Section 14.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accuse provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Due Process (in criminal cases)

- The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law simply that the rules prescribed by section 14 and all other
provisions related to criminal prosecution are followed.
- In this regard, the trial courts observation of the demeanor and deportment of witnesses,
as a rule, will not be interfered with, considering that the behavior, gesture, inflection of
voice and manner of responding to questions propounded to witnesses are best available
to the trial court. It is not appropriate to calibrate anew such observations on the basis
alone of the cold transcript of stenographic notes unless such findings are clearly shown
to be arbitrary. In fact, the trial court was not remiss in its duty in determining the mental
capacity of accused-appellant when it ordered accused-appellants confinement in a
hospital for medical and psychiatric evaluation which examination revealed that accused-
appellant is sane and coherent. The foregoing steps clearly demonstrate that the judge had
sufficiently and effectively satisfied the two components of insanity test that will
effectively guarantee accused-appellants right to a fair trial, which are: (1) whether the
defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide counsel with information necessary or
relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. (People vs. Boras, Gr 127495, December
22, 2000)

Military Tribunals

- Generally, the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over military courts, the SC
does not review decisions of military commissions but of the Court of Military Appeals,
issues of denial of evidence to be presented shall be passed upon by military authorities.
- A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the
period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as
the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.(Olaguer vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144)
-

Presumption of Innocence

- no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
- No rule has been better established in criminal law that every man is presumed to be
innocentuntil his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal prosecution,
therefore, theburden is upon the state to prove every fact and circumstance constituting
 the crime charged,for the purpose of showing the guilt of the accused. (United States vs.
Luling 324 Phil. 725)
- The Supreme Court held that a finding of prima facie evidence of accountability does not
shatter the presumptive innocence the petitioner enjoys because before prima facie
evidence arises, certain facts still have to be proved. (People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil 856)

Elements of the Right to be Heard:

a) The right to be present at the trial;

b) The right to counsel;
c) The right to impartial judge;
d) The right of confrontation; and
e) The right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.

Right to Be Heard and to Production of Evidence

- Maliwat cannot claim that he was denied due process. The records show that he did
testify on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Admittedly, he was
unable to adduce additional documentary evidence that he claims would establish his
innocence and which he now attaches as annexes in his petition for review and
memorandum of law before the Court. But as noted earlier, it was Maliwat who had
sought the postponements and cancellations of the hearings for no less than forty (40)
times, from the date of his arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, a fact that
spanned almost a decade.(Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 718)
- The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he
squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.(Suyan vs People, Gr
No. 189644)

Right to Counsel

- Realistic recognition of the truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional skill to protect himself when in a tribunal, wherein the prosecution is
represented by and experienced and learned counsel.
- Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be
asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him. Areasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated.
Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.(People vs. Holgado, 86
Phil 752)

Absence of Violation
 - Accused should have informed the trial court if he had difficulties with his counsel. He
had the opportunity to present his own version of the events but he just kept
quiet. Besides, accused was convicted based on the strength of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the defense. (People vs. Aquino, Gr No. 129288)
- Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by a
counsel de parte before the CA. There was no violation of his right to counsel when his
new lawyer committed a procedural blunder. (Villanueva vs. People, Gr 135098)

Presence of Violation

- The lawyer of the accused did not cross-examine the first daughter because he was
convinced that she was telling the truth. The case should be remanded because of the
neglect of the lawyer of the accused in representing his cause. (People vs. Nadera, 324
SCRA 490)

Right to be Informed

- the object of the written accusation is, a) to furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; b) to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; c)
to inform the court of the alleged.
- murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority is a defective information;
Accused cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault absent any
allegations in the information of the essential elements of an assault that appellant knew
that the assault victim was an agent of a person in authority; The fact that the crime of
assault was proved by evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of
the accused does not cure the defect because to do so would be convicting an accused of
a crime not properly alleged in the information. ( People vs Regala, 113 SCRA 613 )
- person cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charged
murder by means of stabbing according to The hornbook doctrine is that an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. (People vs Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 )

Nature of Offense: Different Offense; Same Offense

- The accused was charged with murder. During trial, it was shown that the victims also
suffered injuries. A person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been
charged. Accused cannot be held liable for the injuries. ( People vs. Paglinawan, 324
scra 97 )
- The accused-appellants herein can only be convicted of, and penalized for, the crimes
with which they were charged or those necessarily included therein. Similarly, the death
penalty imposed on the accused-appellants for the crime of carnapping cannot also be
imposed because the killing of the driver of the carnapped motor vehicle was not alleged
in the information. The crime alleged being only carnapping under the second clause of
Section 14, the proper penalty to be imposed must not be more than seventeen years and
four months and not more than thirty years. ( People vs. Paramil GR No. 128056-57)
- It is well-settled that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right. ( Evangelista vs. People Gr No. 108135-36)
Absence of Qualifying Circumstance

- If no qualifiying circumstances were alleged in the information, accused cannot be

sentenced to death. (People vs. Villar 322 scra 390)
- The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder appreciating abuse of superior
strength as qualifying circumstance. However, a cursory reading of
the information against accused-appellant shows that abuse of superior strength was not
alleged therein. An accused must be informed of the cause and the nature of the
accusation against him. Since abuse of superior strength qualifies the crime to murder,
accused-appellant should have been apprised of this fact from the beginning to prepare
for his defense. Be that as it may, we find the accused-appellant guilty of murder
qualified by treachery. Treachery was alleged in the information and proven during the
course of the trial. (People vs Ronato, GR no. 124298)
- The trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua. Under Art
335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when
the crime is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. This circumstance must,
however, be alleged in the information because it is the nature of a qualifying
circumstance.] It was not alleged in this case, with the result that it can only be treated as
a generic aggravating circumstance. However, neither this nor accused-appellants
voluntary surrender, which constitutes a generic mitigating circumstance, can modify the
penalty to be imposed because under Art. 63, a single indivisible penalty (such
as reclusion perpetua) is to be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. (People
vs Bayron, GR no. 122732)

- the information or complaint must specifically allege the qualifying circumstances that
would justify the imposition of that extreme penalty. In this case, the circumstances that
would qualify the offense are (a) that the accused-appellant is the father of the victim, and
(b) that the latter is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape. While the criminal
complaint in this case did state the fact that the victim is the daughter of the accused-
appellant, it, however, has failed to mention her being under 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense. The omission is a fatal flaw in the imposition of the death
penalty.(People vs. Abella GR no. 131847)

Difference of Commission of Crime

- The court ruled that an accused cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code in an information charging him with rape by the use of
force or intimidation because none of these modes of committing rape (i.e., when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the woman is under
twelve years of age) were alleged in the information. The rationale for this rule is that
"[t]o convict him under either of these statutory provisions is to deprive him of the
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him." Section 14 (2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accusedshall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." (People vs. Capinpin, GR no. 118608)

Number of Offenses

- If a person is charged only with one count of rape, even though the victim was raped
more than once, the accused can only be convicted of one count of rape. (People vs.
Pambid, GR no. 134453)
- Since the complaint charges only one crime of rape, then, consistent with the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
 against him, PROCOPIO cannot be held liable for other acts of rape. There can only be
one conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence
shows that more than one was in fact committed. (People vs. Tresballes, GR no.
126118)
- Despite appellants claim that she had been raped five times on 20 May 1992, the accused
could only be convicted for one count of rape, considering that the information charged a
single offense.Consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, accused cannot be held liable for more
than what he was indicted for. (People vs. Geromo, GR no. 126169)

Date of Commission of Crime

- The prosecution had no fault in the delay since the membership of the general court
martial underwent changes four times and none of the original members who heard the
prosecution witnesses were reappointed in the succeeding court martial. Besides, the
petitioner failed to assert his right to a speedy trial. It was only after the general court
martial resumed hearing of the case in 1999 that petitioner invoked his right to a speedy
trial. His silence should be interpreted as a waiver of such right.(Sumbang vs. General
Court Martial PRO-Region 6, GR no. 140188)
- The right to a speedy trial is violated only when there is an unreasonable delay without
the fault of the accused. Petitioner-accused is not without fault in the delay of the
prosecution against her.( The right to a speedy trial is violated only when there is an
unreasonable delay without the fault of the accused. Petitioner-accused is not without
fault in the delay of the prosecution against her. (Arambulo vs. Laqui, GR no. 138569)

Right to Speedy Trial

- Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial; Where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable time, accused is entitled relief through mandamus
or habeas corpus.(Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650)
- Appellant anchors, firstly, his claim that due process was violated because his right to
speedy trial was violated. However, the records of this case reveal that bail hearings
started on September 27, 1993, and terminated on November 8, 1993. He was arraigned
on January 11, 1994. The prosecution presented its first post-bail hearings witness on the
same day. The defense presented its first witness on June 7, 1994. The decision of the
lower court was promulgated on August 15, 1995. With this chronology, in our view, no
undue delay could be imputed, much less persuasively shown, against appellee and the
trial court.(People vs. Sesbreno, GR no. 121764)
- The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the constitution but the
same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. It secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of
the State to seek justice. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process.(Tai
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, GR no. 131483)

Right to Impartial Trial

 - Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of
a judge sufficient to assure litigants of his being fair and just; What a trial requires is an
impartial and disinterested tribunal.(Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 scra 18)
- To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation
of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law; and this has several
reasons underlying it. For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an
incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what
information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to
exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to
effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to
confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial
result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain
basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to
make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may
be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom
in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains
passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial
process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant
is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a
reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective
against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is
being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of
what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility
of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when
the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance. (People vs. Estrada, GR 130487)

Impartiality of a Judge

- The fact that respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the
prosecution does not indicate that she was biased.(Soriano vs. Angeles, GR 109920)
- The mere fact that respondent judge ruled against complainant in the three cases filed
before him did not amount to partiality against said complainant or warrant the
conclusion that respondent rendered an unjust judgment.(Almendra vs. Asis, AM
RTJ01550)
- The questioning of the witnesses by the judge is not a sufficient sign of bias. (People vs.
Zheng Bai Hui, GR 127580)

Right to Public Trial

- An accused is entitled to a public trial, at least to the extent of having his friends,
relatives and counsel present -- no matter with what offense he may be charged. (In Re
Oliver, 333 US 237)
- The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be
no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is
the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to
be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.(Garcia vs. Domingo,
L-30104)
Compulsory Process

- The constitutional guarantee to an accused to compulsory process to secure the

production of evidence in his behalf was not violated by the trial judge who refused to
grant the request of the accused for leave to serve written interrogatories to his doctor
who treated their injuries who already left abroad. That the said medical testimony on the
injuries they sustained was vital to their defense can still be adduced thru other witnesses
and hospital records.(Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514)
- The subpoena for the first witness remained unserved while the subpoena for the second
was received four days before date of hearing. The trial court denied the request of the
counsel of the accused for postponement and considered the case submitted for decision
even though it issued a warrant for the arrest of the second witness. The delay is not
entirely attributable to the accused. The trial court should have granted
postponement.(People vs. Yambot, GR 120350)

Right to Confrontation, to Cross-Examine ,or to Meet Witness Face to Face

- Has a two-fold purpose; a) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross-examination, and b) to allow the judge to observe the deportation of
the witness
- the right of confrontation is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous
proceeding, in which event, his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece
of evidence by way of exception to the hearsay rule; Exception contemplated by law
covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witness made is previous proceedings
BUT DOES NOT cover previous decisions or judgments if used proof only that he was
previously convicted of a crime BUT not guilty in a subsequent case. (People vs.
Miyake, 279 SCRA 180)
- Affidavit of a witness who was not presented as such is not admissible in
evidence.(People vs. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167)

Trial in Absentia; Right to be Present

- Requisites for a valid trial in absentia; a) the accused has already been arraigned, b) he
has been notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
- Accused may be compelled to be present at the trial for the purposes of identification
unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person
named; The provision in the constitution allowing trial in absentia means that he waives
his right to meet the witnesses face to face; an express waiver of appearance has the same
effect; HOWEVER, such waiver of right does NOT release the accused from his
obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required; the accused may
waive the right but not the obligation to appear in court.(Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA
273)

Admissibility of Evidence
- Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Leonardo
Morial, the conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of evidence
adduced by the prosecution. It is well settled that where there is independent evidence,
apart from the accused's alleged uncounseled confession, that the accused is truly guilty,
the latter nevertheless faces a conviction. (People vs. Morial, GR no 129295)
- The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-
appellants make them invalid, Paragraph [3] of the a fore stated Section 12 sets forth the
so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter, according to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained
by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently. Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be
regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.(People vs Tulin, GR No.
111709)