REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY.
HENEDINO BRONDIAL
COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
2ND Sem 2016-2017
will apply.
HELD: Yes. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor
finally disposes of it as it leaves something to be done by
the court before the case V. RULES 15-19
DE GUZMAN JR. VS. OCHOA
648 SCRA 677
Doctrine: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor
finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by
the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only
be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if
the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from
the final judgment
FACTS: Respondent spouses Cesar and Sylvia Ochoa ,
through respondent Araceli Azones, ostensibly acting as
attorney-in-fact, filed an action in the RTC seeking the
annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale,
certificate of sale and damages. The petitioners as
defendants in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not state a
cause of action.
RTCs Ruling: RTC denied the petition and at the same
time set the civil case for pre-trial, directing the parties to
submit their briefs.
Petitioner filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that
the certification against forum shopping was not executed
by the parties themselves. Respondents opposed the
second motion to dismiss, RTC agreed with respondents.
Petitioners filed MR but RTC denied.
Petitioner went to CA via a petition for certiorari.
CAs Ruling: CA denied for lack of merit, in its decision, it
agreed with the RTC that following the omnibus motion
rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the
petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise
it in their first motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether the omnibus motion rule is finally
decided on the merits. An order denying such may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from
the judgment after trial. Only in exceptional cases where
the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion that the court allows the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus
motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any
other omnibus motion must raise and include all objections
available at the time of the filing of the motion because
under Section 8, all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. SISON
612 SCRA 702 (2010)
TOPIC:Intervention; Requisites: Intervention Is
Discretionary upon the Court.
DOCTRINE:To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2)
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.
1
FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr.
Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan,
Samar, filed a letter-complaint accusing Governor
Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the
Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison,
before the Office of the Ombudsman relative to the alleged
highly anomalous transactions entered into by them
amounting to several millions of pesos. The alleged
calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity
having been declared by the President; and that purchases
for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were
substantially overpriced. Sison was the Provincial Budget
Officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman found basis to proceed
with the administrative case against the impleaded
provincial officials of Samar. In his counter-affidavit, Sison
vehemently denied the accusations and asserted that his
function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an
appropriation for the requisition exists, that the
corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds
are available. He averred that he never participated in the
alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and
attendance sheet of the bidding and that not one of the
documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-
complaint bore his signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision,
finding Sison and several other local officials of the
Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissing him from service. Aggrieved, Sison
appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43.
CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion
for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA
in its assailed resolution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be
allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decision rendered by the CA?
HELD:No. It is fundamental that the allowance or
disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the
rules shows the intention to give to the court the full
measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
intervention,8 thus:
SECTION1.Who may intervene.A person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION2.Time to intervene.The motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on
the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an
interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main
purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment
all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among,
the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2)
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.
ANONUEVO VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI
636 SCRA
TOPIC: Intervention
FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother
Bernardino filed petition for issuance of letters of
administration with Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental to commence the judicial settlement of the
estate. May Anonuevo and their siblings introduced
themselves as children of Sylvia Desantis, who is the
daughter of Isabel Blee, who at the time of Rodolfos death
is the legal spouse of the letter. Thus, isable is entitled to a
share in estate of Rodolfo.
Petitioners pray that they be allowed to intervene
on behalf in the intestate proceedings because Sylvia and
Isabel have already passed away. Respondents opposed
because the evidences showed by the Petitioners revealed
that Isabel has a subsisting marriage with John Desantis at
time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo. Thus,
marriage with Rodolfo was void ab initio.
The intestate court issued an order allowing
petitioners to take part in settlement proceedings. CA sided
with the respondents with regard to the marriage of Isabel
with John Desantis.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred when it nullified the orders of
intestate court allowing Petitioners to intervene in
settlement proceedings
RULING: NO
A courts power to allow or deny intervention,
albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with
interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to
intervene.Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to
allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.
Petitioners and their siblings failed to offer
sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal
spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and
their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in
Rodolfos estate. The birth certificate of Sylvia precisely
serves as the competent evidence of marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to
present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has
interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by
the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement
proceedings cannot be justified.
2
RODRIGUEZ VS. CA
698 SCRA 352
TOPIC: Motion to Intervene
FACTS:On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho filed before
the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of
land, measuring 125 hectares, located in San Mateo, Rizal.
On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a Decision
evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as
follows:
It has been established that the parcel of land
under consideration was formerly several smaller
parcels owned and possessed by the several
people, all of whom in January 1960, executed
instruments of conditional sale of their respective
parcels of land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on
July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a final
deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the
conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the
benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as
amended.
The CFI confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho
to the parcel of land under consideration and orders the
registration thereof in her name and personal
circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the
Director of Lands was dismissed.Upon finality, a TCT was
issued instead of an OCT. After several sales, respondent
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI),
under TCT No. 482970, became owner on July 15, 1975.
MEANWHILE, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI)
instituted Civil Case No. 12044 entitled A. Doronila
Resources Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was still pending before
the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership
over the subject property. While still pending in court,
ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was
issued on March 25, 1983
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of
Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of
herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two
years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
On May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion
alleging therein that the Decision dated November 16,
1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landichos
title over the subject property has not been executed
alleging that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
Landichos name. As Landichos successor-in-interest to the
subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of
Deeds for Marikina City issue OCT in his name.
Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion,
Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but
alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the
RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding
PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-
5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration
No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection therewith.
On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a
Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that
it was an indispensable party in the case, having
substantial legal interest therein as the registered owner of
the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise
pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT
No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was
fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed
to allege in his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
2ND Sem 2016-2017
remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action
or final court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title
of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.
Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its
intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could
protect its vested rights and interests over the subject
property; to note and admit its Answer-in-Intervention; and
to deny Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit.
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in
an Order dated April 10, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by
PCCAI is proper even though it was filed after rendition of
judgment by the trial court. YES
HELD: Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, pertinent provisions of which read: SECTION 1. Who
may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene
may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading- nintervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to
intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in
several cases, viz:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions
have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the
higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
have not been impleaded, the right to be heard
even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court, and even where the
assailed order has already become final and
executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for
intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines
was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice
and injury and to settle once and for all the
substantive issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for
intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule
of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose
is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify
the relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention.
First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the
subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated
November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became
final and executory. Second, as previously discussed
herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to
3
Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
Landicho who prayed for the execution of the November
16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in
the case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on
the ground that the subject property is already registered
in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from
Landichos TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC,
PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such
action was the most opportune and expedient remedy
available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs
name.
For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the
intervention of PCCAI.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders
dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
deleting the second sentence of the dispositive portion for
being a superfluity.
FERNANDEZ VS. CA
691 SCRA 167
TOPIC: Intervention
FACTS: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio
Henson were elected to the board of directors of NADECOR.
In a regular stockholders meeting where two groups were
vying for control over the company, Calalang, De Jesus,
Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle were
Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate
Secretary. Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be
stockholders of record, sought to annul the said meeting
held. They filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG.
Ricafort/s alleged that they were not given due notice of
the said meeting thus they were not present and were not
able to exercise their right. RTC agreed with the Ricaforts.
Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the
members of the board with the CA, all with application for a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The CA denied such
applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th
division issued a TRO. During the effectivity of the TRO, the
old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new
one in order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the
corporation. All the CA petitions were consolidated as well
as the other cases. On February 17, 2012, the respondents
Ricafort filed their Comment Ad Cautelam to the petition in
CA-G.R. No. 122784. The petitioners therein thereafter filed
three (3) urgent motions to resolve their application for writ
of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and again
on June 6, 2012. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was
questioned. Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to annul the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CAs Special
14th Division. Complainants also filed an Administrative
case against the Justices of the 14th Division of the CA.
Alleged in this administrative complaint that the
respondent Justices are guilty of grave misconduct,
conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the
law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality.
ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to
assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA
14th Division.
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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HELD: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely,
a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be
bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction.
Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger. Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party
in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for
certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to
annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a
person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in
the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the
Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated
differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed
by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no
standing to question the assailed order.
In this Courts Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. Nos.
202218-21, entitled Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v. Court of
Appeals [Special 14th Division], et al., involving a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus,
Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. NalenRosero-Galang, also
questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that
persons who are not parties to any of the consolidated
petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive
writ.
In another Resolution, also promulgated on July 18, 2012,
in G.R. Nos. 202257-60, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by herein complainants to assail the
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in the aforesaid
consolidated CA petitions, we likewise dismissed the
petition due to lack of personality of the petitioners, since
they were non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA
petitions. We pointed out that they should first have
intervened below, and then filed a motion for
reconsideration from the questioned CA order. On
September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for
reconsideration from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants have no
personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the CAs former Special 14th Division, we cannot
now permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the
same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ was
erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot
be held administratively liable for every discretionary but
erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge
cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or
administratively for an erroneous decision render
PANOLINO v. TAJALA
G.R. No. 183616 June 29, 2010
TOPIC: Fresh Period Rule
FACTS:The DENR Regional Executive Director Jim O.
Sampulna (RD Sampulna), by Decision2 of June 19, 2007,
denied for lack merit the application of Julieta Panolino
(petitioner), which was opposed by herein respondent
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land
located in Kinayao, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat, directed
petitioner to vacate the contested property and remove at
her expense whatever improvements she may have
4
introduced thereon, and advised respondent to file her free
patent application over the contested property within sixty
days.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27, 2007,
of which she filed a motion for reconsideration on July 11,
2007. Her motion was denied by Order5 of September 6,
2007, copy of which she received on September 12, 2007.
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
before the Office of RD Sampulna, stating that she was
appealing the decision and order to the Office of the DENR
Secretary. By Order of October 16, 2007, RD Sampulna
denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
beyond the reglementary period. The RD explained that
petitioner should have filed her appeal on September 13,
2007 as she had only one day left of the 15-day
reglementary period for the purpose, pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990.
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the 2005 case
of Neypes v. CA, petitioner argued in her motion for
reconsideration of RD Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order
that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days from her
receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the September 6,
2007 Order denying her motion for reconsideration of the
June 19, 2007 Decision of the RD or until September 27,
2007. Her motion was denied by Order10 of November 28,
2007.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which, by Resolution of January 25, 2008,
dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, she having bypassed the Office of
the DENR Secretary and the Office of the President before
resorting to judicial action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that her
petition for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. CA holding
that "the issue raised is clearly a question of fact," denied
petitioners motion. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "fresh period rule" laid down in
Neypes applies to petitioners case.
HELD:As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the
decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to
Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule
42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial
proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners present case is administrative in nature
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is
indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly
provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied,
the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder
of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the
resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed,
the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his
appeal.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified in
Neypes, being inconsistent with Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case
of petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied.
CHING VS. CHENG
G.R. No. 175507; October 8, 2014
DOCTRINE: Rule 17 of the RC governs dismissals of
actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-
dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 will not apply if the
prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
FACTS: It Antonio Ching owned several businesses
including Po Wing Properties. While he was unmarried, he
had children from two women: Ramon Ching with Lucina
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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Santos; and Joseph and Jaime Cheng with Mercedes Igne.
When Antonio was weak, he entrusted to Lucina the
distribution of his estate to his heirs if something were to
happen to him. Lucina, then handed, all the property titles
and business documents to Ramon Ching for safekeeping.
Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness and
allegedly demanded that Ramon return all the documents.
In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon Ching alleged that
he was summoned to execute an affidavit of settlement of
estate declaring him to be Antonios sole heir. After a year
of investigation, the police found Ramon to be its primary
suspect. Thus, Chengs filed a complaint filed a complaint
(first case) for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon
Ching before the RTC of Manila. The complaint was
amended, with leave of court, to implead additional
defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon
was a primary stockholder. Po Wing Properties filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the subject matter, which was granted by the RTC. In 2002,
Chengs and Lucina filed a complaint (second case) for
"Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by
Virtue of Said Documents against Ramon and Po Wing
Properties.However, Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to
dismiss their complaint in the second case, praying that it
be dismissed without prejudice, which was also granted.
Thus, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order and argued that the
dismissal should have been with prejudice under the "two
dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first
case.
ISSUE: Whether the trial courts dismissal of the second
case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, as per
the "two-dismissal rule?
HELD: The first section of the rule contemplates a
situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the
case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by
the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and
confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court; the
second section of the rule contemplates a situation where
a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before
the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to
dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is
generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by
the court; the third section contemplates dismissals due to
the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute.
The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant
or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is
with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court. As a
general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are
without prejudice except when it is the second time that
the plaintiff caused its dismissal, accordingly, for a
dismissal to operate as adjudication upon the merits.
YAO VS. PERELLO
G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003
REQUISITES TO FILE A MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a
complaint filed by petitioner before the HLURB against a
certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
Enrico Baluyot and PablitoVillarin, private respondents
husband.
The HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to
sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR
Builders to refund petitioner and to pay damages.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR
Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the
office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement.
Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of
land registered in the names of spouses PablitoVillarin and
private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The property was
scheduled for public auction.
5
Private respondent filed before the RTC, a petition for
prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Bagabaldo from
proceeding with the public auction. On even date, public
respondent Judge issued a 72-hour temporary restraining
order and set the case for raffle and conference on March
22, 2002.
The case was eventually raffled to RTC, presided by public
respondent judge. Public respondent judge issued
resolution granting private respondents petition for
prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from
execution. Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not
materialize.
On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public
respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However, public
respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order
of May 10, 2002. Petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether petitioners motion for intervention should
be granted
HELD:NO.Accordingly, private respondent acted well within
her rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the
deputy sheriff because the latter went beyond his authority
in attaching the subject property. This right is specifically
reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is
essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the
act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be
impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as the judgment
creditor in the HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was
an indispensable party in the petition for prohibition and
should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He
was not allowed to do so.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to
intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in
petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow
intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise
qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the
first is not more important than the second.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right
as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting
of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that
there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the
defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that
petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must
exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within
the period prescribed therefor.
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As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only
on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the
rules. The court resolution granting private respondents
petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject
property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002,
after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already
become final and executory.
Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the
reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is sufficient
cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its
errors, if any.
Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court fails to
find grave abuse of discretion committed by public
respondent judge in rendering the assailed resolution and
order.
ALBERTO G. PINLAC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91486 JANUARY 19, 2001
SUMMONS; INTERVENTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF
JUDGMENT
FACTS:The instant case springs from a contentious and
protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real property
situated in what is now known as Old Balara, Sitio
Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City.
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their
dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed
a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC. In
particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which
has an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property
continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than
thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed
applications for land titling in their respective names with
the appropriate government agency.
One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the
Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The
individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were
not specifically named. Since personal service of summons
could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other
named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to
serve summons by publication which was granted.
Accordingly, the summons was published in the
"Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and
published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their
respective responsive pleadings, while the others,
including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared
in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to
present evidence ex parte against the defaulted
respondents. The trial court rendered a partial judgment in
favor of the petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after
the above-quoted judgement by default was rendered, a
Petition for Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus4 was brought before the Court
of Appeals by the titled owners of the subdivided lots
within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgement which
nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no
jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties.
They also alleged that they only came to know of the
adverse judgement when petitioners sought the execution
of the judgement by attempting to dispossess some of the
titled owners of the lots and making formal demands for
them to vacate their respective properties. Also, they
claimed that the Partial Decision against the defaulted
6
respondents was null and void on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, granted the petition for annulment of
judgment.
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that
judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line
with the decisions this Honorable Court had already
rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its
original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest
land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-
35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-
35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and
other interested parties.
The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as
may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the
petition for annulment of judgment?
b. Whether publication of the summons made in
the Metropolitan Newsweek was defective, hence the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents.
c.Whether or not the intervention of the Republic of
the Philippines is proper in this case.
HELD: a.Yes.
The case before the Court of Appeals was one for
annulment of judgement, certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. In resolving the same, the Court of Appeals
need not retry the facts. An action for annulment of
judgement is grounded only on two justifications: (I)
extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. All that herein private respondents had to prove
was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were
prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to
the trial court by some act or conduct of petitioners; or
that they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the
Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack of
jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due
process of law.
The action for annulment of judgement cannot and
was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
very purpose of the action for annulment of judgement was
to have the final and executory judgement set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. Whether or not the
assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts and
evidence presented by the petitioners is meritorious is
irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err, nor did it violate the petitioners' right to due
process of law, when it refused to consider all the factual
issues raised by petitioners.
b. No.
While the service of summons by publication may
have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does
not cure the fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek"
is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City
.The Rules strictly require that publication must be "in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order." The court orders relied
upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the
length of time that the summons was to be published. In
the absence of such specification, publication in just any
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the
rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled
with the defective publication of the summons rendered
the service by publication ineffective. The modes of service
of summons should be strictly followed in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and
failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the
service of summons. It cannot be over emphasized that the
statutory requirements of service of summons, whether
personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must
be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of
service other than that prescribed by the statute is
considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the
publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of
summons would still be ineffective insofar as private
respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for
Quieting of title was filed on November 2, 1983,
VilmaMaloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical
entity. VilmaMaloles Subdivision, a partnership, was
dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January
26,1976. Consequently, it could no longer be sued having
lost its juridical personality.
c. Yes.
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of
procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate
a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed,
in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the
petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was
granted even after the decision became final and
executory, thus
. . . The permissive tenor of the provision on
intervention shows the intention of the Rules to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to
say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously
and only after consideration of all the
circumstances obtaining in the case.
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is
necessary to protect public interest as well as government
properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3.
The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended
as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the
State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
properties.
LAUDE VS. JUDGE GINEZ-JABALDE
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015
Topic: 3-day Notice Rule under Rule 15, Section 4; In
criminal cases, the People is the real party in
interest
FACTS:On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was
killed at the Celzone Lodge in Olongapo City allegedly by
19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton. On
October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by
Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton
before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. On
October 22, 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp
Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.
7
On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an
Information for murder against Pemberton before the
Regional Trial Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of arrest
against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014.
Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M.
Ginez-Jabalde on December 19, 2014, and he was then
arraigned.
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion
to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion
to Allow Media Coverage. The Motion was heard and
denied by Judge Ginez-Jabalde for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
also denied.
Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of
jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
mere technicalities. In particular, they argue that the three-
day rule on motions under Rule 15, Section 4, of the 1997
Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be liberally
interpreted when a case is attended by exigent
circumstances.
Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day
notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity to be
heard, which was present in this case since Pemberton's
counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present in the
hearing of the two Motions filed by petitioners. Petitioners
allege that the court noted their attendance, and were able
to make comments during the December 22, 2014 Motion
hearing. They assert that the rights of Pemberton were not
compromised.
Petitioners also aver that the three-day notice rule should
be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and
arraignment. She also argue that even though the Visiting
Forces Agreement gives the United States the "sole
discretion" to decide whether to surrender custody of an
accused American military personnel to the Philippine
authorities, "the rule is that . . . the Court still has control
over any proceeding involving a jurisdictional matter
brought before it, even if it may well involve the country's
relations with another foreign power.
As for the nonconformity of the Public Prosecutor,
petitioners argue that the Public Prosecutor's refusal to
sign the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail rendered the requirement for conformity
superfluous. Petitioners allege that the Public Prosecutor's
act is contrary to Department of Justice Secretary Leila M.
De Lima's . They quote Secretary De Lima as having said
the following statement in a news article dated December
17, 2014:
The Philippines will now insist on the custody of Pemberton
now that the case is filed in court and especially since the
warrant of arrest has been issued," De Lima told reporters
in an ambush interview.
Petitioners also quoted Secretary De Lima as having stated
in another news article dated December 18, 2014 the
following:
Justice Secretary Leila De Lima stressed that
Pemberton should be under the custody of
Philippine authorities, following the filing of
charges.
"There is also a provision in the Visiting Forces
Agreement that, in cases of extraordinary
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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circumstances, the Philippine government can
insist on the custody and for me, there are enough
such circumstances, such as cruelty and treachery,
that justified the filing of the murder and not
homicide," De Lima said.
The contrary manifestations made by Secretary De Lima,
according to petitioners, meant that "the conformity of the
Public Prosecutor is a mere superfluity" and was meant "to
deny petitioners' 'quest for justice.
In his Comment dated June 16, 2015, Pemberton argues
that Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
Accused to the Olongapo City Jail since petitioners violated
the three-day notice rule and failed to secure the
conformity of the Public Prosecutor assigned to the case.
He claims that he "was not given an opportunity to be
heard" on petitioners' Motion.
Pemberton further argues that the custody over him
"rightfully remain with the United States authorities. . . ."
He cites Section 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which
provides that the "custody of any United States personnel
over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities,
if they so request, from the commission of the offense,
until completion of all judicial proceedings.
Pemberton likewise argues that Marilou S. Laude, being
only the private complainant, lacks the legal personality to
file the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration "without the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor." Quoting Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pemberton states that the
Public Prosecutor's lack of consent "rendered the Urgent
Motion a mere scrap of paper."
Pemberton also argues that Marilou S. Laude cannot rely
on the alleged statements of Secretary De Lima for the
following reasons: First, Secretary De Lima did not direct
the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor to give its
approval to the Urgent Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration Second, Secretary De Lima did not state
that the Public Prosecutor should insist on turning over the
custody of Pemberton to the Philippine authorities. Neither
was there any such order from Secretary De Lima.
Petitioners' claims are, therefore, without legal basis.
As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces
Agreement, Pemberton argues that there is a difference
between "jurisdiction" and "custody." He avers that
jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to try,
hear and decide a case." Pemberton does not dispute that
"Philippine authorities have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over offenses committed by [a] United States
personnel which is why the case is being tried in a
Philippine court." However, custody "pertains to the actual
physical control over the person of the accused and under
the Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton argues that
custody shall reside with the United States Military
authorities, since the Visiting Forces Agreement expressly
provides that "The custody of any United States personnel .
. . shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities . . . from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the 3-day notice rule is justified?
2. Whether the petitioner has legal capacity to sue in
criminal case at bar?
8
HELD:
1.No. The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-
day notice rule is unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at
least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with
protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due
process. In Jehan Shipping Corporation:
As an integral component of procedural due process, the
three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for
the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for
the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon
the adverse party, who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by
the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard,
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply
with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper,
an exception may be made and the motion may still be
acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither
cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her
due process rights.113 The adverse party must be given
time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to
prepare properly and engage the arguments of the
movant.114 In this case, the general rule must apply
because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process. Petitioners admit that they
personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
only during the hearing.
2. No. The conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail is not a mere "superfluity."In Jimenez v.
Sorongon, this court held that in criminal cases, the People
is the real party in interest, which means allowing a private
complainant to pursue a criminal action on his own is a
rare exception
Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases
before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People.
.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal
case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in
several cases and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the
offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a
denial of due process), this exceptional
circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail
the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue
raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the
case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner
did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as
an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the
respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the
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OSG.al settlement which was published but the affidavit was not
In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why the and why it was only after 12 long years that he brought it
Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The out. The RTC went on to cited Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules
alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor
which provides a limitation of 2 years after the settlement
was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and
authority to prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, and distribution of an estate in accordance with either Sec.
including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public 1 or Sec. 2 of the Rule, within which an heir or other person
Prosecutor. Her refusal to give her conforme to the Motion deprived of his lawful participation in the estate may
is an act well within the bounds of her position. compel the settlement of the said estate in the Courts for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.
That petitioners used as bases newspaper articles for The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the
judgment but was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal
position of Secretary De Lima cannot be given weight.
Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper which was denied due course for having been filed beyond
remedy would have been for petitioners to have the act the reglementary period. He filed a MR vis--vis the order
reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal denying due course his notice of appeal.
venues. The RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the
petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still
The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of grave denied the motion on the ground that he had not perfected
abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of
his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court
jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. docket fees.
Petitioner brought his Motion to Set Aside the order
denying his MR of the order denying due course his notice
of appeal for failure to pay the appellate court docket fees
CHIPONGIAN vs BENITEZ-LIRIO
which was again denied.
768 SCRA 204 (August 2, 2015)
Petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari in the CA which
TOPICS:Intervention, Section 1 of Rule 41 on record
affirmed the order of the RTC. The petition was dismissed.
on appeal
Petitioner sought a reconsideration but was denied.
FACTS:The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel
ISSUES: Whether the present petition for review should be
Chipongian, the petitioners sister. Isabel had predeceased
denied for failure of petitioner to file a record on appeal, as
Vicente. The couple had no offspring. After the death of
mandated under Sec. 2 (a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Isabel, Vicente and petitioner executed an extrajudicial
(In reply to respondents comments, the petitioner submits
settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the
that the intervention was not an independent proceeding
latte waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of
but only ancillary or supplemental to the main case, the
Vicente. According to petitioner, however, Vicente
rule on multiple appeals does not apply and the filing of a
executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he
record on appeal is not a pre-requisite to the acceptance
affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal
and consideration of the appeal by the appellate court.)
properties of Isabel.
RULING:Yes. Intervention is a remedy by which a third
Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez (Victoria), a
party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to
nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement
protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
of the estate of Vicente in the RTC. In its order dated May
affected by such proceedings. If an intervention makes a
13, 1994, the RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of
third party litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-
Vicentes estate. On May 20, 1994, it issued the letters of
intervention should form part of the main case.
administration to Feodor.
Accordingly, when petitioner intervened in the Special
The petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings. He
Proceeding, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted
sought the partial revocation of the May 13, 1994 order in
by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any
order to exclude the parapherna properties of Isabel from
final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically
inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited the affidavit of
applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the
Vicente in support of the partial revocation.
Rules, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Feodor countered that he be allowed to continue to
Section 1 Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by
administer all the properties left by Vicente, including
providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment
paraphernal properties of Isabel.
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
Petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicentes estate.
be appealable. In the context of the final judgment rule,
However, he withdrew the motion even before the RTC
Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders
could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for Leave to
and judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
opposed by respondents Victoria and Feodor.
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that
The RTC granted the Motion, and admitted the complaint-
completely determine a particular matter in the case.
in-intervention of the petitioner.
The dismissal of petitioners intervention constituted a
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-in-
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
intervention, holding that petitioner was negligent in
party appealing, that is, his right in the paraphernal
asserting his right within a reasonable time which warrants
properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under
the presumption that he had either abandoned it or
paragraph (c) of Sec. 1 of Rule 109, because it had the
declined to assert it but also cast doubt on the validity of
effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente,
his claim. It took note of the fact that purported affidavit
as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1 because it was
was executed simultaneously with the deed of extrajudicial
a final determination in the trial court of his intervention.
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 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
2ND Sem 2016-2017
Conformably with either or both paragraphs, the dismissal
was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue
of its nature of completely disposing of his intervention.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in
special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on
appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who
wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or
final order within which to perfect an appeal because he
will be filing not a only a notice of appeal but also a record
on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court
with notice to the adverse party..
Considering that petitioner did not submit a record on
appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not
perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his
intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and
immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The
right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict
compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the
right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the
prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and
his failure to perfect appeal within the prescribed time
rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal.
NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION VS. REPUBLIC
764 SCRA
Topic: Intervention
FACTS:
TCT No. T-15387, issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009
square-meter parcel of land situated inside the former Fort
Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig,
Metro Manila. The property previously formed part of a
larger parcel of land situated at the former Fort William
McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On
July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 423 "reserving for military purposes
certain parcels of the public domain situated in the
municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, province of
Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the 15,812,684
square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.On
September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal
issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded from Fort
McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein,
situated in the municipalities of Taguig and Paraaque,
Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an area of
2,455,310 square meters, and declared the excluded area
as "AFP Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. 274 and 730. A month
after, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
478"reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare
and training center site purposes" an area of 537,520
square meters of the land previously declared as AFP
Officers' Village under Proclamation No. 461, and placed
the reserved area under the administration of the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines (VFP).On November 15,
1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale
between the Republic of the Philippines, through
former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo
G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The
deed of sale was subsequently registered and from
which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI's name.
The Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on the
following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title is
part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale
conveying the property to NOVAI, which became the basis
for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB
has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the
purchase of the property, and of the NOVAFs alleged
payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the
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presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487,
claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C.
Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of
the property to NOVAI, is fictitious. NOVAIs answer to the
Republic is that the property was no longer part of the
public dominion, as the land had long been segregated
from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No.
461, and that it had actually filed a letter-application for a
sales patent over the property with the LMB which
prepared, verified and approved the property's plan and
technical description; and that the LMB delivered to it a
copy of the deed of sale, signed and executed by Dir.
Palad, after it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00
purchase price, corresponding taxes, and other charges,
with the balance to be paid in installments. Also, NOVAI
contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may
have attended the sale pertained only to formalities, the
proper remedy for the Republic was to file an action for
reformation of instrument, not for cancellation of title. In
any event, it added that the Republic's cause of action had
prescribed because its title to the property had already
become indefeasible.
BCDA's Comment-in-Intervention
On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending
before this Court, the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-
in-intervention and to admit the attached comment-in-
intervention. The BCDA contends that NOVAI is disqualified
from acquiring the property given the constitutional and
statutory provisions that prohibit the acquisition of lands of
the public domain by a corporation or association; that any
sale of land in violation of the Constitution or of the
provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land
Act are null and void; and that any title which may have
been issued by mistake or error on the part of a public
official can be cancelled at any time by the State. The
BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably failed to
comply with the legal requirements for the release of the
property from the military reservation. More specifically,
(1) the Director of Lands did not cause the property's
subdivision, including the determination of the number of
prospective applicants and the area of each subdivision lot
which should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square
meters for residential purposes; (2) the purchase price for
the property was not fixed by the Director of Lands as
approved by the DENR Secretary; (3) NOVAI did not pay the
purchase price or a portion of it to the LMB; and (4) the
Deed of Sale was not signed by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive Secretary,
but was signed only by the LMB Director.
Issue: Whether or not the comment-in-intervention should
be properly accorded with.
SC Ruling on BCD A's Intervention
In its reply to the BCDA's comment-in-intervention, NOVAI
primarily objects to the BCDA's intervention because it was
made too late. Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or
action by which a third person is permitted by the court to
make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or
defendant, or demanding something adverse to both of
them. Its purpose is to enable such third party to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by the
proceeding, such interest being actual, material, direct and
immediate, not simply contingent and expectant. As a
general rule, intervention cannot be made at the appeal
stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, governing
interventions, provides that "the motion to intervene may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court." This rule notwithstanding, intervention may be
allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect
some interest which cannot otherwise be protected, and
may be allowed for the purpose of preserving the
intervenor's right to appeal. "The rule on intervention, like
all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the
 REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL
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2ND Sem 2016-2017

powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice x x x and aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof." Thus, in exceptional cases,
the Court may allow intervention although the trial court
has already rendered judgment. In fact, the Court had
allowed intervention in one case even when the petition for
review was already submitted for decision before
it.31cralawrednadIn the present case, the BCDA is
indisputably the agency specifically created under R.A. No.
722732to own, hold and/or administer military reservations
including, among others, those located inside the FBMR. If
we are to affirm the CA's decision, the BCDA stands to benefit
as a favorable ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate under
R.A. No. 7227. On the other hand, if we reverse the CA's decision,
it stands to suffer as the contrary ruling will greatly affect the
BCDA's performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the
property without the opportunity to defend its right in
court.Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest
both in the outcome of the case and in the disputed property that
a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without
affecting such interest. Clearly, the BCDA's intervention is
necessary; hence, we allow the BCDA's intervention although
made beyond the period prescribed under Section 2, Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court.

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