METHODS
INTRODUCTION
Many techniques have been proposed for dealing with the
.long-standing
problem of undeteited downed diitribution
conductors. Some of the tech[iques involve the use of only
standard substation relaying inputs; others require the addition
of special equipment, either at the substation or at distributed
locations on the feeder. This chapter discusses only those
techniques whose inputs are reitricted to conventional
substation inputs, i.e., voltage measurements from standard
PT's and current measurements from standard CTs.
Several ofthese techniques have been implemented, either
at the prototype level or at the production fuvel; others have
only been suggested. Those that have been implemented show
mixed success. This chapter discusses each tichnique, along
with a discussion of its performance where applicable.
THIRD HARMONIC MAGNITUDE AND
PHASE ANGLE MONITORS
Hughes Aircraft Company investigated the use of third
harmonic phase current. as a possible indicator of high
impedance faults. This work was done under Epi.I
sponsorship on Project 1285-2 [26).
After analyzing. data from a series of staged downed
-involving
conductor faults both grounded-wyJ and delta
connected distribution systems, Hughes' researchers decided
that two separate detectors were needed, one for use on
grounded-wye systems, and the other for use on
delta-connected systems.
The detector designed for use on wye-connected systems
monitored the phase angle relationshipi between each-of the
three third harmonic phase currents. A sudden shift in one of
these.three^with respect to the other two indicated a high
impedaace fault. To lessen the possibility of normal systein
events incorrectly being identified as faulti, the fault/no-fault
decision also considered the magnitude of the fundamental
current component. A fault was indicated if the relative phase
angle between-one phase and the other two phases suddenly
changed by at least 15 degrees concurrent with an increase in
single.phase load current of at least 15 amperes, and this
condition persisted for at least 5 seconds.
After initial laboratory testing using staged fault data
yielded positive results, two of these phase shift detectors were
built, tested, and installed at utilitierfor long-term evaluation.
These detectors worked well for staged faulti, but experienced
false trips at a tate of three per year. There were no naturally
occurring downed conductor faults during the evaluation
period.
Because the ambient level of third harmonic is verv low on
delta-conaected circuits, a phase relationship measurement
bgcomq quite difficult and somewhat meaningless. However,
since this normal level is so low, a substantial increase in iti
magnitude on such delta circuits could be used as an indicator
of an abnormal condition, e.g., a downed conductor fault.
24
5
Hughes built three third harmonic magnitude monitors, and
tested them in a mamer similar to that used for the phase
shift detectors. These detectors indicated a fault if they
detected a predetermined percentage increase in the level oi
third harmonic curre[t concurrent with a single phase increase
in fundamental current of at least 15 amperei, and both of
these increases persisted for at least three seconds. As with
the phase shift detectors, these magnitude increase detectors
were first tested in the laboratory using recorded staged fault
data, then tested in the field by staging downed conductor
faults, and finally installed on in-service feeders for long-term
evaluation. The detectors worked well in the laboratory and
during staged fault tests on the feeder. In the long-term
installations, they experienced no false trips; as was thi case
with the phase change detectors, there were no naturally
occurring downed conductor faults during the test period.
HARMONIC SEOUENCE COMPONENT DETECTOR
._ Under EPRI Project 1285-1, Power Technologies, Inc.
(PTI) examined the behavior of low order odd iarmonic
current [27]. Based on their examination of the behavior of
these harmonics, both during staged downed conductor faults
and during normal system operating conditions, pTI suggested
detecting broken conductor faults by monitoring the
non-characteristic sequence components of the firsi (i.e.,
fundamental), third and fifth current harmonics.
Under balanced conditions, the fundamental component is
a positive sequence quantity, the third harmonic is a zero
sequence quantity, and the fifth harmonic is a negative
sequence quantity. Thus, the PTI researchers decided that the
non-characteristic sequence components of the first, third, and
fifth current harmonics, which are zero under perfectly
balanced conditions, would be good indicators of a bioken or
downed conductor. To monitor all of these quantities
simultaneously, they decided to combine t[em all
mathematically to form a single number for use as a relaying
quantity. This number, which they called the Z statistii, ii
calculated as Z = (X - Yf Fl' 6- Y). Here, X is a IZX l
vector whose components are the real and imaginary parts of
the non-characteristic sequence components of the firit three
odd harmonics, and lP/ is the covariance matrix of the
elements in the X vector. Also, Y is the average of many
previous samples of the X vector, and the superscript 7
denotes a matrix transpose operation. Because of the
computational burden of calculating the necessary quantities,
the PTI algorithm sampled one 60 Hz cycle each 30 seconds.
Initial results indicated "spikes" in the Z statistic which would
require the threshold level to be set quite high in order to
avoid false trips. Making the threshold this high, however,
meant that the detector would miss many of the lower grade
faults. To overcome this, since most of these spikes lasted
only one or two sample periods, a four sample delay time was
added to the algorithm (i.e., no fault was indicated unless four
successive samples exceeded the Z threshold).
PTI built a prototype detector which implemented
-They its
harmonic sequence component algorithm [28]. used an
Intel 8086-based host microprocessor for this implementation
and programmed the data acquisition and processing code in
 PL/M-86 and PASCAL 86. They increased the number of
cycles checked from one cycle per 30 seconds to one cycle per
one second.
Based on the performance of the detector when tested
against recorded fault and normal system data, and on the
data available about the frequency of occurrence of various
tlpes of high impedance faults, the PTI researchers estimated
that the algorithm would detect approximately 40Vo of allhigh
impedance faults. They also noted that the algorithm would
detect a blown phase fuse as a high impedance fault, since
each event has the effect of altering the balance between the
three phases. Because of the low detection efficienry of the
detector, the technique was not pursued further.
THIRD HARMONIC PHASOR DETECTOR
Nordon Research and Development recently developed a
downed conductor detector based on the phase angle of the
third harmonic fault current with respect to phase voltage
129,301.
Nordon's development is based on the premise that the
current drawn by a downed conductor fault produces third
harmonic current with a unique phase relationship to the
faulted phase voltage. To find the third harmonic fault
current only, without a contribution from the normal system
third harmonic current, an average third harmonic phasor is
calculated and stored; then, when each new third harmonic
phasor is calculated, the stored average is subtracted
(vectorially) from it. The angle ofthis resulting phasor is then
checked. If it matches the direction defined for a downed
conductor fault and the mqgnitude of the phasor is greater
than some threshold level, alfault is indicated. This threshold
is set so that gradual norm4l system harmonic level changes
will not be incorrectly identified as faults.
While normal system changes (e.g., capacitor bank
open/close operations, voltage regulator tap changes, etc.)
may cause substantial sudden changes in the third harmonic
current, Nordon asserts that these changes will produce
different phasor changes than will a downed conductor fault.
Because of this, the two types of changes will be
distinguishable.
A patent has only recgntly been issued on Nordon's
development [31]. As of puhlication of this tutorial, a detailed
description of the technique,was not available.
. ENERGY ALGORITHM
In the late 1970's, Texas A&M University researchers
began an investigation of the high impedance downed
conductor fault problem. Under EPRI Project 1285-3, they
developed the microcomputer based Enerry algorithm, which
detects a sudden increase in the level of a given frequency, or
frequency band, of current [3]. The Energy algorithm was
originally applied to high frequency (2 - 70kHz) current; later,
its applicability to "low" frequency harmonic and non-harmonic
current components was also investigated.
Based on observations made during staged fault tests,
capacitor bank operations, voltage regulator tap changes, etc.,
the A&M researchers noticed that arcing downed conductor
faults produced a marked increase in the level of high
frequency (2 - 10 kHz) current. They also noticed that while
25
other normal system events produced similar increases, these
increases were always time-limited, Iasting only a few cycles,
indicating that monitoring for an increase in high frequency
activity could be used as an indicator of a downed conductor
fault, with time being used as a discriminating factor to
prevent false trips on normal system transients.
Under normal (non-faulted) system conditions, the Energy
algorithm maintains a system status of "Normal." During suiir
times, it calculates and stores an average ambient energy level
for the particular frequency of interest, the energlr being
calculated as the sum of the squared sample values over one
fundamental frequency cycle. As each new energy value is
calculated, it is compared to the previously stored average. If
it is not more than a predefined percentage greater than this
avetage, the system status remains "Normal," the average is
re-calculated including the effect of this new energy value, and
execution continues with the next cycle's energy. If, however,
the cycle's energy is greater than the allowable percentage
increase over the average, the system's status becomes
"Disturbance," and the next few cycles are checked for similar
increases in energy. Ifthe check of these next cycles indicates
that the energy increase was very short-lived (i.e., only one or
two cycles contained increased high frequency activity), the
system's status is returned to "Normal" and execution
continues as before. If the check shows that the increase was
not so short-lived, however, the system status becomes "Event"
and the energy values are checked for the next few seconds.
Again, if only a few (or none) of the energy values in these
next few seconds show increased energy, the system status
returns to "Normal" and monitoring continues. If, however, a
large number of these cycles show high energy levels, the
system status is changed to "Fault."
As previously mentioned, the Energy algorithm was initially
applied to high frequency current. To test the algorithm,
several prototype high frequency Energy detectors were built
and installed for long-term evaluation at various cooperating
utilities (grounded-wye circuits) 132,331. These detectori
performed well for staged fault tests. No false trips occurred
during the evaluation installations; there were no
naturally-occurring downed conductor faults during this period
either.
The Energy algorithm was later applied to odd harmonics
(180, 300, 42A, ... Hz), even harmonics (120, 240, 360, ... Hr),
and non-harmonics (30, 90, 150, ... Hz) in the frequency range
below 1200 Hz. The Energy algorithm's performance when
tested with recorded staged fault data was good, especialty
when applied to even harmonics and non-harmonics.
Problems can be seen if the Energy algorithm were to be
applied to the odd harmonics in the field, since the level of
these odd harmonics are generally higher and less predictable
than the levels of the other components. While the high
frequency current component provides a very good indicator
of a high impedance fault in many cases, the presence of an
energized grounded capacitor bank sometimes shunts the high
frequency signal to ground, making the use of the lower
frequency components necessary.
RANDOMNESS ALGORITHM
In most downed conductor faults, arc current is drawn
intermittently. Most faults arc for a short period of time
(f.9-.-u few 60 Hz cycles to a few rens of ryclds), followed by
a similar period in which no current is drawn. Further, even
during periods of arcing, there are often large variations from
one cycle to the next. This phenomenon hinders the
performance of many of the proposed algorithms. Seeing this
problem, Texas A&M University researchers developed a
micro-computer based algorithm which would not be adversely
affected by this random behavior, and which would actually
use this type of behavior as an indicator of a fault [6,34].
The Randomness algorithm uses the same energy values
that the Energy algorithm uses, and even keeps a normal
system average like the Energy algorithm. Whenever a cycle
energy is found which deviates from the average by a certain
predefined percentage, the system status is changed from
normal to "Disturbance." At this point, the Randomness
algorithm does not look for a sustained increase, however.
Instead, it counts the number of transitions from arcing (high
level of energy) to non-arcing (low level of energy) during a
short period of time (e.g., 30 cycles). During this time, it also
counts the number of adjacent cycles which have energies
which differ from each other by more than a certain threshold
amount (to detect faults which do display longer bursts of fault
current). After checking these cycles, the two counters are
checked. If either counter exceeds its threshold number, a
fault is signalled.
The Randomness algorithm has been tested with high
frequency (2 - 6 kJlz) current as its input quantity. It has
been tested in the laboratory only, using recorded staged fault
tests and recorded normal system events (e.g., capacitor bank
switchings, voltage regulator tap changes, etc.). It performed
well in most cases, missing only the small percentage of faults
which exhibited extremely low levels of high frequency activity.
It correctly distinguished the normal system events as only
system "Disturbances."
The Randomness algorithm has only been tested on high
frequency curreot to date. Testing its applicability to other
frequencies is planned.
RATE.OF.CHANGE DETECTOR
The problem with relaying based on conventional 60 Hz
current information is that normal pick-up levels must be set
high enough to allow for maximum load and for other events
such as cold load pickup (following an outage). With the relay
pick-ups set this high, downed conductor faults, which typically
draw RMS currents of only a few tens of amperes and only for
very short periods of time, will never be seen by conventional
relays. Realizing this and realizing that normal load currents
tend to change slowly over time, J. Carr suggested the use of
a ratg-of-change detector for downed conductor faults [9].
Although never built, Carr's detector would monitor a
signal proportional to the RMS value of the ground current.
This signal would be passed through a "high-pass filter," which
would pass only quickly changing signals, blocking the slowly
changing load current signal. The output of this filter could
be monitored, and a fault signalled if this output exceeded a
threshold. Carr suggested applying this technique to a circuit's
ground current; it would probably work equally well if applied
to phase current.
EXTRACTED FAULT CURRENT TECHNIOUES
Texas A&M University researchers have also proposed the
use of discrimination of quickly changing fault current signals
from slowly changing load current signals. They have
investigated the use of two closely related techniques for
26
extracting the fault current from the total line current' Their
techniques work on a sample-by-sample basis rather than on
an RMS current signal.
The first of the two techniques simply subtracts, point by
point, the previous cycle from the preselt cycle and looks at
the resrlt. Under normal system conditions, the output of this
subtraction should be very small, since loading tends to change
quite slowly. Whenever the subtraction yields a substantial
output, however, something has happened to the system.
Foliowing this, time can be used as a discriminatory factor; if
the curreflt goes from one stable constant level to another
stable constant level, no fault is indicated since this was
probably a normal system switching event. If, however, the
butput of the subtractor continues to fluctuate to a large
degree, a fault is indicated.
A second, very closely related technique calculates the
frequency spectrum of the current signal at each moment in
time; then, using this spectral information, it attempts to
predict what the samples of current in the next cycle should be
[:S1. tf there is close agreement between the two, the system
is assumed to be normal; if there is a large discrepancy,
however, and the discrepancies continue for some nominal
amount of time, a fault is indicated.
ARCING BURST PATTERN ANALYSIS
Fault current in a downed conductor fault is driven by the
fault point voltage between the downed line and the ground.
Because of this, the fault current will follow a somewhat
repeatable pattern [3,36]. It begins to flow when the physjcal
briakdown voltage of the air gap between the downed line
and the ground is reached and continues to flow until the fault
point voltage can no longer maintain the current flow across
ihe gap, somewhere close to the voltage zero-crossing. Then,
this paltern is repeated in the negative half-cycle of the phase
voltage.
When the arc begins, it generally sparks multiple times
before becoming well established; this sparking causes high
frequency current activity. A smaller burst of high frequelcy
activity is produced when the current flow extinguishes at the
voltage zero. This sequence of events produces high
frequency activity which can be matched fairly well to the
phaie voltage. Thus, Texas A&M Unirersity researchers
iealized thai by looking at the level of increased activity in
various portions of the voltage period, they could distinguish
arcing faults from other events which might cause a sudden
increase in high frequency activity.
A second effect of the predictable phase voltage angles at
which current will begin to flow and cease to flow can be seen
by isolating the fault component from the load current (e.g.,
as suggested above in the section Extracted Fault Current
Techniques), and comparing the fault component to the phase
voltage. A positive correlation of the fault component and the
phase voltage is a good indicator that the current is actually
flowing into an arc.
ARCING SPECTRAL ANALYSIS
During their work on EPRI Project 1285-3, Texas A&M
researchers investigated the spectrum of the current produced
by a downed conductor fault [3]. They found that the
fiequency domain spectrum of an arc is unique, producing a
roughly 1// distribution.
 By averaging the frequency spectrum of a number (e.g.,
300) of power frequency cycles, a //distribution can be seen
during an arcing fault. While certain normal system loads may
display broad band noise, the noise is repetitive on
cycle-by-cycle basis, which causes certain discrete frequencies
to be displayed, rather than the smooth frequency distribution
characteristic of downed conductor, arcing faults,
By calculating this average frequency spectrum in the
background while running a detection algorithm, the frequency
spectrum can be examined whenever the detection algorithm
indicates a fault. In this case, if the frequency spectrum
indicates that the event which caused the detection algorithm
to operate is not a true arcing fault, the trip signal can be
inhibited. In this way, system security against false tripping
can be improved.
PROPORTIONAL RELAYING
On a grounded-wye system, Carr shows that the fault
current can be calculated by summing properly proportioned
neutral and ground currents [9]. If the fault current only is
calculated in this way, it would be much easier to detect a
fault than if any raw current signal is used.
The proportioning constants can be calculated as ratios of
the line and ground impedances. Carr reasons that while the
individual impedances used for the calculations may change
due to moisture, temperature, etc., each of the impedances
should,change proportional to the others, making their ratio
unchanged. If this assumption does not hold, he suggests the
use of a feedback path which would automatically adjust the
proportioning constants based on ambient conditions.
recloser. Following this, the indication of arcing concurrent
with the reduction in the original load current level can be
securely identified as a downed, arcing conductor.
a
By identifying patterns for the load analysis algorithm to
recognize as situations in which a conductor is broken and
other pattern for it to classify the conductor as intact, the
overall security of any downed conductor fault detector can be
greatly enhanced. Given the utility position on maintaining
the security of their systems, Texas A&M researchers feel that
such an algorithm must be used in any eventual detector for
it to meet with success.
CONCLUSIONS
Many techniques have been proposed to solve the problem
of undetected downed conductor faults. Several of these
techniques have been tested, either in a laboratory setting or
in the field, with mixed results.
Each of the mentioned techniques has known deficiencies
in that it will miss some subset of the true downed conductor
arcing faults; some also suiier irom the relatively worse
problem of false tripping, either from unknown causes or from
normal system conditions such as blown phase fuses or phase
unbalance. While none of the techniques provide the "magic"
solution which will detect lNVo of the dorvned conductors
while providing complete immunity from false trips, some
combination of a subset of the techniques would greatly
increase the probability of detecting a large number of
downed conductors.

LOAD ANALYSIS
Utilities representatives have stressed that one of their
main concerns is the minimization of false detections. Their
position is that they want a detector which will detect only a
broken conductor on the ground. Any other condition (e.g.,
broken conductor dangling out of the reach of the public,
intact or broken conductor in contact with a tree, etc.) ihoutd
be left energized. The reason for this position is that, while
energized downed conductors are a public safety hazard,
frequent unnecessary service interruptions can pose safety
problems of their own. For instance, during a power outage
traffic signals are off, lighting is lost in homes and businessel,
etc. Because of this concern over maintaining system security
against false tripping, Texas A&M researchers are developing
a load analysis algorithm to monitor patterns in load current.

Whenever a conductor breaks, some percentage of the total

feeder load currert is lost. Thus, a sequence-of-events in
which there is some sudden loss of load current followed by
an indication of arcing from one or more of the arcing fauit
detection algorithms is a good indicator of the scenario which
calls for tripping of the feeder. Using the load analysis
algorithm, recognizing this type of event is possible.

The load analysis algorithm can also recognize patterns

which are somewhat more complicated. For example, ionsider
a rapid increase in current, a subsequent large reduction in
total feeder current (possibly to zero), followed by an increase
in current back to some level less than the original, and
ending with an indication of arcing from one or more
algorithms. This type of pattern can be recognized as an
overcurrent fault which was cleared and re.energized by a

27
 CHAPTER 6
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES AND AVAII ARLE IMPROVEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The energized down-wire is widely regarded by utility
engineers aJ a problem impossible to solve without the
ext-remes of totai underground conversion or a distribution
system equivalent of "Star Wars" - computerized- monitoring
and analysis of conditions on every tap of every feeder.
The down-wire problem isalso misunderstood and
sometimes unappreciated by utility managers unfamiliar with
distribution opiiations. Therefore, the first step taken by- a
utility must 6e involvement of top management in the
distribution system, which has functioned in a fairly unattended
fashion for many years, while executives focused on energy
shortages and environmental issues' The down-wire is itself
a greal environmental issue. A solution will require effort by
laiyers and financiers of the industry combined with
distiibution engineers, researchers, and manufacturers.
Figure 6-1. Beating the hazard of energized downed
wires has stumped utilities since Edison's
time.
Major oversights have occurred in this very technical
debate. Available enhancements of automation systems,
common-sense utility practices, and simple devices can
mitigate public risk. We must do what we can do now, while
we hope for somethiag better. The following represent
improvements which can be made now, long before a
commercial and technically viable relay is available'
The electric utility industry began actively pursuing
down-wire problem ibout 1976 [9]. The common viewpoint
has matured from the "quick fix" dream of a single, high-tech
device to a balanced mix of improved practice, hardware, and
research. The new theme is the old idea to take action when
and where practical, solving the problem in an incremental
way, withoui rate shock to customers, or technological shock
to the utility.
SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENTS
Distribution Automation Systems
Many utilities have installed some level of distribution
automaiion. This usually includes to SCADA (Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition) on some or all feeder breakers
at the substation. Some utilities have equipped major
sectionalizing switches with motor operators, complete with
SCADA monitoring and control. SCADA has also been
extended to pole-top voltage regulators, automatic throw-over
switches, remote line loading monitors, and reading of meters
for major customers, inaccessible meters, and load research.
Technology is available to monitor nearly any parameter or
control any device.
Automation system expansion, aside from research and
development projects, has been driven by economic and
service reliabifty concerns [37]. Concern for public safety can
be incorporated into this expansion by coordinating the system
design with methods for detecting and clearing down-wire
hazards. This criteria puts emphasis on use of multiple,
remote, addressable, and self-actuating devices for interrupting
load currents. Electronically triggered fused cutout barrels
offer some promise for this need. Another requirement of this
planning ciiteria is a widely distributed communications
iubsystern which allows many unique device addresses. Present
SCADA systems mostly use point-to-point communications to
control substation-based feeder breakers. Full automation
can not happen overnight. For example, simple SCADA has
been widely used for more than 30 years, yet many circuit
breakers are still not controlled for various practical or
economic reasons.
Since system enhancement is a given, utilities should plot
a design coursewhich incorporates the features needed to add
down-wire protection. This protection can be installed initially,
or at some later date - if designs for the communications
element and the switching element allow retrofit.
The third element of a down-wire protection system is
detection and verification. Detector/verifiers can be classified
as, a) basic; b) complex; and c) integrated. Any combination
of detector/verifiers can be worked into a well planned
distribution automation system as it gradually expands.
Basic Down-wire Detectors
Loss-of-voltage detection is based on the simple concept
that a sustained loss of voltage on any one or two phases at
the end ofa feeder section means a phase wire has separated
melted jumper,
[9,38]. The cause of lost voltage may be only-a
or sohething else not hazardous to the public, but a wire has
most definit;ly separated. Inss of voltage on all three phases
would be ignored as a conventional outage of the entire
circuit.
Practical details include the type of voltage sensors at the
the
end of each feeder section, the'type of remote terminal,
communications media, and the central logic which checks for
other causes of lost potential or bad communications. There
are many possible hirdware configurations for implementing
this coniept, and it fits very well with distribution automation
as it is eventuallY installed.
 Disadvantages of the method begin when the main feeder
splits into subsections, or divisions. Sensors and a remote
terminal are required at the end of each protected section of
the circuit. A typical feeder may have 5 to 10 such splits, each
requiring full instrumentation, communications, and control
logic integration. All the failure modes of these electronic
systems must be considered before arming a trip function.
Figure 6-2. Typical configuration of the loss_of-voltage
detector for a feeder with trvo sections.
. Loss-of-voltage protection cannot be extended through a
single phase interruption device, unless the status of that
device is included in the logic which determines a down_wire
condition. Therefore, fused taps, or any portion of the main
feeder beyond a fuse or singie phase recloser can not be
protected with this method.
Integrated Detectors
. Several complex and sophisticated relay systems are under
development which have previously been presented in this
document. Several of these methods of detection may be
combined in the future to provide better deteition
performance. This class of detector/verifiers would simply b-
a combination of detectors looking at different parameters.
This technique capitalizes on the stiengths of various schemes
to yield a composite which is more seleitive and sensitive than
any detector aione [38].
The ultimate integration is found in development of expert
systems for protection against down-wires. Many detection and
venllcatlon lnputs can be combined with non_electrical
information, such as time of day and weather conditions, to
leld a much better basis for circuit interruption decisions.
F*p".t systems are also adaptive and dynamic; able to learn
from mistakes. Such systemscpuld signi"ficantly improve fault
detection. However, until didtribution automation is more
widespread and sophisticated, expert relay systems are
available, we should turn to improved practicis to help solve
this problem.
COORDINATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEMS
. ,Utilities can greatly improve the response to reports and
rndrcatlons of down-wire. There are major problems with
existing response procedures, but many can be oue.come if the
ttnqrunjtf, public safety agencies, uiility operators, and the
orstnbutton plant are viewed as one macrosystem. This
discussion must remain fairly vague, because each utility and
community are unique; howevei, examples of this ',system"
approach come to mind:
Certified training modules for police officers, firemen,
EMTs, and other field-based municipal workers can relieve
a lot of pressure created by wire-down reports. Utilities must
respond as if it is a live primary until someone with knowledge
and credibility confirms it to be telephone line, guy wire,
television cable, or other low voltage wire. Utility training
centers can conduct real world training for these agencies, and
develop a system of reporter verification.
Utility dispatch - 911 links can be upgraded from the
simple "hotline" to a computer link which ties the distribution
system with the 911 phone number database. This can allow
the device which must be tripped to be brought up on the
utility dispatcher's SCADA console, ready for command.
Structured procedures, written and frequently practiced,
can bring order to an inherently chaotic process. One
suggestion is to consider the "all points bulletin" techniques
common to police agencies. First "look response" can be meter
readers, field engineers, and other utility workers other than
line crews; even properly trained and certified public safety
personnel.
PRACTICES
Construction Practices
We must take a hard look at construction standards and
practices used over the last fifty years with an eye for things
which contribute to failure of a conductor; and when a wire
does fall, things which allow it to miss contact with the
grounded neutral.
These changes can be controversial with designers and
operating personnel. For instance, stand-off brackets for post
insulators mean more elbow room between phases for the
worker in the bucket, but this is a "wider" framing which
makes it more probable a downed phase will miss the neutral.
Once we identiff the reasons for an old standard, we must
weigh them against the improved public safety we might
achieve with a new practice. Some revised practices, like use
of larger conductors, also carry economic benefit (loss
reduction in this case). Some construction recommendations
for consideration are as follows:
Use larger conductor, even when smaller wire will meet
load current requirements. A common scenario for a down-
wire incident begins with a "normal" fault (from lightning
flashover or tree contact) which melts the primary wire. After
the circuit recloses, the primary is left on the ground
energized. Bigger wire dissipates much more heat from the
arc without melting. Using ACSR (aluminum conductor, steel-
reinforced) instead of all-aluminum conductor is a related
practice. I-arge wire is also more resistant to mechanical
failure from fatigue or the weight of ice and trees.
Use tighter configurations to improve chances of neutral
contact by a falling phase wire. This rule precludes framing
with crossarms, standoff brackets, or anything else which
pushes the conductors out in the horizontal plane. The tightest
design available is vertical post, with the neutral spool on the
same side of the pole as the phase conductors. A subset of
this practice is single phase construction on a post insulator-
on the side (over the neutral) of the pole, instead of the
common pin insulator centered on top of the pole. A centered
phase wire has a 507o chance of falling down the side away
from the neutral, placing 8 to 10 inches ofwood between the
phase and metallic neutral contact.
 Avoid ncompressed neutral' construction. When the neutral
spacing is "compressed" (ultimately up to the crossarm, as in
one REA standard), it is difficult for a falling phase wire to
make metallic contact.
Avoid covered conductor, unless needed for an over-riding
safety concern like clearance to a building. Even when it falls
on a fairly conductive surface, covered wire often doesn't draw
enough current to blow a fuse. Covered wire may also be
more likely to fall. A power arc tends to concentrate at the
point offailure in the covering, instead of"motoring" along, as
is common with bare conductor. The resulting localized
heating often melts the wire. Reduced tree trimming
requirements may not be sufficient cause to run the risks of
covered conductor.
Avoid unfused taps, especially with small wire size, and
even when the tap load is insignificant. The reliable fused
cutout is our first line of defense against "normal" faults.
When a liberal use of fuses is combined with the changes in
fusing philosophy proposed later in this discussion, the cutout
becomes very effective against down-wires. Fortunately,
cutouts are usually easy to retrofit onto all but the most
crowded poles.
Avoid mid.span connections, or "double up" the jumpers.
The flying tap is a handy construction technique, but can be
a source of localized heating and mechanical stress on the
wire.
Avoid floated-wye capacitor banks out on the distribution
feeder. This configuration can be a dangerous backfeed source
during load-side down situations. When a wire breaks at the
pole [where most do], and only one span falls, the odds are
5G50 for the load side going down. Backfeed situations are a
particularly insidious hazard, because the equivalent source
impedance may keep the down-wire from sparking, smoking,
or giving other signs of its energized state.
Avoid grounded-rvye high, delta low side distribution
transformer connections. This presents a backfeed hazard for
Ioad-side down incidents similar to that caused by a floated-
wye capacitor bank.
Improve lightning protection in lightning prone areas. IJse
more arresters, better arresters, lower grounding impedance
and larger downleads (low impedance to high frequency
content of lightning current waveshape) for arresters.
Reduce rear lot line construction. In overgrown rear
easements, maintenance is more difficult and occurs less
frequently, so these lines are more likely to fall. When they do
fall, they often go down in hedgerows and are generally more
accessible, but less visible to the public.
Boost incentives for underground development. This can
even be economically favorable if maintenance and storm
repair costs are evaluated over the life of the system.
Developers will often participate for the aesthetic benefits of
underground distribution.
OPERATING PRACTICES
The same kind of hard look at how we operate our systems
has revealed a number of ways to minimize down-wire events,
and improve things when they do happen. These
recommendations can be as debatable as the changes in
construction standards, and require equally careful analysis of
risk and benefit. Some recommendations:
30
Increase tree trimming. There are many reasons, other than
down-wire risk, for enhanced trimming; so add public safety
to the 1ist. Chronic arcing to branches weakens and melts
conductors, branches can cause phase-to-phase faults, and
trees often physically tear down the line.
Convert 4160 volt systems to the higher voltage. There are
capacity and economic incentives to make the conversions we
have been planning for so many years. A
public safety
incentive is added when we see how difficult it is to detect a
2400 volt fault to ground.
Repair crossarm framing with post construction when
failures occur. The tighter configuration is preferred, and risk
of decayed crossarms is eliminated. Though this "inconsistent"
framing may be traumatic to the utility culture, it has been
proven that the public doesn't notice such construction
features of overhead lines.
Evaluate reclosing philosophy. Try to reduce the number
of reclosures and shorten the elapsed time between fault
initiation and final reclosure. Each shot is a full arcing and
wire-melting event at the fault location. Long cycle times give
curious bystanders time to approach the temporarily dead
conductor. Present practice should be examined in both
quantitative and qualitative ways. Ask questions - What is
really gained by a 4th reclose that a 3rd misses? What is
really gained by waiting 60 seconds to reclose that is lost by
waiting only a few seconds? Isn't "no intentional delay'' of the
first reclose as upsetting to digital-age customers as a 3 second
delayed reclose (which helps arc products dissipate)? Are
there times or circumstances when no reclose should occur?
[3e]
Evaluate fusing philosophy with a focus towards minimum
sizing. The present emphasis seeks the maximum rating which
will still coordinate with upstream devices, hoping to reduce
nuisance blowing during peak load periods. This has resulted
in the simple stepped schemes (eg 600,4-100,4'-65,4.) common
to the industry. A more rational approach asks the minimum
size possible given a generous overload factor. The result is
a wide range of sizes, so this scheme really wasn't practical
before computerized databases and computer generated fusing
diagrams became available. Refering to Figure 6-3, why put a
40A link in series with a 6,{ transformer fuse, when we can
put a solid link in the transformer jack and move the 6,4 link
out to the road to replace the bigger fuse? [39]
Boost public education programs, especially for children,
and especially focused on the down-wire problem. Stress the
dangers even if the wire isn't sparking and even if it is covered
with insulation and looks like an extension cord.
Provide scenario simulation for operators. No amount of
"what-if?" discussion will give operators all the answers, but
every exercise helps provide a structure for thinking through
situations when they occur.
DEVICES
Every fault protection device can be characterized by the
location it senses the fault and the location it clears the fault.
Down-wire protection should follow this same assessment
scheme. Sensing the down-wire at the first upstream protective
device, such as a fused cutout, is said to be local sensing (15).
If this detection occurs two or more protective levels
upstream, the protection method is source sensing (SS). De-
energizing of the down-wire can be grouped likewise as either
local or source clearing.
 tr
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u
u
to
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:<
uI
@Q
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Ig
,2 AAC 6 AMP
r LINK 15 KVA
1 PHAgE LATERAL
Figure 6-3. Fusing philosophy should be re-evaluated in
light of the down-wire probiem.
In various forums [40] and recent discussions of the down-
wire issue., utility engineers, particularty those with operating
responsibilities, have expressed a strong preference for the
1ocal mode of sensing and clearing a down-wlre (LS-LC). This
standard stems from the other hazardous conditions created
by unnecessary power outages. Traffic signals, fire protection,
hospitals, and home-bound life support systems are examples
of our dependence upon electric power for public safetyind
health.
Mechanical Guards
This approach is so old that it is new, and so simple we
tend to overlook it [9,38,41,421. It just forces any down-wire
to make metallic contact with the neutral by way of a metal
rod suspended below the neutral, and at right angles to the
conductors. The resulting short-circuit current is a predictable
value, .and large enough to operate the first upstream
protective device, This local sensing, local clearing (tS-t_C)
form of protection has obvious advantages for utility operating
personnel because: a) it locates the down-wire, bf it uses
existing overcurrent protection to de-energize the down wire,
c) the outage section is minimized, and d) no decisions or
actions are required of the system operator.
.
The _mechanical guard device is effective against phase
wires whicLare only sagging, without touching the ground or
breaking. This type of sag occurs when crossarms fail,
insulators are broken, or clamping hardware fails. If the spans
are long, the wire may sag to within a few feet of the ground.
The guard also offers fair protection from ioad-sidi-down
(backfeed) hazards.
Installation details must be decided on a span-by-span
basis, and include several considerations. One to four guards
per span are recommended, based on the possibility of mid-
span flashovers, splice failure, or a desire to support broken
conductors over a road crossing. In other words, a "clean" span
$t
tt
sl
is
$t
ti
$i
:itl
$i
s!
i
I
Figure 6-4. Mechanical guard rods can be hung by "hot
sticks" on spans without truck access, or to
conserve labor and equipment resources.
with no threatening trees, mid-span taps, or splices might only
require 1 guard at mid-span, since flashover or connsctor
heating failure is most likely at the poles. This discussion of
physical configuration raises the question of failure modes for
the device itself. Some scenarios of a wire falling may have
dynamic aspects which could cause the wire to miss contact
with a guard. More guards per span can mitigate these
concerns, so a probability assessment by the utillty is required,
In some spans the neutral may be so close to a phase wire
that a fault might occur if the guard is tilted by say,
asymmetric ice loading (birds tend to fly away if their perch
starts to move). In these situations, a short length of small
insulating hose should be placed on the phase wire over the
guard.
Disadvantages of this approach center on the material and
labor costs for installation, and the resulting demand on the
skilled workforce and scarce bucket trucks. These probiems,
and the problem of installation in a rear easement, are
relieved by the availability of a "hot stick" version of the
neutral suspension c1amp. Fault energy withstand ratings (I,t)
should be applied to determine a guard's ability to withstand
multiple reclosing cycles. Application of the guards
downstream from fuses is very complementary to the loss-of-
potentiai method, which can not be extended beyond a fuse,
but is effective immediately downstream from the feeder
breaker. A composite protection scheme is again indicated,
but a utility may eventually cover the entire system with
guards to protect from sagging-conductor accidents.
CONCLUSIONS
We can't solve this problem overnight. Managers who come
to terms with the crisis today will still require several years to
implement a balanced protection p1an. It is prudent for
utilities to make a rational response at a reasonable rate. A
progressive response by utilities might include the following
steps in an overlapping fashion:
1) Evaluate constructior and operating practices for
effectiveness in down-wire prevention and protection. Make
changes and retrofit as much as is reasonable. Concurrently;

2) Evaluate mechanical guard protection. Make test

installations downstream from fuses first, then extend system
coverage if performance is satisfactory. Concurrently;

3) Install a source sensing monitor, like the ratio-ground

device, on all feeders to provide backup coverage or advisory
alarms until:

4) Loss-of-potential, or other reliable down-wire detectors as

relays, are included in the ultimate distribution automation
system to complete the down-wire protection plan.

While we wait for a "relafng" solution or automation

solution to this problem, we should revisit all operating and
construction practices to insure we are doing all that is
reasonably possible to eliminate this hazard.
 CHAPTER 7
APPLICATION AND O_PERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF HIGH IMPEDANCE r.Arrr-r OETE'CTON
INTRODUCTION
The application of high impedance fault detection on a
distribution feeder has important implications for the
operation of the circuit. This type of fault detection has
similarities and significant diffelences with respect to
.conventional.
,
protectiory factors which must be iarefully
c,onsidered in implementation. High impedance fauli
detection adds several unique complications to system
operation which must also be considered. Because sensitive
fault detection ga1 implct the number and duration of outages
on a feeder, it is beneficial to develop high impedance fir.lt
detection in such a manner as to idenlif, and rimove known
hazards while not adversely affecting service.
IMPLICANON OF SENSITIVE FAULT DETECTION
For any type of fault anywhere on a power system there is
-detecting
some uncertainty associated with successfully and
removing it. For the highest probabilities of srccess] it is
necessary to have a good match between the type of fault, the
1ry9 of detection method used, and the deteiiion sensitivity.
While' these basic principles are. inherently accepted f;r
conventional protection practice, if is useful to examine their
implications for the detection of downed conductors on
distribution systems.
Electrical Conditions to Detect
The first question that must be asked is "what must be
detected?" A downed conductor can result in eight basic
electricai conditions that can be grouped into three cltegories
as follows:
Category I - Broken Conductors
In this situation, one or more of the feeder conductors is
open circuited. Depending onwhere along the span the break
occurs, either one, both, or neither of thobroken ends might
contact the ground, neutral or a foreign object that co;ld
provide a ground path. The ground contact-might be high
impedance due to the surface being asphalt, dry said, o.,nj*
or it might be essentially an open ciriuit if the conductor is
caught in a tree or shrub. In general, therefore, a broken
conductor can result in four types of electrical conditions:
1. no ground contact or very high impedance to
ground
2. Iow impedance ground contact on the load side
of the break only with no back feed
3. low impedance ground contact on the load side
of the break only with some loads beyond the
break being connected phase-to-phase
4. low impedance ground contact ort the source
side of the break.
33
Category II - Sagging or Fallen Conductors
This category differs from the previous one in that the
conductors themselves are not broken so line current
continues to flow. This situation might typically result from
a.broken pole or pole hardware such as an insulator pin
failure. The conductor may sag or contact the ground, trees,
shrubs or some other foreign object. Two types of etectricai
conditions are therefore possible:
5. no ground contact or very high impedance to ground
6. low impedance ground contact.
Category III - Contact by Foreign Object
In this situation, the line itself is undamaged and fully
operational. The problem results from contact by a tree,
crane, farm machinery or other foreign object. Two tases are
possible:
7. line contact by an insulated or high impedance
object, such as a rubber-tired crane, a man
holding a TV antenna or ladder
8. low impedance ground contact.
Alternative Detection Methods
By considering how each of the eight electrical situations
might be detected, a range of alternative methods can be
assembled. In detail, the alternatives are numerous and have
been the subjects of a number of studies [9]. These methods
have been discussed in detail in Chapters4 and 5. They are
summarized here for the purposes of the present discussion
and they can be classified into five groups as follows:
Group A- Ground Fault Detection Based on 60 Hz
Measurements
This approach is a natural extension of the overcurrent
protection c-onventionally applied to distribution systems. In
its simplest form, it might consist of measuring ground current
with a fault indicated when the ground currint exceeds a
predetermined level. Greater sensitivity can be achieved by
using more complex measurements involving various ratios of
sequence currents or by considering both current and voltage
in some form of impedance oi admittance measurement. T[e
common feature of this group of detection methods is that
they are all based on measuring 60 Hz quantities on the
source side of the fault location.
Group B - Loss of Voltage FAULT TYPE
'lt
o
a @
A break in a conductor could potentially be detected by the P: A Po g rop- 9
loss of voltage on the load side of the break. Taking action --6 oor=
such as deenergizing the line would require some form of iE; A1
:u
E?
aE
6=
O
9@ t o
:'iP
9
^
Y
communication link from the detection location back to the ='f 9
EEd ql
o o{ !2o f
e385 S
substation. DE:i
60
B 8pol9
ao E3 A E!E 3
9b d.6
S
I
Group C - Non 60 Hz Measurements iBgs
of
OF
50
Several investigations have been completed into the noise B-
I
and harmonic currents that are caused by some types of faults
involving downed conductors. There is both experimental oa a aa A- Sansitivo Ground Fauh
evidence and theoretical confirmation of the fact that certain o
types of faults have a harmonic or noise signature that could aoaa B. Loss ol Voltag
{m
m

be used as a basis for their detection. Again, there are many o

J
differing proposals implementation, but all have in
for oo oo c- Nois o
a or Haamonbs 2
common that they are based on electrical measurements at
other than 60 Hz. =
m
aa o aaao D, siFal Gubo Echo atcJ -t
o
E. Fadt Enhencsffint I
Group D - Imposed Signals oa aaaa (Catch Hms etcJ

This group of detection methods relies on measuring the

response of the line to special external signals. For example, Table 7-1. Detection probability matrix.
a pulse echo approach might be used to identify the "end" of
a conductor so that a sudden change in its location would side of the break (2). In fact, the only way in which sagging
signify a conductor break. Another approach is to inject a conductors that do not contact anything might be detected is
high frequency signal and measure the response of the line. by using some of the fault enhancement methods (E).
With the appropriate choice of signal, it might be possible to
have greater sensitivity to the faults of concern than would be Measurement Sensitivitv
possible with 60 Hz measurements.
The final parameter that affects the probability of detection
is the sensitivity of the measurement. Regardless of what is
Group E - Fault Enhancement measured or how parameters are processed after they are
measured, there will be some lower limit to the size of change
There are a number of methods for turning a fault that is that can be detected and hence a range of situations that
difficult to detect into one that can be detected by the cannot be discerned as abnormal.
conventional overcutrent protection arrangements. For
example, a system has been proposed whereby two or three As an example of the effect of sensitivity limits, Figure 7-
metallic rods are connected to the neutral conductor on each 1 shows a time response associated with traditional
span. By orienting the rods perpendicular to the neutral, they overcurrent protection. As the current magnitude gets
make it highly probable that a falling conductor will contact smaller, the time to detect increases so that smaller currents
one of them and cause a high current ground fault. Other are not detected. If a ground curent detector had this
arrangements with similar effects have also been suggested [1]. characteristic, it would be unable to detect some of the very
lowest fault levels associated with the highest impedances.
The same principle of limited sensitivity applies to other types
Probabilitv of Detection of measurements such as loss of voltage (B), non 60 Hz
signals (C) and imposed signals (D).
It is apparent that each of the eight electrical conditions
could be detected by at least one of the five detection
methods, but that no single method will detect all conditions.
This is a point worth emphasizing because it shows that
regardless of what detection method is adopted, there are
definite limitations to the types of faults that can be detected,
quite apart from the question of the sensitivity of the
measurement. The simplest way of showing the fundamental
limitations is to assemble a matrix of the eight fault conditions
and five detection methods as shown in Table 7-1. The dots
in the matrix show where there is some possibility of detecting
faults.

Tabte 7-1 shows that ground fault detection based on 60 Hz

measurements is only likely to be useful in situations where
current may flow to ground (3, 4 and 6). It will be of no use I

in detecting such conditions as a sagging conductor that on

doesn't contact anything (5), or a broken conductor that either Figure 7-1. Inherent limitation measurement
sensitivity.
does not contact ground (1), or contacts it only on the load
 Sensitivity iimitations are usually used to distinguish
-between fault and non-fault conditions.
The overcurrent
characteristic of Figure 7-1 is again a good example of this.
Fuses and overcurrent relais are selected so that normal
currents fall in the area of lqw sensitivity with infinitely long
detection times. Other typds of measuiements can piovidE
discrimination between faulted and non-faulted condiiions in
the same way.
i
Detection Ootions
'Table
7-1 shows that no sfingle measurement method will
detect all the electrical conjditions that can result from a
downed conductor. Even the Eonditions that can be measured
will. not always . be reliably detected due to sensitivity
limitations. The situation when a single measurement method
is used can,be depicted as in Figure 7-2. The heavy circle
represents the area in which pll possible electrical conditions
can occur and the light circlet represents the area covered by
the measurement method. rlnsofar as the circles do noi
coincide exactly, there will be both false indications of faults
and failures to indicare genuine faults.
One approach to successful fallen conductor detection is to
reduce the area of the light circle until there are no false
indications, and then accept a high probability of failure to
detect. Another approach is to use more than one
measurement technique, as slown in Figure 7-3. By choosing
compiementary techniques and suitably adjusiing theii
sensitivities, a much greate( range of condiiions witt Ue
detected. In some situations only one measurement element
would detect the condition, while in others two or more might
simultaneously react. This is depicted in Figure 7-3 by having
the three light circles (measdrement meth-ods) coveiing thI
single heary circle (all possibfe electrical conditions).
All Faults
Urldetec{ed
Delected
Falso
l taken to improve safety may be the same as used in
Figrre 7-2. Single detector covers only some faults.
Dtctor I
All Fau[!
Dcteclor 3
Figure 7-3. Multiple detectors to cover all faults.
35
The choice of approach will depend on the action that is
takenwhen a fault condition is detected. Ifthe faulted feeder
is tripped similar to normal protection practice, it will
probably be best to have as few false trips as possible and to
accept a relatively high rate of failures to trip. Alternatively,
-cause
detection of a fallen conductor may only an alarm
condition at the control center and might not automatically
trip the feeder. In this situation it may be best to have false
alarms rather than to have failures to alarm.
GOAL OF HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULT DETECTION
The concept of high impedance fault detection has often
been discussed as a form of protection, analogous to
overcurrent protection. In actuality, the goal of high
impedance fault detection and overcurrent piotection aie
somewhat different, a fact which merits discussion.
The primary motivation for overcurrent protection is the
protection of the electrical network. The need for overcurrent
protection is based upon the electrical and physical properties
ofthe conductors which supply electricity. Ifthese conductors
carry too much current for too long a period, they will melt,
destroying part of the electrical supply system. A conventional
fault usually interferes with the normal operation of the
system and if left energized could result in extensive
equipment damage. It is straightforward to protect the system
against such an occurrence, and it is easy to measure
parameters which indicate when a potentially damaging
condition exists. In practice, an additional motivation fo;
overcurrent detection is the removal of safety hazards caused
by faulted equipment.
In contrast, a fallen conductor quite often presents no risk
to system equipment and need not affect system operation.
It can, however create a serious safety hazard. The incentive
for applying detection methods is therefore to improve safety,
not to enhancg system operation or protect system equipment.
The electrical network is designed to carry the amount of
cxrrent common in high impedance faults. Although some
damage to c-onductors and equipment may occur during a high
impedance fault, this damage is typically localized to the polnt
of the fault with few, if any, adverse effects on the rest of the
system. The primary motivation for high impedance fault
detection is not to protect system equipment or to enhance
system operation, but rather to improve safety. The action
overcurrent detection, namely, to de-energize the affected
portion of the circuit.
APPROXIMATION OF UNSAFE CONDITIONS
With regard to high impedance faults, the goal of operation
.
is to detect and remove unsafe conditions, and to iontinue
service otherwise. The major challenge with this type of fault
detectioa is to identify unsafe conditions. Unfortunately, this
task is impossible to achieve. "Safety" is not a measurable
quantity upon which one can design the operation of a
detector. As a result, one can only measure parameters which
an -safe
provide approximate indication of or unsafe
conditions.
Asan example, consider that a detector may be monitoring
only.electrical parameters such as current on a feeder. It ma!
be difficult to determine any electrical differences between i
fallen, intact conductor fault, and the arcing caused by a dirty
insulator. Yet the actiom we would take in each iituation
may be quite different. We may wish to immediately clear a
downed conductor fault, but we may be willing to allow a dirty
insulator to continue to arc or even-flashover if there is no
immediate danger to persons or property. To restate, some
high impedance faults may be temporarily "acceptable,"
particularty if they present less hazard than loss of electrical
service to customers.
The determination of whether a high impedance fault is
imminently hazardous or temporarily acceptable is largely
in{luenced tly conditions at the fault site which may be
difficult to measure from a remote location. We desire that
a high impedance fault detector clear hazardous situations and
allow non-hazardous conditions. This choice is largely
influenced by such information as:
. Is a conductor on or near the ground?
. Are people nearby a downed conductor, or is no
one near it?
. Is fire a possibility?
It is impossible to implement a fault detector which could
absolutely answer these and similar questions. One can only
measure parameters or identiff Patterns which are considered
indicative of a hazardous situation.
Despite our best efforts, some unsafe conditions will remain
too subtle for detection. As an example, a pole crossarm may
break causing an intact primary to fall near, but not touching
the ground. While everyone would agree that this is a
dangerous condition, there are no measurable parameters
which would indicate the condition has
occurred.
Notwithstanding such very subtle faults, new technologies,
once conmercial, promise to identif a high percentage of
high impedance faults and unsafe conditions.
OPERATIONAL TRADEOFFS
The implementation of sensitive fault detection will, in all
liketihood, mean that there will be more outages. Because
these faults may be hard to locate, it is likely that the outages
will have longer durations. It is important that utilities try to
trip a circuit only when necessary to remove a hazard and to
preserve service continuity otherwise.
Given that one can only approximate unsafe conditions
through measurement of various parameters, the choice of
operating characteristics becomes critical and the
implementation must be sophisticated. It is difficult to weigh
the implications to safety of various approaches to the
operation of a high impedance fault detector.
If a fallen conductor is located in a residential
neighborhood, one could reasonably assume that the condition
is imminently hazardous and should be cleared at once. But
if the fallen conductor is located in a remote area far from
homes, there may be no immediatehazard, and there may be
some benefit to customers and the public by keeping the
circuit in service.
This last point complicates the whole matter of making
operational decisions about high impedance fault detection'
While we may improve safety on the one hand by de-
erergizirg a feeder at an indication of a downed conductor,
we may also diminish safety at the same time because other
types of accidents occur during electrical outages. One need
only consider the danger encountered at a major intersection
36
when the traffic signals are not working to recognize the
importance of electrical service. It is difficult to make the
tradeoffs involved in choosing the operating decisions for a
high impedance fault detector.
l
UTILITY DESIGN GOAIS
Texas A&M organized the EPRI High Impedance Fault
Detection Workshop in November, 1988 to provide a forum
for utility representatives to discuss different aspects of high
impedance fault detection. The utility representatives
indicated strongly that it is important for a high impedance
fault detector to operate correctly, especially that it not falsely
indicate the presence of a fault when there is none. They
indicated a preference for failing to trip for some high
impedance faults rather than accepting nuisance trips.
The utility personnel also stated that they would like to trip
for a conductor on or near ground condition, and that they
would not trip for a high irnpedance fault in which the
conductor remained intact on the pole top, for example, in the
case of a tree limb in contact with an intact primary.
When a high impedance fault detector trips a circuit, utility
personnel agree that reclosing should be disabled.
RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION
Given these guidelines, as part of research for EPRI
Project RP1.472-4, Texas A&M has recommended the
implementationof a high impedance fault detector which
provides both tripping and alarming actions. It is
recommended that the unit trip only on the detection of the
sequence of: (1) a significant, immediate loss of load, followed
shortly by, (2) electrical activity indicative of arcing. This
sequence is the most reliable indication of a broken conductor
on the ground, the condition which is most easily measured
accurately to indicate a hazardous condition.
Other faults can also be detected, but it is less definitive
that the situation is immediately hazardous. For example, the
presence of arcing without a loss of load is most likely tree
limb contact with an intact primary, or leakage current at a
cracked insulator. The same electrical signature could also be
caused by a single phase, intact lateral on the ground. Given
the utilities'suggested bias toward avoiding nuisance trips, it
would be recommended for this case to alarm the condition,
but not trip.
In practice, it is likely the most effective fault detection
systemwould include a communications link from the detector
to the utility system operator. The detector could provide an
alarm to th"e operatoi for evdnts which are likely io be high
impedance faults but for which the data is not sufficiently
definitive to warrant a trip. The operator can make a
determination for a course of action based upon established
company procedures. The operator-may choose to manually
trip the feeder or send a trouble crew to investigate the event.
The decision can be made based upon the data from the
detector as well as from other information such as an outage
call from a customer or weather-related data.
Allowing utilities to set the operating characteristics for an
automatic trip, a trip on confirrnation, or an alarm will provide
a Eteat deal of flexibility to utilities. Not only would the
abitity to trip a fault be of significant help, but the information
provided byan alarm would also be a substantial improvement
ior utilities in addressing high impedance fault detection.
 FAULT L,OCATION

Because high impedance faults are often subtle, there may made between sensitivity and discrimination, and quite
be little evidence providing the location of the fault. If a fault different performance accepted with respect to false deteciion
_

detector is used to trip an entire feeder, and ifit is difficult to
locate the fault, customers may be without service for
lengthy period.
Typically those faults which involve a broken conductor or
other significant item of poleline hardware will be relatively
easy to find. But faults for which the conductor remains intact
and fault contact is intermittent may be quite difficult to
locate in a timely manner. It may be helpful to use a fault
locating device such as an RF direction finder which can
Iocate RF noise associated with arcing.
and failure to detect.
a
The implementation of high impedance fault detection on
a distribution feeder. presenta many challenges f-
effectiveness. While the goal of detection is to remove
hazardous conditions, measurement of unsafe conditions can
only be approximated. It is important to bias the operation
of a detector to trip only when iertain that a conducior is on
or near ground. The recommended implementation is a
detector,which.trips upon recognition of a pattern of loss of
l9T.,t"9lro*,.0
ty arcing, a condition which most accurately
ldentltres a
broken conductor on the ground. Other conditioni
which are potentially hazardous but-for which the data is not
conclusive can be alarmed.

Previous research on high impedance fault detection has

focused on the implementatio[ of a substation-based detector
which can trip the entire feeder. This approach has been
necessary because heretofore there has been no inexpensive
interrupting device, analogoub to a fuse, which could be
triggered by a fault detector. However, this technologr is
changing, and the future holds promise for the implemendiion
of a distributed high impedance fault detection iystem which
could minimize the portion of a circuit affected by an outage.

Further research is needed before a distributed system

could be implemented so that the most effective system could
be specified. In particular, it must be determined whether
individual detectors can be coordinated as stand-alone units,
or if communications will be required between the units on a
feeder. A related matter is whether or not the individual
detectors must have directional capability.

COORDINATION WITH OVERCURRENT PROTECTION

There are no inherent problems with coordinating high

impedance fault detection with overcurrent protection on a
feeder because the two philosophies address two different
types of faults. There may be overlap of operation for some
downed conductor faults which involve a high degree of
current.

It is appropriate for a high impedance fault detector to

allow some period of time for an overcurrent device to clear
a fault. This is especially true if a fault detector is in service
only at the substation. It is desirable to wait for a
downstream overcurrent device to clear the fault to minimize
the portion of the circuit affected by an outage.

After some period, it must be assumed that the overcurrent

devices are insensitive to the fault. This period would likely
be on the order of ten to thirty seconds, but each utility must
address the question in a way which corresponds to their
protection practices.

coNCLvSTONS

Whatever the approach taken to detecting fallen

conductors, some performance compromises are inevitable.
No single detection method cari cover all situations and some
judgement will be involved in sgtting priorities. Conventional
protection concepts do not always apply when selecting
approaches for detecting fallen conductors because the
incentive for improvement is safety and not necessarily system
operation. For this reason, quite different trade-offs might be
37
 CHAPTER
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Utility relay engineers have done an excellent job in
designing systems which will automatically deenergize the
power system as a result of abnormal or fault conditions.
However, a significant number of faults occurring in electric
utility distribution systems due to downed conductors cannot
be detected by existing commercial protection devices. A
public hazard results when an electrical conductor is downed,
within reach, and energized. Realizing this, utilities have
taken extraordinary means to find a solution to this vexing
problem. To date, no solution exists, but research
investigations continue.
The fault problem can be described as follows. Certain
downed conductors are partially "insulated" because of the
surface conditions on which they fall. For example, a
conductor falling on dry asphalt has a very high impedance
path to ground and will draw very little, if any, current'
Hence, it is possible to define the problem of high impedance
faults as a detection problem wherein these faults draw
insufficient current to be detected by conventional overcurrent
protection devices and methods. Since overcurrent protection
utilizing relays, reclosers, and fuses represerts the primary tool
ofprotection engineers, a certain percentage offaults become
simply undetectable.
High impedance, low current faults have characteristics
significantly different than high current faults. The typical
fault which occurs when a conductor touches another curent
carrying conductor will draw many times the current which
will flow under normal conditions. However, a high
impedance fault may draw currents which are essentially equal
to or less than normal load currents on a feeder. It is
impossible using existing commercial relays to disting-uish
berween normal load currents and these high impedance fault
currents. Other characteristics of high impedance faults
include random behavior which tends to confuse protection
devices. By this we mean that the fault path is unstable and
the current levels fluctuate widely. Such faults are extremely
hard to reliably detect.
For many years, utility engineers and researchers have
sought a solution to this problem. Specifically during the last
decade, research projects sponsored by utilities, manufacturers,
and universities have intensively looked for unique
characteristics of high impedance faults which could be used
to build new protective devices. Significant efforts by such
utilities as Rochester Gas and Electric and Pennsylvania
Power and Light have resulted in a clearer understanding of
high impedance faults. These investigations along with
reiearch sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute
have resulted in several theoretical concepts for new devices.
Researchers at PTI, Hughes I-aboratories, and Texas A&M
University investigated several new concepts during the 1970's.
The early efforts of these five gtoups resulted in various
proposed detection methods ranging from sequence
compooent and harmonic analysis to high frequency spectrum
and noise analysis. While several of these methods were
38
8
shown to successfully detect certain types of faults, no single
approach can reliably detect all high impedance faults.
In the last few years research has intensified on this
problem. Research by Nordon Research and Development,
Westinghouse, several foreign research teams, and intensive
efforts at Texas A&M University have added to our body of
knowledge. The present conclusion generally agreed to by
most researchers is that no single detection technique can be
depended on to detect the majority of high impedance faults.
However, research has shown that a combination of several
techniques might be used to detect a significant percentage of
the presently undetected faults. In order to implement a
combined set of detection schemes, a more intelligent relaying
system will be needed, probably demanding that a
microcomputer based system be utilized. Work on such
synergistic detection methods 4nd intelligent adaptive relays
continues.
While we wait for a significant breakthrough in substation
based protection, other steps cafl be taken to mitigate the high
impedance fault problem. The availability of distribution
auiomation systems, including feeder communications, offers
new possibilities for improved feeder protection. Improved
construction practices, including tighter construction
configurations, the use of iarger conductors, and avoidance of
covered conductor can improve the detection of certain types
of fauls. However, there are obvious places where such
construction approaches are inappropriate. Improved
operating practices such as frequent tree trimming and
improved lightning protectio4 can assist in reducing the
number of downed conductors. New devices such as
mechanical guards can also be of assistance by converting
faults to high current faults before the conductors fall to earth.
While all of these methods may offer some improvement,
none represent a direct solution to the problem of detecting
high impedance faults. If all of the proposed construction and
operating practices were utilized, a certain percentage -of
dbwned ionductors would remain undetected. A method for
detecting these faults is still needed. However, the solution
must be economical and practical to apply. Research by
engineers dedicated to public safety continues. It is hoped
that through continued discussion, investigation, and further
research, methods will be found to detect a higher percentage
ofdowned conductor faults. Hpwever, it should be noted that
it is theoretically impossible to detect all such faults. Even
with an ideal protection system, some faults would remain
undetected and the public must be conscious and cautious of
the danger.
It is the hope of the authors of this document that the
tutorial presentations and text will encourage discussion of
the problem, self evaluation by electric utilities, and further
motivation by all researchers toward improved distribution
fault detection methods.
 REFERENCES
1. "Downed Power Lines:_Why They Can't Always be
D-etected," IEEE Power Engineering Society, February
1989.
"Distribution Faults Current Analysis,,, EpRI Report
EL3085, Prepared by power Technologies, Inc., May
1983.
B. D. Russell, B. M. Aucoin, T. J. Talley, "Detection of
Arcing Faults on Distribution Feedeis," EpRI Final
Report, EPRI EL-2757, December 19g2.
R. H. Kaufman and J. C. page, ,'Arcing Fault
Protection in a Low Voltage power biitribution"system
- Nature of the Problem,,, power Apparatw and
Systems
(AIEE), June 1960, No.48, pp. tOO-tOS.
5. J. R. DunkiJacobs, "The Effects of Arcing Ground
Faults on Low Voltage System Desigi,,, IEEE
Trawactioru on Industry Appliiations, Vot. ti_S, No. g,
May/June 1972, pp. 223-230.
C. Benner, P. Carswetrl and B. D. Russell, ,,Improved
lgorithm for Detecting Arcing Faults Usins Random
Fault Behavior," Electic powei Systems Resiarch, yol.
17, No. 1, 1989, pp. 49-56.
7. B. P. Iithi, Communications Systems, John Wiley &
Sons, New York, 1968, p. 68.
T. J. Talley, . "Power Spectrum Estimates of
Frequency Noise Generaied by High Impedance Faults
High
on Distribution Systems," M. S. Thesii, Texas A&M
University, December 1979.
9. L. Hood, "High Impedance Fault Detection
J. Cary, G.
on Primary Distribution Systms,,, Canadian Electical
Association Final Report, project No. 7g-75, Montreal,
1979.
10. 'Distribution Line Protection practices - Industry Survey
Results," Report of IEEE pES power System Relaying
Committee at the 1986 Conference and Exposition on
Transmission & Distribution, t_os Angeles,'California,
April 1986.
11.
I. E, .k-..D. E. Fritz, P. H. Stiler, L.A. Kilar, D. F.
Shankle, "Prevention of Covered Conductor Burndown
on Distribution Circuits;', froceeOings oiilr" a-.ri.un
Power Conference, yol. 42, pp. SSi-Sii,'epilf'rsSO.
t2.
*. E. k", D. Fritz, p. H. Stiller, D. F. Shankte,
"Prevention of-E'.Covered Conductor Burndown on
Distribution Circuits - Arcing protection Devices,,,
IEEE Paper 81 TD 714:5, Sepiember 1981.
13. of Distritrution Conductor Staged Fault
lP&L-- !.eport
Tests held on October 3-4, lg73 -Internal reiort.
t4. PP&L -1974 arrd 1975 Fallen 12 KV Overhead
Distribution Conductors, Breakdown of 390 Cases _
Internal report.
Pl{r! - Anqlysis
15. of Second Questionnaire on Clearing
of Distribution Line Faults - Internal report.
16. PP&L - Distribution Fault Interruption, Open
Conductor Tests, October 20,1975 - Internal report.
17.
B.E. Ir_",LA Kilar, "Summary and Status Report on
Research to Detect and De-energize High Imp-edance
Faults on Three-phase Four-wire Distribution Circuits,"
IEEE Paper A79 516-6, July 1978.
18. M. Rosado, L. A. Kilar, D. F. Shankle, R. E. ke,
"Improved Relay Schemes for the Detection of Fallen
Conductors on Three- Phase, Four-Wire, Distribution
Circuits," IEEE Paper presented at the 1979 IEEE/PES
&
Conference Exposition on Transmission &
Distribution, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1979.
19. L. A. Kilar, M. Rosado, H. F. Farnsler, R. E. L,ee,
"Innovative Relay Methods for Detecting High
Impedance Faults on Distribution Circuits", Proceedings
of the American Power Conference, Vol. 41, 1979, pp.
1180-1183.
H. Calhoun, M. T. Bishop, C.H. Eichler, R. E. Ire,
"Development and Testing of an Electro-Mechanical
Relay to Detect Fallen Distribution Conductors,,, IEEE
Transactioru on Power Apparatus and Systems, Yol.
PAS-101 No. 6, June 7982,pp.1,643-1648.
27. $. E. Ire, M. T. Bishop, "Performance Testing of the
Ratio Ground Relay on a Four-Wire Distiibution
Feeder," IEEE Traruactiow on Power Apparatus and
Vol. PAS-102, No. 9, September 1983, pp.
It-sterys,
2943-2949.
R. E. Ire, M. T. Bishop, "A Comparison of Measured
lllgh Impedance Fault Data to Digital Computer
Modeling Results," IEEE Transactions on Power
Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-104, No. 10, October
1985, pp. 2754-2757.
R. E. Ire, R. H. Osborn, 'A Microcomputer Based
Data Acquisition System for High Impedance Fault
Analysis," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparafiu and
Sy_stems, Vol. PAS-104, No.10, October 1985,pp.2748-
2753.
W A. Elmore, "Application Considerations of Type
CGR Broken Conductor Detection Relay," Texas A&M
University Relay Conference, College Station, Texas,
April 1982.
J. T. Tengdin (consultant), "Report on Westinghouse
Type CGRS Ground Relay," August 1988, unpublished.
26. Ire, "High Impedance Fault Detection Using Third
I.
Harmonic Curr elt," EPkl Final Report, EPRI EL2430,
June 1982.
27. K. A. Clements, E. Kallaur, "Detection of
S. J. Balser,
Lligh Impedance Faults," EPRI Final Report, E,pRl
El-2413, June 1982.
28. S. J. Balser, D. J. L^awrence, B. Caprino, L. Delaney,
"Implementation of a High-Impedance Fault Detection
Algorithm," EPRI Final Report, EPRI EL-4022, May
1985.

29. D. I. Jeerings, J. R. Linders, "Ground Resistance -

Revisited," IEEE Transactioru on Power Delivery,Yol.
PWRD-4, No. 2, April 1989, pp. 949-956.

30. D. I. Jeerings, J. R. Linders, "Unique Aspects of

Distribution System Harmonics Due to High Impedance
Ground Faults," presented at the IEEE/PES
Conference and Exposition on Transmission and
Distribution, New Orleans, I-ouisiana, April 1989.

31. D. I. Jeerings, J. R. Linders, United States Patent No.

4851782.

32. B. M. Aucoin, J. Zeigler, B. D. Russell, "Feeder

Protection and Monitoring System, Part 1: Design
Implementation and Testing," IEEE Transactioru on
Power Apparatw and Systems, Vol. PAS-1M, No. 4,
April 1985, pp. 873-879.
33. B. M. Aucoin, J. Zeigler, B. D. Russell, "Feeder
Protection and Monitoring System, Part 2: Staged Fault
Test Demonstration," IEEE Traruactiow on Power
Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-104, No. 6, June 1985,
pp.1456-1462.

34. P. W. Carswell, "The Detection of High Impedance

Faults Using Random Fault Behavior," M. S. Thesis,
Texas A&M University, August 1988.
35. T. R. Fischer, H. Jo, B. D. Russell, "High Impedance
Fault Analysis with Prediction Error and Wigner
Distritrution," Intermed.iate Report, National Science
Foundation, December 1988.

36. C. L. Benner, An Algorithm for Faulted Phase and

Feeder Selection Under High Impedance Fault
Conditions," M. S. Thesis, Texas A&M University,
August 1988.

37. R.E. I-ee and C.L. Brooks, "A Method and Its
Application to Evaluate Automated Distribution
Control", IEEE Paper 87 WM 153-0.

38. B.M. Aucoin, "Status of High Impedance Fault

Detection", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol. PAS-1M, No.3, March 1985, pp.638-643.

39. Application and Coordination of Reclosers, Sectionalize rs,

and Fuses, IEEE Tutorial Course Text 80 EHO157-8-
PWR, IEEE Power Engineering Society.

40. T.J. Kendrew, B.D. Russell, B.M. Aucoin, "High

Impedance Fault Detection Workshop", A Summary
Report Prepared as Part of EPRI RP1472-4, November
1988.

41. I. Reedy, "High Impedance Faults Associated with

Fallen or t-ow Hanging Conductors - A New Approach
to Protection", Submitted for presentation at the Spring
89 T&D Conference.

42. I. Reedy, "The Fallen Power Line Hazard: A New

Approach to Protection", Pu blic Utilities Forlniglttly,Y ol.
120, No.3, August 6,1987.

40
 APPENDIX A
SUGGESTED SOURCES FOR FURTHER READING

. This. appendix contains a bibliography of high impedance, 14. J. Carr, "Detection of High Impedance Faults on Mult!
downed conductor fault literature which is not citeddirecily in thti Grounded Primary Distribulion Systems,,IEEE Traruactions
text of the Tutorial. While most of the entries are technical in ort Apparatus and Systems,Vol. pAS_100, No. 4, April,
nature, several also deal wifh related, non-technical issues ^?ower
1981, pp. 2008-2016.
concerning the downed conductor problem.
15. C.:..: Fault Detection Using 60 FIz
.An.attempt has been made to be as complete as possible in this
{;
Methods," l,Higll"_,p"!gnce
IEEE pES Transmission and Disiribution
collection of literature. As with pny project of this nature, however, Conference, Anaheim, September, 19g6.
there may be omissions.
t6. R. .
P. Chinchali, ph.D. Dissertation of Texas A&M
University, College Station, Texas, August 19gg.
1. Y, Al-Dabbagh, R. Daoud, R. Coulter, ,Improved
Microprocessor Based Feeder Earth Fault protection Using 17. R. R. Conrad, D. Dalasta,'A New Ground Fault protective
Pattern Recognition,,, presented at the Fourth Internationa'i System for Electrical Distribution Circuits,, IEEE
Conference on Developments in power System protection, Trattsac-tions ott Industry and GeneralApplicatioru, Vol. IGA_
Edinburgh, UI( April Il-13, j989. 3, No. 3, May/June, '1967, pp.217_22i.
2. B. M. Aucoin, "Detection of High Impedance Faults Using R. F. Cook, R. V. Adams, I. A. Whyte, ,Developing a
Arcing-Generated Burst Noise Sienals,,, IEEE pES Commu.nicarion System for Automated OistribirtiJn,,
Transmission and Distribution Coiference, Anaheim, l|testingltouse Engineer, yol.35, No. l, January 197i, pp. li_
September, I986. 74.

3. B M: Aucoin, _"Operational, Economic and Legal
Considerations of High Impedance Fault Detection," IEEE
PES Transmission and Distribution Conference, Anaheim,
September, l986.
4. B. M. Aucoin, B. D. Rusbell, ,,Algorithm for the Detection
gf yojs_e_Iequencies Generated by High Impedance
Faults," IEEE iontrol of irower System; Co;fe."n"L, pup".
No. 78CHi282-3, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, March, 1978.
5. B. M. Aucoin, B. D. Russell, "Distribution High Impedance
Fault Detection Utilizing High Freque-ncy 'Current
Components," IEEE Trar1sactiorx on powir Apparanx and
Systents, Vol. PAS-101, No. 6, June, 19g2. pp.-i596-1606.
6. B.M. Aucoin, B.D. Russell, ,Detection of Distribution High
Impedance Faults Using Burst Noise Sigtals Near 60 llz.,
IEEE Trattsactions on Power Delivery,yol. pWRD-2, No. 2,
April 1987, pp. 342-348.
7. M. Aucoin, B. D. Russell; C. L. Benner,'High Impedance
Fault Detection for Industrial power Syslems,i' IEEE
Industrial_Applications Society Conference, San Diego,
October, 1989.
8. S. J. Balser, K. A. Clements, "Statistical Algorithm for
Detection of High Impedance Faults,' submitted for 19g3
IEEE/PES Summer Power Meeting.
9. S.J. Balser, K.A. Clements, D.J. l.awrence,
Microprocessor - Based Technique for Detection of High
Impeclance Faults", IEEE Trarcactions on power Detivelry,
Vol. PWRD-1, No.3, July 1986.
"Downed Power Lines: Why They Can't Always Be
Detected," IEEE power Engineering Society public Affairs
Document, 1989.
20. "Distribution Fault Interruption Open Conductor Test,,,
report by the Distribution Fault Curient Interruption Task
Force, Report# SA0 907041, pennsylvania powei and Light
Company, Ocrober 20, 1975.
21, "Distribution Line Protection practices Industry Survey
Analysis." IEEE Committee Report, IEEE Traruictior* on
P^ower Apparatus and Systeftrs: Vot. pAS-102, No. 10,
October, 1983, pp. 3279-3287.
Dbtribution Systen*, Westinghouse Electric Corp., East
Pittsburgh, PA, 1965,567 pp.
23. "Distribution System Protection Manual", McGraw-Edison
Co., Canonsburg pA, Bulletin No. 71021, 155 pp_
24. S. D. Ebron, "A Neural Network processing Strategv
for the
D erec{ i on_ of HigJr.Impeda nce Fa ulrs,, The jis, North
M.i.
Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carotina, 19gg.
25. W.A. Elmore and R.M. Reedy, ,'Electromechanical
Relay to
Detect Fallen Distribution -Conductors,, presentation to
American Public power Association Engineering &
Operations Workshop, February I9g3.
,'A 26 A.8.. Ernan_uell
9tj al., ',High.Imqedance Fault Arcing On
Sandy Soil In 15kV Distribution Feeders: Contributi,ons to
the Evaluation of the Low Frequency Spectrum,,, IEEE
Paper 89 SM 784-0 PWRD.

10. J. J. Burke, "Fault lmpedance Considerations for

Distrit'rution System Protection," IEEE pES Transmission
27.
! E fi:I1.. 'Arcing-Fault
IEEE Trawactions
Relays for Low_Voltage
_Sys1ems,] on Applications and Indusfi,,
and Distribution Conferehce, Anaheim, September 19g6. Vol. AI-82, No. 11, November 1963, pp.317-321.
11. H. J. Calhoun, "Ratio Ground Relay,', U. S. patent No. 28. T. Gange, S. Sakai, T. Emura, ,Development of a Digital
4347542, August 31, 1982_ Relay to Derect Broken Distribuiion Conductors,,,
12. J. Carr, "High Impedance and Broken Conductor Fault !1oce.e{ngs..of the IEEE Southeast Conference, nafe;gh,
Carolina, Paper No. CH2t6t-S 85 0b00_00i4, eugust,
Detection on Primary Distribution Systems,n presented at {o^rth / /
1985.
the Canadian Electrical Association ilZO Spring Meeting,
March 26- 28, 1979, Vancouver, B.C. H. T. A. J. Carlson, T. A.
Graham, Granberg, ,,Broken
and High Tmpedance.Fault Detection by High
13. J._ Carr, "New Approach to High-Impedance Faults,,' S,"1d:.1.r
l.requency Impedance Monitoring,,' IEEE/pES Win[r
Electical f4/orly' Yol. 194, No. 9, December, 19g0, p. g6. Power Meering, Paper No. 4-90-062-6, December, 19g0.
30. "Hish Impedance Fault Detection Remains Unresolved," 47. R.M. Reedy, nOperation of a Down-Wire Protection System
Eteitnc Light and Power, Yol.60, No. 10, October, 1982, p' - An Update', Report to EPRI Workshop on High
25. Impedance Faults, Novernber 1988.

31. C. L. Huang H. Y. Chu, M. T. Chen, "fualysis and 48. G. D. Rockefeller, "Fault Protection with a Digital
Detection Al"sorithms of High Impedance Fault in Primary Computer," IEEE Traruqctioru on Power Apparatus and,
bistribution Systems," National Science Council of Taiwan Systems, Vol. PAS-8E, Noi 4, April, 1969' pp. 438-464.
Final Repo*, Research Project NSC?4-0404-8006-06'
December, 1985. 49. B. D. Russell, "High Impedance Faults Can Now Be
Detected,n Transmission qnd Distributioa Vol. 34, No. 2,
C. L. Huang, H. Y. Chu, M. f' 'Algorithm February, 1982, pp.32-34, 60.
32.
Co-ouriron f6i ffish Impedance Fault -Chen,.
Detection Based on
stasJd Fault Tests,-- IEEE Traruactiorts on Power Delivery, B. D. Russell, B. M. Aucoin, C. Benner, "Computer
vo[ pwRo-1, No. 4, October 1988, pp. 1427-1435' Relaying Techniques for the Detection of High Impedance
Faulis Using Signal Processing and Pattern Recognition
JJ. A. O. Ibe, B. J. Cory, "A Travelling Wave-Based Fault Methods," International Conference on Power System
Lo"uto. for Two-and Three-Terminal Networks,* IEEE Protection, Singapore, September, 1989.
iiaioctiors on Power Delivery, Vol. PWRD-1, No' 2, April'
1986, pp. 283-28E.
51. B. D. Russell, R. P. Chinchali, 'A Digital Sigral Processing
Algorithm for Detecting Arcing Faults on Power
Diitribution Fe eders," IEEE Transactioru on Power Delivery,
34. "IEEE Guide for Interfacing Dispersed Storage and Vol. PWRD-4, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 132-140.
Generation Facilities with Electric Utility Systems"'
ANSI/IEEE Std 1001-1988.
52. B. D. Russell, K. Watson, 'Power Substation Automation
35. "IEEE Recommended Practices for Electric Systems in Using a Knowledge Baped System - Justification and
Health Care Faciities," ANSI/IEEE Standard 602-1986' Preliminary Field Experiments," IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, Vol. PWRD-2, No. 4, October, 1987, pp.
1090-1097.
36. "The Interruption of Downed Conductors on l-ow-Voltage
Power
OiitriUution'Systems", a report prepared by the IEEE
System Relaiing Committee for the Electric Power 53. B.D. Russell, R.P. Chinchali, C.J. Kim, 'Behaviour of Low
fiesearch Institute, October 1976. Frequency Spectra During Arcing Fault and SYi!!!!g
Events', IEEE Trarxactions on Power Delivery,Yol. PWRD-
3, No.4, October 1988, PP. 1485-1492.
3t. A. T. Johns, A. A. El-Alaily, "New Distance Protective Relay
*ittt f*p.ou"O Coverage ior High-Resistance Earth Fault"' B.D. Russell, K. Mehta, R.P. Chinchali, "An Arcing Fault
;;;;d;;i', t^int oinectrxai engineen, (GB), Yot' r24' 54.
Detection Technique Using Low Frequency Current
No. 4, Ap;il, 1977, PP.349'355.
Components-Performance Evaluation using RecoTlgd Field
H. L. Jou, 'Analysis and Detection Simulation of High Dat;', IEEE Transactiaru on Power Delivery, Vol PWRD-3'
38.
i-r"a.*.i paultJ in Distribution Systems," M' s' Thesis' No.4, October 1988, pp. 1493-1500.

lfuiion"t Cheng Kung University, Taiwan, June, 1984' 55. R. F. Shields, ''The Problem of Arcing Faults in Low-
DuringArcing Voltage Power Distribution Systems,"IEEE Tmnsactions on
39. C. J. Kim, B. D. Russell, 'Harmonic Behavior
oi-, Power Distribution Feeders,' Electric Power Indttstty and Geneml Applications, Vol. IGA-3, No. 3,
euritt January/February, 1967, pp. 15-25.
iii*r Research, Vol. 14, No.3, June, 1988, pp' 219-225'

W. J. Smolinski, "A General Analysis of Arcing Faults in

C. J. Kim, B. D' Russell, "Classification -of Faults and 56.
Low-Voltage Power Distribution Systems," IEEE
System
Switching Events by lnductive Reasoning and Exp.ert
IEii,E Trarsactions on Power Delivery, YoL Transactiow on PowerApparatus and Systerns, Vol. PAS-93'
MJh;"i"sr,; No.4, July/August, 1974' pp. 1593-1598.
PWRD-4, Nb. :, rury 1989, pp. t63t-1637 '

H. J. Songster, "High Impedance Fault Detection," W'estem

4L. M. A. Laughton, "Analysls of unbalanced polyphase 57.
Relay Conference, October 27-29, 19BA.
Un"the method-of phase co'ordinates' Part 1'
".t*oif.t
Srtt"* i"p.".entation in phaie frame of reference'n Proc'
't163'1172. 58. J. Stevens, "The Issue of Harmonic Injection from Utility
IEE 1968, 105(8), PP.
Integrated Photovoltaic Systems", IEEE Paper 87 SM 430-
2.
42. D. J. Lawrence, "Detection of High Impedance Faults Based
o"-C[ung"t in Sequence Current Unbalance," IEEE PES J. R. Stewart,
iiunt.nftio, and Distribution Conference, Anaheim' 59. 'Deteqting High Impedance Faults,'
Tmnsmission and Distribwtiory Vol. 31, No. 12, December,
September,1986.
1979, pp. 48-51.
nMicrocomputer
43. M. Narendorf, B. D. Russell, M. Aucoin,
and Monitoring System - Utility 60. R. P. Stratford, 'Rectifier Harmonics in Power Systems,"
iur"O F""O"t'Protection
IEEE Transactiorx on Indttstry Applications, Vol. 14-16, No.
E*olii"n"",- IEEE Transactiotu on Power Appararus and 2, March/April, 1980, pp.27t-216.
i;i;;, vi. pwno-2, No.4, october, 1e87, pp' t046-r0s2'
61. T. Udo, "Fault Generated Impulse Noise Voltage in
H. Hankun, 'Detection of - Broken Transmission Line," IEEE Trarcactions in Power Appemtus
44. A. G. Phadke,
-pi.t.iU,rtion and Systems, Vol. PAS-E0, No. 6, June 1967, pp. 678-684.
Conductors," Proceedings of IEEE Southeast
niioy Corr\rn"ce, Raleigh, N. Carolina, Paper No' CH2l61-
8/85/0000-0074, August, 1985.
62. U. S. Patent No. 4297738, oApparatus for and Method of
Detecting High Impedance Faults on Distribution Circuits
to Broken Conductor with Delta Connected Loads," Issued to I. Lee, October 27,
I. Reedy, "A New Approach
1981.
Protection," product announcement'
U. S. Patent No.4313146, "High Impedance Fault Detection
46. R. M. Reedy, "Minimize the Public Risk of Downed 63.
on Power Distribution Circuits," Issued to L Lee, January
Conau"to.t," 6lr. trical Worl4 September, 1989, pp' 5-36' 38'
40.
26,1982.
 U. S. Patent No .44!6071,'High Impedance Fault Detection
Apparatus and Mefhod," Issued to B. D. Russell, August 14,
1e84.
I

A. R Van C. !1fr1nglon, Protective Reloys: Their Theory

and Practice, vol. 2i London: Chapman ani Ha[, 1969.

66. P. S. Wessels, 'Grlpund Fault Interruption for personnel

Protection on the lOverhead Electric-power Distribution
Line,n Prevlruioa November/December, 19g0, pp.
9-15,32.
^Hazard
I

67. R. F. Wolff, "It's Tfugh to Relay High Impedance Faultg,

Electical Wort4 Vll. 192, No. 3, August [979, pp.32-33.

Ir.I1. YriCht, 'De{th or Injury Caused by Electrocution,,

9yry! lnbomto+ Medicite, Vol. 3, No.2, June 19E3, pf.
343-351. I

43
 APPENDIX B

PHOTOGRAPHS OF REPRESENTATIVE
DOWNED CONDUCTOR TESTS

This appendix illustrates the typical physical behavior of

downed conductor faults during staged fault tests conducted
bv several utilities under various conditions. The procedure
for these tests was, in generai, to attach a section of conductor
to the intact primary,lhrough a fused cutout. Then, the end
of this attachid line was lowered to the ground using a rope
and insulator arrangement to a1low a lineman in a bucket
truck to control the Jonductor. The downed lines were always
fused with a small (e.g., 25T) fuse in coordination with existing
upstream protection, to assure that no customer service
interruptions were caused by the tests.

In many cases, no perceptible fault current was produced

bv the downed conductor; photographs of these cases are not
included in this appendix. For the cases inwhich fault current
did flow, the arcing was spectacular, throwing dirt into the air,
oroducins steam fiom the moisture in the proximate soil' and
"bright
.*it,ing flashes of light from the arc.itsell' In many of
these cises,*some of the sand was heated by the arc to the
point that it fused into glass.-In,none of the. following cases
'Oia tn" 25T luse clear the fau1t. The faults persisted for
Figure 82. Fault to ground rod at PNM in 1981'
several minutes until manuaily disconnected by linemen'

PNM TESTS
TU ELE,CTRIC TESTS

The first two photographs are of tests conducted for Texas conducted for Texas
A&M by Public Service io-purry of New The faults The next photograph represents tests
-Mexico'
were stiged on Rodeo Feeder 2, a 12.5 kV line in Santa Fe
ll Fort Worth' Texas' Thesewing
p.r, h, Terar I hilities faults
^
f;.",";;Jo,; H;;;i; Feeder 54' a 12'5 kv line
which served primarily rurai 1oad. time of the tests was hot
suburban load' The weather at the
The faults were conducted at two different times' The first and dry.
was conducted in July of 1979, the weather was hot and dry,
and the soil was sandy. The second photograph was taken
during tests conducted in July 1981. Again, the weather was
hot and dry, and the soil was sandY.

Figure 83. Fault on dry sod at Texas Utilities in Augusl

19'78.

RG&E TESTS

The final two photographs represent tests conducted for

Figure 81. Ground fault at PNM in 1979. Only tip of TexasA&M by Rochester Gas & Electric of Rochester, New
conductor lowered to ground. York. The faults were staged in J';ly of 1978 on a 12 5 kV
line in Rochester, New York. The feeder served suburban
load, and the weather was fair and warm at the time of the
tests.

The first of these photos shows an arcing fault on

moderately dry sod. The second was taken immediatelv after
the conductor was deenergized; it demonstrates the fire hazard
presented by an arcing, downed conductor.

Figure 84. Fault to moderately dry sod at RG&E.

Figure 85. Conductor and surroundings immediately

after de-energizing fault shown in Figure 84.
 APPENDIX C

REPRESENTATIVE CURRENT PLOTS

DTIRING DOWNED CONDUCTOR TESTS

This appendix illustrates the range of fault currents possible The other current traces in $is appendix illustrate typical
during single line-to-ground faults. Figure C1 represents_ a fault currents experienced duriug downed conductors faults, as
phasJ C to ground fault which was cleared (properly) by demonstrated during- faults stagied by several utilities under
existing protection. various conditions. The procedure for these tests was, in
seneral. to attach a section of conductor to the intact primary,
ihrough a fuse cutout. Then, thd end of this attached line was
IowerEd to the ground using a rope and insulator arrangement
to allow a lineman in a bucket tquck to control the conductor'
The downed lines were always fused with a small (e.g.' 25T)
a.00 fuse in coordination with exisling upstream protection, to
assure that no customer service lintemrptions were caused by
l.o0 the tests.
U
a
$
o Several things can be seen and should be noted from these
0.00
plots. First, arl arc is charactetrized by very sporadic fault
tg iurrent behavior. Current sometimes will flow for only one-
-1.00 half of ore power frequenry cyqle, followed by a lo:g period
of quiescenfnon-arcing. In othdr cases, current will be drawn
-4. o0 for many tens of cycles; however, even in these cases, there
a. oo
often exists agreatdeal ofdifference in the magnitude, phase
angle, harmonic content, etc. from one arcing power frequency
F 1.00 cycle to the next.
r
-e
C
o. oo The second point of interest is that the magnitude of the
q
&
fault current varies greatly frorn one test to another, even if
E the tests are performed at the same test site under similar
I -r.oo conditions.
l

-e.00
e.00 Finally, it is important to rpoint out that none of the
followinj faults werL of sufficignt magnitude for a sufficient
amount of time to melt the fuse link.
o 1 .00
U
II
t 0 .00 TU ELECTRIC TESTS
a
f -1.00
A&$
The first seven plots represent tests conducted for Texas
by Texas Utilities in Fort fiorth, Texas dulng FeEary
1980. the faults were staged dn Randol Mill Feeder 253, a
-a- oo i2.5 kV feeder. The feeder serted primarily residential load'
1. OO

with a load current of approximptely 250 amperes at test time.

The skies were cloudy during lhe tests and the temPerature
{
J
d
0.50
was between 40 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit. The ground
5 consisted of muddy clay due to large amounts of rain and
2 o. oo snow during the preceding few days.
a
tv -0.5{l A point worth noting is that all of these plots come from
two d-owned conductor faults, and these two faults lvere done
-1 -OO
under very similar conditions. lDespite this, there is a great
-a- oo deal of difference in the behavior of the two faults, and there
are even significant differences from one portion of a given
test to another portion of the same test.

Also note that Figure C6 demonstrates that the arcing fault

component of the current is not generally continuous. Instead,
Figure C1. High current phase C to ground fault, it tends to extinguish and restrike during each half-cycle of
properly cleared by conventional protection' voltage.

46
 4

-ir ,:
4 c? I

o0
l
o 0
l
E E
z
o z
< -l o

-2

-5

-4
05 08 lo 12
nME (SECONOS)

Figure
- C2. Ten cycles of unfiltered and high frequency Figure C5. 100 cycles of phase current following those
(2 - 6 kHz) phase current during arcing fault shown in Figure C4.
on wet clay at TU Electric.

-i,r .-}
c ?
L

o0
f o
f
z
= E
< -t z
(,

oo ol o2 of 04 05
IIME (SECONDS)
oo2 00J o04
IIME (SECONDS)

Figure C3. 30 cycles ofphase current during arcing fault Figure C6. Three cycles of phase current, with phase
on wet clay at TU Electric. voltage shown as a reference (dashed line).

Irtl"l i, rilr L ulLu [, [, rulilurr.U I

jr .}
o
oo
?
G rut'['rr[il-rnrrFrr[l['f
f o
E f
z
o
<r zo
=

A /\ A A A A A A A

06 08 to rl
\/]/l/l/ \/vl/ I \/I
rlo o o. oo4 006 00a oro oll o14 016
IIMiE (SECONDS) TIME (SECONDS)

Figure C4. 100 cycles-ofphase current during arcing fault Figure C7. Ten cycles of high frequency (upper trace)
on wet clay at TU Electric. Note: tie30 and unfiltered (lower trace) fault current as
cycles shown in Figure C3 are included in this measured at the fault site (no load current
plot. i measured).
 HI-&P TESTS

The remaining fault current plots are of tests conductecl for

Texas A&M by Houston Lighting & Power in Houston, Texas.
The faults were staged on Kluge Feeder 3, a 12.5 kV line. The
feeder served primarily rural load, and the test site was 5
miles from the substation. The weather conditions were hot .-)
and dry. l
I

Each plot is from the same test, which involved lowering a o

conductor to a ground rod, since faults directly to'the ground L
z
produced little if any fault current. Again, notice that there o
is no consistenry with respect to burst magnitude or burst
duration.

00 02 04 06 08 1.0 12 14 16
TIME (SECONDS)

Figure C10. 100 cycles of phase current during arcin-g fault

to ground rod at HI-&P' Note: The 30 cycle
o shown in Figure C9 are included in this piot.
l
L
z
o

l-T---l
o02 004 O06 o.oa o to a 12

lrME (SECONDS)

Fisure
" C8. Ten cvcles of unfiltered and high frequency
(2-6 kHz) phase current during arcing fault
to ground rod at HI-&P.

ir
c

oo
l
L
z
o

rIME (SECONDS)

Figure C9. 30 cycles ofphase current during arcing fauh

to ground rod at HI-&P.

48