Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne's Early Campaigns (768-777)

Charlemagnes Early Campaigns (768777)
History of Warfare
Editors
Kelly DeVries
Loyola University Maryland
John France
University of Wales, Swansea
Michael S. Neiberg
United States Army War College, Pennsylvania
Frederick Schneid
High Point University, North Carolina
VOLUME 82
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw

Charlemagnes Early Campaigns
(768777)
A Diplomatic and Military Analysis
By
Bernard S. Bachrach
LEIDEN BOSTON
2013
Cover illustration: Porta Nigra (Black Gate) in Trier, Germany.
Photograph: Berthold Werner
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Trier_Porta_Nigra_BW_1.JPG, accessed 6 September 2012.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bachrach, Bernard S., 1939-

Charlemagne's early campaigns (768-777) : a diplomatic and military analysis / by Bernard S.
Bachrach.
pages cm. -- (History of warfare, ISSN 1385-7827 ; 82)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-22410-0 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-24477-1 (e-book)
1. Charlemagne, Emperor, 742-814--Military leadership. 2. Military art and science--Europe--
History--To 1500. 3. Military history, Medieval. I. Title.
DC73.B25 2013
944.0142--dc23
2012044402
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ISSN 1385-7827
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This book is dedicated to the new generation: Sam, Eliana,
Maddie, Jake, Rachel, Jessica, Henry, Caleb, and Lilah
CONTENTS
Acknowledgementsix
List of Abbreviations and Sourcesxi
Prefatory Note Regarding Maps xvii
Map of Charlemagnes Kingdom and Its Environsxix
Introduction1
1.Two Kings: Charlemagne and Carloman108
2.Italy in Flux: Opportunities and Problems139
3.The Saxon War: Phase One177
4.The Unwanted War246
5.The Siege of Pavia310
6.The Fall of Pavia and Its Aftermath374
7.The Saxon War: Phase Two427
8.The Friuli Diversion473
9.The End of the Saxon War510
10.Integration of the Saxon Territory566
Conclusions631
Bibliography654
Index691
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank Professor Kelly DeVries, the director of Brills
series on medieval military history, who read the entire manuscript on at
least two occasions, made several key suggestions in regard to both revi-
sions and augmentations, while advocating vigorously for its publication.
Secondly, I want to thank Ms. Marcella Mulder, Brills editor, with whom it
was a great pleasure to work and who very effectively expedited the publi-
cation process. Finally, with regard to Brills contribution to the process,
I would like to thank Mr. Robert Ellison, who proved himself a vigorous
and diligent copy editor.
With regard to the making of Charlemagnes Early Campaigns, I would
like to thank my son Professor David S. Bachrach of the University of
New Hampshire, who read and commented on various versions of the
manuscript and, in addition, often suggested useful bibliography that
crossed the division between my work on Charlemange and his work on
the military history of the Ottonian dynasty. I also want to thank my
wife, Dr. Deborah Y. Bachrach, PhD. who also read several versions of the
manuscript, while helping me to make clear for the general reader many
of the highly specialized arguments that are necessary in a project of this
kind.
Finally, I want to thank the University of Minnesota, which awarded
me a sabbatical leave for the academic year 20052006. This leave enabled
me to visit numerous places in Germany and Italy, where Charlemagnes
campaigns were executed, and to complete my research for Charlemagnes
Early Campaigns. Also with regard to the University of Minnesota, I would
be remiss very seriously if I did not thank the Office of Inter-library loan
and particularly Ms. Alice Welsh, who located numerous hard to locate
foreign publications that were essential to my research and managed to
obtain copies. Without this help, it would not have been possible to com-
plete my study.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SOURCES
The citation of classical sources follows the system employed by the

Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed., ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony
Spawforth (Oxford, 1996), xxix-liv.
Abbreviations
AP Bernard S. Bachrach, Armies and Politics in the Early

Medieval West (London, 1993).
AS Martin Lintzel, Ausgewhlte Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin,
1961).
BEC Bibliothque de cole des Chartes
EHR English Historical Review
EME Early Medieval Europe
FS Frhmittelalterliche Studien
HS The Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval
History
JRS Journal of Roman Studies
KG Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben, 5 vols., ed.
W. Braunfels and Helmut Beumann (Dsseldorf,
1965).
KK Kaiser Krnung: Das Epos Karolus Magnus et Leo
papa und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn 799, ed. Peter
Godman, Jrg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek (Paderborn,
2002).
KM Karl Martell in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich
Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen, 1994).
KR Die deutschen Konigspfalzen: Repertorium der Pfalzen,
Knigshfe und ubrigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im
deutschen Reichs des Mittelalters
LP Le Liber Pontificalis, Texte, introduction et commen-
taire, 3 vols., ed. L. Duchesne and revised Cyrille Vogel
(Paris, 19551957).
MGH Monumenta Germaniae historica
Cap. Legum sectio II. Capitularia
Epist. Epistolae
xii list of abbreviations and sources
SRG Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum

SRL Scriptores rerum Langobardicarum et Italicarum saec.
VIIX
SRM Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum
SS Scriptores
MIG Mitteilungen des Instituts fr sterreichische
Geschichtsforschung
NCMH Rosamond McKitterick, ed. The New Cambridge
Medieval History: c.700-c. 900, vol. 2 (Cambridge,
1995).
PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome
RH Revue historique
SA Sachsen und Anhalt
S-B Bernard S. Bachrach, State-Building in Medieval
France: Studies in Early Angevin History (London,
1995).
SS Studien zur Sachsenforschung
SSCI Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sullalto
Medioevo
TT Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics,
ed. L.D. Reynolds and P.K. Marshall (Oxford, 1983)
VMPIG Verffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts
UH Untersuchungen zu Handel und Verkehr der vor- und
frhgeschichtlichen Zeit in Mittel- und Nordeuropa.
vol. 3: Der Handel des frhen Mittelalters, ed.
K. Dwel, et al. (Gttingen, 1985); vol. 4 (Gttingen,
1987); vol. 5 (Gttingen, 1989).
WM Bernard S. Bachrach, Warfare and Military
Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002).
799 799-Kunst und Kultur der Karolingerzeit. Karl der
Grosse un Papst Leo III. in Paderborn. Beitrge zum
Katalog der Ausstellung Paderborn 1999, 3 vols., ed.
Chr. Stiegemann and M. Wemhoff (Mainz, 1999).
Sources
Annales Alamannici, MGH, SS, vol. I; and Annales

AA
Alamannici, ed. Walter Lendi, Untersuchungen zur
frhalemannischen Annalistik: Die Murbacher
Annalen (Freiburg- Switzerland, 1971).
list of abbreviations and sourcesxiii
Ado of Vienne Brevium Chronicon, PL, 123.

Agnellus, LP Liber pontificalis ecclesiae Ravennatis, ed.
D. Mauskopf Deliyannis (Trunhout, 2006).
Alcuin, Epist. ed. Ernst Dmmler in MGH, Epistolae Karolini Aevi,
2 (Berlin, 1888).
Altfrid, VL Die Vita Sancti Liudgeri, ed. W. Diekamp (Mnster,
1881).
AE Annales qui dicitur Einhardi, MGH, SRG.
AG Annales Guelferbytani, MGH, SS, vol. I; and Walter
Lendi, Untersuchungen zur frhalemannischen
Annalistik: Die Murbacher Annalen (Freiburg
Switzerland, 1971).
AL Annales Laureshamenses, MGH, SS, vol. I.
ALc Annales Lubacensium cont. MGH, SS, vol. I.
AMP Annales Mettenses priores, MGH. SRG.
AM Annales Mosellani, MGH, SS, vol. I.
AN Annales Nazariani, MGH. SS. vol. I; and Walter Lendi,
Untersuchungen zur frhalemannischen Annalistik:
Die Murbacher Annalen (Freiburg-Switzerland, 1971).
Andrea Andreae Bergomatis historia, SRL.
AP Annales Petaviani, MGH, SS, I.
ARF Annales regni Francorum, MGH, SRG.
ASA Annales Sancti Amandi, MGH SS. I.
ASM Annales Sancti Maximiani, MGH, SS, 13.
Bede, EH Bedes Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed.
Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969).
Benedict Chronicon, MGH, SS, 3.
of St. Andrea
Boniface, Epist. Epistolae, MGH, Epist.
CA Catalogus Abbatum Monasterii casinensis, MGH,
SRL.
Cathwulfus, Epist. MGH, Epist. IV, 501505.
CBC Herwig Wolfram, Conversion Bagoariorum et
Carantanorum. Das Weissbuch der salzburger Kirche
ber die erfolgreiche Mission in Karantanien un
Pannonien (Wein-Kln-Graz, 1979).
CC Codex Carolinus, ed. W. Gundlach, MGH. Ep. (Berlin,
1892), I, 469657.
CCF Guido Farfensis, Consuetudines Farfenses, ed. Bruno
Alpars (Stuttgart, 1900).
xiv list of abbreviations and sources
CCt Constitutum Constantini, ed. Horst Fuhrmann, MGH,

FIGA (Hannover, 1968).
CDL Codex Diplomatico Langobardo, ed. L. Schiaparelli
(Rome, 1933).
CDV Codex diplomatico veronese, ed. Vittorio Fainelli,
2 vols. (Venice, 19401963).
CF Gregorio di Catino, Chronicon farfense di Gregoirio di
Catino, ed. Ugo di Farfa and Ugo Balzani (Rome,
1903).
CM Chronicon Moissacense, MGH. SS. I.
CN Cronica di Novalesa, ed. G.C. Alessio (Turin, 1982).
Creontius, S. Riezler, Ein verlorenes bairisches Geschichtswerk
Annales, ed. des achten Jahrhunderts, Sitzungsberichte der
Aventinus kniglichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
philosophisch-philologischisch-historische Klasse,
I (1881), 247291.
CRF Capitularia regum Francorum, I, ed. A. Boretius.
MGH. Cap.
CRL Catalogus Regum Langobardorum et Italicorum
Brixiensis et Nonantulanus, MGH. SRL.
CS Chronicon Salernitanum, MGH, SS. 3.
De Laude ed. J.M. Lacarra (Textos Navarros de Cdice de
Pampilione Roda), Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de
Epistola Aragon, I (1945), 260279.
DK Die Urkunden der Karolinger, I, MGH, Dip. Karol.
Ercanbert, BRF Breviarium regum Francorum, ed. G. Pertz, SS, II.
FC Fredegarii Chronicorum Liber Quartus cum
Continuationibus, ed. and trans. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill
(London, 1960).
Flodoard Flodoardus Remensis, Historia Remensis Ecclesiae,
MGH. SS, 36.
GAF Gesta Abbatum Fontanellensium, ed. P. Pradi (Paris,
1999).
Gregory, Hist. Liberi Historiarum X, MGH. SRM. I.1.
John, Miracula Paul Lemerle, Les plus anciens recueils des miracles de
Saint Dmtrius, 2 vols. (Paris, 1979).
Notker Gesta Karoli ed. and trans. R. Rau (Berlin, 1960).
Paschasius V.S. Adalhardi, PL, 120.
Radbertus
list of abbreviations and sourcesxv
Paul, Hist., Paulus Diaconus, Historia Langobardorum, MGH,

SRL.
PCL Pauli Continuatio Lombarda, MGH, SRL.
PCR Pauli Continuatio Romana, MGH, SRL.
PCT Pauli Continuatio Tertia, MGH, SRL.
RF Regestum Farfense, ed. Ugo Balzani, 5 vols. (Rome,
18791914).
PK Passio Killiani, MGH, SSRM, 5.
RG Ravenna Anonymi Cosmographia et Guidonis
Geographica, ed. Joseph Schnetz, Itineraria Romana
I (Stuttgart, 1940, rpt. 1990).
Saxon Poet Poetae Saxonis Vita Caroli Magni, ed. Ph. Jaff, in
Bibliotheca Rerum Germanicarum, Monumenta
Carolina, 4 (Berlin, 1867).
TA Testamentum Abbonis, see Geary.
THF Traditionen des Hochstifts Freising 744926, I (Munich,
1905).
VA Vita Anselmi abbatis Nonantulanorum, SRL.
Vegetius, DRM Epitoma rei militaris, ed. Carl Lang (Leipzig, 1885).
VH V. Hadriani I, LP.
VLa V.S. Lebuini antiqua, MGH, SS. 30.2.
VSII V. Stephani II, LP.
VSIII V. Stephani III, LP.
VT V. Theo, LP.
VV Versus de Verona = Poetry of the Carolingian
Renaissance, ed. and trans. Peter Godman (London,
1985), 180187.
VZIII V. Zachariae III, LP.
Willibaldus Vita Prima Bonifatii, SRG.
PREFATORY NOTE REGARDING MAPS
Traditionally, military histories are larded with numerous maps depicting,

for example, routes of march and the location of fortifications, not to men-
tion battle plans. This study is somewhat different insofar as I have used
word maps, similar to those employed throughout the Late Antique
world as these often are found in the itineraries that survived into the
Middle Ages. Of course, during Charlemagnes reign, the value of these
itineraries was much enhanced, especially within the erstwhile borders of
the Roman Empire where most Carolingian military operations were
executed, by several thousand easily read milestones. These markers
were ubiquitous and were found in large numbers along the roads of
Charlemagnes kingdom, which were well maintained through the overall
efforts of the central government in cooperation with local administra-
tions in the pagi.
I have included, however, one modern map, Charlemagnes Regnum
and Its Environs, for the purpose of orienting readers in general terms.
Insofar as can be ascertained, Charlemagne lacked a word map of his
entire regnum. In addition, I have used modern place names throughout
the book. As a result, those readers who want to acquaint themselves in
detail with the topography of any particular campaign or the location of
various fortifications, as described in the kinds of word maps that were
available to the Carolingians, will have no difficulty in doing so on line
through the use of International Map Quest. In fact, short of reproducing
these very same maps in print form, there is no better resource than that
provided by GPS.
CHARLEMAGNES REGNUM AND ITS ENVIRONS
INTRODUCTION
In the short century from 687 to 768, Charlemagnes great grandfather

(Pippin), grandfather (Charles Martel), and father (Pippin) gradually
reunited under Carolingian rule the thoroughly fragmented regnum
Francorum.1 They accomplished this impressive feat in a highly focused
manner, which gave priority in the long term to territorial acquisition and
control of the magnates of the Frankish kingdom, many of whom, espe-
cially if they worked in concert, had the power and influence collectively
to undermine, if not, in fact, thwart, the Carolingians plans.2 In the course
of this process of unification, Charlemagnes forefathers tended to avoid
being distracted by booty-seeking raids focused on possible short-term
targets of opportunity.3 Their strategy of unification was pursued through
1This well-known story has been told many times. See, for example, Louis Halphen,
Charlemagne et lempire carolingien (Paris, 1947), 57119; Margaret Deanesly, A History of
Early Medieval Europe from 476 to 911, 2nd ed.(London, 1969), 339406; Pierre Rich, The
Carolingians: A Family who Forged Europe, trans. Michael I. Allen (Philadelphia, 1993),
1384; Rosamond McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians: 751987
(London-New York, 1983), 1653; Roger Collins, Charlemagne (Toronto-Buffalo, 1998),
2342; and Matthias Becher, Charlemagne, trans. David S. Bachrach (New Haven, 2003),
1939. Roger Collins, Frankish Past and Carolingian Present in the Age of Charlemagne, in
Kaiser Krnung: Das Epos Karolus Magnus et Leo papa und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn
799, ed. Peter Godman, Jrg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek (Paderborn, 2002), 301322, at 304,
may be correct when he observes that suppression of facts or twisting of truth must
seem the salient characteristics of Frankish historiography in the eighth century
However, in the context under discussion, no one doubts that the regnum Francorum was
unified politically under early Carolingian rule.
In the traditional histories these military campaigns generally are treated in rather slight
detail under the heading The Conquests or some similar locution. However, F.L. Ganshof,
Charlemagne, Speculum, XXIV (1949), 520527 and reprinted in idem, The Carolingians
and the Frankish Monarchy (London, 1971), 1727, p. 25 specifically criticizes the thematic
approach which results in the concentration of discussions of Charlemagnes military
operations into geographical or systematic order at the expense of chronological order.
He contends that this approach has a distorting effect. This view of the weaknesses inher-
ent in the thematic approach is echoed by Eric Goldberg in his review of Wilfrid Hartmann,
Ludwig der Deutsche (Darmstadt, 2002) in EME, 12 (2003), 8486.
2As pointed out by Stuart Airlie, Towards a Carolingian Aristocracy, in Die Dynas
tiewechsel von 751: Vorgeschichte, Legitmationsstrategien und Erinnerung, ed. Matthias
Becher and Jrg Jarnut (Mnster, 2004), 109127 at 109, Charles Martel and Pippin, before
the latter became king, undertook the process of teaching the aristocracy how to recog-
nise the new dynasty as the centre of the contemporary political system.
3As will be shown below, some scholars exaggerate the importance of booty to the
Carolingian economy.
2 introduction
adroit diplomacy, and, when necessary, sustained by effective military

operations.4
In the course of vindicating this strategy, Charlemagnes ancestors
placed under direct Carolingian rule a territory of some 700,000 square
kilometers, i.e. a region larger than all of Roman Gaul or of France at its
greatest extent under Louis XIV. This process of political reunification was
initiated by a military victory of great importance at Tertry in 687. This
battle was won by Pippin II (d. 714), Charlemagnes great-grandfather, who
controlled the royal fisc and much else as Mayor of the Palace in
Austrasia.5 As one scholar has put it, the battle of Tertry was a resounding
success that made it possible for Pippin, the dux Austrasiorum to become
the princeps Francorum.6
During almost a quarter-century of campaigning, Pippin IIs son,
Charles Martel (d. 741), was able, after a short hiatus following his fathers
death, to maintain the pattern of diplomatic and military success initiated
by the previous Carolingian Mayor of the Palace.7 Indeed, Charles famous
4For a brief description of these military operations in their diplomatic context and the
strategy that undergirded them, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare:
Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia, 2001) 150, along with the extensive scholarly literature
cited throughout that work.
5Rich, The Carolingians, p. 26, observes that Pippin IIs victory was decisive; Collins,
Charlemagne, pp. 15, 17, sees it as a turning point; and Becher, Charlemagne, p. 30, points
out that Pippins victory combined with the murder of his rivals during the next year made
Pippin the de facto ruler of the Frankish kingdom. Becher would seem to rely on Ercanbert,
BRF, p. 328, regarding the murder of Berchar. Myke de Jong, Carolingian Monasticism: The
Power of Prayer, in NCMH, II, 625626, points out how in the aftermath of the victory at
Tertry, Pippin II was able to chase recalcitrant bishops out their sees and to establish con-
trol of monasteries.
This consensus, and many more examples could be added, makes clear that the effort by
Paul J. Fouracre, Observations on the outgrowth of Peppinid influence in the regnum
Francorum after the Battle of Tertry (687715), Medieval Prosopography, 5.2 (1984), 131, to
diminish the significance of the battle of Tertry was not successful. See also the effort by
Ian Wood, The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450751 (London-New York, 1994), 6165, 256, who
also tries to diminish the significance of the battle. For Paul Fouracre, Frankish Gaul to
814, in NCMH, II, 85; and idem, The Age of Charles Martel (Harlow, 2000), 40, 48, undermin-
ing the significance of the battle of Tertry is of central importance to his efforts to diminish
the role of warfare in early Carolingian history. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 1012, 4748, provides a refutation of the views of both Fouracre and Wood, who, in
general, appear to be intent upon not giving military matters their due as significant factors
in history.
6See McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms, pp. 2829, for the quotation, who, neverthe-
less, seems to have reservations regarding the victory at Tertry as the decisive moment in
the Carolingian rise to power.
7Josef Semmler, Zur pippinidisch-karolingische Sukzessionskrise 71423, Deutsches
Archiv fr Erforschung des Mittelalters, 33 (1977), 136, may exaggerate somewhat the weak-
ness of Charles Martels position as he strove to succeed his father. Charles assets, never-
theless, proved sufficient to sustain his efforts. Richard A. Gerberding, 714: A Crucial Year
introduction3
victory at Poitiers in 732 was considered by his contemporary, the Venerable

Bede (d. 735), a historian of considerable renown, to have been of signal
importance in thwarting the very grave Saracen plague, gravissima
Sarracenorum lues, that seriously threatened Christians.8 In turn, Charles
Martels son Pippin (d. 768), first with the help of his brother Carloman
and later as sole ruler of the Franks, sustained the long-term strategy that
had been developed by his grandfather and father. With the conquest of
Aquitaine, he completed the reunification of the regnum Francorum under
Carolingian rule in 768.9
Pippin was the third Carolingian Mayor of the Palace of that name
and the first of his family to hold the royal title as king of the Franks. He
was elevated to the throne in 751 and thus became rex Francorum.10 This
for Charles Martel, in Karl Martel in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael
Richter (Sigmaringen, 1994), 205216, also tends to underestimate the importance of
Charles military victories. Regarding Charles military activities, see Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, pp. 2136, 4849; but cf. Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel, who has
little to say about Charles at war.
8EH, V, ch. 23 (pp. 556557, n. 5); and Paul Fouracre, Writing about Charles Martel, in
Law, laity and solidarities: Essays in honor of Susan Reynolds, ed. Pauline Stafford, Janet L.
Nelson, and Jane Martindale (Manchester-New York, 2001), 12, who seems to accept the
judgment by Bede that Charles Martel turned the tide of war against the dreadful plague
of Saracens.
9See, for example, Bernard S. Bachrach, Military Organization in Aquitaine Under the
Early Carolingians, Speculum, 49 (1974), 133; and reprinted in idem, Armies and Politics in
the Early Medieval West (London, 1993), with the same pagination. Regarding Pippins mili-
tary operations on a broader scale, see idem, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 3746.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no modern scholarly book-length study of Pippins reign.
Ivan Gobry, Ppin le Bref: Pre de Charlemagne, fondateur de la dynastie carolingienne (Paris,
2001), is intended for a popular audience and is not helpful. Other important aspects of
Pippins reign are discussed, for example, in Die Dynastiewechsel von 751: Vorgeschichte,
Legitimationsstrategien und Erinnerung, ed. Matthias Becher and Jrg Jarnut (Mnster,
2004): see, for example, Janet L. Nelson, Bertranda, pp. 93108; Roger Collins, Pippin III
as Mayor of the Palace, pp. 7591; and Michael McCormick, Pippin III, the Embassy of
Caliph al Mansur, and the Mediterranean World, pp. 222241.
10For important insights into these sources regarding Pippins elevation to the kingship,
see Rosamond McKitterick, The Illusion of Royal Power in the Carolingian Annals, EHR,
115 (2000), 120, who emphasizes various types of manipulation of the facts by the texts at
issue. Many similar arguments are marshaled by Josef Semmler, Zeitgeschichtsschreibung
und Hofhistoriographie unter den frhen Karolingern, in Von Fakten und Fiktionen,
Mittelalterliche Geschichtsdarstellungen und ihre kritische Aufarbeitung, ed. Johannes
Laudage (Kln, 2003), 135164; which are echoed in idem, Der Dynastiewechsel von 751
und die frnkische Knigssalbung (Dsseldorf, 2003), 157. See also Hans-Werner Goetz,
Der Dynastiewechsel von 751 im Spiegel der frh- und hochmittelalterlichen Geschich
tsschreibung, in Die Dynastiewechsel, ed. Matthias Becher and Jrg Jarnut (Mnster, 2004),
321367. For additional bibliography dealing with some of these details, see Rosamond
McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity (Cambridge, 2008), 7172.
However, despite the manipulation of the facts by court writers and their posterity, no one
doubts that Pippin became king of the Franks.
4 introduction
dynastic change was accomplished with the active support of at least

some, if not, indeed, many, of the magnates of the Frankish kingdom, both
lay and ecclesiastical, i.e. bishops and abbots.11 It is also likely the case that
the papacy lent its support early on in this process, if, in fact, the pope did
not play a major role in legitimizing the change of dynasty after 280 years
of Merovingian kingship.12 Many Frankish magnates likely had taken
oaths of faithfulness to support the then-sitting Merovingian monarch,
Childeric III. Consequently, absolution from such an oath probably would
have been smoothed by some sort of high-level clerical intervention,
either by Boniface, who is thought by some scholars to have played a key
role in Pippins elevation in 751, or Pope Stephen, who presided over the
coronation in 754.13
Pippin II, Charles Martel, and King Pippin I led their expeditionary
forces with great and consistent, if not absolute, effectiveness from their
homeland in the valley of the Moselle, sometimes over distances of a
thousand kilometers and more. They made war on the coasts of the
IJsselmeer, on the fringes of the North Sea, in northern Italy, on the coast
of the Mediterranean, and in the shadow of the Pyrenees. First, the early
Carolingians moved west to conquer Neustria and establish their power as
far as the Atlantic coast through the region that subsequently came to be
called Normandy. They then campaigned north into Frisia, south into
Alamannia, southeast into Bavaria, and finally south into Provence and
southwest into Aquitaine. There were, in addition, two brief military cam-
paigns south of the Alps, in 754 and 756. Each of these, which was in
11See Semmler, Der Dynastiewechsel, pp. 5886, regarding support by the magnates.
12McKitterick, The Illusion of Royal Power, pp. 120, argues for a considerably dimin-
ished role by the papacy in Pippins elevation to the Frankish throne in 751 but recognizes
the popes importance in 754. However, it seems to me that McKitterick may perhaps
underestimate the closeness of Pippins relations with Pope Zacharias prior to 751 as these
are indicated in their correspondence (CC. 3, p. 480).
13See A. Rio, The Formularies of Angers and Marculf. Two Merovingian Legal Handbooks
(Liverpool, 2008), 175176, for a translation of the relevant texts regarding oaths in the
Merovingian era. These texts have led Janet L. Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, The 2008
Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute, London (London, 2009), 24, to con-
clude that a strong case is to be made that it was a Merovingian custom for the the people
to swear their submission to the king. For a detailed discussion of the previous literature,
see F.L. Ganshof, Charlemagne et le serment, in Mlanges dhistoire de Moyen Age ddis
la mmoire de Louis Halphen (Paris, 1951), 259290; and trans. Janet Sondheimer as
Charlemagnes use of the oath, in idem, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy
(London, 1971), 111124, who provides an excellent description of the Frankish background
of the oath, the means of the oaths administration, and various details of the texts. See also
Matthias Becher, Eid und Herrschaft: Untersuchungen zum Herrscherethos Karls des Grossen
(Sigmaringen, 1993), whose work is discussed below.
introduction5
response to a papal request for military support, culminated in a success-

ful siege of the Lombard capital, i.e. the erstwhile Roman imperial fortress
city of Pavia in northern Italy, and resulted in King Liutprand recognizing
Pippins superior position, i.e. ditio.14
Early Carolingian Military Organization
The organization of the armed forces that undergirded the military suc-
cess of King Pippin I and his predecessors was tripartite in nature.15 At the
basic level, all able-bodied males, regardless of legal status or wealth, were
required to participate in the defense of the local area in which they lived
with whatever armament they had available to them.16 Since the armies of
the Carolingian Mayors of the Palace and of Pippin and Charlemagne were
engaged overwhelmingly in offensive military operations beyond the bor-
ders of those parts of the regnum Francorum that they ruled, these local
militia forces were rarely mobilized to defend their home territory, i.e. the
pagus, in which they lived. Consequently, little is to be seen of these forces
during the period under discussion here.17
Those members of society, men and women, clerics and lay people,
whose wealth, both landed and moveable, reached a stipulated minimum
as adumbrated by the central government were required when called
upon by the king or his agents, e.g. the count of the pagus, to provide men
to serve in the royal expeditionary forces. These fighting men, in addition
to participating in the local defense alongside their poorer neighbors,
were deployed outside the region in which they lived for offensive military
operations. A person who possessed the means to serve as a member of
the expeditionary levy might participate personally in military operations
if qualified. Those, however, who lacked the capacity, prima facie, to par-
ticipate in military operations, e.g. women, children, clerics, old men, and
the sick, were required to provide substitutes.18
14For a brief survey, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 150.
15For a summary, see Bernard S. Bachrach and Charles R. Bowlus, Heerwesen, in
Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde, ed. Heinrich Beck et al. (Berlin-New York,
2000), 14, 122136, with the substantial corpus of scholarly works cited there.
16Janet L. Nelson, Charlemagne and the paradoxes of power, in Challenging the bound
aries of medieval history: the legacy of Timothy Reuter, ed. Patricia Skinner (Turnhout, 2009),
2950, at 45, makes a point of emphasizing the connection of this Carolingian institution
to the late Roman universal obligation to military service to protect our provinces and
their fortunes See also Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5154.
17Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5254.
18Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5457; and cf. Marios Costambeys, Matthew
Innes, and Simon MacLean, The Carolingian World (Cambridge, 2011), 248, who claim that
6 introduction
Those people who possessed multiples of the minimum level of wealth

could be required by the government to provide fighting men for expedi-
tionary service consistent with their total economic means. For example,
a person holding twelve mansi (farms of a stipulated value) could be
required to provide one heavily-armed mounted soldier, but a person pos-
sessing 120 mansi could be required to support and send off to the muster
as many as ten men thusly equipped. Great magnates possessing thou-
sands of mansi and immense quantities of moveable wealth could, if the
king thought it necessary, be required to provide exceptionally large num-
bers of fighting men as expeditionary levies for a particular campaign.19
The third element in the organization of the early Carolingian armed
forces was the military household. These groups, by and large, were the
obsequia of the kings and of their magnates, both lay and ecclesiastical.
These household troops were paid professional soldiers having regular
employment.20 They may be contrasted to groups of mercenaries, to
whom contracts were offered on a time-limited basis and, thus, were tem-
porary members of the royal obsequium or the military household of one
or another magnate who hired them.21 The kings military household, both
presentales, i.e. those who served at the court and in its environs, and those
established on military lands throughout the kingdom in garrisons and
other venues, constituted the core of the regular standing army under the
Carolingians.22
The magnates of the kingdom were given royal licentia to maintain
military households of professional soldiers.23 With these men and others
hired for the purpose, the great men and women, e.g. abbesses, of the
regnum, who could be seen to owe large quantities of military service
possession of a horse was also a prerequisite for the performance of military service
This is manifestly inaccurate.
21See Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian Mercenaries and Paid Soldiers in Imperial
Perspective, in Mercenaries and Paid Men in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of a Conference
held at University of Wales, Swansea, 7th-9th July 2005, ed. John France (Leiden-Boston,
2008), 167192. Cf. Timothy Reuter, The recruitment of armies in the Early Middle Ages:
what can we know?, in Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society in a European Perspective,
ad. 11300, ed. Anne Norgard Jorgensen and Birthe L. Clausen (Copenhagen, 1997), 3237,
who considers mercenaries to be a fourth element of military organization rather than as
adjuncts recruited to augment obsequia.
22Bernard S. Bachrach, Military Lands in Historical Perspective, HS, 9 (1997), 95122;
and idem, On Roman Ramparts, 3001300, in The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare:
The Triumph of the West, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, 1995), 6491.
23CRF, I, no. 20, ch. 14, makes clear that without royal permission de truste faciendo
nemo praesumat.
introduction7
consistent with the obligations incumbent upon their landed and move-
able wealth, thus were able to respond to the bannum when called upon to
mobilize various military units by the ruler or his duly constituted repre-
sentative.24 A man of any status could be recruited to serve in these mili-
tary households, but all of them, including servi, who had been honored
with the status of vassal, were required to take an oath of faithfulness to
the king in addition to taking an oath to the man under whom they served
directly. Along with the troops of the obsequium regalis, which was by far
the largest and most important of all the military households in the reg
num Francorum, the armed forces employed by the magnates constituted
the professional standing army of the kingdom.25
The capacity of the king and of the magnates of the Frankish kingdom
to support substantial obsequia as the professional base of the royal army
was greatly facilitated by the large quantities of moveable wealth amassed
by the Carolingian dynasty and by those aristocrats who were loyal to
them.26 The gold and silver bullion, coins, and object dart made of pre-
cious metals and encrusted with gems which were kept in the kings trea-
sury provided easy access to assets, when needed, to pay the soldiers of the
royal household and to recruit additional troops as situations might
require.27 In this context, it was regarded by contemporaries as being of
importance that each of these soldiers attached to the palace received an
annual gift (donum militum) from the king, which was distributed at the
court in a festive ceremony by the queen.28
Charlemagnes Assets
In addition to acquiring their share of the royal treasure following the

death of King Pippin I in 768, Charlemagne and his brother Carloman the
Younger inherited rule as reges over separate but equal parts of their

25Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 6871. It should be noted that on occasion
the term obsequium regalis is used to denote all of Charlemagnes army and not merely
his personal military household. This conceit should not mislead the reader.
26Matthias Hardt, Gold und Herrschaft: die Schtze europischer Knige und Frsten im
ersten Jahrtausend (Berlin, 2004), provides a plethora of examples of royal treasure and also
of the treasure of various magnates.
27It should be noted here, however, that many of the military units assigned to the royal
household were supported directly by their officers, at least initially. However, it is obvious
that these officers were well-treated by Charlemagne. See, Bachrach, Early Carolingian
Warfare, pp. 6568.
28See Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. V (22); and the discussion by Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, p. 303, n. 32.
8 introduction
fathers kingdom. The regnum Francorum was divided between them

according to the principle that each new ruler would inherit a rough
equality of the available human and material resources that once had
been under King Pippins regnum.29 Like all previous divisiones, this mas-
sive administrative undertaking was based upon inventories, or descriptio
nes, of a great many hundreds of royal estates, i.e. fisci in royal hands, those
royal estates that had been granted to vassi dominici as beneficia, a great
many tens of thousands of royal dependents of various status and their
lands, as well as of church lands.30
King Pippin, shortly after becoming rex Francorum in 751, went well
beyond what had been the normal process entailed in having detailed
inventories made of royal lands. He had a descriptio or inventory made of
the res ecclesiarum, i.e. estates that belonged to the church and along with
the dependents living on these estates, throughout the Frankish king-
dom.31 This inventory was executed by the kings agents prior to a planned
divisio of church resources, which saw numerous estates granted as benefi
cia to the kings vassals and fideles at royal command (pro verbo regis) for
the purpose of supporting these men in helping the government meet its
needs, especially those of a military nature.32
29F.L. Ganshof, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte und Bedeutung des Vertrages von Verdun
(843), Deutsches Archiv fr Erforschung des Mittelalters, XII (1956), 313330, and translated
as The genesis and significance of the Treaty of Verdun (843), by Janet Sondheimer in
idem, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy: Studies in Carolingian History (London,
1971), 289302; A. Kroeber, Partage du royaume des Francs entre Charlemagne et
Carlomann Ier, BEC, 20 (1856), 341350; Siguard Abel and Bernhard Simson, Jhrbucher
des frnkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Grossen, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 18831888),
I, 2340; Arthur Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1934), 46, map 1; Halphen, Charlemagne,
pp. 4142; Peter Classen, Karl der Grosse und die Thronfolge im Frankenreich, in Festschrift
fr Hermann Heimpel (Gttingen, 1972), III, 24; and McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms,
p. 371, map. 2.
30Ganshof, The Treaty of Verdun, pp. 293, 301, n. 30.
31AG, p. 27; AN, p. 27; and AA, p. 26. See the discussion by Ganshof, The Treaty of
Verdun, p. 294, with the literature cited there. R.H.C. Davis, Domesday Book: Continental
Parallels, in Domesday Studies: Papers read at the Novocentenary Conference of the Royal
Historical Society and the Institute of British Geographers: Winchester, 1989, ed. J.C. Holt
(Woodbridge, 1987), 30, provides a useful but incomplete list of various Carolingian sur-
veys. Janet L. Nelson, Literacy in Carolingian Government, in The Uses of Literacy in Early
Medieval Europe, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, 1990), 258296, at 261, observes
regarding the surviving polyptchs, Ninth century land-surveys are inconceivable without
a continuous sub-Roman tradition of record-using lordship.
32Later traditions, solidified by Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims (Epist. no. 7), unfairly
identified Charles Martel as the major abuser of the church in regard to taking church
property. See Ulrich Nonn, Das Bild Karl Martells in mittelalterlichen Quellen, in Karl
Martell in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen,
1994), 921; and Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel, pp. 183184.
introduction9
The death of Carloman the Younger in 771 left Charlemagne in a

position to reunite the regnum Francorum under his sole rule, which, as
will be seen below, he did rather rapidly and with considerable effective-
ness. The reunification of the Frankish kingdom provided an opportu
nity for Charlemagne to begin the process of trying to take advantage
of the full spectrum of human and material assets to which Pippin had
enjoyed access during his reign. These assets had enabled Pippin to com-
plete the reunification of the Frankish kingdom and were multifaceted.
They included both extensive demographic and economic resources, a
well-developed administrative infrastructure both at the level of the cen-
tral government and in the provinces, a flourishing and effectively admin-
istered royal fisc, and a well-developed matrix of military institutions that
had proved successful for several generations in mobilizing armies of
conquest.33
Ultimately, with these assets, which Charlemagne augmented consider-
ably during the course of his reign, the Frankish king brought under his
direct rule much of what had been the western half of the Roman Empire.
As observed in a recent biography of Charlemagne by Barbero, On a mod-
ern map of Europe, his lands would extend over the whole of France,
Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Austria, Germany as far as the Elbe,
northern and central Italy, Istria, Bohemia, Slovenia, and Hungary as far as
the Danube, and finally Pyrenean Spain as far as the Ebro.34 As will be
seen below, Charlemagne also extended his influence well beyond these
borders. East of the Elbe and south of Rome, he created protectorates,
and, in addition, he maintained fruitful diplomatic relations with both the
Byzantine emperor and the Caliph of Baghdad, from whom he garnered
additional advantages.
Demography and Economy
The robust expansion of the early Carolingian economy and the concomi-
tant process of demographic growth provided substantial surplus human
and material resources that Charlemagne potentially could marshal, as his
father had done, in order to sustain a long-term strategy of extensive ter-
ritorial acquisition. In this context, it is important to note the paradig-
matic observation by James Campbell, The organisation and the economy
33Very useful, in this context, is Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296.

34Charlemagne, p. 75.
10 introduction
of a state are largely reflected in and determined by its organisation for

war.35 The total population of the lands ruled by Charlemagne, both those
people living within the borders of the Frankish kingdom and those who
dwelled in territories that subsequently he brought under his regnum,
likely reached a high point in the neighborhood of 20 million men, women,
and children.36
Many specialists agree that this process of demographic and economic
growth began during the 7th century. However, the beginning of the empo-
rium phenomenon ca. 600 suggests that this pattern of population growth,
at least in the north, likely began no later than the last generation of the
6th century and perhaps even earlier.37 In addition, there is some basis for
claiming that the Basque population also was growing at a considerable
rate from the second half of the 7th century if not earlier.38 The pace
of demographic expansion during the 8th and, at least, into the early
35Some Agents and Agencies of the Late Anglo-Saxon State, in Domesday Studies, ed.
J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1987), 201218; and reprinted in idem, The Anglo-Saxon State
(London-New York, 2000), 201225, at 201 for the quotation.
36Regarding the total population in the 20-million range, see Reinhard Schneider, Das
Frankenreich (Munich, 1982), 124. For an older view, see Ferdinand Lot, Conjectures
dmographique sur la France au IXe sicle, Le moyen ge 23 (1921) 127, 109137 (repub-
lished in Ferdinand Lot, Recueil des Travaux Historiques de Ferdinand Lot, 3 vols [Geneva,
19681973], 3:465521), who although a doctrinaire minimalist with regard to the size of
Charlemagnes expeditionary forces (see below), nevertheless took the position that the
population of the Gallic part of Charlemagnes empire alone was of the same order of mag-
nitude as the population of France in the reign of Louis XIV, i.e. between 22 and 25 million.
Regarding the population of Louis XIVs France, see Paul Bairoch, Jean Batou, and Pierre
Chvre, La population des villes europennes: Banque de donnes et analyse sommaire des
rsultats, 8001850 (Geneva, 1988), 297. James Campbell, The Late Anglo-Saxon State:
A Maximum View, PBA, 87 (1994), 3965; and reprinted in idem, The Anglo-Saxon State
(London-New York, 2000), 130, where he observes (p. 29) it easier to accept Lots com-
monsense suggestion because of Domesday
37Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, p. 25, summarizes the state of the question for an
early 7th-century beginning of this process. However, he does not seem to realize that for
the emporia to get underway early in the 7th century, it was necessary for there to have
been extensive population growth, which in turn resulted in substantial surplus agricul-
tural production that could be traded. Regarding the beginning of the emporia phenome-
non, see Helen Clarke and Bjrn Ambrosiani, Towns in the Viking Age, 2nd ed. (London,
1995); and also of importance here is Bernard S. Bachrach, Plague, Population, and
Economy in Merovingian Gaul, Australian Journal of Early Medieval History (2007), 2956,
where it has been shown that the so-called Justinianic plague, which purportedly struck
various parts of the erstwhile Roman Empire in the west and the Byzantine empire in the
east between the mid-6th and mid-8th centuries, did not have a significant demographic
impact in Gaul. For the consensus ante, see Pierre Rich, Problmes de dmographie his-
torique du Haut Moyen Age (Ve-VIII sicles), Annales de dmogrpahie historique 3 (1966),
3755.
38Roger Collins, The Basques, 2nd ed.(Cambridge, 1990), 97.
introduction11
9th century is widely agreed to have averaged approximately 1 per cent per
year on a kingdom wide basis.39 For some parts of the regnum Francorum,
however, recent research has made clear that there was an annual average
population growth of 2 per cent during this period.40 At an overall average
rate of only 1 per cent per year throughout the Frankish kingdom, a dou-
bling of the population would have taken place in a period of 70 years.41
The economy, i.e. the total production of goods and services of
the Frankish kingdom, has been shown through recent research to have
grown in all sectors during the early Carolingian period.42 The main area
39Jean-Pierre Devroey, Les mthodes danalyse dmographique des polyptyques du

haut moyen ge, Acta Historia Bruxellensia, 4 (1981), 7188; and reprinted with the same
pagination in idem, Etudes sur le grand domaine Carolingien (Aldershot, 1993); Monique
Zerner, Enfants et jeunes au IXe sicle. La dmographie du polyptyque de Marseilles,
81314, Provence historique, 31 (1981), 355377; eadem, La population de Villeneuve-
Saint-Georges et de Nogent-sur-Marne au IXe sicle daprs le polyptyque de Saint-
Germain-des-Prs, Annales de la facult des lettres et sciences humaines de Nice, 37 (1979),
1724; Pierre Toubert, La part du grand domain dans le dcollage conomique de
lOccident (VIIIe-Xe sicles), in La croissance agricole du haut Moyen Age. Chronologie,
modalits, gographie. Actes du 10e colloque de Flaran (Auch, 1990), 5386; and idem,
The Carolingian Moment, in A History of the Family, ed. Andr Burguire et al. and trans.
S.H. Tenison, R. Morris, and A. Wilson (Cambridge, 1996), 379406.
40Karl W, Butzer, The Classical Tradition of Agronomic Science: Perspectives on
Carolingian Agriculture and Agronomy, in Science in Western and Eastern Civilization, ed.
Paul L. Butzer and Dietrich Lohrmann (Basel, 1993), 539605, at 560.
41Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, p. 25, accepts the view for an average 1 per cent
average annual growth, but makes the curious arithmetical error that this would lead to a
doubling of the population every 100 years.
42Basic syntheses are provided by Adriaan Verhulst, Economic Organization, in
NCMH, II, 481509; and idem, The Carolingian Economy. See also Jean-Pierre Devroey, The
Economy, in The Early Middle Ages: Europe 4001000, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Oxford,
2001) 97129; and Toubert, The Carolingian Moment, pp. 379406. For some key local
studies, see Dieter Hgermann, Grundherrschaft und Markt im prmer Urbar, in Das
prmer Urbar als Geschichtsquelle und seine Beudutung fr das Bitburger un Luxemburger
Land, ed. Emile Erpeldig (Bitburg, 1993), 1726; and idem, Der Abt als Grundherr: Kloster
und Wirtschaft im frhen Mittelalter, in Herrschaft und Kirche. Beitrge zur Entstehung
episkopaler und monastischer Organisationsformen, ed. F. Prinz (Stuttgart, 1988), 345385.
Regarding the state of the question ante, see George Duby, The Early Growth of the
European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century, trans.
Howard B. Clarke (Ithaca, NY, 1974), 73111; and Robert Fossier, Les tendences de
lconomie: stagation ou croisance, SSCI, 27 (Spoleto, 1981), 261274. For a direct critique of
this older view, see Adriaan Verhulst, Le paysage rural: les structures parcellaires de lEurope
du Nord-Ouest (Turnhout, 1995), p. 71, who observed, Contrairement aux vues pessimistes
(my ital.) ce sujet la plupart des spcialistes de lconomie du haut Moyen ge
admettent une croissance conomique partir de la fin du VIIe and pendant les VIIIe et
IXe sicles and idem, The Carolingian Economy, pp. 67, points out that Touberts study
(loc. cit.), is still the best analysis of minimalist views on the Carolingian economy and at
the same time a thorough refutation of them, based on recent scholarship and on primary
sources alike.
12 introduction
of economic development was in agriculture and in the production of

agriculturally-related goods.43 This, of course, is to be regarded as hardly
surprising as in the neighborhood of 90 per cent of the population lived
and worked in a rural context.44 Consequently, the substantial growth of
the population had the effect of putting more workers into the fields so
that each one producing a small surplus helped to create a large surplus
when aggregated. However, there is reason to believe that there also were
some increases in productivity. These seem, in large part, to have been the
result of the introduction and development of the bipartite estate, which
gradually replaced the latifundia of later Roman Gaul as the fundamental
method of organizing large-scale agriculture.45
43Of key importance here are the collected studies of Jean-Pierre Devroey, tudes sur le
grand domaine carolingien (Aldershot, 1993); idem, The Economy, pp. 97129; Werner
Rsener, Zur Struktur und Entwicklung der Grundherrschaft in Sachsen in karolingischer
und ottonischer Zeit, in Le grand domaine aux poques mrovingienne et carolingienne.
Actes des colloque international Gand 1983, ed. Adriaan Verhulst (Gand, 1985), 173207; and
idem, Strukturformen der adeligen Grundherrschaft in der Karolingerzeit, in Struktur der
Grundherrschaft im frhen Mittelalter, ed. Werner Rsener (Gttingen, 1989), 158167.
It is important to emphasize that the miserably pessimistic estimate of seed grain/yield
ratios at 2:1 and sometimes smaller, for which George Duby, Rural Economy and Country
Life in the Medieval West, trans. C. Postan (London, 1968), pp. 2527, argued, now are thor-
oughly rejected. Verhulst, Economic Organization, p. 487, notes that a consensus now has
developed to the effect that Dubys conclusions were based on very rare, unreliable and
ambiguous figures. In short, Verhulst makes clear concerning returns during this period:
it is therefore no longer possible to refer to these yield ratios as catastrophic.
Timothy Reuter, Germany in the Early Middle Ages (8001056) (London, 1991), p. 95, takes
note of seed grain/yield ratios of 3:1 and 4:1 in Francia orientalis; these are some 200 per
cent greater than those for which Duby had argued. However, Reuters notion that such
ratios are not high is correct as compared, for example, to Sumerian irrigated lands or
agriculture in the Nile Delta, but he is likely incorrect in arguing that such ratios in early
medieval Europe would have left much of the population in a very precarius position.
Indeed, these returns for the relatively underdeveloped eastern segment of the Frankish
kingdom, cited by Reuter, are within the same range as some of the most fertile lands of
central Italy during the height of the late Roman republic and early empire. Regarding the
Roman data see John Evans, Plebs Rustica. The Peasantry in Classical Italy II: The Peasant
Economy, American Journal of Ancient History 5 (1980), 134174. Curiously, Kathy L.
Pearson, Nutrition and the Early-Medieval Diet, Speculum, 72 (1997), 18, n. 159, still uses
the ratios argued for by Duby in support of his minimalist model.
44For the consensus on this point, see, for example, Chris Wickham, Framing the Early
Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400800 (Oxford, 2005), p. 12; Fredric Cheyette,
The disappearance of the ancient landscape and the climatic anomaly of the early Middle
Ages: a question to be pursued, Early Medieval Europe, 16 (2008), 128, n. 3; and Devroey,
Economy, p. 98.
45This view is developed in detail by Toubert, La part du grand domain, pp. 5386,
which sustains and expands upon the earlier views of F.L. Ganshof, Manorial Organization
in the Low Countries in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries, TRHS, 4th ser. XXXI
(1949), 2931. From the archaeological perspective, see the evidence developed by Paul
Van Ossel, Etablissements ruraux de lantiquit tardive dans le Nord de la Gaule, Gallia,
introduction13
Consonant with increases in agricultural production and perhaps in

productivity in some areas, there is widespread agreement among special-
ists in the history of Carolingian education and resource management
that the formal training of estate officials, both lay and ecclesiastical, was
essential to administer and maintain the records that were used for large-
scale agricultural operations.46 For the average villicus, it was perhaps suf-
ficient that as a child at home he had learned basic arithmetic, which
included addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, as well as the
handling of fractions.47 However, some of the youth who had obtained
their basic education at home and in the future would become estate
managers or members of their staffs went on to attend schools where they
were taught more advanced aspects of mathematics as part of the
quadrivium.48
In addition to learning basic arithmetic, there also was technical knowl-
edge to be acquired from Roman agricultural manuals. As George Duby
accurately observed, these educated men were fascinated by the classical
models of Roman agriculture, e.g. the widely available texts of Columella
and Palladius, and strove to apply these practices to the exploitation of
their own lands.49 Finally, those men who became estate managers or
members of their administrative staffs were in a position to learn tech-
niques from the widely disseminated and frequently copied elements
Supplment 51 (Paris, 1992), 183. As a result of the important study by Peter Saris, The
Origins of the Manorial Economy: New Insights from Late Antiquity, EHR, CXIX (2004),
280311, it has been shown that the bipartite estate originated in Syria and was introduced
into Gaul during the early 5th century.
46For an emphasis on practical literacy, see Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296.
47See E. Alfldi-Rosenbaum, The Finger Calculus in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages:
Studies on Roman Game Counters, FS, 5 (1971), 19; and for the general education of chil-
dren, see John Contreni, The Carolingian Renaissance, Renaissances Before the
Renaissance: Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, ed. Warren Treadgold
(Stanford, CA, 1984), 5974, 184191, at 6667.
48Regarding the teaching of arithmetic, both to laymen and to clerics, see, for example,
Johm J. Contreni, Education and Learning in the Early Middle Ages: New Perspective and
Old Problems, The International Journal of Social Education, 4 (1989), 925; and idem, The
Pursuit of Knowledge in Carolingian Europe, in The Gentle Voices of Teachers: Aspects of
Learning in the Carolingian Age, ed. Richard E. Sullivan (Columbus, OH, 1995), 106141.
49Duby, The Early Growth, p. 16, for the quotation; and in regard to available texts
that have survived, see, for example, M.D. Reeve, Columella, in Texts and Transmission,
pp. 146147; and Bernhard Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne,
trans. and ed. Michael Gorman (Cambridge, 1994), 146, 148, 150; P.K. Marshall, Palladius,
in Texts and Transmission, pp. 287288. For recent studies, see Butzer, The Classical
Tradition, pp. 541570, esp. pp. 558570; and Verena Winiwarter, Bden in Agrarge
sellschaften: Wahrnehmung, Behandlung und Theorie von Cato bis Palladius, in Neue-
Bilder. Wahrnehmungen von Natur und Umwelt in der Geschichte, ed. Rolf Peter Sieferle and
14 introduction
found in the corpus of Agrimensores, complete with diagrams, for the pur-
poses of measuring out fields and establishing boundaries.50 Often, hand-
books (libri manuales) were made which bundled various useful texts, or,
more generally, excerpts from such texts for convenient consultation.51
Several other developments may well have helped to increase crop
yields. The imposition of the three-field system of cultivation, which was
integral to the bipartite organization of large estates, resulted in increased
productivity. The three-field system kept greater quantities of arable land
under the plow each year than had been the case with the two-field regime
of cultivation that it replaced in many regions.52 In addition, the gradual
diffusion perhaps as late as the 8th century, if not the invention of the
heavy plow, made it possible to farm more effectively by deeper plowing of
the predominantly heavy clay soils in the northern parts of the regnum
Francorum.53
While inventions and alterations in agricultural organization resulted
from human intervention, there were natural factors in play as well.
Helga Breuninger (Frankfurt-am-Main-New York, 1991), 123223. However, much more

work is needed on the role of Roman agricultural tracts in regard to medieval agriculture.
50With regard to the manuscripts, see J.B. Campbell, The writings of the Roman land
surveyors: introduction, text, translation and commentary (London, 2000). For the actual use
of these texts, see, for example, Wesley Stevens, Fields and Streams: Language and Practice
of Arithmetic and Geometry in Early Medieval Schools, in Word, Image, Number
Communication in the Middle Ages, ed. John J. Contreni and Santa Casciani (Turnhout,
2002), 113204. Of exceptional interest for more than its insight into agricultural adminis-
tration is Florentine Mtherich, Der karolingische Agrimensoren-Codex in Rom,
Aachener Kunstbltter, 45 (1974), 5974. Rosamond McKitterick, The Written Word and
Oral Communication: Romes Legacy to the Franks, in Latin Culture and Medieval Germanic
Europe, Germania Latina I, ed. Richard North and Tette Hofstra (Groningen, 1992), 89112;
and reprinted with the same pagination in eadem, The Frankish Kings and Culture in the
Early Middle Ages (Aldershot, 1995), 100101, who takes note of mss. of the argimensores in
the libraries of lay magnates of the Carolingian period.
51Contreni, Education and Learning, p. 21; and more generally, Eva Matthews Sanford,
The Use of Classical Latin Authors in the Libri Manuales, Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philological Association 55 (1924), 190248. Much more work needs to be done
on these Carolingian manuals.
52Regarding the development of the three-field system in the early Carolingian era, see
the extensive literature provided by Lynn T. White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social
Change (Oxford, 1962), 6976, and for additional notes 158159; B.H. Slicher van Bath, The
Agrarian History of Western Europe, a.d. 5001850, trans. Olive Ordish (London, 1963),
5960, for reference to the three-field system in 765, with the admonition that relatively
few sources survive from that period; and the recent synthesis by Werner Rsener, The
Peasantry of Europe, trans. Thomas M. Barker (Oxford, 1994), 4243, 5556. For the state of
the question, see Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, pp. 17, 6163; and Butzer, The
Classical Tradition, pp. 567568.
53In regard to the state of the question concerning the development and introduction
of the heavy plow in the west, see Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, pp. 67, 7778.
introduction15
A gradual process of climate warming began in northern Gaul during the

latter part of the 6th century and further to the south, i.e. in the lee of the
north face of the Alps, about 80 years later. This climatic condition of grad-
ual warming contributed to the drying out of the areas that had been
inundated by the flooding of the North Sea in the course of the Second
Dunkirk Transgression and also to an extension of the growing season
throughout Gaul.54 New lands, both within Gaul itself and on the fron-
tiers, were being placed under cultivation in order to meet the demands of
a growing population.55
Substantial agricultural and agriculturally-related surpluses produced
by a growing population resulted in a significant increase in both regional
and long-distance trade.56 It is to be emphasized that this was trade in the
54William H. TeBrake, Ecology of Village Settlement in the Dutch Rijnland, Pathways

to Medieval Peasants, ed. J.A. Raftis (Toronto, 1981), 7, 911; Adriaan Verhulst, The Rise of
Cities in North-West Europe (Cambridge, 1999), p. 15; Aline Durand and Philippe Leveau,
Farming in Mediterranean France and Rural Settlement in the Late Roman and Early
Medieval Periods: The Contribution from Archaeology and Environmental Sciences in the
Last Twenty Years, in The Making of Feudal Agricultures (Leiden-Boston, 2004), 177253,
181165, regarding the recession of Alpine glaciers; W. Roeleveld, De bijdrage van de aard-
wetenschappen tot de studie van de transgresieve activiteit lands de zuidlike husten van de
Noordsee, in Transgressies en occupatiesgeschiedenis in de kuntgebiedgen van Nederleand
en Belgi: colloquium Gent 57 September 1978, ed. A. Verhulst and M.K.E. Gottschalk
(Ghent, 1980), 291312.
I am at a loss to understand why Pearson, Nutrition and the Early-Medieval Diet, p. 24,
came to ignore the status questionis regarding climate warming in the early Carolingian era
and drew the conclusion that there was a general cooling off in the temperate lands (my
ital.) between a.d. 400 and 900. Her note here is to Richard Hodges, Dark Age Economics:
The origins of towns and trade, ad 6001000 (New York, 1982), 139, who refers to conditions
in Greenland, not to temperate lands. Of course, without a poor climate, Pearsons argu-
ment that early-medieval people likely suffered some degree of malnutrition would be
weakened. See the brief outline provided by Clarke and Ambrosiani, Towns, pp. 545,
107127.
55See, for example, among older works, L. Franz, Zur Bevlkerungsgeschichte des
frhen Mittelalters, Deutsches Archiv fr Landes-und Volksforschung, II (1938), 404416;
more recent examples are Karl Bosl, Franken um 800: Structuranalyse einer frnkischen
Knigsprovinz, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1969), 1314; Rolf Gensen, Althessens Frhzeit: Frhge
schichtliche Fundsttten und Funde in Nordhessen (Wiesbaden, 1977), 1638; David Parsons,
Sites and Monuments of the Anglo-Saxon Mission in Central Germany, The Archaeological
Journal 140 (1983), 280321; and Hans-Jrgen Nitz, The Church as colonist: the Benedictine
Abbey of Lorsch and planned Waldhufen colonization in the Odenwald, Journal of
Historical Geography, 9 (1983), 10526. Much recent scholarship is discussed by Butzer,
The Classical Tradition, pp. 560570.
56With regard to Carolingian trade, especially in the Mediterranean, the basic work is
now Michael McCormick, Origins of the Western Economy (Cambridge, 2001); and with
regard to more northerly regions, see several works by Stphane LeBecq: The Role of the
Monasteries in the Systems of Production and Exchange of the Frankish World between
the Seventh and the Beginning of the Ninth Centuries, in The Long Eighth Century, ed. Inge
Lyse Hansen and Chris Wickham (Leiden, 2000), 12148; idem, Entre Antiquit tardive et
16 introduction
modern sense of that idea, and not merely an aspect of gift-giving rituals,
as some who have been enthralled by anthropological theory still may
contend.57 This growth in trade can be charted from the early 7th century
onward as the result of the immensely important efforts by archaeologists
who have done heroic work in excavating emporia sites throughout the
coastal regions of the regnum Francorum and its environs in Britain, south-
ern Scandinavia, and even further to the east.58
The increase in production throughout the agricultural sector of the
economy also played a significant role in the economic and demographic
growth of cities during this period, many of which were located on
sites that previously had been imperial urbes as is well-documented.59
trs haute Moyen Age: permanence et mutations des systmes de communications dans la
Gaule et ses marges, SSCI, 45 (Spoleto, 1998), 461502; and idem, Entre terre et mer: la
mise en valeur des contre littorales de lancienne Frise, Histoire, Economie et Socit 16
(1997), 361376. For a synthesis, see Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, pp. 97113.
57Regarding the old view that gift exchange, not trade, dominated what formally was
considered long-distance commerce during this period, see Phillip Grierson, Commerce
in the Dark Ages: A Critique of the Evidence, TRHS, 5th ser. 9 (1958), 123140; and also
Duby, The Early Growth, pp. 4857. Although this interpretation held sway for a rather long
time, it is now considered a serious oversimplification of the nature of the exchange of
goods. For fundamental critique of Griersons views, see John Moreland, Concepts of the
Early Medieval Economy, in The Long Eighth Century, ed. Inge Lyse Hansen and Chris
Wickham (Leiden, 2000) 134, esp. 58; Florin Curta, Merovingian and Carolingian gift
giving, Speculum, 81 (2006), 671699; and Chris Wickham, Conclusion on behalf of the
contributors, The Languages of Gift in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul
Fouracre (Cambridge, 2010), p. 246, who points out that gift economy theorists [e.g.
Grierson and Duby], argue that the whole economic situation of the early Middle Ages
was structured by the social, and that commerce, and the complexities of contractual rela-
tionship, between people who were not socially linked, were absent or weak. Wickham
then concludes, We [the authors for whom he is speaking] fundamentally disagree with
this view of the period.
58The emporium phenomenon has been widely studied, and credit for pressing the
importance of these trading sites rests, in large part, with Richard Hodges. See, for example,
his Dark Age Economics: The origins of towns and trade, ad 6001000 (New York, 1982); and
Towns and Trades in the Reign of Charlemagne (London, 2000). Unfortunately, Hodges
work tends to be error-prone and rife with unsustainable interpretations. A more cautious
guide is provided by Clarke and Ambrosiani, Towns; and for a very useful review of the lit-
erature, see Heidi M. Sherman, Barbarians Come to Market; The emporia of Western
Eurasia from 500 bc to ad 1000, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Minnesota, 2008),
pp. 150203.
Among more important studies of particular sites are Stphane Lebecq, Lemporium
proto-mdieval de Walcheren-Domburg, in Peasants and Townsmen in Medieval Europe:
Studia in honorem Adriaan Verhulst, J.M. Duvosquel and E. Thoen (Ghent, 1995), 7389;
idem, Marchands et navigateurs frisons du haut moyen ge, 2 vols. (Lille, 1983); W.A. Van Es,
Dorestad Centered, in Medieval Archaeology in the Netherlands: Studies presented to H. H.
van Regteren Altena, ed. J.C. Besteman, J.M. Bos, and H.A. Heidinga (Assen-Maastricht,
1990), 151182.
59For background, see Paul-Albert Fvrier, Towns in the Western Mediterranean,
in European Towns: Their Archaeology and Early History, ed. M.W. Barley (London, 1977),
introduction17
The emergence during the Late Antique era of an effective episcopal

regime based in these fortress cities played a key role in maintaining
continuity in urban administration and infrastructure, which also was
manifested in the pagi, which often were under their jurisdiction.60 As will
be seen below, the military value of these great fortress cities was a well-
recognized aspect of the importance of these urbes.
Administrative Assets
It cannot be assumed that merely because the regnum Francorum was

wealthy and populous, Charlemagnes government could at any time
and under all conditions mobilize the human and material resources that
it required in order to support its offensive military operations. Char
lemagne, like the Roman emperors whom he sought to imitate and whom
he worked to succeed in the West, required effective administrative struc-
tures both centrally and at the local level in order for the government to
operate effectively. As a result, any discussion of Charlemagnes military
operations must identify the various institutional structures and material
assets that provided the Carolingian government with access to the human
and physical resources of the regnum Francorum which were required. In
addition, it is no less important to understand how and why these institu-
tions worked with sufficient efficiency to make possible more than four
decades of largely successful military campaigning. These institutional
structures ultimately undergirded the processes by which the lands under
Carolingian rule, as noted above, were very close to being doubled during
Charlemagnes reign.
The Government
Charlemagne inherited numerous administrative assets for the exercise

of royal power. First, he benefited greatly from an effective and highly
315342; and idem, Vetera et Nova: le poids du pass, les germes deavenir, IIIe-VIe sicle,
in Histoire de la France urbaine. Tome I: La ville antique des origines qu IXe sicle (Paris, 1981),
399493; and Verhulst, The Rise of Cities, whose focus on the northeast is somewhat distort-
ing in regard to Gaul as a whole.
60See, for example, Martin Heinzelmann, Bischofsherrschaft in Gallien. Zur Kontinuitt
rmischer Fuhrungsschichten vom 4. bis zum 7. Jahrhundert. Soziale, prospographische und
bildungsgeschichtliche Aspekte (Munich, 1976); Georg Scheibelreiter, Der Bischof in
merowingerischer Zeit (Vienna-Cologne, 1983); and R. Kaiser, Bischofsherrschaft zwischen
Knigtum und Frsten macht: Studien zur bischflichen Stadtherrschaft im westfrnkish-
franzsichen Reich im Frhen und hohen Mittelalter (Bonn, 1981).
18 introduction
organized central bureaucracy based in the royal court.61 In addition, the

Carolingian government maintained complex administrative assets, both
lay and ecclesiastical, locally in the pagi or counties.62 Finally, the bureau-
cracy of the central government communicated effectively with the
administrative cadres at the local level through the use of missi dominici.
The success and sophistication of this government bureaucracy, both
centrally and locally, as well as the central governments capacity to main-
tain effective oversight of the administration of lay and ecclesiastical
landed assets and personnel, was based upon the extensive use of written
documents.63
61The basic work remains Karl Ferdinand Werner, Missus-Marchio-Comes. Entre

ladministration centrale et ladministration locale de lEmpire carolingien, Histoire com
pare de ladministration (IVe-XXVIIe sicles), ed. Werner Paravicini and Karl Ferdinand
Werner (Munich, 1980), 191239. In addition, see Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296; and
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 137213, which also largely support Werners views. Further
detailed support for Werners treatment of the subject is provided by Mark Mersiowsky,
Regierungspraxis und Schriftlichkeit im Karolingerreich: Das Fallbeispiel der Mandate
und Briefe, in Schriftkultur und Reichsverwaltung unter den Karolingern. Referate des
Kolloquiums der Nordrhein-Westflischen Akademie der Wissenschaften am 17/18 Februar
1994 in Bonn, ed. Rudolf Schieffer (Opladen, 1996), 109166; and by Philip Depreux, The
Development of Charters Confirming Exchanges by the Royal Administration (Eighth-
Tenth Centuries), in Charters and the Use of the Written Word in Medieval Society, ed. Karl
Heidecker (Turnhout, 2000), 4362. Also of considerable importance in this context is
Walter Goffart, Frankish Military Duty and the Fate of Roman Taxation, EME, 16 (2008),
166190, who demonstrates that Charlemagne and his successors maintained detailed
records of the mansus holdings, not only of the church but also of laymen down to the level
of paupares, for the purpose of both military recruitment and taxation. He adds that this
system shows a fundamental continuity with the administration of the later Roman
Empire. Cf. tienne Renaud, La politique militaire de Charlemagne et la paysannerie
franque, Francia, 36 (2009), 133, who seems somewhat confused by Goffarts argument.
Of course, there will always be dead-enders, who ignore the state of the question and
continue to purvey the view, developed in the wake of World War II, that the Carolingian
government, both centrally and in the provinces, was a chimera. For an extreme view, see,
for example, Hans J. Hummer, Politics and Power in Early Medieval Europe: Alsace amd the
Frankish Realim, 6001000 (Cambridge, 2005), p. 8, who asserts: Finally, because a central
bureaucracy did not exist in the early medieval period any investigation of political order
needs to be approached from the local context.
62See, with regard to local government, Werner, Missus-Marchio-Comes, pp. 191239,
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 137213; and Mersiowsky, Regierungspraxis, pp. 109166.
For background purposes regarding local administration, see several studies by Alexander
C. Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure; Studies in Law and Society in Antiquity and the Early
Middle Ages (Toronto, 1983); idem, From Roman to Frankish Gaul: Centenarii and
Centenae in the Administration of the Merovingian Kingdom, Traditio 44 (1988), 60100;
and idem, The position of the grafio in the constitutional history of Merovingian Gaul,
Speculum 64 (1986), 787805.
63The basic study remains Rosamond McKitterick, The Carolingians and the
Written Word (Cambridge, 1989). The efforts to undermine McKittericks views by Michael
Richter, quisquis scit scirbere, nullum potat abere labore. Zur Laienschriftlichkeit im 8.
Jahrhundert, in Karl Martel in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter
introduction19
This Carolingian bureaucracy, both centrally and locally, was made pos-
sible by the availability of numerous clerks who passed through a system
of education which had become increasingly better organized throughout
the second half of the 8th century.64 The government and the church
dedicated substantial assets to preparing students, both those destined
to remain laymen as well as future ecclesiastics, to attain the level of
practical literacy that was required to maintain effective bureaucratic
operations.65 In addition, education in arithmetic, which was required to
maintain various types of quantitative records, was the norm.66 In some
(Sigmaringen, 1994), 393404, have found little support. In regard to the subject in general,
Michael Richter, Oral Tradition in the Early Middle Ages (Turnhout, 1994), tends, on bal-
ance, to be misleading. See also Johannes Fried, Die Schleier der Erinnerung: Grundzge
einer historischen Memorik (Munich, 2004), who believes that there was very little govern-
ment, and that what government there was operated in the context of an oral society in
which flawed human memory cannot be relied upon to provide accurate information.
Since Fried does not prove that early government was based upon orality rather than writ-
ten documents, his arguments can carry little weight in this context.
Obviously, a companion volume to Richters work (loc. cit.) would be useful, so that in
regard to administration, the relation between writing and orality could be examined in
detail and without polemic. Such a volume could expand, especially in methodological
terms, upon the important study by McKitterick, The Written Word, pp. 89112; and also
take into consideration many of the observations by Matthew Innis, Memory, Orality and
Literacy in an Early Medieval Society, Past & Present, 158 (1998), 336.
64Regarding the earlier 8th century, see Pierre Rich, Le renouveau cultural la cour
de Pepin III, Francia 2 1974), 5970; and McKitterick, The Carolingians, p. 220, n. 33. In LHF,
ch. 39, Charles Martel is described as virum elegantem, egregium atque utilem. Paul
Fouracre and Richard A. Gerberding, Late Merovingian France: History and Hagiography,
640720 (Manchester-New York, 1996), p. 93, translate this phrase to indicate that Charles
was a warrior who was uncommonly well educated and effective in battle. This transla-
tion is the same as Richard A. Gerberding, The Rise of The Carolingians and the Liber
Historiae Francorum (Oxford, 1987), p. 179. However, Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel,
p. 40, n. 19, has doubts regarding the translation of elegans as very well educated and
ponders whether perhaps it should mean handsome. In my opinion, the original transla-
tion by Gerberding is to be preferred, as it fits better with what may be considered acquired
characteristics rather than natural ones, e.g. beauty. I would suggest, however, that vir
might be translated more accurately as man or perhaps a man of courage rather than
warrior. Indeed, when the word vir is used in a military context in the kinds of sources to
which the author of the LHF had access, it means a common foot soldier. The phrase egre-
gium atque utilem provides no basis for putting the word battle into the translation.
Rather egregius suggests distinguished or admirable or perhaps even outstanding,
while the word utilis should not stray too far from its basic meaning of useful, although
effective (perhaps in war) also may be appropriate here.
65In addition to McKitterick, The Carolingians; see eadem, Introduction, in The Uses
of Literacy in Early Medieval Europe, ed. Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge, 1990), 110;
and in the same volume, Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296. See also McKitterick, The Written
Word, p. 99, who makes clear, Quite simply, it was much easier for [a Latin speaking]
Frank to become literate than we have imagined hitherto.
66There were two types of basic education in regard to numeracy. First, and by far
the most popular, was that used in everyday life by virtually everyone from farmers who
20 introduction
situations, young men with the necessary aptitude were provided the
opportunity to learn higher forms of mathematics, i.e. beyond what was
commonly taught as part of the quadrivium.67
As evidenced, for example, by a careful reading of De ordine palatii,
written by Adalhard of Corbie, Charlemagnes cousin, it is clear that the
central administration continued to develop and become more complex
after King Pippins death in 768.68 A pattern of very frequent interactions
between the central government and administration at the local level is
illustrated by numerous surviving texts and references both to oral com-
munications of an administrative nature as well as to documents that are
no longer extant.69 With regard to such written communications, it is a
calculated the quantities of seed they planted, the bushels of grain they harvested, and the
percentage of their crops that they owed to their domini, to shepard boys who counted
their sheep, to those who bought and sold in the markets and used the current systems of
weights and measures mandated by Charlemagne. Much of this education was not formal,
but was based upon the finger calculus. See Alfldi-Rosenbaum, The Finger Calculus,
pp. 19. Secondly, there was formal school education focused on the quadrivium, as
discussed above; see, e.g. Contreni, Education and Learning, pp. 925; and idem,
The Pursuit of Knowledge, pp. 106141. Nelson, Literacy, p. 273, argues that there not
only was fairly widespread literacy but also widespread basic numeracy.
67With regard to higher mathematics, the very important studies in Karl der Grosse und
sein Nachwirken 1200 Jahre Kultur und Wissenschaft in Europe, ed. Paul L Butzer et al., 2 vols.
(Turnhout, 1997), especially Wesley M. Stevens, Astronomy in Carolingian Schools, I,
411487; and David Singmaster, The History of some of Alcuins Propositiones, II, 1199;
Paul L. Butzer and Karl W. Butzer, Mathematics at Charlemagnes Court and Its
Transmission, in Court Culture in the Early Middle Ages: The Proceedings of the First Alcuin
Conference, ed. Catherine Cubitt (Turnhout, 2003), 7689; Menso Folkerts, Die lteste math
ematische Aufgabensammlung in lateinische Sprache. Die Alkuin zugeschriebenen Propo
sitiones ad Acuendos Iuvenes (Vienna, 1978); and idem. and Helmuth Gericke, Die Alkuin
zugeschriebenen Propositiones ad Acuendos Juvenes (Aufgabe zur Schrfung des Geistes
der Jugend), in Science in Western and Eastern Civilization in Carolingian Times, ed. Paul
L.Butzer and Dietrich Lohrmann (Basel, 1993), 283362.
68Among those scholars who sought to undermine the effectiveness and complexity of
Charlemagnes rule, it was once argued that De ordine palatii had been forged by
Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims (d. 882). However, the modern consensus makes clear that
the original work was, in fact, written by Adalhard, and was a description of Charlemagnes
government, likely for the use of his son as king in Italy. See, for example, Brigitte Kasten,
Adalhard von Corbie (Dsseldorf, 1986), 7284; P. Depreux, Prosopographie de lentourage de
Louis le Pieux (781840), Instrumenta I (Sigmaringen, 1997), 7679; Janet L. Nelson, Aachen
as a place of power, in Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Mayke de Jong
and Frans Theuws with Carine van Rhijn (Leiden-Boston, 2001), 226232; eadem, Was
Charlemagnes Court a Courtly Society?, in Court Culture in the Early Middle Ages: The
Proceedings of the First Alcuin Conference, ed. Catherine Cubitt (Turnhout, 2003), 41; and
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 142157, and 271. For a detailed review of the historiography
dealing with the problems of Adalhards original authorship, see Bernard S. Bachrach,
Adalhards De ordine palatii: Some methodological observations regarding Chapters
2936, Cithara, 39 (2001), 336.
69See McKitterick, Charlemagne, 1422, for an excellent synthesis of this heretofore
neglected topic.
introduction21
happy accident that any administrative records have survived for more
than 1,200 years in light, generally, of their severely time-conditioned
nature and the intrinsic value of the parchment upon which they were
written. The ink normally was scraped from no longer useful documents
and the parchment was reused.70
Communications
At the technical level, Charlemagnes ability to communicate his will rap-

idly throughout the 700,000 or so square kilometers of the regnum
Francorum depended on the tractoria. Like many important institutions
of the Frankish kingdom, the tractoria, which takes its name from the doc-
uments used by royal messengers to requisition supplies and horses
needed while on the road, was an imperial survival, in this case the sur-
vival of the cursus publicus.71 In this system of rapid overland communica-
tions, trained messengers were capable, under best-case conditions, of
moving information on horseback in relays throughout Charlemagnes
kingdom at a speed which would enable important government orders
and other communications to travel between 300330 kilometers in a
24-hour period.72 This pace for the optimal transmission of information is
70For a particularly interesting case discussed with ample background, see Mark
Mersiowsky, Preserved by destruction. Carolingian original letters and Clm 6333, in Early
Medieval palimpsests, ed. G. Leclercq (Turnhout, 2007), 7398. It is important to note that
when communications were thought to be worth preserving, e.g. Codex epistolaris carolina,
40 years worth of letters were maintained in the royal archives. See the discussion by
McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 38. In addition, a file of letters from the Byzantine emperors
to the Frankish court also was preserved in the royal archives. These, however, now have
been lost, as noted by Janet Nelson, The Setting of Gift in the reign of Charlemagne, in The
Languages of Gift in the early Middle Ages, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (Cambridge,
2010), 137, n. 65.
71F.L. Ganshof, La Tractoria: Contribution ltude des origines du droit de gte,
Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis 8 (1928), 6991; Carlrichard Brhl, Fodrum, gistum, servi
tium regis: Studien zu den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Knigtums im Frankenreich und
in den frnkischen Nachfolgestaaten Deutschland, Frankreich, und Italien vom 6 bis zur Mitte
des 14 Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1968), I, 6567; and Franz Staab, Untersuchungen zur
Gesellschaft am Mittelrhein in der Karolingerzeit (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 32106.
Some scholars argue for the superiority of the Byzantine infrastructure during the 8th
and 9th centuries. See, for example, Renaud, La politique militaire, p. 5. However, Walter
Kaegi, Byzantine Logistics: Problems and Perspectives, in Feeding Mars: Logistics in
Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, CO, 1993), p. 44, points
out that the cursus publicus broke down in the Byzantine empire sometime in the
7th century.
72Regarding the riders of the cursus publicus, see A.M. Ramsey, The Speed of
the Roman Imperial Post, Journal of Roman Studies, 15 (1925), 6074; and for modern
22 introduction
consistent with that of other societies, e.g. the Roman imperial govern-
ment and a post system maintained by the Mongols. The latter is believed
to have been able to average 375 kilometers per 24-hour period.73
The tractoria was made possible by two related efforts undertaken by
the Carolingian government. First and foremost, the Carolingians main-
tained the Roman road system throughout Gaul by overseeing the imple-
mentation of Codex Theodosianus XV.3.6. This edict, in fact, placed the
burden for road repair on the landowners of the region through which the
road passed. These men were subject to government oversight. In
Charlemagnes documents, this law, On the repairing of the roads and
bridges enacted by Theodosius I (d. 395), is characterized as an antiqua
consuetudo, which was a traditional way in which the Carolingians referred
to Roman legislation that was actively in use.74 Secondly, as charter evi-
dence makes clear, the government saw to the maintenance of mansiones,
mutationes, and other infrastructural components of the cursus publicus,
often termed tabernae. Riders and horses were based at these installations
in order to maintain the effectiveness of the tractoria.75
acceptance of these speeds for a courier service, see Norbert Ohler, Reisen im Mittelalter
(Munich, 1986), p. 138.
73Ohler, Reisen im Mittelalter, p. 138.
74Concerning the preservation of the roads and the organization of road work to carry
this out, see Jean Hubert, Les routes du moyen ge, in Les Routes de France, depuis les
origines jusqu nos jours (Paris, 1979), 2556; Majorie Nice Boyer, Medieval French Bridges,
A History (Cambridge, MA, 1976), pp. 1327; Ganshof, La Tractoria, 6991; Brhl, Fodrum,
Gistum, Servitium Regis, I, 6567; Michel Rouche, Lhritage de la voierie antique dans la
Gaule du haut Moyen Ages (Ve-XI sicle), in Lhomme et la route en Europe occidentale au
Moyen Age et aux temps modernes. Centre culturel de Abbaye de Flaran: Deuximes
Journes internationales dhistoire. 2022 septembre 1980, Falaran, 2 (Auch, 1982), 1332;
and T. Szabo, Antikes Erbe und karolingisch-ottonische Verkehrspolitik, in Institutionen,
Kultur und Gessellschaft im Mittelalter: Festschrift fr. Festschrift Josef Fleckenstein, ed.
L. Fenske, Werner Rsener and Thomas Zotz (Sigmaringen, 1984), 125145. Notker of
St. Gaul (GK, I, 31) writing for the emperor Charles the Fat during the late 9th century,
emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining the roads by lauding Char
lemagnes well-known successful efforts in this regard.
N.b. it is widely agreed that the Anglo-Saxon trinoda necessitas was based upon this
same law. See Richard Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England
(Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1988), p. 53; Alan Cooper, The Rise and Fall of the Law of the Anglo-
Saxon Highway, HS 12 (2002), 44; and idem, Bridges, law and power in medieval England,
7001400 (Woodbridge, 2006).
75Regarding the infrastructure required to maintain the tractoria, see, for example, two
important studies regarding the southeast by Otto P. Clavadetscher: Verkehrsorganisation
in Rtien zur Karolingerzeit, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fr Geschichte, 5 (1955), 130; and
Churrtien im bergang von der Sptantike zum Mittelalter nach den Schriftquellen,
in Von der Sptantike zum frhen Mittelalter, ed. Joachim Werner and Eugen Ewig
(Sigmaringen, 1979), 159178; and Wilhelm Strmer, Zur Frage der Funktionen des kirchili-
chen Fernbesitzes im Gebiet der Ostalpen vom 8. bis zum 10, Jahrhundert, in Die
introduction23
In addition to overseeing the maintenance of the infrastructure that

was needed to support relays of couriers who were sent rapidly through-
out the realm, Charlemagne deployed high-ranking envoys, the missi
dominici, in a very effective manner throughout the regnum Francorum.
These missi were generally drawn from among the most important lay and
ecclesiastical magnates of Charlemagnes government; they usually
worked in pairs and numbered in the dozens.76 The missi, accompanied by
their staffs, delivered royal commands, usually on weighty matters, which
often had been incorporated into capitularies, to a wide variety of govern-
ment officials and high-ranking subjects. In most cases, these documents
likely were handed over directly by the missi to those for whom the orders
were intended. The recipients usually were selected from among the sev-
eral hundred counts established throughout the regnum Francorum. In
addition, some capitularies were distributed to relevant vassi dominici and
other fideles, both lay and ecclesiastical, who enjoyed various types of
immunities.77
The missi were instructed, as well, to see that these royal orders were
enforced, and to write reports regarding the effectiveness of their mission.
When the situation arose, they were empowered by the king, as indicated
in numerous capitularies, to act as judges to deal with those who were
charged with failing to obey royal commands.78 One of their ongoing mis-
sions was to make sure that Charlemagnes local officials, e.g. counts, did
not abuse their powers in such a way that their activities undermined the
interests of the royal government. This was of particular importance in
making sure that military forces were raised in an appropriate manner. On
Transalpinen Verbindungen der Bayern, Alemannen und Franken bis zum 10. Jahrhundert,
ed. Helmut Beumann and Werner Schrder (Sigmaringen, 1987), 383, 385393, 396401;
Heinrich Dannenbauer, Paraveredus-Pferd, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fr
Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung 51 (1954), 5573; Gundrun Schneider-
Schnekenburger, Churrtien im Frhmittelalter auf Grund der archologischen Funde,
Mnchner Beitrge zur Vor- und Frhgeschichte, 26 (1986), 111121, and plotted on Tafel 70;
and with regard to the Middle Rhine, Staab, Untersuchungen zur Gesellschaft, pp. 32106.
76The basic work on the institutional structure of the missi dominici remains Victor
Krause, Geschichte des Instituts der missi dominici, MIG, 2 (1890), 193300. Regarding
numbers of counts, vassi dominici, and royal fideles, see the estimates by Werner, Missus-
Marchio-Comes, pp. 191239.
77See, DK, no. 91, regarding Metz.
78For a useful and up-to-date survey with the relevant secondary literature concering
the missi, see McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 214216, 218, 222, 237, 244, 256258, 260266,
278, 298, 379. For a good example of the range of Charlemagnes authority and of the missi
dominici in carrying out his orders extended to the Holy Land, see Michael McCormick,
Charlemagnes Survey of the Holy Land: Wealth Personnel, and Buildings of a Mediterranean
Church between Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Washington, DC, 2011).
24 introduction
the whole, various documents make clear that these missions were, in fact,
executed successfully.79
Charlemagnes Capitularies
Some scholars once believed, and perhaps some still do believe, that
Charlemagnes capitularies, which often set out the kings orders in
substantial detail and generally were supposed to be delivered by the
missi dominici, were mere royal wish-lists.80 Traditionally, this argument
was made by those who espoused the unwarranted assumption that
Carolingian government was primitive and lacked a well-developed and
effectively functioning administrative infrastructure that was capable of
having its writ obeyed in the pagi on a regular basis. In this view of
the situation, the localities supposedly were dominated by over-mighty
magnates.81 Recently, a former adherent of this view radically altered his
position in conformity with recent research. He now characterizes the
wish-list argument as pessimistic.82
79Nelson, Charlemagne and the paradoxes of power, pp. 3738, discusses this point in
regard to Charlemagnes efforts to protect the lower echelons of society so as to preserve
their ability to go to war. See also Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5859.
80A useful analogy with this pessimistic view of early medieval government is provided
by Patrick Wormold, Lex Scriptus and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship,
from Euric to Cnut, in Early Medieval Kingship, ed. Peter Sawyer and I.N. Woods (Leeds,
1977), 105138, who argued that the barbarian law codes essentially were bits of royal
image building rather than working texts for use in courts. However, this view, at least with
regard to the Carolingians, has been shown to be without merit. See the discussion by Janet
Nelson, Rewriting the History of the Franks, History, 72 (1987), 6981; and reprinted in
eadem, The Frankish World, 750900 (London/Rio Grande, 1996), pp. 169181, at p. 173, for
the quotation with the scholarly literature cited there.
81See, for example, Matthew Innis, State and Society in the Early Middle Ages: The
Middle Rhine Valley, 4001000 (Cambridge, 2000); and idem, Kings, monks and patrons;
political identities and the abbey of Lorsch, in La royaut et les lites dans leurope caro
lingienne (dbut IXe sicle aux environs 920), ed. Rgine Le Jan (Villeneuve-dAscq, 1998),
301325, where his emphasis on the role of potentes in local affairs misleadingly over-
whelms a proper appreciation of the real power exercised by the central government at the
local level through its officials.
For a devastating review of Innis State and Society, see Alexander C. Murray, The
American Historical Review, 107 (2002), 921923. For a much kinder, though no less funda-
mental, critique of Innis views regarding aristocratic local power vs. royal power, see Airlie,
Towards a Carolingian Aristocracy, pp. 109127, who shows that the heroes of local auton-
omy touted by Innis were, in effect, agents of the central government. For example, Airlie
(loc. cit., p. 125), observes that men such as Chancor, as well as some lesser lights, reveal
the existence of, if not a Dienstadel, an aristocracy engaged in the routine business of ser-
vice to the central government. In fact, Airlie correctly claims that loyal service [to the
central government] is a component of aristocratic identity.
82For the quotation, see Matthew Innis, Charlemagnes government, in Charlemagne:
Empire and Society, ed. Johanna Story (Manchester, 2005), 78. Nelson, Opposition to
introduction25
There is now a consensus that the pessimists arguments are untenable

regarding the efficacy of Charlemagnes capitularies in having the royal
will enforced at the local level. This new consensus is based upon the now
widely accepted interpretation of the administrative complexity of the
Carolingian government, which was undergirded, in part, by the develop-
ment of a bureaucratic mentality embedded in an aristocracy that, by
and large, was in the service of the state.83 In addition, this new view has
resulted from recent research which demonstrates the effectiveness of
Charlemagnes authority.84 In particular, the careful study of surviving
capitulary manuscripts indicates the wide distribution of these docu-
ments and the enforcement of their provisions.85 In fact, some capitular-
ies have survived in as many as 40 copies.86
Charlemagnes Aristocracy
The pessimists also held, based upon the assumption that royal power was
weak, that Charlemagne found it necessary to formulate his policies, as
Charlemagne, p. 6, gradually has begun to espouse a more optimistic assessment which

she sees to have gained ground among scholars.
83Arlie, The Aristocracy, pp. 94111; and Michael Innis, Practices of Property in the
Carolingian Empire, in The Long Morning of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early
Medieval Studies, ed. Jennifer R. Davis and Michael McCormick (Aldershot, 2008), 246,
where he again diverges from his previously untenable earlier views on the power of the
local aristocracy as contrasted to the supposed weakness of the central government.
84Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, pp. 1820, makes the point, in general terms,
along with a discussion of the methods used by the royal government. See also Warren
Brown, Unjust Seizure, Conflict, Interest, and Authority in an Early Medieval Society (Ithaca,
NY, 2001), 134135, who provides a good example of how Charlemagne, through the use of
his missi dominici, dominated at the local level when it was relevant to his policies.
85Although the most complete general introduction to the capitularies remains
F.L. Ganshof, Recherches sur les Capitulaires (Paris, 1958), much work has been done since.
For this new general consensus regarding the change in the state of the question, see Innis,
Charlemagnes government, pp. 7880; and McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 233263.
Regarding the manuscripts, see several studies of importance by Hubert Mordek: Biblioteca
capitularium regum Francorum manuscripta: berlieferung und Traditionszusammenhang
der frnkische Herrschererlasse (Munich, 1995); idem, Recently discovered capitulary texts
belonging to the legislation of Louis the Pious, in Charlemagnes Heir. New Perspectives on
the Reign of Louis the Pious (814840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins (Oxford, 1990),
437453; idem, Zur Bedeutung des Frankfurter Kapitulars, in 794-Karl der Grosse in
Frankfurt am Main: Ein Knig bei der Arbeit, ed. Johannes Fried (Sigmaringen, 1994), 4650;
and idem, Kapitularien und Schriftlichkeit, in Schriftkultur und Reichsverwaltung und
Reichsverwaltung under den Karolingern. Referate des Kolloquiums der Nordrhein-
Westflischen Akademie der Wissenschaften am 17/18 Februar 1994 in Bonn, ed. Rudolf
Schieffer (Opladen, 1996), 3466. For additional works which elaborate this basic theme,
see Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach, Continuity of written administration in
the Late Carolngian East c. 887911, FS, 42 (2008), 109146, here at 111112, with the litera-
ture cited there.
86Mordek, Biblioteca, pp. 10811082.
26 introduction
represented in various capitularies, at assemblies where a consensus fide

lium by Frankish aristocrats was required in order to validate the kings
actions.87 As a result, it has been claimed that Charlemagne could do very
little without the agreement and the overt support of the potentes, who, it
is argued, had to be coaxed with suitable concessions.88 In short, some
scholars would seem to believe that Charlemagne was fundamentally
beholden to an over-mighty aristocracy, with whom supposedly he had to
treat rather than command. Charlemagnes supposed inability to have his
orders carried out at the local level, where the expeditionary elements of
the Carolingian army were mustered, is argued by some scholars to have
impinged massively on the effective mobilization of Carolingian military
forces and particularly of the kings ability to muster large armies.89
Such an extreme view of the power of the aristocracy founders for sev-
eral reasons. First, it assumes, contrary to the views of those who have
played the major role in the development of studies of the Reicharistokratie,
87This view is set out in a nuanced manner by Jrgen Hannig, CONSENSUS FIDELIUM.
Frhfeudale Interpretationen des Verhltnises von Knigtum und Adel am Beispiel des
Frankenreiches (Stuttgart, 1982), which is the classic statement of the fundamental impor-
tance of the nobles in this context. For additional work on the idea of consensus, see, for
example, Janet L. Nelson, Legislation and Consensus in the Reign of Charles the Bald, in
Ideal and Reality in Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Society, ed. Partick Wormald et al. (Oxford,
1983), 222227; and T.F.X. Noble, From Brigandage to Justice: Charlemagne 785794, in
Literacy, Politics, and Artistic Innovation in the Early Medieval West, ed. Celia Chazelle
(Lanham, MD, 1992), 5657. The earlier state of the question, in regard to Charlemagne,
saw these assemblies as merely consultative as noted by Ganshof, The Institutional
Framework, p. 88.
However, it is important to emphasize that even among those scholars who are (or were)
adherents of the notion of CONSENSUS FIDELIUM, there is no agreed upon modern view
of what constitutes consensus in terms of the balance between royal power and the
potentes. It has yet to be proven that the idea of consensus impinged on Charlemagnes
decision-making in exactly same way that it is supposed to have had an impact on the
decision-making of his grandson Charles the Bald, as developed by Nelson.
88See, for example, Becher, Charlemagne, p. 103, who asserts that Charlemagne had
to buy the loyalty of his magnates However, there is no evidence to support such a
broadly-based generalization, which, of course, does not mean that Charlemagne did not
reward those whom he regarded highly for their proven loyalty and efficient service.
89John France, The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne, Journal
of Medieval Military History, 1 (2002), 6182, here 6364, for the quotation. In this context,
France (p. 65, n. 12) recognizes his debt to Innis, State and Society, who, as noted above, has
significantly altered his earlier position, at least regarding the effectiveness of Charlemagnes
use of capitularies in order to make the royal will operative at the local level. Innis (loc. cit.
p. 258), prior to his conversion, makes one of the most misleading generalizations to be
found in recent literature, at least insofar as it concerns Charlemagnes military operations.
Innis writes: A horse-riding, weapon-carrying aristocracy enjoyed a monopoly on political
power at a local level even in periods of royal strength. This seems to be the misleading
model that France has accepted.
introduction27
i.e. the uppermost echelon among the potentes, that these magnates con-
ceptualized themselves as a unified group. Secondly, such an argument
assumes, also contrary to fact, that the aristocracy recognized its supposed
class interest as being manifested in support of policies that were aimed at
limiting Charlemagnes power to rule. Finally, it also assumes, yet again
contrary to fact, that the magnates acted in a unified manner against
Charlemagne and the interests of the central government according to
some supposed but undocumented agenda for the development of a
hypothetical aristocratic-centered state.90
In regard to evaluating arguments for supposed aristocratic unity ori-
ented in a hostile manner toward Charlemagne during his reign, it is far
more accurate to see the Reicharistokratie as a porous group with some
individuals entering the highest levels of society and other falling from
grace, largely as a result of Charlemagnes granting or withdrawing favor.91
In addition, there was conflict between and among members of the aris-
tocracy at all levels of society, not only among the Reicharistokratie, and
90It is generally believed by those who discuss the Reicharistokratie that its members
cooperated with the king, and, in its strongest form affirms that kings and nobles were
dependent upon each other. However, there is no scholarly consensus in regard to the
nature of the balance in this relationship, which obviously varied according to context.
This is the position of Gerd Tellenbach, Knigtum und Stmme in der Werdezeit des
Deutschen Reiches (Weimar, 1939), who discovered the Reicharistokratie, and identified
many of its leading members. Many more scholars have worked diligently to identify addi-
tional members of this group, to ascertain their origins, and to chart their political behav-
ior. A good example is Karl Ferdinand Werner, Bedeutende Adelsfamilien im Reich Karls
des Grossen. Ein personengeschichtlicher Beitrag zum Verhltnis von Knigtum und Adel
im frhen Mittelalter, in Karl der Grosse, I, 83142; translated as Important noble families
in the kingdom of Charlemagnea prosopographical study of the relationship between
king and nobility in the early middle Ages, in The Medieval Nobility, ed. and trans. Timothy
Reuter (Amsterdam, 1978), 137202, which, however, does not include Werners appendices
on pp. 137142 of the original.
Karl Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen im Karolingerreich (Vienna-Cologne-Graz, 1979),
pp. 812, argues for the importance of identity politics based upon a so-called Traditionskern
that supposedly was remembered by these families. Nevertheless, Brunner makes clear
that the aristocracy was never united against Charlemagne, although sometimes one or
another aristocratic individual or even a small group of such men were highly dissatisfied.
This point is reiterated by Airlie, Towards a Carolingian Aristocracy, who observes (p. 109),
opposition is only opposition on the part of individuals or of groups, it does not involve
the aristocracy as a whole Timothy Reuter, Introduction, in The Medieval Nobility, ed.
and trans. Timothy Reuter (Amsterdam, 1978), 23, makes clear that according to the schol-
arly consensus as of the early 1970s, it was no longer tenable to assume that the relations
between the nobility and the king were necessarily hostile.
91For a useful survey, see Stuart Arlie, The Aristocracy, NCMH, II, 431450; and Thomas
F.X. Noble, Secular sanctity: forging an ethos for the Carolingian nobility, Lay Intellectuals
in the Carolingian World, ed. Patrick Wormald and Janet L. Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 836,
at 22, who focuses on the changeability and fragility of aristocratic status.
28 introduction
this was the case both within more or less closely related kin groups and
among men who were not related to each other in a significant manner.92
Finally, it has been shown that Charlemagne required the aristocracy
at all levels to do his bidding, even to the point of enforcing the reorgani-
zation of their estates according to a model imposed by the central
government.93
In practical terms, those individuals who were members of the high
aristocracy not only recognized their need to win royal favor and patron-
age in order to thrive, but competed with their fellow potentes for
Charlemagnes preferment. This process by which the Carolingians began
their efforts to bring the aristocracy under their control has been shown to
have been begun during the reigns of Charles Martel and Pippin, i.e. long
before Charlemagne came to power and, indeed, even before his father
became king.94 As a result, the potentes understood, certainly by the reign
of Charlemagne if not earlier, the importance of Knigsnhe, i.e. closeness
to the king, and strove to attain it. Knigsnhe, they understood, was
essential in order for them to advance their interests or to maintain the
high positions that they had inherited or had won for themselves by
Charlemagnes grace.95
Karl Ferdinand Werner goes so far as to aver that the magnates of the
Frankish kingdom, or at least those potentes who were successful during
Charlemagnes reign, were molded into a service aristocracy, or Dienstadel,
which was almost totally integrated into the government as office-
holders.96 These sentiments echo the views of Charlemagnes cousin,
Adalhard of Corbie, when he observed that in each man there burned very
ardently a spirit for royal service. Hincmar in presenting a version of
92See, for example, Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 4095.

93Christoph Sonnlechner, The Establishment of New Units of Production in
Carolingian Times: Making Early Medieval Sources Relevant for Environmental History,
Viator 35 (2004), 2148, with special attention to Bavaria and Provence.
94Airlie, Towards a Carolingian Aristocracy, p. 9, for this particular point; and idem,
The Aristocracy, pp. 431450, more generally.
95The point is well made by Noble, Secular sanctity, p. 23, summarizing a broadly-
based consensus among scholars. Stuart Airlie, Semper Fideles? Loyaut envers les caro-
lingiens comme constituant de lidentit aristocratie, in La royaut et les lites dans
lEurope carolingienne (dbut IXe sicle aux environs de 920), ed. R. Le Jan, Stphane Lebecq,
and Bruno Judic (Villeneuve-dAscq, 1998), 130143, recognizes that the aristocracy was co-
opted by Charlemagne.
96Naissance de la Noblesse, lessor des lites politiques en Europe, 2nd ed. rev. and cor.
(Paris, 1998), 290328. Cf. Airlie, The aristocracy, pp. 93111, at p. 96, who finds himself
unable to agree fully with Werners views, although, loc. cit., 111, he is willing to see the
Carolingian state as a strong state.
introduction29
Adalhards De ordine palatii to Charles the Balds son and successor,

Carloman, left his predecessors observations regarding ad regale obse-
quium inflammatus animus ardentius unedited.97 As a result of this com-
petition to serve Charlemagne, it was necessary for the members of the
aristocracy who sought to succeed and have their families prosper to be
team players as emphasized by Stuart Airlie.98 Part of that success, of
course, was the receipt by loyal supporters from an appreciative ruler
of binignitas, sollicitudo, and consolatio.99
With particular regard to the consensus fidelium as a supposed constitu-
tional requirement for the validation, and therefore execution, of royal
orders, it has now been shown, by and large, that the great mass of the
aristocracy, as a group, was not involved in the formulation of Charlemagnes
capitularies. The overwhelming majority of these documents, through
which the king transmitted the orders of the central government to local
officials and to the potentes of the realm, were formulated at the court and
not at assemblies held in the spring that were attended by large numbers
of magnates. In fact, capitularies were drawn up, in general, without the
input either of large numbers of lay and/or ecclesiastical magnates of the
regnum, much less in consonance with some supposed constitutional
requirement that these men provide broadly based agreement or even
counsel to Charlemagne in regard to military plans.100 In fact, detailed
recent analysis makes clear that only comparatively few capitularies, i.e.
below 4 per cent, were issued by Charlemagne in connection with a large
assembly in the spring.101
It is important to emphasize as well that the great spring assembly, to
which, in fact, Charlemagne frequently summoned large numbers of mag-
nates, generally took place in the context of the mobilization of the royal
army for forthcoming military operations. Consequently, the aristocracy,
including high government officials who were employed at the local level,
such as counts, as well as bishops, abbots, and distinguished laymen, had
97De ordine palatii, ed. Gross and Schieffer, cap. V (cap. 27), p. 80, lines 438446. Here I
follow Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 32.
98Semper Fideles? pp. 130143; idem, Charlemagne and the aristocracy: captains and
kings, in Charlemagne: Empire and Society, ed. Johanna Story (Manchester, 2005), 90102
(p. 102 for the quotation), provides a generally accurate picture.
99See Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 32.
100For the status questionis, see the detailed researches of Christiana Pssel, Authors
and recipients of Carolingian capitularies, 779829, in Texts and Identities in the Early
Middle Ages, ed. R. Corradini, R. Meens, C. Pssel, and P. Shaw (Vienna, 2906), 253274; and
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 229230.
101This point is emphasized by McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 230.
30 introduction
little opportunity during such a gathering in the spring to influence

what was going to happen during the campaigning season.102 In fact, only
those potentes who had been summoned to the royal court the previous
winter for the small assembly were in a position to have provided either
information or opinions regarding the nature of military operations and
related measures that were to be undertaken in the wake of the spring
assembly.103
Royal plans for each seasons campaigns and other matters of mili-
tary importance were, of necessity, made during the winter by the
Magistratus.104 Later these initial plans were discussed by a small gather-
ing of important men, and were given final approval by Charlemagne. This
latter group generally was composed of potentes with special knowledge,
who were summoned by Charlemagne to provide particular information
and advice.105 As a result of the rhythm of Carolingian military planning,
all relevant decisions for each years offensive campaigns were made sev-
eral months before the spring assembly, which met at the time of the
mobilization. These plans established where the king would campaign,
102In this context, it is also evident, as shown by Pssel, Authors and recipients,
pp. 253274, that what had once been considered to be the clear meaning of consensus
fidelium in legal terms can no longer be sustained.
103Concerning the two assemblies and especially the large spring assembly in regard to
its meeting at the location where the army was mobilized, see N.D. Fustel de Coulanges,
Histoire des institutions politiques de lancienne France, 7 vols. (Paris, 18761892), 7, 341412;
Erich Seyfarth, Frnkische Reichsversammlungen unter Karl dem Grossen und Ludwig dem
Frommen (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 410; and Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne and the
General Staff, The Journal of Military History, 66 (2002), 313357.
104Robert-Henri Bautier, La campagne de Charlemagne en Espagne (778), Bulletin de
la Socit des Sciences, Lettres et Arts de Bayonne, 135 (1979), 30, considers the planning
group that advised Charlemagne the tat-major of the royal army.
105It was at the earlier meeting of the two above-mentioned gatherings that a group
of men to whom Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. 30 (line 480) refers as senior advisers
and specialists, seniores et praecipui consiliarii gathered to plan operations for
the forthcoming campaigning season. See the discussion by Bachrach, Charlemagne
and the General Staff, pp. 318319; and cf. Seyfarth, Frnkische Reichsversammlungen,
pp. 8187, who treats the planning meeting under discussion here as a Kleine Opti
matenversammlungen; this lacks the specificity provided by Adalhard.
Stuart Arlie, Talking Heads: Assemblies in Early Medieval Germany, in Political
Assemblies in the Early Middle Ages, ed. P.S. Barnwell and Marco Mostert (Turnhout, 2003),
2846, does not discuss military planning in relation to Charlemagne, which perhaps is too
obvious a point insofar as the winter meeting set the stage for what was to happen in the
spring. Timothy Reuter, Assembly politics in western Europe from the eighth century to
the twelfth, in The Medieval World, ed. Peter Linehan and Janet L. Nelson (London, 2001),
432450; and reprinted in idem, Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet L.
Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 193216, at 204, also does not distinguish between Charlemagnes
winter and spring assemblies in regard to military planning.
introduction31
what quantities and what kinds of fighting men were needed, e.g. foot sol-
diers, engineers to build and operate siege machines, and mounted troops,
and in what proportions they would be summoned. Further, it was decided
in the winter meeting from which pagi these troops would be mobilized.
Finally, arrangements for logistical support from various sources were, of
necessity, made well in advance of the final muster in the spring.106
All of these plans, in terms both of overall campaign strategy and spe-
cific detail, that were developed by the Magistratus and approved by
Charlemagne with input from his close advisers at the winter meeting
were to be kept secret. Information was to be disseminated on a need to
know basis, and Adalhard, in describing the planning process, emphasizes
the problems that could arise if information that was supposed to be kept
secret were leaked and became available to adversaries of the royal gov-
ernment.107 Only basic information was disseminated to all relevant par-
ties, i.e. where and when the general mobilization was to be held. In a
more qualified sense, each count or other responsible government official
or immunist was told what quantities and what kinds of fighting men
he was to provide. Finally, all those who were required to provide logisti-
cal support were informed what quantities of food and drink were to
be made available. However, when proper procedure was followed, only
Charlemagne, a few chosen advisers, and the planners at the royal court
were in possession of the entire plan.
These new findings regarding where the capitularies were formulated
and the long-understood primacy of the winter meeting for military plan-
ning should not be taken to suggest that Charlemagne did not rely upon
magnates from throughout his regnum to play important roles in the gov-
ernance of the kingdom at all levels and including in regard to military
matters. Charlemagne called upon high aristocrats and lesser potentes to
serve as missi dominici, bishops, abbots, dukes, counts, and military com-
manders to whom he delegated various types of authority. However,
Charlemagne did not engage in what has been called power sharing.108
Rather, in light of Charlemagnes ability to enforce his will, it is perhaps
106Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 202206; and McKitterick, Charlemagne,

p. 271, who refers to Charlemagnes meticulous strategic planning, which obviously could
not have been undertaken at the assembly where the final mobilization for the campaign
was being held. Regarding the timing of military operations, see Bachrach, Charlemagne
and the General Staff, pp. 318319.
107See Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 318319.
108Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 36, suggests that in the
Carolingian world, control in practice meant power-sharing.
32 introduction
more helpful to characterize this process as one of delegating authority

rather than sharing power.109 Men vied vigorously for the privilege of serv-
ing in the government by demonstrating their faithfulness to Charlemagne
and their fitness to do what was to be required of them.110
Contrary to what some scholars have suggested, it must be emphasized
that Charlemagne and even members of the highest echelon among aris-
tocrats, some of whom not only were his relatives but, in fact, rather close
relatives, e.g. his cousin Tassilo of Bavaria, were in no sense equals.111 This
view of Charlemagnes superiority was the case despite the fact that he
may have been considered in some circles within the Frankish kingdom to
have been illegitimate. In addition, it is thought by some scholars that
since the Carolingian royal family had obtained the kingship only very
recently, i.e. in 751, under circumstances that some might be considered
suspect, i.e. in light of the long-term legitimacy of the Merovingian dynasty,
it was in constant peril of losing its position.112
Charlemagnes relationship with the aristocracy, however, definitely
was not one of primus inter pares.113 In fact, it is perhaps of some interest
that Suetonius, who provided much of the model for Einhards Vita Karoli,
lent his voice to the myth encouraged by Augustus that he was primus
inter pares. By contrast, Charlemagnes biographer and, one might specu-
late, the Great Charles himself, would have none of that particular type
109Cf. Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 36, who recognizes, appar-
ently somewhat reluctantly, that Carolingian authors had some affinity for hierarchy.
110See Arlie, The Aristocracy, pp. 93111. In this context, Innis, State and Society, p. 185,
claims that Charlemagne was not trying to force the local aristocracy to its knees, but to
make local power-holders more answerable to the centre. However, in the middle Rhine
region, Charlemagne, indeed, forced the local aristocracy to its knees, as illustrated by the
case of Chancor discussed above. The question was what did these men, or at least those
who were to prosper, have to do in order for Charlemagne to let them up off their knees?
111Recently, some scholars have given great attention to the fact that Tassilo and
Charlemagne were cousins. See, for example, Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, pp. 139
140. However, there is no evidence, even in the Bavarian sources, for claims (p. 198), that
Tassilo sought the replacement of the upstart Carolingian dynasty with his own.
112See, for example, Collins, Frankish Past and Carolingian Present, pp. 301302, who
rehearses several of the arguments regarding various aspects of the situation that have
been identified by modern scholars in regard to the illegitimate nature of both
Charlemagnes birth and the fragility of Carolingian rule in light of its assumption or usur-
pation of the kingship.
113See Janet Nelson, Peers in the early Middle Ages, in Law, laity and solidarities: Essays
in Honor of Susan Reynolds, ed. Pauline Stafford, Janet L. Nelson, and Jane Martindale
(Manchester-New York, 2001), 2746, 28 for the quotation. Here Nelson reflects the consen-
sus as noted by Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 9001300,
2nd ed. (Oxford, 1997), pp. xlvii, 258259.
introduction33
of propaganda.114 Late imperial distance between the ruler and his sub-
jects, in general, was the rule in formal contexts. Carolingian dedication to
imitatio imperii would seem to have required those who approached the
king in a formal context, and perhaps at other times as well, to prostrate
themselves at the monarchs feet in a rite that appears to resemble the
proskynesis ceremony that had been an important part of late Roman
imperial ritual.115
In order to attain office as a high ranking lay or ecclesiastical function-
ary, one had to be appointed by Charlemagne. Such men, even those in the
clerical hierarchy, served at the kings pleasure and were not inclined to
oppose him even in an indirect fashion, much less in a face-to-face con-
frontation in situations where the royal will was at issue.116 Similarly, those
potentes who were not honored with high office, by and large, also main-
tained their wealth and status at the kings pleasure.117 The capacity of
Charlemagne to control the preferment of aristocrats and just about any-
body else, when he thought it necessary, should not be considered some
sort of constitutional prerogative.118 Rather, these actions are to be seen as
the means by which Charlemagne carried out the business of government
in a regular manner.
114Informally, Charlemagnes style was one of comraderie, which enabled him to take
advantage both of his personal charisma and the desire of people to please him. See
Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, pp. 4748; and Bachrach, Adalhard of
Corbies De ordine palatii, pp. 2021.
115See, for example, Hermoldus, IHL, lines 173, 213, 582, 684, 1234; Ad Pippinum Regem, I,
line 57 (p. 206); Astro. VH, ch. 29; and Thegan, Gesta, ch. 55. It also would appear to have
been a ceremony used by the Carolingians into the early 10th century, or so Dudo of
St. Quentin (De Moribus, bk. 2, ch. 169), would like his readers to believe.
116Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, pp. 109, 129130; and Susan Wood, The proprie
tary church in the medieval West (Oxford, 2006), 215221.
117Nelson, Literacy, p. 278, calls attention to confiscations of land from lay magnates
by the royal government, and finds it remarkable that Charles the Bald, whom most schol-
ars believe was neither as effective nor as powerful as Charlemagne, not only confiscated
lands but also had inventories made of these acquisitions. In this context, it is certainly
worth noting the advice that Lupus of Ferrires gave to Charles the Bald when the latter
complained to the abbot that some potentes were causing trouble. The abbot of Fleury
emphasized (Epist., ed. Levillain, no. 31, p. 144) to his king, that you have nothing to fear
from these men since just as you have made these potentes you can unmake them: Ne
metuatis potentes, quos ipsi fecistis et quos, cum vultis, extenuare potestis.
118Cf. Airlie, The Aristocracy, p. 110, who calls attention to the remarks of a Bavarian
count, Orendil, as the latter seemingly expressed the hope that one of his sons would gain
the office of count. But, as Airlie continues, the count recognized that a son would have to
prove himself worthy of the office. With regard to the dynamics of aristocratic efforts to
obtain preferment, see Rgine le Jan, Famille et pouvoir dans le monde franc (VIIe-Xe sicle).
Essai danthropologie sociale (Paris, 1998), 122135.
34 introduction
When, however, Charlemagne sought to impose what some modern

observers may wish to consider a constitutional structure on his sub-
jects, he did so by edict. For example, following a Roman imperial prece-
dent, which had been used by the Merovingians and perhaps also followed
by King Pippin I, Charlemagne required everyone, not only the potentes
but even the servi who were members of a magnates military household,
to swear an oath of faithfulness to him. This oath was to be taken in the
name of Caesar, nomen Caesaris.119 It is important to make clear that in
so many areas, including the imposition of oaths universally throughout
the lands of his regnum, imitatio imperii was an aspect of Charlemagnes
rule that he cultivated with great care.120
For anyone, even members of the highest aristocracy, to obtain prefer-
ment, it was vital not only to have Charlemagnes trust, but it was neces-
sary also to obtain the proper training. Youthful members of the aristocracy,
and, indeed, young men of lesser status, were put into schools. Among
these centers of education, those institutions that either were at the royal
court or connected to it were especially important in terms of advance-
ment to high government or ecclesiastical office. In these schools, the
young men at issue were advanced beyond the practical literacy and
119Ganshof, Charlemagnes use of the oath, pp. 111124, provides an excellent descrip-
tion of the use of the oath in the Frankish kingdom and the means by which it was admin-
istered, as well as its background. However, Ganshofs observation (p. 111), The oath, as we
know it, was one of the remedies Charlemagne employed to make up for the deficiencies
in the organisation of his realms is not sustainable, in light of the state of the question
regarding the effectiveness of the Carolingian bureaucracy. Indeed, Ganshofs own discus-
sion of the record-keeping involved in the administration of these oaths undermines his
own position concerning the weakness of the administration. Becher, Eid und Herrschaft,
also sees the oath as evidence for Charlemagnes weak position insofar as the Franks sup-
posedly had not developed a strong sense of the importance of royal authority or lordship.
As with Ganshof earlier, Becher does not appreciate either the strength of the Carolingian
bureaucracy or Charlemagnes power over the aristocracy. Contrary to the status questio
nis,Becher believes that Charlemagne had to buy the support of the aristocracy. By and
large, Becher can be counted among the pessimists discussed above. Campbell, The
Emperor, pp. 2032, provides a brief but very effective treatment of both the general and
the military oaths taken by Roman soldiers prior to Christianization and after.
120Regarding Charlemagnes avid interest in imitatio imperii, see, for example, Michael
McCormick, Eternal Victory: Triumphal rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium and the Early
Medieval West (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 358365, 375381. Also of considerable importance in
this context was the cultivation of various aspects of Roman law. See the brief but valuable
discussion by Janet Nelson, Translating Images of Authority: The Christian Roman
Emperors in the Carolingian World, in Images of Authority: Papers Presented to Joyce
Reynolds on the Occasion of her 70th Birthday, ed. M.M. Mackenzie and Charlotte Rouech
(Cambridge, 1989), 194202; and reprinted in eadem, The Frankish World, 750900 (London-
Rio Grande, 1996), pp. 8998; and eadem, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 45.
introduction35
numeracy they generally obtained at home and were introduced to the

study of the trivium and quadrivium.121
For some students, there was the opportunity to go on to even more
advanced study. Those who sought secular preferment were, in addition to
the tuition of magistri experienced in military matters, given the opportu-
nity to learn various aspects of leadership, strategy, and tactics. The ideas
found in Roman histories and military handbooks such as Vegetius De re
Militari and Frontinus Strategemata were made available from widely
available texts which could be accessed while these young men also
undertook arduous combat training.122 Alcuin, who knew these texts well,
points out in a letter that when he taught at Tours, he emphasized that he
was carrying out Charlemagnes orders to provide ancient learning to his
lay students. He contrasted this to teaching the sweet honey of holy scrip-
tures to future clerics.123 With regard to able young men who were marked
out for future clerical advancement, many of the best of these were pro-
moted to the royal chapel, where they were given the opportunity to prove
themselves to Charlemagne. As a result, the royal chapel over time came
to provide men whom Charlemagne made bishops and abbots.124
An anecdote recorded by Notker of St. Gall in his Gesta Karoli catches
the flavor of the situation that faced the young aristocrats who needed a
good education and also to show that they were working diligently in
order to win Charlemagnes approval for further advancement. Notker
quotes from a presumed tongue lashing that Charlemagne inflicted on a
group of these aristocratic young men who were reported not to have kept
up with their studies: Know without any doubt that unless you very
quickly make up for your time-wasting by a vigorous effort, you will never
receive any preferment from Charlemagne.125 In addition, Notker makes
121For general background, see Contreni, The Carolingian Renaissance, pp. 6667;
and Zerner, Enfants, pp. 371373, who discusses schools in rural villages belonging to the
monastery of St. Vincent of Marseilles, where priests were in charge of the education of
local children.
122Concerning the training of young aristocrats for future careers as military leaders,
see Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, p. 91, who traces this tradition to the court of
Constantine the Great; and Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 7175, with the litera-
ture cited there. Cf. M.M. Hildebrandt, The External School in Carolingian Society (Education
& Society in the Middle Ages & Renaissance) 1 (Leiden, 1992), who works diligently though
unsuccessfully to support the notion of a fundamentally uneducated lay aristocracy. See
the review by Bernard S. Bachrach in History of Education Quarterly, 33 (1993), 99101.
123Epist., no. 121.
124Josef Fleckenstein, Die Hofkappelle der deutschen Knige, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1959,
1966), 1, Grundlegung: die karolingische Hofkapelle.
125GK, I, 3. Regarding Notkers account, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 73;
and Noble, Secular sanctity, pp. 20, 22, who finds the substance of Notkers story to be
36 introduction
clear that Charlemagne promised those youth of lesser status who had
done well that they would be advanced.126
Adrevald of Fleury, a contemporary of Notker, gives some substance to
such a promise by indicating that Charlemagne advanced some men who
served as officials of the royal fisc to high administrative office.127 Notker
himself discusses in some detail a poor student who was appointed to
serve in the royal chapel and later was made a bishop.128 The model for
modern scholars of such men raised from the dust is the servus Ebbo. He
is thought to have been the son of Louis the Pious wet nurse. Supposedly,
Charlemagne recognized the boys intelligence, and had him sent to
school, where he was very successful. Ultimately, Ebbo was elevated to the
office of archbishop of Rheims by Louis the Pious.129
In terms of actually exercising royal power over the aristocracy, e.g.
choosing and deposing bishops and abbots, and dispossessing or treating
in an even more harsh manner problematic lay potentes, including distin-
guished officeholders even as high as the comital level, Charlemagnes
behavior indicates that he was in a very strong position.130 For example,
fundamentally accurate, if not a verbatim account of what Charlemagne had to say. It

should be noted that prior to World War II, Notkers Gesta was thought to be useless as a
source for writing history; then the situation was reversed. For recent accounts of the litera-
ture, see Simon MacLean, Kingship and Politics in the Late Ninth Century: Charles the Fat
and the End of the Carolingian Empire (Cambridge, 2003), 199229; and Michael Innis,
Memory, pp. 336.
126GK, I, 3.
127In this text, quoted by Werner, Important noble families, pp. 197198, Adrevald
claims that these men, whom Charlemagne appointed, were, in fact, servi. However, as
Werner makes clear (p. 197), Adrevald was making a tendentious slur upon enemies of the
church. What Werner seems to gloss over here is that in order for the slur to have had rhe-
torical plausibility, at least some members of Charlemagnes fiscal administration, although
perhaps not servi, would have had to have been given advancement into rather high gov-
ernment office. In terms of advancement of men associated with the royal fisc, Nelson,
Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, p. 35, calls attention to Audulf, a former royal
steward who became in effect governor of Bavaria.
128GK, I, 4.
129Werner, Important noble families, p. 198.
130With regard to Charlemagnes control of the church and its aristocratic leaders, see
F.L. Ganshof, Lglise et le pouvoir royal dans la monarchie franque sous Ppin III at
Charlemagne, SSCI, VII (Spoleto, 1960), 95141; and trans. J. Sondheimer as The Church
and the royal power under Pippin III and Charlemagne, in ibid, The Carolingians and the
Frankish Monarchy (London, 1971), 205239. With particular attention to monasteries, see,
for example, Josef Semmler, Karl der Grosse und das frnkische Mnchtum, in Karl der
Grosse, II, 255289; Wood, The Proprietary Church, pp. 221235; and Innis, Kings, Monks
and Patrons, pp. 301324, who observes, Under Pippin and Charlemagne, the establish-
ment of royal lordship over the most important monasteries consolidated the power of the
Carolingian dynasty. Innis observation here is of some importance in light of his view in
State and Society (see above) that Charlemagnes empire was an aristocratic state. Airlie,
introduction37
the work methods employed by Charlemagne indicate that he would send

his missi to exert influence on the proceedings of a local court that was
sitting on a case. In a particular situation that recently has been discussed
in some detail, following the intervention of the missi, the comital court
refused to recognize a local magnates rights. The court then nullified a gift
that the man had made to a monastery. As a result, Charlemagne took con-
trol of the assets at issue and disposed of them as he saw fit.131
That government officials served at royal pleasure was more than a the-
oretical nicety imagined by modern constitutional or institutional histori-
ans, who may have made the methodological error of relying too heavily
on normative texts and treating them as proof for actual practice.132
Charlemagne, p. 98, does not hesitate to characterize Charlemagnes rule as strong,

despite the fact that tensions might be generated at a result.
131DK, 40. Here I rely on the discussion of this text by Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne,
p. 19, who makes clear that this was normal practice. Nelson uses the phrase work
methods.
132Ganshof has been criticized by some recent scholars for this methodological error,
which, in fact, supposedly resulted in an account of what Carolingian rulers wanted to do
but not what they actually accomplished. For the quotation, see Innis, State and Society,
pp. 56. However, it would be strange indeed if Charlemagne, who was so successful in
expanding Carolingian control over large geographical areas through military force, was
not also frequently successful in making the administration of the army work efficiently,
especially in mobilizing the armed forces of the kingdom and providing them with satis-
factory logistical support.
In regard to practice, as illustrated in biased narratives as contrasted to the presumed
wishful nature of normative texts, see, Notker, GK, I, 8, who writes of the removal of several
abbots and counts. These men, according to Notker, failed to follow Charlemagnes orders
in providing satisfactory support service and guidance to a group of Byzantine envoys.
Although there is certainly some, if not indeed substantial, exaggeration in this report, it
also contains more than a grain of truth. A good example of the duty that high officials
were required to see to the needs of legates is made clear by Bishop Frothar of Toul (Epist.,
18), who was much concerned to confirm to the royal court that he had done what was
required of him in regard to giving support to envoys.
Airlie, The Aristocracy, p. 108, makes a point of calling attention to the account by
Notker, cited above, as evidence for the effectiveness of royal authority, and the kings
ability to remove high officials in fact and not only in theory. Cf. Adalheid Krah, Abset
zungsverfahren als spiegelbild von Knigsmacht: Untersuchungen zum Krfteverhltnis
zwischen Konigtum und Adel im Karolingerreich und seine Nachfolgestaaten (Aalen, 1987),
740, at 39, who concludes that only ten important men were removed from office by
Charlemagne throughout his reign. However, Krah does not cast her net sufficiently wide
and, for example, does not treat Notkers account above, and her quantitative results likely
are misleading.
In this context, it may be noted that much of post-World War II scholarship has focused
on presenting early medieval rulers, including Charlemagne, as weak. Even Otto the Great
has been treated in recent decades as a king who ruled only with the support of the high
aristocracy. However, Otto did, in fact, confiscate the lands of those lay and ecclesiastical
magnates whose behavior did not please him. See the recent reevaluation of the state of
the question by David S. Bachrach, The Exercise of Royal Power in the Early Middle Ages:
38 introduction
Charlemagnes control over those who held the comital office, for exam-
ple, was effectively demonstrated on numerous occasions, but perhaps
never so dramatically only seven years after establishing monarchia in the
regnum Francorum following the death of his brother Carloman the
Younger in 771. In 778, Charlemagne dismissed no fewer than nine counts,
all of whom held office either in Aquitaine or Burgundy, i.e. outside the
Carolingian heartlands.133 These counts likely had not been as dutiful as
the king had expected in mobilizing their expeditionary levies for the
invasion of Spain, and insofar as it can be ascertained, none of them ever
again gained prominence. In fact, they seem to have disappeared.134
The specific situation in which these counts were dismissed provides
considerable insight regarding the nature of Charlemagnes real power
over the aristocracy. In 778, Charlemagne led two armies into Spain, one
mobilized in the regnum Francorum and the other from northern Italy,
only four years after his conquest of the Lombard kingdom. Not only was
Charlemagnes campaign in Spain a failure, but it also saw the annihila-
tion of the rear guard at Roncevalles and the capture of the Carolingian
baggage train.135 In addition, just at the time that the above-mentioned
counts were in the process of being relieved of their officia, Charlemagne
also was facing a revolt among the newly conquered Saxons.136 It may be
suggested that Charlemagnes ability to deal decisively with important lay
officials during a period of undoubted difficulty in 778, which some schol-
ars have considered to have been a crisis, provided an object lesson for
any lay or ecclesiastical magnates who might consider displeasing the
ruler of the regnum Francorum.137
The Case of Otto the Great, 936973, EME, 17 (2009), 389419, with the scholarly literature
cited there.
133V.Hlud., II, ch. 8.
134See the discussion by Christian Lauranson-Rosaz, Le roi et les grands dans
lAquitaine carolingienne, in La royaut et les lites dans lEurope carolinginne (dbut IXe
sicle aux enviorons de 920), ed. R. Le Jan, Stphane Lebecq, and Bruno Judic (Villeneuve-
dAscq, 1998), 409436, at 412413; and Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 1415.
135See, for example, Halphen, Charlemagne, pp. 8791; Rich, The Carolingians,
pp. 9293, 115; and Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 6768.
136See F.L. Ganshof, Une crise dans le rgne de Charlemagne, les annes 778 et 779,
Mlanges dhistoire et le littrature offerts Monsieur Charles Gilliard (Lausanne, 1949),
132144.
137For this crisis language, see Ganshof, Une crise, pp. 132144, who tends to overesti-
mate the difficulties faced by Charlemagne as these did not have a long-term impact.
However, whether Charlemagne himself may have considered the situation a crisis cannot
be ascertained, as there is insufficient evidence to prove the case in this regard. In more
general terms, Janet Nelson, Making a Difference in Eighth-Century Politics: The Daugh
ters of Desiderius, in After Romes Fall; Narrators and Sources of Early Medieval History,
introduction39
Also under difficult conditions, Charlemagne undertook to depose, dis-

inherit, and imprison Duke Tassilo of Bavaria and lock away his immediate
family. The success of this effort made clear to all, and especially to those
members of the elite of the Bavarian aristocracy who may have been
dissatisfied with Carolingian rule, the weakness of their position under
Charlemagnes regnum.138 Consequently, the ecclesiastical leaders in
Bavaria, especially Bishop Arn of Salzburg, who had been loyal to Tassilo,
were terrified by the prospect that they would lose their lands. Special
worry was focused on those lands that had been donated to ecclesiastical
institutions by Tassilo. This worry was made very real when Charlemagne
ordered that church lands in Bavaria were to be inventoried along the lines
of what had been done under orders from Pippin I in 751. As surviving
documents make clear, Bishop Arn among others, e.g. the abbots and
bishops of Passau, Niederaltaich, Mondsee, and possibly Isen Freising,
complied and produced the required inventories.139
Despite the obvious acquiescence of the aristocracy of the regnum
Francorum to royal power during the course of Charlemagnes 46-year
reign, much attention has been given recently by scholars to two unsuc-
cessful conspiracies undertaken by what have been depicted as factions of
disgruntled Thuringian and Bavarian magnates in 785 and in 792, respec-
tively.140 Some scholars consider these conspiracies to have been revolts
ed. Alexander C. Murray (Toronto, 1998), 172, would seem to exaggerate when she claims
that Charlemagnes reign was one goddamned crisis after another.
138With regard to Charlemagnes handling of Tassilo, see the nuanced study by Stuart
Arlie, Narratives of Triumph and Rituals of Submission: Charlemagnes Mastering of
Bavaria, TRHS, 6th ser., 9 (1999), 93120. Whatever difficulties Charlemagne may have
faced in getting rid of Tassilo and however biased the Carolingian court sources may
have been in dealing with the process, in the end, royal power was vindicated. In the late
760s and early 770s, Tassilo would seem to have believed that he could establish Bavaria as
an independent kingdom. See below, Chaper Two.
139A useful summary of the situation is provided by Sonnlechner, The Establishment
of New Units, p. 29, and p. 44 for the quotation. See also Brown, Unjust Seizure, p. 68, who
recognizes that by 794, All resistance to Frankish rule had been stifled in Bavaria under
Charlemagne. Brown observes (p. 197) the authority of the Carolingians mattered. In fact,
Brown notes that through a set of statelike institutions the Carolingians were able to
influence peoples behavior indirectly, i.e. this was done through locally based govern-
ment officials directed from the central government. Browns observation that this level of
control was weakened post-814, of course, is not relevant to Charlemagnes ability to have
his writ obeyed throughout Bavaria both by lay and ecclesiastical magnates.
140Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, p. 8 and n. 9, is certainly correct to insist that
those who took part in these conspiracies swore an oath to support each other in further-
ance of their goals, i.e. they were involved in coniurationes. However, it should be noted
here that Suetonius, Divus Augustus, ch. XIX, also uses the term coniurationes to describe
such plots.
40 introduction
or rebellions, and these efforts, according to one recent commentator,

Charlemagne clearly regarded as extremely serious threats to his sur-
vival.141 The conspirators, however, undertook no overt military opera-
tions against the king: not an arrow was launched, a spear thrown, or a
sword wielded in battle.142 In fact, the conspirators mobilized no militarily
significant armed forces. These facts seem to preclude the use of words
such as revolt and rebellion, which, at least in modern usage, would
seem to imply serious military operations.
Neither in 785 nor in 792 did the conspirators raise the standard of
revolt or rebellion. Rather, they plotted to assassinate Charlemagne.143
Both conspiracies failed utterly because Charlemagne received advanced
intelligence concerning the plots, and saw to it that the efforts of
the would-be malefactors were thwarted.144 It should be noted that, in
general, Charlemagne spared no effort to obtain information regarding
actual or potential problems such as the assassination plots under
discussion here.145 In fact, Charlemagnes vigilance became legendary
indeed, a toposamong contemporaries and his posterity into the later
Regarding these and other disruptions during the Carolingian era, see Rgine Le Jan,
Elites et rvoltes lpoque carolingianne: crise des iltes or crise des modles?, in Les
lites au haut Moyen ge. Crises et renouvellements, ed. F. Bougard, L. Feller and R. Le Jan
(Turnout, 2006), 403423; and eadem, Identit thuringienne et opposition politique au
VIIIe sicle, in 774 ipotesi su una transizione: Atti del Seminario de Poggibonsi, 1618 febbraio
2006 (Turnhout, 2008), 1125, who observes (p. 25) that in the wake of the difficulties she
has discussed, lordre carolingien rgnant. Concerning the latter situation, see Genevive
Bhrer-Thierry, De la fin du duch au dbut de lempire: dix ans de transition en Bavire
la lumire des chartes (788799),; and Rosamond McKitterick, Histoire et mmoire de la
crise dune lite carolingienne: lanne 785 et les Annales regni Francorum, both in Les
lites au haut Moyen ge. Crises et renouvellements, ed. F. Bougard, L. Feller, and R. Le Jan
(Turnout, 2006), 2739, 267282, respectively.
141See, for example, Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, pp. 13, 14, 20, 22, for the use of
words such as revolt, rebellion, and rebels, and p. 8, for the quotation. The effort by
Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, p. 199, n. 290, to tie these two conspiracies, which he
characterizes as revolts, together with Charlemagnes deposition of Tassilo, speculates
beyond the evidence.
142See, for example, Einhard, VK, ch. 20; and AM., an., 792; LA, ann. 786, 792; MC, an.,
786; and WA, an., 792. Einhard, VK, ch. 20, makes clear that some plotters were killed when
they drew their swords while resisting arrest. This, however, can hardly be considered the
type of combat that is required to identify a revolt.
143See, for example, Einhard, VK, ch. 20; and AM., an., 792; LA, ann. 786, 792; MC, an.,
786; and WA, an., 792. These were embellished by Notker, GK, II, 1213.
144In regard to intelligence gathering, it was normal practice for Charlemagne even to
have agents scour the court complex at Aachen regularly and provide a written report
weekly to identify undesirables and other problems. A reaffirmation of these practices was
issued by Louis the Pious ca. 820 (CRF, no. 246, chs. 18).
145Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 319323.
introduction41
9th century.146 However, there can be no doubt that Charlemagne took

these assassination plots seriously, as would any political leader, whether
past or present. It is also clear that he vigorously punished the conspira-
tors even though they had not actually made an attempt on his life, but
merely had sworn among themselves that they would try to kill him.147
Einhard, in his account of these two conspiracies, wants his readers to
absorb four important points.148 First, in the course of Charlemagnes
lengthy reign only two plots had been hatched against him, and no others
are mentioned in any of the various relevant sources. Secondly, these had
occurred not because of Charlemagnes bad government, but as a result of
the cruelty of Fastrada the queen. Thirdly, Einhard makes clear that those
who gathered intelligence for the Carolingian government did their job
well and thwarted the plots before even an attempt could be made on
Charlemagnes life. To use a modern turn of phrase, the men who were
responsible for Charlemagnes security connected the dots. Finally,
Einhard reminds his audience that despite Charlemagnes well-known
reputation for mildness, which, in fact, he very likely is exaggerating, it is
clear that when the king was provoked, he would and could act decisively
and brutally to punish those who conspired against him.149
Additional note may be taken here regarding those who were charged
with Charlemagnes security and who had developed intelligence regard-
ing the above-mentioned plots before the conspirators could act. The
author of the revised Annals produced at the royal court claims that the
plot in 792 was exposed by a Lombard named Fardulfus.150 From other
sources, it is clear that Fardulfus was Charlemagnes capellanus, who later
succeeded as abbot of St. Denis upon the death of Maginardus in 792.151
146See, for example, Bachrach,Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 319323; and
regarding the later 9th century, see, for example, Notker, GK, II, 3.
147Einhard, VK, ch. 20; and AM., an., 792; LA, ann. 786, 792; MC, an., 786; WA, an., 792;
and Notker, GK, II, 1213.
148Einhard, VK, ch. 20.
149I think that Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, p. 9, is correct in pointing out that
when Einhard claimed that the plots were reaction to the cruelty of Fastrada, she was
being made a scapegoat and that Einhards affirmation of Charlemagnes mildness is
done too insistently. In short, I agree that Charlemagne likely oppressed those magnates,
who eventually plotted against him, and that he should not be considered mild in politi-
cal matters.
150AE, an. 792.
151See McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 44. The claim in AE, an. 792, that Fardulfus was
rewarded for his work in uncovering the conspiracy is a good example of a poor historian
engaging in the post hoc fallacy. It had been Charlemagnes policy to appoint his capellanus
to be abbot of St. Denis when the office became available. First, he appointed Fulrad and
42 introduction
However, it is highly unlikely that Fardulfus, a foreigner who was known to

be very close to Charlemagne, could have gone under cover and infil-
trated the conspiracy. In this light, Notker of St. Gall tells a story regarding
a young cleric who was hiding in the church where the conspirators met
and, as a result, learned of the plot.152 Putting the account in the revised
Annals together with Notkers story, it seems possible that the cleric
reported what he had learned to Fardulfus, and the capellanus relayed the
information to Charlemagne. In light of Charlemagnes concern with mat-
ters of safety as noted, for example, by Einhard, as well as Pippin the
Hunchbacks apparently well-publicized fear of his fathers spies, it may
be suggested that Fardulfus had been delegated to be the head of palace
security.153
Whatever opposition may have been contemplated by Frankish aristo-
crats over the course of Charlemagnes lengthy reign, none seems to have
borne fruit. Some scholars, especially those with an orientation that is not
unsympathetic to a Marxist theory of class conflict, have focused on
Charlemagnes opposition to sworn associations. According to this
approach, Charlemagne is thought to have been suspicious of the activi-
ties of groups of peasants who were engaged in coniurationes as a threat to
royal power.154 However, despite coniurationes, whether among a faction
of nobles or among peasants, it is to be emphasized that Charlemagne
demonstrated the effective exercise of royal power throughout the
Frankish kingdom, whether in removing high-ranking lay and ecclesiasti-
cal officials, destroying the duke of Bavaria, dealing with a very occasional
group of disgruntled magnates engaged in a conspiracy, or keeping an eye
on the putatively disaffected and perhaps even the restive lower classes.155
when the latter died he appointed Maginardus, who died in 792. At Maginardus death, he
appointed Fardulfus, and when the latter died in 806, the capellanus Waldo was appointed.
Louis the Pious followed the tradition by appointing his capellanus, Hilduinus, in 819 as
abbot of St. Denis.
152GK, II, 14, adds numerous details, which are more in the nature of a good story than
useful to our understanding of what happened.
153Regarding Pippin the Hunchbacks fear that he was being spied upon, see GK, II, 12.
See also VK, ch. 19, where Einhard speaks of the bodyguards who provided security for
Charlemagne and his family.
154In a nuanced treatment of these groups, Nelson, Peers in the early Middle Ages,
pp. 3342, provides a survey of the relevant literature. She does not seem to be sympathetic
to a class warfare model, and argues that these sworn groups were hardly a threat to
Charlemagnes exercise of royal power.
155France, The Armies of Charlemagne, p. 70, doubts the effectiveness of Charlemanges
power and claims that such a view flies in the face of all modern perceptions of the
Carolingian dominion, and totally ignores the powerful position of the magnates who were
far from being the creatures of an all-powerful king. France (pp. 6465) contends that the
introduction43
Local Administration
Charlemagnes ability to rule the Frankish kingdom effectively depended,

in large part, on the way in which royal power was distributed at the local
level. First, the secular administration of the pagus was headed by a count
who was aided in the execution of his official duties by his subordinates,
i.e. vicecomites, vicarii, and centenarii, along with their staffs. All of these
senior officials were appointed by the king and served at his pleasure. In
addition, the king directly controlled units of the royal fisc within these
administrative circumscriptions through villici, whom he had appointed
and who also served at his pleasure. Further, Charlemagne not only had
his missi dominici oversee the behavior of the counts and their subordi-
nates as well as the villici of the royal fisc, he also had them monitor those
units of the royal fisc that had been granted as beneficia to royal vassals,
i.e. vassi dominici. Finally, Charlemagne possessed numerous royal
palaces with their attached dependents and other resources in various
pagi. As Airlie has pointed out, these Palaces were not neutral places
but acted as permanently present and visible reminders of royal
authority156
The king also was the dominant figure with regard to the operations of
the church at the local level. It is clear that bishops were appointed by
Charlemagne and held office at royal pleasure. The same is true of abbots,
Frankish king could not count on a machinery of command. Everything depended on the
personality of the king, his ability to manipulate and control his leading subjects.
In support of his assertions regarding all modern perceptions of the Carolingian domin-
ion, France does not engage the studies discussed above regarding the effectiveness of
Charlemagnes government and administration. Rather, he relies on the no longer current
views of Heinrich Fichtenau, Das Karolingische Imperium. Soziale und geistige Problematik
eines Grossreiches (Zrich, 1949), as found in an abridged English translation by Peter
Munz: The Carolingian Empire (Oxford, 1957). Fichtenau, during the post-World War II
period, played a key role in diminishing the image of Charlemagne as Europae Pater and
did not provide a contribution to the Charlemagne-Festschrift; Karl der Grosse in 1965,
which gave strong support to a positive view of the Frankish rulers accomplishments. This
view of Charlemagnes effectiveness is made clear by Donald Bullough, Europae Pater:
Charlemagne and His Achievement in Light of Recent Scholarship, EHR, LXXV (1970),
59105. Indeed, Fichtenau and Halphen, Charlemagne, can be seen to have initiated the
post-World War II process of cutting the great Charles down to size. See the excellent intro-
duction to the English translation of the abridgement of The Carolingian Empire by Peter
Munz, who provides an important context for Fichtenaus views. However, Fichtenau, loc.
cit., p. 114, did recognize that From the days of the Carolingian mayors of the palace
onward, more and more members of the independent nobility joined the ranks of the rul-
ers following.
156See Airlie, The Aristocracy, pp. 110111, for the quotation.
44 introduction
and it is especially important that all important religious houses were

converted into royal monasteries, which tied the institution, its abbot, and
the resources of the community very closely to the central government.157
As a result of these takeovers, Charlemagne and his officials inserted a
substantial layer of royal government between the locally based potentes
who originally may have founded a particular monastery and/or endowed
it heavily. Charlemagne not only had available to him inventories of the
facultates of both episcopal and monastic establishments, but when he
thought necessary, he granted elements of these resources, pro verbo regis,
as beneficia to his fideles, e.g. to vassi dominici.158
Through the use of missi dominici, Charlemagnes central government
maintained close oversight over both his lay and ecclesiastical appointees,
as well as the local regions in which they functioned, in a more general
sense. These missi also delivered orders, often in the form of capitularies,
from the king to counts, bishops, abbots, and other important men. If the
king himself wanted to take a close personal look at any local situation, he
was well-positioned, in general, to arrange to spend some time at a royal
palace, royal fiscal estate, or a monastery in the particular locality at issue.
In addition, through the use of various types of assemblies to which lay-
men and clerics were summoned, Charlemagne had the opportunity to
speak frankly to any magnate whose actions had not been pleasing to the
royal will. Finally, aristocratic youth who were being educated at the court
or at royal monasteries, were, in fact, potential hostages for the good
behavior of their elders.159
Economic Assets
Substantial demographic and economic growth throughout the regnum

Francorum in the early Carolingian period provided Charlemagne with an
157For a detailed examination of these matters, see Wood, The proprietary church,
pp. 214217, 224228, 230235, 527528.
158Still useful in this context is Giles Constable, Nona et Decima: An Aspect of the
Carolingian Economy, Speculum, 21 (1960), 158172.
159See Adam J. Kosto, Hostages in the Carolingian world (714840), EME, 11 (2002), 133,
who calls attention to the lengthy tradition of the noble son as court hostage; and 144
146, regarding the role of the church in keeping hostages for Charlemagne. Also of interest
in this context is Mayke de Jong, Monastic Prisoners or Opting Out? Political Coercion and
Honour in the Frankish Kingdoms, in Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages, ed.
Mayke de Jong and Frans Theuws with Carine van Rhijn (Leiden-Boston, 2001), 291328.
For a comparative perspective, see Ryan Lavelle, The Use and Abuse of Hostages in Later
Anglo-Saxon England, EME, 14 (2006), 269296.
introduction45
opportunity to access increasing quantities of human and economic

resources. These resources had the potential to make it possible for him to
execute a long-term strategy of expanding Carolingian control over terri-
tories that had once been a part of the Roman Empire in the west and the
numerous peoples who inhabited these lands. In turn, the newly acquired
territories, e.g. northern Italy, provided the potential for increased eco-
nomic surpluses as well as greater numbers of people to work the land and
to serve in his armies. Charlemagne had access to income from these
material resources through the collection of various types of taxes and
tolls, and as the possessor of the royal fisc.160
Government Income
Direct taxes on land had been of primary importance during the late
Roman era and gradually became attenuated during the later Merovingian
era. There is broad agreement that during Charlemagnes reign and after,
Carolingian land taxes likely were only a vestige of those that had been
collected earlier.161 Some scholars believe that the annua dona or dona
annualia, a tax or levy paid both by lay and ecclesiastical magnates to the
king on a yearly basis and usually in public at a general assembly in the
spring, was a vestige of the land tax that lasted well into the 9th century.162
160For a general but brief survey of the institutions from which Charlemagnes govern-
ment obtained economic support, see Ganshof, The Institutional Framework, pp. 9697.
161With regard to the Merovingian background, see Walter Goffart, From Roman
Taxation to Medieval Seigneurie: Three Notes: 1. The Iugum in Ostrogothic Italy; 2. The
Ambulatory Hide; 3. Flodoard and the Frankish Polyptych, Speculum, 47 (1972), 165187,
373394; and idem, Old and New Merovingian Taxation, Past and Present, 96 (1982), 321;
both are reprinted in Walter Goffart, Romes Fall and After (London, 1989), 167211 and 213
231, respectively. For a vestige of aspects of this type of taxation in the Carolingian era, see
Goffart, Frankish Military Duty, pp. 166190. A provocative argument for the long-term
survival of imperial taxes into the Carolingian era is made by Jean Durliat, Les finances
publiques de Diocltien aux Carolingiens [with a preface by K.F. Werner] (Sigmaringen,
1990), pp. 284289. For a critique of Durliats views, see Chris Wickham, La chute de Rome
naura pas lieu, Le moyen ge, 99 (1993), 107126, which, while it must be taken seriously, is
too often tendentious.
162Hincmar, Ad Carolum Calvum, cols. 1050D-1051A, in consideration of the history of
this donum, classifies it as a tax for the support of the army. CRF., no. 217, ch. 4, uses the
phrase dona annualia aut tributa publica. Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 87, appears to
be much agitated by what he seems to see as euphemisms, i.e. gifts in his translation, used
in the Carolingian sources. Thus, he writes Tribute was in practice institutionalized plun-
der, for the recipient particularly attractive because the victim plunders himself. Whether
or not all tax is theft, it is clear that these dona and munera were a source of royal wealth
concerning which contemporaries thought it worthwhile to take note.
46 introduction
Terms such as dona or munera were, of course, traditional imperial usage

for taxes, and those imposts under consideration here likely were some
modified descendant of the Roman munera militaria, which quite obvi-
ously was a tax that in some way helped in the support of the army.163
Likely more important than these munera as a source of royal access to
both human and material resources throughout the Frankish kingdom
was servitium regis, also owed by both lay and ecclesiastical magnates.
Through this aspect of the tax system, hospitality and other resources
were provided to the monarch when he moved either throughout the
kingdom or required supplies when he ventured beyond the frontiers on
For the background on this controversial issue, see Emile Lesne, Histoire de la proprit
ecclsiastique en France, 6 vols. (Lille, 19101943), 2.2, 411419; and Georg Waitz, Deutsche
Verfgassungsgeschichte, 8 vols., 2nd ed.(Berlin, 18931896), III, 591, IV, 107110. This was an
ancient tax that, like the consuetudines antiquae, which required the local authorities to
keep roads and bridges in repair (see below), probably had precedents in late Roman impe-
rial administration. The earliest Carolingian example can be dated to 755, i.e. CRF., no. 14,
ch. 6, where the term munera is used. The same term is also used in 766 by Fred. Cont.,
ch. 48; and Formulae Bituricenses, no. 18. Cf. Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 85, n. 56, who,
while admitting that the Carolingian sources consider this an ancient institution, believes
that it seems to have begun and ended with the Carolingians. Reuter seems to contradict
himself here.
163I am at a loss to understand why Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, pp. 241242, seems to
insist on a meaning for dona and munera as gifts in what I can only understand to be the
modern sense of that word. Then after using this approach, he concludes, quite correctly,
Like tribute such gifts could scarcely be described as voluntary Reuter continues in this
vein, concluding that by the use of gift language the Carolingians overcame, at least for a
while, the hostility to public taxation which existed both before and after their time, in
Austrasia at least. Reuter believes that this fiction salved the pride of the Franks who thus
could see themselves making gifts rather than paying taxes. This seems to be a bit of
romantic nonsense, as it is clear that among the Carolingians (Reuter, loc, cit., p. 241) it was
widely known that these munera were taxes. This point is made clear by the Irish Exile
who observed in 787 in a poem for Charlemagne: These are annual gifts (annua munera)
owed (debentur) to the sublimi regi. In addition, however stiff-necked German mag-
nates may be thought to have been, they like everyone would seem to have prostrated
themselves before Charlemagne and even the much weaker Louis the Pious while perform-
ing what would appear to have been a version of the proskynesis.
The Carolingians had available to them and evidently used the Roman legal vocabulary
regarding taxation in which, for example, munus, in a wide variety of instances, was funda-
mentally a tax. See, in general, A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284602: A Social
Economic and Administrative Survey, 2 vols. (Norman, OK, 1964), I, 724, 732, 749; more spe-
cifically Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia, 1953), 589, with
the literature cited there. In this context, I find it curious that in the broadly-based collec-
tion of essays, The Language of Gift in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Wendy Davies and Paul
Fouracre (Cambridge, 2010), 11, 108, 117, 132, 136, 142, 238, 2439, 252254, no effort was
made, especially in regard to munera, to treat Roman imperial practice if only for back-
ground purposes. Indeed, the impression thus is left that taxes called gifts were a
Germanic introduction west of the Rhine.
introduction47
military campaign.164 In addition, servitium also was provided to royal offi-

cials sent on government business from the court throughout the regnum
Francorum and in the Italian kingdom after 774.165 It is clear that
Charlemagnes subjects owed various other services to the king, which
included both the provision of personnel for military service and substan-
tial quantities of logistical support for the army on the march.166
Tolls and Taxes on Trade
The growth of the Carolingian economy was manifested, in part, by a con-

siderable increase in trade and commerce, which provided Charlemagnes
government with a growing income from tolls and various other taxes.
This economic growth is evidenced in many ways, but perhaps the most
striking is the ubiquitous emporium phenomenon, especially in the north.
The growth of these well-established market sites was complemented,
despite the potential for Muslim interference, by extensive commercial
activity in the Mediterranean.167 Charlemagnes government officials not
only administered the emporia within the regnum Francorum, but when
goods were sold at these places, the government collected a tax of 10 per
cent of the gross value of the commodity.168 Therefore, of special impor-
tance was royal control of markets throughout the kingdom. The most
164The basic work regarding servitium regis remains Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium
Regis. However, note must be taken of the well-taken criticisms by McKitterick,
Charlemagne, pp. 171197, of the application of an Ottonian model of itineration to
Charlemagne.
165Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis, I, 1450, 7074, 97115; and Lesne, Histoire,
pp. 433455. With regard to taxes in kind levied for the army, in particular, see Jean Durliat,
La polyptyque dIrminon pour lArme, BEC, 141 (1983), 183208.
166Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5183; and Jean Durliat, La polyptyque,
pp. 183208.
167McCormick, Origins, passim; Peter Johanek, Die frnkische Handel der
Karolingerzeit im Spiegel der Schriftquellen, in UH, 4, 768, and for the Merovingian back-
ground, idem, Der Aussenhandel des Frankenreiches der Merowingerzeit nach Norden
und Osten im Spiegel der Schriftquellen, in UH, 3, 214254.
168F.L. Ganshof, A propos du tonlieu lpoque carolingienne, in SSCI, 6 (Spoleto,
1959), 485508; and idem, The Institutional Framework, pp. 9395; Reinhold Kaiser,
Teloneum Episcopi: Du tonlieu royal au tonlieu piscopal dans les civitates de la Gaule (VIe-
XIIe sicle), in Histoire compare de ladministration (IVe-XXVIIe sicles), ed. Werner
Paravicini and Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich, 1980), 469485; Neil Middleton, Early
Medieval Port Customs, Tolls and Controls on Foreign Trade, EME, 13 (2002), 313358; and
specifically for the Merovingian background, Kaiser, Steuer und Zoll in der Merowinger
zeit, Francia, 7 (1979), 117.
48 introduction
important, or at least the best documented, of these markets was the

Fair of St. Denis, which would seem to have been established by King
Dagobert I (d. 639). St. Denis along with Quentovic were the two
governmentally-recognized locations for licit trade between England and
the Frankish kingdom.169 Of course, smuggling was not stamped out by
these regulations.170
In addition to taxing sales and market operations, the Carolingian gov-
ernment also established toll stations on the borders of the kingdom and
along various heavily traveled arteries of transportation. Toll stations, in
fact, would seem to have been ubiquitous as they were established along
the roads, on the rivers, in the cities, in urban ports such as Rouen and
emporia such as Marseilles and Durstede, and along the Alpine routes.171
The great value of these tolls can be judged, in part, by the vigorous efforts
of the government to see to their efficient collection.172
Also, Charlemagne took note of efforts that were made to trade illegally
by persons who were trying to avoid tolls and other taxes on commerce. As
a result, he adumbrated appropriate punishments to stop smugglers.173
However, a no less important index of the value of these imposts can be
gleaned from examining the efforts of those engaged in trade, both lay-
men and ecclesiastics, and even Jews, to obtain dispensations from these
imposts.174
Charlemagnes government also gained income from the administra-
tion of justice at the local level. For example, the central government
received one-third of all fines that were imposed by the court over which
the count of the pagus presided or at courts held by his subordinates, e.g.
the vice comes, vicarius, or centenarius.175 The profits of justice were
regarded as being of considerable value, and, as a result, lay and ecclesias-
tical magnates were very much animated in their efforts to obtain immu-
nities. This meant that on their lands, the immunists had the right to
hold the relevant court and that local royal officials were barred from
169McCormick, Origins, pp. 648653.

170See, for example, CRF, I, no. 55, ch. 2; and I, no. 44, ch. 7; which are discussed by
Nelson, Charlemagne and the Paradoxes of Power, pp. 3435.
171Ganshof, A propos du tonlieu, pp. 485508; and idem, The Institutional
Framework, pp. 9395.
172Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, pp. 89, 94, 9899, 105106.
173CRF, I, no. 55, ch. 2; and I, no. 44, ch. 7.
174Kaiser, Teloneum Episcopi, pp. 469485; and Nelson, Literacy in Carolingian
Government, pp. 292293.
175Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, pp. 7197.
introduction49
participation and, therefore, from enjoying the profits of justice.176 One-

third of all fines, the fredus, still was sent to the king, one-third was still
paid to the successful litigant, but the third part that normally went to the
count now went to the immunist whose agents presided over the court.177
The Royal Fisc
The royal fisc was an institution of Roman imperial origin which, like
much else in the regnum Francorum, had been altered gradually in Gaul
during the three centuries prior to Charlemagnes accession in 768.178 The
resources that remained of the imperial fisc during the later 5th century
along with estates that Clovis and a succession of Merovingian reges con-
fiscated from their adversaries constituted the royal fisc of the empires
successor state(s) north of the Alps. Much of the land of the Merovingian
royal fisc, however, was lost to an acquisitive lay and ecclesiastical aristoc-
racy both through gift and theft, especially during the last century of the
monarchy, i.e. the era of the so-called rois fainants.179
Among those who had benefited greatly from this lengthy period of
Merovingian governmental weakness were the Carolingians themselves,
who built up their family patrimony at the expense of the so-called do
nothing kings. However, when the Carolingians secured the position of
Mayor of the Palace and later the kingship, Charlemagnes forebears not
only took control of the remains of the royal fisc but worked diligently to
augment it by reclaiming resources that had been lost by their Merovingian
predecessors.180 Military success and estates confiscated from their
defeated enemies further extended the landed resources of the royal fisc
176Regarding immunities, see the critical bibliographic essay by Alexander C. Murray,

Merovingian Immunity Revisited, History Compass, 8 (2010), 913928. For the continua-
tion of the immunity into the Carolingian era, see Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, pp. 4748;
and Barbara H. Rosenwein, Negotiating Space: Power, Restraint, and Privileges of Immunity
in Early Medieval Europe (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 111, 115121, 124, 133134, regarding Charlemagnes
use of immunities.
177With regard to the profits of justice in the Carolingian era, see Ganshof, Frankish
Institutions, pp. 4142.
178F.L. Ganshof, Charlemagne and the Institutions of the Frankish Monarchy, in
Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, ed. and trans. Bryce and Mary Lyon (Providence,
RI, 1968), 35. The basic work on the royal fisc remains Wolfgang Metz, Das karolingische
Reichsgut: Eine verfassungs- und verwaltungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Berlin, 1960).
179Lesne, Histoire, 411419.
180Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel, pp. 4748.
50 introduction
under the Carolingians as, for example, in the case of the conquest of the
Lombard kingdom and the Saxon region.181
Royal landed assets were divided into two major groups. One group of
estates was maintained in the possession of the king. These facultates
were administered directly by Charlemagnes government officials estab-
lished in the villae which were located in the countryside. Royal officials
established at the court oversaw these local operations, whose administra-
tors were responsible for providing numerous written reports to the cen-
tral government. These lands or estates, which were directly held and
administered by the central government, commonly are considered the
royal fisc. However, a second complex of the kings facultates, also royal
landed assets, were the property of the fisc, but these were held from
Charlemagne as beneficia by various of his vassi and fideles. These men
were responsible for the direct administration of these estates, but their
administration also was subjected to close royal scrutiny.182 With regard to
the former category of lands, it is to be noted that under Charlemagne, the
royal fisc of the regnum Francorum, i.e. excluding assets taken as a result of
the conquest of the Lombard kingdom in Italy in 774 and the beneficia
granted to vassi and fideles, was organized into more than 600 administra-
tive units and perhaps as many as 700 or 800 units.183
A third type of landed wealth, which may be conceptualized as a tem-
porary part of the royal fisc, were estates borrowed from the church
and perhaps also from non-ecclesiastical sources in order to sustain gov-
ernmental operations, particularly those of a military nature.184 These
181Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis, I, 392451.

182For the bipartite structure of the fisc, not to be confused with the bipartite structure
of individual villae, see Ganshof, Charlemagne and the Institutions of the Frankish
Monarchy, p. 35; Daryl Campbell, The Capitulaire de Villis, the Brevium exampla, and the
Carolingian court at Aachen, EME, 18 (2010), 243264; and Bernard S. Bachrach, Are They
Not Like Us? Charlemagnes Fisc in Military Perspective, in Paradigms and Methods
in Early Medieval Studies (The New Middle Ages), ed. Celia Chazelle and Felice Lifshitz
(New York, 2007), 319343.
183Werner, Missus-Marchio-Comes, pp. 148149.
184In 743, Carloman the Elder, Charlemagnes uncle, made it clear to ecclesiastics who
were complaining to the mayors of the palace about the use of church lands for military
purposes that the continued exploitation of these resources by the government was neces-
sary due to imminentia bella (CRF., I, no. 11, ch. 2). Concerning the use of borrowed lands
in the long term to support military services, see the observations by Hincmar of Rheims in
an attempt to protect Gods resources. Looking back from the latter part of the 9th century
on a history of at least 150 years of the systematic exploitation of ecclesiastical resources for
military purposes by the governments of various Carolingian mayors of the palace and
kings, the archbishop tried to stabilize the situation to the benefit of the Church. In his
effort to stem this tide of exploitation and perhaps to turn it back somewhat, he argued
that it was customary that as much as two-fifths of Church income legitimately was to be
introduction51
borrowed lands, however, generally were not kept in direct royal posses-
sion but were granted as beneficia, pro verbo regis, to royal vassals, who,
despite the legal status in regard to the ownership of these estates, also
were considered vassi dominici.185 Charlemagnes use of borrowed lands,
especially for military purposes, was consistent with what his predeces-
sors had been doing during the previous century.186 These estates or villae
continued to be owned by the church and perhaps in some cases by lay-
men, but were scrutinized by Charlemagnes officials, usually missi domi
nici, in the same manner as those that had been assigned to his vassals as
beneficia from the royal fisc itself.187
The number of hectares that belonged to the royal fisc or an account of
the resources that these units produced on an annual basis from the more
than 600 villae under Charlemagnes direct control or the several hundred
that had been granted out as beneficia now cannot be recovered. This
information, however, was available in great detail to the Carolingian
court from numerous reports delivered to the government by the vilici
who administered these estates.188 Regarding those facultates that had
placed at the service of the res publica in order to support the army. It seems from the tone
of his writing on this matter that Hincmar would likely have been very pleased if he could
have established a two-fifths maximum (Hincmar of Rheims, Collectio, pp. 119120). See the
important discussion by Janet Nelson, The Churchs Military Service in the Ninth Century:
A Contemporary View, Studies in Church History, 20 (1983), 1530, and reprinted in eadem,
Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe (London, 1986), 111132.
185Concerning the use of these lands as beneficia, see Hincmar, Collectio, pp. 119120
and Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, pp. 148149, n. 387. The traditional view that the union
of beneficia and vassalage by Charles Martel created feudalism was effectively under-
mined by Bernard S. Bachrach, Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup and
Feudalism, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 7 (1970), 4975; and reprinted with
the same pagination in idem, Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West (London, 1993).
On this point, see Roger Collins, The State of Research: The Carolingians and the Ottonians
in an Anglophone World, Journal of Medieval History, 22 (1996), 97114, who observes
(p. 106), that Bachrachs study was written a quarter of a century before the appearance
of Susan Reynolds recent spirited assault on Charles Martels supposedly revolutionary
creation of feudalism.
186Bachrach, Charles Martel, pp. 6669, takes note of Hincmars efforts to blame
Charles Martel for what had been done before he came to power and continued to be a
basic aspect of military financing in the regnum Francorum long after his death. See the
discussion by Ulrich Nonn, Das Bild Karl Martells in mittelalterlichen Quellen, pp. 933;
and Herwig Wolfram, Karl Martell und das Frnkische Lehenswesen, both in Karl Martell
in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen, 1994), 921
and 6177, respectively; and Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel, pp. 121122.
187In CRF., no. 20, ch. 13, which was issued in 779, when Charlemagne regularized the
situation with regard to church lands granted as royal beneficia pro verbo regis. For addi-
tional discussion and texts, see Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, pp. 148149, n. 387.
188Regarding some surviving reports, it is clear that the number of hectares attached
to particular villae were noted. See most recently, Campbell, The Capitulaire de Villis,
pp. 243264; and Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?, pp. 319343.
52 introduction
been granted as beneficia, Charlemagne had agents sent from the court,
generally missi dominici, to oversee the compiling of inventories of all of
the villae held by these men that belonged to the royal fisc.189 It was
Charlemagnes habit to decree that royal fiscal properties were to be inven-
tories (nostri fisci describantur) in each missaticum throughout the reg
num Francorum.190 These orders resulted in the making of numerous
inventories, and some vestiges of these severely time-conditioned docu-
ments have survived largely as a result of conditions that modern scholars
must consider highly fortuitous.191
With regard to royal access to ecclesiastical lands, King Pippin I, as dis-
cussed above, had a descriptio made of the res ecclesiarum in 751. This
inventory was executed prior to a planned divisio of church resources,
which saw numerous beneficia granted to royal vassals pro verbo regis for
the purpose of meeting the needs of the government.192 It was not only the
Frankish king, and obviously the leaders of the church, who possessed
detailed information regarding ecclesiastical wealth. There would appear
to have been widespread knowledge in some quarters, at least, of some of
the details regarding ecclesiastical holdings. For example, the bishop of
Toledo, Elipandus, and at least some of his suffragans, e.g. Felix of Urgal,
knew that on the estates of the monasteries St. Martin and Marmoutier in
the Touraine, administered by Alcuin as lay abbot, there were in the neigh-
borhood of 20,000 slaves.193
189Ganshof, Charlemagne and the Institutions of the Frankish Monarchy, p. 121, n. 153,
p. 135, notes 261263, lists more than a dozen such orders that have survived.
190CRF, no. 80, ch. 7.
191Klaus Verhein, Studien zu Quellen zum Reichsgut der Karolingerzeit, pt. I,
Deutsches Archiv fur Geschichte (Erforschung) des Mittelalters, 10 (1954), 313394; and pt. II,
ibid, 11 (1955), 333392; Metz, Das karolingische Reichsgut, pp. 1872; and Campbell, The
Capitulaire de Villis, pp. 19. N.b. Nelson, Henry Loyn Memorial Lecture, pp. 167168, that
the term brevis, which was used for reports regarding estate production, was taken over as
a loan word into Old High German in the 9th century. Of exceptional interest is the so-
called Basel role in which Charlemagne saw to the recording by his missi dominici of
Christian assets in the Holy Land. See McCormick, Charlemagnes Survey of the Holy Land,
pp. 199217, for the documents.
192Later traditions, solidified by Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims (Epist. no. 7), unfairly
identified Charles Martel as the major abuser of the church in regard to taking church
property to grant to his vassals. See Nonn, Das Bild Karl Martells, pp. 921; and Fouracre,
The Age of Charles Martel, pp. 183184.
193See Epist., no. 182, where Elipandus writes indicating to Alcuin that viginti millia
servorum habere dinoscris; and no. 200, where Alcuin admits to the accuracy of the figure
(multitudinem servorum usque viginti millia), but claims that he, himself, never pur-
chased any of these servi but all were gifts to the monasteries that were in his care. This
information likely became available to the Spanish bishops from Bishop Felix, whose see at
Urgel was in Frankish-controlled territory and who traveled to Gaul in 792. Regarding Felix,
introduction53
Royal power, both centrally and in the provinces, also benefited from
the high level of organization evident in the operations of the royal fisc.
The capitulary de Villis manifests this well-structured system of organiza-
tion, and its vigorous enforcement is indicated, for example, by various
sources including fragments of reports, which have survived despite their
fundamentally time-conditioned nature.194 The paradigmatic impact of
capitulary de Villis, as the organizing document for the administration of
the royal fisc, is demonstrated not only during Charlemagnes reign but
also by the continued use of its principal features to structure in outline
fiscal organization within the later Carolingian empire and its successor
states, both east and west, into the 10th century and even beyond.195 The
long-term and widespread impact of the types of documents that under-
girded Carolingian agricultural administration has led James Campbell to
suggest that they had an influence even in later Anglo-Saxon England.196
The highly efficient bipartite form of estate organization, which came
to be regarded as a more productive method for organizing land and
agricultural labor, replaced the latifundia that had dominated the rural
organization of the Roman world. This bipartite form of organization
dominated the region between the Loire and the Rhine by the 8th century,
but this was not the case in all areas of the regnum Francorum. Therefore,
when Charlemagne came to power, he undertook a policy to have
the bipartite form of organization established on estates in areas where
it had not yet been developed. For example, it has been shown that
Charlemagne enjoyed considerable success in enforcing the development
see Roger Collins, Early Medieval Spain: Unity and Diversity, 400800, 2nd ed. (New York,
1995), pp. 208209.
194See Metz, Das karolingische Reichsgut, pp. 1872, 220227, and passim, where the
importance of capitulary de Villis is made clear; Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?,
pp. 319343; and Campbell, The Capitulaire de Villis, pp. 243264. Regarding the fisc in Italy,
see Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis, pp. 392451.
195With regard to the continuity of estate structures, see, for example, Bachrach and
Bachrach, Continuity of written administration, pp. 109146; and David S. Bachrach, The
Written Word in Carolingian-Style Fiscal Administration under King Henry I, 919936,
German History, 28 (2010), 399423. Nelson, The Henry Loyn Memorial Lecture, p. 166,
takes note that specialization of function was already anticipated by Charlemagne in De
villis How long and in how many copies capitulary de Villis itself survived during the
Middle Ages cannot be ascertained, as only one copy thus far has been found.
196Observations on English Government from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century,
TRHS, 5th Series, XXC (1975), 3954; and reprinted in idem, Essays in Anglo-Saxon History
(London- Ronceverte, 1986), 115170, at 165166, where he calls attention to a letter by
Abbot Abbo of Fleury (d. 1004), who indicates that he has put to good use an inventory
from the time of Charlemagne (libri politici a temporibus magni Caroli). Abbo partici-
pated in English monastic reform during the later 10th century.
54 introduction
of the bipartite system on ecclesiastical estates in Bavaria.197 This process,

of course, should be understood as yet one more explicit instance which
documents Charlemagnes effectiveness at enforcing royal control at the
local level over the aristocracy.
Mining Assets
It has long been established that Charlemagne controlled the rich silver
mines at Melle in the northern reaches of the Poitou.198 However, only in
recent years have archaeologists been able to demonstrate that the vast
silver resources of the Harz Mountains, which gained great renown during
the Ottonian era, were also exploited effectively by Charlemagne.199 In
fact, silver mining in the Harz did not begin, as once thought, during the
10th century, but these natural resources had been exploited by the local
inhabitants since the 1st century b.c.200 In fact, trade goods from the
Roman Empire have been shown to have reached the Harz region in
exchange for silver mined there.201
More importantly in the present context, extensive datable archaeo-
logical remains have demonstrated a high level of early Carolingian
exploitation of Harz mineral wealth including not only silver but also
iron, lead, and copper. All of this Carolingian exploitation began prior to
the conquest of the Saxon region, as a whole, early in the 9th century.
In fact, toward the later part of the 8th century, Charlemagne ordered the
restructuring of the organization of the mining industry in the region.
Primarily, he centralized the sites where the silver was smelted from the
197See Sonnlechner, The Establishment of New Units, pp. 2148.

198See the brief introduction to this subject by Peter Spufford, Money and its use in
medieval Europe (Cambridge, 1988), p. 32.
199Harald Witthft, Early Medieval Mining and Smelting in the Harz Mountains
Historical perspectives, in Aspects of Mining and Smelting in the Upper Harz Mountains
(Up to the 13th/14th century-in the Early times of a Developing European Culture and
Economy), ed. Christiane Segers-Glocke and Harald Witthft (St. Katharinen, 2000), 99118;
and Hans-Jrgen Brachmann, Das Harz als Wirtsschaftsraum des frhen Mittelalters,
Harz Zeitschrift fr den Harz-Vereins fr Geschichte und Altertumskunde e.V, 43/44 (1992),
725.
200Lothar Klappauf, Studies of the Development and Structure of Early Metal
Production, in Aspects of Mining and Smelting in the Upper Harz Mountains (Up to the
13th/14th century-in the Early times of a Developing European Culture and Economy), ed.
Christiane Segers-Glocke and Harald Witthft (St. Katharinen, 2000), 129.
201Klappauf, Studies of the Development and Structure of Early Metal Production,
p. 22.
introduction55
ore. This likely was due to the need to bring fuel, i.e. trees or pre-
manufactured charcoal, for the smelters to a centralized place.202 In any
case, it seems likely that the coinage reforms inaugurated by Char
lemagnein 793794, which brought into use throughout his regnum the
heavyweight denarius, was made necessary by the increased production
of silver from the Harz.203 This growth in the quantities of available
silver threatened to undermine values denominated in this metal.204
Royal Coinage
In the context of the vast quantities of silver available to Charlemagne,

one additional index of the strength and effectiveness of his rule through-
out the Frankish kingdom and its environs remains to be examined,
namely royal control of coinage. During the 46 years of his reign,
Charlemagnes government carried out several thoroughgoing and highly
successful reforms of the coinage, dictated the location of mints, and
saw to it that a uniform coinage was dispersed throughout the regnum
Francorum. Even Italy was not neglected in this regard. This coinage,
which had considerable propaganda value by making Charlemagnes
image ubiquitous as the guarantor of sound money, also was an important
aspect of good government as it had considerable importance in main-
taining economic stability.205
In regard to the resources that were available to Charlemagne, it is to be
emphasized that the government gained initial mintage and restriking
profits (all foreign coins had to be brought to the mint and melted down),
and scholars are generally agreed that a reliable coinage also played an
important role in sustaining a lively commerce throughout Carolingian
lands. This activity contributed to royal income through various tolls and
other taxes. Simon Coupland, a specialist in Carolingian numismatics, has
asked: Was Charles the GreatCharlemagnereally great? He answers
202Klappauf, Studies of the Development and Structure of Early Metal Production,

pp. 8, 12, 17, 22.
203Witthft, Early Medieval Mining and Smelting, p. 99.
204See Bernard S. Bachrach, Diocletians Inflation: Primarily in Gaul, Cithara, 50
(2010), 325, for a discussion of economic disequilibrium in the context of a commodity
coinage caused by substantial changes in value of precious metals.
205The best general survey of Carolingian coins remains Philip Grierson and M.A.S.
Balckburn, Medieval European Coinage, vol. I The Early Middle Ages ( fifth through tenth
centuries) (Cambridge, 1986), 205210.
56 introduction
this question: On the basis of the numismatic evidence, the answer is

resoundingly positive.206
Plunder and Tribute
In recent years much has been made of the role of tribute and plunder,
tributa and praedae, in regard to the Carolingian economy. This especially
has been the case by those who are not specialists in economic history.207
Both of these sources of royal income, however, were, in general, compara-
tively small in relation to the economy as a whole, see above, and what-
ever impact that plunder and tribute may have had generally was of
limited duration.208 For example, King Pippin I is reported to have imposed
a tribute of up to 300 horses on a recently subdued group of Saxons in 758.
The Saxons were supposed to pay this tribute on an annual basis but there
is no confirmation that this, in fact, was done. Pippin spent most of the
period between 758 and his death in 768 campaigning in Aquitaine and, as
will be seen below, neglected Carolingian interests in the Saxon region.209
The value of this Saxon tribute of 758 in the best case, i.e. if war horses
were at issue, would have been worth more than 2,000 solidi as indicated
by the valuation provided in the Ripuarian law.210 However, it is rather
206Charlemagnes coinage: ideology and economy, in Charlemagne: Empire and

Society, ed. Johanna Story (Manchester-New York, 2005), 211239, and 211 for the
quotation.
207For this minimalist approach to the nature of the economy, to use Verhulsts char-
acterization, see Timothy Reuter, Plunder and Tribute in the Carolingian Empire, TRHS,
5 ser. 35 (1985), 7594; and reprinted in Timothy Reuter, Medieval Polities and Modern
Mentalities, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 231250, here 232234, where, despite an
exhaustive effort to list the taking of tribute by the Carolingians, comparatively few
instances have been identified and very few for Charlemagnes 46-year reign. In fact, Reuter
(p. 232), admits, For the Carolingian period we have rather fewer reports of tribute-
payments, largely because many of the regions from which the Merovingians had extracted
tribute had been incorporated into the Carolingian empire.
208Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 246, claims that his view of the Carolingian econ-
omy is realistic and not pessimistic. However, Reuters realism (p. 247) is firmly embed-
ded in literary fantasies, and he laments that his views could be better justified if we had
more in the way of Beowulf or Islandic saga material. Cf. Janet L. Nelson, The Henry
Loyn Memorial Lecture for 2006: Henry Loyn and the Context of Anglo-Saxon England,
HS, 19 (2007), 155175, who (p. 160) chides those who have become too enamored of Reuters
formula. She observes, Plunder and tribute may be all the rage, but what sense can be
made of the reign of Charlemagne if you have not read your capitularies and in particular
De Villis and their management by carefully supervised and accountable stewards?
209ARF, 758; and AE, 758. Whether the court sources exaggerated the terms of this
agreement in consonance with their strong pro-Carolingian bias must, at this time, remain
an open question.
210See LR., ch. 40 (36). 11, for a value of seven solidi per war horse.
introduction57
unlikely that war horses were at issue. The Saxons would seem not to have
trained in any large number for mounted combat operations and, there-
fore, it is highly unlikely that they trained their horses for military pur-
poses. If pack horses, draft horses, and riding horses were at issue, it is
important to emphasize that 300 of these types of animals, which were of
lesser value than a war horse, in any combination would likely not reach a
total of much in excess of 1000 solidi.211 In short, even if this tribute had
been rigorously enforced for several years, neither the number of horses,
in total, nor their value would have been very great as compared to the
other sources of income available to the royal government.
It is worth noting, for comparative purposes, that each year the studs
maintained on Charlemagnes fiscal properties regularly produced thou-
sands of horses.212 In addition, large numbers of horses were raised on the
estates of lay and ecclesiastical magnates, and likely a thousand or more
well-trained war horses were paid as a tax, e.g. dona and munera, each year
to Charlemagne by both secular and ecclesiastical magnates at the annual
spring military mobilization.213 In fact, when this tax was collected, each
horse that was turned over to Charlemagnes agents was required to have
attached to one of its ears a tag indicating who had provided the animal.
This very likely was done to meet the necessities of government
recordkeeping.214
211Bernard S. Bachrach, CABALLUS ET CABALLARIUS in Medieval Warfare, in The

Story of Chivalry, ed. H. Chickering and T. Seiler (Kalamazoo, 1988), 173211; and reprinted
with the same pagination in idem, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade
Europe (London, 2002), p. 177, n. 21, for the sources.
212See Carroll Gillmore, The Brevium Exempla as a Source for Carolingian War Horses,
The Journal of Medieval Military History, VI (2008), 3257, who discusses the order of mag-
nitude and sophistication of the administration of Carolingian horse breeding, and
observes (p. 45), These computations thus offer some support to the large-numbers side of
the Carolingian army size dispute. As of yet, I know of no study that deals with horse
breeding on lay and ecclesiastical estates during Charlemagnes reign. Given the fact that
both lay and ecclesiastical landowners or landholders owed horses as supposed gifts to
Charlemagne (see the note below), it is likely that they also bred horses.
213With regard to this tax, dona and munera, which was paid in horses, see Janet Nelson,
Introduction on behalf of the contributors, The Language of Gift in the Early Middle Ages,
ed. Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (Cambridge, 2010), 12. Nelson characterizes these, in
effect, as dues or taxes If each of some 100 bishops, 200 abbots, 500 counts, and 1,000
vassi dominici handed over only two animals to the royal government at the spring assem-
bly, this would amount to a total of some 3,400 war horses. Concerning the transfer of war
horses to Charlemagne at the annual spring mobilization, see Reuter, Plunder and
Tribute, pp. 240241, who, however, greatly underestimates the total number at about 200,
which Charlemagne likely received.
214CRF., I, no. 57. c. 5; see the discussion by Nelson, Literacy, p. 286.
58 introduction
The various requirements to pay tribute imposed by Charlemagne

would seem, in general, also to have been a very limited source of
income.215 For example, when a territory or its inhabitants were incorpo-
rated into the Carolingian regnum, e.g. the Saxon region in 777, the inhab-
itants were not required to pay tribute. Rather, as Charlemagnes subjects,
they were integrated, in principle, into the tax system of the Frankish
kingdom.216 A similar result was fashioned following the conquest of
the Lombard kingdom in 774, and no tribute was imposed. Rather, by
and large, during the period under discussion here, it seems that in the
erstwhile Lombard kingdom, fiscal institutions remained intact with
Charlemagne as rex Langobardorum receiving what previously had gone
to his Lombard predecessors.217 Moreover, Charlemagne also gained con-
trol of the Lombard military, which he mobilized and deployed in Spain as
early as 778.218
The matter of plunder, i.e. taking off movables, including slaves, from
areas that were invaded, as a percentage of the total royal income certainly
has been exaggerated.219 Among Charlemagnes military campaigns dis-
cussed in this volume, praedae is not often mentioned. For example, the
sources that discuss Charlemagnes reimposition of Carolingian ditio in
southern Aquitaine and in the Gascon ducatus in 769 provide no indica-
tion that the actual acquisition of booty was an important issue.220
In addition, military operations in Italy that led to the conquest and
control of the Lombard kingdom do not seem to have resulted in large
quantities of booty being acquired from throughout the northern parts of
the peninsula, either in the countryside or in the towns and cities, which
subsequently was carried north of the Alps into the regnum Francorum.
215Reuter, Plunder and tribute, p. 232, lists two firm examples of demands for tribute,
Beneventum and Brittany, but no evidence for follow-up. Nb. he observes that there is no
evidence regarding tribute supposedly paid by various Slavic groups.
216See Chapter Six, below.
217Chris Wickham, Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society, 400800
(London, 1981), pp. 4755.
218ARF., 778; and AE., 778.
219France, Armies of Charlemagne, pp. 6566, effectively criticizes Reuter for exag-
gerating the importance of plunder; and Arlie, Charlemagne, p. 95, also criticizes Reuter,
and suggests that there was less plunder and tribute that we might think. Here Airlie
follows Janet Nelson, The Frankish World (London, 1996), xxxiii-xix. Regarding the impor-
tance of the slave trade, which is an entirely different matter, see McCormick, Origins,
pp. 734, 738740 754. Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 233, calls attention to the taking of
slaves in Saxony in 796. However, this was not part of the regular slave trade, but rather a
punishment inflicted on royal subjects who had violated their obligations.
220See Chapter One, below.
introduction59
The surrender of the Lombard capital of Pavia after a siege of at least eight
months did not result in the city being sacked.221
The matter of booty during the period covered in this study arises in a
significant manner in only two instances, the destruction and sacking of
the Irminsul shrine in the Saxon region and the surrender of the Lombard
royal treasure, both one-time acquisitions.222 The Saxon region was much
poorer than either northern Italy or southwestern Gaul, and once the
Irminsul shrine had been looted there was hardly a great deal of additional
booty to be had. As John France observes, campaigning in Saxony where
the evidence is that of hard knocks and harsh conditions were more read-
ily available than plunder.223 In addition, during this period, there is no
evidence to suggest that in the wake of military operations, Charlemagne
regularly captured large numbers of Saxons and sent them west of the
Rhine to be sold as slaves.224
Military Resources
The once formidable and complex military organization of the

Merovingians had made possible effective campaigns not only throughout
Gaul and beyond the Rhine, but also both in Italy and in Spain. These
institutions, however, partially fell into disuse during the half-century
following the death of King Dagobert I in 639.225 Consequently, in the
process of reuniting the regnum Francorum, the early Carolingians sys-
tematically and incrementally reconstructed and significantly improved
221See Chapter Four, below, where there is a discussion of the capture of Pavia and the
distribution of the Lombard royal treasure.
222See Chapter Two, below. The capture of the Avar royal treasure was also a one-time
acquisition.
223France, Armies of Charlemagne, pp. 6566, for the quotation.
224Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 233, is able to identify only one instance in which
Charlemagne took Saxon slaves, and this was not part of a regular pattern, but a
punishment.
225The basic study remains Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization,
481751 (Minneapolis, 1972). However, for various additions and modifications, see idem,
Quelques observations sur la composition et les caractristiques des armes de Clovis, in
Clovis: Histoire et Mmoire, 2 vols., ed. Michel Rouche (Paris, 1997), 1, 689703; idem, The
Imperial Roots of Merovingian Military Organization, in Military Aspects of Scandinavian
Society in a European Perspective, ad. 11300, ed. Anne Norgard Jorgensen and Birthe L.
Clausen (Copenhagen, 1997), 2531 (in quarto); and idem, Merovingian Mercenaries,
pp. 167192. Cf. the scattered remarks by Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian
West, 450900 (New York, 2003), 121, 135, 138, 149, 152.
60 introduction
the military forces of the Frankish kingdom.226 In this context, the reha-
bilitation of the select levy is of considerable importance because its
members provided the substantial numbers of troops that were needed
for many of Charlemagnes expeditions aimed at territorial conquest.227
These levies were particularly important because large numbers of foot
soldiers were required to undertake sieges, especially the investment of
erstwhile Roman fortress cities, such as Avignon, Saragossa, Verona, Pavia,
and Barcelona.228 It is widely recognized, of course, that sieges dominated
early Carolingian warfare.229
Of particular importance in the development of the Carolingian mili-
tary was the creation of a General Staff, the Magistratus. It was certainly
operating under Charlemagne as both the institution itself, and its specific
functions are described in Adalhards De ordine palatii. It possibly may
have been created even as early at the reign of Pippin II, Mayor of the
Palace and victor at the battle of Tertry in 687.230 This institution, based at
the royal court, systematically developed military plans, or consilia as the
Roman imperial term tended to be used, which undergirded Charlemagnes
military operations. The Magistratus, according to Charlemagnes cousin
and close adviser, Adalhard of Corbie, was animated by the mantra ratio
et actio, first reason and then act.231
226Bachrach and Bowlus, Heerwesen, pp. 122136; in more detail, Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, passim; and the interesting observations by Barbero, Charlemagne,
pp. 249271.
227The composition of the select levy, indeed, its very existence, continues to be con-
troversial. Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, pp. 8991, for example, confounds the men, who
possessed rather limited landed or financial resources, but were required to participate,
when called upon, in expeditionary operations beyond their home territory with the obli-
gation imposed on all able-bodied men, regardless of wealth and status (clergy excepted),
to participate in the local defense. With typical British understatement, France, Armies of
Charlemagne, p. 66, points out that Reuters ideas need to be treated with some caution.
In this context, France notes that Reuters evidence, drawn from capitularies, is biased,
because almost all of the capitularies on almost all topics date from after 800 and we have
no proper base for making a comparison with what earlier material might have said. The
effort by Renaud, La politique, pp. 633, to deal with the matter of the select levy suffers
from the same methodological problem identified by France with regard to Reuter.
Renauds study is based also essentially on these same late capitularies.
228Regarding the need for such heavy manpower, see Bernard S. Bachrach and
Rutherford Aris, Military Technology and Garrison Organization: Some Observations on
Anglo-Saxon Military Thinking in Light of the Burghal Hidage, Technology and Culture
31 (1990), 117.
229The dominance of siege warfare under the early Carolingians is emphasized by
Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 268271; France, Armies of Charlemagne, p. 67; and Bachrach,
Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 202242.
230Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 350351.
231Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. VI (30).
introduction61
With the Magistratus in mind, Rosamond McKitterick has observed

that Charlemagnes Campaigns were subjected to meticulous strategic
planning 232 She notes, as well, that Charlemagnes network of com-
munications, with its great variety of means for acquiring knowledge of
all kinds, underlay the remarkable success of Charlemagnes armies.233
It may be added here, that in addition to the use of spies, to whom
McKitterick calls attention, it is very likely that the early Carolingians had
various types of maps available that could be used for military purposes.234
This, of course, was fully consistent with the teaching of Vegetius De re
Militari (bk. III, ch. 6), with whose text Charlemagne and his advisers, as
will be seen below, were well-acquainted. Some Carolingian maps, which
survive as verbal geographical descriptions, provide exceptional topo-
graphical detail from which the commanders of military forces could ben-
efit greatly in order to carry out operations.235
Military Demography
For the better part of a century, scholars believed, following the arguments
of Hans Delbrck, that medieval armies were very small. Now it is clear to
a wide variety of scholars, largely as a result of the work of Karl Ferdinand
Werner, that Delbrcks methods were irredeemably flawed.236 Werner,
233Charlemagne, p. 217. It is noteworthy that Richard Abels, Alfred the Great: War,
Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (Harlow, 1998), p. 159, calls attention to
Alfreds finely honed system of scouts and messengers, which along with careful plan-
ning and the mastery of logistics were fundamental to his military success.
234Regarding the use of spies, see McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 217. Concerning maps,
see Ernst Klebel, Herzogtmer und Marken bis 900, Deutsches Archive fr Geschichte des
Mittelalters, 2 (1938), 153, who mounts a compelling argument regarding their use by
Charlemagnes armies as a sine qua non for long-range pincer operations. For more recent
research regarding the availability and use of itineraries and maps by the early Carolingians,
see Emily Albu, Imperial Geography and the Medieval Peutinger Map, Imago Mundi,
37 (2005), 136148.
Cf. France, The Armies of Charlemagne, p. 82, who does not seem aware of Klebels
work. Bachrachs work on the Magistratus would appear to have appeared too late to influ-
ence Frances assertion that Charlemagne had no machinery of command such as had
been enjoyed by the Roman emperors and which began to develop again after the twelfth
century. France, however, cites neither scholarly work nor sources to sustain his views on
this matter.
235DK, I, 84, provides an excellent example; and see the discussion by Bachrach,
Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 336337.
236Heeresorganization und Kriegsfhrung im deutschen Knigreich des 10. und 11.
Jahrhunderts, SSCI, 15 (Spoleto, 1968), 791843. For additional detail regarding the flaws in
Delbrcks methods, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Medieval Military Demography: Some
62 introduction
however, did more than discredit the old orthodoxy. He developed a

compelling methodology, based upon a sound quantitative evaluation of
a matrix of various early Carolingian institutional and administrative
structures for estimating the order of magnitude of heavily-armed
mounted troops who were available to Charlemagne for mobilization
from throughout the regnum Francorum.237 It is now also widely agreed
that Charlemagnes government commanded the administrative infra-
structure to sustain the mobilization of very large armies.238
In this context, Werner estimated that Charlemagne had available for
military operations somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 heavily-armed
mounted troops.239 He suggested, as well, that there were also in excess of
100,000 lightly-armed horsemen and foot soldiers who potentially could
be mobilized for military operations.240 This latter figure probably is a
substantial underestimate.241 Such an undercount of Carolingian military
Observations on the Methods of Hans Delbrck, in The Circle of War, ed. Donald Kagay
and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, 1999), 320.
Werners critique of Delbrcks methodology has been widely accepted. See, for exam-
ple, Timothy Reuter, The End of Carolingian Military Expansion, in Charlemagnes Heir:
New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger
Collins (Oxford, 1990), 391405; and reprinted in Timothy Reuter, Medieval Polities and
Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet L. Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 251267, here 259, n. 38, who
observed that Werners critique is a (justifiable) polemic against the views of Lot and
Delbrck. Among other scholars who have accepted Werners critique of previous small
army scholarship, see, for example, Philippe Contamine, La Guerre au Moyen Age (Paris,
1980; 4th ed. 1994), 101103; Charles Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Sturggle
for the Middle Danube, 788907 (Philadelphia, 1995), 19; Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 265
266; France, Armies of Charlemagne, p. 69; Eric Goldberg, Struggle for Empire: Kingship
and Conflict under Louis the German, 817876 (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 124126; Renaud, La poli-
tique militaire, pp. 23; and Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces:
An Essay in Military Demography, in La conduccin de la guerra en la Edad Media:
Historiografa (Actas del Symposium Internacional celebrado en Cceres, Noviembre
2008), ed. Manuel Rojas (Cseres, 2012), 1114 (in press).
237Heeresorganization, pp. 791843.
238Timothy Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, in Medieval Warfare: A History,
ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 28, agrees that Werners methods have identified the
theoretical maximum order of magnitude of able-bodied fighting men who were avail-
able to Charlemagne through Carolingian institutional structures for expeditionary ser-
vice. Others who agree are, for example, Contamine, La Guerre, pp. 101103; Bowlus, Franks,
p. 19; Campbell, The Late Anglo-Saxon State, p. 29; Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 265266;
France, Armies of Charlemagne, p. 69, who accepts Werners calculations as a statement
of military potential; Goldberg, Struggle for Empire, pp. 124126; Renaud, La politique
militaire, pp. 23; and Bachrach, Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 1114.
239Heeresorganization, pp. 820821; and idem, Histoire de France: Les Origines (avant
lan mil) (Paris, 1984), 377, where he recalculated upward toward a figure of 50,000 mounted
troops.
240Heeresorganization, pp. 821822.
241Cf. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 58, who put forth a theoretical model of
100,000 potential fighting men, but calculates Carolingian resources somewhat differently
introduction63
potential is especially likely when one takes into consideration that the
total population of Charlemagnes regnum was in the neighborhood of 20
million people, with some 6 million males between the ages of 15 and 55
potentially available for some sort of military service.242 Werner correctly
maintained that all of the troops which potentially were available for mili-
tary service never were mobilized at one time for a single campaign. He
makes clear that matters such as topography, logistics, and strategic objec-
tives tended to result in only a percentage of all potentially available
troops being mobilized.243 He did affirm, however, that on occasion,
Charlemagne mobilized large armies, which included between 15,000
20,000 heavily-armed cavalry and correspondingly proportional contin-
gents of foot soldiers and support troops.244 On the whole, therefore,
several armies engaged in a single theater of operations, such as for the
invasion of the Avar empire in 791, could number in total some 60,000. In
this campaign, logistical support was provided for the several columns of
the Carolingian army by river boats and barges deployed on the Danube.245
As noted above, Werners critique of the methods used by the tradi-
tional small army school of historians, as epitomized by Delbrck and
Lot, have been accepted almost universally by specialists.246 In addition,
also as seen above, scholars are agreed that Werners methods for identify-
ing the theoretical maximum for the potential order of magnitude of
heavily-armed mounted fighting men in Charlemagnes army are sound.
from the way in which Werner did. Bachrach (pp. 236237) never claims that Charlemagne
actually put an army of some 100,000 effectives into the field. Cf. the observations by Simon
Coupland, The Carolingian Army and the Struggle Against the Vikings, Viator, 25 (2004),
56; and Renaud, La politique, p. 1, who both mistakenly assert that Bachrach claimed that
Charlemagne mobilized armies of 100,000 troops.
242Regarding the total population in the 20-million range, see Schneider, Das
Frankenreich, p. 124. Concerning the age groups, see Ansley Coale and Paul Demeny,
Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations (Princeton, 1966); and S.H. Preston,
A. McDaniel, and C. Grushka, A new model life table for high-mortality populations,
Historical Methods, 26 (1994), 149159.
243Heeresorganization, pp. 815816. Cf. France, The Armies of Charlemagne, p. 69,
who seems to misread Werner here.
244Heeresorganization, p. 816.
245Werner, Heeresorganization, p. 816. Concerning the details for this campaign, see
Walter Pohl, Die Awaren: Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567822 n. Chr. (Munich, 1988),
pp. 315320, who does not address Werners troop estimates.
246A noteworthy exception is Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 119, and p. 268, n. 1, who
enthusiastically embraces Delbrcks small-army approach and lauds his methods. The
same is true for the archaeologist Heiko Steuer, Bewaffnung und Kriegsfhrung der
Sachsen un Franken, in 799, III, 310322, at 322, who believes that an upper limit for
Charlemagnes armies of combined mounted and foot soldiers should be put at between
5,000 and 6,000 effectives. He provides no evidence for these assertions.
64 introduction
Some scholars, however, doubt that at least some of the large forces
postulated by Werner were as numerous as he estimated. For example,
Contamine believed that Werner had been trop optimistes in his
estimate that Charlemagne had mobilized between 15,000 and 20,000
heavily-armed mounted troops for the Avar campaign of 796. Contamine,
however, neither provides an alternative estimate nor explains the reasons
for his skepticism.247
Other scholars, however, do not merely quibble regarding one or
another campaign, but reject tout court Werners estimates regarding the
size of the armies that Charlemagne actually put into the field, e.g. for
operations against the Avars. For example, Reuter, without doubting the
efficient functioning of the requisite administrative structures that were
in place to mobilize large armies, emphasizes that Werner only identified
what was theoretically possible and not, in fact, what was done.248 Reuter
is correct on this point. However, in this context, he does not examine the
contemporary and near-contemporary Carolingian narrative sources
which consistently make clear that Charlemagne raised large armies.249
247See Contamine, La Guerre, p. 103, for the quotation. Renaud, La politique, p. 3,

claims that the majority of specialists are skeptical regarding the large size of the armies
that Werner postulated. This majority, according to Renaud (n. 10), are Halsall, Warfare
and Society, p. 132; France, Armies of Charlemagne, pp. 8082, and Coupland, The
Carolingian army, p. 56. As noted, above, Halsall has accepted Delbrcks small-army doc-
trine, a point which is also noted by Renaud, p. 3, n. 10. France, also as noted above, holds
the no longer tenable belief that Charlemagne was kept from mobilizing large forces by his
inability to have an over-mighty aristocracy do his bidding, and Couplands focus is on war
with the Vikings, which by and large was defensive, and his work is not relevant to a general
discussion of the size of Charlemagnes expeditionary forces.
Among those specialists who see Charlemagne and his successors as mobilizing large
armies, see Bowlus, Franks, p. 19; Goldberg, Struggle for Empire, pp. 124126; Bachrach,
Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 4041; and David S. Bachrach and Bernard S.
Bachrach, Early Saxon Frontier Warfare: Henry I, Otto I, and Carolingian Military
Institutions, Journal of Medieval Military History, 9 (2012), 1760.
248This point is made well by Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, p. 28.
249The easiest way to gain access to these sources on a year-by-year basis is through
J.F. Bhmer and Engelbert Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii: Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter
den Karolingern, 751918, I (Innsbruck, 1908), pp. 60250. For an important critique of these
sources, especially in regard to their biases, see McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 156, and
the extensive literature cited there.
Cf. France, The Armies of Charlemagne, who (p. 72) claims that Charlemagne was
often short of men; p. 75, that the king [was] short of men at various times; and p. 79, that
Charlemagne always faced difficulties in finding troops. However, France cites no sources
which indicate directly that Charlemagne was faced with difficulties in mobilizing large
numbers of troops, much less that this always was the case. In fact, when France (p. 72),
actually treats the sources directly, his methods are suspect. For example, in regard to
Charlemagnes military operations in Aquitaine in 769, France tells his readers that accord-
ing to the ARF for the year 769, Charlemagne attacked Hunoald of Aquitaine with the
support of only a few Franks. Actually, the text says that with a few Franks he destroyed
introduction65
Reuter also does not take into consideration that this Tendenz in the
Carolingian narrative texts to credit Charlemagne with mobilizing large
armies, and even very large armies, is fundamentally anomalous in ancient
and medieval historiography. As Delbrck demonstrated, it is contrary to
the lengthy Western tradition in which biased sources, similar to the type
known to have been written at the Carolingian royal court, depict as small
in size the armies led by their hero. Prior to Charlemagne, source bias
almost universally had manifested itself by claiming that the hero com-
manded small armies or, at the least, that he commanded armies smaller
than those mobilized by his adversaries.250
Logistical Determinism
Without reference to these sources, Reuter proclaims concerning the

Carolingians, it seems doubtful that armies much larger than 1,0003,000
could have survived for any length of time before inflicting starvation both
on themselves and on the surrounding countryside.251 At this point,
Reuter relies on an argument that is based on logistical determinism. He
expands this scenario and claims that armies which numbered in the
10,000 range moving around the countryside would have left swathes
of destruction everywhere more comparable with the downwind ellipse
of fallout from a nuclear weapon.252 This obvious exaggeration is taken
Hunoalds nefarious plan. Nothing is said regarding a direct attack by Charlemagnes

troops on Hunoalds forces in ARF or AE for 769.
The author of the ARF, however, does say that at the urbs of Angoulme, Charlemagne
provided himself with many Franks (plures Francos), i.e. many more than the few he
had with him at the start of the campaign. France paraphrases this later part of the text by
saying: he [Charlemagne] gathered forces at Angoulme and there were enough to end
the rebellion. Conspicuous in this paraphrase is the omission of the phrase plures
Francos, which seems to me to be crucial to any discussion regarding the order of magni-
tude of one or another military force. France also fails to consider AE, where the author
affirms that Charlemagne gathered a great many troops from all quarters (et inde con-
tractis undique copiis).
250See Hans Delbrck, Numbers in History (London, 1913), pp. 1116; and idem, Delbrck,
Art of War, II, 227. On this point, see also the discussion by Bachrach, Early Medieval
Military Demography, pp. 56.
251Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, p. 30.
252See Reuter, Recruitment, p. 36, for the quotation. However, in Plunder and
Tribute, Reuter, pp. 234236, is unable to produce any examples of Charlemagnes armies
causing massive damage in the Frankish kingdom because of a lack of supplies. Of course,
this makes possible the circular argument that no damage worth recording was done
because Charlemagnes armies were small. The Danish archaeologist, Jan Bill, Viking Ages
ships and seafaring in the West, in Viking Trade and Settlement in Continental Western
Europe, ed. Iben Skibsted Klaesoe (Copenhagen, 2010), 39, categorizes Reuter as among
those whom he considers minimalist military historians.
66 introduction
seriously by Halsall, who asserts that Reuter was correct when he imag-
ined that a force of 10,000 troops on the march would have an effect that
was analogous to the down-wind ellipse of fall-out from a nuclear
weapon.253
In the course of using analogies with modern weapons, neither Reuter
nor Halsall recognizes that the Carolingian narrative sources do not accuse
Charlemagnes armies that were operating within the regnum Francorum
of devastating the countryside.254 The clerical authors at Charlemagnes
court fail to follow the model articulated, for example, by Gregory of Tours
in his well-known Ten Books of History, and which was followed by many
others, where he highlights earlier Frankish armies doing a great deal of
damage within their own regions.255 Of course, in light of the biased
nature of all narrative sources, it is of some importance that the vast quan-
tity of charters produced by numerous monasteries during Charlemagnes
reign are uniformly silent regarding local damage caused by his armies
within the various parts of the Frankish kingdom through which they
marched. This is especially noteworthy in regard to the region of the mid-
dle Rhine where early in his reign the spring mobilization often took
place.256
It is worthwhile noting that even when armies went on lengthy marches during the
Middle Ages with the intention of inflicting serious damage, the sources often exaggerate
the situation. See, for example, Jacqueline Caille, Nouveaux regards sur lattaque du Prince
Noir contre Narbonne en Novembre 1555, Bulletin de la Socit dtudes scientifiques de
lAude 109 (2009), 89103, who discusses a force estimated to have been between 10,000 and
20,000 effectives during these operations.
253See Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 129, for the quotation.
254Janet Nelson, Violence in the Carolingian world and the ritualization of ninth-
century warfare, in Violence and Society in the Early Medieval West, ed. Guy Halsall
(Woodbridge, 1998), 90107, at 93, asserts that Legal documents also testify to much ille-
gitimate violence perpetrated by armies against the peasantry of their own kingdom
encountered en route However, the references that she provides do not implicate
Charlemagnes armies in such violence while they were operating within the borders of the
regnum Francorum.
255In this context, two points are noteworthy. First, Halsall, Warfare and Society,
pp. 127128, recognizes, following Goffart, that some clerical authors, e.g. Gregory of Tours,
likely played up stories indicating great damage done by armies on the march and told
them in as much lurid, rhetorical detail as possible, whilst probably keeping quiet about
campaigns or troops movements which were well conducted and did not cause much mis-
ery and disruption. Secondly, Halsall (pp. 149152) in treating Charlemagnes military
operations finds no lurid, rhetorical detail in the stories that were told regarding
Charlemagnes armies as they marched through the Frankish kingdom.
256With regard to the middle Rhine area, see Innis, State and Society, passim, where no
evidence is presented that Charlemagnes armies while passing through the Frankish king-
dom on the way to war beyond the frontiers caused vast amounts of damage to the coun-
tryside or to the local population.
introduction67
Logistical determinism assumes, quite reasonably, that eventually an

upper limit is imposed upon the size of any army over time in relation to
its capacity to be supplied. In this context, it is clear that, in general, the
men who served in Charlemagnes military forces, should they have
remained at home, would not have lacked for food. Therefore, those who
claim Charlemagnes armies would destroy the countryside assume that it
was not possible for the Carolingians to provide adequate supplies for
their troops while on the march within the borders of the Frankish king-
dom. The basic argument pressed is that the cities of the Frankish
kingdom had small populations, much smaller than the size of the armies
that Charlemagne potentially could mobilize according to Werner.
Therefore, large armies could not be fed and, thus, were not mobilized.257
It is clear, however, that the size of urban populations during this period
has been underestimated by those who make this argument.258
In evaluating the arguments of the logistical determinists, it is to be
noted, at the outset, that Reuter and others accept as fact that within the
borders of the regnum Francorum, there were royal roads and royal
estates which could permit the provisioning of armies en route [to enemy
territory].259 The Carolingian government, of course, required on a regu-
lar basis that ecclesiastical institutions provide substantial contributions
257Reuter Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, p. 30, observes: Even the largest towns
of northern Europe probably did not exceed a population of 15,00020,000 and most
were far smaller Therefore, Charlemagnes armies would have been two or three times
larger than the largest towns north of the Alps in the 8th and 9th cent Reuter continues
and argues that even these fixed and predictable locations [the towns] needed a highly
developed infrastructure to survive and, therefore, large armies could not be supplied.
Reuters argument founders for several reasons. First, he assumes that by ca. 800 every
town north of the Alps had reached its maximum population limits because of logistical
determinants. Secondly, he is unaware of the basic logistical principle that it is much easier
to move large numbers of people to a source of food than the opposite. On this point, see
the discussion by Jonathan P. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 bc-ad 235)
(Leiden, 1999), 156222.
258For modern demographic studies, see Bairoch, Batou, and Chvre, La population,
who provide a corpus of population estimates for the larger cities of Charlemagnes reg
num: Cologne 15,000 (p. 6), Mainz 20,000 (p. 7), Regensburg 25,000 (p. 8), Speyer 20,000
(p. 8), Trier 15,000 (p. 9), Worms 10,000 (p. 9), Lyon 12,000 (p. 27), Metz 25,000 (p. 27), Paris
25,000 (p. 28), Poitiers 10,000 (p. 28); Provins, 10,000 (p. 28), Rennes 10,000 (p. 28), Rouen
10,000 (p. 29), and Tours 20,000 (p. 30).
259See Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, p. 30, for the quotations, and
Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 265266. Concerning the estates of the royal fisc providing
logistical support, it is widely recognized that Capitulary de Villis established numerous
aspects of logistic organization with regard to supplying the army. See, for example,
Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy, p. 127; and Bachrach, Are they Not Like Us?,
pp. 119134. However, Campbell, The Capitulary de Villis, pp. 243264, is certainly correct
in pointing out that this capitulary was concerned with more than military matters.
68 introduction
of logistic support, including carts needed for transport purposes, in order

to sustain royal armies on the march and in the field, and, indeed, various
ecclesiastical magnates are known to have complained about these bur-
dens.260 Reuter himself recognizes that Carolingian military forces were
accompanied by carts with food for the men and fodder for the animals,
and by cattle and sheep on the hoof. Nevertheless, he asserts, the point
must quite soon have been reached at which the whole operation would
have ground to a halt under its own weight.261
None of those scholars who have adopted a determinist posture have
done the calculations in a particular context which are necessary to prove
that quite soon the whole operation would have ground to a halt.262
By contrast, it is well-understood by modern scholars that large Roman
armies of both the late Republic and the Empire operated in Gaul for more
than four centuries and only destroyed the countryside when this was an
element of their campaign strategy. Charlemagne and his advisers had
access to large amounts of information regarding such imperial military
operations in Gaul on the basis of Roman accounts written by historians
260Durliat, La polyptyque, pp. 183208, demonstrates that the monastery of Saint-

Germain-des-Prs contributed on an annual basis more than half of the rents it collected
from its tenants to the support of the royal army. Konrad Elmshuser, Facit Navigium:
Schiffahrt auf Seine, Marne, Mosel und Rhein in Quellen zur frhmittelalterlichen
Grundherschaft,in Hfen-Schiffe Wasserwege: Zur Schiffahrt des Mittelalters, ed. Detlev
Ellmers (Bremerhaven, 2002), 2253, makes clear that the various monastic houses north of
the Loire possessed large numbers of vehicles which also were used for commercial pur-
poses. With regard to the specially built war wagons (basternae) which Charlemagne
ordered constructed, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations: An
Introduction to Technological Perspectives, in The Art, Science, and Technology of Medieval
Travel, ed. Robert Bork and Andrea Kann (Aldershot, 2008), 1729.
261See Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, p. 30, for the quotations.
262See, for example, Renaud, La politique, p. 4; and Coupland, The Carolingian
Army, 4970. By contrast, Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 265268, makes an effort, in the
abstract, to calculate the size of supply trains. He uses the data provided by Bachrach,
Animals and Warfare, pp. 707764 (see loc. cit. p. 404), but does not identify any particular
context and does not give sufficient attention either to the availability of water transport,
both riverine and oceanic, or to pre-positioned reserves, although he acknowledges that
rivers were used for transport purposes and magazines were established to maintain logis-
tical support for troops on the march. Steuer, Bewaffnung und Kriegsfhrung, p. 322,
echoes the views of the logistical determinists.
Halsall, Warfare and Society, pp. 12630, 14951, does not provide a cogent treatment of
logistics comparable to that by Barabero and relies, au fond, on Reuters city-model.
However, Halsall rejects the estimate of the population of the city of Paris at between
10,000 and 15,000 people as provided by Philippe Velay, From Lutetia to Paris: The Island and
the Two Banks, trans. Miriam L. Kochan (Paris, 1992), p. 109. Rather, he asserts (p. 129) that
an army of 10,000 men would be double the size of the population of Paris. As noted above,
demographic specialists, e.g. Bairoch, Batou, and Chvre, La population des villes europe
nnes, p. 28, estimate the population of Paris ca. 800 as in the 25,000 range.
introduction69
such as Caesar and Ammianus Marcellinus.263 Consequently, they had the

opportunity to understand what could be done with the proper equip-
ment on the very same roads that the Romans used.264 Or, to put it another
way, there is no reason, prima facie, that Charlemagnes armies could not
have done as well as their Roman predecessors when marching in Gaul.
There are numerous logistical studies, both models in the abstract and
calculations applied to particular historical operations, in which scholars
have developed estimates relevant to the effective supply of forces on the
march. These models provide the quantitative data concerning the sup-
plies needed by armies of various size, and both the numbers and types of
vehicles needed to transport supplies so that the upper limits of logistic
requirements can be ascertained.265 With the primitive transportation
263For historical texts available to the Carolingians regarding large Roman armies
marching in Gaul, see, for example, the Gesta by Ammianus Marcellinus (L.D. Reynolds,
Ammianus Marcellinus, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 68; and Bischoff, Manuscripts
and Libraries, pp. 150, 151, 157); Florus (Marshall, Florus, in Texts and Transmission,
pp. 164166); Livy (L.D. Reynolds, Livy, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 205214); and
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 8, 16, 75, 116, 123, 125; 130, 133147, 153; Scriptores
Historiae Augustae (P.K. Marshall, Scriptores Historiae Augustae, in Texts and
Transmission, 354356; and Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 118, 120, 150); Suetonius
(M.D. Reeve, Suetonius, in Texts and Transmission, 399406; and Bischoff, Manuscripts
and Libraries, pp. 133, 143145, 150); Tarrant, Tacitus, in Texts and Transmission,
pp. 406409; Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 150, 153); Velleius Paterculus
(L.D. Reynolds, Velleius Paterculus, in Texts and Transmission, 431433; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, p. 148).
264McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 378, points out that the earliest surviving mss. of
Caesars Gallic Wars are from the first and second quarters of the 9th century and that,
thus far, this text has not been linked to Charlemagnes court. Here, she relies on
M. Winterbottom, Caesar, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 3536, which is very thin, but
does not cite Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 144, 146. It is not clear whether this
aspect of the manuscript tradition, as presently known, can rule out the possibility that
this text was known to Charlemagne and/or to his advisers. It was certainly known by the
author of the ARF. an., 782, where he quotes Caesar De bello gallico, II, 2. See the discussion
by F.L. Ganshof, Charlemagnes Army, in Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, trans.
B. and M. Lyon (Providence, RI, 1968), 159, n. 57. It is generally agreed that the author of
ARF worked at the royal court.
Insofar as information concerning the road system of Gaul is concerned with the move-
ment of large Roman armies and, by extension, of large Carolingian armies, which is the
point of this note, the Historia Libri Duo of Velleius Paterculus, for example, is more impor-
tant than Caesars Gallic Wars. Velleius (d. ca. a.d. 30) discussed military operations in Gaul
and beyond the Rhine after many of the most important Roman roads had been con-
structed during the reign of Augustus (d. a.d. 14). By contrast, Caesar (d. 44 b.c.) did not
have the good fortune to have been able to take advantage of the system of roads initiated
by Marcus Agrippa, which was carried out under Augustus and his successors.
265Among various works of exceptional value to help the non-specialist to understand
logistics in pre-modern times, see regarding the ancient world, Donald Engels, Alexander
the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley, 1978); Marcus Junkelmann,
Die Legionen des Augustus: Der rmische Soldat in archologische Experiment (Mainz, 1986);
70 introduction
facilities that were the norm in pre-modern Europe, i.e. prior to railroads
and steam ships, individual armies well in excess of 40,000 effectives, i.e.
not including support elements, were provided with supplies without
resulting in the destruction of the local population and their lands.266
An examination of Charlemagnes military operations provides the
basic information regarding how and why his armies did not destroy the
countryside while on the march. First, Charlemagnes military forces
were mobilized initially in small locally-based units within each pagus
where the fighting men dwelled who were mobilized for expeditionary
service. Then, these small units marched as self-contained groups to the
site of the general muster.267 It is likely that only a hundred or perhaps
as many as two hundred men, in general, would be mustered from any
particular pagus that was required to send troops for a forthcoming cam-
paign. A mere 200 men from each of only 200 of the some 600 or more pagi
in the regnum Francorum would amount to a force of 40,000 effectives.
Of course, in some overpopulated areas, e.g. the Paris region and the valley
of the Seine, in general, it is likely that larger contingents could be mobi-
lized.268 Secondly, Charlemagne traditionally established the site for the
Adrian K. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War: 100bc-ad 200 (Oxford, 1996); and Roth,
Logistics.
Concerning the Middle Ages, see the tour de force by Yuval Noah Harari, Strategy and
Supply in fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns, The Journal of
Military History, 64 (2000), 297333, which provides sufficient facts and figures to under-
mine minimalist speculations regarding logistics. Bowlus, Franks, pp. 1832, makes very
good use of many of these methodological advances. See also Bernard S.Bachrach, Animals
and Warfare, pp. 707764; idem, Some Observations on the Military Administration of the
Norman Conquest, in Anglo Norman Studies VIII, ed. R. Allen Brown (Woodbridge, 1986),
125; idem, Logistics in Pre-Crusade Europe, in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare
from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder, CO, 1993), 5778; and David
S. Bachrach, Military Logistics during the Reign of Edward I of England, 12721307, War in
History, 13 (2006), 5778.
For the early modern era, John Lynn, Food, Funds, and Fortresses: Resource Mobilization
and Positional Warfare in the Campaigns of Louis XIV, in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western
Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder, CO, 1993), 137159,
is an excellent guide to the literature.
266Regarding Alexander the Great, see Engels, Alexander; for Roman armies recruited
in Italy, see P.A. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 b.c.-a.d. 14 (Oxford, 1971), pp. 417312; for Louis
XIV, see Lynn, Food, funds, and Fortresses, pp. 137159; and for the Turkish siege of Vienna
in 1529, which saw the deployment of 125,000 men, see Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare.
The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 14941660 (London, 1979), p. 201.
267Mobilization orders to individual magnates, who were responsible for mustering
their contingents, were severely time-conditioned, and thus few survive. The most detailed
of these to have survived was sent to Abbot Fulrad of St. Quentin (CRF, I, no. 75). See
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 228, 272. In this context, it is noteworthy that these local
units possessed banners under which they marched; see CRF, II, no. 274, ch. 13.
268Regarding the overpopulation of the Seine valley, see Verhulst, The Carolingian
Economy, pp. 13, 2328; and Zerner, La population, pp. 1724.
introduction71
muster for the entire army on the borders of the Frankish kingdom.269
Therefore, when large Carolingian armies were mobilized for invasions of
enemy territory, they did not march en masse through the regnum
Francorum, but arrived from different directions at different times at the
muster a few hundred men at a time at most.270
Within the Frankish kingdom itself, the matrix of river systems enabled
individual units, if necessary, to transport their supplies, including vehi-
cles and cattle on the hoof, on barges or other types of river craft.271
In addition, as is widely accepted, the Carolingians were accustomed to
using prepositioned magazines along the route of the march to help in
providing logistical support in a timely manner.272 As a result, no local
area likely was burdened too greatly by the requisition of supplies on an
ad hoc basis and even more importantly without sufficient preparation.273
Further, the regnum Francorum was criss-crossed by numerous Roman
roads, which, as made clear above, were maintained in operable condition
at the local level under royal supervision.274 Efforts directed by the royal
269Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, 1, 60250, provide the details. See, for
example, Abbot Fulrad (CRF., I, no. 75), who was required to lead his contingent from
St. Quentin near Amiens some 800 kilometers to the general muster at Strassfurt on the
Saxon frontier near Magdeburg.
270This will be seen in detail throughout the study, infra, of Charlemagnes military
operations examined in this volume.
271For a general survey, see Dieter Hgermann, Karl der Grosse und die Schiffahrt, in
Hfen-Schiffe Wasserwege: Zur Schiffahrt des Mittelalters, ed. Detlev Ellmers (Bremerhaven,
2002), 1121; and for a more thoroughly documented study, Elmshuser, Facit Navigium,
pp. 2253. Detlev Ellmers, Post-Roman Waterfront Installations on the Rhine, in
Waterfront Archaeology in Britain and Northern Europe: A Review of Current Research in
Waterfront Archaeology in Six European Countries Based on Papers Presented to the First
International Conference on Waterfrom Archaeology in Northern European Towns, ed. Gustav
Milne and Brian Hobley (London 1981), 88, calls attention to ferries that were large enough
to carry carts, horses, and cattle. Other specialized craft were made for the transport of
barrels. Also of importance are several works by Aleydis van de Moortel, The Utrecht Type:
Adaptation of an Inland Boat Building Tradition to Urbanization and Growing Maritime
Contacts in Medieval Northern Europe,; and eadem, The Utrecht Ship type: An Expanded
Longboat Tradition in its Historical Context, both in Between the Seas: Transfer and
Exchange Contacts in Nautical Technology, ed. Ronald Bockius (Mainz, 2009), 321327,
329336, respectively.
272The point is noted by Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 269.
273For a detailed study regarding how this was done, see Strmer, Zur Frage, pp. 379
403; and for further elaboration, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagnes Cavalry: Myth
and Reality, Military Affairs, 47 (1983), 181187, in 4o.; and reprinted in idem, Armies and
Politics in the Early Medieval West (London, 1993), 78.
274Information concerning the high quality of the Roman roads is provided by charters
and other documents and not only from biased narrative sources that may have intended
to make the infrastructure of Charlemagnes regnum appear more efficient and more
Roman than it was in fact. With regard to these roads, which were utilized extensively
by monasteries for transporting their surplus production for commercial purposes
72 introduction
government to maintain the physical infrastructure of the Frankish king-

dom were thoroughly established under Charlemagnes rule.275
The care of roads and bridges was so assiduously overseen by the
Carolingian government that the institutions which saw to the mainte-
nance of the infrastructure were still operative during the reign of
Charlemagnes grandson, Louis the German (d. 876), even in the eastern
reaches of the kingdom which had not been a part of the Roman Empire.276
In discussing this tradition, Notker of St. Gall emphasized the important
role played by counts and by laymen under royal supervision in carrying
out repairs on the roads and the building of new components, e.g. bridges
and canals, to improve the infrastructure at Charlemagnes orders.277 Since
Notker was using the behavior of Charlemagne and Louis the German as
examples to encourage Charles the Fat to follow in their footsteps, it is
possible that the Monk of St. Gauls patron was not as assiduous in this
matter as had been his great-grandfather.
Once the borders of the regnum Francorum had been crossed, it was
the case that Charlemagnes armies often operated within territories that
once had been part of the Roman Empire, e.g. Italy, parts of the Balkans,
and northeastern Spain. Therefore, these forces, in general, had access to
the Roman road system that was similar to that which had survived
in Gaul.278 Beyond the Rhine frontier, important road systems also had
been constructed during the period between the withdrawal of impe-
rial forces from the region and the imposition of Carolingian regnum.
Under Charlemagne, these older roads were serviced and new ones were
throughout the region between the Seine and the Rhine, see Elmshuser, Facit Navigium,
pp. 2253.
275Cf. Renaud, La politique militaire, p. 4, who, apparently unaware of the extensive
work done on Carolingian administration, claims that the linfrastructure existante was
mdiocre, and following Reuter and Halsall (see above), claims without evidence that un
trs grande arme, en pays ennemi comme dans le royaume franc, soulevait denormes
difficults dapprovisionnement en nourriture et en fourrage. Renaud makes no reference
to logistical studies (see above) which provide the details regarding approvisionnement
en nourriture et en fourrage. Thus, Renaud concludes, Aussi admet-on gnralement que,
pour des raisons logistiques, une arme en marche ne pouvait gure dpasse la cap des
10,000 combattants
276Goldberg, Struggle for Empire, p. 225.
277GK, I, 80. In this context, see Hans Hubert Hofmann, Fossa Carolina Versuch einer
Zussammenschau, in Karl der Grosse, I, 43753; and Robert Koch, Fossa Carolina. Neue
Erkenntnisse zum Schifffahrtskanal Karls des Grossen, Hfen-Schiffe Wasserwege: Zur
Schiffahrt des Mittelalters, ed. Detlev Ellmers (Bremerhaven, 2002), 5470, with the exten-
sive literature cited there.
278For useful guidance, see Raymond Chevallier, Roman Roads, trans. N.H. Field
(Berkeley, 1976); and Victor W. Von Hagen, The Roads that Led to Rome (Cleveland-
New York, 1967).
introduction73
constructed following the same institutional regulations that were

employed throughout the Frankish kingdom. In addition, Charlemagne
saw to the construction of bridges.279 Beyond the borders of the Frankish
kingdom, there also were numerous navigable rivers, where boats of the
type noted above could be used to ferry large quantities of supplies in
order to support substantial numbers of troops without clogging the roads
and slowing the pace of marching columns.
A Comparative Dimension
In lieu of examining logistical studies of the type discussed above, some

determinists adduce a comparative dimension in an effort to undermine
the notion that Charlemagne mobilized large armies. Halsall, for example,
observes, Late medieval England was more populous, more urbanised,
more developed in terms of agricultural techniques and production, had a
more advanced economy, and was a more complex state than any king-
dom of the period 450900.280 In the best case, according to Halsall, the
largest army ever mobilized by King Edward III (13271377) was comprised
of only 32,303 soldiers. In general, however, Halsall sees most English
armies of this period as much smaller, i.e. between 9,00020,000 men.281
279Discussion of particular infrastructure installations will be treated in those chapters

below, where relevant. Regarding the remains of Roman efforts at road building east of the
Rhine, see Colin M. Wells, The German policy of Augustus: an examination of the archaeo
logical evidence (Oxford, 1972), 239240. Concerning roads in northwest Germany, see
J.R. Forbes, Notes on the History of Ancient Roads and their Construction (Amsterdam, 1934),
3846; and Karl Ferdinand Werner,Missus-Marchio-Comes, p. 232, with the literature cited
there. For bridges, see Werner, loc.cit. p. 232, n. 144. Ian Wood, The Frontiers of Western
Europe: Developments East of the Rhine in the Sixth Century, in The Sixth Century:
Production, Distribution and Demand, ed. Richard Hodges and William Bowden (Leiden,
1998), 231253, does not deal either with road building or bridge construction. For a general
discussion of roads east of the Rhine beginning in the century after Charlemagnes death,
see John W. Bernhardt, Itinerant kingship and royal monasteries in early medieval Germany:
c. 9361075 (Cambridge, 1993). However, it is noteworthy that many of these roads pre-date
even Charlemagnes reign.
280See Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 131, for the quotation.
281Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 131. This figure is provided by A.E. Prince, The
strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III, EHR, 46 (1931), 353371. In drawing
conclusions regarding the size of late medieval English armies, Halsall fails to treat the
important work by Michael Prestwich, Armies and warfare in the Middle Ages: the English
experience (New Haven, 1996), who provides estimates much larger than those espoused by
Halsall concerning a period during which the total population of the English kingdom was
smaller than that during the pre-plague years of the reign of Edward III. In addition,
Michael Prestwich, War, Government and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), p. 94,
makes clear that in 1296, Edward issued orders for the Exchequer to provide him with cash
to pay the wages of 60,000 foot soldiers. N.b. the surviving Exchequer records for this
planned operation do not provide information regarding the cash that was need to pay his
mounted forces, which likely were at least 10 per cent of the projected total force.
74 introduction
This comparison of Charlemagnes empire to late medieval England

seems less than propos for several reasons. If by Late medieval England,
Halsall means the immediate pre-plague period, i.e. before 13491350,
then it is to be noted that the demographic maximalists estimate the pop-
ulation of England to have been in the 5 million range. If Halsall intends to
call attention to that part of Edward IIIs reign that was post-plague, the
maximalists estimate a population decline to some 2 to 3 million.282
As noted above, the population of Charlemagnes empire is estimated by
modern scholars to have been in the 20-million range, i.e. approximately
four times that of the most optimistic late medieval maximum for pre-
plague England. Moreover, even if one were to reduce the population esti-
mate for Charlemagnes regnum by half, and I see no reason to do so, the
result would still make the population double that of Edward IIIs England
at its presumed peak.
Once it is understood that this comparative approach presents method-
ological problems from a demographic perspective, what is to be made of
the argument regarding the more advanced nature of England, which is
assumed to lead to the conclusion that King Edward IIIs armies had to be
larger than those of Charlemagne? It is hardly self-evident, for example,
that variables such as more developed agricultural techniques, a more
advanced economy, and a more complex state are either necessary or suf-
ficient conditions for the mobilization of English armies that were larger
than those mobilized by Charlemagne. In this context, it is noteworthy
that Renaud calls attention to armies of the Ashanti, who occupied a
region about the size of modern Ghana, that were between 20,00030,000
in size despite the fact that they commanded an infrastructure primitive
and a intendance dficiente.283
For comparative purposes, it is clear, for example, that the Roman
Republic, during the period of the first two Punic wars (264202 b.c.) was
less urbanized, less developed in terms of agricultural techniques and pro-
duction, had a less advanced economy, and was a less complex state than
late medieval England. Yet, these Romans, whose res publica was com-
posed of a population very generously estimated to have been about 4 mil-
lion men, women, and children, frequently raised armies more than twice
282Many specialists in the demography of late medieval England maintain much more
conservative estimates and put the pre-plague population at a maximum of 3.7 million and
the population in 1377, the year of Edward IIIs death, at two million; see C.T. Smith, An
Historical Geography of Western Europe before 1800 (New York, 1967), p. 484.
283Renaud, La politique militaire, p, 2, relying on Emmanuel Terray, Contribution
une tude de larme assante, Cahiers detudes africaines, 16 (1976), 297356.
introduction75
the size of the largest force supposedly mobilized by Edward III and suf-
fered casualties of a much greater order of magnitude than those suffered
by the forces of the English king.284
Another comparative approach has focused on the military forces of
the Anglo-Saxons in the time of King Alfred (d. 899) and of the Vikings as
a means for arguing that Charlemagne had small armies. It is clear that
neither society commanded the institutional sophistication, the large
population, and financial resources comparable to the territories under
Charlemagnes regnum. Yet, it is widely agreed that Alfred the Great devel-
oped a system of defense in depth which called for the deployment of in
excess of 27,000 men to defend one or another of 30 fortifications. In addi-
tion, Alfred created a standing army estimated to have included some
6,000 effectives, all of whom were mounted for rapid deployment. Finally,
Alfred built special warships that arguably were superior to those used by
the Vikings and maintained this fleet on a regular basis.285
Renaud reads these same sources and claims that Alfred was capable of
raising une leve slective de 5,500 hommes and a standing army of
between 1,800 and 2,700 men, which was drawn from the military house-
holds of the king and the great men of the kingdom.286 Whether one
accepts Abels figure of 6,000 or those of Renaud, noted above, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that Alfred is estimated actually, not in theory, to have
put mounted military forces into the field that averaged no fewer
than 5,000 men.287 As numerous scholars have made clear, Alfreds
armieswere able to operate effectively without having their march grind
to a halt because of logistical problems and/or devastating the Wessex
countryside.288
When making comparisons between the armies of Alfred and those of
Charlemagne, most scholars recognize, along with Renaud, that the king
284These Roman figures are supported even by a minimilist such as Delbrck, The Art
of War, I, 301390. For more modern views, see Brunt, Italian manpower, pp. 4490, 131155,
391434; and Nathan Rosenstein, Rome at War. Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle
Republic (Chapel Hill, 2004). With regard to the armies of the later Middle Ages, especially
in England, and Edward III, in particular, see Delbrck, The Art of War, III, 431472. For a
modern view, see Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, pp. 329333, where casualties are dis-
cussed in the framework of the army as a whole.
285Abels, Alfred, pp. 194207; and in a personal communication, 3 October 2008, pro-
vided the 6,000 figure for the standing army.
286La politique militaire, p. 6.
287Cf. Ryan Lavelle, Alfreds Wars: Sources and Interpretations of Anglo-Saxon Warfare in
the Viking Age (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 60, who does not clarify matters with regard to the
Burghal Hidage.
288See, for example, Abels, Alfred, pp. 124168.
76 introduction
of Wessex operated on an chelle nettement infrieure to that of the

Carolingian ruler.289 In fact, Alfreds armies were sustained effectively on a
regular basis throughout Greater Wessex, which boasted a population
not to have much exceeded 450,000.290 In this discussion, no one should
lose track of the demographic inferiority of Alfreds kingdom in compari-
son with size of the population living under Charlemagnes regnum.
Consequently, it should be sobering even to the most avid comparativist
that deploying Anglo-Saxon military statistics as a means of diminishing
estimates for size of the fighting forces in the Frankish kingdom under
Charlemagne has methodological limitations.
What kinds of comparative conclusions may be drawn, in fact, if Alfreds
Wessex, with a population of fewer than 500,000 men, women, and chil-
dren, regularly put a minimum of 5,000 mounted troops into the field on a
regular basis? Simple arithmetic indicates that the population of Alfreds
kingdom was less than 2.5 per cent of that living under Charlemagnes
rule. Thus, the calculation of a simple ratio makes clear that a force of
200,000 mounted fighting men could be mobilized from a population of
20 million. Since the figures for Wessex are generally agreed not to have
been evidence for potential but for what actually was done, then, applying
the same logic to the Carolingians, the figure for Charlemagnes armies
also should not be considered theoretical. Even if the population living
under Charlemagnes rule numbered only in the 10 million range, this
would mean, using the same ratio, as noted above, that the Carolingian
ruler could count on being able to mobilize, in fact not in theory, an army
of some 100,000 troops each year who were all mounted for rapid deploy-
ment, if not actually for combat.
By contrast with the estimates provided by Abels and Renaud for the
size of the forces that Alfred actually put into the field, Halsall opines
that it may not be unduly pessimistic to suppose that the standing army
in late 9th-century Wessex could have been as small as 1,000 men.291
Such a force, he asserts, constituted a large enough army to cope with
most Viking attacks.292 Halsall provides no data here. However, it is widely
289La politique, p. 5, where Renaud also makes some observations with regard to
Byzantine military forces. A discussion of these, including Renauds misunderstanding
of Byzantine military organization and military needs, would require too long a discussion
in the present context.
290See Abels, Alfred, p. 207, for the quotation.
291Halsall, Warfare and Society, pp. 124125, neglects to mention that King Alfred
reserved one-sixth of his tax revenues for the support his military household. The point is
discussed by Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p. 38.
292Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 125.
introduction77
recognized that some Viking armies are known to have been quite large, or
as John France recently put it, the very largest Viking armies should be
numbered in the thousands 293 The Danish archaeologist Laurent
Mazet-Harhoff observes that several thousands of men were involved in
Viking raids from 855 onward.294
Regarding the so-called great heathen army, which operated both in
England during Alfreds reign and on the mainland, Simon MacLean
observes, even the most conservative estimates put the Paris army of 876
88 at around 300 boats carrying 68000 men.295 Consequently, Halsalls
radical diminution of Alfreds standing army to a force of 1,000 men would
seem to make little sense either in tactical or in strategic terms. This is the
case, especially in light of the fact that the Anglo-Saxons enjoyed consider-
able success overall against the Vikings under Alfreds leadership.296
Rather, Halsalls drastic undercount of Alfreds army seems to follow
Delbrcks small army doctrine that has been so effectively demolished by
Werner and others.297
The Tactical Dimension
Contrary to the impression left by some of his critics, Werner, with good
common sense, noted that the size of any single army might be limited by
variables such as the condition of the roads and the difficulties of sup-
ply.298 As a result, he observed that Charlemagne solved this problem, in
part, by attacking his foes with separate army columns from different
directions 299 Here, Werner based his observations on the researches of
293France, The Armies of Charlemagne, p. 81. See also Renaud, La politique, p. 3,

n. 5, who opposes a minimalist view of the size of Viking armies; and Coupland, The
Carolingian Army, pp. 5658, who believes that the Viking forces which operated in
Francia occidentalis were in the thousands. Cf. Halsall, Warfare and Society, p. 123, who
rejects any effort to estimate the order of magnitude of Viking armies; and Lavelle, Alfreds
Wars, who avoids the controversies.
294The incursion of the Vikings into the natural and cultural landscape of upper
Normandy, in Viking Trade and Settlement in Continental Western Europe, ed. Iben Skibsted
Klaesoe (Copenhagen, 2010), 81122, esp. 87.
295Charles The Fat and the Viking Great Army: The Military Explanation for the End of
the Carolingian Empire (87688), Journal of the War College, 3 (199798), 7495, at 76 for
the quotation.
296Abels, Alfred, pp. 124168.
297Bachrach, Early Medieval Military Demography, pp. 320.
298Werner, Heeresorganization, pp. 815816.
299Heeresorganization, p. 816. For example, regarding the Avar campaign (p. 821),
Werner observes that perhaps 15,00020,000 mounted troops divided into many army col-
umns were probably deployed along with infantry and support elements.
78 introduction
Verbruggen, whose major contribution to the study of Carolingian warfare

was to underscore Charlemagnes operational inclination to invade enemy
territory with several armies from different directions by using complex
pincer movements.300 Thus, a total force, as estimated by Werner, had the
potential to reach 60,000 fighting men, but when divided into three or four
columns each corps would be only one-third or one-quarter that size.
The size of any one such separate column, at the lesser figure, was fun-
damentally consistent with the estimates provided by Verbruggen regard-
ing the upper limit in the 13,000 range for any particular force.301
Verbruggen quotes Clausewitz favorably in indicating that Superiority
of numbers in tactics as well as in strategy is the most general principle of
victory. Verbruggen also stresses the observation by Clausewitz that
The direct result of numerical superiority is that the greatest possible
number of troops is to be brought into action at the decisive point. Finally,
Verbruggen observes that this principle was applied in most countries of
Western Europe during the Middle Ages and he goes on show how
Charlemagne applied what modern analysts call the doctrine of over-
whelming force.302
The foregoing discussion of the scholarship regarding the size of
Charlemagnes military forces leads to several conclusions.303 First, the
small-army doctrine propounded by Delbrck and followed by Lot, Reuter,
and Halsall cannot be sustained. Secondly, there is widespread agreement
that Charlemagne, following Werners estimates, commanded the admin-
istrative and institutional structures which made it possible, in theory, for
him to raise some 30,00035,000 heavily-armed mounted troops and in
the neighborhood of 100,000 lightly-armed horsemen and foot soldiers.
This view includes recognition that a supposed over-mighty aristocracy
300LArme et la Strattegie de Charlemagne, in Karl der Grosse, I, 433435; as devel-

oped by Klebel, Herzogtmer und Marken bis 900, pp. 153.
301Verbruggen, LArme, p. 435.
302J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from the
Eighth Century to 1340, 2nd ed., trans. Sumner Willard and Mrs. R.W. Southern (Woodbridge,
1977), 283284. Renaud, La politique, p. 2, ignores Verbruggen, loc. cit., in this context, and
claims that La doctrine de overwhelming force (le triomphe par le nombere) de Bachrach
nest par mieux fonde que la position inverse de Reuter Nb. Renaud provides no evi-
dence that Charlemagne, in general, operated with forces that either were inferior to those
of his adversaries or, for that matter, were not markedly more numerous. In addition, he
does not treat the Carolingian narrative sources that dwell on the large size of Charlemagnes
armies. Consistent both with the information provided in the sources and with the views
of Verbruggen, Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 169, observes that Charlemagnes campaigns
nearly always were invasions with superior forces
303Alcuin, Epist., no. 257, emphasizes that as a result of Gods grace you have
impressed the terror of your power on all nations.
introduction79
was not in a position to thwart Charlemagnes will in these matters. In fact,

for the period treated in this study, as will be seen below, there is no
evidence to suggest that any significant group of high-ranking aristocrats,
or others for that matter, undermined, or even tried to undermine,
Charlemagnes ability to raise large and effective military forces. Nor is
there any evidence that Charlemagne made concessions to aristocrats, in
general, or to any particular group of such magnates to buy their support
in order to undertake a particular military campaign.
Speculations that Charlemagne could not maintain large armies on the
march because of logistical and transportation problems have not been
sustained by the type of research that can distinguish between what could
work and what could not work in particular cases. Or, for that matter, what
did work and what did not work. Comparisons drawn with regard to
English armies, whether early medieval forces as led by Alfred the Great or
late medieval armies mobilized by Edward III, to show that Charlemagne
must have had led small forces on campaign, are not methodologically
sound. Finally, discussion of Viking armies for comparative purposes can-
not be shown to impinge on our understanding of the size of Charlemagnes
expeditionary forces.
Having addressed the scholarship that has treated Carolingian military
demography, several observations are in order regarding how the size of
Charlemagnes military forces will be treated in the present study. Troop
estimates, where possible, will be made for each military operation on its
own terms and, therefore, each one will be dealt with separately as each
campaign was different from the others treated here. There seems to be
little value in broadly based generalizations regarding the size of
Charlemagnes armies over a period of almost a half-century of warfare in
many different theaters of military operations undertaken for various stra-
tegic and tactical purposes generally under rather different conditions.
In the process of estimating the size of Carolingian armed forces, how-
ever, it is important not to ignore claims made in the narrative sources,
however biased they may be, which consistently call attention to
Charlemagnes large armies. This approach, as already noted, is contrary to
a pattern common to no less-biased narrative accounts found in both
the ancient and medieval historical sources. This tradition maintains that
the heroes led small forces.304 In addition, logistical requirements and the
304For example, Asser, in his life of Alfred, portrays the Wessex monarch as suffering
defeats because he was not able to mobilize sufficiently large armies to oppose the Vikings.
Abels, Alfred, p. 138, accepts this topos as accurate and then tries to explain why Alfred had
such small armies.
80 introduction
transportation assets that Charlemagnes armies required will be evalu-

ated and estimated in relation to each situation not only with regard to the
likely size of each force, including its animals, but also in regard to those
who accompanied the army but were not fighting men. The latter also had
to be sustained.
At this point, it is useful to place in the record a few general observa-
tions regarding logistics, which like the title of Varros Latin text, Liber
logisticorici, derives from Greek logistike, which means calculations.305
Varros handbook, which facilitated the calculations for logistical opera-
tions, does not appear to have been available to the Carolingians.306
Although, it is possible that fragmenta from Varros work or one similar to
it found their way into and were preserved in Alcuins handbook,
Propostitions for Sharpening Youth.307 In any case, the level of arithme-
tic, i.e. addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, including frac-
tions, that was required to calculate rations for men and animals could be
handled easily through the use of the finger calculus.308 In fact, it is highly
likely that most every fiscal unit belonging to the government or the
church possessed logistical handbooks similar to the one that has survived
for Corbie, which was authored by Charlemagnes cousin, Abbot Adalhard,
who also wrote De ordine palatii.309
Charlemagnes Military Operations: An Overview
With highly experienced military men and a long-successful matrix of

military institutions at his disposal, referred to by some modern scholars
as a military machine, Charlemagne almost doubled the area under
direct Carolingian rule to somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.5 million
305Kaegi, Byzantine Logistics, p. 39.

306When this valuable text, which was very much in use during the later 5th century,
actually disappeared has yet to be ascertained. Our last report of the text is from the later
5th century when Sidonius Appolinaris, Epist. VIII, vi, 1318, promised to send a copy to his
friend Namatius, who commanded a Visigothic fleet that operated along the Atlantic coast
against pirates. See the discussion by Bachrach, The Education of the officer corps,
pp. 713.
307Propositiones ad acuendos juvenes, chs. 4, 9, 13, 19, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 52, 53, provide
situations that have logistic and military related value.
308See Alfldi-Rosenbaum, The Finger Calculus, pp. 19, with the various notes,
above, that treat numeracy.
309Le Statuts d Adalhard, ed. L. Levillain. It is important in this context that
Hgermann, Der Abt als Grundherr, p. 360, demonstrates that this text served practical
administrative purposes and was a working logistical model. He emphasizes that it was
not a work of abstract moralizing principles, as some have suggested.
introduction81
square kilometers.310 Included under Charlemagnes regnum were Lom

bard Italy and parts of northeastern Spain, Saxon-held territory between
the Rhine and Elbe rivers, and much of the Balkans as far east as present-
day Hungary.311 In addition, administrators along with military colonists
from various parts of the regnum Francorum were settled in the conquered
regions.312 In the process of bringing about this massive expansion of
Carolingian regnum, Charlemagnes government supported the mobiliza-
tion of missionary activities to bring Christianity to those peoples whom
he conquered and, in some cases, to those pagans whom he intended to
conquer.313
Beyond the political and administrative borders that were established
by his forebears reunification of the regnum Francorum and Charlemagnes
direct conquests, the Carolingians strategic position, in military terms
and also in economic terms, was buttressed by the establishment of vari-
ous client states. Charlemagne extended Carolingian power east of the
Elbe both by bringing various Slavic groups under his influence and using
diplomatic methods to isolate the Danes.314 South of Rome, he dominated
the duchy of Beneventum.315 On the Iberian peninsula, much of the north-
east, i.e. Catalonia, was integrated into the Frankish kingdom and in the
northwest, the Christian kings of Asturias would appear to have regarded
themselves as Charlemagnes fideles.316 In the south, Carolingian fleets
dominated much of the western Mediterranean and most of the Adriatic.317
310Regarding the military machine model, see, for example, Barbero, Charlemagne,
p. 149; Nelson, Literacy, p. 278, prefers war machine; and Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 18,
prefers military machinery.
311,Concerning the extent of Charlemagnes empire, see, for example, Barbero,
Charlemagne, pp. 12115; Becher, Charlemagne, pp. 4179; and Collins, Charlemagne,
pp. 43101.
312In regard to the Iberian frontier, see, for example, Martin Aurell, Pouvoir et parent
des comtes de la marche hispanique (801911), in La royaut et les lites dan lEurope caro
lingienne (dbut IXe si aux environs de 920), ed. Rgine Le Jan (Villeneuve dAscq, 1998),
467486; and Cullen J. Chandler, Land and Social Networks in the Carolingian Spanish
March, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 3rd ser. 6 (2009), 133.
313For a useful introduction, see Ian Wood, The Missionary Life: Saints and the
Evangelisation of Europe, 4001050 (Harlow, 2001), who, however, does not tend to give the
royal government sufficient credit for the considerable support it gave to missionary
efforts.
314See the important study by Werner Budesheim, Der limes Saxoniae nach der
Quelle Adams von Bremen, insbesondere in seinem sdlichen Abschnitt, in Zur slawischen
Besiedlung zwischen Elbe und Oder, ed. Werner Budesheim (Neumnster, 1994), 2841, and
for special attention to Charlemagnes dealing with the Obodrites, see, pp. 2931.
315Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 75.
316See, Collins, Early Medieval Spain, pp. 184, 208209, 229230, 251253.
317There is much disagreement on details. See H. Sproemberg, Die Seepolitik Karls des
Grossen, in H. Sproemberg, Beitrge zur belgisch-niederlnderischen Geschichte (Berlin,
82 introduction
In the north, Offas Mercian hegemony depended, at least in part, on a

close and friendly working relationship with Charlemagne.318
No power posed a serious challenge to the dominance of Charlemagnes
military and naval forces in the English Channel, the North Sea, or the
southern reaches of the Baltic, desultory Viking raids late in his reign not-
withstanding.319 Finally, Charlemagne negotiated successfully with Harun
al Rashid, the Caliph of Baghdad.320 As a result, commercial privileges
were obtained for Frankish merchants and religious privileges for pilgrims
who traveled to the East and visited the Holy City of Jerusalem, itself.
Charlemagne, in fact, sent his missi dominici to assess the resources, both
human and material, of the Christian communities in the Holy Land.321
Subsequent recognition by the Byzantine government of Charlemagnes
efforts may be said to have legitimized the usurpation of 800.322
In addition to increasing vastly the lands he ruled, Charlemagne under-
took a substantial array of reforms in regard to the social, economic, reli-
gious, political, and military institutions of both the kingdom of the Franks
and the empire as a whole.323 As a result, it is hardly surprising that both
he and his reign have been the subject of numerous studies, both books
and articles, that in practical terms are too extensive even to count. In rec-
ognition of Charlemagnes conquests, it is to have been expected, as
well, that a great many scholarly works have been devoted to the mili-
tary institutions of the regnum Francorum in particular and those of
1959), 129; Ekkehard Eickhoff, Seekrieg und Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland: das
Mittelmeer unter Byzantinischer und Arabischer Hegemonie (6501040) (Berlin, 1966), 5164;
and John Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon
Seafaring Activity (London, 1991), 95109.
318See Johanna Storey, Carolingian Connections: Anglo-Saxon England and Carolingian
Francia, c. 750870 (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 186187, regarding the trouble caused to Offa by
Charlemagnes embargo of Mercian products and merchants.
319Cf. Sproemberg, Die Seepolitik, pp. 129; and Haywood, Dark Age Naval Power,
pp. 95109.
320See F.W. Buckler, HarunuLRashid and Charles the Great (Cambridge, 1931); Giosu
Musca, Carlo magno e Harun al Rashid, 2nd ed. (Bari, 1996), pp. 945; McCormick, Pippin
III, p. 237; and Philippe Snac, Les Carolingiens et le califat abbasside (VIIIe-IXe sicles),
in Chrtiens et musulmans en Mditerrane mdivale (VIIIe-XIIIe sicle): changes et con
tacts, ed. Nicolas Prouteau et Philippe Snac (Poitiers, 2003), 319.
321See McCormick, Origins, pp. 433443, regarding Mediterranean trade, including
contacts with Muslims.
322See, for example, Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities Am
Vorabend der Kaiserkrnung, in Kaiser Krnung: Das Epos Karolus Magnus et Leo papa
und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn 799, ed. Peter Godman, Jrg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek
(Paderborn, 2002), 231255, with the substantial scholarly literature cited throughout.
323See McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 292380, for a very good summary.
introduction83
the Carolingian empire in general.324 Even some of Charlemagnes partic-

ular military campaigns have been given a modicum of attention by mod-
ern scholars.325
In those studies which treat Charlemagnes wars, there are several
major problems. It is the norm, for example, to trace military actions in a
particular theater of operations diachronically, e.g. the Saxon region or the
trans-Danubian territory. However, this approach results in a seriously
curtailed perspective because the synchronic situation that impinges
upon military operations at any particular time does not receive the atten-
tion it requires. Consequently, efforts to make sense of the tactical, and
especially of the strategic, problems in their diplomatic context are dis-
torted, and attempts to understand Charlemagnes decision making are
undermined.326
On the whole, little analysis is to be found in scholarly work that falls
within the parameters of what are considered by modern specialists to be
the essentials of military history, e.g. strategic planning, campaign opera-
tions, military tactics, and logistics.327 If Charlemagne is discussed at all as
a military leader by modern scholars, he is depicted accurately, though in
a very limited manner, as playing a noteworthy role in an administrative
capacity within the institutional framework of the royal government.328
Charlemagnes role as a military strategist and commander on campaign
or in overseeing the execution of battle tactics in the field or during the
course of siege operations against great fortress cities tend not to receive
the attention they deserve. In fact, these aspects of Charlemagnes career
have not received even what must be considered basic treatment.329
324A useful survey of older work is provided by Bachrach, Charlemagnes Cavalry,

pp. 120; and for more recent work, idem, Early Carolingian Warfare, passim.
325Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 133.
326See, for example, Louis Halphen, La conqute de la Saxe, Revue historique, CXXX
(1919), 252278, and CXXXII (1919), 257305; Martin Lintzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens
durch Karl den Grossen und der schsische Adel, Sachsen und Anhalt, 10 (1934), 3070;
Walter Pohl, Die Awarenkriege Karls des Grossen (788803) (Vienna, 1988); and Bowlus,
Franks.
327In addition to the works cited in the previous note, see Bautier, La campagne de
Charlemagne en Espagne (778), pp. 151; and Michel Rouche, La dfaite de Roncevaux,
Bulletin de la Socit des Sciences, Lettres et Arts de Bayonne, 135 (1979), 145156.
328Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, pp. 7594; idem, The End, pp. 391405; France, The
Military History of the Carolingian Period, Revue belge dhistoire militaire, XXVI (1985),
81100; idem, The Armies of Charlemagne, pp. 6182; and Contamine, La Guerre, pp. 98,
100, 102104, 128, 145, 318319.
329See, for example, McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 217, 271; and Barbero, Charlemagne,
pp. 2274.
84 introduction
Unfortunately, military history itself is deemed as unworthy of histori-

cal study by many medievalists.330 As a result, despite the immense body
of scholarship that has been devoted to the Carolingian world and the
important studies that have dealt with military institutions, there is no
modern treatment of Carolingian military history which focuses on
Charlemagne as a strategist and tactician. By contrast, the strategies, wars,
campaigns, and battles of renowned Western military figures such as
Alexander the Great, Caesar, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, have
been examined frequently and in immense detail.331 The lack of attention
to Charlemagne, in this context, is but one facet of the unfortunate ten-
dency among medievalists, obvious since the end of World War I, to give
comparatively little attention to military history even as seen in
Clauswitzian terms, i.e. as one of the fundamental ways in which diplo-
macy is furthered by other means.332
Neglect of Charlemagne at war has been and continues to be counter-
productive. It not only undermines our efforts to understand the king
himself, but also Carolingian society in general. This is the case if only
because the greatest single societal expenditure of surplus human and
material resources in the pre-modern West, and Charlemagnes regnum is
unlikely to have been an exception, was on military and military-related
matters. It is generally agreed that Before the Industrial Revolution the
cost of the armed forces of a state represented almost always at least
60 per cent of the total expenditures (excluding debt service, which could
not exist in the Roman empire) or, for that matter, during the early Middle
Ages.333 The argument, of course, is not that economic matters are the
only aspect of society that deserves attention. Rather, I am suggesting that
how the leaders of Carolingian society in general, and Charlemagne in
particular, chose to expend surplus human and material resources is
330See the disdain with which these matters are treated by Hans-Werner Goetz, Social
and military institutions, in NCMH, pp. 471473, 479480.
331The observation by Werner, Histoire de France, p. 375, is worthy of note in regard to
Charlemagnes military accomplishments: On ne reverra cela quavec Napolon!
332For a defense of the study of military history and the loss to our understanding of
the times being studied by not giving the study of war its due, see, for example, Charles
Oman, On the Writing of History (New York, 1939), 159160; Walter E. Kaegi, Jr., The Crisis
in Military Historiography, Armed Forces and Society, 7 (1980), 299316; and Gordon Craig,
Delbrck: The Military Historian, The Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,
2nd ed. (Princeton, 1986), 326353, here 352353.
333See Chester Starr, The Roman Empire, 27 b.c.-a.d. 476: A Study in Survival (New York,
1982), 88, for the quotation.
introduction85
ignored at the peril of obtaining only a superficial understanding of the

history of the period.
The costs of war, even broadly understood, are not the entire picture.
In fact, a proper examination of Charlemagnes military endeavors pro-
vides the skeletal framework for our understanding of virtually all major
aspects of royal activity in the lands that the Carolingians ruled during this
period.334 It is likely an understatement of some magnitude to claim that
Charlemagne and those around him who administered the central govern-
ment were preoccupied with preparations for war, the execution of mili-
tary operations, and the aftermath of these efforts. Whatever else the
Carolingian central government undertook to do likely was carried out, for
the most part, within the framework established by the rhythms of plan-
ning Charlemagnes military campaigns, executing these plans, and evalu-
ating their results as the basis for future operations.
At the local level this preoccupation with military matters also was a
basic fact of life. Armies were mobilized and sustained through the actions
of the counts, who were responsible for administering the pagi, and of the
greater magnates in the provinces, both lay and ecclesiastical, who were
charged with overseeing the mobilization for military operations of their
dependents and those who lived on their lands consequent to the obliga-
tions that they incurred as a result of having received immunities from the
royal government. Not only were large numbers of men mustered for cam-
paigns, sometimes for lengthy military operations, but vast quantities of
resources were stockpiled to support the troops on campaign. This meant
not only the gathering of substantial quantities of food but also preparing
large numbers of horses and oxen as well as carts and wagons in order
to provide the logistic support that was necessary to sustain military
operations.
Contents
Charlemagnes military career was lengthy. It covered a period in excess of

a half-century, following the traditional date of his birth, and 46 of these
years were as the military commander at the highest level.335 In addition,
334For a discussion of the matter of Charlemagnes itinerary, see McKitterick,

Charlemagne, pp. 171197.
335I follow the traditional date; see Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 1112; but cf. McKitterick,
86 introduction
Carolingian military operations between 768 and 814 had great signifi-
cance in a wide variety of areas, not only within the regnum Francorum
and later within the empire, but also among peoples considerably further
afield. Frequent military campaigns were undertaken either under Char
lemagnes direct command or by various of his subordinates, often on
several fronts at the same time and usually in consonance with an offen-
sive strategy developed by the central government.336 It would be seri-
ously misleading, however, to treat the subject of Charlemagne at war,
however detailed, only in terms of his numerous military operations and
those undertaken under his orders, narrowly defined, without placing
them in their broader diplomatic, political, economic, social, and religious
contexts.
This study is limited to Charlemagnes early campaigns, 768777, as a
means of making clear in the appropriate detail the primary role played by
preparation for war, war itself, and the aftermath of war in one very impor-
tant period of the early Middle Ages. Indeed, without examining the com-
plex detail inherent in various types of military operations, it is not
possible to convey a sense of how these efforts dominated various aspects
of society. Thus, following this Introduction, Chapter One, Two Frankish
Kings: Charlemagne and Carloman, deals with the diplomatic and mili-
tary activities of both men, King Pippin Is sons and successors, in a period
of divided rule that lasted for three years between 768 and 771. This chap-
ter illustrates the clear limitations imposed on Carolingian military opera-
tions that were inherent in divided rule. Nevertheless, it is shown that with
resources only half as great as those enjoyed by his father, Charlemagne
was able to undertake a successful campaign in the southern reaches of
Aquitaine a thousand or more kilometers from his home base in Austrasia.
Chapter Two, Italy in Flux, provides a detailed examination of the
efforts by Charlemagne to play a key role in Italy and, therefore, to under-
mine the will of his father as indicated in the Divisio of 768. The Lombard
ruler, King Desiderius, seems to have taken the initiative here by offering
his daughter Gerperga as a wife to Charlemagne to secure an alliance with
the Franks. This alliance, the tripartite pact, between Charlemagne,
Desiderius, and the pope was negotiated by the queen mother, Bertranda,
and Abbot Sturm of Fulda. The result, in the short term, was the firm
336See, for example, Louis the Pious siege of Barcelona in 800801, which was under-
taken while Charlemagne was in Rome, and the discussion by Bachrach, Military
Organization, pp. 133.
introduction87
establishment of an important role for Charlemagne in Italian politics and

a Lombard wife.
Chapter Three, The Saxon War: Phase One, focuses on the period
immediately following the death of Carloman as Charlemagne managed
to unite the regnum Francorum under his sole rule and thus to establish
monarchia, as one contemporary source puts it. While in the course of
strengthening his rule over the Frankish kingdom, Charlemagne was able
to initiate a war against the Saxons. His ultimate strategic goal was to con-
quer this territory as far east as the Elbe and to integrate the region into
the regnum Francorum. At one time this territory had been considered
part of the Roman Empire, as described in histories available to the
Carolingians. As a corollary of conquest and necessary to Charlemagnes
intention to integrate the Saxons into the regnum Francorum, he was com-
mitted to the conversion of these pagans to Christianity.
Chapter Four, The Unwanted War, treats the intensive diplomatic
activity that preceded Charlemagnes reluctant decision to invade Italy in
773, i.e. before he had created the conditions necessary to assure the per-
manent conquest of the Saxon region. This war in the northern part of the
Italian peninsula was a conflict that Charlemagne tried to avoid at this
time because he wanted to continue military operations against the
Saxons in order to impose his ditio over them. Curiously, it was also a war
that neither the Lombard king, Desiderius, nor the pope, Hadrian I,
wanted. In this chapter, the initial stages of the invasion itself are exam-
ined, as well as the diplomatic negotiations that preceded it.
Chapter Five, The Siege of Pavia, deals with the initial stages of the
actual conquest of the Lombard kingdom in detail not only from an opera-
tional and a tactical perspective, but also in terms of weapons technology
and logistics. In this chapter, Charlemagne is seen to come through the
Alpine passes, much as his father had in 754 and 756 and to destroy
Desiderius advanced defense of the Lombard kingdom. From this victory
over the Lombards, the Carolingian army marched south to Pavia in order
to establish a siege of the Lombard capital. This investment dragged on for
more than six months without resolution as Charlemagne concluded that
he needed additional troops to convince the Lombard king, Desiderius,
that further resistance was futile. In this context, Charlemagne went to
Rome in order to obtain papal help, which was provided by Hadrian I.
Chapter Six, The Fall of Pavia and its Aftermath, deals with the fall of
the Lombard capital and kingdom. This victory was made possible, in
large part, by the aid of substantial reinforcements provided by the pope
and the assurance of continued logistical support. As a result, Charlemagne
88 introduction
was able to convince Desiderius that further defense of Pavia was futile,
and the Lombard king capitulated. Following the surrender of Pavia and
the deposition of the Lombard king, Charlemagne assumed the title rex
Langobardorum and set out the guidelines for the integration of this king-
dom under his rule. This was carried out in the context of Carolingian
long-term strategic thinking, which was fundamentally conditioned by
the diplomacy that Charlemagne undertook to assure the smooth integra-
tion of the Lombard kingdom under Frankish regnum. With the conquest
of the Lombard kingdom, Charlemagne set his course to establish control
over as much as possible of the erstwhile western half of the Roman
Empire and reach his goal of resuscitating the imperial office in the west
with papal support.337
In Chapter Seven, The Saxon War: Phase Two, Charlemagnes initial
reluctance to go to Italy prior to completing his conquest of the Saxon
region is proven to have been prescient. While Charlemagne was in Italy in
773774, the Saxons invaded the lands that the Frankish armies had
recently brought under Carolingian rule. Charlemagne, upon returning
home, found it necessary to launch a rapid strike into Saxon territory with
the primary purpose of laying the groundwork for a second invasion. This
strike was followed by a second major operation against Saxon assets. The
invasion of 775 strongly followed up the initiation of the war of conquest
that had been launched in 772 and was successful.
337For an outline of this strategy, which was based on the view that the pope could
establish a Frankish ruler as emperor in the west, see Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military
Responsibilities, pp. 231255. Several points developed in this study may be rehearsed. The
papacy made it clear to Charles Martel (d. 741) that it was free to act independently of
the Byzantine emperor and to recognize a Frankish magnate as papal protector. In 754, the
pope established Pippin and his two sons, Charlemagne and Carloman, as patricii, an offi
cium in the gift of one who held imperial power. No later than 767, Pope Paul authored the
Constitutum Constantini, i.e. the famed Donation of Constantine, which established the
right of the papacy to appoint an emperor in the western half of the empire. Finally, by 777,
Pope Hadrian was referring to Charlemagne as Novus Constantinus. Regarding pre-800
intimations in regard to seeing Charlemagne becoming emperor, see Percy Ernst
Schramm, Die Anerkennung, Karls des Grossen als Kaiser (bis 800). Ein Kapital aus der
Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Staatssymbolik, in Beitrge zur allgemein Geschichte I:
von Sptantike bis zum Tode Karls der Grossen (814), (Kaiser, Knige und Ppste. Gesammelte
Aufstz zur Geschichte des Mittelalters), 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1968), I, 215263.
The attempt by Johannes Fried, Donation of Constantine and Constitutum Constantini.
The Misinterpretation of a Fiction and its Original Meaning, with a contribution by Wolfram
Brandes: The Satraps of Constantine (Berlin-New York, 2005), to overturn the now long-
accepted view that the Constitutum Constantini was the work of Pope Paul I, is well off the
mark. See the defense of the traditional view, established by Horst Fuhrmann, Das
Constitutum Constantini, by Caroline J. Goodson and Janet L. Nelson, Review article: The
Roman contexts of the Donation of Constantine, EME, 18 (2010), 446467.
introduction89
Chapter Eight treats the Friuli Diversion. While campaigning with

great success in Saxon territory, Charlemagne received alarming news that
a revolt was being planned by several of the dukes of the Lombard king-
dom whom either he had permitted to remain in office or whom he had
placed in office following his assumption of the Lombard royal title early
in the summer of 774. The planning of this revolt apparently was found
appealing by the Byzantine emperor Constantine V; indeed, it may well
have been initiated by his court with the aim of placing Adelchis, the son
of Desiderius, the deposed Lombard monarch, on his fathers throne.
Thus, when firm intelligence regarding the plot reached Charlemagne, he
regarded it as necessary to undertake a rapid campaign south of the Alps.
In the course of this effort, Charlemagne crushed the ducal revolt and
made major changes in the personnel to whom he entrusted the adminis-
tration of the Lombard kingdom. These changes included, as well, a lesser
role for the pope, as apparently his position had been envisioned in 774
along with an increased role for the Archbishop of Ravenna. However, as
in 773774, so too in 775776, the Saxons once again went to war while
Charlemagne was winning decisive victories in Italy and reorganizing the
administration of the Lombard kingdom. This revolt required yet another
major military campaign in Saxon territory. Chapter Nine, The End of
the Saxon War, treats the Frankish conquest of the Saxons in 776, or
more accurately, victory as Charlemagne and his advisers viewed the situ-
ation in 777.
Chapter Ten, Integration of the Saxon Territory, serves to identify
Carolingian resources in order to explain why the Saxons surrendered
and many of their leaders accepted Christianity. In addition, an effort is
made to show how Charlemagne planned to integrate the Saxon territory
into the regnum Francorum and bring about the conversion to Christianity
of the great mass population, who were still pagans. Following his conclu-
sion that the Saxons were effectively conquered and that the process of
integration was well underway, Charlemagne laid plans for the opening of
a new and very important theater of operations with an invasion of north-
eastern Spain.
It is crucial to emphasize that in the campaigns, 768777, treated in this
volume, Charlemagne first reasserted Carolingian ditio in southern
Aquitaine and the Gascon ducatus following his fathers death. He also
conquered the Lombard kingdom in northern Italy, and believed that
he had cleaned up the Saxon situation. He thought that he had effec-
tively subjected the peoples living in the territory between the Rhine
and the Elbe to Carolingian rule and saw them firmly on the road to the
90 introduction
acceptance of Christianity. In executing these campaigns, Charlemagne

engaged his forces in theaters of operation where his father, Pippin I, had
fought intermittently for the greater part of his reign as king (751768).
Pippin had completed the reconstitution of the regnum Francorum by
conquering Aquitaine, and he had protected the Rhine frontier by con-
structing numerous fortifications and also by undertaking occasional
punitive operations against various Saxon groups. He had gone to Italy in
order to defend the pope against what he perceived to be Lombard aggres-
sion. It would appear to have been inconceivable for Charlemagne to have
undertaken an entirely new strategic initiative across the Pyrenees were
he not convinced that the situation in the regnum Francorum was stable
and also that his conquests in both Saxony and Italy were under firm con-
trol. Consequently, I have ended the present volume with the comple-
tion of the Saxon conquest and prior to Charlemagnes initiation of the
development of early Carolingian long-term strategy south of the Pyrenees.
Methods
In order to understand the behavior of Charlemagne in general, and in

regard to military matters in particular, it is important to avoid, insofar as
is possible, the distortions of hindsight. These distortions not only bedevil
modern scholars, who know what happened in the longer term, e.g.
Charlemagne continued to undertake military operations in the Saxon
region after 777, but also impinge, for a wide variety of reasons, on
the many works written by Charlemagnes contemporaries and near-
contemporaries. The biases of the sources, like those of many modern
writers, become manifest on close inspection. None of the narrative
sources can be read as plain text.338 In addition, at least some, if not many,
338For useful introductions to this problem with regard to the reign of Charlemagne,
see Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 115, 175178; McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 156; and
Yitzhak Hen, The Annals of Metz and the Merovingian Past, in The Uses of the Past in the
Early Middle Ages, ed. Yitzhak Hen and Michael Innis (Cambridge, 2000), 175190, along
with the substantial bibliography provided there. Cf. Thomas Scharff, Die Kmpfe der
Herrscher und der Heiligen: Krieg und historische Erinnerung in der Karolingerzeit;
Symbolische Kommunikation in der Vormoderne: Studien zur Geschichte, Literature und
Kunst (Darmstadt, 2002), which is largely a work of literary theory by a scholar who proudly
avers that he is not interested in military history. It should be noted that Scharff, in his
efforts to support his thesis regarding how a very particular selection of Carolingian narra-
tive sources treat military matters, often mistranslates relevant Latin texts in ways that, not
unexpectedly, he believes to support his views. See the detailed and overly kind review by
David Bachrach in Speculum, 80 (2005), 970972, who nevertheless points out several of
Scharffs more egregious mistranslations.
introduction91
documents of various kinds also must be examined carefully insofar as

they may represent an agenda other than what is obvious in regard to the
verifiable facts that they provide.339
Some sources, however, are more consistently biased than others, while
some texts are biased largely or even exclusively in regard to particular
kinds of situations or presenting certain types of information. For a mod-
ern scholar to write history, i.e. to use the narratives as sources for obtain-
ing accurate information, it is not sufficient simply to point out that a
particular writer is biased in one or another way. It is necessary to identify
what an author discusses or omits or when he provides information that
can be shown to be inaccurate in regard to a particular situation relevant
to the matter being researched. In positive terms, the aim is to ascertain
what particular items of information provided by a source can be used by
the modern scholar as evidence to write history, in this case military
history.340
It is clear that the Carolingian court sources in general, and even the
local annals, are all biased to a greater or lesser degree in an effort to cast
Charlemagne in a favorable light.341 Yet, all these sources, insofar as mili-
tary history is concerned, are rarely biased in regard to the same situation
in the same way. Sometimes they diverge widely. In regard, for example, to
Charlemagnes military operations in Spain in 778, the author of the
Annales regni Francorum depicts Charlemagnes invasion in a positive
light. He ignores the defeat, annihilation of the Carolingian rear guard at
Roncevalles, and the capture of the royal baggage train.342 By contrast, the
author of the revised Annals, Annales qui dicitur Einhardi for the same
year records the defeat of the rear guard in some detail.343 Einhard in his
339A particularly interesting case is provided by the scholarly use and misuse of De
ordine palatii. See Bachrach, Adalhards De ordine palatii, pp. 336.
340Patrick Geary, Zusammenfassung, in Historiographie im frhen Mittelalter, ed.
Anton Scharer and Georg Scheibelreiter (Vienna, 1994), 539542, discusses some of the
various ways in which scholars can get past the limits imposed by our understanding of the
biases that permeate the narrative sources so that the information, or at least the accurate
information, that they provide can be used to write history.
341See Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 115, 175178; and McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 156.
342See the discussion by Collins, Charlemagne, p. 67, who observes that this account is
masterly to the point of mendacity and gives a victorious gloss to a tawdry campaign.
With regard to the ARF, in general, see McKitterick, The illusion of royal power, pp. 120.
343Concerning some of the controlling assumptions at work in the revised edition of
the Royal Annals, see Roger Collins, The Reviser Revisited: Another Look at the Alternative
Version of the Annales Regni Francorum, in After Romes Fall: Narrators and Sources in
Early Medieval, Essays presented to Walter Goffart, ed. Alexander C. Murray (Toronto, 1998),
191213.
92 introduction
Vita Karoli (ch. 9) not only records the defeat in even greater detail, but
also indicates the names of three important officials, Roland, Eggihard,
and Anslem, who were killed. However, contrary to the much later and
more popular Song of Roland, no Carolingian source credits the Muslims
with inflicting this defeat. Rather, it is made clear that the Basques, many
of whom likely were Christians, were the culprits.344
It is uncontroversial that it was Einhards aim in Vita Karoli to cast
Charlemagne in a highly favorable light.345 An old tendency, that may
seem to die hard, is the effort by some scholars, especially prior to World
War II, to suggest the outright rejection of its historical validity.346 It is
important to emphasize that it is methodologically unsound, for example,
to identify parts of a text that are inaccurate, for whatever reason, and
then to assert that none of the information that is provided in the narra-
tive is to be considered useful for our efforts to come to a reasonable
understanding of what was happening. Each item must be examined indi-
vidually and in its own context. Following the present scholarly trend, I
would go at least as far as McKitterick and conclude that Vita Karoli is
exceptionally valuable.347
It is important to emphasize the well-known fact that Einhard,
although thoroughly acquainted with the imperial biographies written
by Suetonius, also was exceptionally well-acquainted with many of the
344Despite the account in the Carolingian sources, some modern scholars tend to
blame or credit the Muslims with the destruction of Charlemagnes rear guard and the
capture of his baggage train. See, for example, R. Moreau, Les assailants de Roncevaux
ont-ils t des Basques o des Arabs? Bulletin de la Socit des Sciences, Lettres et Arts de
Bayonne, 128 (1972), 123127.
345I find the essay by David Ganz, Einhards Charlemagne: the characterisation of
greatness, in Charlemagne, Empire and Society, ed. Johanna Story (Manchester, 2005),
3851, to be a very useful introduction of Einhards aims and limitations. I take the observa-
tion by Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, p. 8, that Einhard used bucketloads of white-
wash in his account of Charlemagne in Vita Karoli to be a rhetorical device.
346See Halphen (ed.), Eginhard, pp. ix-x, xii, as cited by McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 10,
for the quotation. It should be noted, in this context, that Johannes Fried has taken a posi-
tion that it is virtually impossible to write history from medieval narrative sources. See his
Die Schleier der Erinnerung: Grundzge einer historischen Memorik (Munich, 2004); and
with particular reference to Einhard, idem, Papst Leo III. besucht Karl den Grossen in
Paderborn oder Einhards Schweigen, Historische Zeitschrift, 273 (1902), 561593. For a brief
but trenchant critique of Frieds epistemology and, by extension, his methodology, see
David S. Bachrach, Memory, Epistemology, and the Writing of Early Medieval Military
History: The Example of Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg (10091018), Viator, 38 (2007),
6469. Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A study of Memory in Medieval Culture
(Cambridge, 1990), although published prior to Frieds Die Schleier der Erinnerung, pro-
vides the basis for rejecting Frieds methods, and he does not refute her arguments.
347See Charlemagne, p. 10, for the quotation.
introduction93
writings of Cicero, especially in regard to the various types of rhetorical

techniques that the great Roman writer discussed or were attributed to
him in the Carolingian period.348 Therefore, it is of importance that Cicero
wrote pointedly concerning historical truth and the relation between
what actually happened and the need for a historian to maintain rhetori-
cal plausibility in light of what his audience knew.349 It would be astonish-
ing, for example, if Einhard had been unaware of what the Roman
rhetoricianhad said regarding inventio for the purpose of telling a story
that would be plausible to his audience.350 In short, Einhard cared that his
audience believed what he had to say and, as a result, strove for rhetorical
plausibility.351
Sachkritik
An internal critique of a particular narrative source on a particular point

sometimes cannot be conclusive. However, with use of Sachkritik, which
often may include an important component of material evidence gener-
ated through archaeological research, it is possible, at least on occasion, to
compensate for such problems.352 For example, under the year 778, the
author of the Annales regni Francorum claims that upon leaving Pamplona
for the march homeward, the walls of the city were destructa by the
Franks. In a similar vein, the author of the Annales qui dicitur Einhardi
writes that Charlemagne destruxit the muros of Pamplona. Roger
Collins, using these accounts as evidence, concludes, He [Charlemagne]
had the walls of Pamplona demolished.353
348See the basic study by M.S. Kempshall, Some Ciceronian aspects of Einhards Life of
Charlemagne, Viator, 26 (1995), 1138; also Michael Innis, The Classical Tradition in the
Carolingian Renaissance: Ninth-Century Encounters with Suetonius, International Journal
of the Classical Tradition, 3 (1997), 265282; and McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 10, 16, with
the literature cited there.
349De inventione, 1.19.27.
350Of exceptional value for understanding Ciceros arguments here, see Justin C. Lake,
Truth, plausibility, and the virtues of narrative at the Millennium, Journal of Medieval
History, 35 (2009), 221238. Note, as well, McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 1517. Regarding
rhetorical works available at the court, see Donald Bullough, Charlemagnes court library
revisited, EME, 12 (2003), 339363, esp. 359360.
351For a useful example of how understanding the methods used by an early medieval
author who tried to maintain rhetorical plausibility can help the historian in finding what
is accurate in a narrative text, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Writing Latin History for a Lay
Audience c. 1000: Dudo of Saint Quentin at the Norman Court, HS, 20 (2008), 5877.
352See, McCormick, Pippin III, pp. 233236, for an excellent example of how Sachkritik
can be used to correct a narrative source generated at Charlemagnes court.
353The Basques, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1990), p. 120.
94 introduction
It is clear, however, that the Carolingian sources which claim that the
walls of Pamplona were destroyed or demolished were exaggerating.
In fact, they were indulging in the same kind of hyperbole that was used by
their earlier contemporaries when Carolingian court sources claimed that
Duke Waiofer had destroyed the walls of many of the fortress cities of
Aquitaine. The walls of these cities, however, were not destroyed as both
their subsequent use for military purposes and the archaeological evi-
dence makes clear.354 With regard to Pamplona, the surviving physical
evidence does not support the claim by the two above-mentioned
Carolingian court sources that the citys massive stone circuit walls and
their 65 stone towers, in fact, were demolished.355
In addition, circumstantial evidence supports the view that Pamplona
was in a defensible condition not long after Charlemagnes retreat from
Spain in 778. For example, the Banu Qasi, a Muslim clan likely of Visigothic
origin, in competition with others, sought to establish Pamplona as the
capital of a principality in the region.356 Under the highly volatile condi-
tions that existed on the northern frontier of the Muslim state during this
period, such an effort by the Banu Qasi certainly permits the inference
that the city was in a defensible condition. In fact, throughout the later 8th
and the first half of the 9th century, local factions as well as the emirs
354Regarding the misinformation purveyed by these earlier court sources, see the dis-
cussion by Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 133.
355Pamplona was a Roman urbs originally founded as a settlement by Pompey ca. 77
b.c. Beginning in the later 3rd century and through at least the early 4th century, Pamplona
was converted into a fortress city, like so many other Roman urbes in the West. The archae-
ological evidence that has been uncovered thus far does not support the allegation in the
Carolingian court sources that Charlemagnes armies destroyed the walls and the towers of
the city. For the relevant archaelogical investigations, see Maria Angeles Mezquiriz de
Cataln, Notas sobre la antiqua Pompaelo, Prncipe de Viana, 15 (1954), 231247; idem, La
Ciudad de Pamplona en poca Romana (Pamplona, 1965), 115; idem, Pamplona Romana
(Pamplona, 1973), 330. Concerning the towers, see De Laude Pampilione Epistola, ed.
J.M. Lacarra (Textos Navarros de Cdice de Roda, Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona de
Aragon, I [1945], 260279). In regard to the massive program of building fortifications
throughout the western half of the Roman Empire, see, in general, Steven Johnson, Late
Roman Fortifications (Totowa, NJ, 1983).
356See A. Caada Juste, Los Banu Qasi, Prncipe de Viana 41 (1980), 317, regarding
these efforts to control Pamplona from the later 8th through the middle of the 9th century.
The matter of the origins of the Banu Kasi remains controversial. Among those who see
them as of Visigothic stock, see, for example, variste Lvi-Provenal, Histoire de lEspagne
Musulmane, 3 vols. (Paris-Leiden, 19501956), I, 154155; and Claudio Sanchez lbornoz,
La conquista de Espaa por los musulmanes: sometimiento de los vascones, in idem,
Orgenes y Destino de Navarra (Barcelona, 1984), 3344; and cf. Collins, Early Medieval
Spain, p. 188, who thinks that it is most improbable that the Banu Kasi were of Visigothic
stock.
introduction95
Hisham I (788796) and his successor Al Hakam I (796822) found it nec-

essary to undertake military operations with the aim of placing Pamplona
under their control.357
The deployment of Sachkritik supports the view that Charlemagnes
army did not demolish or destroy the walls of Pamplona in 778. This is the
case because of the timing of the Carolingian retreat from Spain in 778.358
In short, Charlemagne began his retreat from Saragossa in mid-July and
had moved through the pass at Roncevalles on his way to Bordeaux by
mid-August. This was a march of at least of 300 kilometers, which under
good travel conditions likely would have taken some three weeks for
Charlemagnes military forces.359 It is well-known that the Carolingian
army was accompanied by a significant baggage train, which, in fact, was
captured at Roncevalles well north of Pamplona. Therefore, it is likely that
the march, if ox carts were used to haul baggage over the mountain roads,
was somewhat slower than for a force without extensive impedimenta, or
using horse-drawn vehicles.360
In light of this chronology, Charlemagnes army, in a best case situation,
i.e. using horse-drawn vehicles, would have had perhaps a week, and likely
less, to destroy the massive stone walls of Pamplona. These included the
65 mural towers mentioned above. The entire defensive complex at
Pamplona had been constructed with thousands of tons of stone fixed in
place with the best Roman mortar, which was exceptionally hard and
extremely difficult to fracture.361 In fact, there are no examples of the mas-
sive walls of erstwhile Roman fortress cities either in early medieval Gaul
or on the Iberian peninsula that were effectively demolished or destroyed
by enemy action. What is more than likely is that in a symbolic act,
Charlemagne simply had the large wooden gates of Pamplona removed
and perhaps even burned.362
357Regarding military operations involving Pamplona, see Caada Juste, Los Banu
Qasi, pp. 515; Lvi-Provenal, Histoire, I, 154156; and cf. Collins, The Basques,
pp. 123124.
358In regard to the timing of Charlemagnes retreat, see the data regarding Char
lemagnes itinerary collected in Bhmer and Muhlbacher, Regesta imperii, pp. 8991.
359Concerning the pace of the movement of military forces, see, for example,
McCormick, Pippin III, p. 234, n. 56, with the scholarly work and sources cited there.
360Concerning travel rates with baggage trains, see Bachrach, Animals and Warfare,
p. 719.
361Although the construction of a stone wall is much more time-consuming than its
destruction, there are many aspects of both types of projects that overlap. See Bernard S.
Bachrach, The Fortification of Gaul and The Economy of the Third and Fourth Centuries,
Journal of Late Antiquity, 2 (1010), 3864.
362See Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 82135.
96 introduction
Archaeological Sources
In addition to providing a corrective to overenthusiastic court writers, e.g.

reports of the destruction of the walls of Pamplona, archaeological studies
make available a substantial corpus of material evidence, especially in
regard to fortifications, roads, and military equipment. This positive evi-
dence provides a further means by which we can gain greater control over
the written sources. For example, we can pin down, in explicit terms, what
is at issue when a contemporary writer records the line of march followed
by a particular army. This is of considerable importance in evaluating the
nature of the impact that the army may have had on the countryside or
nearby towns and cities. Of no less importance, archaeological studies
allow us to grasp not only how the contours of military topography, e.g.
fortifications, roads, bridges, and ports, impinged on Charlemagnes mili-
tary operations, both strategically and tactically, but also how they
impinged upon the efforts undertaken by the Carolingians adversaries.
These material data become particularly important when archaeologists
have been able to identify and date various of Charlemagnes fortifications
in one or another theater of operations that are not mentioned in the writ-
ten sources.363
With the requisite information of a material nature available, we can
discuss in specific terms the great stone walls of one or another particular
old Roman fortress city, such as Pavia or Verona, that was laid under siege.
We can examine the size of castra and castella in order to provide plausi-
ble estimates, according to early medieval calculations, for the numbers
of fighting men who were needed to defend such fortifications and the
numbers required to attack them with some reasonable expectation of
success.364 It is these types of calculations which enable reasonable esti-
mates of the size of armies that actually were mobilized in particular
campaigns.
In addition to helping us understand logistics, archaeological informa-
tion can provide a sound basis for estimating the costs of military cam-
paigning in terms of the expenditure of human and material resources for
363Some of these are discussed in detail in Chapter Ten, below.

364Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117; Bachrach, Early Medieval
Fortifications, pp. 531569; Christopher Loveluck, Rural Settlement hierarchy in the age of
Charlemagne, and Frans Verhaeghe with Christopher Loveluck and Joanna Story, Urban
develpments in the age of Charlemagne, both in Charlemagne: Empire and Society, ed.
Joanna Story (Manchester, 2005), 230258 and 259288, respectively.
introduction97
building various types of fortifications and keeping roads in repair.365

The present volume is the first book-length effort not only to treat the dip-
lomatic, strategic, and tactical underpinnings of Charlemagne at war, but
also the first effort to provide a thorough integration of information gar-
nered from both the written sources and from archaeological work.
Sachkritik, of course, is not limited only to archaeological evidence. For
example, all implications found in the written sources regarding logistics,
including the size of armies, the pace at which such forces marched, and
their requirements for food and water, are subject to the material analysis
intrinsic to the utilization of Sachkritik.366 The physical realities in which
all military operations are inextricably embedded must not be ignored. It
is vital that we understand, at least, the minima of food consumption
required for the health and well-being of both men and animals, the need
for fresh water and its availability for both men and animals, and the size
of loads that wagons, carts, pack animals, and military personnel were
able to transport.367 These ineluctable data, brute facts in the vocabulary
of epistemology, provide the initial methodological test as to whether any
particular written source recounts information in a particular context that
may be considered accurate, however biased the authors conceptual
framework might be.368
It is also necessary, insofar as possible, that we try to see the military
situation, with due caution, as the thrust of both the written and material
evidence leads us to believe the way in which Charlemagne and his advis-
ers saw such matters in their particular and often narrow temporal, geo-
graphical, and political context. Today, we tend to characterize such an
analysis as treating the behavior of our subjects in real time, without the
365See the pioneering work of Hofmann, Fossa Carolina, pp. 43753. For the applica-
tion of Hofmanns methods to late antique and medieval problems, see Bernard S.
Bachrach: The Cost of Castle-Building: The Case of the Tower at Langeais, 992994, in The
Medieval Castle: Romance and Reality, ed. K. Reyerson and F. Powe (Dubuque, IA, 1984),
4662; and idem, The Fortification of Gaul, pp. 3864.
366See Craig, Delbrck, pp. 332333, for a definition.
367Among those scholars who have developed various models, see Engels, Alexander;
Junkelmann, Die Legionen; Goldsworthy, The Roman Army; Roth, Logistics; Harari, Strategy
and Supply, pp. 297333, Bowlus, Franks; Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 707764;
idem, Military Administration, pp. 125; D. Bachrach, Military Logistics, pp. 5778; and
John Haldon, Why Model Logistical systems?, in General Issues in the Study of Medieval
Logistics: sources, Problems and Methodologies, ed. John Haldon (Leiden-Boston, 2006),
135.
368Regarding the matter of brute fact in an epistemological context that is exception-
ally important for historians, see John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality
(New York, 1995).
98 introduction
benefit of hindsight.369 When the sources permit, it is important also to

try to understand how the Carolingians adversaries viewed the situations
in which they were involved, also, when possible, in real time, as condi-
tioned by the material realities that they faced and how they would seem
to have been capable of understanding these variables.
Charlemagne at War
In bringing to a close her book on Charlemagne, Rosamond McKitterick

observes: Although all of these successes in territorial aggrandizement
involved at least a show of force, there is relatively little substance to any
assumption of Charlemagne as a great warrior or military leader.370 With
regard to the latter part of this observation, i.e. evidence for Charlemagne
as a military leader, McKitterick, however inadvertently, already has taken
note of the most important criterion that specialists in military history
employ to judge the greatness of a military leader. Charlemagne was con-
sistently, if not totally, successful for almost a half-century in deploying his
military resources both strategically and tactically.371
Charlemagnes lengthy history of military success was not, however,
the result of luck or, as a classical author might say, fortuna. Rather, as
McKitterick recognizes, it was based on meticulous planning. This, of
course, exposes an important fact in judging great military leaders: they
do not act alone but assemble a staff of effective subordinates and are suf-
ficiently intelligent and personally well-adjusted to benefit from their
work. Using the criteria generally applied by military historians in regard
to evaluating the career of a great military leader, it would be difficult to
identify any particular individual in the history of the West who was more
369I use this phrase in a manner similar to the way it is treated by Donald Bullough,
Unsettled at Aachen: Alcuin between Frankfort and Tours, in Court Culture in the Early
Middle Ages: The Proceedings of the First Alcuin Conference, ed. Catherine Cubitt (Turnhout,
2003), 21.
371The criterion of long-term success is of exceptional importance in regard to special-
ist thinking concerning great military leaders. See Makers of ancient strategy: from the
Persian wars to the fall of Rome, ed. Victor D. Hanson (Princeton, 2010); and The Makers of
Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed., ed. Peter Paret with the col-
laboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, 1986). In this context, it is
rather interesting that Abels, Alfred, p. 123, claims that Alfred the Great was a great war-
lord because of his pragmatism, resolution, and innovative spirit.
introduction99
successful for a longer period of time than Charlemagne.372 Consequently,

when Charlemagnes early campaigns are examined in detail in the pres-
ent volume, the dynamics of military leadership, both strategically and
tactically within their contemporary diplomatic framework, can be seen
at work and understood as they played out during the later 8th century.
McKitterick is correct when she claims that there is relatively little sub-
stance to any assumption of Charlemagne as a great warrior. This obser-
vation illuminates McKittericks approach to understanding warfare in
general, and her conception of the role of the great military leader in par-
ticular. Consequently, it is of signal importance that none of the Carolingian
court writers, who were so fundamentally biased in their efforts to make
Charlemagne appear larger than life and his regnum appear exceptionally
successful and superior, undertakes to depict him as a warrior, much less a
great warrior.373 This likely is due to the appreciation by these authors of
the fact that Charlemagnes military behavior, values, and understanding
of war were firmly circumscribed by ideas inherent in imitatio imperii.
It may be suggested that Einhard chose to use Suetonius Twelve Caesars
and most especially the Life of Augustus as his basic model for the Vita
Karoli because Charlemagne himself had learned from these works and
used them to imitate the way in which Roman emperors behaved. This
suggestion was made by Sanford, who observed that the Lives of the
Caesars probably molded Charlemagnes idea of imperial power 374 In a
similar vein, it may well be that Tacitus Agricola also played a role in help-
ing to inform Charlemagnes self-image in military terms. As McKitterick
observes in suggesting that this work influenced Einhards Vita Karoli,
Agricola still inspires admiration as a military genius and able administra-
tor, particularly skilled at strategic geography 375
The discussion of warfare both by Roman historians and the authors of
the relevant handbooks, e.g. Frontinus and Vegetius, made clear that
372For discussion of military leaders, see, for example, Makers of ancient strategy, ed.
Hanson; The Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Paret; and Basil Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus:
Greater than Napoleon (rpt, New York, 1994).
373James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford, 1992), 154, make this
point well when they observe regarding Einhards Vita Karoli with its heavy debt to
Suetonius treatment of Augustus: Charlemagne emerges as a pious figure, certainly, keen
on learning, but also as a man of the world, a just judge and statesman, and an organizer of
wars, rather than an epic hero.
374This suggestion was made by Sanford, The Study of Ancient History, p. 23, but
to my knowledge, no one has followed up on this point. See Innis, The Classical Tradition,
p. 5, who argues convincingly that a copy of Suetonius work was available at Charlemagnes
court.
375See Charlemagne, p. 37, for the quotation.
100 introduction
sound military leadership and so-called warrior behavior were funda

mentally antithetical.376 The Romans, as one leading specialist recently
observed, did not expect their emperors to fight personally in battle.377
In this context, Charlemagnes self-understanding, at least on occasion,
drew attention to his role in carefully overseeing the administration of his
realm. For example, he referenced his aims in the often-discussed capitu-
lary Admonitio Generalis, in terms of the work of Josiah, king of Judea
(2 Kings 2324). This account of Josiah gave sustained and very positive
attention to the king who maintained the close supervision of his subjects,
spared no effort to correct their behavior when he regarded it as inimical
to the smooth functioning of his regnum, and frequently admonished
everyone to do the right thing. It is noteworthy that Suetonius in treating
Augustus provides a very similar picture of Romes first emperor, whom,
not incidentally, Einhard took as his model for the Vita Karoli. Patterns
of behavior such as these, of course, were long-understood to be keys to
success in both war and peace, and for both secular and ecclesiastical
purposes.378
By contrast with Roman historians and those court writers who chroni-
cled Charlemagnes reign, far too many medievalists, in general, seem to
want to understand Carolingian military leadership in the context of epic
literary fantasies as manifested in some supposedly Germanic form. The
militarily irrational behavior of highly fictionalized warriors such as
Beowulf is the focus of such a model.379 This primitivist view, pressed, for
376Campbell, The Emperor, pp. 5969.

377See Campbell, The Emperor, p. 69, for the quotation.
378Myke de Jong, The empire as ecclesia: Hrabanus Maurus and biblical historia for
rulers, in The Uses of the Past in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Yitzhak Hen and Matthew Innis
(Cambridge, 2001), 191222, at 200, talks of visitation, correction and admonition. As the
title of her article makes clear, de Jongs focus is only on ecclesiastical matters. It should be
noted in this context that Alcuin, who likely wrote Admonitio Generalis for Charlemagne
(Bullough, Alcuin, p. 312), also often referred to Charlemagne as David, a nickname for a
good king that would stick to Charlemagne (Bullough, loc. cit. p. 368, n. 116). For compara-
tive purposes it is noteworthy that Abels, Alfred, p. 123, makes clear that the great king of
Wessex was successful because of careful planning, mastery of logistics, and qualities of
leadership.
379See, for example, Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, p. 247, who thinks much is con-
cealed by the classicising renewal of Carolingian intellectual and spiritual life He argues
that we would have a better understanding of Charlemagne if we had more in the way of
Beowulf or Islandic saga; but the Hildebrandslied and (perhaps) Waltharius point the
way Also note the brief but useful observations on this point by Innis, Memory, Orality
and Literacy, pp. 78; and see Abels, Alfred, p. 138, who observes that The heroic model of
leadership dictated that a commander fight in the front lines, risking his life with the same
abandon he expected from his followers I suppose that someone besotted with the chi-
mera that some of the more extreme aspects of literary criticism have value might argue
introduction101
example, by Reuter and Halsall (see above), attracted a reviewer of the lat-
ters recent book. Thus, Bryan Ward Perkins observed: It remains very dif-
ficult to imagine a seventh or eighth-century army, except as a hairy and
ill-equipped horde, or as a Beowulfian band of heroes He goes on to
conclude that it is almost impossible to envisage what such an army did
when faced with an obstacle such as a walled town.380
In practical military terms, the ideal type of the great warrior is itself
romantic nonsense crafted largely for entertainment purposes, often by
high quality poets, but having no positive value for understanding
Carolingian military planning, strategy, and tactics, or, for that matter,
Charlemagnes leadership in war.381 It seems clear that Charlemagne did
not want to be portrayed by the historians at the Carolingian court either
for propaganda purposes or for any other reason as an epic hero regardless
of how many modern scholars want to think of him as a warlike
German.382
It is significant, for example, in the discussion of real war, as contrasted
to epic fantasies, that when the author of the Annales qui dicitur Einhardi,
an. 778, and Einhard in Vita Karoli (ch. 9) report on the disaster at
Roncevalles, they do nothing to depict Roland and his fellow soldiers as
great warriors or even as heroes. Not even the epitaph for Eggihard, one of
the apparently important men who perished with the rear guard at
Roncevalles, hints that he was a great warrior who died a valiant death.383
The romanticization of Roland and his comrades in the Song of Roland
highlights the great gulf between epic fantasies created for entertainment
that because the highly-biased Carolingian court sources purvey a Roman model for
Charlemagnes military behavior and ignore the great warrior model, it must be concluded
that Charlemagne was, in fact, a great warrior.
380See the review of Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450900
(New York, 2003), in War in History 13 (2006), 524, for the quotations.
381Roberta Frank, Germanic legend in Old English literature, in The Cambridge
Companion to Old English Literature, ed. M. Godden and M. Lapidge (Cambridge, 1991),
88106, is to be given great credit for debunking the warrior myth as having some impor-
tant relation to real war. Also of great importance in this context is Steven C. Fanning,
Tacitus, Beowulf and the Comitatus, HS, 9 (2001), 1738, who has shown how generations
of primitivists have misused the notion of the comitatus as a part of trying to sustain the
warrior culture myth.
382For an interesting and sometimes amusing discussion of the matter of Charlemagnes
identity, see Karl Ferdinand Werner, Karl der Grosse oder Charlemagne? von der Aktualitt
einer berhalten Fragestellung (Munich, 1995). For further investigation down this road, see
the essays collected in Karl der Grosse oder Charlemagne? Acht Antworten deutscher
Geschichtsforscher, ed. Karl Hampe (Berlin, 1935).
383MGH, PLAE, I. ed. Dmmler (pp. 109110).
102 introduction
purposes and real war in which real people die, often in large numbers, as
was the case in the disaster at Roncevalles.
Charlemagne operated as a military leader in the Roman tradition.
In this context, Frontinus tells an illuminating story about the very famous
Roman commander Scipio Africanus (235183 b.c.), victor in the second
Punic war over Hannibal and likely Romes greatest general, pace defend-
ers of Julius Caesar.384 When this great military leader supposedly learned
that it was said of him by some critics that he was insufficiently warlike
(parvum pugnacium), Scipio is alleged to have asserted proudly, My
mother gave birth to a military commander (imperator) not to a fighting
man (bellator).385 In military terms, Charlemagne did not see himself as a
bellator but as an imperator, and his court chroniclers made sure that he
was seen in that light as well.386
Needless to say, Frontinus Strategemata was well-known to the
Carolingians, and finds an echo in the mantra of the Magistratus, men-
tioned above, first ratio and then actio.387 The irrational rush into action of
warriors common to epic fantasies such as Beowulf and, later, the Song of
Roland, was the very antithesis of Charlemagnes view of war and his per-
sonal commitment to careful planning and the deployment of overwhelm-
ing force in regard to the execution of military operations. It is to be
emphasized that a warrior hero only emerges in combat situations when
the military plan has failed, and someone feels called upon to act above
and beyond the call of duty in order to try to save the day. When the plan
works, there is no need for a hero.
Carolingian writers of narrative historical texts were not much inter-
ested in the matter of Charlemagnes courage in battle. For that matter,
they would seem to have had little interest in regard to the bravery of his
father Pippin or his son Louis the Pious. When the subject of royal courage
384The best scholarly biography of Scipio remains H.H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus,
Soldier and Politician (London, 1970); and from the perspective of his generalship, see
Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus.
385Strategemata, 4.7.4.
386It is to be noted that many scholars have observed that Roland is depicted as a fail-
ure as a military commander in the Song of Roland. His heroic search for glory undermined
his obligations to his mission, his men, and his king. See the useful treatment of this litera-
ture by Edward Steidle, Meilz valt mesure: Oliver, the Norman Chroniclers and the Model
Commander, Romance Philology, XLV (1991), 251268. Indeed, the author of the Song of
Roland has Oliver, e.g. lines 10591060, 10391040, condemn Roland for being an inade-
quate commander.
387M.D. Reeve, Frontinus, Strategemata, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 171172, with
the literature cited there.
introduction103
arose, and the writers of Carolingian historical narratives and, perhaps

even more importantly, the court poets wanted to comment on Char
lemagne in this regard, they told stories regarding the dangers that were
faced by their great king while hunting and they did the same in regard to
his father and son Louis. These writers did not focus on the bravery of
these men in battle.388
It may be noted that none of Charlemagnes sons who held the royal
title during their fathers lifetime, nor any of his four grandsons, who simi-
larly held the royal title, were killed in battle. In fact, insofar as can be
ascertained, none of these kings even were wounded in combat. While an
N of nine kings surveyed over the course of more than a century may
result in quibbles regarding statistical robustness, these data would seem
to permit the suggestion that a warrior model based upon heroic perfor-
mance in battle was not fundamental to contemporary understanding of
Carolingian royal military leadership.389
If any single term best characterizes Charlemagnes behavior in regard
to military matters, it is prudence. As will be seen infra, Charlemagne was
focused on victory and conquest. He did not lead his troops on the field
of battle, but like a good Roman military commander such as Scipio
Africanus, observed the course of operations and gave orders accordingly.
There are no accounts of Charlemagne fighting in the front line of a pha-
lanx, climbing a scaling ladder to take a fortress city, or leading a cavalry
charge. In addition, like his grandfather and his father, Charlemagne
worked diligently to avoid the needless sacrifice of his troops in unneces-
sary battles in order to win glory for himself. Real war was for Charlemagne,
and remains for all time, so-called germanically inspired epics notwith-
standing, a serious matter. Real people are killed and wounded. The use of
romantic warrior fantasies such as Beowulf to understand Charlemagne at
388Einhard, VK, ch. 8, makes clear that Charlemagne was never deterred by danger, and
that he was devoted to the hunt (chs. 22, 30). Notker, GK, II, 8, 9, regarding Charlemagne
facing danger on the hunt, and II, 15, regarding King Pippin Is bravery as demonstrated by
killing highly dangerous wild animals. Concerning the efforts by poets, see Peter Godman,
The Poetic Hunt from Saint Martin to Charlemagnes Heir, in Charlemagnes Heir: New
Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins
(Oxford, 1999), 564589, at 577576, 585587. It is perhaps noteworthy that the author of
Karolus Magnus et Leo Papa, as pointed out by Godman (p. 585), likens aspects of the hunt
to the din of battle and uses terms such as exercitus, agmina, and proelia to reenforce that
idea. Jrg Jarnut, Die frmittelalterliche Jagd unter Rechts-und Sozialgeschichtlichen
Aspekten, SSCI, 31 (Spoleto, 1985), 746798, provides a useful introduction to important
aspects of the hunt.
389The Annals of Fulda, an. 881, provide an excellent example of how King Arnulf, a
great grandson of Charlemagne, functioned on the field of battle.
104 introduction
war is tantamount to using the Rambo films to understand General

Eisenhower as commander of Allied forces in Europe during World
War II.
It is so obvious, as almost not to require comment, that we remember
that each party in any historical situation, including the planning and exe-
cution of Charlemagnes military operations, had the opportunity to learn
only from the past, but, of course, not from the future.390 Charlemagne
was both well-educated and intelligent, and had a special interest in
ancient histories written by Romans, which, as noted above, he ordered to
be read aloud at court.391 Charlemagne and his advisers were introduced
to historical works when studying grammar and rhetoric as part of the
trivium.392 They read history and the military handbooks to learn from
the past in order to influence the present and plan for the future.393
This practice of looking to the experts by those responsible for military
matters is an obvious analogue to the efforts of those clerics who studied
biblical commentaries and estate managers who consulted agricultural
manuals.
In regard to learning about military matters from what historians had
written, it is clear that Charlemagne and his advisers had access to numer-
ous Roman texts.394 Among those texts that may be thought to have been
of greater rather than lesser importance are the works of Ammianus
390On this point, see Bernard S. Bachrach, A Lying legacy Revisited: The Abels-Morillo
Defense of Discontinuity, The Journal of Medieval Military History, 5 (2007), 154193; and
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 1720, especially regarding Einhard and Tacitus.
391As an index of Charlemagnes intellectual capabilities in regard to understanding
both difficult Latin and complex ideas, see the discussion of his interest in the writings of
Augustine: Gerhard Ladner, Die Mittalterliche Reform-Idee und ihr Verhltnis zur
Renaissance, MIG, 60 (1952) p. 54; and Janet Nelson, On the Limits of the Carolin
gianRenaissance, Studies in Church History, 14 (1973), 5167, reprinted in eadem, Politics
and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe (London-Renoceverte, 1986), 4950, 54. Even Fichtenau,
The Carolingian Empire, p. 64, who is loath to attribute very much special to Charlemagnes
learning, is willing to concede that he had without doubt read Augustines De civitate
Dei Walter Ullmann, The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship (London,
1969), who was not enthralled either by Charlemagnes intelligence (p. 3) or by his learning
(p. 6), recognizes (pp. 139140) that he was very knowledgeable regarding Augustines
De civitate Dei. Indeed, Ullmann claims that Charlemagne devoured St. Augustines City of
God. Concerning Charlemagnes contributions to the Opus Caroli, see Thomas F.X. Noble,
Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians (Philadelphia, 2009), p. 166.
392Roger D. Ray, Medieval Historiography Through the Twelfth Century: Problems and
Progress of Research, Viator, 5 (1974), 51.
393For a broad-ranging treatment of this subject, see Eva Matthews Sanford, The Study
of Ancient History in the Middle Ages, Journal of the History of Ideas, 5 (1944), 2143.
394See Rosamond McKitterick, History and Memory in the Carolingian World
(Cambridge, 2004), 3950, 186217.
introduction105
Marcellinus,395 Caesar,396 Curtius Rufus,397 Eutropius,398 Florus,399

Justinus,400 Livy,401 Lucan,402 Sallust,403 the anonymous author(s) of the
Historia Augusta,404 Suetonius,405 Tacitus,406 Valerius Maximus,407 and
Valleius Paterculus.408 In the context of learning about military matters
from history, the fate of the Latin translations of Josephus works, which
were widely available, is very much in need of detailed study.409
In addition to having the above-mentioned Roman historical works
available, the Carolingians also knew the Roman military handbooks,
especially Vegetius De re Militari and Frontinus Strategemata. Alcuin and
Charlemagne both were very well-acquainted with these texts. In fact,
when writing to Charlemagne, Alcuin is noted, for example, to have quoted
from Vegetius text (Praef. bk. I) without mentioning either the authors
name or the title of the work.410 In a similar vein, Alcuin also referred in
395L.D. Reynolds, Ammianus Marcellinus, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 68; and
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 150, 151, 157.
396M. Winterbottom, Caesar, in Texts and Transmission, 3536; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 144, 146.
397M. Winterbottom, Curtius Rufus, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 3536; and
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, p. 150.
398L.D. Reynolds, Eutropius, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 159162; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 131, 150.
399Marshall, Florus, pp. 164166.
400L.D. Reynolds, Justinus, in Texts and Transmission, 197199; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 15, 29, 64, 79, 117, 137, 139, 140, 149, 150.
401L.D. Reynolds, Livy, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 205214; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 8, 16, 75, 116, 123, 125, 130, 133147, 153.
402R.J. Tarrant, Lucan, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 215218; Bischoff, Manuscripts
and Libraries, pp. 95, 137, 138, 153, 156.
403L.D. Reynolds, Sallust, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 341349; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 72, 74, 136, 142, 143, 146, 148, 156.
404P.K. Marshall, Scriptores Historiae Augustae, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 354
356; and Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 118, 120, 150.
405M.D. Reeve, Suetonius, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 399406; and Bischoff,
Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 133, 143145, 150.
406Tarrant, Tacitus, pp. 406409; Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 150, 153.
407P.K. Marshall, Valerius Maximus, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 428430; and
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 117, 123, 126, 129, 144, 154.
408L.D. Reynolds, Velleius Paterculus, in Texts and Transmission, pp. 431433; and
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, p. 148.
409M.L.W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe (rev. ed. Ithaca, NY, 1956),
100, 161, 266, 304; and McKitterick, History and Memory, pp. 4547, 193194.
410Alcuin, Epist., no. 257; and the discussion by L. Wallach, Alcuin and Charlemagne:
Studies in Carolingian History and Literature (Ithaca, NY, 1959), 5051. Cf. Richard Abels,
Concluding, in Lay Intellectuals in the Carolingian World, ed. Patrick Wormald and Janet L.
Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 251252, n. 16, who indicates that he knows that Hrabanus
Maurus carefully edited parts of Vegetius text in order to deal with items that were useful
tempore moderno. Yet, Abels believes, following Halsall, Warfare and Society, pp. 145, 268,
106 introduction
his correspondence with Charlemagne to the teaching of Frontinus

regarding military ruses (doli), also without mentioning either the authors
name or the title of the work.411 Doli, of course, were Frontinus hallmark
concern.412 This stylistic conceit of not mentioning the authors name or
the title of the work which is being discussed makes clear that Alcuin
understood that his royal correspondent also knew these texts and their
authors very well.413
In addition to all of the other evidence, both in regard to Charlemagnes
intellectual accomplishments and his interest in learning from history,
special note may be taken here of an exchange of letters between
Charlemagne and Alcuin concerning the prosecution of military opera-
tions in the Saxon region. In this text, which is Alcuins response to a recent
letter from Charlemagne that had been written at the Saxon front, atten-
tion is called to their long-term common interest in antiquis historiarum
libris as crucial to the prosecution of war in a rational manner. In addi-
tion, Alcuin also reprises several ideas that were to be found in historical
texts as well as in the handbooks, mentioned above, concerning which
both he and Charlemagne had exchanged views previously and regarding
which they would seem to have been in agreement.414
Alcuin, in this letter, recognizes the two salient virtues that Charlemagne
himself would seem to have believed were among his own most important
character strengths in regard not only to ruling, but also concerning
war. Consequently, in his answer to the kings most recent letter, Alcuin
calls attention to Charlemagnes consistency, i.e. the most noble stability
of your mind (vestrae mentis nobilissima stabilitas) and also his pru-
dent temperament.415 These characteristics, Alcuin emphasizes, help in
the suppression of a growing rage, i.e. an irrational response, in difficult
n. 35, that copying of De re Militari was mainly a matter of antiquarianism and accepts
Halsalls view that this text had nothing to do with the world in which they lived.
411Epist., no. 149.
412See the broad discussion by Everett L. Wheeler, The Modern Legality of Frontinus
Stratagems, Militrgeschichtliche Miteilungen, 44 (1988), 729.
413An interesting example of this style is Gregory of Tours frequent reliance on the
teaching of Saint Augustine in his Histories, but he neither mentions the great saints name
nor quotes from his works. See on this point, Heinzelmann, Gregory of Tours, p. 154, n. 2.
414Epist., no. 149.
415Epist., no. 149. It is important that both Einhard, e.g. VK, 15; and Notker, e.g. GK, I, 13,
II, 5, also identify these characteristics as fundamental to Charlemagnes personality.
Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, p. 28, n. 4, observes regarding the value of the Gesta
Karoli for understanding Charlemagne: if there is no historical foundation to his [Notkers]
stories, he must have been an outstanding psychologist to invent such a genuine portrait of
Charless character.
introduction107
military situations, in order to stimulate the mind to think rather than

merely to react. In fact, Alcuin reemphasizes that these are the very virtues
that are most essential for waging war militantibus virtutis genus maxime
necessarium esse as made clear in the ancient books of history that we
read.416
416Epist., no. 149.

CHAPTER ONE
TWO KINGS: CHARLEMAGNE AND CARLOMAN
By early September 768, shortly after completing the conquest of

Aquitaine, King Pippin I apparently came to believe that he would not
recover from the illness that had manifested itself at Saintes only a few
weeks earlier. Therefore, he ordered the great lay and ecclesiastical mag-
nates of the realm to be summoned to meet with him in council at Saint-
Denis outside of Paris. There, with the support of these men, he ordered
the division of the regnum Francorum between his two sons, Charlemagne
and Carloman, to be carried out following his death.1 This divisio, like sub-
sequent divisions of the Frankish kingdom executed by the descendants
of Charles Martel, was carried out according to the principle that each
new ruler would inherit a rough equality of the available human and mate-
rial resources once ruled by his father.2 These included facultates such as
1Fred. Cont., ch. 53; ARF, an. 768; and the possible ambiguity of the AE, an. 769. The
obvious speed with which the divisio was executed makes it abundantly clear that very
detailed information from various types of inventories, which was needed to sustain this
massive project, was already in the hands of the central government well before Pippin
died. Of no less importance is the rapidity with which a great many lay and ecclesiastical
magnates were summoned to Saint-Denis. Also of note is their capacity to respond rapidly
in a relatively short period of time during the summer of 768. With regard to communica-
tions, see Ganshof, La Tractoria, pp. 6991; and for background, see Walter Janssen,
Reiten und Fahren in der Merowingerzeit, in Untersuchungen zu Handel, pp. 174228.
2The principles by which later divisions, primarily the divisio of 843, were executed,
have been adumbrated brilliantly by F.L. Ganshof, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte und
Bedeutung des Vertrages von Verdun (843), Deutsches Archiv fr Erforschung des
Mittelalters, XII (1956), 313330, and translated as The genesis and significance of the
Treaty of Verdun (843), by Janet Sondheimer in idem, The Carolingians and the Frankish
Monarchy: Studies in Carolingian History (London, 1971), 289302; the latter is cited here for
the convenience of the reader.
Concerning the divisio of 741 following the death of Charles Martel, see Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, pp. 3739. Although scholars have not found it possible to identify
either the exact principles which undergirded the divisio of 768 or to draw with great preci-
sion the map of this division, it seems clear that Carlomans kingdom encompassed a larger
geographical area than did the regnum inherited by his elder brother. This inequality in
geographical area, therefore, strongly suggests that various types of resources were at
issue in the divisio, as was the case in regard to the division of 843, and not simply the total
quantity of territory. Concerning the divisio of 768, see A. Kroeber, Partage du royaume
des Francs entre Charlemagne et Carlomann Ier, BEC, 20 (1856), 341350; Siguard Abel
and Bernhard Simson, Jhrbucher des frnkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Grossen, 2 vols.
two kings: charlemagne and carloman109
estates of the royal fisc (both those held directly by the crown and those
held as beneficia by vassi dominici), royal monasteries, taxpaying mem-
bers of the population, and productive land.3
The divisio of 768 also took into consideration matters of military strat-
egy similar to those that would be of note in the course of later divisions.4
Pippin provided that Carloman would rule the southerly part of the
Carolingian homeland of Austrasia. Carloman also received some of the
southeasterly parts of Neustria, the eastern half of Aquitaine, Burgundy,
and Alamannia. Pippins thinking in regard to Carloman would seem to
have been conditioned by his concern for Carolingian interests in Italy
and relations with Bavaria, whose duke Tassilo, as will be seen below, had
been trying to act autonomously in relation to the Frankish ruler since 763.
As evidence for Pippins intentions in this matter, those Alpine passes that
were located within the Frankish kingdom were made part of Carlomans
regnum.5
Carloman controlled Carolingian landward access to Italy and access by
sea from the Mediterranean coast. He also controlled the southeastern
sector of the Carolingian eastern frontier in Alamannia. This territory
provided access to pagan Slavic lands and to Bavaria. The latter bor-
deredon the pagan Avar kingdom and also provided access to the Balkans,
where there were close contacts with Byzantine interests. By contrast,
Charlemagne obtained the western half of Aquitaine, the greater part of
Neustria, the northern section of Austrasia and those parts of Saxon
2nd ed. (Leipzig, 18831888), I,2340; Arthur Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1934), pp.
46, map 1; Louis Halphen, Charlemagne, pp. 4142; Peter Classen, Karl der Grosse und die
Thronfolge im Frankenreich, Festschrift fr Hermann Heimpel (Gttingen, 1972), III, 24;
and McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms, p. 371, map. 2.
3Concerning the bipartite structure of the royal fisc (not to be confused with the bipar-
tite structure of great estates divided between lands held indominicatum and tenementa),
which saw the division of estates into lands directly administered by Charlemagne and
estates held as beneficia, see F.L. Ganshof, Frankish Institutions Under Charlemagne, trans.
Bryce and Mary Lyon (Providence, RI, 1968), 3441, 5053. See also, Bachrach, Are they not
like us?, pp. 119133.
4CRF, I, no. 25, prologue; and Reuter, The End, p. 393, with regard to the plan worked
out in 806.
5For the Alpine passes, see the general work of L. Pauli, The Alps: Archaeology and Early
History, trans. E. Peters (London, 1984); regarding the background in the Roman period, see
B. Overbeck, Geschichte des Alpenrheintals in Rmischer Zeit auf Grund der archologischen
Zeugnisse, I Topographie, Fundvorlage und historische Auswertung (Munich, 1982); D. van
Berchem, Les routes et lhistoire: tudes sur les Helvtes et leurs voisins dans lempire romain
(Geneva, 1982); and G. Walser, Summus Poeninus: Beitrge zur Geschichte des Grossen
St. Bernhard-Passes in Rmischer Zeit (Wiesbaden, 1984). For Carolingian history and the
Alpine passes, see Walter W. Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes (Philadelphia, 1935).
110 chapter one
territory which had been made tributary to the Carolingians.6 Relations

with England and particularly with Offa, the effective king of Mercia,
wereto be left to Charlemagne as well.7 As the divisio of 768 recently has
been described, Carloman obtained a relatively compact block of lands in
the center of the regnum that abutted Italy, while Charlemagne inher-
ited a strip of territory that formed a wide arc around his brothers
possessions.8
Strategic considerations of a military nature indicate that Pippin envi-
sioned several areas as appropriate for continued Carolingian political
expansion if necessary or desirable of conquest. Charlemagne and
Carloman were each provided with the opportunity to advance his inter-
ests southward against the Muslims in Spain. Whether such an effort was
seen by Pippin and his advisers, at the time they worked out the divisio, as
requiring collaborative action by the brothers is problematic. There is
good reason to believe, according to most scholars, that there was hostility
between Charlemagne and Carloman prior to their fathers death or, at
least, immediately thereafter.9 From the outset, as Janet Nelson recently
put it, they were uncomfortable colleagues as co-kings of the Franks.10
6Regarding the divisio of 768, see Kroeber, Partage, pp. 341350; Abel and Simson,
Jahrbucher des frnkischen Reiches, I, 2340; Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, pp. 46, map 1;
Halphen, Charlemagne, pp. 4142; Peter Classen, Karl der Grosse und die Thronfolge im
Frankenreich, in Karl der Grosse, I, 24; and McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms, p. 371,
map. 2.
7Regarding Offa, see Patrick Wormald, The Age of Offa and Alcuin, in The Anglo-
Saxons, ed. James Campbell (Ithaca, NY, 1982), 101128; and concerning Charlemagnes rela-
tions with England in general, see J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, Charlemagne and England in Karl
der Grosse, I, 683698. For the earlier background, see Wilhelm Levison, England and the
Continent in the Eighth Century (Oxford, 1946) and Ian Wood, The Merovingian North Sea
(Alingas-Sweeden, 1983).
8For the quotation, see Noble, The Republic, p. 122.
9MGH. Ep. IV, no. 7 (pp. 502505), which indicates that there already was hostility
between Charlemagne and Carloman prior to Pippins death. There has been much
detailed scholarly discussion regarding relations between the two brothers. See, for exam-
ple, Martin Lintzel, Karl der Grosse und Karlmann, Historische Zeitschrift CXL (1929),
122, and reprinted in Martin Lintzel, Ausgewhlte Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1961), II, 1026;
E. Delaruelle, Charlemagne, Carloman, Didier et la politique du mariage Franco-Lombard
770771), Revue Historique, CLXX (1932), 213224; and Cf. Classen, Karl der Grosse und die
Thronfolge im Frankenreich, pp. 545547. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 7782, tries to
explain away the evidence for problems between the two brothers as inherent in sources
that were biased in favor of Charlemagne. However, in this context, it is to be noted that the
narratives at issue were written more than thirty years after Carloman had died and his
sons had disappeared. There was no reason at this time to blacken the image of
Charlemagnes brother.
10Bertranda, p. 105.
On the eastern frontier, Charlemagne was well-positioned to pursue a

long-term project of subduing the Saxons, especially with the advice and
support of Abbot Sturm, whose wealthy monastery at Fulda and other
holdings anchored the southeastern flank of the so-called Fulda gap.11
Pippin, like his early Carolingian predecessors, had limited his military
action against various Saxon groups largely to punitive raids in retaliation
for their incursions into Frankish territory. In the wake of these opera-
tions, Pippin is known to have subjected one or another group of defeated
Saxons to tribute payments. Since Charlemagnes predecessors had pur-
sued a strategy focused on reuniting the regnum Francorum, the Saxon
region, which never had been part of the Frankish kingdom, was not
marked for conquest.12
Carloman was given the opportunity to work with the Bavarians and
Alamanni in pushing a Christian conquest into pagan Slavic lands and
into the Balkans, e.g. the Avar kingdom, which dominated much of what
today is Hungary.13 Pippin likely did not envision Carloman as conquering
northern Italy. Such a grand strategic design had been pointedly rejected
by Pippin in dealing with King Liutprand in 754 and 756, after the latter
surrendered the Lombard capital to the Franks. In any case, if Carloman
were to conquer the Lombard kingdom, it would have made his holdings
a great deal larger and far more valuable than those which had been
11See Chapter Two, below, for a detailed discussion of this matter.

12For the background of the relations of various Frankish rulers with the Saxons, see
Martin Lintzel, Die Sachsen und die Zerstrung des Thringerreiches, Sachsen und Anhalt
13 (1937), 5158; idem, Die Sachsenkrieg Chlothars I, Sachsen und Anhalt, 4 (1928), 113;
idem, Die Tributzahlungen der Sachsen an die Franken zur Zeit der Merowinger und
Knig Pippins, Sachsen und Anhalt, 4 (1928), 1328; and idem, Karl Martells Sachsenkrieg
im Jahre 738 und die Missionsttigkeit des Bonfatius, Sachsen und Anhalt 13 (1937), 5965.
These four studies have been reprinted in Martin Lintzel, Ausgewhlte Schriften, 2 vols.
(Berlin, 1961), I, 5863; 6473, 7486, 8792, respectively. Further citation to all four will be
to the reprinted editions.
13The only noteworthy pagan groups against whom Pippin operated militarily during
his reign were the Frisians and the Saxons. In regard to his dealings with these peoples, it
would be a great exaggeration to consider Pippins initiatives to have been supported by
ideas resembling those of a Crusade similar to the type developed centuries later.
However, it is abundantly clear that by the second half of the 8th century, there was sub-
stantial religious support for military operations against pagans. For various nuances, see
Carl Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of Crusade, trans. M. Baldwin and W. Goffart
(Princeton, 1977), pp. 2022; and more importantly E. Delaruelle, Essai sur la formation de
lide de croisade, Bulletin de littrature ecclsiastique, 42 (1941), 2445. Concerning
Pippins putative role in encouraging the conversion of the Slavs in concert with the
Bavarians, see Conversio Bagoariorum, ed. Wolfram, chs. 35. With regard to the nuances
involved in conquering and converting pagans, see Yizhak Hen, Charlemagnes Jihad,
Viator, 37 (2006), 3351.
112 chapter one
bequeathed to his brother in the divisio of 768. This would have resulted in
a serious imbalance in the resources available to the two kings and likely
would have created yet another potential cause for difficulties between
them.
With regard to Italy, Pippin and his advisers surely knew of previous
unsuccessful efforts by armies of the regnum Francorum in the Merovin
gian era to conquer the Lombard kingdom. In addition, Pippins own expe-
riences in 754 and 756 likely led him to believe that the northern half of the
peninsula could not be subdued effectively without the combined
resources of both Carolingian monarchs and then very probably only with
great difficulty.14 In addition to the Lombards, the papacy, as the major
force among the various indigenous or Roman factions in Italy, and the
Byzantines, who held substantial resources throughout the peninsula,
could not be ignored in any plan for Carolingian expansion south of the
Alps.15 Finally, some Frankish magnates had indicated that they were not
happy with undertaking military operations in northern Italy and pre-
ferred friendly relations with the Lombards.16
Although these diplomatic and military considerations were obviously
of importance in a strategic sense, there also would appear to have been
substantial economic and ideological or religious aspects to the divisio of
768. For example, the Saxon and the Slav territories were economically
underdeveloped in comparison with Carolingian-controlled lands north
of the Alps and also in comparison with both northern Italy and northern
Spain. However, Carolingian military operations in the eastern regions
against the Saxons had resulted in the acquisition of both tribute and
slaves, if only occasionally and in limited quantities.17 In addition, the
Carolingians had enjoyed some success in converting several groups of
Saxons to Christianity with the help of Anglo-Saxon missionaries.18 Most
of the Saxons and the Slavs, of course, were pagans, and their conversion
to Christianity had been a desideratum for both Pippin and his
brotherCarloman before the latter retired to a monastery. More than a few
14Useful background is provided by Robert Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der

Merowinger und des Knigs Peppin, in Das Reich: Idee und Gestalt. Festschrift fr Johannes
Haller, ed. H. Dannenbauer and F. Ernst (Stuttgart, l940), 95132. See Kleinclausz,
Charlemagne, p. 7, for the coalition built by Desiderius, the Lombard king, in order to
thwart a conquest by the Carolingians.
15Classen, Karl der Grosse, pp. 537608.
16Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 45.
17Lintzel, Die Tributzahlungen, pp. 8086.
18See two studies by Lintzel: Die Tributzahlungen, pp. 8086; and Karl Martells
Sachsenkrieg, pp. 8792.
prominent church leaders in the regnum Francorum, and not only those
who had come under the reforming influence of Boniface, were strongly in
favor of bringing Christianity to the pagans.19
Beyond the border with Spain, there were Christians, who were seen in
some quarters of the regnum Francorum as needing liberation from
Muslim domination. It also seems likely that the popes were more than a
little interested in seeing Christian religious interests pursued in Spain
against the Muslims.20 There were also rich cities in the north of the pen-
insula, such as Barcelona, Pamplona, and Saragossa, which were within
comparatively easy reach of Carolingian armies, and could possibly be
brought under Frankish control.21 For merchants in Carlomans kingdom
an increase in economic penetration of the lands bordering the
Mediterranean was certainly a good prospect. In addition, important
Jewish communities already were living within the borders of the regnum
Francorum and on its frontiers during the Merovingian era. These Jews
were understood by the Carolingians to be important assets, especially in
regard to further economic penetration of the Mediterranean.22 This spec-
trum of commercial opportunities, especially the trade in slaves with the
East, had great potential to increase the overall wealth in the Frankish
kingdom and particularly royal income through the collection of tolls and
other taxes.23
19For recent textbook-like coverage, without sufficient historiographical background,

see Ian Wood, The Missionary Life; Saints and the Evangelisation of Europe 4001050
(London, 2001), pp. 5778. For a more scholarly approach, see McKitterick, England and
the Continent, NCMH, II, 6484, and for the bibliography, see ibid., pp. 893900.
20In a letter of Pope Hadrian I (CC., no. 61), there is specific papal manifestation of
these views no later than May 778.
21Delaruelle, Essai, pp. 2445, demonstrates that war against Muslims had a certain
amount of support from the ecclesiastical authorities in the Carolingian world. See also the
introductory observations by Roger Collins, Early Medieval Spain: Unity in Diversity, 400
1000 (London, 1983), 183200; and the observations by Tomaz Mastnak, Crusading Peace,
Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order (Berkeley, 2002), pp. 6773.
22For general background, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Medieval Jewish Policy in
Western Europe (Minneapolis, 1977), pp. 66105. Regarding economic activity specifically,
see Claude, Aspekte des Binnenhandels, pp. 6871. The minimalist thesis put forward by
Michael Toch, Jews in Europe, 5001050, NCMH, I, 547570, relies, in large part, on his
failure to deal with several important clusters of information and a methodological misun-
derstanding of other key data.
23For background material, see two important articles by Dietrich Claude, Die
Handwerker der Merowingerzeit nach dem erzlende und urkundlichen Quellen, in Das
Handwerk in vor- und frhgeschichtlicher Zeit, vol. I, Historische und rechtshistorische
Beitrger und Untersuchungen zur Frhgeschte der Gilde, ed. Herbert Jankuhn et al.
(Gttingen, 1981), 204266; and Aspekte des Binnenhandels, pp. 999. Regarding
Merovingian and Carolingian trade in the north and east, see two studies by Peter Johanek:
Der Aussenhandel des Frankenreiches der Merowingerzeit nach Norden und Osten im
114 chapter one
In the west, Charlemagnes portion of the Frankish kingdom estab-

lished by the divisio provided the opportunity to pursue the conquest and
full integration of Brittany under his regnum.24 Such an expansion of
Carolingian rule would permit merchants from Charlemagnes kingdom to
benefit from the development of trading arrangements in lands along the
western reaches of England, Ireland, and parts of western Scotland. This
area was developing very rapidly as indicated by the emporium-phenom-
enon which emerged early in the 7th century. In addition, Charlemagne
was positioned to dominate trading in the English Channel, North Sea,
and Baltic, which were traditional areas of commercial exploitation under
the Merovingian kings.25 Charlemagne also was given the opportunity to
develop extended diplomatic relations with various Anglo-Saxon rulers in
England.26
Papal Diplomacy
Very shortly after Charlemagne and Carloman were raised to their respec-
tive thrones at Noyon and Soissons on Sunday 9 October 768, Sergius, the
papal legate, arrived in the regnum Francorum and visited both monarchs.
He brought news that Stephen III had been elected pope and was in great
need of military support to thwart the Lombard aggression that was being
planned against Rome and its assets.27 King Pippin, after taking strong
measures to curtail Lombard plans for aggression against the papacy
in the mid-750s, had established a policy of benign neglect with regard
to Italy while he pursued the conquest of Aquitaine during the follow
ing decade.28 Now Pippins sons were informed that the treaty of 754,
Spiegel der Schriftquellen, in Untersuchungen zu Handel, 214254; and idem, Die frn-
kische Handel der Karolingerzeit im Spiegel der Schriftquellen, in Untersuchungen zu
Handel, 4:768; and for the Mediterranean, McCormick, Origins, who develops an argu-
ment regarding the increased importance of the slave trade.
24See Julia M.H. Smith, Province and Empire: Brittany and the Carolingians (Cambridge,
1992).
25For background on trade with the north, see Claude, Aspekte des Binnenhandels,
pp. 999; Wood, The Merovingian North Sea; and more recently Ian Wood, Frankish
Hegemony in England, in The Age Of Sutton Hoo: Seventh Century in North-Western Europe,
ed. M.O.H. Carver (Woodbridge, 1992), 234241.
26Smith, Province and Empire, pp. 4042, sketches Breton trading links during the pre-
Carolingian era. Regarding England, see Johanna Story, Carolingian Connections: Anglo-
Saxon England and Carolingian Francia c. 750870 (Aldershot, 2003).
27V. Stephani III, chs. 16, 17.
28See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 4546, with the literature cited there.
by which, among other things, the Frankish king had, according to Rome,
guaranteed the independence of the papacy and its territorial integrity if
not aggrandizement, was in need of enforcement by the new monarchs.29
Sergius met with the brothers at their respective courts and obtained the
assent of each of them to send a combined delegation of twelve bishops to
Rome for a council to settle matters of very great importance to the pope.30
By this action, Charlemagne and Carloman each took a step toward the
explicit confirmation of the treaty of 754, which their father had negoti-
ated fourteen years earlier, in apparent support of what amounted to a
papal interpretation of this pact, at least in Roman eyes.31
Of considerable importance is Charlemagnes willingness, perhaps
even eagerness, to become involved in Italy. This interest in Italy mani-
fested itself despite the obvious fact that the divisio would seem to have
left relations with Rome and the Lombards solely within Carlomans com-
petence. Charlemagne, however, affirmed by his actions that he would
carry out his sworn duty as patricius Romanorum, a title that both he and
Carloman, along with Pippin, had received from Pope Stephen II in 754.
Charlemagne was sworn to support the pope even if such an effort might
subvert, or appear to subvert, the intent of the divisio of 768. In this situa-
tion, it seems unlikely that Pope Stephen III was ignorant of the terms of
Pippins divisio. If, however, the pontiff had not been informed of the situ-
ation prior to sending Sergius to Francia, it is obvious that the latter easily
would have learned the specific terms of the division when visiting the
courts of Charlemagne and Carloman.
Military Operations in Aquitaine
In the spring of 769, Charlemagne began making a tour of his regnum.

While celebrating Easter at Rouen during the latter part of March and
early April of 769, he learned that Hunoald, the son of the recently
deceased Duke Waiofar, had risen up in opposition to Carolingian
domination of southwestern Aquitaine.32 Charlemagne determined that
29See Noble, The Republic, pp. 116117.

30V. Stephani III, chs. 1617.
31See, for example, Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, pp. 45; Noble, The Republic, pp. 116117;
and J.T. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome: The Lombard Monarchy in the Eighth Century
(Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 113116.
32Philippe Wolff, LAquitaine et ses Marges, in Karl der Grosse, I, 270, n. 5; and Rouche,
LAquitaine, pp. 128129, 527, n. 120, are among the many scholars who discuss the identity
116 chapter one
vigorous and decisive military action would be required to crush the revolt
before it could spread.33 Consequently, he immediately sent word to
Carloman to join him at Moncontour, about 45 kilometers northwest of
Poitiers, for a conference in order to make a formal request for military
support and to decide upon the best course of action, or campaign strat-
egy, to be taken against Hunoald.34 Charlemagne first moved south along
the old Roman road from Rouen to Angers.35 At this stage of the operation,
he apparently had with him only the troops or perhaps even only some of
his military household, the obsequium regalis, or presentales.36 Consistent
with the nature of the royal military household, as contrasted with a nor-
mal army of invasion, i.e. an expeditionary army, the author of Annales
regni Francorum characterized this force as small.37
of Hunoald and the confusion in the sources. In light of contemporary naming patterns
and relevant age cohorts, the Hunoald under consideration here was almost certainly the
son of Waiofar. This is the opinion, as well, of Roger Collins, The Basques, 2nd ed. (Oxford,
1990), p. 110.
33ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769. Exactly when Charlemagne learned that Hunoald was
in revolt cannot be ascertained. However, it may be assumed safely that Charlemagne only
drew the conclusion that military action in his Aquitanian territories would be necessary
after he had established his court at Rouen early in the spring of 769. Had Charlemagne
surmised the need for a military campaign in Aquitaine while he was still at Aachen, where
he celebrated Christmas 768, it is likely that he would have gone south to Tours or even to
Poitiers to celebrate Easter rather than to Rouen, which was very far to the north and west
of his potentially best positioned bases for operations against Hunoald. See, in this context,
King Pippins campaigns in Aquitaine discussed by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 202242.
34For the identification of Duasdivas in the Latin sources with Moncontour,
see Wolff, LAquitaine, p. 270, n.7.
35Charlemagnes route can be adumbrated by the fact that he issued a charter in favor
of the Angevin monastery of Saint-Aubin during the course of this journey (DK. no. 58).
The actual establishment of this act at Mornac-sur-Charante does not affect the fact that
Charlemagne stopped at Angers in order to make contact with Guntarius, the rector of
Saint-Aubin. In a more practical vein, it is noteworthy that Angers was a natural stopping
place on the route from Rouen to Poitiers along the old Roman road, and that Saint-Aubin
was a very wealthy monastery where the royal entourage would have no trouble finding
logistical support. See Carlrichard Brhl, Knigpflaz und Bischofsstadt in frnkischer
Zeit, Rheinische Vierteljahrsbltter 23 (1958), 161274. The assertion by Costambeys, Innes,
and Maclean, The Carolingian World, p. 65, that The brothers marched into Aquitaine
together in 769 is simply wrong.
36In addition to the works cited in The Introduction, above, see regarding the late
imperial and early Merovingian backgrounds, Richard I. Frank, Scholae Palatinae (Rome,
1969), 167232; Paul Guilhiermoz, Essai sur lorigine de la noblesse en France au moyen ge
(Paris, 1902), 4977; M. Deloche, La trustis et lantrustion royal sous les deux premires races
(Paris, 1873), which though old and in need of substantial revision, is still of considerable
value; and Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 13, 14, 32, 71, 72, 97, 109.
37ARF, an. 769; but cf. AE, an., 769, whose author would seem to think that this was a
larger force and labels it an exercitus.
The brothers met at Moncontour early in May, but Carloman refused to

provide troops in order to support Charlemagnes plans to crush Hunoalds
revolt. The sources, which blamed the 18-year-old Carlomans powerful
advisers (proceres) for orchestrating this policy of non-cooperation, prob-
ably are correct.38 Much more important, however, are the likely reasons
why Carlomans advisers sought to distance their principal from his
brother. Charlemagne, as the older and more experienced of the two kings,
likely presumed that he had some sense of natural superiority in regard to
his younger brother. Such a situation, if allowed to develop, could result in
the latters dependence and a diminution of his prestige and authority.
Charlemagnes participation in Italian affairs during the autumn of 768,
despite the diplomatic cover provided by the pope, almost certainly was
regarded by Carlomans advisers as a subversion of Pippins apparent deci-
sion to reserve Frankish interests south of the Alps to his younger son.
Neither Charlemagnes sworn duty as patricius Romanorum nor Pope
Stephen IIIs initiative was likely seen at Carlomans court as a viable
excuse for the violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Pippins will as
evidenced in the divisio.39 Consequently, Carlomans refusal to provide the
auxillium Charlemagne had requested to support his military operations
in western Aquitaine is to be seen as evidence for sustaining the principles
of the divisio. This policy apparently called for each of the brothers to stay
out of the others business according to their respective interests as laid
out in the division of the Frankish kingdom which their father had ordered,
and which many of the great men of the regnum had supported. Pippins
long-term success between 742 and 768 undoubtedly lent considerable
weight to his views in regard to political matters even post mortem.
Having been rebuffed by Carloman, Charlemagne moved south-south-
west about 75 kilometers from Moncontour to Mornac-sur-Charante,
where he encamped late in May.40 This swing to the west may well have
been the result of a search for Hunoald, whom Charlemagne is reported to
have pursued but failed to bring to battle early in the campaign. The
author of the Annales qui dicitur Einhardi suggests reasonably that
38See especially, AE, an. 769; and Einhard, VK, ch. 3.

39Ottorino Bertolini, Roma di Fronte a Bisanzio e ai Longobardi (Bologna, 1941), p. 648,
emphasizes Charlemagnes interest in playing an active role in Italy despite the contours of
the divisio of 768. Charlemagnes own position was made clear by 769 at the latest, when he
had himself styled Karolus gratia Dei rex regnique Francorum rector et devotus sanctae
ecclesiae defensor atque adiutor in omnibus in regard to Apostolicae sedis hortatu (CRF. I,
no. 19). Here I follow the argument put forward by Delaruelle, Charlemagne, p. 214.
40These calculations are based upon the dating information provided by DK. no. 58.
118 chapter one
Hunoald was able to elude pursuit by Charlemagnes forces because of his

knowledge of the region.41 Shortly thereafter, Charlemagne moved further
south and east to the important city of Angoulme. The walls of this late
Roman fortress had been damaged by Duke Waiofar in 763 during Pippins
conquest of Aquitaine. Pippin, however, had the defenses fully restored
and, no later than 766, he saw to the stationing there of a strong garrison
of the kings hominess (men detached from the royal obsequium), to garri-
son the area.42
While based at Angoulme, Charlemagne mustered a very large force of
Franks (plures Francos). These men, our source makes clear, were to move
out on campaign with their construction tools (utensilia) and other types
of equipment required for building operations (praeparamenta) that
might be needed, for example, if a siege were to be undertaken.43 In addi-
tion, Charlemagne summoned a very large group of select levies from
throughout his holdings in Aquitaine (et inde contractis undique copiis) to
undertake military operations beyond the borders of their home territo-
ries. These civitates, which are indicated as mobilizing copii fighting men,
were located in that part of Aquitaine that had come to Charlemagne as
his part of the divisio of 768.44
While mobilizing his large army at Angoulme, Charlemagnes military
advisers, presumably men who served in the Magistratus, developed a
plan to deal with the situation of the revolt and other contingencies that
might arise subsequently. In its initial phase, the plan was for the
Carolingian army to advance about 80 kilometers south of Angoulme to
the right bank of the Dordogne, near its confluence with the Garonne.
This was virtually on the border between Aquitaine and Gascony. The plan
called for the construction of a stronghold. This castellum could be used as
a fortified base, in the short term, for Charlemagnes newly levied army,
composed, likely in large part, of expeditionary levies that had the imme-
diate mission of crushing Hunoalds revolt.45 The Garonne, of course, was
important for the provision of logistical support and the transport of
equipment to sustain Charlemagnes military operations.
41AE. an., 769.

42ARF, an. 769; AE, an. 769; and FC., chs. 46, 48.
43ARF, an. 769.
44AE, an. 769. Cf. France, The Armies of Charlemagne, p. 72, who does not treat those
parts of this text that refer to Charlemagnes forces as plures and copii, while arguing for the
small size of the Frankish kings army.
45ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769.
In the longer term, an improved stronghold (castrum), which

Charlemagne, in fact, later ordered to be constructed in the same place,
i.e. Fronsac, could well serve as a permanent military installation in the
area. Men stationed in this fortress could provide intelligence to the court
regarding the activities of the Gascon duke, Lupus, whose home territory,
between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, was distant from the Carolingian
heartland.46 Moreover, any military operations that Charlemagne might
choose to undertake in the future, either in Gascony or perhaps even
across the Pyrenees into Spain, would require bases in the southwest of
Gaul. Charlemagne, who had served with his father during the conquest of
Aquitaine in the 760s, surely was well-informed regarding such basic oper-
ational realities as they pertained to the southwest region of the regnum
Francorum.47
By the end of July, Charlemagnes large and heavily encumbered col-
umn finally moved out of Angoulme and deployed to build the above-
mentioned stronghold of Fronsac on the banks of the Dordogne within
about 40 kilometers, or a two-day march, of the Gascon border on the
Garonne.48 This construction was rapidly executed.49 From this site,
Charlemagnes army was within easy striking distance of the wealthy for-
tress city of Bordeaux, only 40 kilometers to the southwest, which anchored
the northwestern frontier of the Gascon duchy and served as the major
commercial center in this region of Gaul for long-distance trade in the
Atlantic to the north as far as Ireland and to the south along the coast of
Spain.50
46ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769. The former consistently uses the term castrum, which
may be taken to mean a permanent fortification probably of stone and including a tower.
The latter, by contrast, uses the term castellum, which likely was intended to indicate a less
well-developed stronghold. Regarding the nature of the fortifications in this region, see
Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Medieval Fortifications in the West of France: a technical
vocabulary, Technology and Culture 16 (1975), 531569, reprinted with the same pagination
in idem, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002); Cf.
Collins, The Basques, p. 110.
48For evidence that Charlemagne remained encamped in the area of Angoulme at
Angeac, see DK., no. 59. Rouche, LAquitaine, p. 527, n. 122, rightly takes the date of this act
as evidence for Charlemagnes lengthy and thorough preparations prior to moving further
south.
49ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769. Wolff, LAquitaine, p. 270, n. 9, points out that the
place-name originally given to the location of the castrum was Franciacum, i.e. the strong-
hold of the Franks.
50For the broad picture see Charles Higounet, Bordeaux pendant le haut moyen age
(Bordeaux, 1963) I, 942, 7186, 201259.
120 chapter one
Charlemagnes new castellum, which stood about forty meters north of

the right bank of the Dordogne, was well-situated as a military base to
dominate the local area.51 Carolingian troops based there could be pro-
vided with various types of artillery and small arms, such as bows and
crossbows.52 Consequently, the garrison in this stronghold was positioned
to control traffic both on the river and on the land route along the old
Roman road that followed the lower reaches of the Dordogne.53 In addi-
tion, when necessary, elements of the Frankish garrison were in position
to support toll collectors, who were established to collect the required
tenth from merchants using the Dordodgne and the Garonne, to the south,
as well as those who traveled along the Roman road that went between
Bordeaux and Toulouse and on to the Mediterranean port at Narbonne.54
It is unlikely, however, that as early as 769, Charlemagne had made the
needed administrative investments in the region, e.g. toll stations, so soon
after his fathers conquest of Aquitaine and death. Nevertheless, King
Pippins capitulary for Aquitaine in 768 envisioned the full integration of
the southwest, including Gascony, into the regnum Francorum, and this
was confirmed in 769 by Charlemagnes capitulary for the region.55
Consequently, agents appointed by the central government would be
established throughout southern Aquitaine and Gascony to administer
the region; as discussed above, these officers included toll collectors.
Charlemagne, when his new stronghold was completed, did not order
his now greatly augmented military forces into the field so that they
might search out, engage, and destroy Hunoalds rebel forces. Nor did
Charlemagne send his troops south of the Garonne to ravage the country-
side in search of booty and to terrorize the populace so as to undermine
any support that Hunoald may have had in the Gascon duchy. Both of
these, of course, were options that Charlemagne chose not to exercise in
the short-term. Rather, Charlemagne sent royal missi with orders for Duke
Lupus of the Gascons to capture Hunoald and his family.56 Lupus, at this
51Regarding the exact location of the fortifications at Fronsac, see J.F. Blad, Fin du
premier duch dAquitaine (Annuaire de la Facult des lettres de Bordeaux, X [1882]),
277278. Blads views have been accepted by Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 6, n. 1.
52See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 98116, regarding weapons and
training.
53Rouche, Lhritage, p. 18.
54Rouche, Lhritage, pp. 1819.
55CRF., I, no. 18, for Pippins capitulary issued in 768, and Charlemagnes extended con-
firmation issued in 769, no. 19.
56ARF, an., 769; and AE, an., 769.
time, likely was to be found at the fortress city of Auch on the Gers river,
which runs into the Garonne at Agen about 60 kilometers to the north.
Auch, which had been the capital of the imperial province of Novem
populana during the later Roman era, was located about a hundred or so
kilometers south of Charlemagnes base at Fronsac, and was protected by
a stone circuit wall of some 1,200 meters.57
It should be noted that Lupus, who is variously referred to in the sources
as dux and/or princips, would seem to have been regarded at this time by
Charlemagne as a Carolingian royal official, who, the previous year, had
been delegated by Pippin to administer the Gascon ducatus.58 It is likely
that Lupus had held such an office, or one very similar, under Waiofer,
when the latter had ruled in Aquitaine prior to the completion of the
Carolingian conquest in 768. It also seems likely that Lupus had been per-
mitted to remain in that position by King Pippin after the magnates of the
Gascon ducatus swore faithfulness to the Frankish monarch prior to the
final defeat of Waiofer. In short, the Gascons had made a separate peace
with the Carolingians, which obviated the need for a Frankish invasion of
the region south of the Garonne.59 It has been suggested that this meeting
with Pippin had taken place at Bordeaux, south of Saintes, where Pippin
would appear have contracted the disease from which he would die not
long after.60
Charlemagnes order to Duke Lupus is described in the admittedly-
biased Carolingian court sources as taking the form of a mandatum.61 This
is of importance from an institutional perspective insofar as a mandatum
was a particular type of command in Roman law which was used widely in
the Frankish kingdom.62 Indeed, the mandatum continued to be used not
57See Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 108110, regarding Auchs later Roman
status and its circuit wall.
58Regarding the titles attributed to Lupus in a wide variety of sources, see Rene
Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes de Gascogne (Marsolan, 1982), pp. 1011.
59Fred. cont. ch. 51, calls attention to the Gascons from south of the Garonne, who, in
768, came to Pippin, gave hostages, and swore to be faithful always to the king and his sons.
All of this was carried out prior to the death of Waiofer.
60Rene Mussot-Goulard, Les Gascons, VIe-VIIe-VIIIe sicles: la recherche dun prince
(Angelet, 2001), pp. 166167.
61AE, an. 769, uses the phrase ea conditione mandata.
62Concerning the early medieval use of the mandatum, see Olivier Guillot, La droit
romain classique et la lexicographie de terms du latin mdival impliquant dlgation de
pouvoir, La lexicographie du latin mdival et ses rapports avec les recherches actuelles sur
la civilisation du moyen-ge: Paris 1978 (Paris, 1981), 153166. Regarding the teaching and
learning of Roman law under the early Carolingians, see Pierre Rich, Enseignement du
droit en Gaul du VI au XI sicle, IRMA, I, 5b bb (Milan, 1965), 1215.
122 chapter one
only in the south but also north of the Loire into the 11th century.63 In the
situation at issue here, Charlemagne transferred royal authority through a
mandatum to Lupus so that the latter could deal with Hunoald in the
kings name. This is significant because by doing this, Charlemagne rein-
forced the view of his government that Lupus was a royal official who was
part of the Carolingian administrative hierarchy. This approach to the
treatment of Lupus echoed Pippins treatment of Duke Waiofer, whom
the Carolingian government had characterized as a royal official prior to
the latters revolt, suppression, and death.64
Lupus was ordered to capture Hunoald and his wife and to turn them
over to the kings legati.65 Charlemagnes legates were instructed to make
clear to Lupus that if he failed to obey the royal mandatum, the Frankish
army, now based at Fronsac, was well-prepared to make war (bellum) on
the Gascons. Secondly, if Charlemagne found it necessary to take the field,
he would depose Duke Lupus from office for having failed to obey a legiti-
mate royal command.66 In response to Charlemagnes orders, Lupus, who
is depicted as being terrified, is reported to have taken Hunoald and his
wife prisoner. Then, according to the Carolingian court sources, Lupus
immediately turned the rebel leader over to Charlemagnes legates.67
Lupus also is reported to have cooperated fully in the orchestration of an
extensive and solemn public ceremony in which he gave himself and his
entire ducatus into the kings power. Charlemagne crossed the Garonne in
order to participate in this ceremony and to receive Lupus personal
submission.68
63Guillot, La droit romain, pp. 153166.

64Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 220221, 226.
65See ARF, an. 769, for missi, and AE. 769, for the king sending a legatio and its members
being referred to as legati.
66AE, an. 769, where the idea of Charlemagnes royal power is emphasized by stressing
the punishment that would follow should Duke Lupus display inoboedientia to the king.
67ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769, do not discuss Lupus submission, but the latter does
discuss the dukes fear. Both Einhard, VK., ch. 5 and Astron., VL., bk. I, ch. 2, emphasize
Lupus submission and Charlemagnes crossing the Garonne frontier. See Collins, The
Basques, p. 110.
68Einhard, VK., ch. 5; and Astron., VL., bk. I, ch. 2. Philippe Buc, The Dangers of Ritual:
Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory (Princeton, 2001), wisely admon-
ishes his readers that some medievalists, particularly early medievalists, have made too
much of ritual. However, it will not do to dismiss ritual as mere ritual, completely, and,
Ihasten to add, Buc does not advocate this. From my perspective, there is an important
weakness in Bucs argument (see his summary on p. 249), which can be falsified empiri-
cally. This is the case insofar as he believes medieval authors wrote with higher Truth
rather than fact in mind. It is not fair to say For what mattered to them (as they under-
stood it), distortion (as we understand it) was more often than not the order of the day.
This ceremony made clear to all who either witnessed the ritual or who
heard about it at a later time that Lupus had recognized Charlemagnes
ditio, likely through some particular act such as the proskynesis, discussed
above. Further indication either of Charlemagnes persuasiveness or
Lupus good faith, and perhaps even both, is made clear by the fact that
the duke acquiesced in allowing his son, Lupus Sanchez, to be taken back
to Austrasia by Charlemagne to be educated. In fact, Charlemagne is
identified in a reliable source on this point as the boys nutritus.69 An Arab
source (ibn Hayyan) indicates that Duke Lupus was married to a princess
of the Asturian royal family, who perhaps was the mother of Lupus
Sanchez.70
The education of Lupus likely heir was to be carried out in a manner
consistent with that of other aristocratic young men who were regarded
by the Frankish kings as having a future as high-level figures in the
Carolingian administration. Only a few years earlier, Witiza, better known
as Benedict of Aniane, and his younger brother, who were the sons of the
count of Maguelonne, a man of Gothic ancestry, also were sent north to be
educated at the royal court.71 Obviously, Lupus Sanchez not only was to be
educated, probably at the royal court, but, in addition, he may be consid-
ered within the framework of western tradition to have been a hostage for
the good behavior of his father and perhaps of his blood relatives the
Asturian kings, Aurel and Bermund.
The success of Charlemagnes program for educating and vetting Lupus
Sanchez for future high office is made clear by the fact that he was permit-
ted to succeed his father in the ducal office no later than ca. 800 and prob-
ably considerably earlier. In 800, Lupus Sanchez is noted by contemporaries
I think it is more accurate to suggest that those who wrote history during the Middle Ages
sometimes distorted matters about which they wrote, as we understand the situation, but
it is also correct to make clear that sometimes they got it right, as we understand it, i.e. they
reported the facts accurately. The latter is often the case when they provide a materially
accurate stage set upon which to have a concocted story acted out. Regarding this matter,
see three studies by Bernard S. Bachrach: Dudo of Saint Quentin as a Military Historian,
The Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History 12 (2002 appeared in 2003), 155185;
Dudo of Saint Quentins Views on Religion and Warfare, ca. 1000. A mise au point, in Foi
chrtienne et glises dans la socit de lOccident du Haut Moyen ge (IVe-XIIe sicle), ed.
Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau and Pascal Texier (Limoges, 2004), 241252; and Dudo of
Saint Quentin and Norman Military Strategy, Anglo-Norman Studies, XXVI (2004), 2136.
See also D. Bachrach, Memory, Epistemology, and the Writing of Early Medieval Military,
pp. 6390.
69Collins, The Basques, pp. 109, 129; ARF, an. 816; Hermoldus, IHL, line 166.
70Mussot-Goulard, Les Gascons, pp. 168170.
71See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 70, 7374, 85, 162.
124 chapter one
to have been regarded by Louis the Pious, the king of Aquitaine, as a man
of considerable influence and importance. In 801, the duke is reported to
have played a noteworthy role at the head of a considerable force of
Gascons in the army of Louis the Pious. This force participated in the siege
of Barcelona and played a role in the capture the fortress city that previ-
ously was controlled by the Muslims.72
Although the Carolingian court sources that report on Charlemagnes
dealings with the elder Lupus are known to be biased in favor of the
Carolingian king, there is good reason to believe that their very positive
treatment of operations in 769 likely are accurate. The claim, for example,
that Duke Lupus was terrified by Charlemagnes explicit and implicit
threats is supported by the fact that despite substantial military assets
available to the Gascon duke (see below), he and his advisers chose not to
resist. Lupus lack of resistance is further indicated by the fact that the nar-
rative sources do not indicate that Charlemagnes forces undertook mili-
tary operations south of the Garonne. There are no reports in these sources
of the destruction of property or loss of life in Gascony. In addition, there
is no archaeological evidence that might indicate the destruction of ele-
ments of the physical infrastructure within the Gascon duchy or in its
environs at this time. Perhaps most importantly, there is no report that
Charlemagnes army took booty from a defeated enemy. Finally, the subse-
quent history of Lupus tenure as duke, as noted above, indicates that he
cooperated with the central government in a manner consistent with his
recognition of Charlemagne ditio and the subsequent succession of his
son, Lupus Sanchez, to the ducal officium.73
Charlemagnes Military Assets and Strategy
In this campaign, Charlemagne commanded, in addition to the elements

of his military household with which he came south, the numerous expe-
ditionary levies, i.e. the copii noted above, who were mobilized from the
various civitates that he controlled in the southwest. These units included
the eligible native Romani of the region, who were among those who were
required to serve in the Carolingian armed forces as made clear in Pippins
72Hermold., IHL, lines 151, 164170, 306313.

73The later legend that Lupus did not support Charlemagne in 778 seems to be just
that, a legend with no contemporary support. As noted above, Lupus Sanchez, Duke Lupus
son, later was appointed duke by Charlemagne, which would seem to permit the inference
that the family was trusted. Cf. Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes, p. 75.
Aquitanian capitulary of 768.74 Another major source of trained man-

power was provided by Frankish military colonists, whom Pippin had
established in the Angoumois and other parts of Aquitaine earlier in the
decade.75 Many of these men likely were vassi dominici, who also had their
own vassi. Among the latter troops there probably were unfree depen-
dents, who had been honored with the status of vassals, i.e. servi in
bassallatico honorati sunt, and had been provided with horses, arms, and
armor.76 The plethora of Frankish place names in this region combined
with relevant military artifacts, identified by archaeologists, provide both
onomastic and material support for the assertion in the narrative accounts
that a great many Franks were available in the region for military
service.77
In mobilizing a large army, Charlemagne would appear to have followed
his fathers strategy and committed himself to an operational orientation
that modern scholars describe as the doctrine of overwhelming force.
The aim of such a strategy was to convince ones adversaries in advance of
any significant combat that to resist was futile.78 Charlemagne knew,
either before he had reached Angoulme or very shortly thereafter, that he
wanted to discourage Hunoald from engaging in battle in the field and also
that he wanted to be able to convince Duke Lupus that resistance was not
a viable option. For Charlemagne and his advisers, this plan represented a
rational assessment of the situation. The key question was whether Lupus
would come to the same conclusion.
Duke Lupus Assets
In estimating Duke Lupus assets, it is important to reemphasize that at

least since the early 8th century, the population throughout all of the
Frankish kingdom had been increasing rapidly and that this pattern of
demographic growth has been shown to have begun even earlier in the
Gascon duchy.79 The context for population growth in the region south of
74Concerning Romani, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 215217.

75Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 211, 215, 244.
76CRF., no. 25, ch. 4; and Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 6364.
77Rouche, LAquitaine, pp. 143147.
79Rouche, LAquitaine, pp. 235237; Pierre Bonnaissie, La Aquitaine et lEspagne aux
Ve-VIIIe sicles. Pour une approche historique et archologique de quelques grand prob-
lmes, in Gallo-Romans, Wisigoths et France en Aquitaine, Septimanie et Espagne. Acts des
VIIes journes internationales dArchologie mrovingienne, Toulouse, 1985, ed. Patrick Prin
126 chapter one
the Garonne may be understood, at least in part, by the fact that the duchy
had been free from Muslim raids since Charles Martels decisive victory
over Abd ar Rachman, the Umayyad governor of Spain, at Poitiers in 732.80
It is also of considerable importance that during Pippins lengthy war of
conquest in Aquitaine, the Gascon ducatus was not a theater for military
operations as compared to several regions to the north of the Garonne
that had been ruled directly by Waiofar. Indeed, the Gascon leaders, as
noted above, surrendered to King Pippin on the banks of the Garonne,
even prior to Waiofers death, and thereby avoided a Frankish invasion of
the duchy.81
Peace, of course, was and continues to be of considerable importance in
the maintenance of an upward trending demographic curve. During the
early Middle Ages, a pattern of population growth was fundamental to the
production of an economic surplus. Gascony, like the Frankish kingdom as
a whole, was an agricultural society that was largely innocent of signifi-
cant technological innovation, without which it is very difficult to increase
productivity. Consequently, it is likely that the valley of the Garonne,
which was well-known to be exceptionally fertile since Roman times if
not, indeed, earlier, may well have been as densely populated as valley of
the Seine, noted above. In the valley of the Garonne, for a distance of
almost 400 kilometers north and west of Toulouse to Bordeaux and the
Atlantic, the production of wine was the regions most well-established
and valuable product.82
(Rouen, 1991), 17, at 3; Marie-Genevive Colin, Christianisation et Peuplement des

Campagnes entre Garonne et Pyrnes, IVe -Xe sicles (Carcassonne, 2008), p. 241; and for a
useful summary, see Collins, The Basques, pp. 97, 106109.
80For a brief summary of Muslim military operations north of the Pyrenees in the
Gascon region, see Collins, The Arab Conquest of Spain, pp. 8191. Cf. Costambeys, Innis,
MacLean, The Carolingian World, pp. 4748, who underestimate the importance of Charles
Martels victory in 732 as playing a role for the maintenance of peace in Gascony.
81Fred. cont., ch. 53.
82Regarding Bordeaux as a premier commercial city, see P. Le Gentilhomme, Trouvaille
de monnaies dor des mrovingiens et des visigoths fait Bordeaux en 1803, Revue numis-
matique, xxxix (1936), 87133; and J. Lafaurie, A propos de la trouvaille de Bordeaux, Revue
numismatique, 5e sr. xiv (1952), 229235. See also idem, Les routes commerciales
indiquees par les tresors et trouvailles monetaires merovingiennes, in SSCI, viii (Spoleto,
1961), 231278; idem, La monnaie bordelaise du haut moyen ge, in Bordeaux pendant le
haut moyen ge, ed. Charles Higounet et al. (Bordeaux, 1963), 313314. Concerning the long-
term history of making wine in the Bordeaux region, see Roger Dion, Histoire de la vigne et
du vin en France des origines aus XIX sicle (Paris, 1959), pp. 121, 169170; and Franz Malvezin,
Bordeaux, histoire de la vigne et du vin en Aquitaine (Bordeaux, 1919). Mussot-Goulard, Les
Gascons, VIe-VIIe-VIIIe sicles: la recherche dun prince (Angelet, 2001).
From a demographic perspective, it is important that the tending of the

vines and the growing of wine grapes is almost four times more labor-
intensive than the growing of grain crops.83 Moreover, the valley of the
Garonne was not the only major wine-producing region of relevance in
the Gascon duchy. The valley of the Adour, which constituted the tradi-
tional northern border of the Basque homeland or region, within the large
circumscription of Gascony, itself, had long been a major wine-producing
region and continued to be so into modern times.84 Along the course of its
some 300 kilometers, the Adour runs from the foothills of the Pyrenees
through the old Roman fortress cities of Tarbes, Aire, and Dax to the port
of Bayonne on the Bay of Biscay.
At the northern terminus of the valley of the Garonne, Bordeaux served
as the major commercial hub for the export of wine along the Atlantic
coast.85 A port of secondary importance, in this Atlantic context, was the
fortress city of Bayonne, which dominated the mouth of the Adour as it
ran to the coast.86 Along the southeastern course of the Garonne, the rich
fortress city of Toulouse maintained much of its imperial heritage, as for
example, in the continued use of late Roman legal traditions into the 10th
and 11th centuries.87 Toulouse served as the northern terminus for the
transport of wine on the well-established Roman route overland through
Carcassonne to Narbonne and the Mediterranean coastal region. Although
most of the Iberian peninsula was ruled by Muslims, who were prohibited
by religious law from drinking alcohol, the vast majority of the population
was Christian and suffered from no such restrictions. How well Muslims
obeyed the laws against drinking alcohol remains to be determined.
With regard to commerce, the Gascon duchy was well-positioned to
benefit both from its geographical situation and the relative peace that
83See the discussion by Jones, The Later Roman Empire, p. 818.

84See Collins, The Basques, pp. 9697, regarding borders.
85Dion, Histoire de la vigne, pp. 199200; Charles Higounet, Bordeaux pendant le haut
moyen ge, in Histoire de Bordeaux, ed. Charles Higounet (Bordeaux, 1963), I, 204208;
Doehaerd, The Early Middle Ages, pp. 153, 172, 178, 198200; Latouche, The Birth of the
Western Economy, pp. 129, 134, 137; and Hodges, Dark Age, p. 38.
86Regarding trade in the Atlantic, see the studies by Pierre Boissonnade, Les relations
entre lAquitaine, le Poitou et lIrlande du Ve au IXe sicle, Bulletin de la Socit de des
Antiquaires de lOuest, IV(1917), 181202; and A.R. Lewis, Le commerce et la navigation sur
les ctes atlantiques de la Gaul du Ve au VIIIe sicle, Le moyen ge 60 (1953) 249298.
87Concerning this trade route, see Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, p. 137. With
regard to late-Roman legal traditions at Toulouse, see Paul Ourliac, Les pays de garonne vers
lan mil: La socit et la droit (Toulouse, 1995), pp. 6577. Michel Labrousse, Toulouse
Antique, des origines ltablissement des Wisigoths (Paris, 1968), pp. 208211, reviews the
scholarly literature regarding the demography.
128 chapter one
prevailed for almost a half-century. In addition to wine, both the Garonne

and Adour rivers provided access to large quantities of fresh water fish and
along the Atlantic coast, saltwater fishing was an important means of pro-
ducing food both for local consumption and for commercial purposes.88
In the western Pyrenees, the pastoral economy of the Basques was excep-
tionally productive as their sheep herds supported trade in wool and mut-
ton as well as dairy products.89 Trade between the Gascon duchy and the
Asturian kingdom in the northwestern reaches of the Iberian peninsula
through the passes of the western Pyrenees, such as Roncevalles, also
should be understood as contributing to the wealth of the duchy.90
Recognition of the economic importance of the Gascon duchy to the
Carolingians is evidenced by the establishment of several mints in the
region by Charlemagne early in his reign. Mints were established at
Bordeaux, likely in light of its role in long-distance commerce, especially
in the wine trade, which not only extended southward to the Iberian pen-
insula but also north along the Atlantic coast to Ireland and the British
Isles.91 Charlemagne also established a mint at Agen on the banks of the
Garonne about midway between Toulouse and Bordeaux, which surely
provided for the support of large scale commerce along the river.92 At the
other terminus of the Garonne river trade, there was a Carolingian mint at
88See, for example, Daniel Borzeix, Ren Pautal, and Jacques Serbat, Histoire de Moissac
(Treignac, 1992), pp. 161162, regarding fishing on the Garonne and the Tarn through the
centuries.
89See Collins, The Basques, pp. 5458, for the continuing importance of the pastoral
elements in the Basque economy in the western Pyrenees. For an examination of the ecol-
ogy of the region, see Daniel Alexander Gmez-Ibaez, The Western Pyrenees; Differential
Evolution of the French and Spanish Borderland (Oxford, 1975). For useful background infor-
mation, see Philippe Leveau, Transumances, Remues et Migrations des Troupeaux dans
les Alpes et le Pyrnes antiques. La question du pastoralisme romain, Espaces et Socits
lepoque romaine entre Garonne et bre. Actes de la Table Ronde de Pau 2627 Janvier
2007: Hommage Georges Fabre, ed. Laurent Callegarin and Franoir Rchin (Pau, 2009),
141174.
90A useful introduction is provided by Michel Rouche, Relations Transpyrnenes du
Ve au VIIIe Sicle, in Les communicaitons dans la pninsule iprique au moyean ge (Actes
du Colloque de Pau, 2829 Mars 1980), ed. Pierre Tucco-Chala (Paris, 1981), 1320.
Concerning the passes and the routes through the mountains, see Mussot-Goulard, Les
princes, p. 68, Carte VIII, and pp. 8084.
91See Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes, p. 50; and Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval
European Coinage, I, 132, who indicate that nearly 20 moneyers are known for the
Merovingian era at Bordeaux alone.
92See Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes, p. 50; Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval European
Coinage, I, 92, 122, for Merovingian mints, and p. 198, for Charlemagnes mint.
Toulouse.93 The end of the Garonne route to the Mediterranean, which

passed through Toulouse, was marked by a mint at Narbonne, which dom-
inated access to the sea.94 A fourth mint was established within the duchy
at the old fortress city of Dax, which dominated the Roman road from
Bordeaux to Bayonne, where it crossed the Adour River.95 In this context,
trade in wine along the Adour river valley and between Bordeaux and the
Pyrenean passes, could be facilitated.
Yet one more apparent index of both population and economic growth
throughout the Gascon duchy may perhaps be seen in regard to religious
matters. There is substantial archaeological evidence for the construction
of rural churches, which are thought to have undergirded the develop-
ment of a parish system or, at least, a quasi-parish system.96 In religious
matters, further evidence for both wealth and population growth would
seem to be inherent in the building of new monasteries in Gascony by
Charlemagne. This process was begun no later than 778, and its initiation
likely predates the Carolingian retreat from Spain in that year. Among
what would appear to have been new religious houses examples are to be
found at Squirs (later renamed Le Role), Saint-Svin de Lavedan, and
Sorde.97
King Pippin, following recognition by the magnates of Gascony of his
ditio, which was followed shortly thereafter by the surrender of the mag-
nates of the remainder of Aquitaine, made the entire region between the
Loire and the Pyrenees subject to a broad spectrum of laws that he
imposed on the region. These acta, some of which were recorded in his
Capitulary for Aquitaine, obviously included royal regulation of the
church south of the Garonnne. In fact, Pippins law giving (jura remit-
tens) to the Aquitanian region was recognized by contemporaries not
very long after his death as one of his major accomplishments. Indeed, the
93See Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval European Coinage, I, 132, for Merovingian
mints, and pp. 199, 203, 209, for Carolingian mints.
94Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval European Coinage, I, 207.
95For a detailed discussion of Dax, see Rene Mussot-Goulard, Dax lEpoque
Carolingienne: la question des sources, Bulletin de la Socit de Borda, 1 (1982), 315; and
Grierson and Blackburn, Medieval European Coinage, I, 203.
96Colin, Christianisation et Peuplement, passim.
97Claire Taylor, Rural Protection in Aquitaine and Gascony by c. 1000: The Public, the
Private, and the Princely, in Peace and Protection in the Middle Ages, ed. T.B. Lambert and
David Rollason (Durham, 2009); and Musson-Gourlard, Les Princes, pp. 2122, 74. Nb. these
foundations are not to be confused with the legends that developed during the 10th and
11th centuries, regarding which, see Amy G, Remensnyder, Remembering Kings Past:
Monastic Foundation Legends in Medieval Southern France (Ithaca-London, 1995).
130 chapter one
hailing of a king as law giver in the tradition of Moses was a hallowed

means of praising a ruler.98
Lupus Military Assets
During the latter part of the 8th century, the Gascon duchy was bordered
by the Garonne and Gironde rivers from the east to the northwest, by the
northern heights of the Pyrenees on the south, and the Atlantic Ocean
on the west.99 The heart of the duchy was the old Roman province of
Novempopulana, which originally was composed of twelve civitates, each
of which was administered from a late imperial fortress city. These
urbes were Eauze, Auch, Dax, Lectoure, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges,
Consorans, Barn, Aire, Bazas, Bigorre, and Oloron. Early in the 5th cen-
tury, a thirteenth major fortress city was developed in this region with the
construction of extensive fortifications at Bayonne on the southwestern
coast.100 Novempopulana may be considered the core of the region
between the Garonne and the Pyrenees. However, during the period under
discussion here, Gascony also included the fortress city and flourishing
commercial port of Bordeaux to the northwest and the fortress city and
flourishing commercial centers of Toulouse in the southeast, which, as
noted above, was at the head of the land route to the Mediterranean at
Narbonne.101
When King Pippin completed his conquest of Aquitaine in 768, the
military institutions of the Gascon duchy not only were similar to those of
the rest of Aquitaine north of the Garonne but also similar to those of the
Frankish kingdom as a whole. There were militia troops prepared to fight
for the local defense, expeditionary forces, also composed of militia men,
available to serve beyond the borders of the pagus in which they lived, and
the military households of the magnates, both lay and ecclesiastical, com-
posed of professional soldiers.102 In addition, however, there were large
98See Hermoldus, IHL, line 2155. CRF., no. 18. for Pippins capitulary of 768, and no. 19,
for Charlemagnes confirmation in 769.
99At various times during the early Middle Ages, the Gascon duchy is seen to have had
a rather wide variety of boundaries. See Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes, pp. 5558.
100Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 106, 110112, 130.
101Since the later 7th century, as noted by Mussot-Goulard, Les Princes, p. 67, Toulouse
et Bordeaux taient sans doute partes intgrantes de son [the dukes] territoire. However,
over the years the boundaries changed. Bordeaux remained part of Gascony, but Toulouse
was separated from the duchy.
102Concerning the military organization of Aquitaine, see Bachrach, Military
Organization, pp. 133. For background regarding the civitates of Gascony, see Auguste
numbers of Basques, who were available to serve as mercenaries under the

duke of Gascony as they had earlier in the decade under the duke of
Aquitaine.103
It is noteworthy that elite Gascon troops were lightly-armed horsemen
well-known for their use of thrusting spears and well-trained in the execu-
tion of the feigned retreat.104 This tactic was particularly useful in combat
against heavy cavalry and phalanxes of foot soldiers, which might break
ranks in a hot pursuit of what would appear to have been a defeated
enemy.105 At the battle of Roncevalles, for example, these lightly-armed
Basque mounted troops likely enjoyed a considerable advantage over the
more heavily-armed elite troops who were guarding Charlemagnes bag-
gage train as it moved along the Roman road that passed through difficult
mountain terrain. According to a reliable tradition, the clergy of the region
also were well-trained for mounted combat, and had a reputation for
being particularly bellicose.106
These lightly-armed Basque horsemen probably formed a noteworthy
part of Lupus obsequia, the ducal military household. However, the
Gascon duke also was able to mobilize significant additional forces from
the Basque region, i.e. south of the Adour river and from the western
reaches of the Pyrenees. Basque fighting men were to prove their effective-
ness in August 778 when they destroyed the rearguard of Charlemagnes
army at Roncevalles and captured the Frankish baggage train. While some
of these Basque units, which previously had served under Duke Waiofer,
would appear to have been composed of elements of the traditional expe-
ditionary levies, others, as noted above, are thought by modern scholars to
have been mercenaries.107
Longnon, Gographie de la Gaule au VIe sicle (Paris, 1878), pp. 589607; and cf. the com-
ments by Collins, The Basques, pp. 99112, regarding the geography of Gascony.
103Concerning these mercenaries, see Collins, The Basques, pp. 106109.
104Nithard, Hist., bk. III, ch. 6.
105For a discussion of the feigned retreat tactic, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian
Warfare, pp. 126131, 177179, 193197.
106Regarding the bellicose clergy, indeed, likely with a focus on bishops, see Astron., VL,
ch. 18. Regarding Gascon bishops, see Colin, Christianisation et Peuplement, p. 21, with
regard to the organization of the church; and the discussion by Mussot-Goulard, Les
Princes, p. 61, of the inferior character of bishops lists. See also, Collins, The Basques,
pp. 101102.
107Collins, The Basques, p. 100, suggests In the Roman period it is possible that much of
the reserve manpower thus created [by Basque inheritance customs] and looking for
opportunities beyond the Basque homelands were absorbed by recruitment into the army.
There is no reason to believe that these same enduring inheritance customs failed to result
in a continued production of surplus population and, therefore, the development of
132 chapter one
Unlike many parts of the erstwhile Roman Empire, early medieval Gascony
has benefited neither from extensive archaeological work nor from the
survival of substantial quantities of written sources. Therefore, a compara-
tive perspective may perhaps be of some use for gauging the military
strength available to Duke Lupus during the campaigning season of 769.108
For example, something may be learned from the study of Anglo-Saxon
England in the 9th century. The Burghal Hidage of Alfred the Greats
Wessex kingdom outlined a system of defense in depth, based in substan-
tial part on fortifications built during the later Roman Empire and closely
linked by Roman roads, which helped to provide for a strategy that mod-
ern scholars consider a defense in depth.109 Gascony, especially the core
region of Novempopulana, also benefited from a substantial number of
late Roman fortifications, which were closely linked by Roman roads and,
in some cases, by rivers, as well.110
Wessex, during the reign of Alfred the Great (871899) and through
much of the 9th century prior to his accession to the royal office, had
borne the brunt of frequent Viking raids.111 In light of these attacks, which
not only destroyed infrastructure and population but also saw numerous
people seized and sent off to Scandinavia as slaves, it is highly likely that
Wessex suffered serious economic and demographic losses.112 The great
mercenary companies that fought for the duke of Aquitaine. Regarding these, see Collins,
loc. cit., pp. 106109.
108Regarding a comparative dimension, see Abels, Alfred, pp. 7, 12, 223, 230, 239.
109Regarding the defense-in-depth concept applied to Wessex, see Abels, Alfred,
pp. 201207. For detailed studies of the document known as the Burghal Hidage, see The
defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon fortifications, ed. David Hill and
Alexander R. Rumble (Manchester, 1996).
110Concerning the road system in Gascony in the early Middle Ages, see Gilbert Loub,
Routes de la Gascogne mdivale, in Lhomme et la route en Europe occidentale au Moyen
Age et aux temps modernes. Centre culturel de Abbaye de Flaran: Deuximes Journes
internationales dhistoire. 2022 Septembre 1980, Falaran, 2 (Auch, 1982), 3355, at 3340;
and of special interest from a military perspective, J. Tonnadre, La question des gus dans
les bassins de la Garonne et de lAdour, Histoire des communications de la Midi France, IX
(1966), no. 32, 8296.
111Abels, Alfred, pp. 107118, 124168, provides a useful summary of this phenomenon.
112Peter Sawyer, The Age of the Vikings (London, 1962), pp. 1347, is certainly correct in
emphasizing that the written sources produced by churchmen exaggerate the damage
done by the Vikings. It is even likely that some supposed dastardly deeds were made up
from whole cloth. However, it must be emphasized that the decision by various govern-
ments, both in England and on the mainland, to buy off the Vikings, indicates that these
massive expenditures were thought worthwhile in light of the lessons that had been
learned regarding damage that already had been done.
damage done to London, on the border of Wessex, an estimate of which

rests in large part on archaeological evidence and not on biased narratives
written by churchmen, provides an indication of the kind of negative
impact Viking operations had on the infrastructure and population.113
Despite obvious losses suffered in Wessex, Alfred was able to sustain
thirty strongholds of the Burghal Hidage in Wessex and provide for their
defense with in excess of 27,000 locally based garrison troops.114 In addi-
tion, Alfred himself commanded a standing field army in the neighbor-
hood of 5,000 mounted effectives, who, however, were not trained to
engage the enemy on horseback but dismounted to fight on foot.115 Finally,
Alfred also saw to the construction and maintenance of a significant fleet
of ships which, more often than not, was capable of dealing effectively
with Viking raiders.116 All of this was accomplished with a population that
is not likely to have exceeded 450,000 men, women, and children.117
King Alfred is generally regarded by modern scholars to have acquitted
himself well in frequent encounters with Viking forces.118 At least one of
these invading forces, the so-called Great Army, may have numbered in
the neighborhood of 10,000 fighting men or, at the least, it was only a thou-
sand or so smaller in size.119 These Anglo-Saxon military successes, which
Alfred enjoyed despite a suffering economy and declining population,
may permit the suggestion that Lupus commanded greater military
resources in Gascony than did the king of Wessex. In addition, Gascony,
with an area of some 40,000 square kilometers, was almost double the size
of Wessexs six shires.120 Even if the population of Lupus ducatus, despite
the upward thrust of the demographic curve throughout the Frankish
kingdom since the second half of the 7th century, reached only a half
million men, women, and children, there would have been some 150,000
113See Derek Keens, Alfred and London, in Alfred the Great: Papers from the Eleventh-
Century Conference, ed. Timothy Reuter (Aldershot, 2003), 235249.
114See, for example, Nicholas P. Brooks, The administrative background to the Burghal
Hidage, in The defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon fortifications, ed.
David Hill and Alexander R. Rumble (Manchester, 1996), 128150.
115See Abels, Alfred pp. 194207, for the quotation. In a personal communication of
3 October 2008, Abels provided the 6,000 figure and reminded me that these troops would
all be mounted.
116Cf. Abels, Alfred, pp. 171174, 305307.
117Abels, Alfred, p. 138.
118Abels. Alfred, pp. 124168.
119MacLean, Charles the Fat, p. 76.
120Colin, Christianisation et Peuplement, p. 19.
134 chapter one
able-bodied men in Gascony between the ages of 15 and 55 who could be

made available for one or another type of military service.121
Whether Lupus was able to mobilize in excess of 27,000 militia men to
garrison the fortress cities of Gascony must remain a matter of specula-
tion. However, it is clear that, in general, the fortress cities under Lupus
control, in general, were considerably larger than Alfreds burghs and also
much better constructed. For example, all of the urbes under Lupus con-
trol were built of stone, while some if not many of those that made up the
Burghal Hidage were constructed only of earth and wood.122 With regard
to lesser fortifications in Gascony, as compared to Alfreds England, we are
woefully uninformed.123 However, it seems likely, especially in light of the
large numbers of Gascon expeditionary forces who fought in Waiofers
armies against King Pippin during the 760s, that Lupus would have been
able to raise in excess of 5,000 lightly-armed mounted troops to serve as a
field army.124 It is worthy of emphasis that Lupus strategic position
enabled him to invest his assets in supporting land-based resources, as he
had no reason to undertake the construction of a blue water fleet in order
to deal with Charlemagnes threat of invasion in 769.
Lupus Strategy
If, as suggested above, Duke Lupus military assets in 769 were comparable
to, if not greater than, those available to the ruler of Wessex a century later,
121Regarding models of population distribution by age and sex, see Coale and Demeny,
Regional Model Life Tables; and Preston, McDaniel, and Grushka, A new model life table,
pp. 149159.
122Regarding the size of Alfreds burghs, see David Hill, Gazetteer of Burghal Hidage
sites, in The defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon fortifications, ed.
David Hill and Alexander R. Rumble (Manchester, 1996), 189231. There is no similar study
even for late Roman fortified cities of Gascony much less regarding various castra and cas-
tella located within the region. However, much useful information has been compiled by
Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 108112, regarding late Roman urban circuit walls:
Dax 900 meters; Bayonne, 1200 meters; Auch 1200; St. Bertrand 900 meters; St. Lizier
700 meters; Bordeaux 2400 meters, and Toulouse 3,800 meters. There is no catalogue of the
castra or castella located in Gascony for the early Middle Ages. However, regarding the
stronghold at Fezensac, see Collins, The Basques, pp. 127, 131, and map 16, p. 107.
123The exceptionally important catalogue of non-urban fortifications in Roman Gaul
neglects Gascony, See LArchitecture de la Gaule romaine. Les fortifications militaires,
Documents darchologie franaise 100, directed by Michel Redd with the aide of
Raymond Brulet, Rudolf Fellmann, Jan-Kees Haalebos, and Siegmar von Schnurbein (Paris-
Bordeaux, 2006), 183437. In fact, only one Roman fortification from the region is noted.
See Michel Redd, Saint-Bertrand-De Comminges/Encraoustos, pp. 377379.
124See Collins, The Basques, pp. 108112, for large numbers of Basque fighting men.
why did the Gascon duke come to terms with Charlemagne, rather than
sustain a lengthy war as did Alfred against the Vikings? Although
Charlemagnes forces deployed on the banks of the Garonne may not have
reached 10,000 effectives, they likely were sufficiently numerous and well-
enough equipped to take several of the Gascon fortress cities during the
remainder of the campaigning season of 769, although certainly not all of
them.125 It is likely, as well, that Lupus field forces were insufficient to
engage Charlemagnes army in open battle or, for that matter, to relieve a
Carolingian siege of any particular fortress city. Indeed, in 763, the Gascon
light cavalry fled from the field rather than face Pippins forces in open
battle.126
Because the Gascons likely were not able to oppose Charlemagnes
forces effectively in the field, the Frankish army had the option to range far
and wide in order to ravage the ducatus, destroying significant elements of
the infrastructure and killing large numbers of people. In fact, important
Gascons could be captured and held for ransom, while others, perhaps
even in large numbers, could be taken back to Austrasia to be sold as
slaves. The Carolingians were known even to sell Christians as slaves to the
pagan Saxons. However, small units of Gascon mounted troops could
shadow Carolingian foraging efforts and attack these groups if they were
to be found in weak positions, as was to be the case on a much larger scale
at Roncevalles almost a decade later.127
125With regard to fortified cities in the region, a useful place to begin is Johnson, Late
Roman Fortifications, pp. 31, 76, 108111, 114, 130, 244. For a general treatment of the contin-
ued military importance of later Roman fortress cities on the mainland, see Bernard S.
Bachrach, On Roman Ramparts, 3001300, in The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare:
The Triumph of the West, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, 1995), 6491. For a more detailed
study of the continuity of urban military topography in pre-Crusade Europe, see
ibid.,Imperial Walled cities in the West: an examination of their early medieval Nachleben,
in City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective, ed. James T. Tracy (Cambridge,
2000), 192218.
126Fred cont., ch. 45. The possibility cannot be ignored that the Basques were trying to
carry out a feigned retreat that failed.
127With regard to the tactical flexibility of some types of Basque troops, i.e. those who
slaughtered the rear guard of Charlemagnes army in 778, see, for example, Bautier, La
campagne de Charlemagne, pp. 151; and Michel Rouche, La dfaite de Roncevaux,
Bulletin de la Socit des Sciences, Lettres et Arts de Bayonne 135 (1979), 145156.
In Britain, it now seems to be well-accepted that the great fortress cities built by the
Romans became empty shells and ghost towns. However, the effort in Halsall, Settlement,
to impose this model to the mainland urbes is to be rejected. See the methodological cri-
tique of Halsalls treatment of the evidence regarding the mainland in Bachrach, Metz,
pp. 363381.
136 chapter one
With all of the above taken into consideration, it was highly unlikely
that Charlemagnes army, at this time, was of sufficient strength to take
control of the Pyrenean parts of the duchy, which would require the Franks
to pry the Basques out of their fortified positions in the clusae, which
controlled the passes through the mountains.128 In fact, it is highly likely
that Charlemagne and his advisers were aware at least of the problem of
dealing with the Basques in the mountains as a result of accounts of
Merovingian operations in the region that had been discussed by Gregory
of Tours in his widely available History almost two centuries earlier.129
When we try to understand why Lupus failed to oppose Charlemagne,
several realities likely were clear to the duke and his advisers. First, the
Gascons had witnessed the effectiveness of the Carolingian military
machine in grinding down the forces of Duke Waiofer and, in particular,
the inability of the Aquitanians to hold the great fortress cities of the
region against Pippins armies. In fact, the Gascon aristocracy, upon wit-
nessing Pippins successes north of the Garonne, had agreed to a separate
peace by which they recognized the Frankish kings ditio in 768 rather
than face an invasion by his armies. Although it undoubtedly was clear
that in 769, Charlemagne could mobilize but half the resources that had
been available to Pippin for his war against Waiofer, Gascony was much
smaller and weaker than greater Aquitaine, which the Carolingians, in
fact, had conquered.
Since 732, the Gascons had enjoyed peace and prosperity, and to go to
war with Charlemagne undoubtedly not only would result in substantial
losses but the likelihood of success was not very great. In addition, the
Gascons faced a second and perhaps even more dangerous enemythe
Muslims, who dominated the region to their south. The Umayyad gover-
nor of Spain, Abd ar Rachman, was a potential threat to move his armies
north of the Ebro, through the Pyrenees, and into Gascony much in the
same way that his namesake had done in the 720s and early 730s until he
was defeated and killed at Poitiers by Charles Martel in 732.130 As earlier in
the 8th century, it was, in fact, the Frankish army that provided what may
be considered the overall guarantee for Gasconys continued security
against a sustained Muslim intervention.
128Bautier, La campagne, pp. 2123.

129With regard to these operations, see, for example, Gregory, Hist., bk. VII, ch. 45; bk. X,
ch. 31.
130A useful introduction to these matters is provided by Philippe Snac, Les carolingi-
ens et al-Andalus (VIIIe-IXe sicles) (Paris, 2002), pp. 4041.
If Lupus and his supporters chose to force Charlemagne to go to a war

that would focus on sieges, they likely could expect a series of annual inva-
sions from the north that would not be dissimilar to the campaigns under-
taken very successfully by Pippin in the 760s. These military operations
could be launched from well-established bases such as the fortress city of
Angoulme, until the region south of the Garonne was placed fully under
Frankish rule. The effectiveness of Pippins siege operations throughout
the greater part of Aquitaine, along with the damage caused by the invad-
ing forces, surely was fresh in the memory of decision-makers from
throughout Gascony. In light of the recognized effectiveness of Carolingian
siege warfare, challenging Charlemagne to reduce the Gascon fortress cit-
ies by siege likely was not considered to be a viable military strategy.131
As a result, Lupus recognized Charlemagnes ditio and provided his son as
hostage for his own good behavior.
In the Wake of Military Success
The failure of Carloman to provide aid to Charlemagne, which the latter

had requested and the former initially may perhaps even have promised
for this campaign in southern Aquitaine, cannot have done much to heal
any rift that already may have existed between the two brothers.132 The
court sources refer to the problems between Charlemagne and Carloman
as very contentious quarrels (contentionis rixas) and disputes (litigia), as
well as divisiveness (divisiones) which arose from discord (discordia).133
131Concerning Pippins operations in Aquitaine, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian

Warfare, pp. 202242.
132See Einhard, VK, ch. 3, who affirms somewhat tendentiously that only Charlemagnes
patience kept war from breaking out between the two brothers, and idem, ch. 5, for
Carlomans promise to provide aid. Cf. the discussion by Lintzel, Karl der Grosse,
pp. 1013. Cf. also the arguments by several modern scholars, e.g. McKitterick, Charlemagne,
pp. 7981, who claim that the rift between the brothers was exaggerated by the court
sources to enhance Charlemagnes reputation. However, these writers had no reason to
magnify problems between the two brothers, as these texts were written more than thirty
years after Carlomans death and the disappearance of his heirs. There is no evidence that
there were dead-enders among the Carolingian aristocracy in the early 9th century who
were still defending Carloman. In addition, as will be seen below, the pope seemed to
believe that there was a serious rift between Carloman and Charlemagne.
133See, in addition to the court sources noted above, CC., no. 44, which provides Pope
Stephen IIIs public understanding, as seen from Rome, of the problems between
Charlemagne and Carloman. This view of the popes understanding of the situation is pro-
vided by Stephens formal response to this information, likely in the form of a now-lost
letter, that had been brought to him officially by missi from the regnum Francorum. It must
138 chapter one
Consequently, Charlemagne, after sending the copii whom he had mus-

tered in Aquitaine back to their homes, had much to consider. It was
already late in September 769 when, following his success in southern
Aquitaine and, no less importantly, in Gascony, Charlemagne began the
lengthy march home with his military household, i.e. the pauci Franci
from among his presentales, with whom he had begun operations. This
journey of about 1,000 kilometers from the banks of the Garonne on the
Gascon frontier to his pre-selected winter headquarters at Dren, in
the environs of Cologne, would require, under good conditions over erst-
while Roman roads, a journey of about seven weeks.134
be assumed, however, from the context of the popes letter, that he had learned about the
conflict between the two brothers well before the official delegation of missi mentioned
above reached him early in the summer of 770 with news that the problems which had
festered between the two brothers had been significantly ameliorated.
134See ARF, an. 769; and AE, an, 769, for Charlemagnes return journey to Austrasia.
CHAPTER TWO
ITALY IN FLUX: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS
Likely before his arrival at Dren in mid-November, Charlemagne learned,

apparently to his great surprise, that Desiderius, king of the Lombards,
was intent upon opening negotiations with him. Desiderius primary aim
was to resuscitate the alliance, or amicitia, between the Carolingians and
the Lombards that had flourished during the reign of Charles Martel, but
which Pippins vigorous support for the papacy, especially during the mid-
750s, had undermined.1 In this communique, the Lombard king offered
his daughter Gerperga as a wife to the Frankish king in order to gain
Charlemagnes support for this alliance. In addition, Desiderius suggested
that his own son Adelchis, who was co-ruler and presumptive heir to the
Lombard throne, be wed to Charlemagnes sister Gisela.2
Desiderius surely understood that if Charlemagne were kept out of Italy
as envisioned by the divisio of 768, and if Carloman followed the policy
that his father had pursued with regard to the papacy, the Lombard posi-
tion could be seriously weakened. However, like Pope Stephen III,
Desiderius knew that there was discord and potential for conflict between
Charlemagne and Carloman. He also knew that Charlemagne maintained
a continuing interest in Italian affairs, as evidenced by the legation of bish-
ops he sent to Rome in 768, despite the provisions of Pippins divisio.
Consequently, Desiderius was interested in strengthening Charlemagnes
position in Italy so that the papacy would be forced to deal with two
Frankish kings who either were hostile to each other or potentially so.
If the Lombard kings plan succeeded, one of these two Frankish rulers,
1Regarding Charles Martels alliance with the Lombards, see Jrg Jarnut, Die Adoption
Pippins durch Knig Liutprand und die Italienpolitik Karl Martells, in Karl Martell in
Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen, 1994), 217226,
and the copius literature cited there.
2For the identification of this daughter of Desiderius as Gerperga, see the effective
argument by Nelson, Making a Difference, pp. 183184; and its apparent acceptance by
Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, p. 65. Cf. McKitterick,
Charlemagne, pp. 8586, who not only rejects the identification made by Nelson, but
doubts that there was any marriage at all. Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, pp. 297304,
speculates that the princess at issue was Liutpirc, whom, he believes, first married
Charlemagne and then married Tassilo. This is a fantasy.
140 chapter two
i.e. Charlemagne, would have a close connection with Desiderius family.

Desiderius also would be secure in the knowledge that whatever role
Charlemagne might seek to play south of the Alps likely would be opposed
by Carloman. As a result, the value of the Frankish monarchs to the papacy
also would be limited.3
It is clear that Desiderius wanted to have both Carolingian reges, not
just Carloman, involved in Italy. If Desiderius plan for an alliance with
Charlemagne failed, there was, however, a fallback position. At the least,
Desiderius could try to play off one brother against the other, which would
help to undermine Frankish support for the pope. In furtherance of this
potential strategy, Desiderius son-in-law, Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, was
positioned to make trouble for Carloman in Alamannia. Tassilo also could
resuscitate the contacts his father Odilo had enjoyed with various groups
in the Saxon region which were hostile to the Carolingians. Problems in
these areas would attract the attention of Charlemagne and Carloman to
matters north of the Alps and diminish their opportunities to become
involved in Italy.4 For Tassilo, the involvement of Charlemagne and
3See Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, pp. 78, regarding the outline of Desiderius plan; and
Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 114116. Unless some very important information simply
has been lost over the years, we are compelled to believe that neither Charlemagne nor
his mother initiated negotiations with Desiderius. First and foremost, neither Charlemagne
nor his mother had any recorded prior contact with the Lombard court. In addition, as
noted above, Charlemagne had poor relations with Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, Desiderius
son-in-law. Further, Charlemagne already had a wife, Himiltrude, and a son to whom he
had given the name Pippin, after his own father, the king, as a sign of the boys importance
to him personally as well as a forecast of the youths political future. Finally, it is not with-
out significance that Pope Stephen III treated the situation as though he were convinced
that the initiative for a Lombard alliance with the Carolingians came from Desiderius
(CC. no. 45) and not from Charlemagne.
Over the years scholars have argued against regarding Desiderius as having taken the
initiative in planning the projected alliance with Charlemagne. See, for example,
Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, p. 119. However, not a few scholars have seen this entire
Lombard policy as the work of the queen mother Bertranda. See, for example, Thomas
Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, 8 vols. (Oxford, 18801899), VII, 310315; and Delaruelle,
Charlemagne, p. 215.
Of course, Einhard, VK, ch. 18, who was ever watchful to protect Charlemagnes reputa-
tion, blames the queen mother Bertranda for what he and his audience knew to be the
unsuccessful Lombard marriage. The version of the situation provided by Einhard, how-
ever, cannot be used either to claim that Bertranda initiated negotiations with the
Lombards or to sustain the position that she orchestrated Carolingian policy indepen-
dently in this matter. Einhards apparent need to absolve Charlemagne of any blame in
regard to the Lombard marriage may well encourage the attentive reader to believe that
there were rumors at the royal court to the effect that the king himself eagerly had
embraced the policy that brought about the marriage.
4See, for example, Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 3940, in regard to this
background.
italy in flux: opportunities and problems141
Carloman in an ongoing political competition that had the potential to

become violent surely would enable the Bavarian duke to strengthen the
autonomy of his duchy. Optimally, Tassilo might even be provided an
opportunity to press for outright independence and the establishment of
a Bavarian kingdom.5
The death of King Pippin and the divisio of 768 had destabilized the
diplomatic situation from Rome to the English Channel and from the
Atlantic to the Weser. As 769 was drawing to a close, all parties were work-
ing to take advantage of this fluidity in order to improve their prospects.
Desiderius could forecast his interests to flourish if he could effectively
draw Charlemagne into Italy as a Lombard ally. Consequently, the arrange-
ments that Pippin had established with the papacy would be weakened, at
least in part, as Carloman would not be the sole arbitor of Frankish policy
south of the Alps. The diplomatic aims of both Frankish parties would be
further complicated, also in Desiderius interest, if the marriages of both
Charlemagne and Gisela were realized. Carloman, as Giselas brother, as
well as the brother of Charlemagne, would become the brother-in-law of
the Lombard co-ruler Adelchis, who in the normal course of events would
succeed to sole possession of his fathers regnum in northern Italy. In addi-
tion, Duke Arichis of Beneventum, south of Rome, was married to another
of Desiderius daughters. Thus, both Carloman and Charlemagne would
have reason to support their Lombard relatives by marriage and perhaps
restrain the papal policy of territorial aggrandizement that had emerged
following the death of Pope Stephen II.
The multiplication of options on all sides, depending, in large part, on
the success of Desiderius initiative, would have the likely result of sustain-
ing the fluidity of the diplomatic situation. The papacy, it was predictable,
would not simply stand by and permit the Lombard king to manipulate
the situation in Italy without making a diplomatic response. In this con-
text, the pope, as will be seen below, lent some support to the aggrandizing
efforts of Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, who had been estranged from the
Carolingians since 763.6 It is clear, however, that Rome had wanted to
5Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, pp. 99200, explores Tassilios efforts to develop
some sort of independence in relation to Charlemagne. See especially his conclusions,
pp. 198199.
6A strong effort has been made by recent scholars to undermine the traditional argu-
ments based on the court sources regarding Tassilos misdeeds. One of these is the allega-
tion that Tassilo deserted from the Carolingian army in 763 and therefore was guilty of a
capital crime. See particularly, Becher, Eid und Herrschaft, pp. 2177; and Airlie, Narratives
of Triumph, pp. 93120, in a more balanced way. A particularly difficult obstacle to
142 chapter two
avoid being seen by King Pippin as currying favor with Tassilo. Yet, it seems
obvious that if the duke of Bavaria hoped to gain a royal title, he, like
Pippin, would require papal support. In addition, the pope was in position
to take advantage of the fact that both Charlemagne and Carloman had
sworn oaths to be patricii Romanorum, which required them to defend the
papacy. Finally, Pippin had issued an edict guaranteeing to the papacy a
certain territorial integrity as a means of trying to undermine Lombard
efforts to take control of lands that belonged to Rome. Prior to Pippins
death, both Charlemagne and Carloman had agreed to support this
guarantee.
Carlomans Response and the Bavarian Factor
Carloman either heard rumors or, as is more likely, obtained concrete

information regarding Desiderius scheme to have Charlemagne become
thoroughly involved in Italy as a Lombard ally. Indeed, Tassilo also learned
of his father-in-laws plans. Thus, it is of great importance that Pippin, in
preparing Carloman to deal with Bavarian and Italian affairs through the
Divisio of 768, had arranged for two important magnates, Autchar/Otkar
and Fulrad, to serve in his younger sons government. Autchar was
descended from an aristocratic Frankish family of considerable local
importance in the region of Mainz.7 This development took place some-
time following the reestablishment of Frankish control in Bavaria by
Charles Martel in the wake of his successful military operations of 725, but
well before 750, when a branch of this Mainz-family was established in the
overcome, in this context, is a letter from Pope Paul ca. 765 (CC, no. 36), which indicates
that Tassilio had petitioned the pope numerous times to mediate peace (pax) between the
Bavarian duke and the Frankish king. As Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, p. 151, n. 61,
observes, this must have been an attempt by Tassilo to limit the damage from his falling
out with Pippin at the royal assembly at Nevers in 763. Nevers was the site of the muster
prior to the siege of Bourges the same year. Here Hammer follows Herwig Wolfram,
Virgil als Abt und Bischof von Salzbug, in Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrte, ed.
H. Dopsch and R. Juffinger (Salzburg, 1985), 342356, at 344.
7In regard to the variant orthography for the name Autchar/Otkar, see Brunner,
Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 4243, 5354, 207, 219. An easily accessible but very brief
introduction to this familys activities in the Middle Rhine area is provided by Innes, State
and Society, pp. 6065. In more detail regarding the importance of this family in the region
of Mainz and beyond during the course of the later 8th and well into the 9th century, see
A. Gerlich, Zur Reichspolitik des Erzbischofes Otgar von Mainz, Reinische Viertel
jahrsbltter, 19 (1954), 286316.
Tegernsee region.8 By the early 750s, Autchar is seen to be a very important

figure in Pippins entourage, with influence and close contacts both at
the Bavarian court and in Rome.9 Fulrad, who later was made abbot of
St. Denis, was one of Carlomans leading ecclesiastical advisers. He had
close Bavarian connections due to the Frankish settlement policy, men-
tioned above, and had been Pippins primary expert on affairs in Italy.10
In the context of Desiderius initiative, Carloman sent Autchar on a
fact-finding mission to the court of Tassilo, who as duke of Bavaria poten-
tially could emerge as a major figure in this situation. Tassilo was the
cousin of both Carloman and Charlemagne and Bavaria was subject de
jure to the rex Francorum.11 However, in 763, while on campaign in
Aquitaine, Tassilo had deserted from Pippins army and then begun a pro-
cess of trying to develop an autonomous position for his ducatus.12 Also in
8See Michael Mitterauer, Karolingische Margrafen im Sdosten. Frankische Reichsa

ristokratie und byrische Stammesadel im sterreichischen Raum (Vienna-Graz-Kln, 1963),
5053; and for further research, see the extensive discussion by Alain Stoclet, Autour de
Fulrad de Saint-Denis (v. 710784) (Paris, 1993), 242251. It is not clear from which branch of
the newly-divided family Autchar was descended. Much of his subsequent activity, how-
ever, permits the inference that he was from the Bavarian group.
9See V. Stephani II, chs. 18, 20. Bowlus, Franks, pp. 7879, provides a very useful sketch
of Autchars career, which will be discussed in greater detail below. It is also important that
both branches of the family sustained a long-term relationship with the monastery of
Fulda, which undoubtedly played a role in maintaining a close connection between both
groups. Regarding the Fulda-connection, see, for example, Innes, State and Society,
pp. 6071.
10Concerning the origins of Fulrads Bavarian connection, see Josef Fleckenstein,
Fulrad von Saint-Denis und der frnkische Ausgriff in den sddeutschen Raum, in Studien
und Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte des grossfrnkischen und frdeutschen Adels, ed. Gerd
Tellenbach (Freibourg im Brisgau, 1957), 139; and Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, pp. 242244.
11With regard to the juridical status of the Bavarian duchy within the regnum
Francorum, see the information provided by Joachim Jahn, Hausmeier und Herzge:
Bemerkungen zur agilolfingisch-karolingischen Rivalitt bis zum tode Karl Martells, in
Karl Martell in Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen,
1994), 317344. See the discussion of the situation by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 2426, along with the scholarly studies cited, pp. 274275.
12Regarding the dukes desertion during the campaign of 763 in Aquitaine, see ARF, an.
763; and AE, an. 763. For the background, see, for example, Jahn, Hausmeier und Herzge,
pp. 317344. The effort by Becher, Eid und Herrschaft, pp. 4551, to warn readers regarding
the pitfalls of reading texts, such as the court sources regarding Tassilo, above, as plain
text is sound. However, such an admonition cannot be used pro forma as a basis for
rejecting the accuracy of any particular item of information that such a source reports.
Indeed, even severely biased sources sometimesand perhaps even oftenconvey
accurate information.
Those scholars who argue that Tassilo had not, in fact, deserted in 763, contend that this
was a fiction implanted in the Carolingian court sources to help support Charlemagnes
suppression of Bavarian independence. See, for example, McKitterick, History and Memory,
144 chapter two
763, Tassilo married Liutperga, the daughter of the Lombard king,

Desiderius.13 This alliance strengthened Tassilos position vis--vis the
Franks because King Pippin, as a result of his strong support for the papacy
and successful military action against Pavia in 754 and 756, had abandoned
the Lombard alliance, which Charles Martel had established almost a half-
century earlier. Indeed, the Lombards, who had played a key role in help-
ing Charles Martel establish his ditio over the Bavarians, would seem after
763 to have sided with the Bavarians against the Franks.14
Tassilo, however, was not satisfied with establishing a potentially anti-
Carolingian alliance with the Lombards. In 764, the year after his deser-
tion from the Frankish army and marriage to Liutperga, Tassilo sought
support from Pope Paul I (757767). King Pippin, however, regarded Pauls
initial reaction to the Bavarian dukes initiative as compromising Romes
position regarding the Franks. As a result, the pontiff found it necessary to
assure the Frankish king in a very humble, if not, in fact, humiliating letter
that he would not support the Bavarian duke against Carolingian inter-
ests.15 Tassilo apparently was seeking to displace Pippin as protector of
Rome and to take advantage of his close ties to Desiderius in order to serve
as the mediator between the Lombards and the papacy.16
Tassilos efforts to distance himself from the Carolingians are evidenced
also in his diplomatic acta. The duke issued documents from 763 onward
in which he gradually ceased to recognize the regnal years of King Pippin
in the datum clause. Also, institutions under his control, e.g. the church of
Freising, followed the same pattern. These acta recognized only the regnal
pp. 45. Whatever, the truth may have been regarding events in 763, it is clear that in the
decades between this supposed desertion and 787, when Tassilos power was, in effect,
destroyed by Charlemagne, there was little cooperation between the Bavarian duke and
the rex Francorum. In this context, as will be discussed below, Abbot Sturm of Fulda would
appear to have been caught up in the conflict between King Pippin and Tassilo and was
exiled as a result.
13Concerning the date of the marriage, see Jrg Jarnut, Geschiche der Langobarden
(Stuttgart-Berlin-Kln-Mainz, 1982), 119; and Joachim Jahn, Ducatus Baiuvariorum: Das
bairische Herzogtum der Agilofinger (Stuttgart, 1991), 374. The speculations by Hammer,
From Ducatus to Regnum, pp. 297304, can be disregarded.
14For Lombard relations with Charles Martel, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
p. 25.
15CC. no. 36; cf. Peter Classen, Bayern und die politische macht im Zeitalter Karls des
Grossen und Tassilos III, in Die Anfange des Klosters Kremsmnster: Symposion 1518 Mai
1977 (Linz, 1978), 169, who argues for a rapprochement between Tassilo and Pippin, which
I do not find in the sources.
16See the discussion by Nelson, Making a Difference, pp. 171190, of Desiderius hand
in all of this as he used his daughters to create alliances.
year of Tassilo as duke of the Bavarians.17 Seen on the basis of hindsight,

this was a drastic change in diplomatic protocol. However, since this
change apparently was instituted in a gradual manner, no single instant of
revolution likely was identified at Pippins court by the men responsible
for evaluating intelligence regarding the situation in Bavaria. Pippins
advisers, however, could see Tassilos efforts, even if they were only inter-
mittent, as one among several elements of an overall trend toward a decla-
ration of Bavarian independence from Frankish rule.
In the wake of the Lombard alliance, Tassilo developed a policy inde-
pendent of the Carolingians with regard to the Bavarian church. Of con-
siderable importance is the role that was given to the soon-to-be-famous
cathedral church of Salzburg. This monumental building, often referred
to as Virgils Cathedral after the soon-to-be appointed archbishop at
Salzburg, was designed to be the third-largest church in the Latin Chris
tian world. Although it was completed only very early in the 770s, it was
planned earlier and ground was broken for construction no later than
767 and probably before that date. In contemporary thinking, this monu-
mental edifice was seen not only as suitable for the seat of a very pow
erful archbishop, but also quite appropriate for the coronation of a rex
Baiuvariorum.18
Also in 763, probably not long before he began planning for the Salzburg
cathedral, Tassilo established a new monastery at Scharnitz. Shortly there-
after, he set in motion the plan for the building of yet a second house, the
monastery of Innechin, in an underdeveloped region between the rivers
Inn and Drau. The latter was consecrated only in 769, and then was turned
over to the abbot of Scharnitz to administer. The construction of Innechin,
however, had been begun much earlier. All of this developmentperhaps
it might even be characterized as reformin the Bavarian church, led by
an exceptionally ambitious duke, was strongly supported by the papacy.19
17Herwig Wolfram, Intitulatio I, Lateinische Knigs- und Frstentitel bis zum Ende des
8. Jahrhunderts (Vienna, 1967), 125184. It is clear that Tassilos sustained effort to avoid
recognizing the ditio of the rex Francorum can be traced only with hindsight from 767
onward. Thus, when the divisio was made by the Carolingians in 768, they were in a posi-
tion only to speculate regarding Tassilos future behavior.
18See Frederich Prinz, Herzog und Adel im agilulfingischen Bayern. Herzogsgut und
Konsensshenkungen vor 788, Zeitchrift fr Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 25 (1962), 283311.
For a useful though brief account of Tassilos independent behavior between 763 and
ca. 768, see Bowlus, Franks, pp. 3637.
19Regarding Tassilos policy of monastery building, see Jahn, Ducatus Baiuvariorum,
pp. 409411, 424425; and Wallace Hadrill, The Frankish Church, p. 417. Also, see the discus-
sion by Bowlus, Franks, p. 37, with the relevant notes.
146 chapter two
Tassilos efforts to develop a personal relationship with Pope Paul had

additional ramafications.20 For example, the Bavarian duke planned to
support missionary activities beyond his frontiers among the pagan
Slavs.21 Tassilos success in converting various groups of Slavs to Christi
anity would in the normal course of events, as recapitulated frequently in
early medieval Europe, likely were to have considerable political and eco-
nomic repercussions. For example, missionary success resulted in the
establishment of episcopal administrative districts, bishoprics, and, thus,
the dukes ability to appoint the relevant bishops. Such appointments
were a major aspect of patronage. These activities also brought under the
dukes control lands that could be made part of the ducal fisc and peoples
who could be taxed and mobilized for military service. In broader political
perspective, these missionary efforts would bring under Tassilos control
peoples and lands that had never been part of the regnum Francorum and
over which, therefore, the Carolingians would have no legitimate claim to
exercise regnum. Finally, insofar as Tassilos efforts were seen as doing
Gods work, he would continue to gain both papal recognition and the
support of an engaged clergy.
Even before undertaking the above-mentioned initiative among the
Slavs, Tassilo gained control of the south Tyrol. This territory previously
had been under the domination of the Lombards and had never been
ruled by the Franks. It is very likely that the south Tyrol had been trans-
ferred to the Bavarian dukes control as part of the dowry that was brought
by the Lombard princess Liutperga when her marriage settlement with
Tassilo was finalized in 763. In addition, the bishopric of Sben, later
Bressanone, which had been located in Lombard territory and which also
never had been under Frankish rule, was brought under Bavarian control.
This likely was a result of the same process, i.e. as part of the dowry brought
to Tassilo as a result of his marriage to Desiderius daughter.22
20Jahn, Ducatus Baiuvariorum, pp. 390395, shows that Tassilo visited Italy, and very
likely Rome, in 768. It is not clear why Jahn believes that this was Tassilos first visit to the
holy city, as he was in a good position to act as a diplomatic intermediary between
Desiderius and the pope from as early as 763. Jahn (pp. 469470) argues that in 772, Tassilo
was serving as an intermediary between his father-in-law and Pope Hadrian. However,
even if Tassilos first visit to Rome was in 768, it is likely that the Carolingians would have
known of these diplomatic interchanges, which of necessity undergirded such a meeting
well before it actually took place. It is true, of course, that between 763 and 765, when
Tassilo petitioned Pope Paul to bring about pax with King Pippin (CC. 36), the Bavarian
duke did not have to visit Rome.
21Wallace Hadrill, The Frankish Church, p. 417.
22Concerning Tassilos position in these areas, see Bowlus, Franks, p. 37, who, however,
does not connect this situation with the marriage of the Bavarian duke to the Lombard
princess, Liutperga.
Seen in light of the Bavarian factor identified above, Autchars mission

was of considerable importance to whatever plans Carloman would make
regarding his policy in Italy. Over the course of the late summer and into
the autumn of 769, Autchar is to be found in the company of Tassilo, while
the latter traveled to Italy with his entourage. Carlomans legate accompa-
nied the Bavarian duke when the latter went to meet with King Desiderius.
In the course of the return journey from the Lombard court, Autchars
close relations with Tassilo were evidenced in an important ceremony
that took place at Bolzano. There, Tassilo issued the charter that offi-
cially established the Bavarian dukes new monastic foundation of
Innichen. Autchar was given an exceptionally prominent place among the
witnesses.23
Autchars fact-finding mission, initiated by Carloman, was intended to
obtain insight into Tassilos reaction to Desiderius initiative regarding the
proposed marriage of Gerperga and Charlemagne, and to learn whatever
he could regarding the thinking of the Lombard court in this regard. It was
recognized at Carlomans court, however, that whatever information
Autchar might obtain was unlikely to be definitive and may, in fact, have
been tainted with misinformation by men who wished to mislead the
Carolingians. In this fluid context, Carloman took immediate steps to
assure that his logistic assets for a possible Carolingian invasion of Italy
through the Mount Cenis pass were secure. During the late summer or
early autumn of 769, i.e. prior to Autchars return to the Frankish court,
Carloman summoned Abbot Asinarius of Novalesa to the royal court at
Chaumuzy, in the region of Rheims. There, he granted to Saint Peter of
Novalesa an immunity from a vast spectrum of tolls collectable through-
out the entire portion of the regnum Francorum that had been assigned to
him by the divisio of 768.24
At this time, Novalesa was an immensely wealthy monastery, whose
lands were to be found throughout Provence, parts of Burgundy, and
northern Italy. Its founder and initial patron, as well as its subsequent
23Regarding Autchars experience in Italian affairs, see for example, V. Stephani II,
chs. 18, 20. For the events of 769, see, Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 5455; and
Bowlus, Franks, p. 78.
24DK. no. 47. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, p. 58. Unfortunately, these
royal acta do not provide witness lists. The mention of Abbot Asinarius petitioning for this
immunity might well signal his presence at the royal court. Abbot Asinarius was no
stranger to the Carolingian court or to Gaul. For example, he attended the council of
Attigny in 762 (Con. Car. no. 13.) See the discussion by Eugen Ewig, Saint Chrodegang et la
reforme de lglise franque, Saint Chrodegang. Communications prsentes au colloque tenu
Metz loccasion du XIIe centenaire de sa mort (Metz, 1967), 2533, and reprinted in Eugen
Ewig, Spatntikes und frnkisches Gallien, 2 vols. (Munich, 1979), I, 238241.
148 chapter two
abbots, had been loyal supporters of the early Carolingians, and had been
charged with the defense of Mont Cenis since the days of Charles Martel.25
This immunity from tolls constituted a large gift to the monastery, and was
a less-than-subtle way for Carloman to assure the loyalty of the house and
its abbot. In addition, the gift very likely was intended to assure the avail-
ability of supplies to be provided to the Franks should Carloman find it
necessary either to lead an army into Italy or to send an expeditionary
force under the command of one of his officials.26
Charlemagnes Response to the Lombard Initiative
Carlomans effort to strengthen his strategic position by assuring logistic

support for a large army passing through the Alps into Italy was executed
before Charlemagne returned from Aquitaine. So far as can be ascertained,
Charlemagne began the process of responding to Desiderius initiative
only after Carloman had begun to seek intelligence through Autchars mis-
sion and to prepare for military operations with his grant to Novalesa.
While it is likely that Charlemagne knew of Carlomans initiatives, we can-
not be certain. Whatever the situation, Charlemagne was in no hurry to
act. He may have decided on a course of action during his Christmas court.
Nevertheless, he summoned his mother Bertranda and Abbot Sturm of
Fulda, who were to be his envoys to Desiderius, to the royal court at Lige
on the Maas during Easter of 770.27
Charlemagnes choice of Bertranda and Sturm as the leaders of the
royal delegation to the Lombard monarch signaled some of his more obvi-
ous concerns. First, it may be noted that Sturm had very strong family ties
25For a recent examination, in a long series of studies regarding the wealth of Novalesa
based upon the testamentum of Abbo, see Patrick J. Geary, Aristocracy in Provence: The
Rhne Basin at the Dawn of the Carolingian Age (Philadelphia, 1985).
26Regarding tolls, see Ganshof, A propos du tonlieu, pp. 485508; and idem, A propos
du tonlieu sous les Mrovingiens, pp. 293315; Kaiser, Teloneum Episcopi, pp. 469485;
and Stoclet, Immunes ab omni Teloneo, pp. 4586.
27ARF, an. 769; and AE, an. 769, both provide the information that Charlemagnes
Christmas court was located at Dren and that his Easter court was at Lige; only the latter
account, however, treats Bertrandas mission to Italy. It is possible that Bertranda and
Sturm were summoned to Charlemagnes Christmas court at Dren rather than to his
Easter court at Lige, but such an early meeting is in no way required by the chronology of
their subsequent actions. For Sturms participation in this mission, see V. S. Sturmi, ch. 23.
Regarding the value of the Vita as an historical source, see Martin Lintzel, Der Quellenwert
von Egils Vita S. Sturmi fr der Sachsenkriege Karls des Grossen, Sachsen und Anhalt,
8 (1932), 616 (reprinted in idem, Ausgewhlte Schriften, I, 128137), and particularly p. 132,
n. 16, concerning the episode under consideration here.
in Bavaria, and was understood by Charlemagne to have excellent rela-

tions with Tassilo.28 Secondly, but no less importantly, Charlemagne
already was married, at least according to Frankish custom if not accord-
ing to the laws of the church, and any effort by him to put aside his wife
Himiltrude and marry in the Christian rite likely would require the sup-
port of prestigious religious figures. For Charlemagne to have a highly-
regarded holy man such as Sturm, the abbot of St. Bonifaces monastery at
Fulda, involved in this very delicate matter, undoubtedly would be of con-
siderable importance to the young king in the event that he chose to put
away Himiltrude and marry Desiderius daughter.29 Charlemagne could
not afford to alienate those important churchmen, who, perhaps under
Bonifaces reforming influence a few decades earlier, had supported the
enduring nature of sanctified wedlock, whether Frankish or Christian. In
addition, Charlemagne could ill-afford to alienate those great families of
his regnum who had an interest in the connections that had been created
by Himiltrudes royal marriage, however defined, and their potential
close connections with the future king, Pippin.30
In addition to the religious concerns and political realities at issue,
there were family matters which could not be ignored. First, the royal lega-
tion, while on its way to Italy, was scheduled to stop at Carlomans court,
which was being held in the old Roman fortress at Selz. There, it is very
28With regard to Sturms family, see Wilhelm Strmer, Eine Adelsgruppe um die
Fuldaer bte Sturmi und Eigil und den Holzkirchener Klostergrnder Troand, in
Gesellschaft und Herrschaft: Forschungen zu social- und landesgeschichtlichen Problemen
vornehmlich in Bayern, ed. Richard van Dlmen (Munich, 1969), 134. Wood, Missionary
Life, pp. 6971, goes so far as to speculate that Sturms falling out with King Pippin, dated to
763765, was a result of the abbots too-vigorous defense of Tassilo, which was based upon
the abbots Bavarian connections. The suggestion by Jrg Jarnut, Genealogie und poli-
tische Bedeutung der agilolfingeschen Herzge, MIG, 99 (1991), 122, that Sturms only
meeting with Tassilo was after the death of Carloman, is off the mark. It is possible, how-
ever, that Sturm went to Bavaria a second time as Charlemagnes envoy after Carlomans
death.
29For the basic treatment of the founding of Fulda, see Thomas Martin, Klosterleben
und Reichspolitik: Die Anfnge des Klosters Fulda, 744842 (Mainz, 1992). See, in general,
Pius Engelbert, Die Vita Sturmi des Eigil von Fulda: Literarkritisch-historische Untershchung
und Edition (Marburg, 1968).
30It is often asserted (see, for example, Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, p. 119) on the basis
of later sources, e.g. Paul the Deacon, Episc. Mett., p. 265; and Einhard, VK, ch. 20, that
Himiltrude was a concubine rather than a true wife in a Christian sense. The pope, how-
ever, considered her to be Charlemagnes legitimate wife and said so (CC. no. 45). The char-
acterization of Himiltrude as a concubine would appear to have been the way in which the
divorce was legitimized post hoc by writers who were intent upon absolving Charlemagne
of any wrongdoing in this matter. See also Nelson, Opposition to Charlemagne, pp. 813,
who argues for the continued influence of Himiltrude after she had been put away.
150 chapter two
likely that Bertranda was delegated to do her utmost to patch up relations

between her two sons and create concordia between them. Once at the
Lombard court in Italy, it surely was Bertrandas task, among others, to
ascertain whether Gerperga was a suitable candidate, in physical terms, to
be her elder sons wife. In this context, the young womans fertility, if not
her virginity, certainly was of primary interest to the Carolingian monarch
and his family.31 In addition, Bertranda certainly understood that her
actions in these matters would have an important impact on the life of
young Pippin, Charlemagnes firstborn son and her grandson.
We cannot, however, rely too heavily on the likelihood of excessive sen-
timentality impinging greatly on Bertrandas actions in pursuit of her mis-
sion. There is the well-known story of Queen Clotilde, who had been
considered a saint since her death. Ostensibly, she was known to have con-
demned several of her grandsons to a violent death rather than see them
made monks. This story, whether true or not, cannot be ignored as a locus
classicus for the sorts of behavior of which royal grandmothers were capa-
ble, even those tinged with holiness.32 In fact, if Charlemagne had consid-
ered Bertranda to have been overly sentimental, he likely would not have
appointed her to lead this important mission. Last but not least, should a
satisfactory pact be arranged with Desiderius, it would be the task of
Bertranda and Sturm to sell it to Pope Stephen III.
Following the discussion of various options with Charlemagne and his
advisers, Bertranda, in the company of Abbot Sturm, left Lige and went
on to visit Carloman at Selz, where his Easter court was being held.33
At this meeting, Charlemagnes brother surely was informed regarding the
details of the situation regarding Desiderius offer, the queen mothers
mission to Italy, and likely her own views concerning the matter at
hand. No less important was her warrant from Charlemagne to establish
For a good example of this literary tactic, which Nelson, loc. cit., pp. 1213, correctly char-
acterizes as damnatio memoriae, see the discussion of Chalpaida, Charles Martels mother,
by Waltraud Joch, Karl Martellein Minderberechtigter Erbe Pippins? in Karl Martell in
Seiner Zeit, ed. Jrg Jarnut, Ulrich Nonn, and Michael Richter (Sigmaringen, 1994), 149169.
One should follow Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 8, n. 1, and conclude that Himiltrude was
Charlemagnes legitimate wife, however defined. Cf. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 8585,
who having played down the existence of the marriage itself, speculates subsequently
(p. 88), that difficulties between Charlemagne and Adalhard arose for reasons other than
the latters objections to the marriage.
31The role of the future mother-in-law in examining the bride-to-be is not a subject
which early medieval monastic chroniclers found to be of much interest. Thus, we are for-
tunate to have the insightful observations of Richer, Hist., bk. II, ch. 92.
32See Gregory, Hist., bk. III, ch. 18.
33AE, an. 770.
concordia with Carloman. Bertranda was in an auspicious position to

explain not only the value of the projected alliance to overall Carolingian
interests, but also to remind her younger son that any alliance was far from
a fait daccompli, whatever may be seen to have been its advantages and/or
disadvantages to all parties concerned. Finally, Carloman would be
reminded that should the marriage of Gisela and Adelchis take place, his
connection to the Lombard royal house would not rely solely on
Charlemagnes marriage to Gerperga.34
After the queen mother and the abbot of Fulda left Selz, they went on to
visit Duke Tassilo in Bavaria before crossing into Italy.35 Their aim likely
was to dampen the hostile feelings that had simmered between
Charlemagne and the virtually independent ruler in the southeast since
763.36 If the royal marriage between Charlemagne and Gerperga were to
be arranged, Tassilo and the Frankish king would become brothers-in-law,
as their respective wives were sisters.37 Whether Bertranda had been per-
mitted by Charlemagne at least to hint to Tassilo that no effort would be
made to impinge on the Bavarian dukes de facto autonomy cannot
be ascertained. Clearly, this is likely to have been an arguing point. In the
end, more than a decade was to pass before Charlemagne took substantive
action against Tassilo in 781. Another five or so years were to pass before
Charlemagne moved to depose Tassilo and (re)integrate the Bavarian
duchy fully into the regnum Francorum.38
Because of his close family connections with important elements of the
Bavarian aristocracy and his reputation as a holy man, Abbot Sturm was in
a position to have a positive influence on Tassilo. Indeed, if Sturms exile
between 763 and 765 had been due to his support for Tassilo, as some
scholars have argued, then the abbot had proven his good faith to the
Bavarian duke. Not long after Bertrandas legation left the Bavarian ducal
court, Tassilo summoned a council of the greater magnates of his regnum,
34Nelson, Bertranda, pp. 104105, emphasizes Bertrandas dedication to the success

and well-being of her children.
35Concerning Bertrandas visit to the Bavarian court, see AE, an. 770.
36As already noted, Charlemagnes difficulties with Tassilo likely dated from the dukes
desertion during the campaign of 763. These problems probably were exacerbated by
Tassilos independent actions, discussed above. For the varied background of relations
between the Bavarian dukes and the Carolingian house, see, among many studies, Jahn,
Hausmeier und Herzge, pp. 317344; and Hammer, From ducatus to Regnum, pp. 99200.
37See the various schemes laid out by Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 7; and Hallenbeck,
Pavia and Rome, pp. 121122.
38The story is told well from Tassilos perspective by Classen, Bayern, pp. 165185; see
also in more detail, Hammer, From Ducatus to Regnum, pp. 137191.
152 chapter two
which was held in September at Freising.39 Explicit information concern-

ing the decisions taken at Freising does not survive. Yet, it is evident that
Tassilo continued to pursue an independent policy, especially with regard
to the Bavarian church and support for missionary activities among the
Slavs. Over time, these efforts would bring additional territories under his
control that had never been part of the regnum Francorum.40
The calling of magnate-councils in the context of Bertrandas and
Sturms mission was not unique to Tassilo. Immediately after Bertranda
and Sturm left the royal court at Lige on their way to Selz, Charlemagne
summoned a general assembly of his magnates to meet at the Rhenish city
of Worms only 80 kilometers from his brothers Easter court.41 At about
the same time, i.e. soon after Bertranda and Sturm left Selz, Carloman
moved rapidly on two fronts. Probably on the advice of his just-departed
guests, and undoubtedly with the support of his proceres, perhaps in some
sort of council, Carloman sought an immediate rapprochement with
Charlemagne. Carloman acted swiftly, and Charlemagne responded
quickly in a positive manner in order to establish concordia between them.
This part of Bertrandas mission would seem to have been a great success,
at least in the short term.42
After their meeting, the brothers immediately dispatched news of their
friendship pact to the pope. Indeed, Charlemagne and Carloman acted
with such alacrity that their missi, Bishop Gauzibert of Chartres, a priest
named Fulcbert, and two distinguished laymen (glorissimi viri), Ansfredus
and Helmgarius, arrived in Rome with the good news even before the pope
had received intelligence regarding Bertrandas mission to King Desid
erius. The pope responded to the news of peace north of the Alps with
effusive praise for the brothers good sense. He then urged them vigor-
ously, in their capacity as patricii Romanorum, to deploy their military
forces in Italy, as their father had, so as to assure to the papacy its legiti-
mate rights against Lombard aggression.43
39Traditionen des Hochstifts Freising, I, no. 39.

40For a brief and easily available summary of these matters, see Kathy Lynne Roper
Pearson, Conflicting Loyalties in Early Medieval Bavaria: A View of Socio-Political Interaction,
680900 (Aldershot, 1999), pp. 6370.
41ARF, an. 769; and AE, an, 769.
42See CC., no. 44, for the peace-making and the rather tendentious observation by
Einhard, VK, ch. 18, regarding Charlemagnes patience in dealing with Carloman, who is
depicted as hating his elder brother and being jealous of him.
43See CC., nos. 44 and 45, respectively, for the popes reaction to the news of the broth-
ers concordia and Bertrandas mission.
Carloman, however, also acted with regard to his Italian interests. Once
again, he set about strengthening his position in northern Italy, particu-
larly with regard to control of the Mont Cenis pass. He recalled Abbot
Asinarius to the royal court, which at this time was sitting at Neumagen,
and there, he confirmed an important grant that his father, King Pippin,
had made to Novalesa. This earlier act had guaranteed the freedom of the
monastery from episcopal jurisdiction and the free election of its own
abbot. It is unlikely that Novalesas lands were given full immunity from
comital government at this time. As will be seen below, Charlemagne was
to deal with this matter in treating with Abbot Frodoenus, Asinarius
successor.44
Why Carloman confirmed Pippins grant in his act of 26 June 770 and
had not done so in his grant of October 769 might well relate to the rela-
tions of both parties with the bishop of Maurienne. By and large, Carloman
had to decide whether the bishop of Maurienne would likely be more loyal
in overseeing the provision of the required militia owed by Novalesa, or
the abbot would be more reliable, especially if he had been freed from
episcopal jurisdiction. Carloman concluded, likely on the advice of Fulrad,
who was the kings leading expert on Italian affairs, that Abbot Asinarius
was to be regarded as the more reliable supporter. This would be the case,
especially if Pippins judgment in the earlier grant regarding this matter
were regarded as sound, and the abbey were exempted from the bishops
control.45
By mid-summer 770, Pope Stephen III finally learned of Bertrandas mis-
sion to Desiderius. Yet, the negotiations that were being carried on at Pavia
between the queen mother and the Lombard king surprisingly were kept
secret. Even the papal agents, who were operating at Desiderius court or
nearby, were unable to ascertain which of the two already-married
Carolingian monarchs, Charlemagne or Carloman, was being sought as a
candidate to marry Gerperga. Nevertheless, the pope and his advisors
were greatly agitated in regard to the negotiations. In light of several
actions discussed below, it might be concluded that they were over-
wrought by the news of Bertrandas mission. In consequence of his poor
44DK. no. 53. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, p. 59. With regard to King
Pippins earlier grant, it is to be noted that Asinarius attended the council of Attigny in 762
(Con. Car. no. 13). However, at this time, Carloman certainly was too young to have made
any personal connection with the abbot. See Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii,
section on lost acta no. 381, regarding Pippins grant.
45Between January of 769 and December of 771, Fulrad was frequently with the king.
See DK., nos. 4353; and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, pp. 5760.
154 chapter two
intelligence in regard to the substance of the negotiations, however, Pope

Stephen acted precipitously. He wrote both to Charlemagne and to
Carloman in an intemperate and ill-conceived effort to keep the
Carolingians from forming an alliance with Desiderius.46
Initially, in the letter, the pope attacked the very humanity of the
Lombards. Apparently resting on Deut. 22:9, Pope Stephen levied a dia-
tribe against the mixing of the races. The Lombards were seen as some-
thing other than fully human. He characterized them as the race from
which lepers had their origin, a perjured people and a foreign race with
which it would be madness for either of the Carolingian royal brothers to
ally in marriage. The Lombards are portrayed as a most foully stinking
race. To commingle with the Lombards, who were regarded by the pope,
in contrast to the Franks, as a barbarian people, not only would con-
taminate and defile the Carolingian family but the Franks as a race. Such
a marriage was characterized by the pope as nothing less than the work of
the Devil.47
After much rhetoric, history, and invective, Pope Stephen delivered his
edict gainst any such marriage:
Since Saint Peter, prince of the apostles to whom the Lord God delivered the
keys to the kingdom of heaven and granted the power of binding and loosing
both in heaven and on earth, forcefully commands you and at the same
time We, together with all the bishops, priests and other ecclesiastics and
the lay magnates and counts and all of our people in this Roman province,
call Divine judgment to witness and command you by the true and living
God that in no circumstance shall either of you [Charlemagne or
Carloman] dare to accept in marriage the daughter of the afore-mentioned
Desiderius, king of the Lombards, and, in addition, that your most noble sis-
ter Gisela, beautiful in Gods eyes, shall not be granted to Desiderius son,
and that you shall not dare in any manner to cast aside your wife
After making clear his will in the matter of the marriage, the pope goes on
to emphasize the exceptionally holy character of Christian wedlock and
the punishments that would be incurred if the papal order were to be
violated:
Thus, we first placed this, our exhortation and command, in the confessio of
Saint Peter and then we sent it to you. If anyone dares to act against our
command and exhortation, let him know that by the authority of my
lord, Saint Peter he is anathematized and shut out of Gods kingdom and
46CC. no. 45.

47CC. no. 45. See the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 315317.
destined to burn with the devil in the eternal fires. But let it be that he who
shall observe and defend our edict be made illustrious by our Lord God with
celestial blessings and be counted worthy to be made a participant with all
of Gods saints in the enternal joys of reward.48
Although we do not have evidence for Charlemagnes reaction to this let-
ter, Carloman, also likely in the mid-summer of 770, made his position
very clear. The letter undoubtedly had convinced Carloman that Pope
Stephen would block the projected marriages of Charlemagne to Gerperga
and, if possible, of Gisela to Adelchis. Indeed, in addition to the diatribe
against the Lombard people, the pope appears to have said as much when
he recalled, in the context of one of the brothers potentially putting away
his legitimate wife, the supposed historical fact that Pope Stephen II had
stopped King Pippin from setting aside Bertranda in order to pursue a
negotiation for his marriage to a Byzantine princess.49 In addition, Stephen
III made clear that both Charlemagne and Carloman are not free to join
yourselves to another race or to dare to act in any way against the will of
the pope. Further, the pope admonished the brothers that to ally with the
Lombards would be perjury. The treaty of 754 to protect the papacy, which
was sustained by their oaths, obviously would be endangered if an alliance
with Desiderius were made.50
Upon receiving Stephens letter and edict, Carloman and his advisers
concluded, not unreasonably, that Desiderius projected alliance with
Charlemagne was unlikely to take place. Or, at least, Charlemagne would
be taking an immense risk, in both religious and political terms, if he pur-
sued the marriage and thereby caused a serious confrontation with the
pope. Thus, Carloman wrote to Pope Stephen making clear that he was not
the Carolingian king who was flirting with the deep spiritual disaster,
which had been outlined in the letter and condemned by the edict sent to
him from Rome. Carloman assured the pope that he was firmly wedded to
his wife, that he would continue to carry out the obligations incumbent
48CC., no. 45. See the dated but still valuable discussion by Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 317321.
49Nelson, Bertranda, pp. 103104, despite the remarks in Pope Stephens letter, doubts
that such negotiations took place between Pippin and the Byzantines, that Pippin ever
considered putting away Bertranda, and that the pope stopped him from doing so. Nelson
believes that the pope (which one is not clear) made all of this up so that he could pro-
nounce a moral admonition.
50Paul Kehr, Die sogenannte karolingische Schenkung von 574, Historische Zeitschrift
70 (1893), 385441, remains basic; see, more recently, Jrg Jarnut, Quierzy und Rom:
Bemerkungen zu den Promissiones Donationis Pippins und Karls, Historische Zeitschrift
220 (1975), 425446. A useful summary of the literature is to be found in Noble, The
Republic, pp. 8387.
156 chapter two
upon him as holder of the title patricius Romanorum, and promised his
constant fidelitas to the Holy Father.51
This response, in effect, committed Carloman to support the papal pol-
icy of plenaria iustitiae, i.e. papal right to obtain for Saint Peter what legiti-
mately belonged to the Roman see, as claimed by the pope, even if it
meant war with the Lombards.52 Moreover, Carloman sought to distance
himself from Charlemagnes marriage plans and to assure the pope of his
full support. In addition, he instructed his missi, Abbot Berald of
Echternacht and the vir illustrissimus Audbert, to put a series of questions
to Stephen, which are described as being of such a delicate nature that
they were not written down. One might reasonably speculate here that
Carloman wished to know if the pope would depose Charlemagne should
he defy the papal edict, put away his legitimate wife, and marry Gerperga.
Finally, but this time in writing, Carloman requested that Pope Stephen
serve as co-father to the kings newly born son, who was given the auspi-
cious name Pippin.53
The pope was elated by Carlomans letter and averred that God had
poured into his sweet royal heart the grace of pious judgment and skill
in effective action. Stephen continued, and indicated that the illustrious
fame of his very celebrated name and heavenly given wisdom endures
throughout the entire world Stephen went on to proclaim that
Carloman was a blessed, noble, and most Christian king. In regard to the
very delicate questions which Carlomans missi transmitted to the pope
orally, Stephen indicated that he provided answers in a separate commu-
nication. It is not clear whether this message was transmitted orally or in
writing, but information regarding its contents no longer survives.
Nevertheless, the pope made clear in the letter that does survive that
51CC., no. 45.

52The popes demand that the new Carolingian monarchs support the policy of ple
naria iustitia was broached earlier (CC. no. 44). See the discussion by Hallenback, Pavia and
Rome, pp. 113119.
53Although Carlomans letter is no longer extant, parts of it can be reconstructed from
Pope Stephens reply. See CC., no. 47, where Stephen refers to Carloman as patricius
Romanorum, remarks on the kings constant faithfulness, and calls attention to the mon-
archs request regarding the co-fathership of the newly born Pippin, as well as to the ques-
tions which had not been written down but which were transmitted orally by the kings
missi. Regarding godfathers and co-fathers, and the distinction between these spiritual
connections with regard to the Carolingians, see Arnold Angenendt, Das geistliche
Bndnis der Ppste mit den Karolingern (754796), Historisches Jahrbuch 100 (1980), 194
at p. 64; and, in general, see Joseph Lynch, Godparents and Kinship in Early Medieval Europe
(Princeton, 1986). Concerning the date of CC. no. 47, see Lintzel, Karl der Grosse, p. 19,
n. 58, who is followed by Noble, The Republic, p. 123, n. 121.
Carloman, now referred to as his God-protected excellence and his God-

inspired highness, would find the papal position reassuring.54
With regard to the request that the pope stand as co-father to the baby
Pippin, Stephen wrote to the God-instituted noble king and most excel-
lent son that he would be overjoyed to serve in the loving relationship of
co-fatherhood to Carlomans illustrious and royal offspring whom God
had deigned to bestow on the king for the exaltation of His holy church.
It seems obvious that the pope fully understood the symbolic significance
of the childs name in the context of King Pippin Is strong support for the
papacy. In closing, the pope prayed for Carloman so that God would pro-
tect you by His grace and grant you victory from on high for the sake of the
defence of His holy church and deign to keep you safe for many years on
the throne of the kingdom together with our most excellent and most
Christian daughter, the queen, your most dear wife, and your most loving
children and to allow you to possess the eternal joy of the kingdom of
heaven.55
Pope Stephens response obviously was made in consonance with the
advice of his primicerius Christopher, who, at this time, dominated both
Romes foreign policy and military forces. On the basis of hindsight, it is
clear that the pope moved precipitously to support Carloman. Stephen
had not yet learned the details of the negotiations that had been carried
on at Pavia. When this letter was written, the pope certainly was not privy
to the contents of the pact that Bertranda had arranged with Desiderius.
When Bertranda and her embassy finally reached Rome, probably early in
the autumn of 770, she very likely explained to the pope what thus far had
been accomplished. It had been agreed that Desiderius would give up cer-
tain specified territories which Rome claimed and, in addition, the
Lombard monarch along with Charlemagne would guarantee peace in
Italy. No mention would appear to have been made of Carloman in this
context. In return, Saint Peters maximilist claims, which were represented
by Christophers policy of plenaria iustitiae and which had been revived by
Stephen III following King Pippins death in 768, would have to be aban-
doned, at least for the time being. It was further agreed that Charlemagne
would marry Desiderius daughter, but that Gisela would not marry
Adelchis.56
54CC., no. 47.

55CC., no. 47.
56The basic evidence for this agreement and the popes acceptance is provided by
CC., nos. 46, 48, as well as V. Stephani III, ch. 26. This is a brief summary of the major points
158 chapter two
Bertranda offered at least two demonstrations of the efficacy of the tri-

partite alliance as part of her effort to convince the pope that this was a
viable concordat. First, she ordered the troops who had accompanied
her mission and were commanded by Charlemagnes referendarius Iterius,
to undertake an operation south to the border between papal terri-
torywith the duchy of Benevento. There, they reclaimed for the pope a
significant fiscal territory that had been in the hands of King Desiderius
son-in-law Arichis. These estates were returned to papal control without
bloodshed.57
The second demonstration concerned Archbishop Michael of Ravenna.
He had been put in power through the influence of the Lombard king, and
consecrated contrary to papal policy. Bertranda promised the pope that
this situation would be reversed, and that Desiderius would not defend
the anti-papal archbishop at Ravenna. This promise was made good
in the autumn of 770 by a military force under Count Hucbald, one of
Charlemagnes commanders. Michael was deposed and replaced as arch-
bishop by Leo, the popes candidate.58
After considerable discussion, Pope Stephen accepted the agreement
which Bertranda presented to him as the new reality.59 Christopher, the
architect of the popes earlier anti-Lombard policy, as well as the faction
that supported the primercerius, undoubtedly not only were severely dis-
appointed, but also very much alienated from the pope as a result of his
acquiescence in the new alliance. Perhaps even more importantly, at least
in regard to the situation north of the Alps, Carloman, who previously had
worked diligently with Christopher and his son Sergius, clearly was now
diplomatically isolated from Rome, or at least from the pope. The thrust of
the arrangements orchestrated by Pippins divisio, which had given
Carloman the primary place in developing the interests of the Carolingians
in Italy, was severely blunted by the popes change of policy. Charlemagne,
discussed in detail by Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 122125, who rests his reconstruc-
tion, in part, on the views of Bertolini, Roma di Fronte a Bisanzio, p. 650.
57Regarding the mission of Iterius, see CC., no. 46; and for a discussion of Iterius, who
served Pippin and then became an important figure in Charlemagnes government, see
Donald Boulough, Aula Renovata, The Court before the Aachen Palace, in Carolingian
Renewal (Manchester, 1991), 126127.
58Regarding the mission of Count Hucbald, see V. Stephani III, chs. 25, 26; and
CC. no., 85.
59CC., nos. 46, 48; and V. Stephani III, ch. 26. See the discussion by Hallenback, Pavia
and Rome, pp. 122125. Jahn, Ducatus Baiuvariorum, p. 391, argues for a quadripartite alli-
ance which included Bavaria.
thanks to the negotiating skill of Bertranda and Sturm, would appear to

have been established as the dominant Frankish king in Italian affairs.60
Scholars have vigorously debated the purpose of the accommodations
negotiated by Bertranda in Charlemagnes name. Some see a plan which
created a series of interlocking obligations that was intended to result in a
balance of power. The limitations imposed by these obligations would
severely limit the independent action of the principals and, thus would, of
necessity, result in peace.61 Other scholars, however, view Bertranda as
favoring Charlemagne and, therefore, as working in his interest to ensure
his role in Italian politics with the concomitant result of seriously dimin-
ishing Carlomans position not only in Italy but in the regnum Francorum
as a whole.62
It should be emphasized that these two interpretations are not mutu-
ally exclusive. The tripartite covenant, negotiated with King Desiderius
and Pope Stephen by the queen mother, surely curtailed Carlomans
options while increasing those of his brother. Such limitations on
Carlomans freedom of action, however, were necessary if there were to be
peace in the regnum Francorum. Charlemagne simply would not tolerate
being excluded from Italy. In this context, it should be emphasized that
Charlemagne had taken an oath as patricius Romanorum to protect the
interests of the papacy, and this could not be easily disregarded. As to
Bertrandas personal motives, it may be suggested that she believed that
the only way to save Carloman from a disastrous war with Charlemagne
was to limit her younger sons options and provide the elder with a role
in Italy.63
During the autumn of 770, well before the snows closed the Alpine
passes, Bertranda and her embassy returned from Italy. She brought with
60It is interesting to note that Paolo Delogu, Lombard and Carolingian Italy, NCMH, II,
290319, at 300301, does not appear to recognize the existence of the tripartite
agreement.
61For example, Delaruelle, Charlemagne, p. 217; followed by Kleinclausz, Charlemagne,
p. 9.
62See, for example, Lintzel, Karl der Grosse, pp. 1622; followed by Hallenbeck, Pavia
and Rome, pp. 127128; and Nelson, Bertranda, p. 105, who asserts that Bertranda threw in
her lot with the elder son.
63It is clear that in the wake of Carlomans death, Bertranda, whose work as a diplomat
appears to have been accomplished, disappears from the political scene. CC., no. 48, marks
Bertrandas last documented appearance on the historical stage in an official capacity. She
lived a very long life, however, and died on 30 April 783. According to Einhard, VK, ch. 18, on
the whole she remained on very good terms with her son. Cf. the overall review of
Bertrandas role by Mikel V. Ary, The Politics of the Frankish-Lombard Marriage Alliance,
Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 19 (1981), 726.
160 chapter two
her Gerperga, Chalemagnes bride-to-be. In the course of the journey

north, Bertranda very likely stopped to visit Carloman and to inform
him personally of the details of the tripartite pact before going to Char
lemagnes winter court at Mainz.64 Himiltrude, whom later sources of an
apologist parti pris insist upon characterizing as Charlemagnes concu-
bine and not as a legitimate wife, was put aside, although her son Pippin,
known as the Hunchback, remained with his father.65 Charlemagne and
Gerperga were married, probably during the Christmas court held at
Mainz in December of 770, over which Lull, Bonifaces successor as arch-
bishop, likely presided.66
While celebrating Easter 771 at Herstal, Charlemagne summoned his
magnates to attend a conventum generalis, which was to meet later in the
spring at Valenciennes. Undoubtedly, the purpose of this meeting was to
apprise the great bulk of his secular and ecclesiastical magnates, who
likely had not been invited to attend the wedding, concerning the course
of the years events.67 In the spring of 771, as in the previous year,
Charlemagne planned no military operations. Instead, he waited pru-
dently to ascertain the effect that his diplomatic maneuvering was to have
on Carloman, Tassilo, and on the situation in Italy.68
64AE, an. 770, reports that Bertranda returned to her sons (filios) in the Frankish king-
dom. The fact that Carlomans lands lay between Italy and Charlemagnes territory surely
supports this observation, and permits the inference that she visited with the former
before going on to see the latter in order to report personally on the success of the negotia-
tions and to deliver his bride-to-be.
65Einhard, VK, ch. 20; AM. an. 772; and AL., an. 772.
66It is noteworthy that both the ARF. an. 770, and the AE, an. 770, are silent concerning
the festivities, which obviously must have accompanied what ultimately was to be a failed
marriage and a failed alliance. However, V. Adalhardi, ch. 7, permits the inference that
there was a considerable gathering in the context of the wedding and noteworthy mag-
nates swore an oath to uphold the treaty with the Lombards. See Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 314,
regarding the value of the V. Adalhardi, ch. 7, here; and the concurrence by Nelson, Making
a Difference, p. 181, n. 50.
The chronology of Bertrandas homeward trip from Italy to the regnum Francorum
makes it very likely that the marriage did not take place before Christmas, 770. It is also
unlikely that the marriage took place as late as Easter when the court met at Herstal.
Everything appears to have been under control in Italy with regard to the treaty well before
the beginning of Lent, 771. Ash Wednesday fell on 20 February (see below).
67For the early years of Charlemagnes reign, the author of the ARF, ann. 770, 771, 773,
consistently refers to such gatherings as a synodum, while the author of the AE, ann. 770,
771, uses the phrase conventum generalis. For a very useful summary of work dealing with
assemblies, see McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 222231.
68Cf. Abel and Simson, Jhrbucher I, 112, who believe that Charlemagne was paralyzed
by his brothers policies and thus was unable to take the appropriate action required by the
needs of his kingdom. Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 13, would appear to agree. See also Jorg
Jarnut, Ein Bruderkampf und seine Folgen: die Krise des Frankenreiches (768771), in
Charlemagne did not have long to wait. Carloman undoubtedly had

received intelligence during the late summer or early autumn of 770, i.e.
prior to Bertrandas return to Gaul, that the queen mother had negotiated
a tripartite agreement with Desiderius and Pope Stephen. He then met
with his mother, as noted above, on her return from Italy and learned first-
hand that Gerperga was in Francia for her forthcoming marriage to
Charlemagne. Carloman also learned that Pope Stephen no longer was
interested in anathematizing Charlemagne or in pursuing a policy of hos-
tility toward King Desiderius and the Lombards. Rather, in regard to policy
in Rome, the pontiff would seem to have used the pact negotiated by
Bertranda as a means of freeing himself from the domination of
Christopher, the primicerius, and the latters son Sergius.69
Carlomans main source of information regarding the situation in Rome
itself prior to Bertrandas return, was through a legation or embassy sent
by Christopher to his court.70 Carloman regarded both Christopher and
his son Sergius as his amici. The Frankish king undoubtedly had become
acquainted with the latter when he led the legation from Rome to the
Carolingian court in 768, following the death of King Pippin.71 The primic
erius envoy, perhaps even Sergius himself, very likely outlined a plan to
Carloman that was intended to bring about papal repudiation of the
tripartite alliance and to have Pope Stephen reaffirm his earlier anti-
Lombard stance. This plan was certain to appeal to Carloman, as had
Stephens letter, discussed in detail above, because it required also that the
pope condemn Charlemagnes forthcoming marriage to Gerperga. Indeed,
Stephens edict, now an inconvenient fact for the pope, had made it clear
Herrschaft, Kirche, Kulture: Beitrge zur Geschichte der Mittelalters. Festschrift fr Friedrich
Prinz zu seinem 65 Geburtstag, ed. G. Jenal and S. Haarlnder (Stuttgart, 1993), 165176, who
not only thinks of this three-year period as a crisis, but (pp. 165166) claims that the armies
of the regnum Francorum failed to go to war in 770 and 771 because of the two brothers
hostility toward each other. On the whole, Jarnut would seem to exaggerate the entire situ-
ation. I certainly do not agree with Nelson, Making a Difference, p. 172, that Charlemagnes
reign suffered from persistent insecurity and one goddamn crisis after another. At the
least, such an argument should venture a definition of crisis that is epistemologically
valid, i.e. both necessary and sufficient. All of this hyperbole seems to me to be far too
driven by a mindset that has been conditioned by the modern media, which tend to label
every bump in the political road a near-death experience.
69Jan Hallenbeck, Pope Stephen III, Why Was He Elected?, Archivum Historiae
Pontificiae, 12 (1974), 287299; and in summary form Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome,
pp. 126128.
70V. Hadriani I, ch. 5, which also makes clear that Carloman was a friend of Sergius,
Christophers son.
71V. Stephani III, chs. 16, 17.
162 chapter two
that if Charlemagne went through with the marriage, he would be

anathematized.72
The potential consequences of the popes edict were dire. In the event
of being the subject of papal anathema, Charlemagnes position as patri
cius Romanorum would be placed at risk. Even Charlemagnes position as
rex Francorum could be subjected to severe stress. The oaths of faithful-
ness taken by his vassi and fideles might be considered in some quarters to
be null and void until Charlemagne made his peace with the pope and was
absolved. With the anathematization of Charlemagne, Stephen, at least
until amends had been made by the king, might well be forced to recog-
nize Carloman as the only legitimate patricius Romanorum. In short, if
Christophers plan were to succeed, the pope would be bound to stand
behind the edict that he had issued in the summer of 770, which con-
demned the Lombard-marriage and all that stemmed from that poisoned
fruit.73
This plan, as reconstructed from the primicerius subsequent actions,
called for Christopher and his son Sergius to mobilize the various military
forces of the Roman state. The pope was to be held as a prisoner under
house arrest. He would be compelled to fulfill the threats that he had made
in the edict, published in the summer of 770, which condemned, in
advance, any marriage between an already-married Carolingian monarch
and a Lombard princess.74 In this context, Carloman, in consequence of
his office as patricius Romanorum, was to send a substantial force of elite
troops to Rome. This military operation not only would make clear that
this particular rex Francorum was carrying out his duty to defend the pope,
72The edict embodied in CC., no. 45 puts forth papal policy as contingent on the mar-
riage of one of the Carolingian kings, i.e. Charlemagne or Carloman, to Desiderius daugh-
ter. Any notion that the plan to force Pope Stephen to return to the policy that he had
articulated prior to his acceptance of the agreement negotiated by Bertranda, i.e. the status
quo ante, that could have originated at Carlomans court would fail to grasp the complexity
of the situation in Italy and particularly in Rome itself. Indeed, only someone with an ency-
clopedic knowledge of the situation in the Roman state and with very considerable influ-
ence both in the city of Rome and in its environs, e.g. Christopher, could possibly have
orchestrated the plan that is described below in this chapter.
73See, CC., no. 45, for the details of the punishments that would be visited upon the
Carolingian king who put away his legitimate wife and co-habited with a Lombard
princess.
74For various views concerning the plan, see Lintzel, Karl der Grosse, pp. 2226;
Louis Halphen, La papaut et le complot Lombard de 771, Revue historique, CLXXXII
(1938), 238244 (all further citations are to the reprinted version in idem, A travers lhistoire
du moyen ge [Paris, 1950], 5157); Bertolini, La Caduta, pp. 227261; 349378; and
Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 128135.
but that he was committed to stopping or, at least repudiating, the illicit
Lombard marriage.
Christopher and other members of the papal council, as well as King
Desiderius, all were very well aware of the effective role that a Carolingian
army could play in the defense of Rome. Indeed, only fifteen years earlier,
forces led by Pippins legate, Abbot Fulrad, at Rome had saved the city
from the Lombards.75 Thus, the army Carloman was to send to Italy was
not to be taken lightly by those who sought to maintain the tripartite alli-
ance. However, Carlomans army was required by Christophers plan not
only for its military value. This army also permitted the portrayal of
Carloman as the only legitimate patricius Romanorum. By sending an
army to Rome, he was playing his proper role as defender of Saint
Peter, while anything that Charlemagne might do was to be regarded as
unacceptable due to the popes edict which proclaimed him to be
anathematized.
In the spring of 771, as soon as the Alpine passes could be traversed by a
large force, Carloman sent a substantial army of picked men to Rome
under the command of his missus Dodo.76 It would seem likely that
Carlomans support for Novalesa, discussed above, was of importance in
regard to Dodos march into Italy. Novalesa very likely was charged with
providing the bulk of the logistical support at a difficult time of the year,
i.e. prior to the spring harvest. Consequently, it seems very likely that
Dodos army moved south through the Mont Cenis pass. It would appear
that no effort was made by the Lombard king or local forces of any type to
interdict Dodos army at any point between the Italian frontier and Rome.
75Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 218220; and Noble, The Republic, pp. 9092.
76CC, no. 48. The suggestion by Gundlach, the editor of CC, that this letter was written
about Easter time (Easter fell on 7 April) is off the mark. There is no way for a Carolingian
army of any considerable size to have been mustered in the regnum Francorum and to have
reached Rome so early in the spring, much less to have carried out all of the various deeds
ascribed to it by Pope Stephen prior to 7 April 771. This letter could not have been written
before the latter part of May 771. Gundlach was basing his dating of the letter on Creontius,
Annales, an. 771. This text, as we now have it, is a reconstruction, done in the 16th century
by Aventinus. It has some claim to credibility because it very probably was based upon
now-lost Annales believed to have been the work of Creontius, the referendarius of the
Bavarian duke Tassilo. However, Halphen, La papaut, pp. 5657, makes clear (with exten-
sive bibliography) that Aventinus scrupulousness in recording these so-called Bavarian
annals is suspect for many reasons, including an effort to be too precise (ses fausses prci-
sions). The reference to the events under discussion here as taking place in Lent is
regarded by Halphen as one such exaggeration. See also the observations of Nelson,
Making a Difference, p. 178, n. 36, who calls attention to earlier literature dealing with
these Annales.
164 chapter two
Not only are there no reports of military opposition to this force, but there
are no reports of attempts to deprive Dodos army of logistical support.
When King Desiderius learned of Carlomans support for Christophers
plan and the passage of Dodos army through the Lombard kingdom to
Rome, he ordered his forces to be mobilized during Lent 771. Then, he
advanced on Rome with the Lombard exercitus.77 Desiderius likely had
multiple reasons for taking this military initiative. It was vital that he
thwart Christophers plans to force Pope Stephen to abandon his new and
ostensibly pro-Lombard policy, which had been orchestrated by Bertranda.
As part of this strategy, it is also likely that Desiderius hoped to get rid of
the primicerius and his faction, which is a goal that the pope also would
seem to have favored. The elimination of Christopher and Sergius
would seem to have been of fundamental importance if the tripartite
alliance were to be sustained without continuing opposition within the
papal government.
In regard to the situation at Rome, the Lombard monarch can be seen
to have made preparations prior to his advance on the Holy City. He gained
the support of Paul Afiarta, a cubicularius in the papal household. Pauls
mission was multi-faceted from Desiderius perspective. First, he was to
provide intelligence to the Lombard monarch regarding the situation at
Rome. He was also to discredit Christopher and his son Sergius in the eyes
of Pope Stephen, if this, indeed, were necessary. More importantly, he was
to undermine the position of the primicerius in the view of the pontiffs
other advisers, and, no less importantly, to deprive the forces arrayed
against tripartite alliance of the support of the people of Rome. The populi
of Rome, like the male inhabitants of the other fortress urbes throughout
the erstwhile Roman Empire in the west, were organized to provide sig-
nificant militia forces for the defense of the citys great walls. Indeed, these
defenses, since they had been reconstructed during the later Roman
Empire, had often withstood enemy sieges.78
In order to understand the nature of this developing military confronta-
tion at Rome, it is important that the Lombards were not able to dominate
the central part of Italy militarily. The wide variety of indigenous military
77The reference in Creontius, Annales, an. 771, chronologically may apply to the mus-
tering of Desiderius army at Pavia. This is a subject about which the secretary of Duke
Tassilo, the Lombard kings son-in-law, is likely to have been well-informed. Creontius uses
the term exercitus.
78V. Stephani III, chs. 28, 29; and the detailed discussion by Jan Hallenbeck, Paul Afiarta
and the Papacy: An Analysis of Politics in Eighth-Century Rome, Archivum Historiae
Pontificiae 12 (1974), 3354, who emphasizes that Paul had his own agenda.
institutions of Roman imperial origin which flourished in this region were

capable of providing strong opposition to Desiderius army.79 Thus, when
Christopher and Sergius learned of Desiderius plans and discovered the
efforts of Paul Afiarta, the primicerius and his son began to prepare for
the defense of the city. The largest and, and from a military perspective,
the least professional of the forces at the primicerius disposal was the
urban militia of the city of Rome itself. The legislation establishing urban
militia forces, and especially the urban militia of Rome, was already well-
attested in 440 when the Emperor Valentinian III clarified the existing
situation in the following manner:
We decree that all are to know that no Roman citizen or member of a
guild is to be compelled to do [expeditionary] military service. Indeed, he is
required to do armed service only on the walls and at the gates [for the
defense of the city] whenever the necessity arises. The regulations made by
the Illustrious Prefect of the City are to be obeyed by all. (Nov. Val.V.2)
Under Christophers command, this long-standing and traditional armed
force of the citys inhabitants, i.e. adgregantes populum armati, were
mustered according to the popes Vita.80 Analogues illustrating the thor-
oughgoing militarization of the civilian population are conspicuous
within the frontiers of the erstwhile Roman Empire throughout the early
Middle Ages. This is especially the case in the great fortified urbes of
Romes successor states and in the environs of these fortress cities.81 The
military effectiveness of these urban militia forces, i.e. citizen-soldiers,
was, by and large, limited to local defense. However, with the massive
walls and towers of the imperial fortress cities to protect them, such troops
could and often did give a good account of themselves when fighting to
79Piero Rasi, Exercitus Italicus e milizie cittadine nellalto medioevo (Padua, 1937),
remains the basic work on the Roman military in the early Middle Ages. However, now see
the interpretative study by Evelyne Patlagean, Les armes et la cit Roma du VIIe au IXe
sicle, et le modle europen des trois fonctions, Mlanges darchologie et dhistoire, 86
(1974), 2562. The studies by Rasi and Patlagean have the virtue of bringing together a sub-
stantial array of sources dealing with the matter of the military at Rome for the period
under consideration here. As the reader will see, however, I do not often see these texts in
the same manner as either Rasi or Pantlagean. Louis Duchesne, The Beginnings of the
Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes, trans. A.H. Matthew (London, 1908), 6061, is excessively
pessimistic regarding the information provided by the sources regarding the military.
80V. Stephani III, ch. 29; and the more general observation in Creontius, Annales,
an. 771.
81Bachrach, Recruitment, pp. 5563, discusses the militarization of the civilian
population.
166 chapter two
keep their homes from being looted and burned and while protecting
their children and women folk from being killed or carried off as slaves.82
Christopher also mobilized units of those fighting men who were still
considered regular soldiers, i.e. milites, and joined them with the militia
forces for the defense of Rome. The milites formed the proper army of the
city of Rome (exercitus Romanae urbis) and not only helped to provide for
the local defense but also undertook offensive military operations.83 These
milites of the Roman exercitus, however, also should be thought of as sol-
dier-citizens. In the course of generations, they had taken on many of the
characteristics of the civilian population by engaging in a variety of urban
business enterprises as well as farming and viticulture.84 Indeed, this pro-
cess of turning the regular army into a force of soldier-farmers and sol-
diers-urbanites was well underway during the later Roman Empire and
merely continued apace in Romes successor states.85 It is not unfair to
see the regular soldiers of Romes successor states in the West as inferior
to the professional soldiers who were under arms prior to the later
5th century.
The stipendium that was paid to the milites of the Roman exercitus in
the 8th century was sufficiently attractive, however, even to encourage sol-
diers to have their underage sons, or pueri, registered on the military rolls.
In addition, it appears to have been common for old men, or senes, to
remain on the payroll even after their military effectiveness likely had long
passed.86 It may be observed, in general, that in the rank and file of an
army, neither underage boys nor old men contributed very much in a posi-
tive vein to military effectiveness even when the enthusiasm of youth and
the experience of old age have been duly considered. In a military context,
however, it is important to note that the term puer not only was used
for boys, who, as in the present case, were underage, but also for servile
82Bachrach, Imperial Walled Cities, pp. 192218.

83V. Stephani III, ch. 14.
84T.S. Brown, Gentlemen and Officers: Imperial Administration and Aristocratic Power in
byzantine Italy A.D. 554800 (Rome, 1984), esp. pp. 82108.
85Bachrach, Recruitment, pp. 5563.
86V. Severini, ch. 2. This was already a problem in ca. 640 when pueri and senes are
described as a part of the army of Rome. For the registration during the later Roman empire
of pueri, who were destined to be officers and, thus, were assigned to the schola at Rome for
training, on the rolls of the Roman army, see Frank, Schola Palatinae, pp. 168175; and the
further discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, The Education of the Officer Corps in the fifth
and sixth centuries, in La noblesse romaine et les chefs barbares du IIIe au VIIIe sicle, ed.
Franoise Vallet and Michel Kazanski (Paris, 1995), 713. N.b. The military training of youth
at the courts of the Merovingian kings, who were being groomed for military officia, began
after pueritia.
dependents, i.e. as a synonym for servi, such as those, discussed above,

who had been honored with vassalage.87
In addition to the forces of Rome itself, Christopher levied fighting men
from throughout the Republic of St. Peter.88 Specific forces are mentioned,
for example, as having been drawn from Tuscia, Campania, and the duchy
of Perugia; it is probable that others also answered the primicerius call to
arms.89 These likely were select levies, i.e. a combination of regular troops
(milites) and militia men (citizen-soldiers), who possessed the economic
means to participate in expeditio. These forces were mobilized from the
civitates of the hinterland of the papal state to serve outside their home
districts. In addition to these troops, Christopher had under arms the citi-
zen militia and exercitus of the city of Rome, discussed above. All of these
troops taken together likely permitted Christopher to think positively
about defending the walls of Rome, if necessary, against Desiderius while
awaiting the army which Carloman was to send from the north.90
The massive walls of the city of Rome, which ranged in height from fif-
teen to twenty meters, had been fitted with galleries. These provided inte-
rior lines of movement that made the rapid dispatch of troops for the
defense from one part of the circuit to another, in an ostensibly protected
situation, far more expeditious than could be achieved outside the walls
by any besieging force. In addition, the walls were strengthened by hun-
dreds of towers, which made it possible for the defenders to take advan-
tage of overlapping fields of fire with both artillery and hand-held missile
weapons. Finally, Romes many gates, which were intrinsically the most
vulnerable part of the defenses, were heavily fortified with complex tower
87See the discussion by Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, esp. pp. 5052,
6465, 7273.
88Creontius, Annales, an. 771, has Christopher levying troops from omnes urbes that
were still subject to the Roman Empire. Although the author of this source, who served at
the Bavarian ducal court, may be seen to have pro-Lombard sympathies because Duke
Tassilo was married to King Desiderius daughter, he nevertheless refers to Christopher as
a prudentissimus vir and would appear to legitimize the primercerius actions in calling up
the various armed forces, discussed above, by referring to him as praefectum caesareum,
i.e. imperial governor.
89V. Stephani III, ch. 28. The use of the phrase multitudo populi surely is intended to
indicate a general levy as contrasted simply to an exercitus composed of regular soldiers,
i.e. milites. The terminology in ch. 28 should be compared to the usage in ch. 14, where one
finds the phrase universus exercitus Romanae urbis seu Tuscie et Campanie. This latter
force is described as being comprised of units called cunei militum. Cf. Patlagean, Les
armes, esp. pp. 4446.
90Regarding the belief at the time that Desiderius intended to attack Rome, see
V. Stephani III, ch. 28; and Creontius, Annales, an. 771.
168 chapter two
systems. They had been improved during the later empire by being sub-
stantially narrowed.91 Christopher, who was not unaware of the vulnera-
bility of the gates, is reported to have had some of them blocked up with
masonry.92
Laying siege to Rome, to say nothing of actually capturing the city, was
a monumental military task. When Romes walls were manned by a suffi-
ciently large number of dedicated defenders, the immense size and solid-
ity of the defenses made them very difficult to take by storm. Scaling
ladders at even fifteen meters was exceptionally unwieldy, both because of
their length and weight, and because the construction of proper siege tow-
ers was a long and difficult process. Knocking breaches in the walls with
battering rams also was difficult and time-consuming, both because of the
walls thickness and their ashlar construction. The vast length of the
defended circuit, with its many gates, also made the city difficult to besiege
effectively. A very large army was required merely to gird the enceinte with
troops. Even more troops and laborers were required if the besieging force
were to vallate the walls of Rome so that supplies to the city could be effec-
tively cut off for a lengthy period of time. In addition, the besieging forces
required regular logistical support to sustain a large force for a lengthy
period of time.
Likely in April or early in May, when Desiderius is thought already to
have been in the environs of Rome for more than a month, Dodo finally
arrived with his army from Francia. As the head of this army, Dodo was
admitted into the city by Christopher without incident.93 So far as can be
ascertained, Desiderius did nothing to inhibit the entrance of Dodos
forces into Rome. It appears that the Lombard king was trying to avoid a
casus belli, which would enable Carloman to claim that his forces had
been attacked by the Lombards while they were carrying out the obliga-
tions that had been ordered by the patricius Romanorum. It would seem
that the Lombard monarch even may have sought to avoid killing any of
the Frankish troops who had been sent from the regnum Francorum
regardless of their affiliation. Dead Franks could well result in suits for
91Ian A. Richmond, The City Wall of Imperial Rome (Oxford, 1930), remains basic con-
cerning the defenses of Rome. A very brief but nevertheless very useful summary of the
state of knowledge concerning Romes defenses is available in Malcolm Todd, The Walls of
Rome (Totowa, N.J., 1978).
92V. Stephani III, ch. 28. Cf. Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 320321, who fails to appreciate the mag-
nitude of the effort required to make major fortifications ready for defense.
93Regarding Dodo and his forces, see CC., no. 48. Neither V. Stephani III, ch. 28, nor
Creontius, Annales, an. 771, mentions Dodos army.
monetary compensation by their relatives in the north, and, thus, create

the basis for yet another cause for war.94 Finally, it must be remembered
that some if not many Frankish magnates probably still entertained pro-
Lombard sympathies, and Desiderius likely saw no value in alienating
such men.
Christophers authority throughout the Roman state is well-illustrated
by the willingness of the various officials, who commanded the levies
drawn from various civitates beyond Rome itself, to respond to his mobili-
zation orders. Indeed, many of these civitates were located well beyond
the environs of the papal city, and, as discussed above, they nevertheless,
came to the defense of Saint Peters Republic. For example, the force of
select levies mustered from Perugia, more than 160 kilometers to the
north, were, in the best case, a five- or six-day march from the papal city.95
Such a rapid pace is based upon the assumption that this force was using
packhorses rather than wagons or carts to carry its supplies. In addition, it
assumes that the men of Perugia were committed to maintaining their
ability to fight on horseback throughout the march along the Via Amarina,
the military road built in the late 6th century to connect Rome with the
northeast.96
The primicerius position was sustained within the city itself, by Duke
Gratiosus, his son-in-law, who commanded the army of Rome. This force
was organized for defensive purposes, as seen above, from two basic units:
the urban militia and the exercitus urbis comprised of milites, i.e. profes-
sional soldiers. In light of contemporary technology, one man was required
to defend approximately each 1.3 meters of wall.97 Thus, the 18-kilometer
94It is possible, but highly unlikely, that Dodo was sent with his force to Rome during
the summer of 770, i.e. in the wake of Pope Stephens letter (CC. no. 45), which recognized
Carloman as papal protector and threatened to anathematize Charlemagne, but before the
pontiff accepted the agreements that had been negotiated by Bertranda (CC. no. 46).
However, Pope Stephen provides Carloman with deniability for Dodos actions (CC. no.
48) and, thus obviously does not want to alienate the king. See the discussion by Lintzel,
Karl der Grosse, pp. 2225; followed, in general, by Bertolini, Roma di Fronte a Bisanzio,
p. 652.
95Concerning the logistics involved here, see Bachrach, Animals and Warfare,
pp. 507551.
96Concerning this military road, which replaced the Via Flaminia as a strategically pro-
tected route, see Charles Diehl, Etudes sur ladministration byzantine dans lexarchat de
Ravenne, 568751 (Paris, 1888), pp. 6869.
97See Bernard S. Bachrach and Rutherford Aris, Military Technology and Garrison
Organization: Some Observations on Anglo-Saxon Military Thinking in Light of the
Burghal Hidage, Technology and Culture, 31 (1990), 117; and reprinted in Bernard S.
Bachrach, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002), with
the same pagination.
170 chapter two
perimeter walls which surrounded the city required somewhat fewer than
14,000 able-bodied men for their defense. In light of the order of magni-
tude of the population of Rome during the latter part of the 8th century,
there were likely some 20,000 to 30,000 able-bodied men living within the
walls and in the environs of the city, i.e. a 20-kilometer radius, who were
between about 15 and 55 years of age and, therefore, were able to perform
military service in the militia for a variety of locally-based defensive
assignments.98
The army of Rome drew personnel, in part, from those able-bodied
inhabitants of the city and, indeed, from small landowners established
throughout the papal state who possessed sufficient wealth to be able to
afford to campaign for several months at their own expense.99 In addition,
98Santo Mazzarino, Aspetti sociali de IV secolo (Rome, 1951), pp. 230238, estimates the
population of Rome at the end of the 4th century to have been a bit less than one million,
or approximately the same order of magnitude as during the reign of Augustus (27 B.C.-
A.D. 14). Richard Krautheimer, Rome: Profile of a city, 3121308 (Princeton, 1980), pp. 291292,
estimates the population of the city ca. 600 at about 90,000. However, Jean Durliat, De la
ville antique la ville byzantine: Le problme des subsistances (Rome, 1990), pp. 159160, sees
a figure no lower than 50,000 but would seem to believe that 90,000 is too high. See also
Neil Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne: An Archaeology of Italy, ad 300800
(Aldershot, 2006), pp. 6771, for a review of the literature dealing with the period to ca. 600.
If Krautheimers estimates, which seem to be among the most optimistic, are used, there
would have been a population decrease of about ninety per cent or 900,000 in the course
of two centuries. While such demographic catastrophes may perhaps have taken place in
the history of the medieval West, one would be hard put to document such losses even dur-
ing the high point of the black death in England in the course of the Hundred Years War.
What is important in the present context, however, is that there is widespread agree-
ment that the 8th century saw immense economic growth within Rome. See, for example,
Paolo Delogu, The Rebirth of Rome in the 8th and 9th Centuries, in Rebirth of Towns in the
West, A.D. 7001050, ed. R. Hodges and B. Hobley (London, 1988), 3242; and Thomas Noble,
Paradoxes and Possibilities in the Sources for Roman Society in the Early Middle Ages, in
Early Medieval Rome and the Christian West: Essays in Honour of Donald A. Bullough, ed.
Julia M.H. Smith (Leiden-Boston-Kln, 2000), 5583, who sees the take-off period during
the papacy of Gregory II (715731). By contrast, R. Coates-Stephens, Dark Age Architecture
in Rome, Proceedings of the British School in Rome 95 (1997), 117232, working from recent
archaeological work, has suggested that scholars have remained too long under the influ-
ence of Krautheimers view that the 7th century was a period of weakness and decline. As
a result of new work, Coates-Stephens sees a pattern of population growth already in the
7th century.
99V. Theodori, ch. 1, would seem to be referring to those elements of the local levies that
were capable of expeditionary service. These men initially had operated well beyond their
own walled cities where they now were taking the oath required of them by Maurice. The
later reference to these same men, who took the oath, (ch. 2) as the omnem exercitum
Italiam and as the exercitus Romanus does not contradict this interpretation because
Donus, the magister militum, is seen to lead the regular army (exercitus) against this force
of levies. Indeed, the rather unmilitary behavior of Maurices levies, when confronted by
Donus exercitus, would seem to confirm the above interpretation of the former as militia
troops.
the magnates, who dwelled within the Roman state, were expected to
bring their personal military households to fight beyond the boundaries of
their local districts when called upon by the pope or his surrogate. Finally,
it is likely that troops also were drawn from the newly developed domus
cultae, i.e. military colonies established on papal lands.100 During the
spring of 771, Christopher mustered a very substantial army for his
defense of Rome. It consisted of the select levies of Tuscia, Perugia, and
Campania (and also perhaps other regions not mentioned in the sources),
a Carolingian army under the command of Carlomans missus Dodo, and
the Roman army led by Duke Gratiosus, which included both the milites
and the citizen militia of Rome.101
Desiderius appears, on the basis of hindsight, merely to have been lurk-
ing in the neighborhood of Rome with his substantial exercitus. This force,
however, would seem to have been sufficiently formidable to deter
V. Zachariai III, ch. 3, collectoque generaliter exercitu ducatus Romani obviously refers
to a force which includes expeditionary levies as well as that part of the exercitus com-
posed of milites. This impression is strengthened by comments concerning the great size of
this force. V. Stephani II, ch. 50, talks of plures exercitus Romanorum, which may be an
allusion to the various parts of the Roman army, composed of milites, expeditionary levies,
and perhaps the troops based at the newly developed domuscultae (see below).
V. Gregorii II, ch. 7, calls attention to the expeditionary elements of the citizen levy from
Naples operating at Cumae; ch. 17, deals with the military operations threatened by omnes
Pentapolenses atque Venetiarum exercita; the reference to the exercitus in ch. 23 may well
also include levies. Regarding these general levies, see also V. Hadriani, ch. 25, universum
populum Tusciae, Campaniae et ducatus Perusini et aliquantos de civitatibus Pentapoleos.
N.b See the curious episode of the dux Toto and his brothers (V. Stephani III, ch. 3), who
aggregantes tam ex eadem Nepesina quamque ex aliis Tusciae civitatibus multitudinem
exercitus atque catervam rusticorum advanced on Rome. Note also ch. 7, where expedi-
tionary levies from Rieti and Forcona join with a Lombard force to advance on Rome.
100The domuscultae are first attested in the pontificate of Zacharias (V. Zachariai, chs.
25, 26) where at least four and perhaps five are mentioned. These were large agrarian
estates established as military colonies whose soldier-farmers-or, perhaps more accu-
rately, farmer-soldierswere placed under the superista, who was an official in the popes
government. The literary evidence provided by V. Zachariai, above, and V. Hadriani I, chs.
54, 55, 63, 76, 77, is augmented by archaeological research: see, for example, the useful
articles by Philip J. Jones, LItalia agraria nellalto medioevi: Problemi di cronologia e di
continuit, SSCI, 13 (Spoleto, 1966), 5792; and Chris Wickham, Historical Aspects of
medieval South Eturia, in Papers in Italian Archaeology, I, ed. H. Mck. Blake, T.W. Potter,
and D.W. Whitehouse (Oxford,, 1978), 4:373390. For background, see the discussion by
Ludo M. Hartmann, Grundherrschaft und Bureaukratie im Kirchenstaat vom 8. bis zum
10. Jahrhundert, Vieteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichte, 7 (1907), 147, 151152;
Peter Partner, Notes on the Lands of the Roman Church in the Early Middle Ages, Papers
of the British School at Rome, 34 (1966), 6877; and Noble, The Republic, pp. 246249, who
appreciates the military importance of these installations, as does David Whitehouse, Sedi
medievali nella campagna romana; La domusculta e il villagio fortificato, Quarderni
storici, 24 (1973), 864876.
101Regarding Gratiosus, see Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 117, 129, 142,
172 chapter two
Christopher and his supporters from seeking to meet the Lombard army in
battle in the open field. In addition, Christopher concluded that the city
was in danger of being placed under a formal siege or perhaps even threat-
ened by a direct attack on the gates and/or the walls. He responded accord-
ingly with pragmatic defensive measures. An all-out attack on Romes
walls by Desiderius might plausibly have been defended in the propa-
ganda wars of the time as a justified military operation. To make such pro-
paganda effective, it would have been necessary to have the view bruited
about publicly that the Lombard king was making an attempt to save Pope
Stephen from Christophers clutches. The Lombard king would also have
to make it clear that his actions were in accord with the tripartite agree-
ment that had been negotiated during the summer of 770, and therefore
sanctioned by Charlemagne, who was a patricius Romanorum.
Desiderius certainly would have required a force of some 40,00050,000
effectives in order to be able successfully to storm the walls of Rome if the
city were vigorously defended in a well-organized effort by a force of some
10,000 to 15,000 dedicated citizen-soldiers and soldier-citizens.102
Desiderius ability in the early spring of 771 to put a force of this order of
magnitude into the field is unlikely, even though the tripartite alliance
with Charlemagne and the Papacy had substantially enhanced his posi-
tion as ruler of the Lombards. The marriage between Charlemagne and
Gerperga certainly left the impression among the Lombard dukes that
Desiderius could now depend upon Frankish aid. It may be concluded,
therefore, that few, if any, Lombard dukes or counts were likely to reject or
ignore his summons to raise their locally-based expeditionary forces for a
campaign against Rome.103
102Calculations made regarding the effectiveness of early medieval weapons, particu-

larly the bow and arrow, make it clear that a besieging force which enjoyed less than a
four-to-one manpower superiority over the defenders had little or no hope of taking forti-
fications by storm if a vigorous and well-organized defense were mounted. See Bachrach
and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117.
103There is considerable controversy regarding Lombard military organization and its
impact on the Carolingian period. Two works have gained considerable acceptance,
although they are not in complete agreement. See Giovanni Tabacco, I Liberi del Re
nellitalia carolingia e post-carolingia (Spoleto, 1966); and Ottorino Bertolini, Ordinamenti
Militari et strutture sociali dei Longobardi in Italia, in SSCI, 15 (Spoleto, 1968), 429607.
Both scholars review and critique previous works. It seems to me that there emerges from
these studies the view that expeditio, i.e. service in the host for offensive operations, was a
publica functio that was owed by all free men who possessed sufficient landed resources to
support themselves while on campaign. Those men of Lombard legal identity are generally
called armanni in documents of a juridical nature. The term execartales would seem to be
more ambiguous. Regarding Lombard military forces in this context, see also Pierre
The equipment appropriate to execute a siege of great Roman walled

cities had been available to Lombard commanders from the later 6th cen-
tury onward. They also had long demonstrated the ability to organize the
logistical support that was required to feed an exercitus of substantial size
for an extended period of time. Most recently, as seen in the perspective of
decision makers ca. 771, the siege of Rome mounted in 756 had demon-
strated both the ability of the Lombard king to mobilize a very large army
and to provide it with logistical support. It is important to note also that
Desiderius may have been able to muster Byzantine naval support, as had
been done in 757 for the campaign against Beneventum.104 With Byzantine
ships, Desiderius could bring supplies up the Tiber to his own troops. At
the same time, these ships would be able to interdict supplies for Rome
that had to be brought along the same river. In short, Desiderius likely was
seen by Romes defenders to have had the potential to establish a credible
siege, even if he were unwilling to risk large numbers of casualties by
storming the walls.
As viewed from 770, there were very few occasions in recent times, as
perhaps the last centuries of the empire were considered, when the walls
of the city of Rome had been penetrated by enemy forces. For example, in
410, Alarics Visigothic forces broke through at the Porta Salaria in a night
attack.105 In 455, the Vandals entered and sacked Rome. Some argue that
the city was not even defended.106 Almost a century later, during the win-
ter of 546, Totilas Ostrogothic army entered through the Porta Asinaria.107
It is generally argued, however, that these successes were won when the
defense had been poorly prepared, or not prepared at all, and morale was
Toubert, La libert au haut Moyen Age et le problme de arimanni, Le moyen ge, LXIII
(1967), 127144. In short, the situation in the Lombard kingdom, both before and after the
Carolingian conquest, was similar, in many ways, to that throughout most of the states that
were formed within the erstwhile Roman Empire in the West. See Bachrach and Bowlus,
Heerwesen, pp. 122136. See also Bachrach, Recruitment, pp. 5563, who emphasizes
that wealth was the fundamental criterion for expeditionary military service and not eth-
nic background. For example, Romani and others served in the armed forces of the
Lombard kings in Italy from the beginning of the monarchy, at least for defensive purposes.
Indeed, could a fortress city, such as Milan, where the vast majority of the population was
composed of Romani be defended without the help of the latter? This pattern held in the
other Romano-German kingdoms of the erstwhile empire in the West.
104CC., no. 17, with the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 257258.
105See the discussion by Herwig Wolfram, History of the Goths, trans. T.J. Dunlap
(Berkeley, 1987), p. 158.
106See, for example, Christian Courtrois, Les Vandales et lAfrique (Paris, 1955),
pp. 194196.
107Procopius, B.G., III, 20; and the discussion by Todd, The Walls of Rome, p. 66.
174 chapter two
low. Perhaps most importantly, there usually was support, in the form of
treasonous behavior, by one or another group among the supposed
defenders.108
Stories about Alarics victory, Gaiserics sack of the city, and Totilas suc-
cesses surely were common knowledge throughout Italy, at least among
the educated upper classes, both Roman and Lombard. Desiderius, how-
ever, probably was even more aware of what was at issue in regard to an
attack on Rome. He was in possession of considerable accurate detail con-
cerning the winter siege of Rome that had been carried out in 756 by the
Lombard king, Aistulf. For these operations, the entire Lombard army had
been mobilized: Aistulfus generalem faciens motionem cum universo
regni sui Langobardorum populo, contra hanc Romanam advenit
urbem.109 Indeed, Pope Stephen II made clear in a letter to Pippin that
cunctus Langobardorum exercitus Tusciae partibus was attacking Rome.
Desiderius, as the Tuscan dux, undoubtedly served as one of Aistulfs sub-
commanders during the siege.110
An examination of Aistulfs siege, moreover, may provide some insight
into how Desiderius and Christopher viewed their respective prospects for
military success. Aistulfs operation had lasted more than three months.
However, nothing positive was gained for the Lombards because the
arrival in Italy of a relief army under King Pippin required the siege to be
raised.111 The important role played in the defense of Rome by Pippins
missus, Warnechar, during the early stages of Aistulfs siege probably gave
Desiderius and his advisors reason to consider the potential that
Carlomans missus, Dodo, and his army represented for the defense of the
city should either a formal siege be established or an effort be made to
storm the walls.112
Desiderius would seem to have wished to propagandize the view that
he was dealing with the city in consonance with the tripartite pact in order
to save the pope. Christopher, therefore, did not want to leave the impres-
sion that he was holding the pope against his will. Consequently, Stephen
108For treason stories, see Sozoman, Hist. bk. IX, ch. 9; and Procopius, B.V., I.2, regarding
Alaric; Procopius, B.G., bk. III.36.9, regarding Totila; and the discussion by J.B. Bury, History
of the Later Roman Empire, 2 vols. (rpt. New York, 1958), I, 183, n. 3, and II, 250, n. 13.
109V. Stephani II, ch. 41.
110CC. no. 8.
111The basic sources regarding the siege are CC., nos. 810; and V. Stephani II, chs. 42, 43.
For helpful general accounts, see Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 208218; and Bertolini, Roma di fronte
a Bisanzio, pp. 558565.
112Hodgkin, Italy, VII, 212, discusses Warnachars role.
was permitted by Christopher to leave Rome for the purpose of negotiat-

ing with Desiderius. In light of a sober assessment of the military realities
on the ground, Desiderius and Stephen agreed that main force unlikely
was to be effective and that more subtle tactics were required to break
Christophers power in the city. If control of Rome were to be returned to
the pope and the tripartite agreement preserved, it would be necessary to
undermine the primicerius command of the armed forces which had been
mobilized within the city. Military action by a Lombard army, even in the
best of circumstances, would appear to have been regarded by both
the king and the pope as far too great a risk. Conspiracy was deemed to
be the road to success.113
After conferring with Desiderius, Stephen returned to the city.
Christopher, who wanted to appear as the defender of Romanitas against
barbarian Lombard aggression, made no effort to limit the popes commu-
nications with the Lombard king. In this context, Paul Afiarta began a pro-
paganda campaign that was intended to undermine the position of the
primicerius.114 Christopher responded by leading an armed force to the
Lateran palace. However, after confronting Stephen, Christopher lost his
nerve and left the pope free once again to visit with Desiderius.115 When
Dodo ordered his troops to close the gates and to keep Stephen from reen-
tering the city, the Roman militia turned against Christopher. Duke
Gratiosus fled the city and surrendered to the pope, who was then in the
Lombard camp. Soon after, Gratiosus was followed to the Lombard camp
by Christopher and Sergius; the coup dtat had failed. The primicerius and
his son, consistent with their supposed treasonous behavior, were blinded
and the former died of his injuries.116
Dodo and his troops were permitted to leave Italy under a safe conduct
provided both by Desiderius and the pope and to return unharmed to
their homes in the north.117 Once Dodo and his army had reached the
113Bertolini, La Caduta, pp. 368372; and idem, Roma di Fronte a Bisanzio, pp. 656
659. Cf. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 128129, who seems ambivalent on the matter of
Pope Stephens role in the overthrow of Christopher. It is clear that the pope, at the least,
knew what was happening. The question at issue focuses on whether the pope was a party
to the planning before Christopher and Sergius were overthrown. Creontius, Annales, an.
771, despite his pro-Lombard bias, or perhaps because of it, thoroughly implicates Pope
Stephen in the plot to overthrow Christopher.
114Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 128129; and with greater detail, Hallenbeck, Paul
Afiarta, pp. 3354.
115V. Stephani III, ch. 29.
116Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 128129.
117CC., no. 48.
176 chapter two
Frankish kingdom, Carlomans missus reported to his principal that Pope

Stephen was intent upon maintaining the tripartite agreement. Dodo
averred that the pope was responsible for the blinding and death of
Christopher and the blinding and subsequent imprisonment of Sergius.
The pope, despite his machinations during the siege, made an obvious
effort to maintain a role for Carloman as a major figure in Italian politics.
Thus, Stephen exonerated Carloman from any oprobrium that might have
resulted from Dodos actions at Rome. Indeed, Stephen feared, perhaps as
a result of a now lost communication from Carloman, that if he were to
have his reputation or position damaged as a result of what had recently
transpired, the rex Francorum would come to Rome with his armies (cum
suis exercitibus) and deal harshly with the pope.118
By mid-summer 771, the tripartite pact that had been negotiated the
previous year by the queen mother, was still on track. Charlemagne had, at
least for the time being, secured a major position in Italy, despite the
thrust of the divisio of 768. Pope Stephen, who apparently benefited from
the elimination of Christopher and Sergius, was very much interested, as
noted above, in seeing Carloman also have a major role so as to maintain
the balance of power south of the Alps. As a result, he explicitly, though
quite tendentiously, absolved Carloman of having played a role in
Christophers plot. Dodo is depicted as having acted on his own and con-
trary to Carlomans wishes. Indeed, by blaming Dodo, the pope gave
Carloman deniability for the role he played in the plot hatched by
Christopher and Sergius. The pope reaffirmed Carlomans status as patri
cius Romanorum on a par with his brother, Charlemagne.119 As part of his
effort to maintain good relations with Carloman, there is every reason to
believe that Pope Stephen made it clear that he would be very pleased to
honor his promise, made in 770, to serve as co-father to the kings son
Pippin.120
118V. Hadriani I, ch. 5, reports the popes fears as though Stephen had personally
confided this matter to Hadrian and then the latter had related this information to the
author of the Vita.
119CC., no. 48.
120For the popes promise in this matter, see CC, no. 45.
CHAPTER THREE
THE SAXON WAR: PHASE ONE
Charlemagne, in the wake of the tripartite agreement and his marriage to

Gerperga, spent the early part of 771 waiting to see how the newly-crafted
alliance in Italy developed.1 After celebrating Christmas at Mainz, he
moved the court north into the Carolingian heartland at Herstal for the
Easter holiday. He is not reported either to have held a general assembly or
to have planned any new military operations at this time.2 However, rather
than partaking in an extended Easter celebration, he rushed off to Worms
on the Rhine, some 250 kilometers southward. There, he issued a charter
on 11 April, only four days after Easter Sunday.3 In light of this apparently
hurried visit, it is likely that Charlemagne was accompanied only by a
rather small force drawn from the presentales of his military household,
which rode hard and took advantage of the tractoria system so they could
maintain a very rapid pace by using frequent changes of horses.4
Why Charlemagne raced off to Worms at this time is not known. As
subsequent events indicate, he was to choose this old Roman fortress city
as the site for the mobilization of the army that would invade Saxony the
next year, i.e. 772.5 It may be suggested that in the spring of 771, Charlemagne
was experiencing a growing sense of confidence that the tripartite pact
was rendering the situation in Italy stable. As a result, he may have been
trying to decide whether the time was ripe to launch an invasion of Saxon
territory in the spring or early summer of 771. Easter, however, was rather
late in the year to begin planning a major military operation of this type.
One possibility is that Charlemagne hurried to Worms in order to ascer-
tain if a mobilization there could be accomplished on short notice and
1See McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 8688, who tries to explain away the comparatively
large body of evidence for Charlemagnes marriage to Gerperga.
2ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771. N.b. These Annales indicate that Charlemagne celebrated
Easter at Herstal.
3DK., I, no. 61 and cf. Bhmer and Mulbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 140.
4Ganshof, La Tractoria, pp. 6991. With regard to the speed of travel under various con-
ditions, see the useful information collected by Norbert Ohler, The Medieval Traveler, trans.
Caroline Hillier (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 97101.
5ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772.
178 chapter three
with sufficient alacrity to make possible an effective invasion of Saxon ter-

ritory later in the campaigning season of 771.
Another, and perhaps more likely, possibility for Charlemagnes rapid
journey to Worms at this time also concerns the matter of a military mobi-
lization. Following the failure of Dodos mission at Rome, Carloman had
threatened to lead an army into Italy in order to overturn the tripartite
alliance.6 If Carloman were to mobilize, then Charlemagne would have to
do so as well, and Worms was well-situated in light of the location of his
brothers Easter headquarters to the north. Whatever the reason for
Charlemagnes unusual behavior in the second week of April, it is clear
that he did not invade Saxony, he did not find it necessary to oppose
Carlomans forces in the field in order to stop them from invading Italy,
and he did not mobilize his army at Worms in the spring or early summer
of 771. In short, we may conclude that Charlemagnes hurried visit to
Worms, at the least, had been precautionary and perhaps even prepara-
tory in nature with regard to operations that were to be undertaken later
in 772. This effort, whatever its purpose, provides yet another demonstra-
tion of the kings prudence and foresight in regard to military matters even
early in his career.
Following his journey to Worms and the end of the Easter season,
Charlemagne moved his court from Herstal to Valenciennes. There, he
summoned an assembly of his magnates to meet early in the summer of
771.7 At this assembly, Charlemagne once again declined to order either a
general or a specific troop mobilization in order to undertake a major mili-
tary operation; at the least, the sources are uncharacteristically silent on
these matters.8 The court was still at Valenciennes in July 771.9 From there
Charlemagne is reported to have moved the court into winter quarters at
Attigny on the upper course of the Aisne. The sources note that he
intended to spend Christmas and the winter season of 771772 at Attigny.10
From these actions, it seems clear that the situation in Italy, arranged
through Bertrandas diplomatic efforts, was stable, but that Charlemagne
was not yet ready to commit himself to launching an invasion of Saxon
territory.
6V. Hadriani I, ch. 5.

7DK., I, no. 61 and cf. Bhmer and Mulbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 140.
8ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771.
9DK, I, no. 62 and Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 141.
10See ARF an. 771; and AE, an. 771, for the very specific reference to winter quarters
with the implication that this was very unusual so early in the year.
the saxon war: phase one179
This pattern of behavior, as seen in the context of both his father

Pippins traditional military planning and operations as well as those
undertaken by Charlemagne throughout the remainder of his reign, was
unusual.11 Some scholars have argued that the potential for hostilities
between the two brothers, despite the concordia discussed briefly above,
left them both paralyzed with regard to undertaking independent mili-
tary operations. As a result, Charlemagne and Carloman are thought to
have spent the years 770771 watching each other very closely and, conse-
quently, were unable to carry out what under normal circumstances would
be their traditional military obligations or pursue their strategies. The
image of the mongoose and the cobra comes to mind.12
There is some truth to this view, but, on the whole, as will be seen below,
it is misleading. The monistic causal mechanism attributed to Char
lemagnes actions and those of his brother, as well, is too simply formu-
lated. Charlemagnes behavior through the course of the year undoubtedly
was anomalous. Carlomans behavior also was not consistent with the pat-
tern that his father had consistently pursued over the course of his reign.
Charlemagnes choice of Attigny for his winter quarters, however, was
quite purposeful. Carloman was holding his own court at Samoussy, only
65 kilometers to the west-northwest of Attigny. Therefore, at Attigny,
Charlemagne was well-positioned not only to have Carlomans behavior
observed closely through the use of spies, but he was also able to receive
information in a timely manner concerning what was in progress at his
brothers court. In addition, Charlemagne, if necessary, could rapidly com-
municate with his brother.13 As seen above, the close proximity of the two
courts during the previous year had been a benefit to both rulers as
Bertrandas diplomatic mission to Italy developed.
In 771, however, Charlemagne was not motivated solely by supposed
personal discord with his brother. Bertranda, as we have seen above, had
arranged concordia between them, and this peace pact had been reported
to the pope, who appeared to have been satisfied. Rather than obvious
personal animosity between the two brothers at this time, Carlomans
avowed hostile policy toward Pope Stephen and his aim to destroy the
11Regarding King Pippins campaigns during the previous decade, see, for example,
Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 4450; and concerning Charlemagnes tendency
to campaign on an annual basis, see Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, 67225.
12Jarnut, Ein Bruderkampf, pp. 165176. Cf. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 7781, who
tries to diminish the supposed hostility between the two brothers.
13For Carlomans headquarters at Samoussy, see ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771.
180 chapter three
tripartite alliance likely were Charlemagnes main concerns.14 Carlomans

threats against both the pope and the alliance were credible for two rea-
sons. First, there were Carlomans arrangements with Novalesa, which
likely had been reported to Charlemagne. These provided logistical sup-
port for Carlomans army to move through the Mont Cenis pass into Italy.
Secondly, Dodos mission to Rome at the head of an army demonstrated
that Carlomans logistical arrangements had functioned effectively.
As best as the situation can be reconstructed at a remove of 1,200 years,
Carloman was irate in the wake of the failure of Christophers plans at
Rome and the report on the situation that he received following Dodos
return to court. As a result, Carloman threatened to lead his armies to
Rome in order take Pope Stephen III prisoner. His aim, as had been the
aim of Christopher and Sergius, was to destroy the tripartite alliance that
the queen mother Bertranda had negotiated the previous year.15 Since,
however, Carloman made no move to mobilize an army while at Samoussy,
Charlemagne did not find it necessary to mobilize at Worms. Rather,
Charlemagne was positioned to use his military household to interdict any
movement that his brother might make with his own military household
in the direction of Italy.
Charlemagnes hurried visit to Worms early in April, presumably in
order to ascertain the readiness of the city to host a mobilization, in fact
likely reflected a request for help from Pope Stephen to deal with
Carlomans threats.16 Such communications from Rome were frequent,
especially after Pippin and his sons had been made patricii Romanorum by
the pope and had sworn to defend papal interests. Pleas from various
popes for military aid to the Carolingian court after the establishment of
Pippin as king of the Franks in 751 usually exaggerated the Lombard
threat.17 In light of Dodos earlier military operation, Charlemagne would
have been remiss not to have taken Carlomans threat seriously. As a result,
until Charlemagne knew whether or not Carloman was going to invade
Italy, he had to be prepared to stop him should he take the road for Rome.
14Cathwulfs letter to Charlemagne (Epist. 4, 502) written following the fall of the
Lombard kingdom in 774 mentions Carlomans insidiae intended for his brother. Since
there is no corroborating evidence, it seems to me that Nelson, Making a Difference,
pp. 180181, places far too much weight on this letter in arguing that the main purpose of
the tripartite alliance was to isolate Carloman. It must be remembered that King Desiderius
initiated negotiations in regard to the alliance (CC., no. 44).
15See V. Hadriani I, ch. 5; and cf. Delaruelle, Charlemagne, p. 219.
17See, for example, CC., nos. 1, 2, 610, 13, 44, 48.
Obviously, any plans that Charlemagne may have had for the invasion of
Saxon territory at this time had to be placed on hold.
Carlomans Death
At about the same time that Carloman seems to have abandoned, or at

least delayed, the idea of invading Italy, he made the last of several well-
publicized donations to the cathedral of Rheims.18 As one document put
it, this assured his burial ad sanctos in the basilica of St. Rmi.19 With the
benefit of hindsight, this arrangement made by the king with Archbishop
Tilpinus permits the inference that Carloman probably knew that he was
seriously ill and likely too sick to lead his armies on campaign. Otherwise,
why would Carloman have chosen just this juncture at which to secure the
place of his final entombment? Carloman even may have come to believe
that he was terminally ill. As is well-documented, Carlomans supposed
sense of his demise in the very near future was unerring. He died on
4 December 771, apparently of natural causes.20
The only report of any of the symptoms presented by Carloman during
his illness suggests that he died of some sort of hemorrhage.21 This is a very
unusual cause of death for a man of Carlomans age, and suggests one of
three possible etiologies: an aneurism, a blood clot, or a peptic ulcer.22
Because of what seems to have been Carlomans rather early warning
regarding his mortality, as evidenced by his arrangements with Archbishop
Tilpinus, a peptic ulcer would appear to have been the most likely malady
to have caused his death. Both aneurisms and blood clots generally act
18Regarding the relevant acta, see DK., nos. 471, 474, 476; and Flodoard, Hist., bk II,
ch. 17 (pp. 168, 170171). See also Martina Stratmann, Die Knigs-und Privaturkunden fr
die Reimser Kirche bis gegen 900, Deutsches Archiv fr Erforschung des Mittelalters 46
(1996), 155.
19See, for example, the quotation from this charter by Flodoard, Hist., bk II, ch. 17
(pp. 170171). Concerning the royal graves, see Karl Heinrich Krger, Knigsgrabkirchen der
Franken, Angelsachsen und Langobarden bis zur Mitte des 8. Jahrhunderts. Ein historische
Katalog (Munich, 1971), p. 81.
20ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771. More important in this context is Creontius, Annales, an.
771, who, as a Bavarian, generally was hostile to Charlemagne but does not claim there was
foul play. This date is uncontested. See, for example, Becher, Charlemagne, p. 51.
21Creontius, Annales, an. 771.
22I would like to thank my frequent collaborator, Dr. Jerome Kroll, for his suggestions in
this matter. One, of course, must warn the reader that any historical diagnosis must be
speculative. From a methodological perspective, see Jerome Kroll and Bernard S. Bachrach,
Justins Madness: Weakmindedness or Organic Psychosis?, Journal of the History of
Medicine and Allied Sciences, 48 (1993), 4067.
182 chapter three
with great suddenness and give little or no warning to the victim. This was
especially the case before the advent of x-ray technology and even more
advanced medical scanning devices. By contrast, a peptic ucler, which ulti-
mately hemorrhages and causes death, generally presents with consider-
able bleeding prior to the fatal event. This bleeding would have been
evidenced by Carlomans vomiting, a distinct symptom of peptic ulcer,
and likely in his stool, as well. Over the course of several months, depend-
ing upon the severity of the loss of blood, Carloman would have become
progressively weakened. It is in this context, therefore, that we can best
understand the early arrangements made with Archbishop Tilpinus of
Rheims, noted above, by which the youthful Carloman secured his burial
ad sanctos and sought to ease the passage of his soul to heaven.23
There is reason to believe that by early or mid-October 771, Charlemagne
was aware of Carlomans illness and perhaps even aware of gossip that
people at his court thought he would die in the near future. It seems clear
that Charlemagne had ceased to focus on Carlomans threat to Italy by
October 771, if not earlier, and had begun the process of preparing for an
invasion of Saxon territory that would take place during the campaigning
season of 772. It is in this context that Charlemagne left his winter quarters
at Attigny in October and abandoned, if only temporarily, his watch on the
decline of Carlomans health. Charlemagne traveled to Longlier, about 120
kilometers to the east where he met with Abbot Sturm of Fulda.24
Abbot Sturm of Fulda
Abbot Sturm of Fulda had demonstrated both his loyalty and diplomatic
talent to Charlemagne as well as his influence in Bavaria while helping to
negotiate the tripartite alliance. In addition, Sturm was the Frankish kings
most important fidelis on the Carolingians central frontier with Saxon ter-
ritory.25 The purpose of this meeting, therefore, likely was twofold. First,
23For useful background, see Donald Bullough, Burial, Community and Belief in the
Early Medieval West, in Ideal & Reality in Frankish & Anglo-Saxon Society: Studies pre-
sented to J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, ed. Patrick Wormald with Donald Bullough & Roger Collins
(Oxford, 1983), 177201; and Frederick Paxton, Christianizing Death: The Creation of a Ritual
Process in Early Medieval Europe (Ithaca, NY, 1990).
24See DK., I, no. 63, regarding the journey to Longlier. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher,
Regesta Imperii, I, no. 142.
25Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 22 (p. 158), draws attention to Sturms meeting with Charlemagne
after the diplomatic embassy to Italy and prior to the first invasion of Saxon territory. For
the chronology of the meeting at Longlier, see DK., I, no. 63. See the discussion by Bhmer
and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 142; Lintzel, Der Quellen, pp. 130132; and cf.
Halphen, La conqute, pp. 212214.
Charlemagne wanted to receive a firsthand report with regard to the

situation in the east. This information, was, itself, twofold in nature.
Charlemagne wanted to know what the Saxons were doing on the fron-
tiers of Hesse, where the monastery of Fuldas lands bordered on enemy
territory, and on the Thuringian frontier to the south.26
Secondly, Charlemagne also likely wanted to obtain geographical and
topographical information from Sturm that would be important for his
invasion of the Saxon region. It was not without some purpose that Eigil,
Sturms biographer, chose to characterize his principal as an accomplished
explorator, the term traditionally used by later Roman authors for a mili-
tary scout or even a spy.27 Indeed, Eigil emphasizes that Sturm had a prac-
ticed eye with regard to understanding the lay of the land. He was known
to be sagax when it came to examining the hills and the flat land, i.e. the
mountains and the valleys.28
Sturm is also cast by his biographer as an expert in technology with
special regard to the management of water resources. This apparently was
the case with regard to both streams and fountains, which, as will be seen
below, were to be of importance during Charlemagnes first campaign in
Saxon territory.29 Finally, Sturm seems to have understood some of the key
methods of hydraulic engineering that had been developed by the Romans.
He is credited with having overseen the diversion of a part of the Fulda
river for the purpose of building canals to support the monasterys work-
shops, and perhaps even mills.30
Charlemagnes second reason for meeting with Sturm at Longlier, a
great many months before a major campaign was to be launched into
Saxon territory, was to confer with the abbot on the role that he and his
monastery would play in the forthcoming military operations.31 Two
points are to be noted here. First, Sturm was regarded as having significant
military abilities that were recognized by Charlemagne. Even as late as
776777, when Sturm was already an old man, Charlemagne gave the
26Abbot Sturm had various sources of information regarding the Thuringian frontier.
One of the most important would appear to have been merchants who operated along the
east-west road between this region and Mainz. See, Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 139).
27With regard to Sturm as a scout, see, Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 138); and for a second
important use of the term, see ch. 21 (p. 156).
28Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 138).
31For Charlemagnes meeting with Sturm prior to the first invasion of Saxony, see Eigil,
V.S. Sturmi, ch. 22 (p. 158). The exact dates of the meeting at Longlier are provided by DK., I,
no. 63. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 142.
184 chapter three
abbot military responsibility for the overall command of the entire Fulda
gap. Charlemagne also appointed Sturm as commander of the fortress
town of Eresburg, which was to be guarded by a strong garrison of custodes
and strengthened as well by the abbots military household (socii). As Eigil
put it, Charlemagne iussit Sturm, in Heresburc ad tuendam urbem cum
sociis suis sedere .32 Finally, Eigil leads his readers to believe that Sturm,
in addition to having considerable talent in military matters, was a first-
class administrator and a leader who was able to instill discipline when it
was needed.33 In this context, while it is clear that Eigils bias in favor of
Sturm is extensive, the accomplishments noted above do not redound to
the abbots spiritual prowess.
Of no less importance to Charlemagnes planning of this campaign into
Saxon territory was the great wealth of the monastery of Fulda. This was
evidenced most obviously by the construction of a magnificent abbey
church and numerous supporting structures.34 The monastery was able
to employ large quantities of surplus human and material resources for
construction purposes. Among the former were considerable numbers of
artisans, skilled in the craft of building in stone among other things. There
were also fossatores, who were well-trained at the digging of canals, and, as
will be seen below, the construction of a moat to protect the monastery.35
There were also highly skilled silver- and goldsmiths.36
These surplus resources accumulated by the monastery were put to
work by Sturm for the purpose of improving the church and the buildings
used to house the monks as well as the abbeys numerous workshops. Eigil
makes mention of columns being fashioned and exceptionally large
wooden beams (gradibus trabibus) being made to support new roofs.
These very large beams were probably needed because lead had been
obtained to cover the new roofs.37 In a more decorative aspect of this
building work, Sturm obtained large quantities of both gold and silver to
build a ciborium over the tomb of St. Boniface. This requium, as the local

33Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 156), discusses the administration of the monastery and
the restoration of discipline among the monks. Such abilities are transferable to military
administration and the discipline of soldiers.
34For a very helpful examination of the state of the question regarding the construction
of churches and other ecclesiastical buildings at Fulda during the period, see David
Parsons, Sites and Monuments of the Anglo-Saxon Mission in Central Germany, The
Archaeological Journal 140 (1983), 295306.
35V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 156).
36V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 156).
37V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 156).
monks called it, was fashioned by numerous highly skilled gold- and
silversmiths.38
The sources of this surplus wealth can be traced to the landed endow-
ment of Fulda. The monastery over which Sturm presided had been
founded in 744, and before the end of the 8th century a contingent of some
400 monks was resident at the mother house and its dependencies.39 The
surplus wealth discussed above was produced largely by the monasterys
vast agricultural holdings, which numbered in the neighborhood of 10,000
manses.40 These data suggest that a population of at least 40,000 men,
women, and children was dependent on the monastery.41 From a military
perspective, which is what is at issue here, the monastery, as the possessor
of some 10,000 manses, could be called upon by Charlemagne to provide
perhaps as many as 10,000 lightly-armed militia troops for expeditio in the
select levy for the purpose of an invasion of Saxon territory. Or Charlemagne
could demand various other types of better-equipped troops in lesser
quantity.42
Eigil emphasizes how greatly the Carolingian rulers, Pippin I and Char
lemagne, had benefited Fulda with massive gifts of lands and privileges.43
These gifts, and also gifts provided by Christian landowners in the sur-
rounding region, account for the vast numbers of estates that the monas-
tery had acquired during Sturms abbacy. In this account, however, Eigil
not only highlights the generosity of the Carolingians to Fulda, but also
the amicitia, which is the traditional term for a friendly alliance, between
38With regard to Bonifaces tomb, see Parsons, Sites and Monuments, pp. 303306;
and Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 156).
39Regarding the number of monks at Fulda, see two studies published in Kloster Fulda
in der Welt der Karolinger und Ottonen, ed. Gangolf Schrimpf (Frankfurt am Main, 1986):
Dieter Gruench, Die personelle Entwicklung der Klostergemeinschaft von Fulda bis zum
Jahn 1000, pp. 167168; and Werner Rsener, Die Grundherrschaft des Klosters Fulda,
p. 209, who discusses some methodological problems in arriving at accurate totals.
40See Ulrich Weidinger, Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftsstruktur des Kloster Fulda in
der Karolingerzeit (Stuttgart, 1991), p. 119, who suggests that at a barest minimum, the mon-
astery possessed 6,0007,000 manses early in Charlemagnes reign. In the 12th century the
monastery is estimated to have possessed 15,000 manses and 450,000 journales. See also
Rsener, Die Grundherrschaft, pp. 222223, regarding the number of mansi and journales,
for somewhat larger numbers.
41During the later 8th and early 9th centuries, the population of the Carolingian realm
was growing at a rate of 1 per cent a year. See Verhulst, Economic Organization, pp. 482
483, who synthesizes the views of several highly-sophisticated studies based on polyptychs
from various parts of the Carolingian empire: north, south, east, and west. At this rate of
growth, a nuclear family size in excess of four was required.
186 chapter three
Sturm and Charlemagne. By implication, this pact of friendship not only

justified but made imperative the monasterys support for Carolingian
military operations, objections which may perhaps have been posed by
pious monks to such involvement in secular matters notwithstanding.
As will be seen below, it should come as no surprise that when Char
lemagne initiated the first phase of the Saxon war, it was focused in the
area north of the monastic complex at Fulda. This is the region now identi-
fied by modern military analysts as the Fulda Gap because it provides
the best corridor in the region for operations between east and west.
Charlemagne, of course, could have had no knowledge of NATO military
strategy. However, in light of his well-established interest in the study of
ancient histories, it is important that the Romans had undertaken military
operations and built numerous fortification over the course of several
decades in the region that later became Saxon territory.44 Among the most
important Latin accounts that provided information on these operations
was Tacitus Annales, which was available at Fulda.45 Thus, the autumn of
771 was surely a propitious time for Abbot Sturm to make available the
relevant parts of Fuldas manuscript of the Annales to his king.46 This
would give Charlemagne and his Magistratus, whose staff were planning
for an invasion of Saxon territory to take place during the campaigning
season of 772, ample time to examine the text in order to see what could
be learned, in this context, from ancient history.47
One King, One Kingdom
The latter part of 771 and early 772 saw a major reorientation of the politi-
cal forces that dominated in both the regnum Francorum and in Italy fol-
lowing the death of Carloman on 4 December 771. His death would appear
44Concerning Roman operations in the region that the Saxons would later occupy, see,
for example, Colin M. Wells, The German policy of Augustus: an examination of the archaeo-
logical evidence (Oxford, 1972), pp. 163233. Regarding Charlemagnes interest in ancient
histories see, Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities, pp. 243249.
45Regarding the manuscript of Tacitus Annales, books 16, which are relevant in the
current situation, see R.J. Tarrant, Tacitus, Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin
Classics, ed. L.D. Reynolds and P.K. Marshall (Oxford, 1983), 406409; and Bernhard
Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries in the Age of Charlemagne, trans. and ed. Michael
Gorman (Cambridge, 1994), 150, 153.
46Concerning Carolingian military planning, see Bachrach, Charlemagne and the
General Staff, pp. 313357.
47With regard to Charlemagnes often discussed interest in ancient history, see Einhard,
VK, ch. 24.
to have been rather sudden although probably not unforeseen.48 In the

immediate wake of Carlomans death, his widow Gerberga fled with their
children to the court of Pope Stephen III at Rome.49 A year or so earlier,
Stephen had graciously praised and blessed Carloman, his wife, and their
children. Most importantly, in this context, was Stephens promise in writ-
ing to act as co-father to Carlomans infant son Pippin. In addition, as
noted above, the pope had forgiven Carloman for the actions undertaken
by Dodo. Pope Stephen, however, died on 24 January 772, probably shortly
after Gerberga and her party, who were in a great hurry to avoid detention
by Charlemagne, reached Rome. A new pope, Hadrian I, was elected on 9
February of the same year.50
Charlemagnes strong support for Tilpinus of Rheims following Carlo
mans death strongly suggests that the archbishop had kept him informed
regarding his brothers plans for burial at Rheims.51 In addition, as a result
of his ongoing contacts with some of Carlomans leading magnates, e.g.
their cousin Count Adalhard, it is likely that Charlemagne also had intel-
ligence from his brothers court regarding the state of the latters health.52
Fulrad, discussed above because of his expertise in Italian affairs, also ral-
lied to support Charlemagne in 771 following Carlomans death.53 Other
48ARF, an. 770; and Creontius, Annales, an. 771, a source, as noted above, associated
with the Bavarian court, which gives no hint of foul play.
49For the traditional view that Gerberga went directly to Desiderius court, see, for
example, Nelson, Making a Difference, pp. 182183. As will be seen subsequently, it is
likely that Gerberga first went to Rome in order to have Pope Stephen III fulfill his promise
to act as co-father to her young son, Pippin. Regarding this promise, see, Angenendt, Das
geistliche Bndnis, p. 64, and CC., no. 47, in nostris ulnis ex fonte baptismatis aut etiam
per adoradi chrismatis unctionem spiritalem suscipere valeamus filium; ut. eadem Deo
prosperant compaternitas gratia in medio nostrum corroberata .
50For the election, see V. Hadriani I, ch. 1.
51I do not agree with Nelson, Making a Difference, p. 181, who implies that Charlemagne
was displeased by Tilpinus behavior. Nelson relies on Flodoard, Hist., bk. II, ch. xvii, and
mentions the confirmations, but does not take note of Charlemagnes support for Tilpinus
with Pope Hadrian in obtaining the pallium for the archbishop of Rheims.
52Concerning Adalhards close relations with Charlemagne following Carlomans
death, see, ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771. Before Carlomans death, Adalhard was to be found
at Charlemagnes court giving his strong support to his cousins marriage to the Lombard
princess Gerperga. Here, I agree with the interpretation of Paschius Radbertus, Vita
Adalhardi, ch. 7, suggested by Brigitte Kasten, Adalhard von Corbie (Dsseldorf, 1986),
pp. 2425, and accepted by Nelson, Making a Difference, p. 181, n. 50. Since Adalhard
broke with Charlemagne as a result of his decision to end the marriage with Gerperga
(Kasten, loc. cit.), it is clear that this decision was made at some considerable remove after
the death of Carloman. Cf. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 8889, who argues that the dis-
solution of Charlemagnes marriage to his Lombard wife likely was not the cause of dissen-
sion between the two cousins.
53Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, p. 465.
188 chapter three
men of importance from Carlomans council named in the sources along

with Fulrad as supporting Charlemagnes policy of depriving his nephews
of their rightful inheritance are Archbishop Wilchar of Sens, the counts
Warin and Adalhard, and many other ecclesiastics and lay magnates.54
The first named Adalhard, mentioned above, was the cousin of both Char
lemagne and Carloman, i.e. the son of their paternal uncle, Bernard.55
Many of the other men in Carlomans entourage also may well have been
working with Charlemagne prior to the death of their principal. This likely
was the case among those men who favored the tripartite alliance and
efforts to maintain peace in Italy.
In addition to gaining at least the promise of overt support from many
of the most powerful men of Carlomans regnum prior to their kings death,
Charlemagne worked to take advantage of his brothers increasingly debil-
itated condition in other ways. For example, he curried favor with leading
figures in the Alamannic region, which had been given to Carloman by the
divisio of 768.56 As a result of these contacts, though rather recently wed to
Gerperga, the Lombard princess whose marriage surely had played a note-
worthy role in establishing the tripartite alliance, Charlemagne accepted
Hildegarde, a young woman of high Frankish aristocratic lineage, into his
bed as a concubine.57 She was descended from the leading family in
Alamannia, but her kin also had close connections with the Agilofing
ducal family of Bavaria, and with several of the magnate families of the
middle Rhine region.58
54ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771.

55See L. Weinrich, Wala. Graf, Mnch und Rebell (Lubeck, 1963), pp. 1112. Janet Nelson,
La famille de Charlemagne, Byzantion, 61 (1991), 194212, and reprinted with the same
pagination in Janet Nelson, Rulers and Ruling Families in Early Medieval Europe: Alfred,
Charles the Bald, and Others (Aldershot, England, 1999), 196.
56Delaruelle, Charlemagne, pp. 220221, develops the evidence for Charlemagnes
efforts to win over Carlomans magnates, but dates the process as beginning in April. This
would seem to be a bit early. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, p. 137, follows Delaruelle.
57Dating this connection is based upon dating Hildegardes death to 30 April 783 (ARF,
an. 783; and AE, an. 783), which according a charter issued by Charlemagne occurred in
anno tercio decimo coniunctionis nostrae (DK. no. 149). Thus, the joining of Charlemagne
and Hildegarde could have been as early as 30 April 771 or as late as 29 April 772. Cf. Bhmer
and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, p. 66; and Abel and Simson, Jahrbcher, I,104105, n. 5.
58See Michael Mitterauer, Karolingische Markgrafen im Sdosten: frnkische Reich
aristokratie und bayerische Stammesadel im sterreichischen Raum (Vienna, 1963), pp. 825.
Hildegarde was the daughter of a count of the Middle Rhine area named Gerold and his
wife Imma, who was a descendant of the Agilolfing duke of Alamannia named Odilo. The
consistent identification in contemporary sources of Hildegarde as Alamannian demon-
strates the dual system of descent which dominated at the time, as well as the tendency
of contemporaries to identify a person with the family of his or her ancestor of higher
status. The basic work on kinship in the regnum Francorum remains Alexander C. Murray,
In consonance with Hildegardes background and family connections,

Charlemagnes choice of this particular concubine should not be seen
solely as just one more instance of his well-documented reputation for
seeking diversity in his sex life, however well-earned it may have been.59
It is clear that with a vast spectrum of women available to him, Char
lemagnes choice of Hildegarde at a time when he was interested in
strengthening his position in Alamannia at the expense of Carloman,
should not be considered purely an accident of the heart, however beauti-
ful and well-accomplished the young lady was thought to have been by
contemporaries. It may be noted here that Hildegardes reputation in the
long term may have benefited from the negative characterization, also by
contemporaries, of Fastrada, Charlemagnes next wife.60
Immediately following Carlomans death, i.e. before the beginning of
the Christmas holidays in late December 771, a meeting was arranged
between Charlemagne and many of the dead monarchs leading support-
ers. This gathering was held at Corbny, 25 kilometers south of Samoussy
and 65 kilometers west of Attigny. Sources with a pronounced bias in favor
of Charlemagne report that at this gathering, Carlomans former support-
ers came to a consensus regarding the fate of their erstwhile kings heirs.
According to this information, it was agreed that Charlemagne was to take
control his deceased brothers regnum and be established as king over the
entire kingdom of the Franks at the expense of Carlomans sons.61
Germanic Kinship Structure; Studies in Law and Society in Antiquity and the Early Middle
Ages (Toronto, 1983).
59Concerning Charlemagnes robust reputation for excessive sexual activity, see Paul
Dutton, The Politics of Dreaming in the Carolingian Empire (Lincoln, NE, 1994), 5080.
Charlemagnes sex life was not a topic for discussion only among the Carolingians. See, for
example, S. Konecny, Die Fraue der karolingische Knigshauses (Vienna, 1976), 6162, fol-
lowed by Nelson, La famille de Charlemagne, p. 198. They see Charlemagne as a serial
monogamist who committed adultery on occasion, but they affirm that he was not a
polygamist. Cf. the less kind views of Michael Richter, Karl der Grosse und seine Ehefrauen.
Zu einigen dunkleren Seiten Karls des Grossen Anhang von Quellen des ausgehenden
achten und beginnenden neunten Jahrhunderts, in Karl der Grosse und das Erbe der
Kulturen, ed. Franz-Reiner Erkens (Berlin, 2001), 1724.
60Regarding the perhaps unwarranted negative discussion of Fastrada by contempo-
raries, see Nelson, La famille de Charlemagne, pp. 206207.
61ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771. The notion put forth in the AMP, an. 771, that these mag-
nates anointed over themselves Charlemagne, the gloriosissimus rex, as their dominus,
would seem to suggest that some sort of ceremony had been carried out at Corbny. The
term feliciter, indicating that Charlemagne had obtained the entire monarchia of the reg-
num Francorum, is to be taken to mean that there was no significant opposition. However,
the author of these Annales was notoriously biased in his efforts to see the Carolingians
and especially Charlemagne in the best possible light. See, in general, Hartmut Hofmann,
Untersuchung zur karolingische Annalistik (Bonn, 1958); Irene Haselbach, Aufstieg und
190 chapter three
Additional sources that are even more prone to exaggerate Char

lemagnes popularity, assert that these magnates anointed over them-
selves Charlemagne as their dominus. He is referred to, in this regard, as
gloriosissimus rex. This treatment of the meeting with Carlomans advisers
at Corbny, even if seriously exaggerated for propaganda purposes, per-
mits the inference that some sort of ceremony was carried out by which
Charlemagne was to be recognized as king of the entire regnum Francorum
to the detriment of his nephews supposed legitimate rights. Those
of Carlomans advisers who supported Charlemagne are characterized
with perhaps some exaggeration as representatives of the late kings
subjects.62
Early in the 9th century, it was asserted that during the council at
Corbny, Charlemagne obtained the entire monarchia, i.e. sole rule, of the
regnum Francorum. It was further asserted that this decision among
Carlomans fideles came about feliciter. This is to be understood to mean
that among Carlomans closest councilors there was no significant opposi-
tion to Charlemagnes acquisition of rule over the entire Frankish king-
dom.63 There is a tendency by modern scholars to discount this very
positive treatment of Charlemagnes coup dtat by the author of the
Annales Mettenses priores because of the bias inherent in the work as a
whole. However, the immediate and well-documented flight by Carlomans
widow Gerberga and their children from the regnum Francorum to Italy
supports the thrust of the account in these Annales. Gerbergas flight
strongly suggests that she and those who advised her were convinced that
the position of the late kings heirs had been thoroughly compromised
Herrschaft der Karolinger in der Darstellung der sogenannten Annalen Mettenses priores,
Historische Studien 412 (1970), 1208; Janet Nelson, Gender and Genre in Women Historians
of the Early Middle Ages, in LHistoriographie mdivale en Europe, ed. J.P. Jenet (Paris,
1991), 156160; and Yitzhak Hen, The Annals of Metz and the Merovingian Past, in The
Uses of the Past in the Early Middle Ages, ed. Yitzhak Hen and Michael Innis (Cambridge,
2000), 175190.
62ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771. The effusive treatment discussed above is provided by
AMP, an. 771, which, as already noted, is a thoroughly biased source. However, it must
always be remembered that a certain amount of rhetorical plausibility was required when
those who were the likely audience for the story being told were also more or less knowl-
edgeable regarding what actually had happened. Grumbling at court or in other contexts
that the author exaggerated or got it wrong would not be of much help in maintaining an
effective line of propaganda.
63AMP, an. 771, and the discussion in the previous note regarding its bias. Paul Fouracre,
Conflict, Power and Legitimation in Francia in the late Seventh and Eighth Centuries, in
Building Legitimacy: Political Discourses and forms of Legitimacy in Medieval Societies, ed.
Isabel Alfonso, Hugh Kennedy and Julio Escalona (Leiden-Boston, 2004), 326, does not
discuss this important example of how Charlemagne established his legitimacy as ruler of
the entire regnum Francorum.
within a few days of Carlomans death, if not even before the expected
passing actually took place.64
So far as can be ascertained, very few of Carlomans close advisers
remained loyal to his heirs and the queen. The Bavarian magnate Autchar,
discussed above because of his high standing at the Bavarian court and
knowledge of Italian affairs, apparently was the most influential of this
small group of loyalists. He led this party of refugees as Gerberga and her
children sought safety by going south to Italy.65 Another supporter, who
seems not to have acted immediately to abandon Carloman, was
Archbishop Tilpinus of Rheims. He looked after the interment of the late
kings body at the Basilica in Rheims as had been arranged earlier in the
year.66 It has recently been suggested that Charlemagne possibly attended
his brothers funeral, but no source mentions such an obvious act of frater-
nal piety, which, in addition, may have had some possible propaganda
value.67
Having assumed authority as king over the entirety of the regnum
Francorum, Charlemagne returned to Attigny to celebrate Christmas.68
A month later, on 24 January 772, Pope Stephen III died at Rome, and it is
likely that by late in February, Charlemagne learned of the pontiffs
death.69 It is not clear exactly when Charlemagne received information
64ARF, an. 771; and AE, an. 771 imply that Charlemagne permitted them to go but con-
sidered their journey to Italy to be pointless if not outright foolish. It is not clear whether
Charlemagne did, in fact, give his permission for Gerberga and her party to go to Italy, or
whether they slipped away in the night, so to speak, and simply were not captured despite
efforts to take them. In light of what would appear to have been Charlemagnes careful
planning of the coup dtat, which was to take place after Carlomans death, it would seem
that if the escape had been accomplished despite his efforts to stop it, then Gerberga either
had to have been very lucky or she had considerable help. As later events would seem to
suggest, Charlemagne may have erred in not having developed an effective plan to take
Carlomans sons prisoner. By contrast with AE, an. 771, AMP, an. 771, may leave the impres-
sion that Gerberga and her party fled as soon as they learned of Carlomans death, and,
thus, the inference is permitted that she believed that Charlemagne would have tried to
stop her if he had known of her plans.
66See, for example, the quotation from this charter by Flodoard, Hist., bk II, ch. 17
(pp. 170171); and Krger, Knigsgrabkirchen der Franken, p. 81.
67McKitterick, Charlemagne, p. 195.
68ARF an. 771; and AE, an. 771.
69Regarding the death of Stephen III and the election of Hadrian I, see Hallenbeck,
Pavia and Rome, pp. 140142. The travel time from Rome to Attigny or its environs, a jour-
ney of more than 1000 kilometers as the crow flies, would likely have taken more than a
week even under good winter conditions, using the Tractoria system. Exactly where
Charlemagne was during the latter part of February or early March is not at all clear.
On 13 January 772, Charlemagne was holding court at Blanzy, some 120 kilometers south-
southeast of Attigny, but clearly not on the road to Herstal where he was supposed to cel-
ebrate Easter, which fell on 29 March. See DK., I, no. 62 and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher,
192 chapter three
regarding the election of Hadrian I, Stephens successor, which took place

on 9 February of the same year.70 However, by the beginning of spring and
perhaps somewhat earlier, it is probable that Charlemagne had been made
aware of what was happening at Rome from those of his representatives
who were established at the papal see. This chronology is likely despite the
widely recognized difficulties inherent in crossing the Alps during the
winter and occasional problems with the more lengthy route by sea from
Rome to Marseilles and then by land through the Rhne-Rhine corridor to
Charlemagnes home territory in Austrasia.71
As the winter of 771772 came to an end, Charlemagne prepared once
again to move the royal court. With the approach of Easter, the household
departed from Attigny, and the court was established for the holiday cele-
brations at Herstal, in the heart of Austrasia.72 Several tentative conclu-
sions may be adduced from the establishment of the Easter court at
Herstal. First, the news from Rome and, more particularly, the election of
Hadrian as Stephens successor did not encourage Charlemagne to believe
that the situation in Italy had changed significantly. Stephen IIIs indica-
tion, a year earlier, that Desiderius was considered the popes excellentis-
simus filius apparently was still understood by Charlemagne to be policy at
Rome.73 At a broader level, the tripartite alliance was still functioning with
reasonable effectiveness despite the election of a new pope, who was
known previously either to have been in the party of Christopher and his
son Sergius or at least sympathetic to its vigorous anti-Lombard policies.74
Following upon these conclusions, it is clear that Charlemagne believed
that Desiderius, the Lombard king, was not dissatisfied with the state of
the tripartite alliance.
As far as Charlemagne was able to ascertain at this time, Pavia had no
concerns regarding the state of the Frankish kings marriage to Gerperga.75
Regesta Imperii, I, no. 143, regarding Charlemagnes whereabouts on 13 January. McKitterick,

Charlemagne, pp. 188197, provides some long-needed cautions regarding the use of the
datum clause in charters to plot the royal itinerary and to date the kings whereabouts at
any particular time.
71Concerning travel between Rome and the more northerly parts of the regnum
Francorum, see McCormack, Origins, pp. 476481.
72ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772.
73CC., no. 48.
74Noble, The Republic, pp. 127129, does not go so far as to identify Hadrian as part of
Christophers faction. He does make clear, however, that the new pope reversed Paul
Afiartas policies.
75Nelson, Making a Difference, pp. 181183, claims that Charlemagne repudiated
Gerperga in the immediate wake of Carlomans death on 4 December 771 because he no
This may seem curious to the modern reader because at about this time,
Charlemagnes concubine, Hildegarde, likely was showing signs of being
pregnant.76 It is hardly possible that Queen Gerperga was unaware of this
situation, but it seems not to have perturbed the political status quo estab-
lished by the tripartite alliance. Kings, or at least Frankish leaders, may
well have been expected to produce bastards. It surely was well-known
that Charles Martel, Charlemagnes grandfather, had produced many.77
Finally, the establishment of Charlemagnes court in the northeast sug-
gests that he was not immediately concerned regarding the fate of
Carlomans heirs, now in Italy. Nor, would it seem, was he worried by the
potential for opposition from those of Carlomans erstwhile fideles, most
of whom likely dwelled in the southeast of the regnum Francorum and
may have preferred the succession of the dead kings sons as Frankish
monarchs. Rather, at this time, Charlemagne was thinking primarily about
and, indeed was planning, an invasion of Saxon territory. As prima facie
evidence that he was not overly concerned either about the viability of the
tripartite alliance or the possible machinations of those who supported
Carlomans sons, Charlemagne did, in fact, launch his long-awaited inva-
sion of Saxon lands later in the year.78
Making War against the Saxons
It might seem odd that Charlemagne, once free of the Aquitanian annoy-
ance that had been created by Hunoalds revolt, and no longer worried by
Carlomans potential for causing trouble either in the regnum Francorum
longer needed the tripartite alliance. Such a chronology fails to explain why, as will be seen
below, Charlemagne struggled until the late spring of 773 to save the alliance. If, as Nelson
argues, the repudiation of Gerperga made Desiderius hostile to Charlemange, it must
also be explained why the Lombard king also worked to preserve the alliance for another
two years.
76See V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, regarding the reticence of the Carolingian sources to talk
about bastards who were subsequently legitimized. See Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 132133,
in regard to Einhards failure to discuss Charlemagnes childhood. N.b. Richter, Karl der
Grosse, p. 21, who believes that Hildegarde had given birth only to a daughter at this time
and that the male child mentioned in Hadrians vita, above, was not her son but Pippin the
Hunchback, the son of Charlemagnes first wife.
77See the discussion by Nelson, La famille de Charlemagne, pp. 195196, with regard
to Charles Martel.
78ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772. The invasion of the Saxon region, which finally took
place during the campaigning season of 772, was a substantial operation, as will be seen
below, and required considerable detailed planning.
194 chapter three
or in Italy, should dedicate his first major offensive military action to oper-
ations in the Saxon region. As compared with Spain, for example, to which
Charlemagnes armies had rather easy access through Aquitaine and a
newly chastened Gascon territory, the Saxon territory was a relatively
impoverished region.79 If the lure of booty were the primary motivation
for Carolingian military operations, as some modern scholars aver, the
highly developed economy of the region that came to be called Catalonia,
with its important commercial cities such as Barcelona, surely was a more
lucrative target than Saxon agricultural villages and cow pastures east of
the Rhine.80
Charlemagne, however, was not obsessed, nor even driven, by the kinds
of anthropological primitivismthe search for booty and preoccupation
with gift exchangethat so exercise some modern historians of the
Carolingian world.81 Rather, as a ruler with an obligation to defend his sub-
jects and the frontiers of his kingdom, the threat posed to his credibility as
an effective king by regular or even irregular Saxon raids into the regions
of Thuringia and the lower Rhine valley was both real and pressing. The
regnum Francorum for centuries had suffered from a chronic Saxon prob-
lem, and in regard to the late winter and early spring of 772, there is no
reason to believe that this problem had disappeared. From a purely defen-
sive perspective, attacks on the territory of the regnum Francorum by well-
trained and highly mobile Saxon forces, which ranged widely in search of
cattle, slaves, and other types of booty, were in need of Charlemagnes
attention sooner rather than later.82 Indeed, during the last years of
79For an introduction to the economy of the Saxon region, see two studies published in
The Continental Saxons From the Migration Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic
Perspective, ed. Dennis H. Green and Frank Siegmund (Woodbridge, 2003): Walter Drfler,
Rural Economy of the Continental Saxons From the Migration Period to the Tenth
Century, pp. 133148, with the literature cited there and the discussion on pp. 148157; and
Heiko Steuer, The Beginnings of Urban Economies among the Saxons, pp. 159181, with
the literature cited there and the discussion on pp. 181192. See, more broadly, idem,
Handel und Wirtschaft in der Karolingerzeit, in 799, pp. 407416. These studies make
clear that it was not until the Saxon region was integrated into the Carolingian regnum that
it began to flourish economically.
80For the oft-cited but overly simplistic plunder model based upon a primitivist view of
Carolingian society, see Reuter, Plunder and Tribute, pp. 7594. It is refuted by Bachrach,
81See the recent study by Curta, Merovingian and Carolingian Gift Giving, pp. 671
699, which greatly diminishes the importance of this primitivist gift exchange model.
82For the background, see four studies by Lintzel: Die Sachsen und die Zerstrung des
Thringerreiches, pp. 5863; Die Sachsenkrieg Chlothars I, pp. 6473; Die Tributzah
lungen, pp. 7486; and Karl Martells Sachsenkrieg, pp. 8792.
Pippins reign and the three years of his sons joint reign, Saxon armed
raiding parties apparently had been harassing territory on the Carolingian
border with relative impunity.83
In relation to a forthcoming invasion of Saxon territory, it is to be
remembered that Charlemagne had curtailed his celebration of Easter at
Herstal in early April 771 and hurried off to Worms. This former Roman
fortress city, the sources make clear, was to serve as the mustering center
for the campaign of 772. It is likely that during the visit in April of 771,
Charlemagne had carried out an inspection of the city and its environs in
order to ascertain if its facilities and administrative infrastructure were
sufficient to support the kings plans. In this context of planning the inva-
sion for 772, it will be remembered that Charlemagne met with Abbot
Sturm in October 771, likely because the monastery of Fulda would have
considerable responsibility with regard to forthcoming Carolingian mili-
tary operations in Saxon territory.84
Abbot Sturm was Charlemagnes primary representative on the central
sector of the Saxon frontier, and his monastery was very close to the pro-
jected theater of operations.85 In addition to receiving advice from Sturm,
help likely was forthcoming from the numerous military officers of consid-
erable talent and experience, whose names surface in the sources during
the early years of Charlemagnes reign. The most famous, if not the most
prudent, of these officers, was Rotlandus, i.e. the Roland of epic poetry.
However, other more successful military commanders also were available.
Among these was Charlemagnes paternal uncle, Bernard, who earlier had
taken a Saxon wife of aristocratic lineage, and obviously was in a position
to be more than nominally involved in matter east of the Rhine.86
83Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 22, would seem to refer to this early period. See Lintzel, Der
Quellen, pp. 130132, but cf. Halphen, La conqute, pp. 212214, that chs. 21 and 22 of
V.S. Sturmi are certainly not free from error and that Eigil, the author of the Vita, had a very
pronounced parti pris in favor of Sturm. However, simply because a particular author, e.g.
Eigil, makes errors on particular points and demonstrates a bias does not mean that all of
the information that he provides, therefore, is to be rejected as unreliable. In the present
case, a report of Saxon raids on the regnum Francorum during the period under discussion
should hardly be considered wildly out of character for the Saxons, given the fact that both
Pippin and Charlemagne were distracted during this period by matters in distant
Aquitaine.
84DK., I, no. 63, and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 142.
85Egil, V.S. Sturmi, chs. 21, 22, and the discussion by Lintzel, Der Quellen, pp. 130132.
Cf. Halphen, La conqute, pp. 212214.
86Concerning Bernard, see Weinrich, Wala, pp. 1112.
196 chapter three
Obtaining Intelligence
When Charlemagnes staff began to consider the formulation of a plan for

the invasion of the central border region of Saxon territory, which was to
take place during the campaigning season of 772, they had the potential to
gain access to a great abundance of information of potential military
value. Many Frankish troops had served with the various Carolingian
armies that had penetrated the frontiers of the Saxon region on at least
five and perhaps six occasions between 743 and 758. At least some of these
men had engaged the enemy in combat.87 A soldier who, for example, was
20 years of age during the campaign against the Saxons in 743, would be
less than 50 years of age in 772. Undoubtedly, at least some of the men who
took part in these campaigns were available to provide Charlemagne and
his advisers with various types of intelligence concerning the specifics of
Saxon military capabilities. Some of this information would be dated, but
other types of information, e.g. battle tactics and combat techniques,
likely were not to have changed radically in the course of three decades or
less and therefore could be considered to have considerable value.88
In addition to useful intelligence regarding military tactics and combat
techniques obtained from those who had engaged the Saxons in the past,
it was widely understood that fresh information was of great importance.
The lesson taught in the Bible, e.g. Joshua 2:17, 6:2223, regarding the
importance of gathering current intelligence surely was not lost on a man
with Charlemagnes personal interests in both military matters and the
religious significance of the Israelites as Gods chosen people earlier in
their history. In addition, many of Charlemagnes advisers shared the view
that all kinds of information valuable in secular matters could be learned
from a careful reading of Holy Scripture.89
87Fred. cont., chs. 27, 31, 35; ARF, ann. 743, 744, 747, 748, 753, 758; and AE, ann. 743, 744,
747, 748, 753, 758; Cf. Halphen, La Conqute, p. 147; and Lintzel, Die Tributzahlungen,
pp. 8386. N.b. Charles Martels campaign in 737 (Fred. cont., ch. 20) might also be included
here.
88Saxon military tactics and combat techniques, which were rather diverse, remained
constant between the pre-conquest period and the establishment of the Saxon dynasty as
rulers in Francia orientalis. See, for example, Bachrach and Bachrach, Saxon Military
Revolution, pp. 186222.
89The study of intelligence gathering and espionage during the Middle Ages in general,
and the early Middle Ages in particular, is badly in need of detailed research. For some
limited guidance, see Pamela O. Long and Alex Roland, Military Secrecy in Antiquity and
Early Medieval Europe: A Critical Reassessment, History and Technology, 11 (1994), 259
290. Regarding the use of the Bible in specific non-religious contexts, see de Jong,
Charlemagnes Church, p. 122.
There were, of course, many likely sources from which Charlemagnes

general staff, the Magistratus, could obtain information concerning
the Saxons. For example, the Carolingian administrators, who had been
charged with collecting the annual tribute of 300 horses that had been
imposed on the Westphalian group of Saxons by Pippin I in 758, surely
could be counted upon to provide to their king whatever information
they had accumulated in carrying out their duties.90 No less important
as potential sources of information were the numerous missionaries,
both Franks and Anglo-Saxons, who were sponsored by the Carolingian
government and worked among the Saxons. These men could easily
be summoned to Charlemagnes headquarters at Herstal in order to be
debriefed.91 Whatever information merchants might bring also surely was
welcomed.92
In addition to the various above-mentioned groups of people with
knowledge of the Saxons, there was also a corpus of written material at
hand that could be studied by the seniores of the Magistratus and their
clerks. Relevant officials of Charlemagnes government were in a position
to read about the Saxons in general, and about previous campaigns against
them by Frankish armies. Such accounts were to be found in older histo-
ries as well as in those written by relatively near contemporaries. As to the
former, Gregory of Tours Ten Books of History was, for example, extremely
popular. This was especially the case with regard to the six-book abridge-
ments that focused upon secular events with special attention to military
90ARF, an. 758; and AE, an. 758, record this tribute. Cf. Lintzel, Die Tributzahlungen,
pp. 8386.
91It would be an error to see the Carolingian clergy and especially missionaries in a
modern light that rigorously separates Church and State. Contemporary, i.e. modern,
Christian missionaries from the West, are known, at least on occasion, to work against the
interests of their own governments and even against those of their ecclesiastical hierar-
chies in order to pursue what some observers have come to call liberation theology. By
contrast, the Carolingian clergy was, in general, firmly under Charlemagnes control. For
the general picture of governmental control of the church by the early Carolingians, see
Ganshof, The Church and the royal power, pp. 205239.
Regarding the missionary background in Germany, see Levison, England and the
Continent; and Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish Church, pp. 143161. For a recent study of the
conversion of the Saxons during Charlemagnes reign, see John Hines, The Conversion of
the Old Saxons, in The Continental Saxons From the Migration Period to the Tenth Century:
An Ethnographic Perspective, ed. Dennis H. Green and Frank Siegmund (Woodbridge,
2003), 299310, with the literature cited there and pp. 314328, for discussion.
92Steuer, The Beginnings, pp. 159181, argues that prior to the Carolingian conquests,
the Saxon region saw rather little trade as compared to other areas of the northeast.
However, a supposed low level of commerce is not the same as no commerce at all. See
above concerning the importance of trade in the Harz Mountains.
198 chapter three
matters. Ironically, these abridgements excluded much of the religious

matter that had been so important to the bishop of Tours.93
Of no less value to Charlemagnes planners were more recent histories.
There was a high level of secular interest in history among the early
Carolingians, as evidenced even within Charlemagnes family circle itself.
Count Childebrand and his son Count Nibelung, Charlemagnes close
relatives, patronized the continuation of Fredegars Chronicle. In fact, it
is emphasized by the so-called Continuator that the above-mentioned
magnates were diligentissime in seeing that the historiam vel gesta
Francorum were written down in order to be preserved.94 It was well-
recognized that memory unaided by the written word had a tendency
to fade.95
The acquisition of information concerning ones enemies was, of
course, basic to the Western tradition in the Roman Empire with regard to
the military aspects of government. In this context, the reading of history
was thought to be one of the three fundamental ways in which would-be
officers obtained the knowledge required to command.96 Isidore of Seville
(d. 635) very likely was summarizing the traditional view held at the courts
of the empires successor states in the West when he observed that the
study of history should play an important role in training men to serve as
leaders in contemporary society.97 Indeed, as implied by Isidore, success
93See Walter Goffart, From Historiae to Historia Francorum and Back Again: Aspects of
the Textual History of Gregory of Tours, Religion, Culture, and Society in the Early Middle
Ages: Studies in Honor of Richard E. Sullivan, ed. Thomas F.X. Noble and John J. Contreni
(Kalamazoo, 1987), 5576; and reprinted in Walter Goffart, Romes Fall and After (London,
1989), pp. 255274. Like Goffart, I also tend to see the six-book version as the work of a later
editor with aims somewhat different from what Gregory intended in the ten-book
version.
94Fred. cont., ch. 34. It seems to me that vel in this context should be understood as
and. Thus, the Continuator indicates that there is a difference between historia and gesta.
95Exactly when these continuations of Fredegar were written is a matter of some
debate. See, for example, McKitterick, History and Memory, pp. 138140.
96Regarding the early medieval background, see Bachrach, The Education of the
officer corps, pp. 713; and regarding continuity into the Carolingian age, see Bachrach,
A Lying Legacy Revisited, pp. 153193.
97Isidore, Origines, I, xliii. Regarding education in the regnum Francorum during the
half-century or so prior to the accession of Charlemagne, see the very useful survey by
Pierre Rich, Education and Culture in the Barbarian West: Sixth through Eighth Centuries,
trans. John Contreni (Colombia, SC, 1976), pp. 421446, and regarding England and Italy
with which the Carolingians had considerable contact, see pp. 369399 and 399421,
respectively. Of Course, Isidores work was well-known in the regnum Francorum. See, for
example, the brief remarks on its use by the anonymous author of the Liber Historiae
Francorum as noted by Richard Gerberding, The Rise of the Carolingians and the Liber
Historiae Francorum (Oxford, 1987), pp. 24, 2627, 36.
in conducting military operations was certainly among the fundamental

criteria, if not the fundamental criterion, by which a ruler was judged by
his contemporaries.98
Saxon Political and Military Organization
From a military perspective, the most important general information

available from written sources concerning the Saxons dealt with the pecu-
liar characteristics of their government and how these aspects of their
society were reflected in their military organization. These peculiarities
are regarded to have had a significant impact both on their military com-
mand structure and the processes by which the Saxons decided to go to
war.99 Crucial to understanding the Saxon constitution, in general, and it
military capabilities in particular, are the observations by Bede (d.735),
whose Ecclesiastical History was well-known to the Carolingians, and who
wrote prior to Charlemagnes conquest of the region east of the Rhine.
Bede observed that the Old Saxons [i.e., those on the mainland] had no
king (rex) but many governors (satrapae) were established over their
gens.100
The term satrap, which is found in the Old Testament to indicate,
among other important governmental officers, a Persian provincial gover-
nor, very likely was understood in Anglo-Saxon, Bedes native language, as
an ealdorman and in Latin as a comes or perhaps, but less likely, as a dux.101
98See the discussion by Bachrach and Bachrach, The Saxon Military Revolution, pp.
186222.
99The Saxon constitution has been a subject of an immense body of research. For a
very useful and rather recent survey with extensive bibliography, see Matthias Becher, Non
enim habent regem idem Antiqui Saxones Verfassung und Ethnogenese in Sachsen
whrend des 8. Jahrhunderts, Studien zur Sachsenforschung, 12 (1999), 131.
100Bede, HE, Bk. V. ch. 10, whose observations are defended and regarded as accurate by
Hines, The Conversion, pp. 301302. Regarding the availability of Bedes history to the
Carolingians, see Bischoff, Manuscripts and Libraries, pp. 67, 96; and Donald A. Bullough,
Ethnic History and the Carolingians: an alternative reading of Paul the Deacons Historia
Langobardorum, in The Inheritance of Historiography: 350900, ed. Christopher Holdsworth
and T.P. Wiseman (Exeter, 1986), 85105 (and reprinted with some minor changes in
D.A. Bullough, Carolingian Renewal: Sources and heritage [Manchester, 1991], 97122, with
all citations to the latter), 99, 111112.
101Becher, Non enim habent regem, pp. 316, expends considerable erudition to argue
that the satraps should be considered minor kings, (Klein-)Knige. The main problem
with this argument is that none of the Merovingian or Carolingian Latin sources, to whom
terms such as regulus were well-known, use this royal terminology to describe these early
Saxon leaders. In this context, Becher does take note of the use of the term dux by the
Saxon Poet (an. 772 v. 26 ff.), but this was two generations after the completion of the con-
quest of Saxon territory by Charlemagne.
200 chapter three
If this gloss is correct, then the satrap, as the analogue of the Frankish
count, would be, in Bedes usage, the military and civil governor of a sub-
stantial administrative-territorial unit similar to the civitas or pagus in the
West. The equivalent Saxon term for the civitas or pagus was the Gau.102
It is generally agreed that the Saxons had organized approximately 100 of
these administrative units in the region that they controlled east of the
Rhine.103 A particular district in Saxon territory, which in the Merovingian
and Carolingian sources is termed a Gauas, for example, in the con-
structions Bardengau and Schwabengaumay well have been the unit
governed by a person whom Bede labeled a satrap.104
For a critical view of Bechers approach, see Ian Wood, Beyond Satraps and Ostriches:
Political and Social Structures of the Saxons in the Early Carolingian Period, in The
Continental Saxons From the Migration Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic
Perspective, ed. Dennis H. Green and Frank Siegmund (Woodbridge, 2003), 271290,
(pp. 272281 regarding social structure) with the bibliography cited there, and pp. 290297,
for discussion. Wood, Missionary Life, p. 116, summarizes much of the above-cited study
and shows that the term satrap was widely used during the Merovingian and Carolingian
period to identify various types of nobles, but never royalty. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, Bedes
Ecclesiastical History of the English People: A Historical Commentary, (Oxford,1988), p. 183,
would seem to suggest that Bede chose to use the term satrap because they [the Old
Saxons] had no king, which to an Anglo-Saxon would call for explanation. However,
acephalous societies were hardly unknown to Anglo-Saxons familiar with the Bible, e.g. the
establishment of Saul (I Samuel 8:7, 9:16, 10:1). More generally, the Merovingian Franks
early in their history, were depicted as being an acephalous society ruled by duces (Fredegar,
Chron., bk. II, ch.6, bk. III, chs. 2 and 6; and cf. LHF, ch. 4, where the Franks are ruled by
principes). Attention might also be called to a decade-long period in Lombard history dur-
ing which the duces decided that a king was unnecessary (Paul, Hist. bk. III, ch. 16).
It might be noted in this context that both the Merovingians and the Carolingians used
the term count in a flexible manner to indicate important men other than those who
were the civil and military administrators of a civitas or a pagus. See Bachrach, Merovingian
Military Organization, p. 79, and Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 911.
102The nature of pre-conquest Saxon local government is highly controversial. Thus, for
example, analogies between Saxon governmental organization at the local level prior to
the Carolingian conquest and local organization in the regnum Francorum or in the Anglo-
Saxon regna of England traditionally are rejected out of hand because both of these latter
regions once had been under Roman domination, while Saxon territory had remained free
from direct Roman imperial rule.
Secondly, the methodological problems inherent in using information generated during
the post-conquest period for the study of governmental structures prior to the conquest
also has resulted in great controversy. See, for example, Martin Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und
Stammesverband in der altschsischen Verfassung, Sachsen und Anhalt, 5 (1929), 137
and reprinted in idem, Ausgewlte Schriften, I, 263291, to which further citations will be
made. Regarding the problem of the Gau in particular, see idem, Gau, Provinz und
Stammesverband, pp. 263269.
103Eric Goldberg, Popular Revolt, Dynastic Politics, and Aristocratic Factionalism
in the Early Middle Ages: The Saxon Stellinga Reconsidered, Speculum, 70 (1995), 476477,
n. 47.
104Concerning administrative subunits, see Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und Stammesver
band pp. 263269; and Wood, Beyond Satraps and Ostriches, pp. 275276.
Bede also observes that when war was imminent, the satraps, or, at the
least, those satraps who ruled in the areas that were affected or likely to be
affected by an invasion of some sort, gathered together in what may be
considered a council of war. At this meeting, according to Bede, the satraps
had the mandate to choose a leader (dux) from among themselves by lot.
According to Bede, all the satraps who participated in such a council
agreed to obey the newly-established commander until the particular mil-
itary action for which the selection had been made came to an end. Once
the war was over, however, the dux gave up his power to command, and all
of the satraps were again equal in authority vis--vis each other.105
The viability of this process over any considerable span of time would
seem to compel the inference that each satrap was recognized by his col-
leagues, at the least, to have the requisite military knowledge, in a practi-
cal sense, to command a rather large army in the field. Likely, he was
assumed also to have had the ability to meet other concomitant responsi-
bilities that such an officium entailed, e.g. to arrange for logistical support
when necessary, to develop an effective campaign strategy, and to deploy
his troops in an appropriate tactical manner in regard to any particular
military situation that he might be required to confront. In short, a prereq-
uisite for holding the office of satrap would seem to be a respectable level
of ability in regard to military matters.
The one major question for which scholars apparently have not been
capable of providing a compelling answer is the constitutional process by
which a satrap was elevated to power in the particular Gau in which he
ruled. There is, for example, considerable debate over whether the satraps
held their positions by hereditary right or were chosen through some sort
of elective process. Those who argue for a process of selection or election
also are divided. Some believe that the free population, or elements within
the free population, of the Gau chose the satrap. Others take the position
that the satrap for each Gau was established in his position by some larger
constitutional body. Finally, yet other scholars seem to prefer an interpre-
tation that has the satrap selected through some combination of heredi-
tary right and election.106
Whatever the constitutional position of the satraps may have been, it
would seem that Bedes account, taken at face value, requires that each of
105Bede, HE, bk. V. ch. 10.

106See the recent study by Becher, Non enim habent regem, pp. 316, who leans toward
a royal explanation with hereditary implications, but cf. Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und
Stammesverband, p. 265, who sees the satrap as an official elected by an annual represen-
tative assembly.
202 chapter three
these men had well-recognized military abilities. Bedes treatment of the

subject indicates that the choice of a dux from among these local gover-
nors to lead an army mobilized from among the inhabitants of a group of
Saxon Gaue or pagi was essentially a procedure designed for the prosecu-
tion of a defensive war on a more or less large scale. In the first instance, a
conflict that called for the election of a dux should be seen to have been
perceived by contemporaries to have been of an order of magnitude which
required the cooperation of at least two satraps and their military forces.
Secondly, the apparent hurried nature of the process of selecting a dux, i.e.
choice by lot rather than on the basis of deep discussion and consensus,
leaves the impression that rather little warning had been given of the com-
ing enemy invasion. This understanding of the text would appear to be
inherent in Bedes observation satrapas qui inruente belli (my italics)
articulo aequaliter sortes .107 A phrase such as on rushing war can only
with great intellectual ingenuity be construed to mean an offensive war
planned by the satraps themselves, or by some other competent constitu-
tional body within the Saxon polity.
This interpretation of Bedes all-too-brief report on the constitution of
the mainland Saxons is complemented by an equally terse account of a
different aspect of Saxon government found in the Vita Libuini antiqua.108
Libuinus himself was an Anglo-Saxon missionary who worked among the
Saxons and died in 773. His Vita, however, was written more than a half-
century after his death, but is generally agreed to have contained a consid-
erable corpus of information that reflects a reasonably accurate view of
the Saxon constitution during Libuinus lifetime.109 Libuinus missionary
career in the service of the Carolingians, and especially that part of
107Bede, HE, Bk. V. ch. 9.

108V. Libuini antiqua, ch. 4. This part of the Vita has been the subject of immense con-
troversy. See the relatively recent and very useful review of the literature by Matthias
Springer, Was Libuins Lebensbeschreibung ber die Verfassung Sachsens wirklich sagt
oder warum man sich mit einzelnen Wrten beschftigen muss, Studien zur
Sachsenforschung, 12 (1999), 223238. The perceptive discussion of this text, both histori-
cally and historiographically, provided by H. Lwe, Entstehungszeit und Quellenwert der
Vita Lebuini, Deutsches Archiv fr Erforschung des Mittelalters, 21 (1965), 345370, is an
exceptionally useful introduction to the knotty problems surrounding the antiqua and the
immense corpus of scholarly discussion it has attracted. From Lwes discussion, the value
of the antiqua as an historical source for pre-conquest Saxony is well-defended against its
critics. Cf. Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 110111, 115117.
109Karl Brandi, Karls des Grossen Sachsenkriege, Niederschsisches Jahrbuch fr
Landesgeschichte, 10 (1933), 2952; and reprinted in Die Eingliederung der Sachsen in das
Frankenreich, ed. Walther Lammers (Darmstadt, 1970), 328, to which all further citations
will be made, at p. 4, for the date 773. See also Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 110111, 115117.
it which was spent in contact with Saxon territory, well predated Char
lemagnes conquest of the region.110 However, the surviving version of the
Vita was completed after the Carolingian conquest was an accomplished
fact. These factors require that the information provided in Libuinus
so-called Vita antiqua be treated very carefully.111
The author of the Vita reports that Saxon society in the period prior to
the Carolingian conquest was comprised of four socio-legal classes: nobi-
les, liberi, lidi, and servi.112 Of these four groups, the first three are said each
to have sent 12 men from each pagus along with their satrap to an annual
representative assembly at a place called Marklo.113 If these figures are to
be accepted, and there seems no reason for the author of Libuinus Vita
antiqua to have exaggerated, then in the neighborhood of 3,600 represen-
tatives for the 100 Gaue met at these assemblies. The meeting place, which
is generally thought to have been located in the vicinity of the Weser River,
traditionally is believed to be Marklohe (Kr. Nienburg) in Niedersachsen.114
In this account of the assembly, which also is reported to have been
attended by the satraps, three constitutional functions are adumbrated:
1) various laws of the Saxon gens were reviewed and amended as needed;
2) special types of legal cases were adjudicated; and 3) in what would
110Scholars have identified numerous personal and institutional conflicts between the
Anglo-Saxon missionaries, who worked for church reform and to convert pagans, and the
native clergy of the regnum Francorum. See, for example, Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish
Church, pp. 143161. However, from the perspective of Charles Martel, Pippin, and
Charlemagne, all of these missionaries, whether Anglo-Saxons or natives and however
diverse their efforts, were supported and often protected because they were seen to serve,
in one way or another, the long-term interests of the Carolingian house. See the discussion
by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 23, 34.
111Regarding the care with which this text must be treated, see Wood, The Missionary
Life, pp. 115117.
112V. Libuini antiqua, ch. 4. Whether these groups should be considered classes or castes
has preoccupied some scholars, but it is not of immediate importance in the present con-
text. See, for example, the discussions by Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und Stammesverband,
pp. 278279, 286287, 291; and Walther Lammers, Die Stammesbildung bei den Sachsen:
Eine Forschungsbilanz, Westflische Forschungen, 10 (1967), 2557 (republished in
Entstehung und Verfassung des Sachsenstammes, ed. Walther Lammers (Darmstadt, 1967),
pp. 301312, with the literature cited there. More recently see, Wood, Beyond Satraps and
Ostriches, pp. 281282; and Eric Goldberg, Popular Revolt, pp. 467501.
113Regarding the arrant nonsense regarding early Germanic democracy, which once
flourished in regard to this text, see the critique by Springer, Libuins Lebensbeschreibung,
pp. 223224, 228231.
114V. Libuini antiqua, ch. 4. Regarding the location of Marklo, see Joseph Prinz, Marklo,
Westfalen, 58 (1980), 323. Like much else in the history of the Saxons prior to the
Carolingian conquest, this identification is also in dispute. See, for example, Wood, Satraps
and Ostriches, pp. 277278.
204 chapter three
appear to have been a consensus building process (communi consilio), the

representatives of each pagus, reasoning together, decided whether to go
to war, i.e. to undertake an offensive war, or to stay at peace during the
forthcoming campaigning season.115
This last-mentioned constitutional prerogative of the council is of spe-
cial importance. Obviously, the councils decision to go to war or to remain
at peace was intended to bind the Saxon gens as a whole with regard to a
policy that would stand at least until the assembly met the next year. Such
a conciliar apparatus surely was concerned with the decision to commit
the gens to an offensive war. This contrasts markedly with the problem of
dealing with an on rushing war or defensive war, discussed above, in
which there is no communi consilio reported, merely the choice by lot of a
dux to lead the relevant military forces. The latter type of war not only was
defensive in nature but of an order of likely magnitude which required a
rapid and unified response by various satraps of the pagi that were at risk
due to enemy operations. No annual representative council of the type
described in the Vita Libuini antiqua could possibly deal on a regular basis
with emergency situations such as an on rushing war.
It is obvious that a policy decision by the council to stay at peace was
not binding on the satraps with regard to the defense of their districts. It is
doubtful also that if the annual council at Marklo decided that the gens as
a whole was to remain at peace for the subsequent year, such a decision
was binding upon individual satraps or other magnates who might choose
to lead the fighting men serving in their military households on raids
beyond the frontiers of Saxon territory or perhaps even against other
Saxons.116 By contrast, the decision to go to war that was made at Marklo
by the council of representatives from each Gau must be seen as a policy
that committed the Saxon gens as a whole to a unified military effort. Such
a decision, it may be presumed, was guided by the perception among the
council delegates that such action was for the benefit (utilitas) of the peo-
ple as a whole.117
From a defensive perspective, the need to establish the kind of viable
military structures at the local level that were required to protect the civi-
tas, pagus, or Gau from enemy attack hardly sets the Saxons apart in a
radical manner from other peoples both within the regnum Francorum
115V. Libuini antiqua, ch. 4. See the discussions by Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und
Stammesverband, pp. 287288.
116Cf. Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und Stammesverband, p. 269.
117Lintzel, Gau, Provinz und Stammesverband, p. 291.
and those living beyond its frontiers. Rather, it surely would have been an
oddity worthy of comment if the satraps were not able to take action in
the defense of the districts they governed in the face of an onrushing war.
Frankish counts did not require the action of the central government to
mobilize local forces for the defense of their pagi.
From an operational perspective, the question may be broached
whether defensive actions in Saxon territory, which required the coordi-
nated action of the armed forces of several Gaue and, thus, the gathering
of a council of satraps, was more cumbersome than the systems found in
Romes successor states that were established in erstwhile imperial terri-
tory. As will be seen below in regard to Charlemagnes conquest of the reg-
num Langobardourm, the existence of a monarch among the Lombards
hardly assured the maximization of military resources on a large scale for
defensive purposes. What is at issue in times of such a relatively near-term
military threat is the quality of leadership and not merely institutional
structures. The latter, nevertheless, must be regarded as indispensable.
Charlemagne and his advisers undoubtedly were well aware that, tradi-
tionally, Saxon military forces were regarded as being very dangerous and
feared by their neighbors.118 Indeed, most of the land that was considered
Saxon territory during the second half of the 8th century very likely had
been taken from the natives by military conquest.119 The Danewerke,
which blocked landward access to the Danish peninsula from Saxon terri-
tory, was built by the natives of the region in order to hinder Saxon land-
ward penetration northward. This great wall of earth, wood, and stone,
which was completed in ca. 737 at a large cost in human and material
resources, may have been responsible, at least in part, for turning Saxon
military interests more intensively toward the regnum Francorum.120 At
this time, the Saxons lacked any noteworthy naval assets which could have
made possible significant seaborne operations. Such assets would have
118Saxon military operations against Charlemagnes father and grandfather were dili-
gently recorded. See, for example, Fred. cont., chs. 27, 31, 35; ARF, ann. 743, 744, 747, 748, 753,
758; and AE, ann. 743, 744, 747, 748, 753, 758.
119See Lammers, Die Stammesbildung, pp. 312331, for a discussion of the various
views regarding how the Saxons came to control the so-called Saxon region. See also
Martin Last, Niedersachsen in der Merowinger- und Karolingerzeit, in Geschichte
Niedersachsens, ed. Hans Patze (Hildesheim, 1977), 543574; and Torsten Capelle, Die
Sachsen des frhen Mittelalters (Stuttgart, 1998), 68108.
120For the Daneverke, see James Graham-Campbell, The Viking World (London, 1980),
108109. An estimation of the building costs for this work is a desideratum. Another crucial
factor in attracting Saxon military operations against the regnum Francorum was the much
greater wealth found in the west as compared with the north.
206 chapter three
rendered the Danewerke a meaningless defensive bulwark in both strate-

gic and tactical terms.121
As observed above, the Carolingians had considerable opportunity to
become well-acquainted with the armament and tactical flexibility of the
Saxon military as it operated both offensively and defensively against the
assets of the regnum Francorum during the middle third of the 8th cen-
tury. The great mass of able-bodied Saxon males, and here it is obvious
that the lidi, i.e. the semi-free class, who are reported to have sent repre-
sentatives to the annual general assembly at Marklo, are to be included,
were lightly-armed foot soldiers. The basic weapons carried by these men
were a thrusting spear and the single-edged short sword, or seax. Some
scholars believe that the gens as a whole took its name from this latter
weapon.122 These foot soldiers, literally the rank and file, carried weapons
which were suitable for combat at close quarters by men fighting on foot
and deployed in massed groups, i.e. a phalanx or, as some scholars prefer,
a shield wall, especially when discussing the Anglo-Saxons.123
A relatively small group among the Saxons, likely elements which
served within the military households of the satraps and of other wealthy
nobiles (often called primores in the texts), was armed with double-edged
long swords. This form of armament, as contrasted to the short swords
discussed above, was not well- suited for close-order combat. Rather, the
spatha was more efficaciously wielded by mounted troops who enjoyed
sufficient freedom of movement to slash at their enemies with a fullarm
motion. These mounted troops also appear to have used a pole weapon,
which is estimated to have had a shaft of approximately two meters in
length. Its size, in the final analysis, of course, depended on the size and
strength of the man wielding it. The striking point of this so-called
121The claims by Haywood in Dark Age Naval Power regarding Saxon naval power are
seriously exaggerated, in general. However, when he admits (p. 125) that the Danewerke
was built probably to create a barrier against them [the Saxons], he implicitly recognizes
their lack of naval power.
122For a very useful, although perhaps overly general, presentation of the archaeologi-
cal evidence, see Heiko Steuer, Historische Phasen der Bewaffnung nach Aussagen der
archologischen Quellen Mittel- und Nordeuropas im ersten Jahrtausend n. Chr.,
Frhmittelalterliche Studien, 4 (1970) 348383, esp. 362366; idem,Bewaffnung und
Kriegsfhrung, pp. 310322; and Herman Westphal, Zur Bewaffnung und Ausrstung bei
Sachsen und Franken: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede am Beispiel der Sachkultur,
799, III,323327.
123See, for example, AE, an. 782; and the discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, Caballus et
Caballarius in Medieval Warfare, in The Study of Chivalry, ed. Howell Chickering and
Thomas H. Seiler (Kalamazoo, 1988), pp. 188189; and reprinted in idem, Warfare and
Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002), with the same pagination.
Flgellanze was provided with wings or balks to stop it from penetrating so

deeply into an enemy that it could not be withdrawn after wounding or
killing ones adversary.124
Both the long sword and the Flgellanze were well-suited for use in
mounted combat in combination with a shield. Saxon mounted fighting
men were armed during the course of the 8th century much like their
Carolingian contemporaries. This type of equipment, in addition, was very
similar to the way in which the Saxons were equipped as military colonists
during the later Roman Empire and in Romes successor states. The elite
fighting men had the option of fighting from the backs of their horses with
long swords and thrusting spears, or to dismount and fight in close order
on foot among the rank and file of the phalanx with their pole weapons.125
Many of these men likely also were equipped with short swords.126 When
the rider dismounted, the Saxon spear could be used for thrusting. Indeed,
during the 8th and 9th centuries, Saxon fighting men, both those who
opposed the Carolingians and those who ultimately came to serve in the
armies of Charlemagne and his successors, frequently proved to be effec-
tive soldiers, whether fighting on foot en masse or on horseback as
individuals.127
Much of the Saxon region was very well-suited for raising large numbers
of horses. The inhabitants of the Westphalian region, as noted above,
agreed in 758 to pay an annual tribute of 300 horses to Pippin. These 300
horses, if of the best type, were worth, as noted above, perhaps as much as
3,000 solidi to the Carolingian government.128 In addition, some Saxon
124With regard to these weapons, see Frauke Stein, Die Adelsgrber des achten
Jahrhunderts in Deutschland, 2 vols. (1967), vol. 1: Textband, pp. 126127, 134136; and Steuer,
Historische Phasen der Bewaffnung, pp. 362363. Cf. the critique of Steins work by
Bachrach, Charles Martel, pp. 6365. For a nuanced examination of these pole weapons,
see Christoph Steinacker, Die Flgellanze der Karolingerzeit: Jagdspiess, Fahnenlanze
oder Reiterwaffe?, in Archologie als Sozialgeschichte: Studien zu Siedlung, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft im frgeschichtlichen Mitteleuropa. Festschrisft fr Heiko Steuer zum 60
Geburtstag, ed. Sebastian Brather, Christel Bckner, and Michael Hoeper (Rahden-
Westfalia, 1999), 119126.
125Concerning shields, see Kurt Tackenberg, ber die Schutzwaffen der Karolingerzeit
und ihre Wiedergabe in Handschriften und auf Elfenbeinschnitzereien, Frhmittelalterli
che Studien, 3 (1969), 277288 and here 278287. Nb. Stein, Adelsgrber, Textband, pp. 19, 77,
calls attention to smaller shields, which Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 316, n. 56,
suggests were used by mounted troops. In general, regarding the armament of the forces of
the regnum Francorum, see Bachrach, loc. cit. pp. 98102, 174176; and Simon Coupland,
Carolingian Arms and Armor in the Ninth Century, Viator, 21 (1990), 2950.
126Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 8791. There is archaeological evidence to
suggest that at least some elite troops carried both a long sword and a short sword.
127See Bachrach and Bachrach, The Saxon Military Revolution, pp. 186222.
128Concerning the value of horses, see Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 707764.
208 chapter three
elites followed a religious practice that required the killing of fully-grown

stallions, i.e. potential or actual war horses. The corpses of these animals
then were interred in the graves of rich and important men during the
course of elaborate and costly burial rituals. These graves, which also con-
tained weapons, likely were used for erstwhile leaders and perhaps some
of the wealthier members of their military households.129 Finally, as an
index of the wide availability of horses, the pagan Saxons, unlike the
Christian Franks, were accustomed to eating horse meat and they did so to
the consternation of missionaries such as Boniface.130
The availability of a surplus of horses for tribute payments and religious
sacrifices as well as for food would seem to permit the inference that the
Saxons also possessed equines in sufficient numbers to provide mounts
for their elite troops. They may even have been able to provide horses for a
substantial part of the rank and file of the army who were accustomed to
fighting on foot.131 Large numbers of men may have been in a position to
ride to the area where a campaign was to take place in order to undertake
the military operations required of them. This, of course, was the custom
among the mainland Saxons insular neighbors, the Anglo-Saxons.132 Such
surpluses of horses may be taken to mean, as well, that the Saxons were in
a position to use pack horses in order to sustain their logistical needs.133 It
may be suggested that much of the Saxon army should be considered to
have had considerable operational mobility like their Anglo-Saxon coun-
terparts.134 The widespread use of horses for military purposes presup-
poses a functioning logistical infrastructure capable of providing needed
supplies for the stall-fed animals used by the Saxons.135
129Stein, Die Adelsgrber, pp. 126127; and Steuer, Historische Phasen, pp. 363365.
See also two studies by Judith Oexle: Merowingerzeitliche PferdebestattungenOpfer
oder Beigaben? Frhmittelalterliche Studien, 18 (1984), 122172; and Studien zu merowinger-
zeitlichen Pferdegeschirr am Beispiel der Trensen (Mainz, 1992).
130See the letter from Pope Zachary to Boniface (Epist., ed. Tangl, no. 87), which refers
to equi silvatici; this suggests an abundance of potential mounts living in the wild.
131The archaeological evidence examined by Steuer, Historische Phasen der
Bewaffnung, p. 364, would seem to permit the inference that the graves of Saxon men
indicate a high incidence of connections with horses as compared with other peoples fur-
ther to the west.
132Richard Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England (Berkeley,
1988), p. 262, n. 73, 74.
133Regarding the general practice in the Romano-German kingdoms of early medieval
Europe of classifying horses under three rubrics: 1. war horses; 2. riding horses; and 3. pack
horses, see Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 711712. Nb. the contemporary texts also
indicate the relative value of these three types of horses.
134With regard to the Anglo-Saxons, see, for example, Abels, Alfred, pp. 196198.
135The archaeological evidence suggests that these horses were stall-fed, at least to
some extent, and were not solely range-nourished. See the literature cited by Steuer,
In addition to having information concerning Saxon weaponry and an

understanding of the way in which it was most effectively deployed tacti-
cally in the field, the Carolingians had acquired considerable experience
in dealing with Saxon fortifications. In 743, for example, Carloman the
Elder, Charlemagnes uncle, took temporary control of the Saxon frontier
in the region near the confluence of the Ruhr and the Lenne rivers by cap-
turing the enemy fortress at Syburg.136 In 753, King Pippin captured the
Saxon hill fort of Iberg, about 40 kilometers southeast of the confluence of
the Hase and the Ems rivers.137 Finally, in 758, Pippins army invaded the
valley of the Lippe, and there it captured several strongholds including
Sythen, the Saxons main fortress in the central sector of their western
frontier.138 It seems reasonable to assume that the cost of constructing and
garrisoning Saxon fortifications was the responsibility of the population of
the Gau in which it was built, as there is no information that suggests that
the annual council levied taxes for such projects.
Saxon Military Demography
The number of able-bodied fighting men whom the people living in the
Saxon territory might be able to mobilize remains somewhat of a mystery.
The region itself is thought to have encompassed some 360,000 square
kilometers.139 Thus, the Saxon territory was approximately 9 times larger
than Gascony and 18 times larger than Alfreds Wessex. If the traditional
view, as noted above, is correct and the Saxon region was divided into 100
Gaue, it might be suggested that each of these administrative districts, on
average, encompassed some 3,600 square kilometers. For purposes of the
Historische Phasen, p. 363, n. 97; and also the works cited by Oexle, Merowingerzeitliche
Pferdebestattungen, pp. 122172.
136The text tradition of the ARF, an. 743, is ambiguous as to whether Carloman himself
built the stronghold at Syburg or whether he captured a Saxon fortress that was already
there. Whatever the case may have been in 743, and on balance the evidence favors the lat-
ter reading, it is clear, as will be seen below, that when Charlemagne began operations
against the Saxons in 772, the fortress at Syburg was in enemy hands. Cf. AE, an. 743. Both
of these texts confuse the position of Theodoric, concerning whom, see Fred. cont., ch. 27.
The latter provides details regarding Carlomans success in this campaign. Concerning the
campaign, see Brandi, Karl des Grossen, pp. 56.
137Fred. Cont., ch. 35; ARF, an. 753; and AE, an. 753.
138ARF, an. 758; AE, an. 758. A brief review of these efforts with citations to earlier litera-
ture is provided by Brandi, Karl des Grossen, pp. 56.
139See the estimates by Halphen, La conqute, pp. 145146; Lintzel, Die
Tributzahlungen, pp. 8286; and idem, Karl Martells Sachsenkrieg, pp. 8792.
210 chapter three
annual assembly, each Gau, as seen above, supposedly sent 36 representa-

tives to Marklo, or a total of some 3,600 men to represent the people of the
region as a whole. If each of these men represented a mere ten of their
neighbors, i.e. adult male family heads, then it can be suggested that in
excess of 36,000 able-bodied men might be mobilized for offensive mili-
tary operations by a decision of the annual assembly. Obviously, if each
man sent to the assembly represented 20 household heads then it is likely
that some 70,000 adult males would be available for military service.
In this context, one absolute figure that is generally found to be accurate is
that the rebel Widukind commanded in excess of 4,500 fighting men dur-
ing the 770s and early 780s. These 4,500 men, who were taken prisoner by
their fellow Saxons and handed over to Charlemagne, likely represented
but a small fraction of the able-bodied men in the region where they were
captured.140
The Saxon Territory
The men on Charlemagnes staff who had the responsibility for planning
the campaign of 772 commanded a considerable quantity of intelligence
from the sources discussed above. For this invasion, the planners focused
their attention on the western reaches of Westphalia immediately east of
the Weser River. As will be seen below, the aim of this campaign was to
capture the fortress of Eresburg and to destroy the Irminsul, a major, if not
the major, Saxon religious shrine. From information gathered as the result
of the military operations executed during the reign of King Pippin, mod-
ern scholars, like their Carolingian counterparts, can identify the western
frontier of the Saxon region. In the north, it began about 25 kilometers
from the mouth of the Ems River, which was controlled by the Carolingians
Frisian subjects. From the Ems, the frontier extended in an irregular man-
ner toward the south-southwest in the direction of the Rhine valley around
Bocholt.141 From there, the border turned eastward toward the foothills of
140For a spectrum of views concerning these men and their execution, see four studies:
Karl Bauer, Die Quellen fr das sogenannte Blutbad von Verden; Friedrich von Kloche,
Um das Blutbad von Verden und die Schlacht am Sntel 782; Erwin Rundnagel, Der Tag
von Verden; and Wilhelm Schmitt, Das Gericht zu Verden 782, all republished in Die
Eingliederung der Sachsen in das Frankenreich, ed. Walther Lammers (Darmstadt, 1970),
109150; 151204; 205242; 243257, respectively.
141German geographers have worked on the problem of the frontiers of Saxony for
a very long time. The sources are problematic and the methods employed to use them
often are controversial. See, for example, Karl Spruner von Merz and Heinrich T. Menke,
the Teutoburg along the upper course of the Wupper, about 40 kilometers
before it turned south-southwest to run into the Rhine. Carolingian infor-
mation regarding the Saxon southeastern frontier, available from opera-
tions undertaken by Pippin and Carloman in the 740s, indicates that after
crossing the Teutoburg, the frontier ran east along the right bank of the
Eder to within about 25 kilometers from the Carolingian stronghold at
Fritzlar.142
Previous Carolingian campaigns had focused on the Saxons western
frontier, but only in a limited manner. The Franks, as noted above, at one
or another time had taken Iburg and Syburg, which could be seen to block
the valley of the Lippe and Ruhr, respectively. However, fortifications fur-
ther to the east at Eresburg, Gaulskopf, Brunisburg, and Skidrioburg had
not been seriously threatened, much less taken, during these earlier mili-
tary operations.143 No sustained effort had been made either to punch
through the Teutoburg on a regular basis or to go around this obstacle, i.e.
through the Fulda Gap, into the heart of the central sector of the Saxon
region. Pippins operations in 753 with an immense army, as reported by
sources highly favorable to the Frankish king, may have reached Minden,
but no effort was made to establish a permanent Carolingian presence in
Saxon territory on the Weser during this campaign.144
Simply put, the early Carolingians had not chosen to sustain a strategy
aimed at taking control of land located within what the Franks would
seem generally to have recognized as Saxon territory. Charlemagnes pre-
decessors did not establish strongholds with garrisons in order to assert
direct control over either Saxon land or the people living there. With the
exception of some parts of the frontier between Thuringia and the south-
ern reaches of Saxon territory, i.e. the Germer Mark, there had been no
effort to establish a permanent Frankish military presence within any sig-
nificant part of what is estimated to have been the Saxon region.145
Handatlas fr die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, 3rd ed. (Gotha, 1880),
maps 31 and 34; Bodo Knll, Historische- Geographie Deutschlands im Mittelalter (Breslau,
1903), p. 66; and regarding the controversial eastern frontier, see Max Lipp, Das frnkische
Grenzsystem unter Karl dem Grossen (Breslau, 1892), pp. 3132, who is followed by Halphen,
La conqute, Map.
142In regard to military operations in 747, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
p. 42.
143See, Hardt, Hesse, pp. 221222.
144See Fred. Cont., ch. 35; ARF, an. 753; and AE, an. 753.
145Regarding the size of the Saxon territory, see Halphen, La conqute, pp. 145146;
Lintzel, Die Tributzahlungen, pp. 8286; and idem, Karl Martells Sachsenkrieg,
pp. 8792.
212 chapter three
A New Strategy
Prior to the initiation of the campaigning season of 772, Charlemagne

faced a significant strategic decision. Would he continue the policy toward
the Saxons that his father had followed, or would he develop a new strat-
egy of his own to deal with them? Pippins policy, or what might even be
considered a long-term early Carolingian strategy, was consistent with
that of his own father, Charles Martel, and had advanced on a double
track. In terms of what might be considered an offensive posture, at least
from the perspective of some Saxons, Pippin encouraged missionary activ-
ity with the goal of bringing about the conversion of these pagans to
Christianity through a combination of preaching and persuasion.146
In a defensive posture, Pippin and his predecessors had seen to the con-
struction of strongholds along the border with the Saxons in order to mini-
mize their threat as raiders. On the whole, however, Charlemagnes
predecessors were satisfied from time to time to take tribute from those
Saxons, who, having attacked Frankish territory, were defeated, and sued
for peace. In addition, on occasion, Pippin was willing to undertake mili-
tary action in order to support missionaries and their converts when they
were attacked by Saxon leaders who are depicted in the sources as aggres-
sive defenders of paganism. Otherwise, Carolingian military efforts against
the Saxons were largely retaliatory operations intended to punish raiders
who had attacked parts of the regnum Francorum, and to enforce the pay-
ment of tribute when relevant.147
It would appear to have been Pippins thinking, very likely influenced
by those Anglo-Saxons who bore the brunt of the missionary effort, that
the strategic emphasis should be on the gradual conversion of the
Saxons.148 This fundamentally peaceful approach, the argument went,
ultimately would bring the Saxons into the family of Christian nations.
Thus, the result would be the peaceful co-existence of the Saxons with the
Franks and the Carolingian monarchy. The Anglo-Saxon missionaries
would appear to have eschewed concerted military operations resulting in
146McKitterick, England and the Continent, pp. 7381, provides a useful introduction
to the Pippinid church and its missionary activity.
147For a general overview, see Walter Schlessinger, Zur politichen Geschichte der frn-
kischen Ostbewegung vor Karl dem Grossen, in Althessen im Frankreich, ed. Walter
Schlesinger (Sigmaringen, 1974), 963; and more specifically Schlesinger, Early medieval
fortification in Hesse, pp. 243260. See also Lintzel, Die Tributzahlungen, pp. 8286.
148Hen, Charlemagnes Jihad, pp. 4244, provides useful information regarding what
may be considered the Anglo-Saxon perspective.
conquest and what perhaps might be construed as forced conversions

both as a matter of religious conviction and perhaps also as a matter of
practical politics.149
No less important, the permanent conquest and occupation of Saxon
territory had not been a primary political aim of the early Carolingians.
King Pippin, like his father and grandfather, had a far more important
military objective upon which to focus, i.e. the reuniting of the regnum
Francorum under Carolingian rule. For example, the conquest of Aquitaine
was of primary importance during the 760s. In a very practical sense,
Pippin, like his predecessors, whether Merovingians or Carolingians,
understood very well that military campaigns on two fronts were to be
avoided when possible. Under no circumstances was a two-front offensive
strategy to be adopted as a fundamental course of action.150
Charlemagne, however, understood that after the disposal of Hunoald
and his supporters in Aquitaine and the recognition of Carolingian rule in
Gascony, the situation in the southwest of the Frankish kingdom was not
a problem. In addition, he believed that the situation in northern Italy was
stable as a result of the tripartite pact. Therefore, with no militarily press-
ing concerns to distract him from vigorous action against the Saxons, he
was in a position to depart from his fathers policy and to initiate a new
strategy in 772 that was aimed at the conquest of the region east of the
Rhine. In this context, as noted above, he was aware that this region had
once been a part of the Roman Empire.
There is, however, considerable scholarly debate concerning whether
Charlemagne decided upon a strategy of conquering the Saxon region as
early as 772 or whether this decision was made at some later date. Many
scholars believe that Charlemagnes initial campaign in 772 was merely a
raid in force intended to sustain the strategy of deterrence and punish-
ment that his father, and, indeed, his grandfather, had pursued. The sur-
vival of a considerable corpus of information which, in one way or another,
149Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish Church, pp. 155261. Cf. V. Lebuini antiqua, ch. 6, where
Lebuinus is alleged to have told the Saxons at their great council meeting, probably at
Marklo, that they could remain free if they would accept Christianity. He went on to assert
that if the Saxons did not become Christians, the neighboring king (in vicina terra rex),
here Charlemagne likely is meant, was prepared to conqueror them. This account, how-
ever, may well be tainted insofar as it was written down after the conquest of the Saxon
region by Charlemagne. It is more likely to represent Anglo-Saxon values as evidenced by
the observations by Alcuin, e.g. Epist., no. 110. See the discussion by Hen, Charlemagnes
Jihad, pp. 4244.
150Bernard S. Bachrach, Gregory of Tours as a Military Historian, in The World of
Gregory of Tours, ed. Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood (Leiden, 2002), 351363; and
Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 150.
214 chapter three
characterizes operations against the Saxons in 772 as the beginning of a

new strategy has been widely discounted. This skepticism has resulted
from some scholars belief that the court sources imposed, post hoc, the
view that Charlemagne initiated a new strategy in 772, which, in fact, was
put in place only sometime later. The purpose of this retrojection of the
initiation of a new strategy is thought by some scholars to have been
intended by the biased Carolingian sources to inflate Charlemagnes
reputation.151
It should be noted, however, that by retrojecting the beginning of
Charlemagnes strategy, the sources make clear that it took a very long
time to conquer the Saxons. Since there is a widespread agreement that
the Carolingian authors were intent upon demonstrating Charlemagnes
prowess, it should be pointed out that it would have redounded to his
credit as a military leader if they would have delayed the date of his deci-
sion to conquer the region. The imperative would have been to make
Charlemagnes campaign of conquest as short as possible. Little glory was
to be won from a long and drawn-out war of conquest, if it could have
been projected in a shorter time frame as a rapid victory.
Defending the view that Charlemagne initiated a new Saxon strategy in
772, however, does not require reliance on the supposed hindsight
deployed by the more or less biased authors of the Carolingian narrative
sources.152 Charlemagnes orders to destroy the Irminsul along with its
religious shrine and to confiscate the Saxon treasure, discussed in detail
below, were, in themselves, radical departures from traditional Carolingian
policy. The Irminsul was located in a region not far from Eresburg, that had
been easily accessible to Carolingian armies in earlier campaigns. Yet, it
had not been attacked, much less destroyed and looted. The failure of
either Charles Martel or King Pippin to destroy this shrine permits the
inference that there had been, at the least, a tacit agreement between the
Franks and the Saxons that the Irminsul was off limits.
151See, for example, Halphen, La conqut, pp. 148149. For a consensus of more recent
views along the same line of reasoning that Charlemagnes campaign in 772 was for the
purpose of Sicherung der Grenze, see Angelika Lampen, Sachsenkriege, schsischer
Widerstand und Kooperation, in 799, I, 264273, and p. 267, for the quotation.
152For this sort of hypercriticism, see Halphen, La conqut, pp. 148149; and also the
methodological critique of Halphens general approach by Bachrach, Adalhards De ordine
palatii, pp. 336. In methodological perspective, neither writing after an eventthe only
way possible for a historian to proceednor being biased is sufficient to dismiss as inaccu-
rate specific information provided in a source, despite much hyperbole in regard to these
matters to the contrary.
It is suggested here that Charlemagne understood that the destruction

and looting of the Irminsul complex would lead to a Saxon response that
was greatly different from their traditional desultory raids. This attack on
the Irminsul, therefore, was intended by Charlemagne to signal the initia-
tion of a new overall strategy that was very different from that which the
Franks previously had pursued. In addition, Charlemagnes taking posses-
sion of the fortress of Eresburg and placing a Frankish garrison there, as
well as the construction and garrisoning of a new stronghold, likely at
Herstelle, both in territory that undoubtedly belonged to the Saxons, also
are to be seen as radical departures from previous Carolingian policy.153
In this context, it must be made clear that much of the region east of the
middle and lower Rhine as far east as the Fulda river was disputed between
the Franks and the Saxons for several generations, and likely for an even
more lengthy period of time. It served as a sort of frontier no mans land. A
decade or so after Charlemagnes completion of the conquest of the Saxon
territory, Einhard, looking back upon the causes of this war of conquest,
described the situation that had existed in the long-term ante:
Scarcely a day passed when there was no incident that was not thought to
break the peace. Our borders and theirs were contiguous and nearly every-
where the country was flat and open. The only clearly defined borders were
in areas where large forests and mountain ranges separated the territories of
the two peoples. Murder, robbery, and arson were constant occurances on
both sides. Finally, the Franks concluded that these incidents had to come to
an end. Thus, they decided to give up their traditional retaliatory measures
and chose to undertake a full-scale war [of conquest] against the Saxons.154
As rex Francorum, Charlemagne understood the imperative that a new
ruler, especially in light of his recent coup dtat, was required to protect
his subjects in order to maintain his credibility. Continued and largely
unopposed Saxon raiding would demonstrate the failure of the Frankish
monarchy to protect the frontiers. In addition, the traditional Carolingian
153Hans-Dietrich Kahl, Karl der Grosse und die Sachsen, Stufen und Motive einer his-
torischen Eskalation, in Politik, Gesellschaft, Geschichtsschreibung. Giessener Festgabe fr
Frantisek Graus zum 60 Geburtstag, ed. Herbert Ludat and Rainer Christoph Schwinges
(Cologne-Vienna, 1982), 49130, would seem to have been misled by media treatment of
the then recently concluded Vietnam War. See the more useful observations regarding the
destruction of the Irminsul by Hines, The Conversion of the Saxons, p. 300, Charlemagnes
reported destruction of a central Saxon heathen sacred tree, the Irminsul (= giant pillar)
in the first year of his campaigns, 772, must surely have been more than an act of random
desecration or destruction and rather a symbolic statement of his intentions .
154VK, ch. 62. Hardt, Hesse, pp. 219232, demonstrates that the archaeological evi-
dence supports Einhards observations.
216 chapter three
defensive policy with regard to Saxon territory would greatly inhibit the
opportunity for a growing population within the Frankish kingdom to
engage in the settlement and economic development of lands eastward of
the Rhine. Finally, it was thought that a conquered Saxon people, once
absorbed into the Frankish kingdom, likely would be more easily and
more rapidly converted to Christianity than if they were to remain inde-
pendent under their pagan leaders.
Charlemagnes goal of conquering all of Saxon territory was not moti-
vated solely by contemporary security necessities, a desire for economic
development, and the expansion of Christianity. It is of importance that
the region frequently disputed between the Franks and the Saxons, dis-
cussed by Einhard, was limited largely to the territory between the Rhine
and the Weser. By contrast, the territory east of the Weser all the way to the
Elbe had been solidly under Saxon control for generations. Indeed, it had
never been Frankish territory.155 Therefore, it was of considerable impor-
tance from Charlemagnes perspective, informed by ideas of imitatio impe-
rii, that during the reign of Augustus, i.e. prior to the disaster in the
Teutoburg suffered by Varus in A.D. 9, the entire region between the Rhine
and the Elbe was considered part of the Roman Empire. Indeed, Varus was
the Roman governor charged with developing the imperial administration
in this region before he suffered defeat at the hands of Arminius, a Roman
equestrian and military officer of German descent who turned traitor to
the empire.156
Imperial conquest and claim to the region between Rhine and the Elbe
were well-documented in the various Roman histories which were avail-
able to the Carolingian court; some remain available today.157 The early
155All kinds of debates have been generated regarding such largely fruitless questions
as the identity of the Saxons and their origins. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the
contemporary and near-contemporary sources that discuss Charlemagnes military opera-
tions characterized the enemy as Saxons. See the useful tour of the horizon by Matthias
Springer, Location in Space and Time, in The Continental Saxons From the Migration
Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic Perspective, ed. Dennis H. Green and Frank
Siegmund (Woodbridge, 2003), 1123, with the literature cited there and pp. 2336, for
discussion.
156With regard to Varus mission to integrate the region between the Rhine and Elbe
into the empire following what was believed to have been a successful conquest, see Wells,
German Policy, pp. 93245. Concerning the use of Arminius as a nationalist symbol in the
post-medieval and modern era, see Richard Kuehnemund, Arminius, or The rise of a
national symbol in literature from Hutten to Grabbe (Chapel Hill, NC, 1953); and William A.
Oldfather and Howard V. Canter, The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of
Augustus, (Urbana, 1915), pp. 920.
157See Wells, German Policy, pp. 93245, for the various Latin sources at issue; and
in more detail Thomas Grane, Roman sources for the geography and ethnography of
Carolingians were attuned to developing long-term strategies. King Pippin,

as has been noted here, followed the strategy developed by his forebears
to reunify the regnum Francorum and gain control of the royal title.
Charlemagne took this strategy of unification a lengthy step further and
sought to reconstruct the empire in the West by initiating a campaign to
conquer the region as far east as the Elbe.158 As will be discussed below,
not long after what was thought to be the conquest of the Saxon region in
776, Rome recognized Charlemagne as novus Constantinus.159
Planning the Invasion
After the delays of the previous year, engendered in part by Carlomans

behavior, it is clear that Charlemagne was eager to get on with the cam-
paigning season in the spring of 772. He departed from Herstal well before
Easter Sunday, which fell on 29 April, for the royal villa at Diedenhofen,
which was almost 200 kilometers to the south.160 Diedenhofen was about
175 kilometers west of Worms, which earlier Charlemagne would seem to
have identified as an appropriate place to muster his army either for a
Saxon campaign or for a march into Italy.161 However, Charlemagne
remained at Diedenhofen throughout the month of April and into early
May.162 There, he met with several very distinguished ecclesiastics, among
other important men, before going east to take direct command of the
army of invasion. These forces had been mustered at Worms, and were
encamped there in preparation for the forthcoming invasion of the Saxon
region.163
Germania, in The Spoils of Victory: The North in the shadow of the Roman Empire, ed. Claus
von Carnap-Bornheim and Carsten U. Larsen (Copenhagen, 2003), 126147. For the avail-
ability of many of these sources to the Carolingians, see Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military
Responsibilities, pp. 244246. A useful collection of the Latin and Greek texts that treat
the Germans is provided by Joachim Herrmann, Griechische und lateinische Quellen zur
Frhgeschichte Europas, 4 vols. (Berlin, 19881991). For a fuller discussion, see below,
Chapter Eight.
158Charlemagnes efforts in this regard, which led up to his resuscitation of the empire
in the West, are treated in more detail by Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Respon
sibilities, pp. 231255.
159With regard to the novus Constantinus language, see, for example, CC., no. 60, for
Pope Hadrians usage.
160Indeed, Charlemagne was in residence at Diedenhofen by 1 April. DK., no. 66; and cf.
Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, no. 145.
161ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772, for the muster at Worms.
162DK., nos. 66, 67, 68, for Charlemagne at Diedenhofen in April and [early] May 772.
163Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, nos. 145149, who believe that
Charlemagne did not hold the muster at Worms until mid-July.
218 chapter three
Charlemagnes behavior in the present context represents a pattern of

hurry up and wait, which continues to be a very well-known phenome-
non in military circles. It was given long-term significance by the Romans,
who referred to the Emperor Augustus dictum festina lente when advocat-
ing both the need for and the desirability of deliberate action. In practical
terms, Charlemagnes delays likely were conditioned by his need to obtain
information regarding the military decisions being taken for the coming
year by the annual Saxon assembly at Marklo. If the Saxon representatives
at Marklo had intelligence that Charlemagne was planning an attack on
their territory, they would have been able to take precautionary measures
to oppose Frankish operations. The Saxon council had the capacity to
mobilize a large army.164 However, without information regarding Char
lemagnes plans, the Saxon assembly in the spring of 772, as will be seen
below, apparently declined to mobilize an ingens exercitus of its own for
military operations in order to defend against the projected Carolingian
invasion. Simply put, Charlemagne sought to disguise his intentions from
the Saxons at least until the annual meeting at Marklo had been con-
cluded and the representatives returned home to their respective pagi.
As is clear from all of the sources that treat this initial phase of the
Saxon war, it was Charlemagnes primary military objective for the cam-
paign of 772 to capture the Saxon hilltop fortress at Eresburg.165 Char
lemagnes secondary objective was the Irminsul complex, which he
intended to destroy and to loot of its extensive treasures.166 Eresburg
overlooked the Fulda gap, and thus threatened the supply lines of any
Carolingian army that intended to penetrate the interior of Saxon territory
beyond the Weser. In addition, from a logistical perspective, enemy con-
trol of Eresburg, which dominated the course of the Diemel river, meant
that Charlemagne could not use this waterway to ship supplies eastward
onto the Weser for operations deeper into the Saxon region.
By taking and garrisoning the stronghold at Eresburg, Charlemagne
would control the Fulda Gap between the Diemel and Eder rivers,
164See, for example, Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159), and below for further discussion.
165See, for example, ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772. Of course, the sources that indicate
that Charlemagnes effort was focused on the capture of the Saxon fortress at Eresburg
were written after the fact. Charlemagnes plans for the invasion itself do not survive. Any
documentation that the Carolingian planners may have developed for the invasion
undoubtedly was severely time-conditioned by the situation in 772 and, therefore, of com-
paratively little value after the event itself. By contrast, the parchment on which such infor-
mation likely would have been written down was of substantial value and could be scraped
for use in the future.
166See, for example, ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772.
ostensibly as far east as the Werra and its confluence with the Weser. He
already was in control of a substantial military complex 45 kilometers to
the south at Fritzlar, which included the major stronghold at Braburg.167
A next obvious step for the purpose of sustaining offensive operations to
the north and east would be to gain control of and to fortify a crossing
point at the confluence of the Weser and the Diemel.
From a defensive perspective, control of Eresburg provided the Caro
lingians with a strategic option, which modern scholars tend to character-
ize as making possible a defense in depth. Mobile Carolingian forces
stationed as part of a garrison at Eresburg could be positioned to identify,
if not interdict, Saxon raiders who were attempting to cross the lower
course of the Diemel. In addition, mobile troops based at the Fritzlar-
Braburg complex controlled both banks of the Eder River, 50 kilometers
west-southwest of its confluence with the Fulda. These forces could easily
move east-northeast, and in concert with troops from Eresburg, hold the
fords which Saxon raiders would have to use when returning home from
raids on Frankish territory. If the raiding forces were small enough, these
Frankish troops also might be sufficient to interdict an initial enemy
movement west of the Weser. It would be more consistent with a defense
in depth strategy, however, for the Carolingians to interdict raiders on
their homeward journey, when they would be forced to use the better
roads and to move slowly because they were laden with booty and cap-
tives. In such circumstances, the enemy would find it more difficult to
move quickly or to fight, and likely would be deprived of its gains. A pat-
tern of suffering such losses might deter future raids if the Saxons con-
cluded that such operations proved, in fact, to be futile.
In 772, Charlemagne initiated a strategy based on gaining control of the
Fulda Gap west of the Weser as a necessary prelude to the conquest of
Saxon territory further east. By contrast, previous Carolingian military
167See two studies by Norbert Wand: Die Braburgein frnkische Grossburg zum
Schutz des Edergebietes, in Fritzlar im Mittelalter: Festschrift zur 1250 Jahrfeier (Fritzlar,
1974), 4059; and Die Braburg und das Fritzlar-Waberner Becken der merowingisch-
karolingischen Zeit, in Althessen im Frankreich, ed. Walter Schlesinger (Sigmaringen,
1975), 173210; and Michael Gockel, Fritzlar und das Reich, in Fritzlar im Mittelalter:
Festschrift zur 1250 Jahrfeier (Fritzlar, 1974), 9099. I am skeptical regarding the interpreta-
tion of recent archaeological work, summarized by Joachim Henning, Civilization versus
Barbarians? fortification Techniques and Politics in the Carolingian and Ottonian
Borderlands, in Borders, Barriers, and Ethnogenesis: Frontiers in Late Antiquity and the
Middle Ages, ed. Florin Curta (Turnhout-Belgium, 2005), 2335, which claims that the
major Carolingian fortification on the Saxon border were, at this time, built of wood and
not of stone. For further discussion, see below.
220 chapter three
operations, as noted above, were ostensibly ad hoc punitive forays intended

to pacify obstreperous Saxons in Westphalia and only very occasionally in
other parts of the region east of the Weser River. These earlier military
operations lacked both a strategic overview of an offensive nature and the
follow-up action required to sustain such efforts.168 The capture and gar-
risoning of Eresburg was intended to be a first and a very important step in
the implementation of Charlemagnes new strategy for the ultimate con-
quest of the Saxon region.
It should not go unnoticed, moreover, that the campaign strategy with
regard to the Saxons, which was intended to undergird Charlemagnes
operations east of the Rhine, followed the pattern that he had used in
Aquitane in 769. In the south, Charlemagne built a new stronghold at
Fronsac, which provided a base for further local tactical operations of
both an offensive and defensive nature. Fronsac also had strategic impor-
tance as a base for the extension of Carolingian power southward toward
Muslim-held territories in northeastern Spain. In 772, when Charlemagne
set out to capture the Saxon fortress at Eresburg, there was one significant
difference as compared with the Aquitanian operation. If this Saxon cam-
paign were to prove successful, it would not be necessary for Charlemagne
to invest the substantial human and material resources, as well as the
time, that was required to build a new stronghold. In the worst case,
repairs would have to be made to the fortress at Eresburg depending on
the damage that resulted in the course of its capture.
The Muster at Worms
Given the fact that Charlemagnes primary strategic objective was to cap-
ture the Saxon fortress at Eresburg, we are left with the obvious question:
why did Charlemagne choose to muster his troops at Worms, which was so
far to the south and west of the area in which he intended to campaign?
From an operational point of view, it would be much more efficacious to
hold the muster in the environs of Coblenz, a kilometer or two north of the
168It is important to note, however, that throughout northern Hesse, the Carolingians
had either built or rebuilt a vast network of fortifications that were intended to diminish
the impact of Saxon raids. See two studies by Rolf Gensen: Christenberg, Burgwald und
Amneburger Becken in der Merowinger- und Karolingerzeit, in Althessen im Frankreich,
ed. Walter Schlesinger (Sigmaringen, 1975), 121172; and Frhmittelalterliche Burgen und
Siedlungen in Nordhessen, in Ausgrabungen in Deutschland, 2 vols. (Mainz, 1975), 2, 313
337. See also the two studies cited above: Wand, Die Braburg und das Fritzlar-Waberner
Becken, pp. 173210; and Die Braburg, pp. 4059. Also of importance is Gockel, Fritzlar,
pp. 9099.
confluence of the Lahn and the Rhine, or even at Mainz or at Frankfurt

further to the south. From Coblenz, the armys march could follow a route
of about 150 kilometers along the banks of the Lahn, and supplies could be
floated a considerable distance on the river. From the Lahn, the route to
Saxon territory went another 75 kilometers or so north-northeast overland
to Eresburg. This route was very well-protected by Carolingian strongholds
at Dietkirchen, Gronauer Schloss, Amnenburg, and Dreihausen, all the
way to the great fortress of Kesterburg on the Christenberg, within no
more than a two-day march from Eresburg. Of course, well-protected mag-
azines also could be established at each of these forts to provide logistical
support for a large army.169
From a muster at either Mainz or Frankfurt, the situation was only
slightly more difficult than if the army were mustered at Coblenz. From
either of these two starting points, it was necessary for Charlemagnes
troops to cross both the Rhine and Main, circle around the Taunus moun-
tains through the valley of the Wetter, cross to the valley of the Lahn, and
then to follow the Lahn and the relevant roads along the same route to
Kesterburg, described above. From this fortress on the Christenberg, how-
ever, regardless of the place of the initial muster, i.e. Coblenz, Mainz, or
Frankfurt, Charlemagnes forces would have no protection for the crossing
of the Eder.170 Thus, it is likely that the crossing would have to take place at
Laisa-Battenberg, where the ford was well-known, before the final push to
Eresburg, a two-day march to the north-northeast. Kesterburg is about ten
kilometers from this crucial ford, which probably could be secured by
forces stationed at the fortress prior to the entire armys effort to cross
the river.171
The obvious route for Charlemagnes armies to follow in their march to
the stronghold at Eresburg, as seen above, was through the valley of the
Lahn. The Franks had fortified this route largely for defensive purposes
against Saxon raids at least as early as the later 7th century. Pippin had
improved the route so that it provided relatively safe use as a corridor for
169See Konrad Weidemann, Archologische Zeugnisse zur Eingliederung Hessens und

Mainfrankens, in Althessen im Frankreich, ed. Walter Schlesinger (Sigmaringen, 1975), 103
105, and map 4 on p. 104; and Gensen, Christenberg, Burgwald und Amneburger Becken,
pp. 125172.
170The crossing of rivers in the face of the enemy was a well-known tactical problem
which created considerable difficulties. See the discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach,
Anatomy, pp. 7678, with the literature cited there.
171Schlesinger, Early Medieval Fortification in Hesse, p. 248, makes clear that the forti-
fications on the Christenberg could be used as a base of operations for troops moving north
so that they might ford the Eder at Laisa-Battenberg.
222 chapter three
the types of punitive operations further to the east which had been the
traditional Carolingian response to Saxon raids. However, it should be
pointed out that since the Lahn route to Kesterburg for the invasion of
Saxon territory is obvious to modern scholars and was obvious to Char
lemagne and his predecessors, it likely was obvious also to the Saxons,
who had seen it used frequently in the past. With this information in hand,
the Saxons likely would scout the route on a regular basis and, therefore,
be in position not only to dispute the crossing of the Eder at Laisa-
Battenberg, but to gain early intelligence regarding an on rushing war,
which would enable the satraps to mobilize forces for the defense of the
region.
It is suggested here that Charlemagne ordered his forces to muster at
Worms for two reasons. This old Roman fortress city traditionally had not
been used as a base for launching an attack on Saxon territory. Rather, it
generally had served as a base for the mobilization of armies that were to
be directed south into Aquitaine and Italy. Thus, without specific intelli-
gence to the contrary, the representatives at Marklo, who had to decide on
peace or war and likely knew of the planned Carolingian mobilization at
Worms, would conclude that this effort was not aimed at Saxon territory.
Secondly, once the Carolingian army moved out of Worms, the route east-
ward could be masked partially. Thus, Charlemagne could exploit the
potential, at least temporarily, to delay the Saxons capacity to identify his
primary strategic objective. If enough time could be bought by this diver-
sion, then it may have been reasoned by Charlemagnes advisers that the
Saxons would not be able to send a significant relief force to the strong-
hold at Eresburg before the Carolingians could undertake an effort to cap-
ture it very quickly by storm.
In strategic terms, as seen above, if the Saxons meeting at Marklo had
accurate intelligence regarding Charlemagnes campaign goals for 772,
they could muster very large forces from virtually all strata of society for
purposes of defending the homeland. Such large armies might be difficult
to maintain in the field for very lengthy periods of time due to the lack of
a sophisticated logistical system. However, for operations of relatively
short duration, e.g. the relief of a fortress under siege, holding together a
large force likely would be less difficult. In any case, a lengthy siege of the
fortress at Eresburg by the Carolingians was not an attractive option for
Charlemagne, especially if he intended to move deeper into Saxon terri-
tory during this campaign in order to take control of the Irminsul shrine
and establish a stronghold at the confluence of the Diemal and the Weser
Rivers.
Worms, by contrast with Coblenz, Mainz, and Frankfurt, was not the
obvious place from which to launch an attack on Saxon territory. Saxon
observers or spies could reasonably conclude that when Charlemagne
ordered his troops to be mustered at Worms, he did so because he intended
to move his armies south in the direction of Bavaria or Italy or perhaps
even Spain.172 Previous Carolingian attacks on Saxon territory tradition-
ally were not launched from the south, but from places such as Lippenham,
more than 300 kilometers north of Worms.173 As can be seen from an anal-
ysis of earlier campaigns in various theaters of operation, Charlemagne
certainly was not unaware that misdirection was a useful tool in the
armentarium of a successful military strategist.174 Indeed, Vegetius highly
regarded handbook, discussed above, makes a point of mentioning the
importance of misleading the enemy in regard to ones true intentions.175
With the notion of misdirection kept in mind, Charlemagne very likely
did not move his forces from Worms through Frankfurt to the valley of the
Lahn and then on to a forward base at Kesterburg. Such a route not only
would have given early warning to the Saxons, but also would have limited
Charlemagnes use of available water courses further to the south for the
purpose of transporting equipment and supplies.176 This was important
because of his intention to attack a major enemy fortress and the possible
need for siege equipment, especially battering rams. This equipment
was much more difficult to move overland than by water. Rather, Char
lemagne probably went directly from Worms to Frankfurt, which could
serve very well as his primary trans-Rhenish base.177 Then, his route likely
followed the Main River to the valley of the Kinzig. This route not only was
172For example, Pippin held his assembly at Worms when it appeared that he intended
to move against Tassilo in Bavaria (ARF, an. 763). The fact that Pippin ultimately did not
proceed against Tassilo at this time is of no consequence with regard to what would appear
to have been his initial intentions. See also ibid., ann. 787 and 791, for the Bavarian or south-
ern focus of the musters at Worms. As will be seen in Chapter Five, the Saxons were able to
obtain very good information regarding Carolingian troop movements.
173For a list of previous campaigns in Saxon territory with information regarding
the mobilization, see Fred. cont., chs. 27, 31, 35; ARF, ann. 743, 744, 747, 748, 753, 758; and
AE, ann. 743, 744, 747, 748, 753, 758.
174See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 226227, with regard to Pippins maneu-
vering as he prepared for his invasion and projected conquest of Aquitaine.
175Vegetius, DRM, bk. III, ch. 6.
176Cf. Brandi, Karls des Grossen, pp. 67, with the literature cited there.
177Even those scholars who believe that Charlemagnes route went through the valley
of the Lahn agree that Frankfurt was a likely stopping point on the march. See, for example,
Brandi, Karls des Grossen, pp. 67. Regarding Pippins campaign operations, which indi-
cate that it was standard operating procedure to establish a secure base to his rear as he
advanced into enemy territory, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 206212.
224 chapter three
well-protected by major fortifications at Glauberg and Alte Burg, which

straddle the valley of the Kinzig, but also had the virtue of providing water
transport for Charlemagnes supplies and siege train from Worms (assum-
ing the Rhine was used) to within 35 kilometers of the well-developed
monastic complex at Fulda.178
The Base at Fulda
The wealthy and growing frontier monastery at Fulda depended, in large

part, upon the security provided by Carolingian military assets. Abbot
Sturms traditional loyalty to the Carolingians was buttressed by the com-
munity self-interest of the monks. Sturm undoubtedly was highly moti-
vated to provide whatever support might be required for the next stage of
Charlemagnes march to Eresburg. It was generally agreed that the bish-
ops, abbots, and abbesses throughout the Carolingian regnum were
required to use at least 40 per cent of their annual resources in support of
military forces for service to the res publica.179 These obligations included
both the provision of troops and supplies to the army. Some monastic
houses were assessed in excess of 50 per cent of their rents for the support
of military operations and troops of all types.180
The elite soldiers provided by ecclesiastical institutions were drawn,
likely in large part, from among the permanent armed forces maintained
by both bishops and abbots in their well-developed military households.
Militia troops, who served in the select levy for expeditiones beyond the
borders of their local civitas or pagus, generally filled out the contingents
raised by bishops and abbots from those living on their lands or under
their jurisdiction, which had been provided by immunities.181 In addition
178Concerning the fortifications at Glauberg and Alte Burg as well as numerous minor
Carolingian strongholds in the region see Weidemann, Zur Eingliederung, pp. 103105,
with map 3 on p. 104.
179Hincmar of Rheims (De Ecclesiis et Capellis, ed. Gundlach, p. 135), who may be con-
sidered the most ferocious defender of ecclesiastical independence and church property
rights in the later 9th century Francia, was willing to sustain this 40 per cent divisio of
church wealth, which clearly was customary by his time. See the discussion by Nelson, The
Churchs Military Service, pp. 117132, and p. 124 for the arithmetic.
180Durliat, La polyptque dIrminon, pp. 183208, deals with some of the military obli-
gations owed by the monastery of Saint-Germain-des-Prs very early in the reign of
Charlemagnes son and successor Louis the Pious. Also, see Wand, Die Braburg und das
Fritzlar-Waberner Becken, pp. 173210, with the extensive literature cited there.
181Hincmar, De Ecclesiis et Capellis, ed. Gundlach, p. 135, regarding the casati. More will
be said on this topic below and various other means of recruiting will be discussed as well.
to maintaining a standing army of professional soldiers, i.e. the military

household, each bishop, abbot, and abbess had to maintain an arsenal of
arms and armor. This arsenal included the most expensive types of equip-
ment, e.g. long swords and mail coats. Also required were pack horses, rid-
ing horses, and war horses, which were needed to supply at least some of
their men for military operations.182
When Charlemagne met with Sturm in November of 771, i.e. after his
marriage to Gerperga but prior to the death of Carloman, the abbot surely
was apprised of the kings plans for an invasion of Saxon territory.183 It is
likely that Sturm was informed that the royal army would utilize the
monastic complex at Fulda as a base for logistical support and perhaps as
a major source of troops. Fulda, as noted above, possessed in the neighbor-
hood of 10,000 mansi, and in a worst case for the economy of the monas-
tery, Sturm could be required to provide perhaps as many as some 10,000
able-bodied but lightly-armed foot soldiers for this campaign.184 Such
militia men would, of course, be much needed in large numbers for an
attack on Eresburg if it proved necessary to storm the walls of the fortress
with scaling ladders. By contrast, much smaller numbers of heavily-armed
horsemenFulda could be required to mobilize more than 800 of these on
the basis of one soldier per twelve mansesobviously would have a far less
central combat role when ladders were to be climbed and artillery was to
be operated.185
It is likely that men from the Fulda region were meant to meet a part,
and perhaps even a substantial part, of Charlemagnes manpower require-
ments for this campaign. The men from the Fulda region were more
knowledgeable about the battle tactics and combat techniques of the
Saxons, who lived nearby but beyond the frontier, than were troops who
were mobilized from pagi further to the west. This advantage can be said
to have accrued both to the expeditionary militia levies of the region and
to the professional soldiers based in the military households of the lay and
ecclesiastical magnates, including the abbot of Fulda himself. Eigil, Sturms
182CRF., no. 74, ch. 10 (p. 167).

183For the date of their meeting, see DK., no. 63; cf. Bhmer and Mlbacher, Regesta
Imperii, I, no. 142. The details regarding Sturms close working relationship with
Charlemagne are set out in Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, chs. 3739, which unfortunately are highly
condensed. Throughout, an effort will be made to untangle this compressed chronology.
Basic for the study of this work is the commentary by Engelbert, Die Vita Sturmi, with
whom, however, I do not always agree.
184See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5659, regarding the one-manse basis
for expeditionary militia service early in Charlemagnes reign.
226 chapter three
contemporary and biographer, makes it abundantly clear that the abbot

of Fulda not only had a formidable personal military household but played
a very important role in the success of Charlemagnes early Saxon
campaigns.186
During his meeting with Sturm early in the planning process,
Charlemagne certainly emphasized to the abbot the heavy burdens that
the monastery would have to sustain for this campaign.187 Charlemagne
demonstrated his prudence to all the relevant magnates by making early
preparations for this major military operation. He also demonstrated his
insight into the importance of personal diplomacy in a sensitive situation
by meeting very early with Abbot Sturm. The monastery of Fulda was
going to be heavily taxed for the forthcoming campaign. Clearly, Char
lemagne regarded Sturms full and enthusiastic cooperation as fundamen-
tal, not only to the success of this initial campaign but also for the further
military operations that would be necessary for the conquest of the entire
Saxon territory.
It seems very likely that Sturm was fully informed regarding the funda-
mental change in Carolingian policy, which was aimed now at the con-
quest of the Saxon region and the rapid conversion of its people. Sturm,
whose monastery and estates were on the frontier and consistently vul-
nerable to Saxon raids, may, in fact, have counseled support for Char
lemagnes policy that was intended to alter what had been traditional
Carolingian strategy.188 Yet one more point illuminates Fuldas role in the
new Carolingian approach to the Saxons. In the years following Char
lemagnes gradual conquest and establishment of effective Carolingian
rule over the lands that previously had been dominated by the Saxons, the
monastery of Fulda became a very well-rewarded beneficiary of the new
strategy.189 While it cannot be proven that Charlemagne explicitly prom-
ised the abbot of Fulda that the monastery would share extensively in the
spoils of conquest, it took little imagination for a man of Sturms intelli-
gence and experience to draw the inference that this would be the case.190
186V.S. Sturmi, chs. 2223 (p. 156158).

187See, for example, Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im frhren Mittelalter (Stuttgart,
1971), pp. 80, 104.
188Some scholars have argued that Sturm advocated a vigorous policy aimed at con-
verting the Saxons to Christianity. See the discussion by Wood, Missionary Life, p. 88.
189See, for example, Franz Staab, Der Grundbesitz der Abatei Fulda bis zur Mitte des 9
Jahrhunderts und seine Stifter, in Hrabanus Maurus und seine Schule: Festschrift der
Rabanus-Maurus-Schule, ed. W. Bhne (Fulda, 1980), 4863.
190It should be noted that Sturms participation in these matters was not a violation of
his clerical obligations. See David S. Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of War, c. 300-c. 1215
Logistics
Charlemagne mobilized a very large army, as was Carolingian custom, for

his first invasion of Saxon territory. It is important that Eigil, in his Life of
Sturm, refers to Charlemagnes grandus exercitus. The monk undoubtedly
knew that Fulda played a key role in mustering numerous expeditionary
levies and in providing large quantities of victuals. Using the Fulda river,
Sturms people could provide the Carolingian military train with both
boats and land transport vehicles for the march northward in the direction
of Eresburg. For example, a 35-kilometer portage was required from the
region of the headwaters of the Kinzig to the Fulda River. Wagons and
carts of a type that the monastery could mobilize from its estates were eas-
ily available. Indeed, the duty of performing carting service, sometimes
called ambascia, was, like the tractoria, a highly-developed obligation dur-
ing the later Roman Empire which was maintained by the Frankish kings.
Its administration normally was the responsibility of the wealthier seg-
ments of society, both clerics and laymen, and these costs traditionally
were passed on to their dependents.191
Once the portage was accomplished with the support of Fuldas vehi-
cles, Charlemagnes army would be positioned to move north, i.e. down
the Fulda river to its confluence with the Eder. At this point, the route
went northwest up the Eder to the highly fortified Braburg-Fritzlar com-
plex. This almost certainly was to serve as Charlemagnes advance base for
the push toward Eresburg.192 The Fulda route to Braburg included an
exceptionally well-guarded crossing of the river at Fritzlar. Finally, it has
been well-established that during the course of the 9th century, a major
high-quality road was in operation between these two important military
posts at Fritzlar and Eresburg. In light of the topography of the region, it is
likely that this road was in service by the mid-8th century, if not a great
deal earlier.193
(Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 3243; Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, pp. 72115; and Nelson, The
Churchs Military Service, pp. 125126.
191See, for example, Durliat, La polyptyque, pp. 183208.
192Regarding the Braburg-Fritzlar military complex, see Wand, Die Braburg und das
Fritzlar-Waberner Becken, pp. 173210.
193Regarding the roads, see Rafael von Uslar, Studien zu frhgeschichtlichen Befes
tigungen zwischen Nordsee und Alpen (Graz, 1964), p. 38; Georg Landau, Beitrge zur
Geschichte de alten Heer-und Handelsstrassen in Deutschland, with a new introduction and
map by Willi Grich (Kassel, 1959); and Willi Grich, Geschichtliche Atlas von Hessen
(Marburg, 1960), p. 7. Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne, p. 64, recognizes the importance
of the hospitable terrain between Braburg and Eresburg in this context, but it is clear that
more archaeological work is needed.
228 chapter three
The Fulda route surely was more efficacious for the transport of sup-
plies and a Carolingian siege train largely by water than any of the other
approaches to Eresburg. In addition, this route was far better suited to the
purpose of shielding Charlemagnes advance from those who might be
gathering intelligence for the Saxons as compared to the route through the
valley of the Lahn, discussed above. Initially, the Main-Kinzig route to
Fulda is shielded by the Taunus Mountains and Vogels Gebirge. These
highlands provide a significant degree of protection from enemy scouts,
and would cover the movement of Charlemagnes army almost to the very
environs of the fortified monastic complex at Fulda.194 It was only after
Charlemagnes army departed from Fulda that it was likely to be spotted
by those seeking to provide intelligence to Saxon military commanders.
It must be emphasized that a force of perhaps some 15,000 to 20,000
men (see below), including many horses, as well as carts and wagons,
makes a considerable amount of noise when it travels through the coun-
tryside. Depending upon the terrain, such clatter can be magnified by
echoes from the surrounding hills, and, as a result, it can be heard at con-
siderable distances. No less importantly, a force of this order of magnitude
stirs up substantial clouds of dust when the weather has been dry. Under
the right circumstances, such dust clouds can be seen at great distances.
For example, when the weather is clear, an observer elevated in a tree or
on a hill, i.e. without constructing a special watch tower, a mere ten meters
above a flat plain can identify objects unaided by a telescope or other mag-
nifying device more than 10,000 meters to the horizon. Thus, a Saxon scout
could easily spot an enemy column half a days march away in the valley of
the Lahn. A dust cloud that rose ten or fifteen meters above the horizon
could be spotted several times 10,000 meters in the distance. Great clouds
of dust, of course, rise well above the horizon and many natural perches
for observation purposes may be found throughout the Lahn valley. By
contrast, however, for a Saxon scout to spy on the Carolingians Fulda
route, he would have to cross the Taunus Mountains or Vogels Gebirge in
order to spot Charlemagnes army in the valley of the Kinzig.
Saxon Intelligence Capability
The environs of the monastery of Fulda itself, where Charlemagnes

army would be required to march in the open (see below) were about
194Concerning the protection available, see Schlesinger, Early medieval fortification in

Hesse, p. 245, with the literature cited there.
100 kilometers south of the Saxon frontier. This distance constituted a

journey of about four to five days for a military column using carts pulled
by horses or mules.195 However, if Saxon scouts or spies were detailed to
operate beyond the no mans land of the Fulda gap between Eresburg and
Braburg-Fritzlar, it is unlikely that they would have been able to venture
very far to the south of the Eder river in the direction of Fulda without
being in danger of detection. In order to obtain intelligence concerning
Charlemagnes army while it was on the march from Fulda toward
Eresburg, Saxon operatives would have to cross the Eder river, avoid detec-
tion by the Carolingian forces based at the Braburg-Fritzlar complex
some 30 kilometers south of the frontier, and then bypass the patrols that
operated from the Carolingian garrison based at Hersfeld on the middle
course of the Fulda. These fortifications, moreover, were not isolated out-
posts in otherwise deserted territory. Rather, they were located in the
midst of a rather heavy area of Frankish settlement.196
It is important to note, however, that elements among the Saxon mili-
tary were capable of disguising themselves so that they could pass as
Franks. There is reliable information that some Saxons were able to imi-
tate certain distinctive aspects of Frankish dress and to command a par-
ticular dialect of the Frankish language.197 Yet, even if valuable advance
intelligence were obtained by Saxon spies, this information still had to be
relayed to the command staff at Eresburg. Then, an accurate evaluation of
these data had to be made at the fortress if subsequent effective action
were to be taken. Finally, it was necessary to muster sufficient resources,
on what surely would be rather short notice, perhaps a week at most, to
prepare for an enemy attack on the fortress.
For the Saxons to detect the Carolingian invasion force once it had
reached Fulda provided a very small window of opportunity to make a
significant response. If, however, Saxon spies, perhaps disguised as mer-
chants selling goods to the Carolingian army in the area just east of
195Although there was a frontier and likely even a border between the Saxon region
and the Carolingian regnum, it would appear to have been rather fluid. This point was
made by Einhard, VK, ch. 62, quoted above, and is emphasized as well by the Saxon Poet,
VKM, Bk. I, lines 25 ff. (an. 772). Although this latter source is often found suspect because
of its derivative nature and late date, I have found it compelling, as will be seen below, on
several original points.
196Weidemann, Archologische Zeugnisse zur Eingliederung, pp. 95119; and Fred
Schwind, Die Franken in Althessen, in Althessen im Frankreich, ed. Walter Schlesinger
(Sigmaringen, 1975), pp. 211280.
197See, for example, AE, an. 775.
230 chapter three
Frankfurt, learned of Charlemagnes plans well before the army reached

Fulda, the defenders of Eresburg could have sufficient time to cause sub-
stantial problems for the invaders. Militia levies could be mobilized in the
endangered Saxon pagi and those nearby under their respective satraps.
A dux could be selected by lot from among these local governors to lead a
relief force. If the Saxons were prepared, Charlemagnes campaign could
be seriously hindered.
Target Eresburg
There is no reason to believe that the garrison at Eresburg had obtained

sufficient useful information regarding Charlemagnes invasion force prior
to its crossing the frontier into Saxon territory so that extensive prepara-
tions could be made to hold the fort. Or, to put it another way, the arrival
of a Saxon relief force in the Weser valley, discussed below, was too late to
disturb Charlemagnes plans with regard either to the capture of Eresburg
or the destruction of the Irminsul shrine. Of course, the complete surprise
of a major stronghold by a large army traveling between 20 and 25 kilome-
ters per day for more than two weeks was ostensibly impossible under nor-
mal conditions. Charlemagne, however, did not require that his army
launch a surprise attack on the fortress. He needed only enough time so
that the Carolingian army could launch a massive attack on the walls of
the fortress and overwhelm the defenders before the arrival of a relief
force would force him into establishing a costly and time-consuming
siege.
Charlemagne likely appeared at Worms to take direct personal com-
mand of the army early in May 772, where the invasion force already was
in a high state of readiness. Once Charlemagne arrived, the army was on
the march without delay, as one of the court annalists reports.198 If the
army broke camp at Worms by the end of the first week in May, an easy
three-day march along well-used roads would bring the force to Frankfurt.
A days stop over at Frankfurt to check out the equipment and assure that
the horses were in good condition was necessary so that the push on to
Fulda could be made in another four days with relatively well-rested
animals.199
198AE, an. 772, observes that the march began sine mora.
199Concerning travel times for military columns, see Bachrach, Animals and Warfare,
pp. 716725. A horse that is to be kept in battle-ready condition may be ridden about
Even after the Carolingian army reached Fulda, however, the likelihood
that the Saxons at Eresburg knew of the invasion (see the discussion
above) remained small. Following a stop at the monastic complex pre-
sided over by Abbot Sturm, where supplies and heavy equipment could
once again be put on river craft, likely barges, the journey down the Fulda
River through Hersfeld to Braburg-Fritzlar probably took another four
days. With a day spent at Braburg-Fritzlar to make sure everything was in
order, the bulk of Charlemagnes forces had the logistical potential to be
encamped below the walls of Eresburg before the end of May.
The Saxon fortress at Eresburg (modern Ober-Marsberg) is located
about 45 kilometers north of Fritzlar and about 30 kilometers south of
Paderborn. Its immensely important strategic position was recognized
throughout the early Middle Ages.200 The physical dimensions of this for-
tress, which undoubtedly were well-known to Charlemagne and his staff
prior to undertaking their efforts to capture it, were formidable.201 It is to
be noted that the plateau at the top of this hill covered an area of 28
hectares. Not all of it was enclosed within the walls, which provided a cir-
cuit of about 2,000 meters. There were, however, various defensive outer
works composed of ditches and palisades placed in strategic locations
atop the plateau but outside the walls.202 Eresburg resembled in many
30 kilometers per day for six days and then a day of rest is required. If Charlemagnes forces
had pushed on from Worms through Frankfurt to Fulda without a rest, they would have
been on the road for at least seven days and the health of the horses would have been
risked unnecessarily. However, if the army pushed ahead from Worms for six days and then
rested, a camp would have to be made a day out of Fulda with tired horses. By staying over
an extra day at Frankfurt, the army would have well- rested horses for the four day march
to Fulda. The point is a small one, but commanders who fail to look after small matters
often find themselves in difficulties. In western military tradition, the first few days of
a march are generally thought of as a shake out to make sure that everything is in order.
Cf. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 178186, who would seem to have large groups,
e.g. Charlemagnes court, moving too rapidly.
200Halphen, La conqute, p. 147, n. 3, summarizes a vast amount of information very
usefully; and see also Albert K. Hmberg, Die karolingisch-ottonischen Wallburgen des
Sauerlandes in historischer Sicht, in August Stieren zum 70. Geburtstage (1955), and
reprinted in Albert K. Hmberg, Zwischen Rhein und Weser. Aufstze und Vortrge zur
Geschichte Westfalens (Mnster, 1967), 80113, 253268, which will be cited here, pp. 9496,
261262.
201Carl Schuchhardt, Die frgeschichtlichen Befestigungen in Niedersachsen (Berlin,
1925), p. 39, with the map on p. 35. This study is volume 3 of Niederschsiche Heimatbcher
series.
202Schuchhardt, Die frgeschichtlichen Befestigungen, p. 39, with the map on p. 35;
Hans-Jrgen Brachmann, Die schsenisch-frankischen Auseinandersetzumgen des 8.
Jahrhunderts im Siegel des Befestigungsbaues, Zeitschrift fr Archologie 19 (1984), 217;
and Werner Best, Rolf Gensen and Philipp R, Hmberg, Burgbau in einer Grenzregion,
in 799, III, 332333, and abb. 7.
232 chapter three
ways but was considerably larger than the very substantial Carolingian
strongholds at Kesterburg and Braburg, mentioned above, which helped
to provide for Carolingian control of the southern reaches of the Fulda
Gap.203
As the situation likely developed in late May of 772, under what may be
considered normal military conditions (there is no evidence in the sources
that anything extraordinary occurred), Charlemagnes army almost cer-
tainly was detected by Saxon scouts. This probably occurred at the time
when Charlemagne was encamped at Braburg-Fritzlar, if not a short time
earlier. When the Saxon commander at Eresburg was informed of the
Carolingian invasion force, he had to assume that his fortress was at risk.
With this information in hand, the commander undoubtedly sent appeals
to the satraps of the various nearby pagi that might be threatened by the
Carolingian expeditionary force, for immediate reinforcements. His strat-
egy likely was to hold out in the short term, i.e. until a Saxon army could be
mobilized by the satraps after they met in council to choose a dux.204 This
is just the type of situation we are led to understand from Bedes account
to be an on rushing war.
The Saxons probably had at least a two- or three-day window of time,
perhaps even a week, in order to prepare Eresburg to withstand an enemy
attack. It is very likely that the garrison commander followed the same
procedure for the defense of strongholds used in the regnum Francorum.
All able-bodied fighting men from the local area were brought into the
stronghold along with their families and supplies, especially livestock.
Whatever food stuffs that could not be gathered up usually were burned so
as to deprive the enemy of an easily accessible source of logistical support.
As a result, in order to obtain fodder, the invading force would have to for-
age at a greater distance than otherwise would have been the case. Finally,
if possible, last-minute repairs would be made to the walls if necessary.205
In regard to understanding the progress of any military campaign,
a good-faith effort must be made by modern scholars to provide a
203Useful comparative information is provided by Best, Gensen, and Hmberg,

Burgbau in einer Grenzregion, 3, 338345. For additional detail, see Norbert Wand, Die
Braburg und das Fritzlar-Waberner Becken, pp. 121172; and Gensen, Christenberg,
Burgwald und Amneburger Becken, pp. 173210.
204ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772, both report that after Charlemagne captured Eresburg,
he met with Saxons on the banks of the Weser some fifty or so kilometers to the east. These
Saxons undoubtedly were a force that was sent to aid the garrison at Eresburg but arrived
too late.
205For a discussion of standard operating procedure, see Bachrach, Animals and
reasonable estimate of the order of magnitude of the forces involved.206

In the present situation, it is necessary to begin with an examination of
Saxon military assets both at Eresburg and in its environs. It is very likely
that Charlemagne had done just that on the basis of intelligence reports
before deciding not only how large an army he would need to mobilize in
order to capture the fortress at Eresburg, but also what kinds of troops and
equipment would be necessary. In terms of its physical attributes, the
most important aspect of the stronghold of Eresburg was a perimeter wall
of approximately 2,000 meters.207 A fortress of this size required a mini-
mum of some 1,600 able-bodied men armed with missile weapons, i.e.
bows and arrows, crossbows, and spears, to provide for its minimum
defense needs against an attacking force four to five times that number,
which sought to present a credible threat to take the defenses by storm.
According to early medieval doctrine, an attacking force that had any
hope of taking a major fortified enemy position by storm was required to
have, at a minimum, between a four-to-one and five-to-one numerical
superiority over the defenders.208
The 28 hectares on the Obermarsberg plateau has been estimated by
modern scholars to serve as a military encampment for well in excess of
10,000 able-bodied men for a limited amount of time.209 When mobilizing
his army to attack Eresburg, Charlemagne could not ignore this fact. The
number of local people who would be encamped on the plateau, both
those protected by various outer works and those established within the
walls of the fortress itself, would depend, in large part, upon how early the
military command at Eresburg received intelligence of the approach of
Charlemagnes army. If some 10,000 men, women, and children from this
area of the Westphalian region were to find refuge at Obermasberg, then
some 3,000 able-bodied men of military age, in addition to the garrison,
likely would have been available for the defense of the fortress. Smaller
numbers of refugees would mean a smaller number of males between the
206See Bachrach, Early Medieval Military Demography, pp. 320, where the consen-
sus among military historians and the professional military is made clear, i.e. the discus-
sion of military operations without an appreciation of military demography is at best
misleading.
207Schuchhardt, Die frgeschichtlichen Befestigungen, p. 39, with the map on p. 35;
Brachmann, Die schsenisch-frankischen Auseinandersetzumgen, p. 217; and Best,
Gensen, and Hmberg, Burgbau in einer Grenzregion, pp. 332333, and abb. 7.
208Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117.
209See, for example, Schuchhardt, Die frgeschichtlichen Befestigungen, p. 39, who cor-
rectly makes this evaluation by way of a comparison with Roman army camps.
234 chapter three
age of roughly 15 to 55, which composed about 30 per cent of most nor-
mally distributed populations during this period.210
In a worst-case scenario from the Carolingian perspective, perhaps as
many as 5,000 able-bodied men, not including reinforcements led by
satraps from the threatened area, might be available to defend Eresburg. It
is likely, therefore, that Charlemagne mobilized an army well in excess of
the 6,500 or so effectives, i.e. the minimum number that would be required
by early medieval doctrine for successfully storming a stronghold with a
2,000 meter perimeter wall defended by a minimum of 1,600 troops. It is
even likely that in order to be sure that the fortress could be taken quickly,
Charlemagnes forces greatly exceeded the 8,000 required by a 5-to-1 ratio
of assault troops to defenders.211
As he demonstrated in his operations against Hunoald in Aquitaine in
769, and would demonstrate consistently throughout his military career,
Charlemagne was influenced by the principle that modern scholars con-
sider the doctrine of overwhelming force, which his father, King Pippin,
also had favored. Therefore, an estimate of the size of Charlemagnes army
for the attack on Eresburg should be in the 15,000 to 20,000 range. This
view is based upon the assumption that Charlemagne would take into
consideration that the regular garrison deployed to defend Eresburg would
be greatly augmented by refugees, who under normal circumstances
would have constituted the local militia forces. In addition, the capture of
Eresburg was not Charlemagnes only objective for this campaign, for
which, as made clear in Sturms Vita, a large army had been mobilized.212
It is important to note that Charlemagnes campaign into the Saxon
region was planned to focus on an assault against Eresburg which was to
result in the rapid capture of the fortress. Charlemagne undoubtedly
had his own encampment at Eresburg fortified in the normal manner with
several castra, following standard operating procedure. However, since he
210The methodological techniques that undergird these estimates are based upon the
tables assembled by Cole and Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables, pp. 4, 13, for Life Tables
West; they explain their methods on pp. 541. For additional discussion of these tables and
their applicability to the later Roman empire, see Tim G. Parkin, Demography and Roman
Society (Baltimore, 1992), pp. 7990; and Walter Scheidel, Progress and Problems in Roman
Demography, in Debating Roman Demography, ed. Walter Scheidel (Leiden, 2001), 1719.
Nb. Verhulst, Economic Organization, pp. 482483, bases his arguments on sources for
the early Carolingians that are superior to those that are available even for the later Roman
empire.
211See Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117.
212With regard to the size of early Carolingian armies, especially those deployed to cap-
ture enemy fortresses, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 236237.
planned for a rapid assault on the fortress, there likely was no purpose in
these early days of the operation either to vallate the enemy stronghold or
to contra-vallate his own position. Efforts of this type, as will be seen
below, not only were time-consuming, but were purposeful only when
a rather lengthy siege was contemplated. If a lengthy siege ultimately
became necessary at Eresburg, a vallation surrounding the fortress itself,
and even a contra-vallation to protect the besieging force, could be con-
structed at a later time.213
In this initial stage of operations, Charlemagne also ordered another
fortified camp (castra) to be constructed on the left bank of the Weser.214
The purpose of this fortification was to interdict any Saxon expeditionary
levies which might attempt to cross the river in this area. Such an enemy
force, if it were to arrive at Eresburg prior to the fall of the fortress, i.e. in
time to be deployed either to reinforce the garrison or to harass the
Carolingian attacking army before the fortress fell, would seriously under-
mine Charlemagnes plans. Exactly where this new fortified camp was
established remains a matter of debate, but the most likely place is
Herstelle, located at the confluence of the Diemel and the Weser Rivers
some 60 kilometers to the east of Eresburg, a march of between two and
three days. As both the military geography of the situation and the name
Herstelle indicate, this is the likely location for an astute military com-
mander, such as Charlemagne, to have placed a fortified encampment and
arranged for a troop deployment to block Saxon reinforcements from
reaching Eresburg in a timely manner.215
Troops stationed at Herstelle or nearby would be well-positioned to
interdict and delay reinforcements that had been mobilized from regions
deeper in Saxon territory. The Saxon levies, who were to be mustered to
aid the garrison at Eresburg, could be mobilized rather quickly under the
213For the traditional French terminology La contrevallation and Le circonvallation,

which differs from that used in English, see Michel Redd, Alise-Sante-Reine/ Mont
Auxois, Alisia (Alsia), in LArchitecture de la Gaule romaine. Les fortifications militaires,
Documents darchologie franaise 100, directed by Michel Redd with the aid of Raymond
Brulet, Rudolf Fellmann, Jan-Kees Haalebos, and Siegmar von Schnurbein (Paris-Bordeaux,
2006), 183190.
214See AMP, an. 772, for the castra on the banks of the Weser.
215Cf. ARF, an. 797; AE, an. 797; and AMP, an. 797, for the earliest mention of this place
by name in various Carolingian sources. However, it seems clear from context that
Herestelle was already developed as a place for the army prior to its first mention in the
sources several years after the campaign against Eresburg. As will be discussed below, there
is often a substantial time lag between the construction of a fortification and its first men-
tion in a surviving written source.
236 chapter three
leadership of their satrap. For such a force to march, for example, the 50 or
so kilometers from the area around Detmold-Schieder-Lgde to Eresburg
would likely require about two to three days. Charlemagne, therefore,
needed troops to be positioned at Herstelle so that they could stop, or at
least significantly delay, such an army mustered from Saxon territory
beyond the Weser. With control of the river crossing, Charlemagnes men
could have a strong impact on a relief force.
In light of both the natural and the military topography, a Saxon relief
force levied in Westphalia would be expected to try to cross the Weser
north of its confluence with the Diemel.216 Should forces sent to relieve
Eresburg march much further to the south of the confluence of these two
rivers in order to cross the Weser, they would be doubly vulnerable. They
could be attacked, prior to crossing the river, from strategically-located
positions in Carolingian-held Thuringia, as well as from troops stationed
in the fortress atop the 130-meter hill at Kassel on the Fulda river just west
of the confluence of the Werra and the Weser.217 In short, the capacity of a
Saxon relief force headed for Eresburg to move quickly was limited.
Having deployed a blocking force, most likely at Herstelle, and estab-
lished several defensive fortifications, or castra, in the environs of Eresburg
itself, the topography at the fortress-site dictated that Charlemagne would
deploy his forces to the west, south, and east of the enemy stronghold. The
north side of the hill rose some 150 meters at a sharp angle and at the base
was the Diemal River. Thus, due both to the elevation of the plateau and
the river, the northern side of the stronghold was effectively protected
from attack by storm. Easiest access to the plateau was from the from the
south where the gradient was least sharp, but this also likely was to be the
best-defended area of Eresburg.218
In accord with the standard operating procedure of the Carolingian
army, developed while it was under King Pippins command and probably
216AE, an. 772, mentions the Saxons deployed on the banks of the Weser with whom
Charlemagne dealt later in the campaign.
217The military importance of Kassel was recognized by the Romans, see Wells, The
German Policy, p. 149; this continued to be the case thereafter. See, for example, Karl
Heinemeyer, Knigshofe und Knigsgut im Raum Kassel (Gttingen, 1971), for the construc-
tion of a Royal palatio there; concerning the roads, see Arnold Beuermann, Hann. Mnden:
Das Lebensbild einer Stadt (Gttingen; 1951), pp. 5864.
218It is likely that Charlemagne sent troops across the Diemal in order to interdict com-
munication with the fortress garrison from the other side of the river. It was standard oper-
ating procedure to keep the besieged either from receiving communiqus or sending them.
In light of the difficulty of attacking Eresburg from the north, it is unlikely that Charlemagne
deployed catapults on the banks of the Diemal.
even earlier, it is likely that Charlemagnes forces first advanced up the

gradual slope of the hill from the south and systematically captured the
outer defensive works that had been established at various strategic points
outside the walls. This, for example, is what Pippin did when he laid siege
to Pavia both in 754 and 756.219 Again, following standard operating proce-
dure and within a few days of the arrival of the Carolingian army,
Charlemagne likely had his catapults and battering rams set to work
against the fortress, probably against the south wall.220 The decision to
storm the walls, whether a breach had been opened or not, probably, as
suggested above, was taken by 3 or 4 June, and the stronghold was cap-
tured by direct assault no later than the fifth or perhaps the sixth of the
month.221
Operations against the Irminsul Shrine
After capturing Eresburg, Charlemagne arranged for a Frankish garrison to

hold the fortress.222 He also undoubtedly followed traditional Carolingian
practice and issued orders to repair any damage that had been done to the
stronghold in the course of the above-mentioned military operations.223
As a result, Eresburg would, once again, be in a fully-defensible condition.
After seeing to the care of the wounded and those thought worthy of being
made prisoners (concerning whom the sources are silent), as well as those
who had sought refuge in the stronghold (concerning whom the sources
are also silent), Charlemagne moved the bulk of his army across the
Diemal River, probably at a nearby ford, as no boats are mentioned, in
the direction of the Weser.224 A day or so after leaving Eresburg, the

220See, for example, the siege of Bourges in 763 as discussed by Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, pp. 232233.
221The chronology for the campaign rests upon the fact that Charlemagne was at the
royal palatio of Brumath on the upper course of the Rhine, some 500 kilometers from
Herstelle on the Weser, by no later than 5 July 772 (DK. no. 69). Thus, all of Charlemagnes
operations were completed in Saxony by the third week of June. Regarding the dating of
this Saxon campaign, cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, no. 149.
222The need to control the fortress at Eresburg is evidenced throughout the early
phases of the Saxon wars. Thus, for example, Charlemagne took it in 772: ARF, an. 772; and
AE, an. 772; lost it again in 773 (see, below, Chapter Five) and retook it in 775: ARF, an. 775;
and AE. 775; (AM. an. 775; and AMP, an. 775).
223See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 241, regarding traditional Frankish
practice.
224For the march to the Weser from Eresburg, see ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; and AMP,
an. 772.
238 chapter three
Carolingian army reached its second objective of the campaign, the exten-
sive and well-known Saxon religious shrine, called the Irminsul, which
was located in the foothills of the Teutoburg.225
Charlemagne, having encountered no resistance, ordered the huge col-
umn-like symbol made of a massive tree trunk, i.e. the so-called tree of
the Universe, to be destroyed.226 The extent of the shrine is perhaps best
indicated by the report from friendly sources that it took Charlemagnes
men three days to destroy it, despite the fact that apparently it was not
defended by enemy troops.227 As viewed from the Saxon perspective, this
was an act of sacrilege and extreme provocation. It would recall to many,
both pagans and Christian Franks, Bonifaces destruction a generation
earlier of the Great Oak that was located at Geismar and dedicated to
Donar.228 However, whereas Boniface was a pious cleric and Charlemagne
was a secular ruler, the point should not be missed that in destroying the
Irminsul, the Frankish king likely wanted to be seen in the mold of his
martyred precursor in the sense of being a true leader of the Christian
faith and enemy of paganism.229
To reiterate, the destruction of the Irminsul, which the Carolingians
had not attacked previously and which the Saxons apparently regarded
as the support (or perhaps one of the supports) of their heaven, must
be considered a symbol of Charlemagnes new strategy and a radical
change in the policy that his father and grandfather had pursued.230 It is
important to note that the wealth of this particular religious shrine
undoubtedly was well-known, but previous Frankish rulers had not
225For the arrival at the Irminsul, see ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; ASM, an. 772; AMP, an.
772; and AM., an. 772.
226For the destruction of the Irminsul, see ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772; ASM, an. 772;
AMP, an. 772; and AM., an. 772.
227Saxon Poet, VKM, bk. I, lines 67 ff. (an. 772). The poets mention of the three days
required to destroy the shrine has the ring of truth since nothing was to be gained regard-
ing Carolingian glory by recognizing the difficulties encountered in reducing a pagan idol.
In addition, Charlemagne had no good reason to stay in the area for three days under
adverse conditions (see below), and, thus, it is likely that it took him all of that time to
destroy the Irminsul. See, for example, Heinz Lwe, Die Irminsul und die Religion der
Sachsen, Deutsches Archiv fr Geschichte des Mittelalters, V (1941), 35, regarding the value
of the account by the Saxon Poet concerning the Irminsul.
228Here I follow Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish Church, p. 183.
229See Valerie Flint, The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, 1991),
pp. 267268.
230Lwe, Die Irminsul, pp. 122. Note the very brief but interesting characterizations
of the Irminsul by Wallace Hadrill, The Frankish Church, p. 183; and see also Bullough, The
Age of Charlemagne, p. 46.
ordered it to be looted.231 Charlemagne confiscated the treasure as the

spoils of war. Then following the imperial tradition of a commander, who
wished to be considered conmilitio by his troops, he ordered these large
quantities of gold and silver to be distributed to his men.232 This order to
distribute the treasure, of course, was a gesture fully consistent with the
pattern of imitatio imperii that the Carolingians had been following for
decades. Roman emperors routinely decided how booty was to be distrib-
uted or delegated that authority to their commanders in the field.233
Dealing with a Saxon Relief Force
The difficulties encountered by the Carolingians in destroying the shrine

made it necessary for Charlemagne to remain in the area for three days.
Therefore, following standard operating procedure, he had a fortified
camp, or castra, measured out and constructed at the site of the Irminsul
for the protection of his troops.234 In the course of the three-day stay in
this encampment, the army apparently had problems obtaining fresh
water for themselves and their animals. This problem, however, was
solved, and while the court sources attribute the propitious availability of
water to a miracle, we need not believe that supernatural forces were
involved.235 However, it was only after Charlemagne received a report that
231See ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; and AMP, an. 772; for the treasure and its great size.
Saxon Poet, VKM, bk. I, lines 67 ff. (an. 772), suggests that the magnitude of the precious
adornment was commensurate with the grandeur of the column. Of course, these are post
hoc accounts, which very likely suffer from exaggeration, and cannot be confused
with intelligence reports provided to Charlemagne prior to the beginning of military
operations.
232Regarding the treasure, see Hines, The Conversion of the Old Saxons, pp. 302303.
See AMP, an. 772, for the order to distribute the treasure. Nb. The claims by Reuter, Plunder
and Tribute, pp. 7594, that the rank-and-file of Charlemagnes armies were impoverished
because only the magnates benefited from the distribution of spoils cannot be sustained
on the basis of the sources. This assumption is also unproven despite the clever Marxist
problematic employed by Eckhard Mller-Mertens, Karl der Grosse, Ludwig der Fromme
und die Freien (Berlin, 1963).
233The famous Soissons-vase incident related by Gregory of Tours (Hist., bk. II, ch. 27)
in which the commanders absolute control of the distribution of booty is challenged by a
lowly soldier, may well reflect the remnants of a moribund Frankish custom, which Clovis
was intent upon eliminating. Later in his career, Clovis controlled the distribution of booty
in the Roman imperial tradition. See regarding the early Carolingians, Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, pp. 139140, and the discussion in the relevant notes.
234See ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772, for the construction of this castra.
235See ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; and AMP, an. 772, for the three-day sojourn in the envi-
rons of the Saxon shrine and concerning the problem of obtaining a sufficient quantity of
240 chapter three
a Saxon force, which had been mobilized further to the east, was approach-
ing the right bank of the Weser, that he ordered his army to break camp.
He marched off to the east with his troops in order to confront the
enemy.236
Once Charlemagne reached his previously-established fortified
encampment on the Weser, probably at Herstelle as suggested above, the
Saxons became aware of the great size of the Frankish army. It would
appear to have been of a sufficiently overwhelming order of magnitude
and so well-equipped that the Saxons concluded that Charlemagnes
forces could cross the Weser with virtual impunity even in the face of a
deployed enemy force that was in a superior tactical position on the far
bank of the river. It may be noted that the Carolingians possessed the tech-
nology needed to assemble prefabricated boats that were carried in the
baggage train in pieces. The Carolingians also had the technology to make
inflatable river craft from animal skins. Both of these types of boats are
known to have been transported as part of the armys impedimenta in the
baggage train while on campaign.237
Charlemagne, if he so chose, likely could move his forces across the
Weser. Thereafter, this army could undertake devastating military opera-
tions well into the interior of Westphalia and perhaps even further afield
into Angraria or Ostphalia. It was only the later part of June. Therefore, an
opportunity presented itself to carry on military operations for perhaps
another 90 days or even longer before the autumn rainy season likely
would make the continuation of operations in Saxon territory more
difficult. Such a campaign could take the form of and probably would be
water for the men and horses. Charlemagnes army very likely did have some problems
with securing its water supply. However, the treatment of this subject in the sources cited
above permits the inference that this episode was being used by some Carolingian authors
to demonstrate that the Saxon gods had failed in their efforts to deprive Charlemagnes
army of water and, by implication, that the Christians were aided by their God through a
miracle when they did obtain the needed water. What the rank-and-file of the army, or
even Charlemagne, believed cannot now be recovered. Although, it is likely that we would
not be far off the mark if we suggested that both Charlemagne and his men were inclined
to believe that God was on their side.
236For Charlemagnes march to the Weser and the Saxons already being there, see ARF,
an. 772; and AE, an. 772; AMP, an.772. The time sequence here may be established by the
internal logic of the situation. When Charlemagne decided to stay in the neighborhood of
the Irminsul, it must be assumed either that a Saxon presence in the region of the Weser
had not yet been discovered or that the enemy army had been discovered but Charlemagne
had not yet been informed of its arrival. In any case, the sources cited above imply that
when Charlemagne learned of the arrival of a Saxon army, he moved on to the Weser
quickly to deal with it.
similar in effect to the well-publicized raid in force that King Pippin had
carried out, also with a very large army, in 753.238
The military superiority of the Carolingian army on the banks of the
Weser is evident from the fact that the Saxon commanders, with whom
Charlemagne consented to meet in a placitum, are reported to have been
intent upon avoiding combat with the invaders from the west. This great
reluctance was manifest despite the fact that the Saxons held what
undoubtedly was a strong defensive position on the river bank which
stood astride the route that the Frankish army would have to take into the
interior of Saxon territory. Tactically, Charlemagnes forces would have to
cross the river under a hail of Saxon missiles and then scamper up the
river bank in the face of an emplaced enemy. Despite these obvious tacti-
cal advantages, the Saxons are reported to have offered terms.239
On its face, our information regarding the treaty agreed to by Char
lemagne, as recounted in the Carolingian sources, is manifestly incom-
plete. At first reading, it would seem that the Saxons bought off the
Carolingians rather cheaply. The Saxons were spared a potentially costly
initial battle and subsequent ravishing of the countryside. Charlemagne,
however, is not reported to have received an immediate payment in either
gold or silver or animals, nor is the annual tribute of 300 horses that had
been imposed by Pippin in 758 mentioned, much less an additional trib-
ute. Rather, Charlemagne is reported to have accepted a mere twelve
Saxon hostages, and then returned to Francia in peace.240
Information that comes to light in discussion of these particular Saxons
two years later, however, makes clear that these hostages were regarded by
the Carolingians as a guarantee that they would not attack Charlemagnes
newly-acquired assets. Thus, this treaty in 772 would appear to have con-
stituted de jure recognition by the Westphalians, or at least one or more of
their satraps, of Charlemagnes conquest of the territory between Eresburg
and Herstelle, both of which strongholds were garrisoned by Carolingian
troops. To put it another way, Charlemagnes conquest of the fortress at
Eresburg and the establishment of the Carolingian frontier on the line of
238For Pippins operations, see Fred. Cont., ch. 35; ARF an. 771; and AE, an. 771.
239ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772; AMP, an. 772.
240ARF, an. 772; and AE, an. 772; AMP, an. 772. In light of the widely recognized ten-
dency of the Carolingian sources to manipulate their stories to the general benefit of
Charlemagnes reputation, it is important to take note of Kosto, Hostages, pp. 126127,
who provides a compelling methodological justification for the acceptance of most infor-
mation provided by these writers regarding hostages.
242 chapter three
the Diemel and the Weser as far north and east as Herstelle was recog-
nized, probably by the authority of the dux who led the Saxon army.241
Recognition of Carolingian control of this frontier region was the real
concession made by the Saxons, and it was far greater in value from a stra-
tegic perspective than an annual tribute of 300 horses or even large
amounts of gold. From a Frankish juridical perspective, a violation of this
agreement by the Saxons provided Charlemagne with a casus belli for fur-
ther action against an enemy which could be seen to have perjured itself.
This strategy of establishing a de jure situation of this type had been used
widely by Charlemagnes forebears as a means of establishing that they
were engaged in a just war.242 As a result of operations undertaken in the
spring of 772, Charlemagnes (re)conquest of this region, once regarded as
a part of the Roman Empire, had begun.
The fact that Charlemagne wanted the treaty so that he could begin
his integration of Saxon territory into the regnum Francorum is easily
understandable. However, it seems rather odd that he was satisfied with
only twelve hostages as a surety for the maintenance of the agreement.
Thus, it is worth entertaining the idea that Charlemagne, consistent with
long-term Frankish pursuit of imitatio imperii, also understood that the
acceptance of hostages in addition to their value as a surety, constituted in
the Roman sense a symbolic recognition by the losing side that they were
now to be regarded as the subjects of the victors. Giving hostages was a
marker of submission. Indeed, many of the Roman histories that treat
these conventions were available to the Carolingians.243
From a military perspective, however, it must be asked why Charlemagne
chose to accept the enemys terms so quickly. He relinquished the oppor-
tunity to advance across the Weser, rout the Saxon force in front of him,
and devastate the countryside for many kilometers in all directions. If
Charlemagne were motivated solely or even largely by the acquisition of
booty to keep his greedy followers content, as some scholars claim, then
two or three months of potentially rewarding ravishing and plundering
surely would have given the rank-and-file considerable gratification in the
241Cf. Lintzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens, pp. 96127, to which further citations will
be made. For the treaty of 772, see pp. 9799.
242See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 1718, 222526, 4344, 219. It is possi-
ble to identify various juridical aspects of such a treaty and the role played by hostages.
Regarding hostages, see Kosto, Hostages, pp. 123147, who is certainly correct in not limit-
ing his enquiry only to the legal aspects of such arrangements.
243See the discussion of the Roman use of hostages in a symbolic manner by Kosto,
Hostages, p. 137, and the works cited there.
short term. Conversely, the denial of this opportunity to supposedly booty-

hungry Carolingian soldiers might well lead to a certain amount of
disgruntlement among the troops. Of course, not all would-be plunder-
ingoperations against an apparently outmanned enemy go as intended.
Even apparent walkovers sometimes work out differently than originally
hoped. Charlemagne, or at least members of his Magistratus, likely were
not unaware, for example, of the debacle suffered by King Chlotar I (d. 561)
in combat against the Saxons when the Merovingian ruler reluctantly
chose to undertake further military operations rather than accept what
would appear to have been an advantageous, if temporary, treaty ending
hostilities.244
It is also likely that Charlemagne, like his father, followed the more pru-
dent strategy that was a hallmark of early Carolingian military operations.
Apparently, he had planned to undertake a limited operation, i.e. to take
Eresburg and destroy the Irminsul. It was a well-established pattern of
early Carolingian strategy, as made clear, for example, in the opening cam-
paigns of Pippins operations in Aquitaine, to move incrementally against
the enemy. In 760762, Pippin attacked and took control of various strong-
holds in eastern Aquitaine in order to assure his lines of communication
with Frankish territory. In may be noted, as well, that in 762, Pippin estab-
lished the location for the muster of his main army so that he might mis-
lead the enemy about his invasion route. The campaign tactic of
misdirection was not only advocated by Vegetius but used by both Pippin
and Charlemagne. Only in 763 did Pippin launch a major invasion that was
intended to capture the great fortress city of Bourges, the so-called north-
ern capital of Aquitaine.245
For Charlemagne to have moved his armies beyond the Weser in the
spring of 772 would have been a major second step. It would have required
that the region had been properly reconnoitered and perhaps even
mapped. Lacking proper preparation in the summer of 772, the area that
lay beyond the Weser likely was more or less terra incognita as far as the
Carolingian army presently in the field was concerned. Finally, all indica-
tions are that the summer of 772 was a particularly dry season. One source,
undoubtedly working from contemporary reports, observed regarding the
weather during the campaign:
244This information was readily available to Charlemagnes advisors, if not directly to

the king himself, from Gregory, Hist., bk. IV, ch. 14. Cf. the discussion by Lintzel, Die
Sachsenkrieg Chlothars I, pp. 6473.
245See the discussion by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 219227.
244 chapter three
At that time there had been a heat spell of long duration, and the heavens
were peaceful [i.e. no rain]. The fields were burning up and there was not
even any water in the springs. Many streams were filthy with dust.246
Even if Charlemagne were not deterred from venturing more deeply into
Saxon territory by the possibility of a continued drought, he surely was
aware that the excessive heat would take its toll upon his men and
animals.247
It is clear that Charlemagne had much more than the acquisition of
booty on his mind when he chose to alter radically the policy that had
been pursued by his father and grandfather. There was a very important
religious aspect to this new policy. In his life of Sturm, Eigil emphasizes
that Charlemagne began the important process of converting the Saxons
to Christianity in the wake of this victory in 772. Eigil makes clear that the
Frankish king brought some Saxons to accept Christianity by conquest.
This likely referred to the people living in the Eresburg region and perhaps
also those living in the region of the Irminsul and of Herstelle. Eigil also
calls attention to the use of persuasion. The large number of clerics who
are mentioned as having accompanied this invasion force may be seen to
have played a role in beginning the conversion process. Finally, Eigil
admits that Charlemagne was not beyond the use of bribes (munera), and
it is perhaps through this tactic that he brought some of the leaders of the
Saxon people to accept Christianity.248 In the wake of operations in 772,
Charlemagne supported further efforts to preach among the conquered
Saxons with the aim of baptizing converts, building churches, and estab-
lishing parochiae.249
Upon returning to the regnum Francorum, Charlemagne met with
Abbot Sturm of Fulda, who does not seem to have been one of the many
246ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; and AMP, an. 772, for the problem of a lack of water. Saxon
Poet, VKM, bk. I, lines 68 ff. (an. 772), for the quotation.
247Saxon Poet, VKM, bk. I, lines 72 ff. (an. 772), takes note of how the heat fatigued
Charlemagnes soldiers.
248See Lintzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens, pp. 96127, who discusses the co-option
of the Saxon aristocracy by the Carolingians. Whether this amounts to class warfare is
another matter.
249V.S. Sturmi, ch. 23 (p. 158). It is clear that Eigil is condensing much that happened in
a period of several years. He does, however, make it very clear that the process of convert-
ing the Saxons began in the wake of Charlemagnes initial victory in 772. Wood, Missionary
Life, p. 69, accepts Eigils treatment of having Sturm play a major role in this missionary
activity and the kings role in establishing the overall ecclesiastical organization. Although,
on the whole, Wood (p. 266) tries to downplay the governmental role, and especially that
of Charlemagne, in dominating missionary activity.
bishops, abbots, and priests who accompanied the invasion force.250 At

this meeting with Charlemagne, the king is reported to have given Sturm
charge of administering the greater part of the region, or pars maxima,
that had been brought under Carolingian rule. This entailed both religious
and secular duties. Among the former, Eigil, Sturms biographer, is more
forthcoming at this time. Sturm was given the overall responsibility for
organizing the mission to the Saxons with the aim of converting them to
Christianity. The message was for the Saxons to forsake their idols and
images, destroy the temples of their gods, cut down their sacred groves,
and build holy churches. Eigil credits Sturms initial effort with consider-
able success, and takes specific note of both the preaching done by his
priests and the building of churches.251
250Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 23 (p. 158) mentions the many clergy who accompanied
Charlemagnes army on this campaign but does not indicate that Sturm was among them.
Given Eigils strong parti pris in regard to placing Sturm in the forefront of events, this
omission permits the inference that the abbot did not accompany the army.
251Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 23 (pp. 158159).
CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNWANTED WAR
The chronology of Charlemagnes return to the Frankish kingdom in the

wake of his successes in the western reaches of the Saxon region makes it
obvious that he left the army while it was returning home and traveled
back across the Rhine more quickly. Undoubtedly, he delegated the com-
mand of the forces that had campaigned against the Saxons to one or
another of his magnates, perhaps his uncle Bernard, who would be a
prominent commander in Carolingian military operations during the next
two years. Charlemagne, however, did not rest when he reached Austrasian
territory. Rather, he moved with considerable speed, likely accompanied
by a relatively small unit of his military household, southward into
Alemannia. By 5 July, he was ensconced in the royal palatium at Brumath
in the upper reaches of the Rhineland, the home territory of the extended
maternal lineage of his concubine Hildegarde.1
While moving through his kingdom, Charlemagne surely was given as
full a briefing as possible regarding the highly fluid diplomatic situation in
Italy. Also, he almost certainly received intelligence regarding the failure
of his wife Gerperga to become pregnant, as well as the progress of
Hildegardes pregnancy. At this point, therefore, some of Charlemagnes
domestic and foreign problems were becoming intertwined. If Gerperga
did not produce a male heir, or at least a child, to demonstrate that she was
not barren, Charlemagne would be hard pressed to keep her as his wife.
However, if he repudiated Gerperga, this act would have the potential to
play a negative role in his relations with her father, King Desiderius. As a
result, the future of the tripartite alliance, which was keeping the peace in
Italy, possibly could be compromised. In addition, both Bertranda, who
had arranged the marriage, and Charlemagnes cousin Adalhard, who had
1DK. no. 69; and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, no. 149. N.b. Charlemagne
was at Brumath, on the upper course of the Rhine some 500 kilometers from Herstelle on
the Weser, by 5 July 772. This could not have been accomplished if he had traveled with the
army.
the unwanted war247
given it his vigorous support in the spring of 771, regarded the marriage to
Gerperga and the Lombard alliance as being of great importance.2
Pope Hadrian, however, was very much interested in undermining what
would still appear to have been Charlemanges good relations with
Desiderius. The pope wanted to destroy the tripartite alliance and gain
Charlemagnes vigorous support for the return of papal territories that the
Lombards held. In this regard, Hadrian had the option to raise the specter
of weakening Charlemagnes position in the regnum Francorum by enter-
taining the possibility of supporting Carlomans sons, and perhaps even by
anointing them as Frankish kings.3 Prior to being overtaken by events
and his subsequent affirmation of the tripartite alliance, Pope Stephen III,
as seen above, had contemplated using Carloman as a counter to Char
lemagne. If Charlemagne found it necessary to put aside Gerperga, with
the potential for serious negative consequences in regard to his relations
with Desiderius, Pope Hadrian would likely be accommodating in lending
his support to an annulment of the Lombard marriage and in recognizing
the legitimacy of the Frankish rulers liaison with Hildegarde.
Queen Gerberga, Carlomans widow, and her party likely had arrived at
Rome either late in 771 or early in 772. At this time, Pope Stephen III may
have been ill or very soon may have begun to manifest a decline in health
that would end in death on 3 February 772.4 The papal biographies are
silent as to whether Stephen personally baptized young Pippin, Carlomans
son, and became his co-father as he had promised, but it is likely that he
did, or had it done in his name. As a sick man perhaps even contemplating
his own death, it is highly unlikely that Pope Stephen would have reneged
on a promise of such importance. Depending upon Stephens personal
piety, the fact that the promise had been made in writing may have been
2This information is provided by Paschasius Radbertus, V. Adalardi, ch. 7. See the dis-
cussion by Janet Nelson, Aachen as a place of power, in Topographies of Power in the Early
Middle Ages, ed. Mayke de Jong and Frans Theuws with Carine van Rhijn (Leiden-Boston-
Cologne, 2001), 231, with the literature cited in n. 68; and cf. McKitterick, Charlemagne,
pp. 8788.
3Traditionally, it is assumed that Gerberga fled directly to the court of the Lombard
king Desiderius. See Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 137141, with the literature cited
there. This view depends upon the assumption that by 4 December 771, when Carloman
died, Charlemagne had already repudiated Gerperga and, as a consequence, Desiderius
had been alienated, and would be very willing to have the widow and her children at his
court in order to make trouble for the Frankish ruler. As will be seen below, however, it is
clear that both rulers, Charlemagne and Desiderius, were still working together to preserve
the tripartite alliance more than a year and a half after Carlomans death.
4Regarding the chronology, see David S. Sefton, Pope Hadrian I and the Fall of the
Kingdom of the Lombards, Catholic Historical Review, 65 (1979), 206207.
248 chapter four
of some significance.5 However, it is clear that the ailing pontiff did noth-
ing rash. For example, he did not anoint Carlomans sons as kings in order
to support the dead rulers heirs in their pursuit of a legitimate share in
the kingship of the regnum Francorum.
Immediately following Stephens death, there had ensued at Rome a
succession struggle of some magnitude for control of the papal office. On
one side were Paul Afiarta and his supporters. They had distinguished
themselves earlier as defenders of the tripartite alliance and as enemies of
Christopher, his son Sergius, and, by extension, Carloman. Paul and his
followers were opposed by Hadrian, who had succeeded as leader of the
faction which had supported Christopher and Sergius. Both Christopher
and Sergius had opposed the tripartite alliance and had aided Carlomans
efforts to destroy it. It is possible, as well, that the Hadrianic faction was
not averse to seeking Byzantine aid if it could be accomplished without
too great a cost to the popes agenda of pursuing a policy of papal
independence.6
Hadrian, with the support of those who previously had been led by
Christopher, was elected pope, and took office on 9 February. It seems
clear that this election had not been carried out in consonance with the
rules laid down in the council of 769, and, therefore, Hadrians legitimacy
as pope likely was suspect, at least in some quarters.7 Hadrian followed up
his election by exiling Paul and his supporters. In addition, he immedi-
ately either freed or recalled to Rome those men whom his adversary had
imprisoned or exiled.8 On its face, the tripartite alliance, made in 770,
would seem to have been in some jeopardy by the early winter of 772.
Carlomans heirs, though only children, undoubtedly now would be seen
at Rome by the new pope and his supporters as symbols or surrogates
for Carolingian opposition to a close working relationship between
5Pope Stephen III had shown himself exceptionally supportive of Carloman and his
heirs and exonerated him from any guilt in trying to overturn the tripartite alliance. As
seen in CC. no. 48, Stephen blamed the entire situation on the royal missus Dodo. Stephens
Vita was written during the reign of Pope Hadrian and after the latter had abandoned
Carlomans heirs. Thus, there was good reason to omit any information that Stephen may
have helped the boys. See also the intentionally vague treatment of these events in
V. Hadriani I, ch. 9.
6Much has been written regarding Pauls effort to gain control of the papacy. See, for
example, Hallenbeck, Paul Afiarta, pp. 4753; Sefton, Pope Hadrian I, pp. 206210; and
Noble, The Republic, p. 128, with the diverse literature cited in these works.
7See Costambeys, Power and Patronage, p. 293, n. 83.
8V. Hadriani I, ch. 4. Although one finds different nuances, it is clear that no love was
lost between Hadrian and Paul. See, Hallenbeck, Paul Afiarta, pp. 4753; Sefton, Pope
Hadrian I, pp. 206210; and Noble, The Republic, p. 128.
the unwanted war249
Charlemagne and the Lombards.9 Indeed, in emphasizing his own aver-

sion to the tripartite alliance, Hadrian went so far as to praise Carloman
posthumously for his support of Christopher and Sergius. The pope
emphasized very positively that Carloman had been ready to come to
Rome with his armies in order to imprison Stephen because of the latters
unholy arrangements with the Lombards.10
Carlomans heirs, however, were children. The magnates in the territo-
ries which the dead monarch had ruled, had, in general, lent their support
to Charlemagnes monarchia. Pope Stephens likely assumption of the role
of co-father to young Pippin, the redemption of a promise he had made
earlier to Carloman, though not without importance, hardly was tanta-
mount to anointing young Pippin or his elder brother as king of the Franks.
Therefore, if Hadrian were to anoint either or both of Carlomans sons as a
rex Francorum, the obvious purpose of Gerbergas flight to Rome, he would
be setting in train a new papal policy by legitimizing them as a threat to
Charlemagne. Such a policy would surely alienate Charlemagne and a
great many of his supporters. If such a step were taken precipitously by the
pope, the act might even result in drawing Charlemagne closer to
Desiderius. This was, in fact, the opposite of what the pope wanted, and, in
the bargain, would accomplish nothing in regard to the recovery of papal
lands then in Lombard possession.
Rather, as we have come to understand Pope Hadrians diplomatic abili-
ties, it is more likely that he intended to set about subtly to intimate to
Charlemagnes representatives the possibility that he might anoint
Carlomans heirs. Surely, the role of the pope in the establishment and
anointing of Carolingian kings was not at issue as the events of 751
and more particularly those of 754 had demonstrated and were well-
remembered at the Carolingian court. Charlemagne, nevertheless, could
appreciate the weakness of the popes position. Carlomans heirs had no
obvious support among the Frankish aristocracy, and, in addition, at least
some and perhaps even many Frankish magnates likely still preferred the
pro-Lombard policy that had been followed by Charles Martel rather than
the pro-papal policy that King Pippin had pursued. Moreover, Carlomans
9Jrg Jarnut, Quierzy und Rom: Bemerkungen zu den Promissiones Donationis

Pippins und Karls, Historische Zeitschrift 220 (1975), 289290, 425446, provides an analy-
sis of the difficulties that could be caused for Charlemagne by the anointing of his neph-
ews. However, Jarnut focuses his attention on Lombard efforts to exploit the boys, which, it
is argued here, is the second phase of the effort led by Queen Gerberga to have her sons
made reges Francorum.
250 chapter four
sons had no easily mobilizable army in the Frankish kingdom to make

good their claims to regnum against their uncle even if they were to be
anointed and given formal papal recognition.
It is in this context, i.e. creating a potential military opposition to
Charlemagne, that Pope Hadrian undertook a flurry of diplomatic activity
with Duke Tassilo of Bavaria. It will be remembered that it was and
remained the dukes ultimate aim to attain independence from Frankish
rule if not a royal title for himself and his successors. Hadrian, shortly after
coming to power, lent his support to the Bavarian dukes synod at Neuching.
This effort by the papacy aided Tassilo in gaining greater control of the
Bavarian church.11 In mid-May of 772, following the synod, Tassilo made a
pilgrimage to Rome with his son Theudo and arrived during the celebra-
tion of Pentecost. At Rome, Pope Hadrian stood as co-father to Theudo.
This is the first example of a non-royal being co-fathered by a pope during
the later 8th century.12
Pope Hadrian encouraged Tassilo to continue his military operations in
Carantania with the aim of creating a secure secular and ecclesiastical
administration. Hadrian was interested especially in seeing Tassilo bring
about the conversion of the natives to Christianity. These operations, com-
menced by the Bavarian duke in late May, are reported to have been excep-
tionally successful. It is reported that in addition to overseeing numerous
conversions, Tassilo was recognized by the Carantanian Duke Waltunc as
his lord. No less important, however, was Tassilos establishment of ducal
control over the churchs operations in this newly subjugated region. For
this program, Tassilo not only had full papal support, but since this terri-
tory was not part of the regnum Francorum, Charlemagne had no claim to
rule it.13
In the wake of this success, the identification, in some quarters, of
Tassilo with the emperor Constantine the Great, surely fostered his dreams
of Bavarian independence and perhaps even of kingship. From a more
practical perspective, Tassilos successes in Carentania and Charlemagnes
interests in the Saxon region helped the Bavarian duke to maintain control
of the Brenner Pass through the Alps to Italy. This pass provided rapid and
11Concerning the synod of Neuching, see Jahn, Ducatus Baivariorum, pp. 512514.
12With regard to the date of the papal co-fathering at Rome, see AA, an. 772; for further
sources, see Angenendt, Das geistliche Bndnis, p. 66; and Bowlus, Franks, p. 36, with the
literature cited there. Pearson, Conflicting Loyalties, p. 65, while getting the date right,
seems to confuse Pope Paul and Pope Hadrian at this point.
13See Bowlus, Franks, p. 36, with the literature cited there.
the unwanted war251
easy access for the movement of Bavarian armies to the fortress city of
Verona and the Lombard plain. Likely at the behest of the pope, Tassilo
also began conversations with some of the greater magnates of Alemannia.
Such an initiative by Tassilo might well have accounted for Charlemagnes
rapidly orchestrated visit to the upper Rhineland, where, as noted above,
he is seen to have been holding court no later than 5 July 772.14
Like Desiderius, Charlemagne was a supporter of the tripartite alliance
that his mother had negotiated. In opposing the alliance, the new pope
may be seen to have been acting contrary to the contemporary interests of
the Carolingian government. The availability of Carlomans sons at Rome
as potential reges Francorum, whose anointing could perhaps pose a prob-
lem for Charlemagne, surely was well-understood by Hadrian. It is of con-
siderable importance to see that the pope, from the beginning of his reign,
was, in fact, initiating a new policy toward the Carolingians. This was made
manifest in several ways. For example, since the accession of Paul I to the
papal throne on 29 May 757, it had been the policy of each new pontiff to
inform the rex Francorum of his election. This had been done seriatim also
by the usurper Constantine and by Pope Stephen III. By contrast, Hadrian
did not write in the traditional manner in order to inform Charlemagne of
the results of the papal election, nor did he inform the Frankish king
directly of the election in any other manner, such as by sending a legate.15
In contrast to Pope Hadrian, King Desiderius very much wanted the tri-
partite alliance to continue. The Lombard king sent a very high level
embassy headed by Tunno and Theodicius, the dukes of Ivrea and Spoleto,
respectively, and the royal vestiarius, Prandulus, to visit Pope Hadrian
shortly after his election in early February became known at Pavia.16 The
Lombard legation arrived in Rome by the middle of March, at the earli-
est.17 By this time, Desiderius and his advisers not only were aware of
14See the discussion by Bowlus, Franks, p. 36.

15See, for example, the interesting evidence gathered by Sefton, Pope Hadrian I,
pp. 206210, regarding the pontiffs policy of independence. Cf. Classen, Karl der Grosse,
pp. 1113.
17It would seem that Desiderius wanted to open negotiations with the new pope as
soon as possible. However, we, like the principals, must be attentive to the demands of time
and distance with regard to the diplomatic activities under consideration. First, intelli-
gence regarding both the election of Hadrian at Rome and his positive treatment of
Christophers faction had to reach Pavia. Then this information had to be evaluated. Once
Desiderius and his advisers had affirmed that Lombard policy with regard to Hadrian
would focus on an effort to preserve the tripartite alliance of 770 and it was decided also to
send an embassy, particular men who were not only able but also available had to be cho-
sen to lead it. Next, this embassy would have to be gathered for a briefing. At the least, if the
252 chapter four
Hadrians victory in the struggle for the Fishermans throne, but also of
Paul Afiartas defeat, disgrace, and exile. Hadrians actions in regard to Paul
and his supporters had great potential to bode ill for the tripartite alliance.
Nevertheless, or perhaps even because of Hadrians likely hostility to the
alliance, the aim of Desiderius embassy was to assure the new pope of the
Lombards peaceful intentions. It was Desiderius aim to convince Hadrian
to maintain the tripartite alliance among Romans, Franks, and Lombards
that had been affirmed by all three parties in 770.18
This embassy had little, if any, positive effect on the pope. In response
to Desiderius initiative for continued peace and cooperation, Pope
Hadrian belabored the kings envoys with examples of the monarchs pre-
vious acts of hostility and untrustworthiness. Hadrian emphasized, par-
ticularly, that despite the agreements which undergirded the tripartite
alliance, a substantial quantity of papal territory still was being illegally
held by Desiderius. Nevertheless, rather than openly rejecting Desiderius
initiative, Hadrian insisted that he too would like to maintain friendly
relations among the Romans, Franks, and Lombards.19 However, rather
than accepting the status quo established by the tripartite agreement, the
pope made clear to his own supporters that he desired a return to the con-
ditions that had resulted from Pippins victories in 754 and 756.20 Hadrian
clearly was working toward a return to the papal policy of plenaria iustitiae
that some of his predecessors had pressed against the Lombards with
Frankish support, though without great success.21
men who were delegated to lead the embassy were not able to come to the capital person-
ally in a timely fashion to be briefed, they would have to be instructed by messengers sent
from Pavia. Finally, after all of these efforts had taken place, the embassy led by Tunno,
Theodicius, and Prandulus, with an entourage appropriate to their status and their mis-
sion, would have to make the 500-kilometer journey from Pavia to Rome. With fresh horses
and cooperative weather, considering that the journey was undertaken during the winter,
the embassy, traveling approximately 40 kilometers per day with frequent changes of
horses, would have taken about two weeks to reach Rome.
18V. Hadriani I, ch. 5. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 141146, correctly sees the corner-
stone of Desiderius policy as being based upon having good relations with Pope Hadrian
in accord with the terms that had been arranged with Stephen III in 770 as a basic part of
the tripartite alliance that Bertranda had negotiated.
19V. Hadriani I, chs. 5,6. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 143144, also detects the hostil-
ity in Pope Hadrians tone.
21Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, p. 151, recognizes that by the summer of 772, Hadrian
had made the execution of plenaria iustitiae central to his policy of papal independence
and territorial aggrandizement. There is no reason, however, to believe that this was not
Hadrians fundamental policy from the start.
the unwanted war253
With the return of the Lombard embassy to Pavia during the latter part
of March 772, it became obvious to King Desiderius that Pope Hadrian,
despite his protestations of qualified friendship, was uninterested in main-
taining the policy that had been accepted by Pope Stephen III. Desiderius
continued to support the tripartite alliance of 770 during the latter part of
February and into mid-March 772. This action would seem to constitute
prima facie evidence that Charlemagne, despite his relations with
Hildegarde, had done nothing to jeopardize his marriage to Gerperga and
thereby supposedly to anger her father. There is no information in the
highly biased Vita of Hadrian that even hints that there were problems
between Charlemagne and Desiderius at this time. The fact that in May of
772, Charlemagne not only went on campaign in the Saxon region, but also
initiated there a new and highly aggressive policy of conquest, provides
compelling circumstantial evidence that the Frankish ruler saw no press-
ing problems with Desiderius at this time.22
Of course, it is not impossible that in the immediate wake of Carlomans
death, i.e. early in December of 771, Charlemagne had repudiated Gerperga.
Such a hypothesis, favored by some scholars, is based upon the assump-
tion that following the death of Carloman, Charlemagne no longer had
any use for the Lombard alliance as a means of maintaining a major pres-
ence in Italy.23 The alliance and the marriage, it is argued, had been
accepted by Charlemagne only in order to give him the strong position in
Italy that he had been denied by the divisio of 768 and by Carlomans
latent, if not overt, hostility. Therefore, when Carloman died, and
Charlemagne was about to take over his kingdom, he chose to repudiate
Gerperga and send her back home to her father.24 If this were the case,
however, then Desiderius efforts to save the tripartite alliance, and, as will
be seen below, Charlemagnes efforts in the same direction, make it clear
22In trying to date the initiation of Carolingian problems with the Lombards, in
the present context, scholars have placed far too much weight upon the observation by
Einhard, VK, ch. 18, that Charlemagne repudiated his Lombard wife after one year
of marriage. Indeed, had Charlemagne sent Gerperga back to her father after one year of
marriage, i.e. early in the spring of 772, then Desiderius surely would have made some sort
of remonstration. Thus, Charlemagnes ability to undertake the Saxon campaign in the late
spring of 772 probably would have been undermined or, at least, endangered. Costambeys,
Power and Patronage, pp. 291292, rightly casts doubt on the exactness of Einhards chro-
nology, but does not take into consideration Charlemagnes beginning of the Saxon war as
evidence that good relations, i.e. the tripartite alliance, had not collapsed.
23See, for example, Delaruelle, Charlemagne, pp. 213214, 221224, who is followed by
many, and recently, Costambeys, Power and Patronage, pp. 291292.
24See, Delaruelle, Charlemagne, pp. 213214, 221224; and Hallenbeck, Pavia and
Rome, pp. 137139.
254 chapter four
that the Lombard monarch was not behaving as though he had been
greatly insulted and infuriated by the repudiation of his daughter. If, in
fact, Charlemagne had sent Gerperga home, this action certainly did not
constitute a casus belli between the Franks and the Lombards at this time.
Charlemagnes interest in repudiating Gerperga, whatever her child-
bearing potential, surely was not likely to have been an issue until
Hildegarde gave birth either to a son or a daughter who lived, thus proving
not only that she was fertile but that her children likely were to be viable.
In light of the chronology, it is unlikely that Hildegarde gave birth before
the later part of 772. It must be emphasized that during the winter of 771
772, Charlemagne was interested in maintaining the tripartite alliance
while he planned the invasion of the Saxon region. He had no good reason
to alienate King Desiderius, to cause problems with the latters son-in-law,
Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, or to alter the status quo in Italy with regard to
Carolingian policy toward the papacy.
Charlemagne, by contrast, had good reason to maintain cordial rela-
tions with Desiderius and Tassilo. Carolingian attention was focused on
two major goals. At home, Charlemagne sought to sustain the continued
reunification of the regnum Francorum as it had flourished under King
Pippin. This meant the peaceful absorption by Charlemagne of Carlomans
regnum under his own monarchia.25 Secondly, as seen above, Charlemagnes
foreign policy was focused on planning the invasion of the Saxon region.
This was seen, at that time, by Charlemagne and his advisers as the open-
ing phase in a war of conquest, which was a major strategic departure
from traditional Carolingian policy and apparently of the highest priority.
25Einhard, VK, ch. 18, observes with considerable prudence that no one knows why
Charlemagne repudiated his Lombard wife. Indeed, Einhard never even names the woman.
Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne, p. 45, rightly emphasizes the potential political value in
terms of strengthening his position within the regnum Francorum of Charlemagnes subse-
quent marriage to Hildegarde.
It is clear that Charlemagne accepted Hildegarde into his bed sometime after 30 April
771 but before 30 April 772. This chronology is based upon the fact that Hildegarde died on
30 April 783 (ARF, an. 783; and AE, an. 783) and that at the time of her death, Charlemagne
issued a charter in which it is indicated that Hildegarde died in anno tercio decimo coni-
unctionis nostrae (DK. no. 149). The chronology recorded in this act does not mean, how-
ever, that Hildegarde died during the thirteenth year of her marriage to Charlemagne in the
Christian sense of marriage, nor does it mean that she had been made his queen at the
time of their coniunctio. At the time of Hildegardes death, Charlemagne likely was some-
what sad and sentimental, and there surely was no reason for him to make an invidious
distinction between the time that she had been his concubine and the time that she had
been his wife under Christian rules. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, p. 66;
and Abel and Simson, Jahrbcher, I, 104105, n. 5.
the unwanted war255
It surely was a setback to the plans of both Charlemagne and Desiderius

when the Lombard embassy returned to Pavia at the end of March 772 and
reported to the king regarding Pope Hadrians exceptionally unenthusias-
tic support for maintaining the tripartite alliance. In response to Hadrians
actions, Desiderius ordered the mobilization of several of his armies for
the purpose of taking the field against papal assets. It is clear that the
Lombard monarch decided that it was necessary to pursue diplomacy by
other means. It was Desiderius aim to apprise Pope Hadrian in a very con-
crete manner, i.e. by the use of military force concerning the dangers that
were inherent in abandoning his predecessors highly conciliatory policy
toward the Lombards in particular, and in regard to the tripartite alliance
in general.26
It is likely that prior to leaving for Saxon territory, Charlemagne was
aware of the efforts that the Lombard king was undertaking in order to
educate the new pope.27 The Frankish monarch likely gave at least his
tacit approval to Desiderius initiative. Charlemagne could not have been
pleased with Pope Hadrians behavior. As noted above, there likely was
some sort of fraud connected with Hadrians election, and, in addition, he
had failed to follow protocol in informing the Frankish king of his eleva-
tion to the papal throne. This latter situation likely was considered a mark
of disrespect at the very least; perhaps it was even regarded at the
Carolingian court as a calculated insult. Pope Hadrian also was in posses-
sion of Carlomans heirs. From Charlemagnes perspective, any discour-
agement that Hadrian might suffer as a result of a carefully calibrated
Lombard military action would only enhance in the popes mind the value
of the Frankish army now led by the Frankish king, a principal of the tri-
partite alliance, as the arbiter of peace in Italy. Finally, Hadrians ability to
cultivate Tassilo as an ally likely would be weakened when it became clear
to the Bavarian duke that his father-in-law was in a hostile posture toward
perceived papal interests.
26See Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, p. 144, who does not, however, evoke an echo of
Clausewitzs famous dictum, but nevertheless makes the same point. Costambeys, Power
and Patronage, p. 296, believes that the Lombard king was looking to cling to his policy of
76971, when Desiderius had managed to build alliances with Ravenna, with the Frankish
king and with the pope. However, Costambeys view (p. 296) that Charlemagne had dis-
solved the tripartite alliance at this time is not supported by the sources.
27Costambeys, Power and Patronage, p. 295, describes Desiderius policy as a carrot-
and-stick approach, but does not believe that this was done with Charlemagnes approval,
much less his support.
256 chapter four
By early April, well before Charlemagne actually mobilized his army for
operations in Saxon territory, Lombard forces took control of the cities of
Faenza, Ferrara, and Comacchio. The constraints of time and distance
upon military operations require that we conclude that these rapid
Lombard victories were brought about by diplomacy and/or intimida-
tion rather than the result of the effective deployment of significant overt
armed force or actual warfare. The area around Ravenna, however, was
penetrated by Desiderius armed forces and the countryside is reported to
have been harried. The city of Ravenna itself certainly was not placed
under siege at this time, and there is no reason to believe that the walls
were subjected to a direct attack, however desultory.28
In short, during the first months of his pontificate, Hadrian did nothing
to secure Charlemagnes support. The pope, however, did do a great deal to
give the Carolingian ruler reason to harbor serious suspicions regarding
Romes behavior and its potential to redound negatively in regard to
Charlemagnes rule over a united regnum Francorum. Desiderius, at this
time, had good reason to believe that Charlemagne, whose marriage to
Gerperga apparently still was intact, or, at the least, was not an issue of
consequence to the Lombard king, would give his continued support to
the tripartite alliance. If Desiderius military operations did nothing else,
ultimately, they would require Pope Hadrian to seek Carolingian support,
and Charlemagne could enforce the tripartite alliance on a would-be too-
independent pope.
Desiderius military initiative would set the stage for the undermining
of Hadrians policy of papal independence, which the pope appeared to be
pursuing. This policy was perceived by Desiderius and likely also by
Charlemagne as contrary both to Lombard and to Frankish interests. If
Desiderius were successful, Hadrian would be required by Charlemagne to
abide by the tripartite alliance that his mother Bertranda had negotiated
with Pope Stephen only two years earlier. In this context of Frankish-
Lombard cooperation, papal efforts to achieve Plenaria iustitia would be
stifled, at least in the short term. In addition, those Frankish magnates
who advocated a pro-Lombard policy likely would lend their support to
Charlemagnes policy in Italy aimed at maintaining the tripartite alliance.
Pope Hadrian, however, predicated his efforts upon the assumption
that he would win Charlemagnes support for his revanchist policy to the
detriment of Desiderius and the Lombards. Hadrian, like his predecessor
28V. Hadriani I, chs. 6, 7.

the unwanted war257
Stephen II, undoubtedly had a very low opinion of the Lombards and
assumed that sooner rather than later Desiderius would do something so
ill-advised with regard to the pope or papal interests that Charlemagne
would not be able to ignore his behavior and, therefore, would have to
intervene. The pope also undoubtedly was aware of the fragile nature
ofCharlemagnes marriage to Gerperga and the potential for disharmony
between Franks and Lombards that might be engendered by its
dissolution.
Hadrian likely took as his model the policy of Pope Stephen II, who had
won King Pippins support against King Aistulf. Pippin, as events showed,
obviously had a very strong religious commitment to maintaining the
independence of the papacy, both in regard to the Lombards and the
Byzantines. Charlemagne, it was believed at Rome, had accepted his
fathers views in this matter, as demonstrated, for example, by his assump-
tion of the title of patricius Romanorum. The pope would seem to have
assumed that Charlemagne only had agreed to the tripartite alliance in
order to undermine Carlomans dominant position in regard to Italy,
which had been the result of the divisio of 768. Therefore, with Carlomans
death, Hadrian believed that there no longer was any reason for
Charlemagne to coddle the Lombards.29
Hadrian likely was not looking forward to the prospect of having a
Carolingian army invade Italy in order to deal with the Lombards. Such an
army, by its very presence, had the potential to compromise the indepen-
dence of Rome that the pope was seeking to establish and, at the least, to
limit papal diplomatic maneuverability.30 It would seem to have been the
popes plan to raise the specter before Desiderius that Charlemagne would
come to the aid of the papacy, if called, and, thus, the Lombards would be
forced to behave in the required manner toward Rome and return papal
lands. The alternative for Desiderius, in this scenario, was to face the type
of humiliation that Aistulf had suffered at the hands of King Pippin in 754
and in 756. Indeed, Pope Hadrian could be very certain that Desiderius
remembered that he, himself, had been put on the Lombard throne by
Pippin following Aistulfs death.
In short, Hadrian believed that Charlemagnes treaty obligations to the
papacy, as incurred in his capacity as patricius Romanorum, not only were
strong for religious reasons but also had a basis in the Carolingian kings
29See, for example, Lintzel, Karl der Grosse, pp. 2526; Delaruelle, Charlemagne,
pp. 213214, 221224; and Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 137139.
30Sefton, Pope Hadrian I, pp. 208209.
258 chapter four
sense of Realpolitik.31 In addition, Hadrian likely was aware that at least

some royal advisers took the position that Desiderius was a subject of
Charlemagne because the Lombards had recognized Frankish ditio follow-
ing their surrender to King Pippin in 756. Thus, because Desiderius sup-
posedly was Charlemagnes fidelis, the rex Francorum would have
considerable influence in curbing the behavior of the Lombards toward
Rome without the need to invade Italy.32 However, should this estimation
of Charlemagnes commitment to the papacy and of his influence with the
Lombards be mistaken, Pope Hadrian also cultivated cordial relations
with Tassilo and the Byzantines, and kept Carlomans sons at Rome. These
measures could be seen as potential threats to Charlemagnes peaceful
reunification of the regnum Francorum and to his role in the politics of the
Italian peninsula.
The armed conflict that erupted between the forces of King Desiderius
and Pope Hadrians supporters in April 772 threatened to bring an end to
the tripartite alliance. However, Charlemagnes sense of what was happen-
ing south of the Alps during the spring of 772 is problematic. Indeed, a
message sent from Rome by Pope Hadrian to inform Charlemagne of
Lombard operations in the Ravennate is unlikely to have arrived at Worms,
more than 1000 kilometers to the north, before the Carolingian army had
begun its march eastward in May in order to invade the Saxon region.
There is no evidence that Desiderius had communicated with Charlemagne
at this time regarding this issue.33
It is possible, but unlikely, that a papal messenger caught up with
Charlemagne with information that Desiderius was abusing the papacy in
violation of the treaties of 754, 756, and 770. If this were in fact the case, it
is clear that Charlemagne did nothing at this time to deal with the situa-
tion in Italy. He did not alter his military plans, stop the march eastward,
and turn his army southward for an invasion of Italy. There is no reason to
believe that at this time or earlier, Charlemagne had repudiated Gerperga
and sent her back to Desiderius in disgrace as some sort of warning to the
31ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 773.

32For the general position that the reges Francorum held the ditio over the Lombards,
see Fred. Cont., ch. 37, and with regard to Charlemagne and Desiderius, see CM, p. 295; and
AMP, an. 773.
33Philipp Jaff, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (rpt. Graz, 1956), no. 2396,
believes that Pope Hadrian perhaps sent an embassy to Charlemagne in February of 772 in
order to obtain support against Lombard aggression. Not only is this date impossible
on chronological grounds, but the sources cited by Jaff provide no basis for such a date.
Cf. Noble, The Republic, p. 130, n. 154, who believes the date possible but unlikely.
the unwanted war259
Lombards. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Charlemagne sent

envoys of any kind either to Pavia or to Rome at this time. Any decision
regarding Gerperga, and, indeed, any decision regarding Carolingian pol-
icy in Italy would have to await the end of the Saxon campaign. It seems
clear that at this time, Charlemagnes priorities were focused on the Saxon
region and he had no plans to march into Italy.
Negotiations
By late June 772, when Charlemagne returned from his successful military
operations in the Saxon region, the diplomatic and military situation in
Italy was beginning to cause problems for him. Charlemagne began to
express concern as to whether he might have to postpone his second
round of military operations in Saxon territory that tentatively was sched-
uled for the campaigning season of 773.34 A growing domestic problem,
ostensibly unconnected to the conflict between Desiderius and Hadrian,
further complicated Charlemagnes efforts to maintain the tripartite alli-
ance in Italy. Likely sometime in the winter of 771772, Charlemagne, as
we have seen above, took as a concubine a woman named Hildegarde. She
was the daughter of an exceptionally influential Swabian family whose
support Charlemagne wished to cultivate in order to help in the consoli-
dation of his power throughout the regnum Francorum following
Carlomans death. By the time of Charlemagnes return from campaigning
in Saxony, late in the spring or early in the summer of 772, Hildegarde cer-
tainly was pregnant and possibly may already have given birth to a bastard
daughter, at least as seen through the eyes of the church.35
34ARF, ann. 772, 773; and AE, ann. 772, 773, both indicate that following the Saxon cam-
paign of 772, Charlemagne spent the Christmas season at Herstal, then apparently went to
Diedenhofen to spend the greater part of the winter. Following his stay at Diedenhofen,
Charlemagne returned to Herstal to celebrate Easter, which fell on 18 April. Cf. Bhmer and
Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, nos. 150(147)-157 (154). The location of Herstal in the north
of the regnum Francorum indicates that Charlemagne, who no longer needed to mask his
movements in regard to the Saxon theater of operations, was not greatly interested in going
to Italy.
35As noted above, Charlemagne took Hildegarde to his bed as concubine sometime
after 30 April 771 but before 30 April 772. As previously suggested, it is likely that
Charlemagne began his relationship with Hildegarde no earlier than the summer of 771
and perhaps even later. It should be noted, in this context, that Hildegarde was exception-
ally fecund and had at least eight pregnancies which resulted in live births during a period
of fewer than twelve years. Concerning Hildegardes children whom Charlemagne fathered,
see Halphen, ginhard, p. 57, n. 2; and McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 8990.
260 chapter four
In the meantime, however, Gerperga not only had failed to give

Charlemagne an heir, but as a later commentator observed, she was con-
fined to her bed and unable to have a child.36 As a result, this account of
the situation continues: Charlemagne, with the advice of his very pious
clergy, put her aside as though she were already dead.37 Sometime follow-
ing the repudiation of Gerperga, Charlemagne would appear to have for-
malized his liaison with Hildegarde by means of a properly constituted
Christian marriage and made her his queen.38 The date of Gerpergas repu-
diation is not clear. However, in light of the possibility that Carlomans
sons might be anointed as reges Francorum, either by Pope Hadrian or
byan anti-pope supported by Desiderius, should the latter become hos-
tile due to the repudiation of his daughter, Charlemagnes need for a
legitimate male heir was becoming acute. At this time, Charlemagne does
not appear to have favored his son Pippin the Hunchback as a future
rex Francorum. However, it was not in Charlemagnes nature to act
precipitously.39
If the repudiation of Gerperga is to be taken as a cause for King
Desiderius doubts regarding the long-term survival of the tripartite alli-
ance, then Charlemagnes action in this regard is unlikely to have taken
place before the late summer or early autumn of 772. By this time, not only
By September of 773, when Charlemagne was besieging Pavia, Hildegarde had given
birth to at least one child, who already was regarded as being old enough and sufficiently
healthy to travel from Francia to Pavia and then to Rome. V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, speaks of
Charlemagnes nobilissimos filios, although the son in this context likely was Pippin the
Hunchback, and, thus, it cannot be assumed that Hildegarde already had given birth twice.
In any case, Hildegardes eldest son, Charles the Younger, could not have been conceived
before the latter part of 772.
Light is cast on Hildegardes background and early marriage in two articles published in
the collection Actes du Colloque Autour dHildegarde, ed. Pierre Rich, Carol Heitz, and
Franois Hber-Suffrin (Metz, 1987): Jean Schneider, Charlemagne et Hildegarde:
Conscience dynastique et Tradition locale, pp. 918; and Robert Folz, Tradition et Culte
de Hildegarde, pp. 1925. Of primary importance, however, is Kl. Schreiner, Hildegardis
regina: Wirklichkeit und Legende einer karolingische Herrscherin, Archiv fr
Kulturgeschichte 57 (1975), 170.
36Notker, GK, bk. II, ch. 17.
37Notker, GK, bk. II, ch. 17.
38V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, refers to Hildegarde as already being queen during the autumn
of 773.
39Einhard, VK, ch. 19; and Creontius, Annales, an. 771. The value of this latter source is
undoubtedly problematic, as already discussed. However, this report captures the flavor of
the situation. At the Carolingian court, the queen mother Bertranda, who had worked so
hard in concert with Desiderius for the tripartite alliance, appears, according to Einhard
(VK, ch. 19), to have been angry and bitter. However, it is far from clear whether Bertrandas
reaction was a result of the looming failure of the tripartite alliance or because she was
blamed at court for accepting a barren bride for her son.
the unwanted war261
had Gerperga given no hint of becoming pregnant, but Hildegardes bas-

tard daughter likely already was born. When the Lombard court learned of
Gerpergas repudiation by Charlemagne, Desiderius and his supporters
undoubtedly were greatly upset. The reaction at Pavia is certainly under-
standable both in personal terms by her father and diplomatically by the
king with regard to what was feared as the diminishing likelihood that the
tripartite alliance would survive. However, even at this late date, Desiderius
continued to work at keeping alive this alliance with the Franks.
It is difficult to ascertain whether Desiderius disappointment at the
repudiation of his daughter was mitigated by the likelihood that she, in
fact, was barren, and that Charlemagne had acted correctly. Intimation of
possible personal hostility between the two kings is indicated, and then
only obliquely, in a suspect account of the repudiation apparently
authored at the court of Gerpergas sister, Liutperga, in Bavaria. According
to the annals drawn up by Creontius, Duke Tassilos referendarius: The
queen, practically at deaths door, was taken from Francia to Italy. He con-
tinues with the very unlikely conclusion that Although it had been bruited
about that she was sterile, she bore a son in Italy and died in childbirth.40
By trying to refute the Frankish view, Creontius certainly shows an aware-
ness of claims made at the Carolingian court that Gerperga was sterile and
that this condition likely was basis for her repudiation (N.b. there is no
evidence to corroborate either Gerpergas pregnancy or her death in this
time frame).
Despite the dramatic nature of this pitiful story, it is not credible that
Charlemagne would have repudiated his legitimate wife, who brought
with her significant diplomatic advantages, including maintenance of the
tripartite alliance, while she was pregnant and while he was increasingly
in need of having a legitimate male heir. Rather than abandon hope of
maintaining good relations with the Lombard king, a desideratum of some
and perhaps many important Frankish magnates, Charlemagne, in the
wake of his repudiation of Gerperga, offered to Desiderius a sum of 14,000
solidi. This money should be seen either as some sort of composition for
the repudiation of Gerperga or perhaps the return of a bridal gift or dowry
that had accompanied the marriage.41
40Creontius, Annales, an. 771.

41On two occasions (V. Hadriani I, chs. 27, 30), Charlemagne is depicted as offering
Desiderius a sum of 14,000 gold solidi so that war might be avoided. Neither the basis for the
amount of money offered nor any reason why Charlemagne should think that Desiderius
would cooperate for a cash payment is provided. Indeed, the very silence of the sources
262 chapter four
As church law during this period makes clear, it was fully legitimate for
the relevant religious authorities to annul a legitimately contracted mar-
riage when the bride proved to be barren.42 Indeed, at no time following
the repudiation of his daughter did Desiderius seek to have either Pope
Hadrian or any other distinguished clerical authority defend the insolubil-
ity of the marriage of Charlemagne and Gerperga. This provides some rea-
son to believe that she was, indeed, barren. It is of considerable importance
that earlier, Pope Stephen II had upheld the permanence of the marriage
bond against the well-known and rather un-Christian matrimonial pro-
clivities of the Carolingian ruling house.43
Hadrian surely did not lack the sophistication necessary to exploit the
kind of opportunity for diplomatic advantage that would have been pro-
vided by Charlemagnes repudiation of Gerperga had the Frankish ruler
acted contrary to the canons. Of course, the pope may well have left this
arrow in his quiver. A causa, whether soundly based or not, could have
considerable diplomatic value as a challenge to the legitimacy of
Charlemagnes marriage to Hildegarde and the future throneworthiness of
her sons, should any be born. More simply put, in the highly unlikely cir-
cumstance that Hadrian and Desiderius might make common cause
against Charlemagne, the pope could always challenge the legitimacy of
the annulment as a means of trying to influence Carolingian behavior.44
As relations between Charlemagne and Desiderius would seem to have
become less positive in the wake of the repudiation of Gerperga, although
perhaps not because of it, Pope Hadrian bided his time. He continued to
delay in meeting the request by Queen Gerberga that he anoint Carlomans
sons as Frankish kings. In the context of Charlemagnes difficulties with
Desiderius and what would appear to be the growing influence of Hadrians
position at the Frankish court, Queen Gerberga and her primary adviser,
Duke Autchar, reevaluated the situation. They came to understand that
they would gain the support of Pope Hadrian only in the rather unlikely
case that Charlemagne violated his solemn oath as patricius Romanorum
and insisted on supporting King Desiderius against Rome.
regarding the purpose of the monetary offer raises the suspicion that the author wanted his
readers to believe that it was a bribe offered by Charlemagne to avoid war and, therefore,
had no basis either in law or custom.
42Suzanne Wemple, Women in Frankish Society: Marriage and the Cloister, 500900
(Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 7679, covers the material in a satisfactory manner.
43CC., no. 45.
44Pope Hadrians sophistication, if not his ruthlessness, is emphasized by both Sefton,
Pope Hadrian I, pp. 206220; and by Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 137171.
the unwanted war263
As Queen Gerberga and her advisers saw events moving in the direction
of a papal rapprochement with Charlemagne, they reevaluated their posi-
tion. Therefore, it was decided that they flee from Rome and seek the for-
tune of Carlomans sons at the Lombard court.45 This move by the queen
indicates that she was convinced that although Pope Hadrian was intent
upon destroying the tripartite alliance, his primary preference was not the
support of a hoped-for Carolingian faction in the regnum Francorum that
would oppose Charlemagne in the name of Carlomans heirs. Rather, it
was the popes aim to use Charlemagnes army, or more likely the threat of
a Carolingian invasion against the Lombards, just as previous popes effec-
tively had used Pippins forces against Desiderius predecessors.
In such an eventuality, Hadrian might well be expected to return the
young princes and their mother to Charlemagne as part of an arrange-
ment that would bring Carolingian power to bear against Desiderius in the
interest of papal policy. It is important to note that Hadrian did not have
the personal obligation of co-father to Carlomans son Pippin, which
required defense of the boy and his interests, that Pope Stephen III very
likely had undertaken. Finally, if Hadrians estimation of Charlemagnes
response to the new papal policy were correct, and obviously Gerberga
took this position, then Desiderius might very well have good use for
Carlomans sons as potential reges Francorum. Whether Desiderius took
the initiative and spirited Queen Gerberga, her children, and advisers out
of Rome, or Carlomans people simply sought out the Lombard king, can-
not be ascertained. It is obvious, however, that Desiderius had no reason
to support Carlomans sons until Charlemagne had repudiated Gerperga
and other political leverage might be needed to influence his erstwhile
son-in-law to maintain the tripartite alliance.
In any case, during the late summer or early autumn of 772, Desiderius
seems to have become convinced that he could not rely on Charlemagne
to act decisively in order to sustain the tripartite alliance in the face of
Pope Hadrians opposition. It is at this point that the Lombard king initi-
ated a vigorous campaign to coerce the pope into anointing Carlomans
sons as reges Francorum.46 What role, if any, Charlemagnes repudiation of
Gerperga may have played in regard to Desiderius decision to alter his
45V. Hadriani I, ch. 9, makes it very clear that Gerberga, Autchar, and Carlomans heirs
are to be found at Desiderius court after the Lombard ruler had begun direct military oper-
ations against Hadrian at Rome.
46V. Hadriani I, chs. 1824.
264 chapter four
policy in this direction can only be a matter for speculation.47 However, as

will be seen below, Desiderius did not want war with the regnum
Francorum, and Hadrian did not want war with the Lombards. Neither
side wanted a Carolingian army to invade Italy, and Charlemagne, as late
as the spring of 773, was intent upon continuing military operations in the
Saxon region during the forthcoming campaigning season. It is obvious,
that at this time, he did not want to lead an army south of the Alps as his
father had found to be necessary on two occasions in 754 and in 756. War
in Italy in 773 was something that was wanted by no one.
Desiderius pressed military operations against papal assets throughout
the remainder of the campaigning season of 772. The city of Ravenna itself,
was placed under siege.48 A Lombard force drawn from the duchy of
Spoleto took Otricoli on the Via Flamania. Yet another Lombard force was
deployed to sever connections between the Pentapolis and the duchy of
Rome by taking control of the fortified towns of Montefeltro and Urbino.
A third unit moved south to capture Sinigaglia on the coast. This force
then moved south-southeast to take the fortified town of Jesi. Following
this success, this same unit was detailed to gain control of a spur of the old
Flaminian Way that would lead them almost due west to Gubbio from
where access to the Via Amerina could be controlled.
The capture of Sinigaglia, Jesi, Montefeltro, and Urbino placed an effec-
tive wedge between the Pentapolis and the duchy of Rome. When Gubbio
was taken, Desiderius forces opened the Via Amerina so that a Lombard
army could begin the march south through Perugia straight on to Rome.
Only the fortress town of Nepi remained to be captured or bypassed.49
While at least four Lombard armies were operating at the same time
between Ravenna and Gubbio, Desiderius himself led the select levies of
the region of Tuscia into the field. His first target was the fortress at Blera
on the frontier between the Lombard kingdom and the duchy of Rome,
about 45 kilometers from the Holy City itself.50
As the ring of Lombard armies gradually tightened around Rome, Pope
Hadrian is credited by his biographer as being increasingly willing to dis-
cuss a settlement with the Lombard king. He is said to have promised that
47Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 139155, although his time frame is different, sees
Desiderius as being motivated, in large part, to take revenge against Charlemagne for the
repudiation of Gerperga.
49V. Hadriani I, ch. 18, sets out the geography of Lombard advances which makes sense
in terms of military strategy.
the unwanted war265
if Desiderius would withdraw from Roman territory, he would negotiate

regarding the crowning of Carlomans sons. Desiderius, however, insisted
that the pope meet with him personally as a precondition before the
Lombard armies withdrew from any of the papal cities that had been
seized.51 In order to break this impasse, Desiderius ordered his forces to
harry the territory of the Roman duchy to the very walls of the city, itself,
and he put into place a loose blockade, which made it impossible to move
into and out of the duchy of Rome by land without Lombard approval.52
It was clear at this point in Lombard military operations that Desiderius
was preparing the strategic groundwork so that he would be able to put in
place, if necessary, a close siege of the city of Rome during the campaign-
ing season of 773. In anticipation of Desiderius assault on Rome itself,
Hadrian closed and strengthened the citys gates. He began preparing for a
close siege by mobilizing military forces from throughout the duchy in
order to defend the Holy City.53 The pope realized, however, that like his
predecessors, he too would need significant military aid from the
Carolingians to survive a Lombard siege of Rome. Therefore, in the winter
of 773, he sent a missus named Peter to ask Charlemagne personally for
help.54 Desiderius and Hadrian had played at diplomatic brinksmanship
and now both men were poised to precipitate a situation neither of them
really wanted: a greatly increased Carolingian military presence south of
the Alps.
Because of the success of Desiderius blockade, Peter, the popes legate
to the Carolingians, had to travel by sea to Marseilles. He then journeyed
overland to Charlemagnes court at Diedenhofen, more than 700 kilome-
ters to the north. There, the Frankish king was continuing to prepare for
his second campaign in the Saxon region.55 When Peter arrived at
Diedenhofen, he found an embassy from Desiderius which had arrived
there before him. It was the task of these Lombard envoys to explain
Desiderius position to the Carolingian court so as to maintain good rela-
tions with the Franks. They were at Diedenhofen to convince Charlemagne
to continue to permit Desiderius to pursue his policy of educating Pope
Hadrian regarding the value of maintaining the tripartite alliance that
51V. Hadriani I, ch. 18; ARF, ann. 772, 773; and AE, ann. 772, 773.
52See, V. Hadriani I, ch. 22, along with the discussion of the military forces available to
the pope as adumbrated in Chapter Two, above.
53V. Hadriani I, chs. 21, 24, would seem to be describing a continuous process for the
defense of Rome.
55V. Hadriani I, ch. 18; ARF, ann. 772, 773; and AE, ann. 772, 773.
266 chapter four
Bertranda had negotiated and which both the Franks and the Lombards
believed would keep the peace in Italy. As part of this educational process,
the pope was to be deprived temporarily of papal lands and rights that
Desiderius had permitted the papacy to hold in fulfillment of the tripartite
alliance.56
Desiderius envoys undoubtedly recalled to Charlemagne and his advis-
ers Hadrians aberrant and provocative behavior. The pope had been
fraudulently elected contrary to the council of 769, and he had not even
informed Charlemagne of the results of the papal election as apparently
was required by tradition. Further, the pope had sought close relations
with the Byzantine emperor, and, finally, he had ostensibly rejected the
tripartite alliance of 770, which his predecessor Pope Stephen III had
accepted in good faith and, in fact, had embraced. Special mention
undoubtedly was made to Charlemagne of Hadrians persecution of Paul
Afiarta, who, in 771, had played a key role in thwarting the efforts of
Christopher and Dodo, Carlomans missus, to intimidate Pope Stephen III
and overturn the tripartite alliance. Indeed, Pope Hadrians order to
imprison Paul was emphasized to the Carolingian court as well as the
fact that this dutiful papal cubicularius and supersista, who had
served Charlemagnes interests so well in thwarting Carolomans plans,
had been executed at Ravenna while in the custody of Hadrians subordi-
nate, Archbishop Leo.57 Finally, Desiderius envoys very probably were
instructed to make clear that it was the Lombard kings intention to send
Carlomans sons back to their royal uncle and to their grandmother,
Bertranda, once an accord had been reached with Charlemagne reaffirm-
ing the tripartite alliance.
Given the diplomatic talent available to Desiderius, it is unlikely that
his envoys were so rash as to call Charlemagnes attention explicitly to the
potential consequences of an open break between the Carolingians and
the Lombards. Charlemagne surely was aware, however, that if there were
a break with the Lombards, Desiderius would undoubtedly seek to have
56V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, makes clear that a Lombard embassy was at the Carolingian
court in order to give assurances to Charlemagne that Desiderius was acting in a correct
manner. The author of V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, who has a strong pro-Hadrian bias, had no
reason to elaborate on the details of Desiderius defense of his actions unless there was
some question regarding his principals behavior. Indeed, it was in the interest of the popes
apologist to make Desiderius look like the source of all evil in the world.
57V. Hadriani I, chs. 1018, tells the story of Hadrians treatment of Paul Afiarta from the
papal side. This account makes clear that serious charges had been made against the pope,
which were necessary to deny. There are, of course, many ways to interpret the facts pro-
vided by Hadrians Vita. Cf. Sefton, Pope Hadrian I, pp. 213215.
the unwanted war267
Carlomans sons anointed as Frankish kings. Even if Hadrian withstood

Desiderius pressure to carry out the anointing, an anti-pope could be
established by the Lombards, who then would elevate Carlomans sons to
the Frankish kingship. In fact, the various successes enjoyed by the anti-
pope Constantine and the efforts of the anti-pope Waldiperts supporters
were still recent memories, not only at Rome but throughout Italy as
well.58 Whatever would have been the legitimacy of Carlomans sons as
anointed kings, their very existence would constitute a threat to
Charlemagnes monarchia.
In the regnum Francorum, these episodes regarding anti-popes were
known to Charlemagnes experts in Roman matters, such as Fulrad. The
possibility certainly could not be ignored that such a creature, who would
consent to become anti-pope, could be placed on the fishermans throne
by Lombard arms. In addition, it is likely that an anti-pope, as the situa-
tions mentioned above make clear, would have considerable support from
some if not many members of the Roman aristocracy. This especially
would be the case for those who had lost out in the struggle for power
between Paul and Hadrian. With an anti-pope in place to do the bidding
of a hostile Lombard king, Carlomans sons easily could be consecrated as
reges Francorum to the detriment of Charlemagnes interests.
Undoubtedly, there still were important aristocrats within the regnum
Francorum itself who would lend their support to the process of vindicat-
ing the rights of Carlomans sons to succeed to their fathers patrimony if
the boys were to be anointed as kings in a plausible manner.59 For
Charlemagne, in addition, an open break with Desiderius would very
probably result in renewed problems with the Lombard kings son-in-law,
Duke Tassilo of Bavaria. Tassilos military forces surely could prove some-
thing of an annoyance to a Carolingian war effort should Charlemagne
find an invasion of Italy to be necessary. The Bavarian duke also could
make trouble for the Carolingians in the Saxon region as his father, Odilo,
had during the reign of Pippin. Charlemagne surely would need no tuition
regarding the fragility of Tassilos loyalty to his Carolingian cousin.60
Finally, there always had been a strong party at the Carolingian court
which favored collaboration with the Lombards and was hostile to the use
58Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome, pp. 106112, provides useful insights into both
situations.
59Classen, Karl der Grosse, p. 13; and Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 18, emphasize
Charlemagnes need to gain control of Carlomans sons. Cf. Hallenbeck, Pavia and Rome,
p. 159, who reviews a broad spectrum of causes.
60Concerning Charlemagnes problems with Tassilo, see above, Chapter Two.
268 chapter four
of a Frankish army in Italy to support the papacy.61 At least to some extent,

Desiderius likely counted on those men who maintained such sentiments
to advise Charlemagne against undertaking an invasion of Italy and war
with the Lombards.
When Peter, the popes legate, was given an audience with Charlemagne,
the Carolingian ruler was exposed to the papal side in the conflict with the
Lombards.62 The popes imprisonment of Paul Afiarta most surely was
defended on the grounds that he had been proven guilty of the murder of
Christopher. Either the envoy Peter or the papal letters he carried undoubt-
edly also explained, as the later and much-biased Vita Hadriani takes great
pains to make clear, that the pope had played absolutely no role in Pauls
execution. Indeed, the papal position was that the secular government at
Ravenna had executed Paul contrary to Pope Hadrians efforts to save the
life of this unholy murderer.63
Peter likely also likely would have found it necessary to make clear the
nature of the contacts or connections that Pope Hadrian may have had
with the Byzantines. These, of course, the popes envoy surely minimized
or explained away as a mere diplomatic posture assumed by Hadrian to
maintain cordial relations with Constantine V and therefore of no real sig-
nificance.64 By contrast, the popes promise to Desiderius envoys made in
March 772, to try to live by the treaty of peace that had been agreed to by
the Romans, Franks and Lombards surely was emphasized. It is highly
unlikely that Hadrians agenda in these matters, i.e. to obtain the full resto-
ration of papal lands, was exposed to Charlemagne in a fully candid
manner.65
After all of these important matters had been addressed, and we have
no idea how Peter dealt with the question of the legality of Hadrians
election or his failure to inform Charlemagne in a timely manner of his
61Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik, pp. 95132, for the background.

62It seems clear that V. Hadriani I, chs. 522, provides the papal view of the facts sur-
rounding the conflict between the pope and King Desiderius into the winter of 772773.
Thus, this papal apologetic is treated here as the version of events provided to Charlemagne
by Hadrians envoy. In chapter 22, the author makes explicit mention of apostolic letters
that were brought by Peter to Charlemagne. Although these letters are no longer extant,
they very likely provided much the same information with the same parti pris that, at a
later date, was incorporated into the V. Hadriani I itself.
64Noble, The Republic, pp. 132134, does an excellent job of explaining away Pope
Hadrians putative involvement with the Eastern empire. One may assume that Peter
tried to do so, as well, but his effectiveness cannot be gauged.
the unwanted war269
accession to the papal throne, the ground was prepared by the popes leg-
ate to enumerate Desiderius treaty violations and other crimes. Just as
Hadrian is reported to have made clear to the Lombard kings envoys at
Rome in March 772 the delicts for which their master had been responsi-
ble, it must be assumed that Peter also provided such a list, if not an even
more embellished account, to Charlemagne at Diedenhofen.
According to Hadrian, as his views are recorded in his Vita, Pope
Stephen III had recounted to him the details of Desiderius fraud and bad
faith regarding the treaty of 770. In addition, Hadrian is said to have
emphasized that Pope Stephen had made clear to him that Desiderius
had lied concerning every promise that he had made under oath, while
touching the body of Saint Peter, with regard to the restoration of the law-
ful rights that belonged to Gods holy church. In addition, the papal envoy
very likely emphasized that Pope Stephen had told Hadrian that the
Lombard king, working through Paul Afiarta, was to be blamed for blind-
ing Christopher and Sergius, which resulted in the death of the former.66
Desiderius failure to fulfill his oaths to return papal property according
to the treaty of 770 was only the beginning of a lengthy list of crimes with
which he was charged by Rome. Hadrian claimed that Desiderius, while
engaging in negotiations, presumably to fulfill the territorial obligations of
the treaty of 770, in fact undertook hostile actions against papal interests.
The pope charged that Desiderius stole the cities of Faenza, Ferrara, and
Comacchio from the exarchate of Ravenna, and harassed the Ravennate
with Lombard troops. Hadrians envoy claimed that the pope sent several
ambassadors to Desiderius in order to convince the Lombard king to give
back to Saint Peter what had wrongfully been taken, and thus to meet the
terms of the treaty to which he was a party. These efforts, Peter reported,
had failed.67
Desiderius, however, is depicted by Peter as demanding that the pope
come to him personally for negotiations. The Lombard monarch is claimed
to have insisted that Hadrian anoint and crown the sons of Carloman as
reges Francorum. As Pope Hadrians supporters wanted Charlemagne to
see Lombard policy, it was Desiderius aim to trick the pope into coming to
Pavia so that the pontiff could be coerced into anointing Carlomans sons
as Frankish kings. This, Peter undoubtedly emphasized at the Frankish
court, would result in an unholy division of the Carolingian regnum and
separate Charlemagne from the papacy. In the wake of this discord,

270 chapter four
Desiderius would be able to take control of the city of Romea loose

blockade limiting travel already was in placeand to extend the Lombard
kingdom throughout all of northern Italy at the expense of the papacy.68
Not only was Charlemagnes honor as patricius Romanorum to defend
Rome at issue, but the unity of the Frankish kingdom was also on the verge
of being imperiled by Desiderius efforts to have Carlomans sons anointed.
Peter, moreover, was in a position to emphasize that Pope Hadrian had
bravely refused to go to the Lombard court or to anoint Carlomans sons as
reges Francorum, despite the great pressure that was being placed upon
him by Lombard military actions. The papal envoy then reported to
Charlemagne that Desiderius responded to Hadrians continued and
steadfast loyalty to Charlemagne by stealing even more cities from Saint
Peter and by making life even more miserable for Romes dependents
throughout the more northerly parts of Italy. In the apostolic letters that
Peter brought to the Carolingian court, Charlemagne was given a second
lengthy list of territories and cities, subsequently recorded in the Vita
Hadriani, that were harassed or taken by the Lombards. Among these lost
cities were Sinigaglia, Jesi, Montefeltro, Urbino, Gubbio, Octrioli, and
Blera.69
The papal argument very likely was strengthened by the fact that at the
very moment that Peter was at Charlemanges court, Rome was under dis-
tant blockade. This was proven by the fact that Peter and his entourage
had to make a sea voyage from Rome, i.e. Ostia, to Marseilles in order to
reach the regnum Francorum. It is clear that the Lombards blocked the
land route through the Alps that normally was used. Peter also presumably
had evidence of some sort, perhaps from a Lombard defector (see below),
that Desiderius was planning to lay close siege to the Holy City during the
campaigning season of 773. Pope Hadrian emphasized that in this highly
dangerous situation, Rome needed Charlemagnes vigorous diplomatic
support and perhaps even Frankish military intervention.70
The papal legate continued, and emphasized that it was in the
Carolingian rulers own interest to defend the rights of Saint Peter, as made
clear by the papal exposure of Desiderius nefarius plans in regard to
Carlomans sons. It was also Charlemagnes duty as patricius Romanorum
to protect Rome in fulfillment of his oath. Charlemagne undoubtedly was

70See V. Hadriani I, ch. 22; and the acceptance of the account of the blockade by the
Frankish court as evidenced by ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 773.
the unwanted war271
reminded, as the Vita Hadriani indicates, of the treaties that had been
made in 754 and 756, which he too had sworn to honor by a solemn oath.
The good work that his father, King Pippin of holy memory, had done by
coming to the aid of Gods holy church surely was a tradition and, indeed,
a model that Charlemagne was urged to imitate both quickly and
vigorously.71
More Negotiations
Charlemagne responded to the popes entreaties by sending yet another

envoy to Desiderius. The purpose was to admonish the Lombard king vig-
orously and convey the message that it was necessary to return the papal
cities to Pope Hadrian if the tripartite alliance of 770 were to be preserved.
The Lombard policy of educating the pope was to be reversed. In a return
embassy, Desiderius representatives responded to Charlemagne with
assurances that everything would be returned to the pope as quickly as
possible. Charlemagne then sent a very high level group of envoys into
Italy. This embassy was destined for a meeting with the pope in order to
ascertain whether Desiderius were keeping his promise to return all that
he had taken from Saint Peter. The embassy was further instructed to fol-
low up its mission to Rome with a visit to the Lombard court.72 Clearly,
Charlemagnes intention was to preserve the tripartite alliance, despite his
repudiation of Gerperga, and the efforts of the pope to destroy this pact.
While Charlemagne and his advisers were evaluating the claims and
counter-claims of the papal and Lombard embassies, Desiderius himself
was moving on Rome with his army and with Queen Gerberga and her
sons in his entourage.73 Pope Hadrian responded to Desiderius threat-
ened attack on Rome with a three-pronged strategy. First and most impor-
tantly, a large military force was successfully mobilized and ensconced
within the walls of Rome in order to defend the city.74 Secondly, the
pope undertook efforts in a continuing manner and with a modicum of
success to undermine Desiderius support among various of his aristo-
cratic and military supporters.75 Finally, Hadrian ordered the drawing

72See V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, which is discussed below in greater detail.
75V. Hadriani I, ch. 24, lists the military forces which came to the popes support at this
time, i.e. the entire levies of Tuscia, Campania, Perugia, and some of the cities of the
272 chapter four
up and publication of a sentence of anathema. Among other matters, the

pope prohibited Desiderius, all Lombards, and even Duke Autchar from
setting foot on the soil of the Roman duchy.76
By the early spring of 773, the Lombard invasion force apparently had
already reached the city of Tivoli, only some 30 kilometers north of Rome.
There, it was met by Hadrians embassy, which was headed by three bish-
ops: Eustratius of Albano, Andrew of Palestrina, and Theodosius of Tivoli.
At Tivoli, according to the Vita Hadriani, Desiderius gave the embassy an
audience. In the course of this meeting, the Lombard king was informed of
the details of the popes anathema. It is also very probable that Desiderius
was given a copy of the document, which the pope is known to have had
ordered to be drawn up, and which included all of the relevant details
noted above.77
In the immediate wake of this meeting, in what scholars have found to
be a very puzzling response to the anathema, Desiderius is described,
somewhat self-servingly in the Vita Hadriani, as having returned home at
once in great awe and confusion.78 Actually, Desiderius moved his army
from Tivoli and established his encampment in the environs of Viterbo
some 70 kilometers northwest of Rome. Viterbo, however, was in Lombard
territory and, thus, did not fall within the geographical limits of the popes
order and threat of anathema. At Viterbo, the Lombard ruler awaited
further diplomatic developments. Clearly, the threat to his position posed
by a papal anathema was a matter to be given careful consideration, but it
hardly put an end to all Lombard military operations against papal assets.79
A widespread belief, purveyed by Rome, that Desiderius was moved to
break off his projected attack on the holy city in awe and confusion, and
Pentapolis. It is important here to take into account the propensity for a certain amount of
hyperbole, in this context, which was intended to exaggerate the popes success.
Nevertheless, it should be clear that for Hadrian to have had even small amounts of mili-
tary support from the above-mentioned areas, with the exception of Campania, it was nec-
essary for him to have undermined, at least to some extent, Desiderius position in these
regions. As will be seen below, aristocratic support for Desiderius policies, and perhaps
even for the king himself, was questionable in some parts of the regnum Langobardorum.
See Stephano Gasparri, Il passagio dai Langobardi ai Carolingi, in Il futuro dei Longobardi.
LItalia e la costruzione dellEuropa di Carolo Magno (Brescia, 2000), pp. 2544, at 3536,
who argues for an anti-royal Lombard conspiracy, while Contambeys, Power and Patronage,
pp. 288289, argues that there is no evidence for this.
79V. Hadriani I, ch. 25. Gasparri Il passagio, pp. 3536, evokes a conspiracy by various
Lombard magnates to argue that Desiderius saw himself in a weakened position.
the unwanted war273
ostensibly because of Hadrians anathema, surely was very well-suited to

the goals of papal propaganda. However, it is rather difficult to accept the
notion, at face value, that Desiderius acted for purely religious reasons in
light of the vigorous and sometimes very bloody Lombard offensives that
he had orchestrated against papal assets during the previous year.80
Whatever putative awe Desiderius may have had for Pope Hadrians spiri-
tual power, and it surely cannot be concluded that the Lombard king was
immune from the religious implications of a papally proclaimed anath-
ema, it would be rash to assume that his response was conditioned solely
by his personal religious sentiments. Rather, Hadrians success in prepar-
ing for the defense of Rome and the weakening of support among at least
some members of the Lombard aristocracy for Desiderius policy of edu-
cating the pope to the value of the tripartite alliance likely also under-
mined the kings enthusiasm at this time for the plan to besiege Rome.81
In addition, Charlemagnes envoys had been sent to look very carefully
at the charges and counter-charges that had been made at Diedenhofen
by both Desiderius and Hadrians envoys. After this meeting was ended,
and the Lombard envoys reported to Pavia, Desiderius, in fact, sent yet
another envoy to Charlemagne with assurances that the papal cities would
be returned to Hadrian.82 Sometime before Pope Hadrians anathema
message was presented to Desiderius at Tivoli, however, the Lombard king
surely learned that a Carolingian embassy was in Italy and under orders
from Charlemagne to ascertain whether the papal cities had been
returned.83 Desiderius, who had not yet, in fact, returned the occupied
cities to the pope, or, at least, this is the view presented in Hadrians Vita,
80Gina Fasoli, Carlomagno et lItalia, vol. I (Bologna, 1968), 7879, very strongly empha-
sizes the religious motivation for Desiderius behavior, and in this is closely followed by
Noble, The Republic, p. 131.
81For example, Johannes Haller, Das Papsttum: Idee und Wirklichkeit, 2 vols. (Basel,
1951), I, 449, argued that Desiderius believed that his forces were unequal to the task of
capturing Rome.
82V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, indicates that Desiderius had informed Charlemagne that the
Lombards had restored the stolen cities and all of Saint Peters legitimate rights. The time
frame for this exchange of information would seem to suggest that, at best, Desiderius
promised that he would make the restoration, not that it already had been carried out.
See Sefton, Pope Hadrian I, p. 216, who emphasizes Desiderius fear of the Carolingians.
83V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, makes clear that Charlemagnes inspection team, which was to
ascertain whether the cities that Desiderius had taken from the Roman republic had been
returned to the pope, arrived in Rome shortly after Desiderius had retreated to Viterbo.
It is unlikely that Desiderius actually met with this group of inspectors sent by Charlemagne.
However, there can be no doubt that the Lombard king, whose own envoys had been
visiting Charlemagnes court and whose distant blockade of Rome was still in force, knew
that this embassy was on its way to Rome before he withdrew to Viterbo.
274 chapter four
surely wanted to avoid attacking Rome while Charlemagnes inspectors,

Bishop George of Amiens, Abbot Gulfard of Saint Martin at Tours, and
Albinus were discussing the diplomatic situation with the pope.84 In short,
Desiderius had many good non-religious reasons for not beginning the
process of laying close siege to Rome early in the spring of 773.
Further, Desiderius was well aware that various important men in
the Lombard kingdom were far from pleased with his policies. For exam-
ple, Abbot Anselm of Nonantola was well-known to favor Carolingian
interests. At this time, he resided under Charlemagnes protection at the
monastery of Monte Casino. Anselm, despite his abbatial position, was
not a figure of profound spiritual importance who was positioned to exer-
cise great moral authority over the Lombards. Rather, at this time, he was
something of a powerful clerical bureaucrat. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, he had very good connections to the Lombard aristocracy, espe-
cially in the northeast of the regnum. Prior to his entry into the clerical life,
Anselm not only had been duke of Friuli but he was the brother-in-law
of the late King Aistulf, Desiderius predecessor.85
Anselm was but one of many Lombard aristocrats who were more
or less disaffected from Desiderius and hostile to various of his policies.
Men of considerably lesser stature than Anselm in various parts of the
Lombard kingdom also showed signs of their discontent.86 For example,
in the region of Brescia during the year 772, a group of nine men and their
supporters led by a certain Augino and described in the Lombard sources
as infideles, i.e. the disloyal ones, revolted against Adelchis, Desiderius son
and co-ruler. Adelchis would appear to have had some overall administra-
tive responsibility for the region. The revolt failed, and Adelchis confis-
cated the rebels land, much of which, however, he found politically useful
to donate to the monastery of Saint Savior in Brescia. Augino is reported to
have managed to flee to safety in Francia.87
Although there is speculation that Hadrian arranged, or perhaps only
encouraged, Auginos revolt, any role that the pope may have had in this
matter has yet to be proven. In addition, it is unlikely that Charlemagne
did any more than give refuge to a group of malcontents who might be of
84V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, regarding the leaders of Charlemagnes embassy and their recep-
tion at Rome by Pope Hadrian.
85See the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 365.
86CS, ch. 9.
87CDL., ed. Brhl, no. 44; and the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders,
VII, 365.
the unwanted war275
future use. This, of course, was a traditional strategy that had been well-
developed by the Romans and also was practiced by Charlemagnes
Byzantine contemporaries. However, such episodes, which also would
seem to have had something of an analogue at Spoleto, were very likely to
be more than a little troubling to Desiderius as he faced the prospect of
establishing a protracted close siege of Rome under difficult military and
spiritual conditions.88
When Charlemagnes envoys arrived at Rome, they were assured by
Pope Hadrian that Desiderius had not returned the papal cities that the
Lombards had occupied. The envoys were informed as well of additional
difficulties that the Lombards had caused since Hadrians envoy, Peter, had
made his report to Charlemagne at Diedenhofen during the winter, some
three months earlier. When Bishop George, Abbot Gulfard, and Albinus
departed from Rome in order to visit Pavia, they were accompanied by a
papal embassy carrying letters from Hadrian to Charlemagne. These epis-
tles are supposed to have contained detailed papal advice to the Frankish
king with regard to what should be done to force Desiderius to abandon
the cities that the Lombards continued to hold illegally.89
Pope Hadrian would appear to have believed that the situation had
deteriorated greatly. As a result, the pope made it very clear that it was
Charlemagnes duty as patricius Romanorum to come in person to Italy in
order to lead the armies of the regnum Francorum in defense of the rights
of Saint Peter and to restore the cities that the treacherous Lombard king
had stolen.90 Undoubtedly, the effective operations undertaken by King
Pippin in 754 and 756 were adroitly adumbrated by Rome as precedents
for this action. Whether Hadrian had given up hope that the Lombards
would undertake the territorial restorations that he demanded and that he
really wanted a Frankish army to invade Italy in order to engage the
Lombards in battle is not clear. Pope Hadrian may still have believed that
88Pope Hadrians policy of winning the support of the duchy of Spoleto for the Roman
republic was only to reach fruition following Desiderius failure to stop Charlemagnes
armies in the Alpine passes (V. Hadriani I, chs. 3233). It seems unlikely, however, that this
move by a powerful group of magnates from Spoleto was taken without considerable prior
planning and consultation. Indeed, within three weeks of his consecration as pope,
Hadrian was gaining supporters at the Spoletean monastery of Farfa (CF, pp. 156158).
Hadrian also used Abbot Probatus of Farfa as an envoy at the head of a large embassy to
Desiderius (Vita Hadriani I, ch. 19).
90V. Hadriani I, ch. 26, undoubtedly records the gist of these letters, which are no longer
extant.
276 chapter four
the specter of such a Frankish offensive might threaten Desiderius suffi-

ciently so that he would return the stolen cities.
Charlemagnes embassy did not return directly to the Carolingian court,
but with the papal envoys in their train, journeyed to Pavia in order to
discuss the situation further with Desiderius. Charlemagne had instructed
the envoys to visit Desiderius after they had met with Hadrian in case the
Lombard king had not yet made the restorations of papal properties and
rights that he had promised. It seems clear that at this time, Charlemagne
still wanted to maintain a good working relationship with the Lombards
and to preserve the tripartite alliance. Perhaps more to the point,
Charlemagne wanted to remain free of entanglements in Italy at this time
in order to pursue the new Carolingian trans-Rhenish strategy aimed at
the territorial conquest of the Saxon region. This attempt by Charlemagne
to give exclusive focus to his military plans east of the Rhine, of course,
was an analogue of Pippins policy by which he freed himself from prob-
lems in Italy and the Saxon territory in order to pursue operations in an
uninterrupted manner for the conquest of Aquitaine during the 760s.
Hadrians Vita provides exceptional pro-Carolingian propaganda in
support of Charlemagnes subsequent invasion of Italy. Charlemagnes
ambassadors are reported to have begged and exhorted Desiderius, in
the manner that they supposedly had been instructed by their king, so
that the Lombard ruler would make the required restorations. The
Lombard monarch, however, would appear to have been unconvinced by
the efforts of the Carolingian envoys. He failed to agree to act as they
requested. Unfortunately, our information regarding Desiderius response
to the Frankish envoys also depends solely upon the Vita Hadriani. This
text, of course, also is heavily larded with papal propaganda in regard to
the negotiations. As a result, it must remain suspect in regard to whether
it provides the whole story or merely a biased papal version of the truth
in regard to Lombard behavior.91
Whatever propaganda value this failed embassy by the Carolingian
envoys to Pavia was to have subsequently at Rome as support for papal
policy, it is clear that Charlemagne did not want to undertake an invasion
of Italy during the campaigning season of 773. This remained the case
even after Bishop George and his colleagues returned empty handed from
Pavia. In fact, as soon as this embassy reported its failure to the Frankish
ruler, likely at Herstal where he was celebrating the Easter holiday and not

the unwanted war277
incidentally still well-situated to muster his troops for an invasion of the

Saxon region, Charlemagne sent yet another legation to Desiderius.92 This
time, perhaps with some exaggeration, Charlemagnes envoys are depicted
once again as begging Desiderius to restore peacefully the cities that he
had stolen and to fulfill the legally held rights of Romans. In addition,
Charlemagne is reported to have renewed his offer to pay a lump sum of
14,000 solidi to Desiderius. As mentioned, above, this payment would seem
to have been some sort of composition offered by Charlemagne for the
repudiation of Gerperga since in no way could a mere 14,000 solidi com-
pensate for the revenues that potentially would be collected by the
Lombard fisc from the papal cities that Desiderius is alleged to have
stolen.93
It would appear, however, that at a certain point in these discussions,
Desiderius interpreted Charlemagnes continued willingness to negotiate
as a sign of Carolingian weakness, or at least of the Frankish kings indeci-
sion as to whether he would lead an army into Italy. There can be little
doubt that the Lombard ruler knew that Charlemagnes primary strategic
interest at this time was to launch a second invasion of Saxon territory. It
is also likely that the so-called pro-Lombard faction at the Frankish court
counseled Charlemagne against attacking Desiderius and becoming
unnecessarily or excessively involved in Italy when important work was
still to be done east of the Rhine. Finally, it must be remembered that
Carlomans heirs were still at the Lombard court and a reminder of the
potential danger they represented to Charlemagnes efforts to maintain
monarchia in the regnum Francorum.
Desiderius, likely as a result of his view of the situation north of the
Alps faced by Charlemagne, seems to have remained adamant in his
refusal to return the cities that he had seized. Or, at least, this would appear
to have been his position until various conditions were met by the pope.
92V. Hadriani I, ch. 26. See Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 563, who has a very good
grasp of the chronology at this point.
93V. Hadriani I, ch. 26. It is important to make clear that the offer of 14,000 solidi is not
described in this account as a compensation for giving up possession of the papal cities.
Indeed, the very failure of the Vita to make an explicit connection between the withdrawal
of Lombard forces from the papal cities and the cash gives rise to the suspicion that they
were unrelated. Cf. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 367, who reads several words into
the text in order to connect the payment with the withdrawal.
N.b. A later interpolation in V. Stephani II, ch. 34 reports that Pippin offered Aistulf 12,000
solidi if the Lombard king would make peace and return certain properties to the papacy.
CM, p. 295; and AMP. an. 754, follow V. Stephani II on this point. All, however, are to be
rejected as likely a projection backward of Charlemagnes offer to Desiderius.
278 chapter four
The Lombard kings problems with Hadrian can be traced back to the first
embassy that he sent to Rome following the new popes election. Hadrians
Vita, which, as already noted, misrepresented initial Lombard aims, fails to
recognize, as might be expected, that the pope bore any responsibility for
the deteriorating diplomatic situation. In light of the obvious bias of our
sources, which focus on Desiderius malignant behavior, it seems reason-
able that the Lombard ruler, who could not possibly have forgotten
the great military successes enjoyed in Italy by King Pippin I, very likely
was not as stubbornly intransigent as he is portrayed in the Vita Hadriani.
In light of the complicated diplomatic situation discussed above, Char
lemagnes repudiation of Gerperga, whenever it may have taken place,
obviously was not the casus belli for the war that was about to begin.
Going to War
Toward the beginning of May 773, the above-mentioned second spring

embassy that Charlemagne had sent to Desiderius returned to the regnum
Francorum from its failed mission. It became clear to Charlemagne, who
appears still to have been at Herstal, that a decision would have to be
made as to whether an invasion of Italy would be undertaken during the
campaigning season of 773.94 Undoubtedly, Charlemagne already had
shared both with the relevant local government officials of the regnum
Francorum and the great ecclesiastical and lay magnates of the realm who
were responsible for mobilizing and playing leadership roles in Carolingian
expeditionary forces, that the desired second campaign in Saxony might
have to be postponed. In addition, they surely were informed that it might
be necessary to mobilize for military operations south of the Alps.95
In early March of 773, at just about the same time that Charlemagne
sent his first embassy, headed by Bishop George, to Italy, he summoned
Abbot Frodoenus of Novalesa to the royal court at Quierzy, north of Paris.
It was at this time that the Frankish ruler granted the monastery a sweep-
ing immunity from the jurisdiction of local royal officials.96 As has already
been noted in regard to Carlomans relations with Novalesa, this wealthy
monastery was propitiously located, from a logistical perspective, to sup-
port Carolingian military operations in the region of the Mont Cenis Pass
94ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 773.

95See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5759.
96DK., no. 74, makes it clear that Frodoenus was at Quierzy with Charlemagne on
25 March 773.
the unwanted war279
for an expedition through the Alps. It may be wondered, in this context,

whether Desiderius learned of Frodoenus trek to the Carolingian court
and, if so, what he made of the situation.
The presence of Abbot Frodoenus at the royal court at this time pro-
vides some insight into the time frame for Carolingian military planning
in regard to the acquisition of the logistical support that was required to
move a large army from the Frankish kingdom over the Alps into northern
Italy. Arrangements with the abbot of Novalesa also make us aware of
Charlemagnes prudence in preparing various strategic options well in
advance of their possible implementation. By the beginning of March 773,
i.e. at least two months before a final decision in regard to leading an army
into Italy was to be made, Charlemagne already was undertaking elabo-
rate preparations for the possibility of an invasion of the Lombard king-
dom. He was working to assure the availability of satisfactory logistic
support some 700 kilometers down his line of march should he have to
abandon his plan to campaign in the Saxon territory and undertake mili-
tary operations in Italy.
Among the extensive properties owned or controlled by the monastery
of Novalesa, many scores of estates were situated in regions that the
Carolingian armies would traverse should an invasion of the Lombard
kingdom prove necessary.97 During late March of 773, while Frodoenus
was at Quierzy, Charlemagne granted to the monastery of Novalesa sub-
stantial immunities for its holdings from the jurisdiction of the local
counts and their subordinate officials in these regions.98 Abbot Frodoenus
was given full administrative responsibility for securing the required logis-
tic support from lands owned or held by Novalesa should the contingency
plan to invade Italy that was being developed by Charlemagnes Magis
tratus have to be made operational.
Charlemagne wisely chose to deal directly with the abbot, who was in a
position to coordinate the levies of men and matriel owed from the
estates of his monastery. Without such a grant of immunity, the local
counts in each of the many administrative circumscriptions, or pagi, in
which Novalesa had facultates would have had the ultimate responsibility
for mobilizing troops and supplies from the lands of the monastery.99
97See TA, ed. Geary, passim, regarding the extensive holdings of Novalesa, which could
provide the substantial resources to support Carolingian military operations for part of an
Italian campaign.
98DK., no. 74.
99See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 219, with regard to such immunities.
280 chapter four
The use of local royal administrators clearly was regarded by Charlemagne

and his advisers, in the present context, as considerably less efficient than
the unified model of command and responsibility represented by the
grant of immunity to Frodoenus. In addition, the more Frankish officials
who had even a hint of the possibility of a Carolingian invasion of Italy, the
more likely it would be that such information would reach the Lombard
court, which had a well-developed intelligence gathering apparatus.100
By mid-May, at the latest, Charlemagne decided that it was necessary to
invade Italy. His closest advisors in regard to this policy likely were Bishop
George of Amiens and Abbot Fulrad of St. Denis. The former, who was a
native of Italy and previously had been bishop of Ostia, had headed
Charlemagnes mission that had visited both Rome and Pavia in the pro-
cess of the negotiations discussed above.101 Abbot Fulrad, who, as already
noted, had been King Pippins longtime ambassador in Italy, continued to
play a key role as an adviser to Charlemagne at this time.102 Finally, from a
military perspective, it seems very likely (see below), that Charlemagnes
paternal uncle Bernard played at least as significant a role in the planning
of the campaign as he was to play in the invasion itself. Bernard, a younger
half-brother of King Pippin, was of an age that makes it likely that he had
also occupied a responsible position in the two Carolingian campaigns
undertaken in Italy during the mid-750s.
With the benefit of hindsight, a multiplicity of reasons can beand
indeed have beenadduced to suggest why Charlemagne elected to
invade Italy at this time. Some contemporaries, as well as some modern
scholars, argue that Charlemagne, like Pippin before him, took the reli-
gious duties that were both implicit, and in some cases explicit, in his
assumption of the office of patricius Romanorum very seriously. However,
even setting aside whatever may have been Charlemagnes personal spiri-
tual attachment to the papacy and his views in regard to the sacrosanct
nature of oaths, the request made by Pope Hadrian for military aid simply
could not be ignored by a new king who may have believed that he needed
100Ratchis, 13 (LL, ed. Beyerle), provides considerable information regarding Lombard

intelligence gathering. Walter Pohl, Frontiers in Lombard Italy; The Laws of Ratchis and
Aistulf, in The Transformation of Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed.
Walter Pohl, Ian Wood and Helmut Reimitz (Leiden-Boston-Kln, 2001), 117141, provides a
useful introduction to this text, but its potential for the study of Lombard intelligence gath-
ering has yet to be fully exploited.
101See V. Stephani II, ch. 23; and V. Stephani III, ch. 17.
102Concerning Abbot Fulrads diplomatic career, see Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad,
pp. 461467.
the unwanted war281
the support of Rome to maintain the unification of the regnum Francorum

under his rule.103
In this context of competing prioritiesSaxon conquest vs. war in Italy
Charlemagne had to ascertain to his satisfaction that the popes request, in
fact, was legitimate in light of supposed Lombard intransigence and
duplicity. Charlemagne also had to decide not only that a strong military
response was required, but also that it was required specifically during the
campaigning season of 773. This emphasis both on the legitimacy and the
urgency of the popes request was necessary because in the past, various
popes had exaggerated the dangerous state of affairs in Rome. This had
been the case during the 760s, while Pippin was in the process of conquer-
ing Aquitaine, and the king concluded, at that time, that the popes pleas
for aid were not worthy of an immediate military response.104
Other scholars emphasize that Charlemagne feared that Desiderius
would succeed in his effort to have Carlomans sons anointed as reges
Francorum either by exerting irresistible pressure on Pope Hadrian or by
the Lombard king elevating a pliable anti-pope to undertake the task.
Such an eventuality, as recognized by all, obviously could have consider-
able potential to cause dislocation within the Carolingian realm and
threaten the unification that Charlemagne was working continuously and
diligently to maintain.105 Of special importance was a broad spectrum of
opportunities that Duke Tassilo would be in position to pursue in conso-
nance with his father-in-law, who could come to dominate the papacy. All
of these possible initiatives that the Bavarian duke might be thought to
pursue, including perhaps even the establishment of his dynasty as kings
of the Bavarians, would likely be regarded at the Frankish court as inimi-
cal, at least in the short term, to Carolingian authority and power.
In the long term, Charlemagne could not ignore what was happening
in Italy. Prolonged conflict between Lombard and papal forces, absent
Carolingian military intervention, could only weaken Frankish influence
in Italy and embolden both the Lombards and Bavarians. Ultimately,
Carolingian enclaves in the north of the peninsula, i.e. Aosta and Susa,
which were important to the control of several Alpine passes, could be
103See, for example, Halphen, Charlemagne, p. 96, who places the emphasis on the
notion that Charlemagne was convinced that the pope had been mistreated by Desiderius
and as patricius Romanorum he had an obligation to set things right. Hallenbeck, Pavia and
Rome, p. 158159, elaborates on this point.
104See, for example, CC., nos. 1421. Noble, The Republic, pp. 108109, labels this behav-
ior papal paranoia.
105See, for example, Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 18; and Classen, Karl der Grosse, p. 13.
282 chapter four
endangered. In addition, war in Italy could provide an inviting setting for

an increase in Byzantine influence at Rome and even for the intervention
of East Roman military forces in the more northerly reaches of the penin-
sula. The emperor Constantine, who led Byzantine forces effectively in the
Balkans, was a potential player who could not be ignored. Further, increas-
ing political instability and even desultory warfare likely would have a
negative effect on long-distance trade between the Frankish kingdom and
Italy. Finally, Muslim forces, which maintained strategic positions on vari-
ous western Mediterannean islands, could well be attracted by increased
opportunities on the mainland itself.
The potential negative effects of Charlemagnes failure to intervene
effectively in Italy were, by and large, not immediate, but more long-term
in nature. The question, therefore, is not why Charlemagne saw the need
to invade Italy and bring about its pacification, but rather, why he chose to
do so during the campaigning season of 773. A later date would certainly
have been more convenient given the situation in the Saxon region, which
Charlemagne certainly knew was potentially volatile in the short term.106
It is likely that no intelligence had as yet reached Charlemagne indicating
that the Saxons, during their great annual spring council at Marklo, were
planning a major military offensive. By the beginning of May 773, Char
lemagne, using previous patterns of Saxon behavior as a guide, could rea-
sonably conclude that there would be no coordinated military operations
against Frankish assets during the late spring or early summer and, more
particularly, there would not be an effort to reconquer what had been lost
the previous year.
Here, it is important to emphasize that repeated Carolingian diplo-
matic initiatives following the accession of Hadrian as pope, which had
been intended to create a modus vivendi with Desiderius, seemingly had
failed. It is likely also that the situation had not been improved by the
Frankish kings need to have his marriage to Gerperga annulled. Char
lemagnes envoys reported to him, both on the basis of their formal meet-
ings at Pavia and even more likely from Lombard court gossip, that, at this
time, Desiderius had no inclination to surrender the gains that he had
made at papal expense. It seems to have been the opinion of Bishop
George and the other Carolingian experts on Italian affairs that Desiderius
was convinced that Charlemagne, at this time, lacked the resolve to pur-
sue his diplomatic efforts in Italy by other means, i.e. military action.
106See Chapter Five, below.

the unwanted war283
Should Pope Hadrian draw the same conclusion, Carolingian influence

south of the Alps could diminish quite rapidly. In effect, Charlemagne, as
the leader of a great power, knew, if not from his own experience then
from having observed his fathers policy decisions with regard to events in
Italy, that, when necessary, he had to act quickly and decisively in order to
maintain the credibility of his position as the arbiter of events in the
northerly reaches of the peninsula. A failure in Italy surely would make it
more difficult for Charlemagne to execute his policies everywhere else.
This, of course, included matters at home, where the integration of
Carlomans erstwhile regnum into a unified Frankish kingdom likely could
not yet be regarded as having been fully accomplished. As a result, some-
time during the spring of 773, i.e. after the return of his second failed
embassy to Desiderius, Charlemagne drew the firm conclusion that a
timely and unambiguous military intervention was required in Italy.
Mobilizing the Army
Once the decision was made, Charlemagne acted decisively and ordered
military forces from various parts of the regnum Francorum to be mobi-
lized for a muster at Geneva.107 This large force, like all Carolingian armies,
began its mobilization at the local level, first in the centenae and then in
the civitates and pagi so that initially units moved in relatively small
groups to the muster and, as a result, placed no significant pressure for the
provision of supplies on the countryside.108 The process of mustering all of
these small groups ultimately at Geneva likely took place during the
greater part of July of 773, and the subsequent advance into the Alps was
probably begun toward the end of July or the beginning of August. In light
of the complexity of the Carolingian military bureaucracy and the rather
lengthy distances that at least some of the expeditionary levies had to
travel, this may be considered a rather rapid timetable for mobilization.
107See, for example, ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 773. Charles R. Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-
Avaria: The Grand Strategy behind Charlemagnes Renovatio Imperii in the West, The
Journal of Medieval Military History, I (2002), 4951, evinces surprise that Charlemagne did
not set the muster in a place that would permit the Carolingian army to advance through
the Chur passes. Since the greater part of the Carolingian military forces likely were mobi-
lized from areas to the west of the Rhine for this invasion, as had been the case under
Pippins leadership in 754 and 756, the establishment of Geneva for the muster and the use
of more westerly passes was the strategically sounder course.
108Bachrach, Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 142.
284 chapter four
Before the contingent from any civitas or pagus in the regnum Fran
corum could begin its march to Geneva, much work had to be done at the
local level. Messengers from the royal court, then located at Herstal, had to
ride throughout the kingdom with documents that informed each count
who was being ordered to mobilize troops, how many fighting men and of
what kinds, e.g. foot soldiers, archers, artillerymen, engineers, lightly-
armed mounted troops, and heavily-armed mounted troops, he was
required to bring to the muster.109 Summonses also went out to those of
the kings vassi dominici who were to be mobilized for this operation.
Finally, summonses also were, of necessity, delivered to relevant immun-
ists whose lands were exempt from local comital jurisdiction for purposes
of responding to the bannum and for meeting the mobilization require-
ments set out by the central government.110 With regard to the immunists,
Abbot Frodoenus of Novalesa, for example, was directly responsible for
raising the troops for expeditio and logistical support (hostilitio) fromthose
estates that belonged to his monastery, which had been granted an immu-
nity from local jurisdiction by Charlemagne only a few months earlier.
Most militia men, when summoned by the proclamation of the ban
num, were formed ultimately into contingents under the general com-
mand of their local count. As discussed earlier, these men served in the
select levies of the Carolingian exercitus for military expeditiones beyond
the borders of the civitas or pagus in which they dwelled. Included in the
counts overall command were men levied from the lands of the comital
fisc (comitatus) or ministerium as well as those men who were levied from
the estates and farms of all other landholders, great and small, who were
neither vassi dominici nor the holders of immunities. The immunists and
the vassi dominici were responsible for leading the contingents they owed,
which were often raised from their own estates or paid for by their own
resources.
Some contingents, e.g. those levied in the north from the regions of
Ghent and Nijmegen, had to travel from 700 to 800 kilometers in order to
reach Geneva. Marches well in excess of 400 kilometers, which required
contingents to cross large rivers and traverse difficult mountain terrain,
were the norm for forces raised throughout Austrasia and Neustria. For
example, an elite unit composed of perhaps 100 heavily armed mounted
troops, using pack horses rather than carts to carry their supplies and

110For a useful outline of Carolingian military obligations, see Ganshof, Frankish
Institutions, pp. 5968, 151161.
the unwanted war285
bereft of any noteworthy number of camp followers could travel perhaps

as many as 30 kilometers per day for six consecutive days. This, of course,
is a best-case situation for troops traveling in friendly territory, following
the frequently used Roman roads, and not suffering adverse weather con-
ditions.111 A unit of this prototypical elite mounted force that had com-
pleted its mobilization at Cologne toward the end of the first week in June
could be expected to reach the muster at Geneva early in July.
The size and the complexity of the Carolingian army for this campaign
and Charlemagnes force was large, as will be seen belowalso likely had
an impact on the pace of mobilization. Given the wide variety of both the
strategic and tactical problems that could arise in Italy, not all of the per-
haps several hundreds of locally-mobilized contingents of the Carolingian
army could possibly be composed of elite units of 100 mounted troops. As
was clear from Pippins invasions of Italy in 754 and 756, Charlemagne
understood that he needed foot soldiers, artillery, and masses of supplies.
For expeditio, the base rate for recruitment, at this time, likely was that
each mansus could be required either to send an able-bodied fighting man
or some sort of logistical support.112 The count of the civitas maintained
lists of those men eligible for service from throughout his jurisdiction and
also the number of men owed by each immunist. The counts power in this
crucial area was greatly strengthened by his authority to impose heavy
fines on those men who failed to comply with the royal mobilization
order.113
Some sense of the potential order of magnitude of these local contin-
gents can be gained from an examination of the situation in the Rouenais.
A survey of the lands of the monastery of Saint Wandrille, which was
ordered by Charlemagne, demonstrates that this religious house could
have been required to provide, on the basis of the number of mansi it con-
trolled, in excess of 4,000 lightly armed foot soldiers or a smaller number
of foot soldiers in combination with lightly armed and/or heavily armed
mounted troops for expeditio.114 When taken in concert with all of the
111Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 716726.

114GAF, ch. 45, reports that in 787, Charlemagne ordered Abbot Landricus of Jumiges
and Count Richard of Rouen to make an inquest of the lands belonging to Saint Wandrille;
as a result, 4,078 manses were listed. There is no reason to believe that 15 years earlier the
monasterys landed resources were very much smaller, or, for that matter, very much larger.
However, not all surveys were taken for the same purpose. See, for example, Auguste
Longnon, Polyptyque de labbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Prs, 2 vols. (Paris, 1895), I, 237238,
where the monastery of Saint-Germain des Prs is identified, on the basis of incomplete
286 chapter four
other landed resources in the civitas of Rouen, e.g. the estates of the comi-
tal fisc, lands belonging to the bishopric, as well as the holdings of the
other great lay and other ecclesiastical landed aristocrats in the region, a
force of many thousands of fighting men might well be levied from this
region if they were needed for offensive military operations.
If only a small percentage of those who were eligible for service, were in
fact summoned from a well-populated and wealthy district (civitas) such
as the Rouenais, the result would be a column of only several hundred
fighting men, divided into smaller units representing the centena in which
they were levied or the royal vassal whom they followed. If, however, a
total of only perhaps 400 expeditionary troops were mobilized from the
Rouenais, i.e. less than one-tenth of the lightly armed foot soldiers that the
monastery of Saint Wandrille alone might perhaps be required to mobi-
lize, this force, with its baggage train and camp followers using horse-
drawn carts to carry supplies, could not have marched from Rouen to
Geneva in less than a month. A journey of at least 45 days is far more
realistic.115
Charlemagnes regnum was comprised of perhaps as many as 700 or so
pagi.116 Moreover, it can be asserted with confidence that every fighting
man who was eligible for service in hostis for expeditio from each of these
districts, was not, in fact, mustered for this campaign in Italy, or for any
other offensive Carolingian military operation during the reign of
Charlemagne.117 Such an army would have amounted to well in excess of
several hundred thousand men, and Charlemagne had no need for such a
large force for the operations he undertook. If, however, only 300 pagi
were called upon each to send to Geneva a contingent of only 200 men,
returns, as having a total of 1670 manses. Of this total, 1,646 manses are recognized to be
manses tributaires and twenty-four are recognized as manses seigneuriaux. The former
totaled 15,145 hectares, the latter 17,343.25 hectares. Or, to put it another way, the average
seigneurial manse was in excess of 720 hectares, while the average tributary manse was
slightly more than 9 hectares.
There can be no doubt that when Charlemagnes officials levied troops from the sei-
gneurial manses of Saint-Germain they obtained considerably more than 24 foot soldiers,
i.e. one from each manse. If, for example, the nine-hectare standard of the manses tribu-
taires were applied to the seigneurial manses, then these facultates would be required to
provide in excess of 1,900 lightly armed fighting men without horses to the Carolingian
army for expeditionary purposes. Thus, the monastery would be required as a whole to
provide in excess of 3,500 foot soldiers for expeditio or some combination of foot soldiers,
light- and/or heavily-armed horsemen.
115Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 716726.
116See Werner,Missus-Marchio-Comes, p. 191.
the unwanted war287
Charlemagne would have been positioned to put some 60,000 effectives of

all types, i.e. foot and horse, into the field for this campaign. If only 200
men were on average drawn from each of 200 pagi, then some 40,000 men
would be called up for service.
Logistics
Since all armies travel on their stomachs, it is important to emphasize that

a force of 60,000 or so men would require a minimum of approximately
60 metric tons of food each day, mostly grain products in the form of bis-
cuits or hardtack.118 It should be noted that these men, who were mobi-
lized from various parts of the regnum Francorum, individually, if they
would have stayed at home, would have had food available to meet their
daily requirements, and at least some of the food that they needed on
campaign could have been carried from home. Therefore, it is important
that throughout pre-modern western history, soldiers were expected to
carry at least 40 kilograms in a backpack for lengthy periods of time over
long distances and difficult terrain. If only three-quarters of such a load
were composed of biscuits, each of Charlemagnes foot soldiers could
carry enough food for a month.119
It is likely that Charlemagnes army carried additional food and also
various types of equipment. A cart drawn by two horses or two mules, or
even two oxen, could haul a load of approximately 500 kilograms. For an
army of 40,000 men, 800 carts could carry all of the food needed to feed
such a force for a period of ten days. As had been the case in the Roman
Empire, such loads could be transported much more cheaply, more easily,
and more rapidly by river boat than by animal-drawn vehicles.120 In light
of this material reality, it is clear that Frankish kings could mobilize large
118See the groundbreaking work by Engels, Alexander; and for a detailed chart of com-
parative data with commentary, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Some Observations on the Role
of the Byzantine Navy in the Success of the First Crusade, Journal of Medieval Military
History, 1 (2002), 97100.
119Regarding the historical background, see Roth, Logistics, pp. 6877. Marcus
Junkelmann, Die Legionen des Augustus: Der rmische Soldat in archologischen Experiment
(Mainz, 1986), pp. 4358, has carried out experiments with untrained civilians who covered
a distance of 500 kilometers and traversed an Alpine pass with a backpack comparable to
that carried by a Roman legionary at a pace of 25 kilometers per day.
120The basic work on this subject remains A. Burford, Heavy Transport in Classical
Antiquity, The Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 13 (1960), 118. See also Engels, Alexander,
pp. 2627; and with specific attention to the early Middle Ages, Bachrach, Animals and
288 chapter four
armies for extended military campaigns because numerous navigable riv-

ers traverse the hexagon, i.e. the territory of modern France from north to
south and from west to east.
While the riverine network of Gaul was of immense value for the sup-
port of military operations, it was complemented by a complex network of
roads. The Romans had found it expedient to construct roads of the high-
est quality along one or another bank of the important rivers throughout
Gaul.121 It is also important that most of the hundred or so fortress urbes,
which were established within the regnum Francorum on the Rhine or
west of the river as the secular and religious capitals of their civitates, also
were located along these roads. While not all of these cities were located
directly on rivers, none was located more than a two-day march from a
river upon which military supplies could be transported quite easily.122
These roads were still widely used during the early Middle Ages in support
of the tractoria system discussed above.123 The Roman road system could
be used because the routes were kept in repair by royal order in accor-
dance with legislation that had been included in the Codex Theodosianus.
When Charlemagne referred to this obligation, he referred to it as an anti
qua consuedo.124
Planning Military Operations
An invasion of Italy from the north, which meant that large forces had to
cross the Alps, presented medieval commanders with myriad complex
strategic and tactical problems. These, however, were not very different
from those that had faced previous commanders such as Hannibal, Caesar,
Constantine, and even Napoleon. Often, these problems are not easily
appreciated by modern observers because of the immense gap in trans-
portation and communications technology that separates our world from
121See Albert Grenier, Manuel darchologie gallo-romaine, VI.2 (Paris, 1935), which
remains the most complete treatment of the Roman roads in Gaul. Raymond Chevallier,
Les Voies Romaines (Paris, 1997); and a popular work by Victor W. von Hagen, The Roads that
led to Rome (Cleveland-New York, 1967), are useful.
122See Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, p. 83, Map; and Chevallier, Les Voies, pp. 299
301, and fig. 192, for Itinraires fluviaux et portages dans la Gaul romaine.
123Concerning the preservation of the roads and road work to carry this out, see Hubert,
Les routes, pp. 2556; Boyer, Medieval French Bridges; Bachrach, Carolingian Military
Operations, pp. 1327; Ganshof, La Tractoria, pp. 6991; Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium
Regis, I, 6567; Rouche, Lhritage, pp. 1332; and Szabo, Antikes Erbe, pp. 125145.
124For Charlemagnes capitularies, see, for example, CRF. I, no. 91, ch. 4; no. 93, ch. 7; and
additional information in his charters, e.g. DK., I, no. 91.
the unwanted war289
the pre-modern era. Charlemagne and his advisors, however, were in pos-
session of a substantial corpus of intelligence regarding Lombard defenses,
military organization, and political weaknesses. In addition, the Caro
lingians had considerable experience in dealing successfully with these
matters. Many senior figures who served in Charlemagnes government
also had served in the forces that his father had mobilized for his two suc-
cessful invasions of the Lombard kingdom in 754 and 756, respectively.
Charlemagne himself may have taken part in one or perhaps even both of
these operations.125
Rulers of the regnum Francorum and their military commanders had
been leading expeditionary forces into Italy since the first half of the
6th century. These armies had campaigned against the Ostrogoths, the
Byzantines, and the Lombards, with varying degrees of success.126 Mum
molus, the Gallo-Roman general who commanded the armies of Guntrams
Burgundian kingdom, established Frankish control of Mont Cenis by con-
quering the very strongly fortified garrison town of Susa on the Italian side
of the pass. During the later 7th and early 8th centuries, although the
Merovingians did little in Italy, they did maintain control of Mont Cenis.127
Powerful magnates in the Alpine region, such as Abbo, the self-styled
rector of Maurienne and Susa, were dominant regional figures analogous
to, if not as important as, the leaders of the Eudo-Waiofer clan, who for all
intents and purposes ruled in Aquitaine as duces during the same period.128
It is of some importance that the connection between Maurienne and
Susa dated from the later Roman Empire when it had been constituted as
a self-contained administrative unit, i.e. the Cottian Alps.129 It is clear, as
125Charlemagne played a noteworthy role in dealing with Pope Stephen II when the
latter came to the regnum Francorum in order to gain Pippins support in 754. It was at this
time as well that Charlemagne was awarded the title Patricius Romanorum along with his
father and brother Carloman. See, for example, V. Stephani II, ch. 25; ARF, ann. 754, 755; AE,
ann. 754. It is possible, of course, that Pippin left Charlemagne at Vienne with Bertranda
during the first invasion of Italy.
126For useful reviews of this problem, see Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik, pp. 95132;
and Reinhard Schneider, Frnkische Alpenpolitik, in Die Transalpinen Verbindungen der
Bayern, Alemannen und Franken bis zum 10. Jahrhundert, ed. Helmut Beumann and Werner
Schrder (Simaringen, 1987), 2349.
127See the discussion by Pierre Duparc, Les cluses et la frontire des Alpes, BC, CIX
(1951), 1415; and Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 2831.
128Rudolph Buchner, Die Provence in merowingerische Zeit: Verfassung-Wirtschaft-
Kultur (Stuttgart, 1933), 2425, 100101. See the additional material developed by Geary, The
Aristocracy pp. 3335, 115125, 145146, 151, on the basis of Abbos testamentum, which was
proved authentic by Ulrich Nonn, Merowingische Testamente. Studien zum Fortleben
einer rmischen Urkundenform im Frankenreich, Archiv fr Diplomatik, 18 (1972), 1129.
129R.L. Poole, The See of Maurienne and the Valley of Susa, in Studies in Chronology
and History (Oxford, 1934), pp. 123134.
290 chapter four
well, that the Carolingians controlled the old Roman fortifications at

Aosta, which dominated access to the Great Saint Bernard Pass from the
Italian side, and thus gave armies from the north free access through the
mountains into the Piedmont plain.130
When Charles Martel reconquered Burgundy, Abbo, Rector of Mauri
enne and Susa, was co-opted and integrated into the Carolingian military
organization that Charlemagne later inherited.131 The Carolingians thus
gained control of the pass at Mont Cenis. However, when Abbo died with-
out heirs, probably during the early 740s, either Charles Martel or, more
likely, his son Carloman the Elder undertook responsibility for defending
the pass. In this context, the monastery of Novalesa, which the Rector had
founded and which was heir to the bulk of his extensive estates, undoubt-
edly played an important role in financing these defenses.132 As seen
above, both Carloman the Younger and Charlemagne worked diligently to
maintain a close and smooth working relationship with the abbot of
Novalesa and his monks.
Mont Cenis, with its frequently-used high-quality Roman road, was a
major artery for transportation and trade between Italy and Gaul. It is
clear that the Carolingians, likely because of their control of Susa at the
south end of the pass, preferred the Mont Cenis route for invasion pur-
poses into Italy.133 In 754, Pippin marched along the Roman roads south
through Lyons and Vienne. Then his army moved on to Grenoble and con-
tinued along the Roman road system through the valleys of the Isre and
the Arc before reaching Saint-Jean-de Maurienne at the northern entrance
to Mont Cenis.134 In 756, Pippin moved south through Chalon-sur-Sane
and Geneva and then once again to Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne.135 On both
occasions, the Lombards did not attempt directly to hinder Pippins army
from crossing the Alps as it moved through Mont Cenis.136 Rather, they
prepared to meet the invading army at Chiusa to the south of the
130Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 1416.

131See the observations by Geary, Aristocracy, pp. 120121. Regarding the methods used
to develop these backgrounds, see Werner, Important noble families, pp. 137202.
132TA, ed. Geary, passim.
133See the basic work by E. Oehlmann, Die Alpenpsse im Mittelalter, Jahrbuch fr
Schweizersche Geschichte, 3 (1878), 197205, which is accepted by Walter Woodburn Hyde,
Roman Alpine Routes (Philadelphia, 1935), pp. 5556, regarding the Carolingians.
134Fred. Cont., ch. 37, with the commentary by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 203.
135Fred. Cont., ch. 38; with the commentary by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 216.
136Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 1012; W.A.B. Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage of the
Alps in 773, The English Historical Review, 21 (1906), 504; Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne,
p. 49; and Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 2831.
the unwanted war291
Carolingian-held fortress at Susa, where elaborate fortifications, or

clusae, had been established centuries earlier by the Roman imperial
government.137
During the campaign of 754, King Aistulf is reported to have established
a fortified camp (castra) with which he blocked the valley entrance at
Chiusa and from which he was well-prepared to keep Pippin from pene-
trating into Lombard territory. The contemporary Carolingian family
chronicler, who records these operations, discusses in some detail Aistulfs
military assets. He makes specific mention of the Lombards having both
hand-launched missile weapons (telli) and machines (machinae), which
likely also were built for the purpose of hurling missiles, e.g. onagri and
ballistae. The chronicler also calls attention to a hoard of supplies, which
had been gathered in order to sustain a lengthy siege-like situation in the
foothills of the Alps.138
Aistulfs position south of Susa was very strong. Pippin, however, having
effective intelligence regarding the Lombard deployment, is reported to
have mobilized a large army. As a result, the forces that he commanded
likely enjoyed the four- or five-to-one advantage in effectives which was
required to storm fortifications that were defended by troops using missile
weapons.139 Pippins problem, however, was that the fortified front of the
Lombard defenses was too narrow for the full engagement of his forces.
Therefore, he could not easily take advantage of the superior numbers
137These clusae likely were a more westerly analogue of the Claustra Alpinum Iuliarum,
i.e. defenses in the Julian Alps. See, on the latter, Christie, The Lombards, pp. 63, 173, where
some sense of the order of magnitude of these fortifications can be ascertained. More
recent archaeological information is provided by Neil Christie, From Constantine to
Charlemagne: An Archaeology of Italy ad 300800 (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 324326, 336, 361,
396397.
With regard to Carolingian operations against the Lombards, contemporary written
sources do not provide much detailed material information concerning the clusae.
However, by the early 11th century, CN, pp. 146149, recorded the tradition that the clusae
were great stone walls that spanned the valley from end to end. Indeed, the chronicler
called attention to the remainder of stone walls that were regarded as the ruins of the clu
sae. As pointed out by Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 2829, recent archaeological work argues
for a less formidable system of defense. See, for example, Christie, From Constantine to
138Fred. Cont., ch. 37.
139AE, an. 755, tells his readers that Pippin came cum valida manu. Concerning the
ratio of attackers to defenders required for the successful storming of fortifications garri-
soned by troops with missile weapons, see Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology,
pp. 117. Cf. Fred. Cont., ch. 37, where the mention of Pippins army being of insufficient
size to defeat the Lombards in the field serves to introduce the role of God in the Carolingian
victory and cannot be taken as evidence for the relative order of magnitude of the two
armies.
292 chapter four
enjoyed by the Carolingian army.140 The lengthy history of the tactical

advantage enjoyed by those deployed to defend a mountain pass, of
course, was very well-understood in the early Middle Ages, as it had been
during the Roman Empire and even earlier.
Pippin could not hope to outlast Aistulf, i.e. lay siege to the defenders of
the pass and starve them into submission. Despite the assets available
from Novalesa and other sources in the region, the Carolingians would
have had considerable difficultly in gathering sufficient supplies to sustain
a lengthy siege in the foothills of the Alps. Such an operation would have
necessitated bringing large quantities of matriel through the mountains,
perhaps even during the winter, if the siege were to be of sufficient dura-
tion. Such an eventuality certainly could not have been welcomed by
Pippin, especially in light of the fact that a substantial group of Frankish
magnates had not been in favor of the invasion in the first place. A lengthy
siege under adverse conditions would certainly lower morale and encour-
age those who had voiced initial opposition to this course of action to
complain loudly or even worse.
By contrast, Aistulf had unhindered access to logistical support from
assets that could be mobilized to his rear, and these supplies would remain
unthreatened by the Carolingian invading force. Rather than retreat, how-
ever, Pippin, who traditionally favored the offensive, as his Aquitanian
campaigns make clear, ordered a group of select troops to attempt an
encirclement of the Lombard position by taking a very difficult route over
the mountains. It would appear that Aistulf and his staff believed this
route could not be traversed effectively by a force that was large enough to
discomfort his position. The circling movement by this select unit of
Pippins army, however, was successful. Thus, when the Lombard monarch
received intelligence that a part of the Carolingian army had bypassed his
defenses in the clusae, he ordered his troops to withdraw from their
emplacements, and prepared to engage Pippins army in the open field. In
what is reported to have been a particularly bloody battle south of the
clusae, the Lombards were soundly defeated, and fled further south in
order to take refuge in their fortress cities.141

141The parti pris of the Carolingian court chronicler (Fred. Cont., ch. 37) may make his
information here suspect. However, it should be noted that armies often suffer particularly
extensive losses during a retreat. In this case, the Carolingian circling force obviously was
in a position to harass the Lombard line of retreat as Pippins main units pursued from
the rear.
the unwanted war293
When Pippin invaded the second time, King Aistulf, who had been
besieging Rome, led an army once again to the defenses in the Val di Susa
at Chiusa. This time, however, the Lombard king does not seem to have
had sufficient time to mobilize fighting forces from throughout his reg
num, nor did he have time to prepare the fortifications in the Alpine region
for a sustained defense. The need to bring up to the clusae large numbers
of missile throwing machines would appear to have been crucial to this
effort, but he failed in this as well. Thus, Aistulf, not having waited for his
full force to be mobilized south of Susa in the narrows at Chiusa, deployed
the troops that were at his disposal to take up positions in front of the line
of the Carolingian advance.142
Pippin, who seems to have been exceptionally well-informed regarding
the Lombard situation, did not wait for Aistulf to gather the entire com-
plement of his forces in the clusae beyond Susa or even to form up his
troops for battle. Rather, the Frankish king ordered his entire army to
attack in force and apparently without rest, i.e. as soon as his men came
through the pass and into the valley south of the fortress at Susa. Whether
this meant that the Carolingian marching columns as they approached
the Lombards were redeployed in line or attacked without redeployment
must remain a matter of speculation.143
The Lombard forces at the time of Pippins attack were divided into at
least two major divisions. One, under Aistulfs personal command, already
was in the environs of Susa, while the other, still further south, was appar-
ently marching through the valley to support the king. This latter force,
however, appears not yet to have been fully organized into operational
units, but was divided into many separate smaller groups which lacked
tactical cohesion. The Carolingian army soundly defeated Aistulfs van-
guard at Susa. This force then dissolved into a disorderly mass and went
into headlong retreat toward the Piedmont plain. Pippins forces followed
up Aistulfs retreat and moved rapidly down the valley slaughtering the
Lombard relief units or reinforcements, in detail, as they came upon
them.144
Charlemagne and his advisors had several important strategic and tac-
tical lessons to learn from Pippins marches through the Alps, and the
Lombard capacity to defend the passes. Obviously, King Desiderius could
choose to make a stand at Chiusa, i.e. to entrench in the clusae, prepare

294 chapter four
the army with missile weapons and throwing machines, and stock up food
supplies as Aistulf had in 754. In all probability, the dangerous passage
around the fortifications at Chiusa that Pippins special forces had discov-
ered and effectively exploited through an encirclement maneuver in 754,
now was blocked effectively. In any case, at the very least, Charlemagne
had to assume this was the operative situation. He could not base his strat-
egy on the hope that the Lombards would make the same serious error, i.e.
not blocking the route previously used for encirclement, twice in a period
of fewer than two decades.
If Charlemagne followed the plan used by the Carolingians in 754, and
assuming that the encirclement route used by Pippins forces was blocked,
either he would have to lay siege to Desiderius army in the clusae with the
aim of starving out the Lombards, or he would have to storm the
fortifications.
Desiderius forces had protected lines of supply to their rear, while the
Carolingian army would have to rely upon its logistical support crossing
the Mont Cenis Pass. As with Pippins earlier operations, it was not a real-
istic option for Charlemagne to expect to starve out the Lombards over the
long term. In the course of such a lengthy siege, Charlemagnes army by
mid-winter, when the snows had closed the passes, could well be suffering
more from food shortages than Desiderius forces. However, it was prob-
lematic for the Carolingians to storm the Lombard defenses in order to
win a quick victory. This would require an exceptionally large army, not
simple numerical superiority. In addition, the narrowed nature of the ene-
mys defensive front would necessarily diminish and, in fact, perhaps even
nullify the importance of Carolingian numerical superiority at least until
attrition made itself felt among the defenders. Like Pippins army in 754,
Charlemagnes forces initial tactical problem was to get past the Lombards
well-defended fortifications at Chiusa. However, the Carolingian invasions
of Italy in 754 and 756 also had required that a close and rigorous siege of
Pavia be undertaken.145 With the benefit of hindsight, it will be seen that
Charlemagnes plans for the campaign of 773 did not omit future consider-
ation of siege operations.146 When Charlemagne proclaimed the bannum
and mobilized his army in the early summer of 773, he was very much
aware, that, like his father before him, he faced two separate but interre-
lated tactical problems. He could not ignore the possibility, indeed, the
145Fred. Cont., chs. 37, 38.

146See below, Chapter Five.
the unwanted war295
likelihood, that he would have to face a substantial Lombard field army in

open battle and on terrain that King Desiderius or one of his commanders
would probably be able to select to the detriment of the Franks. This
meant that Charlemagne would need a considerable force of well-trained
regular troops who were accustomed to fighting battles in the field against
first-class enemy soldiers.
Charlemagne also knew that he would need very large numbers of
fighting men who could be deployed in order to besiege the walls of Pavia
and perhaps other important Lombard fortress cities for as long as a year
or perhaps even for 18 months. In regard to a siege of the Lombard capital,
it likely was common knowledge that although Pavia had fallen rather
quickly to Pippin in 754 and 756, it had held out for more than three years,
569572, when defended by Roman troops against the Lombards.147 In
addition to assuring that a steady stream of supplies was available to
maintain a lengthy siege of Pavia, Charlemagne also had to have available
for such operations various types of specialists. Men were needed who
could build siege machines, e.g. stone-throwing catapults and battering
rams, as well as other skilled workers to manufacture weapons such as
incendiaries. In addition to these engineers, men also were needed who
were knowledgeable in the implementation of various besieging tech-
niques, e.g. vallation and contra-vallation, and sappers who were trained
to undermine walled fortifications.148
In light of these imperatives, the Carolingian army that was mustered at
Geneva in early August of 773, likely was considerably in excess of the
20,000 or so effectives deployed, in much less demanding circumstances,
by his father at Bourges a decade earlier.149 The combined Carolingian
armies that Charlemagne led into Italy, as will be seen below, likely were of
an order of magnitude in the 40,000 range and perhaps even larger. This
meant, as alluded to above, the mobilization, on average, of approximately
147This information was recorded by Paul, Hist., bk. II, ch. 26, and probably was com-
mon knowledge. Whether the length of this siege was due to a lack of Lombard expertise
in siege warfare or the quality of the fortifications and their defenders is a moot point. Most
all of the other fortified cites that the Lombards placed under siege capitulated rather
quickly.
148The accounts of Charlemagnes siege, as will be seen below, make it clear that he had
the necessary equipment and manpower to carry out a lengthy and successful investment.
In addition to information regarding Pippins operations against Pavia, Charlemagne and
his advisers were also well-informed regarding Pippins siege of Bourges in 763. See
149With regard to Pippins siege of Bourges, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 114115.
296 chapter four
200 men of the expeditionary levies, from each of some 200 or so pagi. If
more than 200 pagi were called upon to mobilize a force in the 40,000
range, then each pagus would on average be required to produce fewer
than 200 effectives.150
As will be seen below, the army that Charlemagne himself commanded
was sufficiently large to be divided into two effective fighting forces. Each
of these forces was potentially capable of independent operations in the
field against first-class enemy troops and fortress cities. In addition, a sec-
ond army, commanded by Charlemagnes uncle Bernard, was deployed to
operate independently in the northeast of the Lombard kingdom. The
total Carolingian force also was large enough so that it could be divided
again into several separate units in order to undertake, among other oper-
ations, the simultaneous siege of two exceptionally well-defended major
fortress cities, i.e. Pavia and Verona. These forces were able to maintain a
close siege of Pavia for some eight or nine months, while the second force
was of sufficient size to convince the defenders of Verona, as will be seen
in the next chapter, that it could take this formidable fortress city by storm.
While still at Geneva, Charlemagne undoubtedly received intelligence
that Desiderius either had moved or was in the process of moving a large
force into the fortifications south of the Carolingian-held stronghold at
Susa, north of Chiusa. These defenses were the clusae, mentioned above,
that when defended blocked the Val di Susa between Monte Pirchiriano
and the present-day village of Chiavri.151 Obviously, it was Desiderius
plan to keep the Carolingians from invading the Lombard kingdom by
holding the clusae against the Franks. At this point, it surely became clear
to Charlemagne that once the Carolingian army had marched through
Mont Cenis and Susa, it would not be possible to move directly through
the Lombard fortifications at Chiusa, as Pippin had done in 756. Desiderius
army was already deployed. Rather, a pincer movement of some type
would be required, perhaps analogous to the one that had been executed
by Pippin in 754, in order to turn the Lombard flank and attack the
emplaced Lombard forces at Chiusa from the rear.152
In light of the information that was available to the Magistratus when
Charlemagne arrived at Geneva, and perhaps even earlier, he divided his
forces into two major armies. While keeping the force that would engage
150See the discussion by Bachrach, Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 142.

151See Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage, p. 504; Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne,
p. 49; and Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 531.
152This is briefly mentioned by Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 3031.
the unwanted war297
Desiderius directly in the clusae south of Susa under his own command,
he placed his paternal uncle, Bernard, in command of the corps that was
charged with securing the Carolingian left flank. This force was assigned to
outflank the Lombard position by going through the Great Saint Bernard
Pass.153 The plan, however, was neither a simple flanking deployment by
Bernards army nor a pincer movement intended to catch Desiderius army
from the rear at Chiusa.154 Bernards forces were to march almost due east
for more than 100 kilometers along the Roman road that traversed the
northern shore of lake Geneva.155 Then the army would turn south, again
following the Roman roads, through Saint Maurice and Martigny, two
monastic centers that were well-positioned to provide logistical support
for his forces. From there, Bernards army would follow the Roman road
through Octodurus and Val dEntremont. Given the difficulty of the ter-
rain, the army likely required about two weeks to reach the Great Saint
Bernard from Geneva.156
Once Bernards troops had crossed the Great Saint Bernard, apparently
unopposed, and had marched another two days, this force would be posi-
tioned to encamp in relative safety in and around the old Roman fortress
town of Aosta. This stronghold, as noted above, was, like Susa on the Mont
Cenis route, in the hands of forces that were loyal to the Carolingians.
However, from Aosta, Bernard was in a very poor position to aid in Char
lemagnes assault on the Lombard forces ensconced at Chiusa. Bernards
army could not easily reach the southern end of the Val di Susa from Aosta
even though it was only 65 or so kilometers to the south-southwest as the
crow flies. The very rough Alpine terrain in the region between Aosta and
Chiusa made the direct route between the two places impossible to tra-
verse by a substantial military force with its own supply train.157
153ARF, an. 773; AE, an. 773; CM, p. 295; AMP, an. 773 (p. 60); and V. Hadriani I, ch. 29, all
of which indicate that Charlemagne first divided his army into two forces. All these
accounts, with the exception of V. Hadriani I, mention Bernard and make clear that he
was designated to lead the force under his personal command through the Great Saint
Bernard Pass.
154Cf. Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage; and Georgine Tangl, Karls des Grossen
Weg ber die Alpen im Jahr 773, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und
Bibliotheken, 37 (1957), 5, who describes this route.
155Concerning the Roman road in question, see Chevallier, Roman Roads, pp. 168168,
and map 34 (p. 160).
156Marius of Avenches, Chron. an. 574, provides notice of this route when describing
the Lombard invasion of Gaul. See the discussion by Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 7374.
157See the details regarding this route provided by Tangl, Karls des Grossen Weg,
pp. 56.
298 chapter four
Rather, Bernards army, in order to attack the rear of the Lombard posi-
tion at the southern end of the pass, would have been required to follow
the Roman road from Aosta east and then south along the valley of the
Dora Baltes. This was a long days march from the environs of Ivrea.
However, this important fortress city, with its Lombard garrison and mili-
tia levies, obviously would be a matter of some concern to Bernard, as
these forces could harass the Carolingian line of march and slow down his
column. Additionally, Charlemagne and his advisers knew, as we have
seen above, that earlier in the year, Duke Tunno of Ivrea had demonstrated
his strong support for Desiderius policies and even had served as one of
the kings select envoys to represent Lombard views to the pope.158
Bernards tactical difficulties in this situation, moreover, were even
more complicated as a result of obvious topographical realities. After
clearing the territory of Ivrea, Bernard would be required to march another
two to three days south to the banks of the Po before he could move west
along the Roman road toward Chiusa. This route, the only one feasible for
an army of any meaningful size, necessitated that Bernards force march
another two or three days to the confluence of the Dora Riparia and the
Po. From there, the Carolingian line of march was required to go west to
Chiusa. However, this route was controlled by the great fortress city of
Turin, where the Roman road passed within bowshot of the walls of the
urbs. Bernards force could be harassed easily as it moved through the
environs of Turin before it could march west toward a rendezvous with
Charlemagnes army.
Opposition to Bernards march certainly would have been expected at
Ivrea from Duke Tunno. Further to the south, while moving along the Dora
Baltes toward the valley of the Po, Bernards army was exposed also to
potential attack by forces based to the east at the fortress city of Vercelli.
Finally, the Carolingians had absolutely no reason to believe that Bernards
army would be permitted free passage through the hinterland of Turin,
even if the Carolingian force far outnumbered the levies which could be
mobilized there for the local defense. There were exceptional difficulties
inherent in Bernards position with regard to a supposedly timely pincer
movement intended to link up with Charlemanges forces in the Val di
Susa and to the rear of the Lombard army. These difficulties require that
we rethink the traditional notion that Bernards army was sent through
the Great Saint Bernard to be deployed in a pincer movement against
Desiderius main force in the clusae at Chiusa.
158See, Tangl, Karls des Grossen Weg, pp. 56.

the unwanted war299
There was, however, an important tactical role for Bernard to play once
his forces had negotiated the Great Saint Bernard Pass. This was to move
eastward in order to occupy the attention of the garrisons and militia
forces of the Lombard cities to the north and east of Pavia. In terms of a
threat mobilized in the short term, serious attention had to be given to
troops which could be mobilized at Milan, Bergamo, and Brescia. In the
longer term, forces from Trent, Verona, Treviso, Viacenza, and even Friuli
might wend their way westward to support Desiderius either in the clusae
or, if necessary, in the defense of Pavia. In short, Bernards army was to be
deployed to the east as a blocking and/or delaying force, while, as will be
seen below, other measures were undertaken to outflank Desiderius posi-
tion south of Susa.159
In this context of Bernards army playing the role of a blocking or shield-
ing force, it must be considered that Charlemagne and his advisors were
concerned not only by the potential of various Lombard dukes to the
north and east to aid their king.160 The Carolingians would have been
remiss in their planning had they not also entertained the possibility
that Duke Tassilo of Bavaria, Desiderius son-in-law, might send an army
into Italy in order to aid the Lombard king. The anti-Frankish faction of
the Bavarian aristocracy had a fundamental interest in opposing Char
lemagnes invasion, which might destroy Desiderius, increase Carolingian
influence with Rome, and isolate Tassilo. At the very time under consider-
ation here, Autchar, who was orchestrating the strongly pro-Lombard
policy of Carlomans widow, Queen Gerberga, could be expected to
encourage members of his family to lend their support to Tassilo should
the Bavarian duke not have shown an inclination to intervene in support
of Desiderius. The likely route for Tassilo to take, should he have been
inclined to oppose Charlemagne, was to mobilize an army at Augsburg
and cross the Alps through the Brenner Pass which led south to Verona
with subsequent easy access to Pavia.
The view taken here is that Bernards army was deployed through the
Great Saint Bernard Pass for two related purposes. First, his troops were
intended to occupy the attention of the military forces of the eastern
Lombard fortress cities noted above. Secondly, Bernards forces were
159Tangl, Karls des Grossen Weg, pp. 56, appreciates many of the difficulties, but
does not seem to understand the nature of Charlemagnes military operations.
160Cf. Gasparri, Il passagio, pp. 3536, who hypothesizes that at least some of the east-
ern magnates, e.g. the duke of Friuli, were in Charlemagnes camp. Even if this were the
case, and there is no direct evidence to support it, could Charlemagne trust such
traitors?
300 chapter four
deployed to protect the Carolingian left flank by blocking a potential

Bavarian intervention.161 The situation, however, was even more complex
insofar as in the past, the Avars had on occasion cooperated both with the
Bavarians and also with the Lombards. With the support of the Bavarians
and particularly the Lombard duke of Friuli, the Avars could easily enter
northern Italy. Avar mounted archers could be very effective in harassing
Carolingian troops while the latter were on the march in various parts of
the Lombard kingdom.162
The deployment of Bernards army as a blocking force to the east would
leave Charlemagne free to deal with Desiderius main army, which was
fully entrenched at Chiusa. This would appear to have been much the
same situation as had prevailed in 754 when Pippins special forces turned
the Lombard left flank in the clusae. In order to assure that the Lombard
position would be subjected to the threat of attack on two fronts, a tactical
pincer movement was devised by the Carolingian planners in 773 that
required the division of the force under Charlemagnes direct command.163
One unit was sent through Mont Cenis and past the Frankish-held fortress
at Susa to Chiusa in order to confront the Lombard fortifications in the
region of Monte Pirchiriano. A second force was sent west to outflank the
Lombard positions in the clusae.164
The route from Geneva to Chiusa, while not capable of being negoti-
ated as the crow flies, nevertheless was rather straightforward, and the
Carolingians knew it well. Charlemagne probably followed the well-used
Roman roads south through Annecy to Albertville and then west through
Saint Pierre, Aiguebelle, and Saint Jean de Maurienne, where considerable
logistical support likely already had been gathered.165 After obtaining sup-
plies from the magazine at Saint Jean, the army then had to move along
the established route, through Modana and Lanslebough before heading
into the pass at Mont Cenis, itself, and reaching the fortress at Susa at it
southern terminus.166 This road, which had been developed by the Romans
161A variant of this argument is provided by Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, pp. 4951.

162See the discussion by Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, pp. 5052, regarding the poten-
tial threat posed by Avar mercenaries, in this context, and their military effectiveness.
163This will be discussed below. Cf. Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage, pp.
495500.
164ARF, an. 773; AE, an. 773; CM, p. 295; AMP, an. 773(p. 60; and V. Hadriani I, ch. 29, all
indicate that Charlemagne led a force through Mont Cenis. Cf. Coolidge, Charles the
Greats Passage, pp. 495500.
165As noted in Fred. Cont., ch. 35, the Carolingians largely controlled this city.
166Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 5155. It is possible that this army took an alter-
nate route by continuing south-southeast at Albertville to Moutier and then going
the unwanted war301
who established Saint Jean and Susa as part of a single administrative dis-
trict, had the advantage of being in very close proximity to the extensive
resources, discussed above, that the fisc of Novalesa was obligated to pro-
vide to the Carolingian army.167
The march from Geneva to Mont Cenis could be negotiated comfort-
ably in about three weeks under normal conditions by a substantial and
well-equipped military force. This would result from an average pace of
approximately 15 kilometers per day and taking into consideration the
need to rest the animals, especially draft and riding horses, every seventh
day. By contrast, the 30-kilometer march from the Carolingian base at Susa
at the southern end of Mont Cenis to the Lombard defenses at Chiusa, fol-
lowing standard Carolingian operating procedure employed by King
Pippin, probably should be seen in terms of a far more cautious advance.
Enemy skirmishers posed a constant threat at virtually any time during
the course of the march. It seems that in such circumstances, the baggage
train which trailed at the rear of the main force was particularly vulnera-
ble. Therefore, the last 30 kilometers of the Carolingian advance likely saw
a much less rapid troop deployment.
If Charlemagne followed traditional Carolingian tactics as employed by
both Charles Martel and King Pippin, he would have sent a vanguard to
scout and perhaps to probe the enemy position. The main body of troops
then slowly moved into position, and, following Carolingian standard
operating procedure, established one or more fortified encampments. A
rear guard was deployed to act as a reserve.168 This latter force likely was
based at the fortress of Susa itself.169 The total deployment, which created
a defended route between Susa and Chuisa, i.e. marching camps or castra,
had to be constructed facing the Lombard position, which may have taken
up to a week or perhaps even longer to accomplish.
As the main force moved carefully into defended positions between
Susa and Chiusa, Charlemagne retained a second unit of his divided army
under his direct command and led these men through the pass at Mont
Genvre.170 The most direct route for this line of march was over the
east- northeast to Bourg Saint Maurice, east-southeast to Val-de-Isre, and then south-
southwest to Lanslebourg.
167Poole, The See of Maurienne, pp. 123143.
168Regarding traditional Carolingian operating procedure, see Bachrach, Early
169Regarding the defenses at Susa, see Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne,
pp. 326331, and fig. 62.
170The primary textual basis for concluding that Charlemagne divided the force under
his own command into two parts after having made the first division, which sent Bernard
302 chapter four
Roman roads from Geneva south- southwest to the fortified city of

Grenoble (Grantianopolis), the first major base for the revictualling of this
part of the army. From there, the road turned east and ran to the western
side of the pass, which was guarded by the old Roman stronghold of
Brianon (Brigantium). Since no enemy opposition is reported to have
materialized to slow the progress of this force, the movement of the troops
under Charlemagnes personal command for almost 300 kilomters over
rough terrain likely took at least three weeks to negotiate at an average
pace of no better than 17 kilometers per day.171
The passage of Mont Genvre, however, placed Charlemagnes army
directly on the route to Susa, just 50 or so kilometers to the north-
northeast as the crow flies, but some 20 kilometers longer following the
with one force through the Great Saint Bernard Pass, is provided by a rather confused state-
ment made by Ado of Vienne (Chron., p. 319). He writes: Pius rex Carolus usque ad genuam
venit: divisoque ibi exercitu suo partem misit per Alpes Cottias, et per iugum Gibennica, id
est per montem quam accolae Cenisium vocat, quae latera aperiunt in agros Taurinorum.
Thus, according to Ado, after Charlemagne came to Geneva, he divided his army and sent
part through the Cottian Alps and then through the pass at Genvre, which ends up in
Taurasia. There is no doubt that the iugum Gibennica, in this context, means the Genvre
pass (see Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage, p. 494; and Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes,
pp. 5051, 199200). The problem, of course, is that Ado claims that the local inhabitants
call Mont Genvre Mont Cenis, which, of course, is absurd.
It is clear from the vast range of sources cited above that at least part of Charlemagnes
army went through Mont Cenis. Thus, the most reasonable conclusion is that Ado tried to
turn the information available to him regarding a divided force into a single force. As a
result, he confounded Mont Genvre and Mont Cenis. Cf. the effort by Coolidge, loc. cit. to
explain away Ados confusion by denying that Charlemagne sent any troops through Mont
Cenis.
Some additional support for the notion that Charlemagne took tactical advantage of
using Mont Genvre (in concert with his well-documented use of Mont Cenis) is provided
by the CN, ed. Alessio, bk. III, ch. 7, where it is noted: Movens intera idem rex ingentium
exercitumm suum pervenitque in montem Geminum, sive ianuam regni Italiae dici potest.
The fact that Charlemagne is cited here as personally leading his army through Mont
Genvre is of some moment because this means that he did not, at that time, personally go
through Mont Cenis and, thus, he did not visit the monastery of Novalesa on the way to
confront the Lombards. Coolidge, loc. cit., pp. 495496, ably defends the notion that the
monks of Novalesa preserved a tradition, whether orally or in writing is not of conse-
quence, that was not to the benefit of their monastery and, therefore, is to be considered all
the more believable.
As will be seen below, the mention of the Mont Genvre route by Ado and the CN merely
provides some textual support, however controversial, for our understanding of the tacti-
cal situation at Chiusa. Without such textual support, one simply would have to hypothe-
size the use of the Mont Genvre pass by the Carolingian flanking force that threatened the
Lombard position from the rear. In short, the only plausible way for the Carolingians to
threaten the rear of the Lombard army at Chiusa was to send a force through Mont Genvre
and then over the mountains.
171Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 5355.
the unwanted war303
traditional Roman road.172 If Charlemagnes unit continued in this direc-

tion, his force would be in position to link up with the troops who had
marched through Mont Cenis. Such a reunion in the environs of Susa obvi-
ously would make no tactical sense because it would place the entire
Carolingian army directly in front of the Lombard forces entrenched at
Chiusa. Indeed, if this had been Charlemagnes intention, there would
have been no tactical purpose in dividing his own army at Geneva and
sending one part through Mont Cenis while he led the other through Mont
Genvre on a longer and more difficult route to Susa.173
As we know from the hostilities that ensued, it was Charlemagnes plan
to deploy this latter force, which at this time was still under his personal
command, to threaten Desiderius position from the rear. Therefore, it
must be concluded that after moving through Mont Genvre, the king
likely continued along the Roman road through Csanne (Gadaone) and
over the Col de Sestrires as far as Fenestrelle, i.e. along the normal route
to Susa.174 At Fenestrelle, however, the road forks. At this point, Char
lemagne continued, probably with a small and fast-moving personal
escort drawn from his military household, to Susa so as to take personal
command of the main Carolingian force already facing the Lombard army
at Chiusa and perhaps even to reopen negotiations with Desiderius for a
peaceful resolution of the situation.175
172Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 5055; Coolidge, Charles the Greats Passage,
p. 494; and for a good description see J. Ball, Western Alps, new ed. (London, 1898), map iii.
173It is possible that logistical requirements encouraged Charlemagne to divide his
forces, but the resources from Novalesa that were available on the Mont Cenis route should
have been sufficient for an undivided force since, as seen above, plans for the availability of
supplies had been made several months in advance. Moreover, as will be seen below, the
route through Mont Genvre gave Charlemagnes force a tactical advantage in gaining
access to the Lombard defenses at Chiusa from their left flank.
174For the normal route, see Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 5055; Coolidge, Charles
the Greats Passage, p. 494; and Ball, Western Alps, map iii.
175V. Hadriani I, chs. 3031, makes clear that Charlemagne was still interested in negoti-
ating a settlement with Desiderius or that the Carolingian ruler wanted it to appear that he
was willing to negotiate.
The question may be raised as to why Charlemagne took the Mont Genvre route rather
than the Mont Cenis route if it were his intention, all along, to arrive personally at Susa.
Mont Cenis had been the customary route for a Carolingian invasion force and Mont
Genvre was not. Therefore, it may be suggested as a possible explanation that Charlemagne
led the force along the latter route in order to provide whatever morale benefit that might
accrue from his personal presence in a potentially unknown or less well-known situation.
Such behavior in which the commander faces with his men the perils of the campaign is
well-understood in military circles from antiquity to the present to be the essence of effec-
tive leadership. See, for example, Bachrach, The Education, pp. 713.
304 chapter four
The greater part of the unit that Charlemagne earlier had led through
Mont Genvre as far as Fenestrelle is described in the various sources as a
scara and as a legio.176 This constitutes prima facie evidence that this
detachment was composed of professional soldiers likely drawn from the
royal obsequium and perhaps also from the military households of some of
Charlemagnes more important fideles. A similarly described unit of select
troops or special forces had been chosen by Pippin to be used in a similar
situation some two decades earlier. In both cases, it is clear that the sources
are not referring to militia troops who were serving in expeditione.177
Nevertheless, the scara, which Charlemagne sent to strike the Lombard
army from the rear, had to have included several thousand fighting men in
order to be effective against Desiderius army or even to constitute a viable
threat, i.e. something more than a mere distraction.
Once Charlemagne departed from this special forces unit composed of
escariti, it continued south-southwest through Perosa on the route to
Pinerolo and the Piedmont plain. It was probably at this point, i.e. at
Pinerolo, that the force turned north and east through the mountains to
Pissasco.178 Einhards far too generalized observation regarding the path-
less ridges of the mountains that the army crossed likely refers to this
flanking movement.179 By contrast with the line of march taken by this
scara, the well-used Roman roads through the Great Saint Bernard, Mont
Cenis, and Mont Genvre Passes were comparatively easy to negotiate,
especially during the summer season.180 It should be noted further that
although this scara had to be of considerable size, as indicated above, it is
likely that the men were on foot and carried their own supplies. Perhaps
176ARF, an. 773, describes the force that deployed to the rear of Desiderius position as
a scara; and AMP, an. 773 (p. 60), describes this force as a legio while calling attention to its
especially elite composition. CM, p. 295, uses the same terminology as AMP. See the discus-
sion of these terms in Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 8283, as indicative of pro-
fessional soldiers as contrasted to expeditionary militia troops.
178Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 5355, describes this route. Regarding the fact that
this force was sent over the mountains, see ARF, an. 773; AMP, an. 773 (p. 60); and CM,
p. 295. These sources condense the time frame of the action and, thus, would lead the
unwary reader to think that the scara or legio had been dispatched from the Val di Susa in
front of the Lombard position at Chiusa for the purpose of this encirclement maneuver.
Such a movement was not possible. Due to the terrain, the Lombard rear could only be
attacked by forces which were in the Piedmont plain. See Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 1011.
179VK, ch. 6.
180Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 1011, regarding accessibility of Chiusa from this route. It is
important that ARF, an. 773, describes the force that deployed to the rear of Desiderius
army as coming over the mountains. Both CM, p. 295; and AMP, an. 773 (p. 60), use similar
phraseology.
the unwanted war305
some mules were used because the difficult terrain that they were forced
to negotiate undermined the use of horses, especially high-spirited war
horses.
How Charlemagnes planners obtained the necessary intelligence so
that this scara could pick its way through the difficult terrain from Pissasco
into the region around Giaveno and ultimately behind Desiderius postion
at Chiusa, i.e. in the region of Avigliana and Rivoli, helps to cast light on
Carolingian military planning. Traditionally, scholars follow the entry in
the Chronica di Novalesa, written during the later 11th or early 12th century,
which indicates that Charlemagnes forces followed this route with the
help of local guides. In fact, special attention is given to a minstrel as
providing key information.181
Memory of the role of these guides and particularly of the highly roman-
tic tale of a minstrel, who may be thought to have provided a now-lost
verse concerning the situation, which perhaps included the place names
of the line of march, is thought to have been preserved in local oral tradi-
tions. These stories supposedly were known at the monastery of Novalesa,
and likely were embellished during the three centuries or so following
Charlemagnes invasion and conquest of the Lombard kingdom. It is
exceptionally important, however, that there is general agreement among
modern scholars, based upon the lay of the land, that the toponomical
information dealt with above provided by the Chronica di Novalesa is
accurate despite the mistaken reference to the so-called via Francorum.182
Relying on local guides to provide information for military operations
was a hallowed technique that frequently had been employed both in the
ancient world by the Greeks and the Romans and continued to be used
throughout the Middle Ages. However, the use of locals always had a vari-
ety of potential flaws, which, on occasion, could lead to disaster.183 In
order to avoid such disasters, Charlemagnes forces likely also had infor-
mation in addition to that which was provided by local guides by which
this intelligence could be evaluated and double-checked. Archbishop Leo
of Ranvenna (770778), who, as seen above, had been put in office by
181Costambeys, Power and Patronage, p. 299.

182Regarding the accuracy of the topography, see Duparc, Les cluses, pp. 1011; and
Coolidge, Charles the Greats passage, p. 502. CN, ed. Alessio, bk. III, ch. 14, indicates that
this route was thereafter called the via Francorum. The editor, Alessio, p. 155, n. 1, provides
substantial critical literature to the effect that the account in the chronicle of how the so-
called via Francorum got its name is to be discounted. Barbaro, Charlemagne, p. 30, seems
to misunderstand the role of Bernards force, discussed above.
183See the discussion by Vegetius, DRM. bk. III, ch. 6.
306 chapter four
Charlemagnes military forces, is reported in an account written much ear-

lier than the Chronica di Novalesa to have first showed to the Franks the
route into Italy. As a result of Leos efforts, we are told that Desiderius was
deposed and imprisoned.184
According to Agnellus, the author of the Liber pontificalis ecclesiae
Ravennatis who grew up in Ravenna during the reign of Charlemagne,
Bishop Leo helped the Franks through the efforts of his deacon Martin.
Agnellus makes clear that Martin was knowledgeable regarding the rele-
vant route that so advantaged Charlemagnes forces and disadvantaged
those of Desiderius. The fact that Charlemagne later established Martin as
archbishop of Ravenna (810818) may perhaps have been a reward for his
valuable service in helping to drive the Lombards from the clusae.185
Martin, however, so far as can be ascertained, was, like most of the key
members of the Ravenna ecclesiastical hierarchy, a native of the Ravennate.
Thus, the obvious question arises as to where he could have obtained key
geographical information of a local nature regarding a part of Italy more
than 350 kilometers to the west of Ravenna as the crow flies.
A possible answer to this question lies in the substantial geographical
library that was available at Ravenna. For example, the Cosmographer of
Ravenna is known to have had a large variety of sources, some of which he
clearly used in the construction of his Cosmography. It is also very likely
that the Cosmographer did not use all of the available sources for his work
as we now know it.186 During the later Roman Empire, maps and espe-
cially itineraries were produced in the thousands and many survived into
the Middle Ages.187 Therefore, in evaluating Martins possible contribu-
tion to Charlemagnes victory, it hardly would be a great leap of faith to
believe that the Ravenna deacon provided the Carolingian planners, who
briefed the members of the scara that was deployed by Charlemagne to
turn the Lombard left flank, with a helpful itinerary or perhaps even a map
(picta) of the type that Vegetius discusses, to guide them.188
184See, Agnellus, LPER, 160, for the truncated Vita of Leo, and for the Vita of Martin
167170. The effort by Costambeys, Power and Patronage, p. 299, to explain away Agnellus
account is not compelling.
185LPER, 160, 167170.
186For a very valuable introduction to the knotty problems regarding this text, see
Franz Staab, Ostrogothic Geographers at the Court of Theodoric the Great: A Study of
some sources of the Anonymous Cosmographer of Ravenna, Viator, 7 (1976), 2764.
187Robert K. Sherk, Roman Geographical Exploration and Military Maps, in Aufstieg
und Niedergang der rmerischen Welt, ed. Hildegard Temporini, II.1 (Berlin-New York, 1974),
534562, provides a useful introduction.
188DRM, bk. III, ch. 6.
the unwanted war307
The likelihood that there was a copy of a relevant itinerary or map is

increased by the fact that detailed Roman geographical materials of this
type were widely available to the Carolingians and not limited to the
library at Ravenna. It is well-established, for example, that Charlemagnes
planners, i.e. the Magistratus or general staff, also had access to numer-
ous texts of this type. It has recently been demonstrated that the famous
Peutinger Map very likely was created at Charlemagnes court through
the blending of many such geographical guides.189 In trying to ascertain
how Charlemagne obtained the necessary information to turn the
Lombard flank in the clusae, it likely would not be far off the mark to sug-
gest that in addition to information provided by local informants attached
to Novalesa, the Franks had some sort of itinerary or map from the library
at Ravenna provided by Martin through the efforts of Archbishop Leo.190
While Charlemagnes special forces unit, the above-mentioned scara,
was outflanking Desiderius position, the main Carolingian army, now
once again under Charlemagnes direct command, already was fully
deployed in the Val di Susa. At this point, Charlemagne is credited in Pope
Hadrians Vita with having undertaken yet one more effort to open nego-
tiations with the Lombards. The terms Charlemagne presented to
Desiderius would appear to have been exceptionally generous. First, the
Frankish king is reported once again to have offered to make a monetary
settlement of 14,000 solidi directly to the Lombard king. Desiderius, in
turn, would have to promise to return the lands that he had taken from
St. Peter. However, to guarantee this promise, Desiderius would have to
provide Charlemagne with only three hostages, i.e. sons of Lombard
judges. If these terms were met, Charlemagne promised that the
Carolingian army would withdraw and return home.191
The Lombard king, probably advised by his son and co-ruler Adelchis
and perhaps also by the Bavarian noble Autchar, who also enjoyed close
relations with Tassilo, rejected Charlemagnes terms. The Carolingian
189Albu, Imperial Geography, pp. 136148, provides a substantial corpus of references

regarding the availability of Roman itineraries to the Carolingians and develops the argu-
ment regarding the Peutinger Map.
190It may be a coincidence, but according to Einhard (VK, ch. 33), Charlemagne made
Archbishop Martin of Ravenna a beneficiary in his will for one of his silver map tables, i.e.
the one that depicted Rome. Agnellus (LPR, ch. 170) confirms that Martin received the gift.
For other more sophisticated explanations for this gift, see Deborah Mauskopf Deliyannis,
Charlemagnes silver tables: the ideology of an imperial capital, EME, 12 (2003), 169177,
with the literature cited. there.
191V. Hadriani I, chs. 3031, provides this information, but because of its harsh anti-
Lombard bias may perhaps have understated Charlemagnes demands.
308 chapter four
rulers willingness to negotiate, even at this late date, likely was interpreted
as a sign of weakness by Desiderius and his advisers, which may have
hinted at the unwillingness on Charlemagnes part to commit his troops to
battle.192 In addition, Desiderius may have expected Bavarian support and
perhaps even help from the Avars.193 It is likely that he had not been
informed regarding Bernards army which had been deployed to the east
to protect the Carolingian right flank.
However, very shortly after rejecting Charlemagnes offer, Desiderius
learned that a flanking force, i.e. the scara that Charlemagne had sent
through the mountains, was coming up toward Rivoli. The Lombard king
realized immediately that this force soon would be behind the Lombard
defenses at Chiusa. As a result, he ordered a rapid retreat in order to avoid
having his army caught in a pincer between Charlemagnes main army and
the flanking force.194 The Lombards awareness that they faced a serious
threat to their position and that they regarded the threat as acute consti-
tutes prima facie evidence that the scara which carried out the flanking
movement was a unit of considerable size, capable of doing more than
nominal damage to Desiderius position.195
The situation is described by one well-informed contemporary who
reported with some hyperbole: Desiderius, his son Adelgis and all of the
Lombards were filled with terror and great fear . Thus, during the night,
they abandoned their tents as well as all of the equipment that was in their
tents and fled despite the fact that no one was pursuing them.196 Despite
the sources bias, which is intent upon depicting the cowardice of the
Lombards, there likely was little pursuit by Charlemagnes special forces
due to the likelihood, as noted above, that it was on foot due to the diffi-
culty of the terrain that it had traversed. Nevertheless, there would appear
to have been some Frankish engagement with the Lombards, perhaps
by the troops of the Frankish scara, as Duke Theudicius, whose Spoletan
192V. Hadriani I, ch. 31, notes the rejection of the terms and calls attention to Adelchis
presence at Chiusa. CM, p. 295, makes clear that Autchar accompanied Desiderius forces.
193See Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, pp. 5052.
194ARF, an. 773; CM, p. 295; and AMP, an. 773(p. 60); all associate Desiderius immediate
retreat with the success of the Carolingian flanking movement.
195Cf. the minimalist guesses for the order of magnitude of Charlemagnes armies by
France, Armies of Charlemagne, pp. 6182. France asserts (p. 82) that no more than
20,000 [troops] were ever raised at any one time by Charlemagne. Now see, Bachrach,
Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 142.
196V. Hadriani I, ch. 31, for the quotation. See also, ARF, an. 773; AE, an. 773; CM, p. 295;
and AMP, an. 773 (p. 60) all of which indicate that the Lombards fled before Charlemagnes
army attacked. Regarding Autchar, see CM, p. 295.
the unwanted war309
exercitus would seem to have provided the rear guard for the retreating
Lombard forces, was killed.197
For all intents and purposes, and especially as compared with Pippins
operations in the clusae in both 754 and 756, Charlemagne not only had
won a bloodless victory, but the abandoned Lombard fortifications at
Chiusa were in his hands. In addition, as the result of Desiderius rapid
retreat, the Carolingians gained possession of the equipment, likely stone
throwing machines, that the Lombard army had brought to defend the
clusae. Perhaps even more importantly, it is very likely that Charlemagnes
forces also captured considerable quantities of foodstuffs, which had been
accumulated in the Lombard camp in order to feed the troops while they
defended their positions.
Despite this victory, Charlemagne showed no inclination to order the
troops under his direct command to pursue the retreating Lombard army
in order to destroy it. Clearly, Charlemagnes strategy at this stage in his
military operations was different from that pursued by Pippin in 756.198
Perhaps Charlemagne was still thinking in terms of a negotiated settle-
ment along the lines discussed above, which he had offered to Desiderius
before hostilities had begun. In addition, there may have been some senti-
ment for the arrangement of a peace with Desiderius among some of the
Carolingian magnates, or at least those who traditionally advocated a pro-
Lombard policy.199
197See the discussion by Pierre Toubert, Researches de Diplomatique et dHistoire

Lombardes, Journal des Savants (1965), 171203, at 191195, regarding the death of the duke.
See also V. Hadriani I, ch. 31.
198ARF, an. 773, makes clear that the forces under Charlemagnes direct command did
not suffer any losses and also makes clear that his senior officers, i.e. his fideles, also did
not suffer loses. AE, an., 773, indicates that no battle took place.
199The background of opposition among some substantial element of the Carolingian
aristocracy to military operations in Italy is noted by Einhard, VK, ch. 6. N.b. ARF, an. 773,
where special attention is called to Charlemagnes convocation of a synodum at Geneva
to discuss the campaign. See AE, an., 773.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE SIEGE OF PAVIA
Passage by Charlemagnes army through the Lombard fortifications at

Chiusa obviously was the necessary first phase for successful Carolingian
military operations in Italy against King Desiderius. Charlemagne knew
very well, however, that once his forces broke through Desiderius defenses
in the clusae and prepared to enter the plains of northern Italy, there
would be new and different strategic and tactical problems with which to
deal. Desiderius army, which had fled from Chiusa, had not been seriously
damaged, although its morale is likely to have been weakened by the sud-
den and unplanned retreat. Therefore, Charlemagne had to consider the
possibility of having to engage a reformed and reinforced Lombard army
in the field under royal command.
Since Desiderius was on the defensive, he was positioned to choose
both where and when to confront the invaders. In addition, Charlemagne
might have to capture numerous city, town, and lesser fortifications, either
by storm or extended sieges, should these strongholds choose not to sur-
render but rather to oppose the Carolingians. In fact, the need to deal with
only a few important fortress cities before advancing to Pavia likely would
be exceptionally disruptive to the Carolingian march on the Lombard cap-
ital and rather different from Pippins operations in 754 and 756, which
faced no local opposition. In addition, Charlemagne had to consider the
possibility, despite the deployment of Bernards army to the east in order
to block an enemy advance, that relief forces might come to Desiderius
aid from his son-in-law in Bavaria, with or without Avar support, or even
by way of a possible Byzantine intervention.
During the Merovingian era, as various histories and chronicles well-
known to the Carolingians attested, Frankish armies from north of the
Alps traditionally had little trouble ravaging the countryside of northern
Italy. However, these forces had great difficulty in taking the fortress cities
and other strongholds that dotted the landscape. Armies from the regnum
Francorum that had been deployed south of the Alps usually either negoti-
ated some sort of peace with city officials or exhausted their supplies and
retreated north as best they could. These retreats usually were undertaken
under increasingly difficult material conditions due to logistical problems
the siege of pavia311
and harassment by militia levies mobilized from among the militarized

indigenous populations at the local level.1
Closer in time and importance to Carolingian military operations in
773, as a possible guide to Charlemagnes planning, were Pippins success-
ful invasions of the Lombard kingdom in 754 and 756. After breaking
through the defenses that were more or less well-established by King
Aistulf in the clusae, Pippin struck in both campaigns directly at Pavia, the
Lombard capital.2 Charlemagne and his advisers had what would appear
to be sound information regarding Pippins operations from the reports
recorded by the Carolingian court chronicler, to whom we refer as
Fredegars Continuator. In addition, Charlemagne likely also had informa-
tion from men serving in his army who had participated in these opera-
tions. It was recorded that in 754, for example, Pippin had established a
fortified camp, or castra, in the environs of Pavia. Then, the Frankish king
is said to have dispatched raiding parties to forage throughout the coun-
tryside and to ravage and burn what could not be carried away. This strat-
egy included the destruction of what would appear to have been the
relatively small Lombard military encampments, referred to by the
Continuator as castra,that dotted the region in the neighborhood of Pavia.
In addition, Pippin made a point of capturing the inhabitants of these for-
tifications and holding them as prisoners.3
These castra were the home bases for units of Lombard arimanni. These
men dwelled in the environs of Pavia with their families and served as
elements of the standing army of the regnum Langobardorum, i.e. they
were members of the kings military household or obsequium. Because of
their proximity to the capital, the arimanni may be considered presen-
tales.4 The use of military colonies of this sort would seem to have had a
contemporary analogue developed under papal auspices in central Italy.
The popes called such installations domus cultae. These settlements of
1See the discussion by Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 2627, 6061;
and more recently, Dick Harrison, The Early State and the Towns: Forms of Integration in
Lombard Italy, ad 568774 (Lund, 1993), pp. 6768, 102, 112, 141142. Historical works such as
those of Gregory of Tours were frequently copied and edited by the Carolingians. See
Goffart, From Historiae to Historia Francorum, pp. 255274.
2Fred. Cont., chs. 37, 38.
4See Fred. Cont., ch. 37, where mention is made of the tentoria, either soldiers tents or
much more probably, in the present context, military equipment (see below), that was
taken when the Lombard castra in the countryside fell to Pippins forces. The emphasis on
the capture of military equipment gives some support to the idea that these castra were
military bases.
312 chapter five
military personnel were created by the popes as military lands upon

which, as seen above, soldiers of the papal army were based for the defense
of the region around Rome and the city itself.5
The various political authorities in Italy used different terms to describe
settlements such as the castra of the arimanni and the domus cultae where
papal troops were settled. Nevertheless, all of these institutions involving
military lands likely had their institutional roots in structures developed
during the later Roman Empire.6 Such military colonies had been contin-
ued in parts of Italy, especially in the north, by the Ostrogoths until ca. 555,
i.e. just prior to the completion of Justinians reconquest and the subse-
quent Lombard invasion in 568.7 Military colonies still were maintained in
other parts of Italy dominated by the Byzantines in the later 8th century,
as well as in the eastern parts of the empire.8 In a similar manner, the cen-
tenae established in various of the civitates and pagi of the regnum
Francorum were adapted to be used as bases to support elements of the
royal obsequium as well as serving as the basic administrative unit for the
mobilization of select levies. It is noteworthy that Merovingian practice in
these matters was continued by their Carolingian successors.9
It was the tactical imperative in the initial phase of each of Pippins
invasions of Italy, to get through the clusae. Similarly, the first phase of
operations around Pavia in 756 was consistent with that which was fol-
lowed in 754. In both campaigns, Pippin saw to it that the region around
Pavia was stripped of all movables and that foodstuffs were comman-
deered following standard military practice in such situations. However,
there were some noteworthy differences regarding Pippins military opera-
tions in and around Pavia in 756 as compared to 754. During the later
campaign, Pippin deployed his army all around the city and did not
merelybase his forces in one or more fortified encampments (castra). As
the court chronicler, who was working under the patronage of Pippins
cousin observed, the Carolingian army encircled the walls of Pavia (circa
muros Tincini) so that no one could escape (ita ut nullus exinde evadere
5See the discussion of the domus cultae above, in Chapter Two.

6For an introduction to the subject in comparative perspective, see Bachrach, Military
Lands, pp. 95122.
7See the observations by Thomas S. Burns, A History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington,
IN, 1984), 196198.
8Regarding the use of military lands by the Byzantines, see Warren Treadgold,
Byzantium and Its Army, 2841081 (Stanford, 1995), 171179.
9The matter of colonies and the organization of both the royal and papal military
forces are discussed above, in Chapter Two.
potuisset) from the city.10 This, in effect, is evidence that Pippin had the
city completely vallated by his siege works. The vallation of a fortress, as
contrasted to the use of castra, also required the use of a contra-vallation
to protect the besieging troops who might be attacked from the rear. A
contra-vallation, as reported by the court chronicler, is known to have
been established by Pippin at Bourges in 763.11
In both 754 and 756, King Aistulf is reported to have despaired of hold-
ing Pavia against the siege tactics used by Pippin. Consequently, he sued
for peace. The first siege, according to the court chronicler, came to an
end because of Pippins devastating sweep of the countryside and particu-
larly because of his destruction of the above-mentioned local castra.
The taking of these strongholds resulted in the capture of the people who
lived there. In addition, this effort resulted in the acquisition of a large
treasure in gold and silver (plura ornamenta) and a substantial quantity of
military equipment. Special mention is made of the capture of siege shel-
ters (tentoria), or mantlets used for protecting troops who were engaged in
storming the walls of a stronghold.12
During the siege of 756, Aistulf is said to have sought terms because he
realized that he had no hope of escape.13 This should be taken to mean
that he despaired of being able either to flee from the city or having a relief
force come to his aid that would drive off the Carolingian army and thus
break the siege. Obviously, it was Pippins thinking, and it proved to be cor-
rect, that if Aistulf were forced to surrender, several positive consequences
would follow. There was no concerted opposition to the Franks by the
Lombard duces, gastaldi, judices, and other royal officials who commanded
the many fortifications, both fortress cities and lesser strongholds, widely
distributed throughout the Lombard kingdom. In effect, there would be
no need for the Carolingians to besiege the other great fortress cities held
by the Lombards once Pavia surrendered.

11Regarding Pippins siege of Bourges, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 228238.
12Fred. Cont., ch. 38; cf. the editorial note (p. 106, n. 1) by Wallace-Hadrill regarding the
meaning of the term tentoria. To give this term the meaning tents in the context of being
taken as booty as the result of the capture of a castrum or, for that matter, the capture or
several castra, is certainly possible. However, for Aistulf to have been motivated to surren-
der, at least in part, because Pippins army captured tents is less meaningful than the
reading that Aistulf was encouraged to surrender by the fact that the Carolingians had
captured siege equipment. Harrison, The Early State, pp. 67, 112, 149150, makes clear from
a variety of sources that sieges dominated warfare in Lombard Italy prior to the Carolingian
conquest.
13Fred. Cont., ch. 38; ARF, an. 755; and AE, an. 755.
314 chapter five
Crucial to the success of Pippins strategic thinking was his ability to

mobilize both overwhelming force and a highly sophisticated siege train
in the environs of Pavia. As a result, Aistulf and, perhaps no less impor-
tantly, the Lombard fighting men at Pavia were convinced that resistance
was hopeless. At issue in such situations is the morale both of the com-
manders, who were charged with leading the defense of these fortifica-
tions, and of the fighting men who were facing the enemy. The matter of
destroying the enemys morale in such cases was well understood by
Pippin, according to the court chronicler, who later, in describing the
Carolingian conquest of Aquitaine in the 760s, calls attention to the behav-
ior of Duke Waiofer and his men in the context of their failed morale and
their lack of will to resist.14
Charlemagne and his advisers had access to a great deal of very valuable
information, both written and oral, regarding Pippins successful opera-
tions in 754 and 756 as well as his siege of Bourges in 763. Charlemagne
knew that in order to maintain successful siege operations against Pavia,
he had to have under his command specialists in the building and use of
various types of machinae. He also needed men who were knowledgeable
in the implementation of various besieging techniques, e.g. the construc-
tion of properly-designed installations for the vallation of a great fortress
city such as Pavia as well as the contra-vallation of his own siege emplace-
ments. As the accounts of Charlemagnes siege operations discussed below
make clear, he mobilized the necessary equipment and manpower to carry
out a lengthy and successful campaign under what must be considered
difficult conditions. The siege was executed in hostile territory through the
winter of 773774, a thousand or so kilometers from the Carolingian home
base in Austrasia.
Following his sweep through the passes, Charlemagne encamped the
bulk of his army in the area of Chiusa. There, as was standard operating
procedure, he saw to it that the wounded were treated and the dead were
buried with appropriate religious services.15 For security reasons, the
Carolingian army likely made use of the deserted Lombard defenses.
Therefore, they avoided expending valuable time and resources to con-
struct new castra. It was standing operating procedure for the Carolingians,
as it had been for the Merovingians, to establish defenses for their armies
14See Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 133.

15Concerning religious rituals during the Carolingian era in regard to burying fighting
men who had died in battle, see D. Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of War, pp. 6162.
Concerning the wounded, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 133134.
while operating in hostile territory in order to protect the soldiers, their

equipment, and their animals.16 Of course, in following this imperative,
the Franks were imitating Roman procedure. It is important to note that
there is no evidence that while in the forests of so-called Germania libra,
barbarians, who lacked contact with the Romans, employed a regulation
or followed a doctrine that required the use of castra while on the march
in enemy territory.17
Charlemagne was in no hurry to pursue Desiderius forces following the
seizure of the defenses at Chiusa and the rout of the Lombard army. He
chose not to order his mounted troops to carry out a hot pursuit, compa-
rable, for example, to that employed in 507 by Clovis at Vouill with the
aim of destroying the enemys armed forces following a victory in the field.
As has been well-established, it is while retreating that early medieval
armies were most likely to suffer serious casualties.18 As the time frame of
Charlemagnes subsequent operations makes clear, the two or so weeks
that the Carolingian army remained at Chiusa undoubtedly were used as a
period of rest for the men and animals and for the refurbishing of the
equipment following the crossing of the Alps.
After the completion of a lengthy march and an engagement with the
enemy, it was standard operating procedure, if possible, to rest the men
and animals and to inspect the equipment with the aim of making neces-
sary repairs. Considerable refitting certainly was necessary for the force of
professional soldiers, the escariti, which marched over very difficult ter-
rain to turn the left flank of the Lombard position in the clusae. The lim-
ited skirmishing undertaken by these Carolingian troops with the rear
guard of the fleeing Lombard army during the course of Desiderius retreat
likely resulted in some casualties among the escariti and probably also
took some toll on the equipment of this large unit of Charlemagnes elite
forces.
16The chronology of Charlemagnes campaign, as will be seen below with regard to the
beginning of the siege at Pavia, makes it very likely that the Carolingian army rested for
some time before moving against the Lombard capital. From what we have seen thus far of
Charlemagnes prudence as well as early Carolingian standard operating procedure, it is
inconceivable that he would have permitted his forces to encamp in the open fields with-
out having taken proper security measures.
17E.A. Thompson, The Early Germans (Oxford, 1965), 109149, provides what still is the
best expos of the primitive nature of the early German military prior to the effective influ-
ence of the Romans.
18See Bernard S. Bachrach, Vouill in the Context of the Decisive Battle Phenomenon,
in The Battle of Vouill 505 ce: Where France Began, ed. Denuta Shanzer and Ralph W.
Mathisen (Berlin, 2013), 1142.
316 chapter five
In addition to resting his men and animals, Charlemagne needed, in the

new circumstances following the victory at Chiusa, to recoordinate his
strategy with Bernard. The latters force, which had not participated in
military operations at Chiusa, was still considerably to the east, where it
had been deployed in order to provide a screen to block a potential flank-
ing movement by a Lombard army or perhaps by some combination of
Lombard and Bavarian forces, or even of Avar mercenaries. If Charlemagne
decided to move against Pavia, as his father had in both 754 and 756, in
order to lay siege to the city, it would be important to continue to deploy
Bernards army to the northeast where it could continue to serve as a
blocking force against potential supporters of King Desiderius.
A coalition of various Lombard dukes united against the Frankish inva-
sion certainly still was a possibility, and could not be ruled out by
Charlemagne without taking a chance of being unpleasantly surprised, if
not seriously discomfited.19 So too, the mobilization of a Bavarian army
under Tassilo to intervene in support of his father-in-law could cause con-
siderable trouble. Such a force, once mustered at Augsburg, easily could
traverse the Brenner Pass and move on to Verona. This fortress city was a
likely base, in strategic terms, for the muster of an army intending to
relieve a siege of Pavia some 200 kilometers to the west-southwest. It is
important to emphasize that in 754 and 756, the political situation in
Bavaria was very different from that in 773. During the mid-750s, there was
no question of a Bavarian army being deployed in support of the Lombards
against King Pippin. Tassilo was a minor and thus dependent upon Pippin
for his office and perhaps even for his life.20
Finally, and no less importantly, while he was still at Chiusa, Char
lemagne was in great need of fresh intelligence concerning the disposition
of Desiderius army. This force had not been defeated in the field, but
merely had retreated from the clusae under pressure from the column of
special forces that had turned its flank. Without sound information to the
contrary, Charlemagne had to assume, in the worst case, that Desiderius
was still in the field with a substantial military force, one that might,
indeed, have been reinforced. Charlemagne had to be very careful to take
the appropriate measures required to protect his army from a Lombard
19Cf. Gasparri, Il passaggio, pp. 3536, regarding the supposed defection of the dukes,
and also regarding Charlemagnes supposed knowledge of this treason.
20Tassilo attained his majority in 757 and only married Desiderius daughter, as seen
above, in 763. See the observations by Pearson, Conflicting Loyalties, pp. 5962, with the
extensive literature cited there.
counterattack, especially a surprise attack. The Carolingians clearly could

not risk being seriously discomfited, and perhaps even being defeated in
the field so far from home by a Lombard surprise attack.
As the above situation makes clear, Charlemagnes further military
operations would depend, in large part, upon Desiderius subsequent
strategy. No less important, however, to both rulers was the behavior of the
Lombard dukes and other royal officials. These men not only commanded
the various units of the Lombard kings field forces, i.e. the Lombard expe-
ditionary militia, and their own military households of professional sol-
diers, but, in addition, were charged with the defense of the many fortress
cities, fortified towns, and lesser strongholds that were thickly distributed
throughout the Lombards north-Italian regnum. For example, the Caro
lingians were well aware, at the least, of some of the potential dangers they
could encounter when they began their advance along the old Roman
road that ran from Chiusa toward Pavia.
If Charlemagne were to follow the line of march undertaken in 754 and
756 by Pippin with the Lombard capital as his primary military objective,
then the Carolingian army would have to take under its control, besiege, or
bypass the fortress city of Turin, which was located only about a two- to
three-day march beyond the clusae. Turins very well-fortified 2,400-meter
circuit wall certainly could present Charlemagne with difficulties should
he decide on an assault. If the city were not taken, however, Charlemagnes
problems could increase. Turins commander could deploy his garrison
and the armed populace of the region, serving as a militia force of general
and select levies, to provide resistance to the Carolingian advance by raid-
ing the baggage train and attacking foragers.21 At the very outset, Char
lemagne had to know what the Lombard commander at Turin was likely
do in light of Desiderius retreat from Chiusa.
As Charlemagne waited, and undoubtedly had the situation at Turin
reconnoitered, various items of intelligence regarding the political and
military situation gradually reached him. Most importantly, Charlemagne
was to learn that Desiderius, largely following the failed strategy that had
been used by King Aistulf in 754 and 756, demobilized the greater part of
his field army. The Lombard ruler, in fact, ordered the redeployment of the
various expeditionary contingents, which had formed the bulk of his army
at Chiusa, back to their respective civitates.22 As noted above, it long had
21For the physical aspects of Turin, see the brief remarks by Grimal, Roman Cities,
pp. 273276.
22V. Hadriani I, chs. 32, 33.
318 chapter five
been standard operating procedure for the Italians in the north to defend
their fortress cities against Frankish armies rather than to meet the invad-
ers in battle. It also became clear to Charlemagne that Desiderius, in com-
mand of the royal military household and the expeditionary levies of the
Pavia region, had retreated, along with his son and co-ruler, Adelchis,
along the via Fulvia to the Lombard capital.23
Desiderius decision to demobilize the field army and to have his local
commanders hold the fortress cities of the kingdom was, as mentioned
above, traditional Lombard strategy. For example, as Charlemagnes advis-
ers undoubtedly knew from the often copied and epitomized pages of
Gregory of Tours Ten Books of History, a large Merovingian army, i.e. well
in excess of 30,000 men, composed of 20 units, each led by its own dux,
and divided into three army corps, had invaded Italy in 590.24 Since the
Lombards decided to hold out in their fortified towns and cities, this
Merovingian army, aside from doing considerable damage to the country-
side, accomplished nothing of a lasting nature.25
For Charlemagne, as for previous commanders of Frankish invasion
forces from the north, the main strategic question centered on the loyalty
to the Lombard king of the dukes and other royal officers who commanded
strongholds.26 In short, would the Carolingians be required to undertake
the extensive and perhaps impossible task of laying siege to the dozens
of strongly fortified towns and cities of the Lombard kingdom? This, of
course, would be a replay of Pippins multi-year operations in Aquitaine
during the 760s. The result of such a strategy would surely deprive Char
lemagne of an opportunity in the near term of continuing his campaign to
conquer the Saxon region. In addition, a prolonged conflict would keep
Charlemagne south of the Alps for long periods of time, which might
23V. Hadriani I, ch. 31, remarks on the rapidity with which Desiderius returned to Pavia.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that he took the via Fulvia, which was the shortest route
from Chiusa to the Lombard capital.
24See regarding these operations, Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization,
pp. 6061.
25Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, V,267275, VI, 2933; and Gregory, Hist., bk. X, ch. 3.
Regarding the military demography of this campaign, see Epist. Aust., no. 40, where part of
the army is reasonably put at 20,000 effectives. For more general observations regarding
Merovingian military demography, see Bachrach, Anatomy, esp. pp. 161167. Cf. Halsall,
Warfare and Society, pp. 119133, who parrots the litany of unsustainable bromides regard-
ing the primitive nature of warfare in the early Middle Ages, which then are used in a cir-
cular manner to argue that it would be impossible for the Franks to have had large armies.
For an overall treatment of Carolingian military demography, see Bachrach, Charlemagnes
Expeditionary Armies, pp. 142.
26See Gasparri, Il passaggio, pp. 3536.
hinder his abilities to assure his sole rule in the regnum Francorum. Finally,
the position of the papacy would not be materially improved.
Until he received intelligence to the contrary, Charlemagne was bound
by ordinary prudence to proceed upon the assumption that the Lombard
magnates, especially those who controlled important fortified cities, were
inclined to support Desiderius. Yet Charlemagne no doubt intended to
undermine such support for Desiderius wherever it might exist. In order
to do this, the Carolingian ruler made a decision to follow the approach
that had proved so successful for Pippin in both 754 and 756. As will be
seen below, he decided to attack the Lombard kingdom at its head.
Therefore, he followed a campaign strategy based upon capturing King
Desiderius by laying siege to the fortress city of Pavia. Either the Lombard
king would surrender, as had been the case during Pippins operations
against Aistulf, or Charlemagne not only would have to lay siege to the city,
but it was also likely that he would be compelled to capture it by military
action. Such an operation, certainly in the worst case, would require that
the Frankish army storm the walls of the city, and Charlemagne knew that
if this became necessary, he very likely would see his army suffer large
numbers of dead and wounded.
In order to enhance the possibility that local resistance would be lim-
ited, Charlemagne, like Pippin, apparently kept his soldiers from under-
taking the tactics of gratuitous devastation of the capital infrastructure of
the areas through which they marched and the taking of booty when
crossing enemy territory. In addition, it was made clear that the local peo-
ple were not to be harassed. Such a policy, it was long understood by
Frankish military commanders, was to be avoided, if possible, when the
goal of military operations was the integration of the conquered territory
and defeated people under ones own regnum or, at the least, to avoid
alienating the natives.27
27Clovis is depicted as recognizing the importance of not destroying the native popula-
tion, either intentionally or unintentionally, and of maintaining the infrastructure in good
condition. This view of Clovis behavior was popularized by Gregory of Tours. See the dis-
cussion of this in Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. xvii-xix. N.b. Even Chilperic, Clovis otherwise
supposedly reprobate grandson, is reported by an inveterately hostile but contemporary
source to have executed one of his commanders because, against royal orders, he permit-
ted his men to loot the countryside. See Bachrach, Gregory of Tours, pp. 351363, for a
discussion of the episode and other aspects of Gregorys work as useful information for the
study of early medieval military history. Cf. Halsall, Warfare and Society, pp. 137140, who,
to support his ideas regarding the primitive and undisciplined nature of Frankish armies,
accepts as plain text the anti-war laments of disaffected clerics regarding the supposedly
gratuitous and irrational destruction wrought by Frankish armies. Even if taken at face
320 chapter five
In fact, the Franks had learned this lesson early on in their history as
rulers in part of Gaul, and we can see it operative as early as the reign of
Clovis (d. 511).28 In a very practical sense, the population of the Lombard
kingdom, both Lombards and Italo-Romans, was militarized. Therefore,
the local population in various areas could do serious damage, if provoked,
to the Carolingian war effort. They could be especially dangerous to small
foraging parties that were detailed to operate in the countryside and, per-
haps even more importantly, to messengers who were needed to maintain
communications between various of Charlemagnes military forces.29
By the time the Carolingian army began to move out of its encamp-
ments in the neighborhood of the clusae early in September, Charlemagne
also had learned, likely from messengers who had been sent from Rome,
about the defection to the pope of several Lombard magnates from Rieti
and Spoleto. At least some of these defections had taken place prior to
Desiderius retreat from Chiusa. This makes clear that the pope was under-
taking efforts to undermine the Lombard kings power in the context of
the Carolingian invasion. However, following Desiderius withdrawal to
Pavia in the face of Charlemagnes success in the north, these defections,
although still largely local in nature, turned into larger scale opposition to
the Lombard kings authority and those officials who remained loyal to
him.30
Charlemagne also was informed that Pope Hadrian had established
Hildeprand, who opposed the Lombard monarch, as the new duke of
Spoleto.31 The death of Duke Theudicius of Spoleto at Chiusa made it pos-
sible for a political faction in the region led by Hildeprand to seize power
with papal support. Hildeprands activities, however, require further
notice as evidence for deeply penetrating Carolingian diplomatic efforts
in northern Italy prior to the invasion. Hildeprand, despite his promi-
nencein Lombard affairs, was a member of an important Franco-Bavarian
value, which is decidedly poor methodology, such complaints cannot be magnified to rep-
resent evidence of a quantitative nature for normal military operations.
28See the discussion of this by Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. xvii-xix. Cf. Halsall, Warfare and
Society, pp. 138139, who wants his readers to believe that Gregory made up this story from
whole cloth because the bishop of Tours supposedly was preaching here. However, there
is other evidence, some of it documentary, that supports this view of Clovis campaign
strategy. See Bachrach, Clovis, passim.
29See the discussion of Lombard military organization above, in Chapter Three.
30V. Hadriani I, chs. 32, 33; and the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII,
370372. Cf. Gasparri, Il passaggio, pp. 3536, who sees these actions as taking place too
early in the campaign and as being too widespread.
31V. Hadriani I, chs. 32, 33; and Costambeys, Power and Patronage, pp. 6667.
family. Prior to his activities in Spoleto, he is documented as spending sev-

eral years in Swabia. It is likely, therefore, that before returning to Italy, he
had made contact either with Charlemagnes agents or perhaps with the
Frankish king, himself. As subsequent documents make clear, Charlemagne
maintained a close personal relationship with the new duke.32
The pope also informed Charlemagne that the expeditionary levies,
which had been mobilized by Desiderius as militia forces from among the
citizens of Fermo, Osimo, Ancona, and Citt di Castello, sent representa-
tives to Rome after having fled from the clusae. The first three of the towns
on this list were located within the duchy of Spoleto, while Citt di Castello
was in the duchy of Chuisi. At Rome, the representatives of these expedi-
tionary levies are reported to have taken an oath promising to be loyal to
Saint Peter, his vicar, and all the latters successors.33 In short, at least some
of the higher ranking Lombard officials and the forces they commanded
clearly were not planning to support Desiderius in his subsequent conflict
with Charlemagne. This was especially the case after the Lombard kings
failure to hold the clusae. Other important Lombards also defected to the
pope at this time.34
Charlemagnes army moved south slowly and arrived at Pavia toward
the latter part of September 773.35 Likely, it took at least two weeks to com-
plete the march of some 200 kilometers from Chiusa along the via Fulvia
to the Lombard capital.36 The sources fail to indicate that Charlemagne
gained control of the fortified city of Turin or, for that matter, that he had
secured control of any of the many other Lombard fortifications along the
route from Chiusa to Pavia. In light of the strong parti pris of these sources
32The basics are discussed by G.V.B. West, Charlemagnes involvement in central and
southern Italy: power and the limits of authority, EME, 8 (1999), 343344, at 350. However,
because West (p. 366) is interested in stressing the limits of Carolingian power, he does not
emphasize the obvious connection that brought Hildepand to the popes attention and
which resulted in Charlemagnes support. An alternative view would have us draw the
unlikely conclusions that all of these connections were the result of coincidence.
33V. Hadriani I, ch. 33; and see Noble, The Republic, p. 134.
34CPL, p. 218, Spolitini et Reatini multique alii Lombardi ad mandata summi pontificis
venerunt.
35See V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, for the arrival. PCL, p. 218, indicates that the siege of Pavia
lasted six months following Charlemagnes return from Verona. The same chronology is
provided both by PCR, p. 201; and PCT, ch. 54, but in ch. 55, the impression left by the latter
is that the siege lasted ten months. Cf. CM, p. 295, where the siege is said to have ended in
June of 774 after having lasted ten months. Likely, the author confused the beginning of the
campaign in July with the beginning of the siege in September.
36These are marching rates for large armies under normal conditions, as seen in
Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 716726; and J. Nesbitt, The Rate of March of
Crusading Armies in Europe: A Study and Computation, Traditio, 19 (1963), 167181.
322 chapter five
in favor of Charlemagne, this silence surely permits the inference that

these fortress cities, fortified towns, and lesser strongholds had been
bypassed. As a result, they neither were attacked by the Frankish army nor
did they surrender. This policy of bypassing potentially hostile enemy
strongholds pursued by Charlemagne also had been Pippins strategy. It is
likely as well that the garrisons and the various militia forces based at
these strongholds and their environs did nothing noteworthy to impede
Charlemagnes march to the Lombard capital.37
Of course, from a strategic perspective, there was a severe limitation
imposed upon the Carolingians by moving south to establish a siege at
Pavia without first establishing control over the fortifications that were
situated to the rear of the advancing Frankish army. In these circum-
stances, Charlemagne could not secure his supply lines from the north
along the route from Susa to Pavia. In addition, Charlemagne likely knew,
considerably prior to his advance southward, that he would have to rely on
logistical support from assets in Italy and not from transalpine sources
moved through Mont Cenis, Susa, and Chiusa. Pippins earlier campaigns,
which had followed a pattern very similar to that being pursued by
Charlemagne, likely had been successful because they had secure sources
of supply in Italy. It seems probable that papal resources had played an
important role in providing the Carolingians with logistical support in 754
and 756 and, as will be seen below, this likely was the case in 773774
as well.
Pavia: The Siege Target
Pavia was an exceptionally strong fortress city with a 3,100-meter perime-

ter wall, roughly trapezoidal in form, that enclosed approximately 32 hect-
ares. The walls were studded with towers, and the gate complexes were
heavily defended by additional towers. At least some of the towers and
perhaps even parts of the wall reached a height of ten meters or more.
Generally, the walls of the fortification averaged between approximately
three-and-a-half to four meters in thickness, i.e. they were of the same
type of exceptionally strong ashlar construction commonly used through-
out the late Roman world for building urban defenses. Beyond the wall, a
ditch of some significance enhanced the citys defenses. The ditch made
37The argument from silence is often perilous but in the case of Charlemagne, as will
be seen passim, contemporary and near-contemporary authors were not wont to ignore
the kings victories even when they were bloodless or minor.
any effort to storm the fortifications more difficult.38 Early medieval histo-
rians such as Procopius (d. post-555), who were very knowledgeable
regarding the military situation at Pavia, considered the defenses of the
city to have been very strong.39
Construction on the late Roman walls had begun during the latter part
of the 3rd century and certainly was carried on into the 4th century.
However, unlike most refortifications of this period, the new walls at Pavia
extended the limits of the fortress city beyond those of its Augustan pre-
cursor.40 This was an obvious indicator of prosperity in a period during
which population shrinkage and urban decline in northern Italy are often
thought to have been the norm.41 In any case, the decision to increase the
size of Pavias defensible interior space during the later Roman Empire
may well have been stimulated by the intention of the imperial govern-
ment to use the city both as a military base to support the defense of the
region and offensively as a staging point for military expeditions.42 It is
also likely that the decision to make Pavia the home of a major arms fac-
tory for the production of bows (Ticenensis arcuaria) and presumably of
arrows and/or larger missile weapons and missiles was taken because of
the citys strategic importance and its access to reliable riverine transpor-
tation for the movement of men and equipment.43
Both the strength of Pavia as a fortress city and its strategic value surely
played an important role in attracting the attention of Theodoric the Great
(d. 526) late in the 5th century. As imperial governor of Italy and Ostrogothic
king, Theodoric not only made Pavia one of his capitals and built a palace
there, but he also improved the mural defenses of the city.44 It is possible,
and perhaps even likely, that he extended the walls beyond their 4th cen-
tury extent. This is suggested by an anonymous source which commented
that Theodoric fecit alios muros civitatis. This observation surely per-
mits the inference that more than repairs were carried out.45
38R.G. Salomon, Opicinus de Canistris, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,
XXV (1936), 142; and the revision by Donald Bullough,Urban Change in Early Medieval
Italy: The Example of Pavia, Papers of the British School at Rome, XXXIV (1966), 82130, esp.
here, pp. 8789; and fig. 2, p. 85.
39Procopius, BG, II, 12, 32.
40Bullough, Urban Change, pp. 8889.
41This matter is discussed by Bachrach, Metz, pp. 363365.
42Bullough, Urban Change, p. 83.
43ND, oc. IX, 28.
45AV, ch. 71. Bullough, Urban Change, p. 88, finds this interpretation by several Italian
scholars to be implausible, but cautiously notes that all sound conclusions ultimately
must rest on future archaeological work.
324 chapter five
Theodoric also established Pavia as a major military base. He arranged

for a part of his military household, i.e. presentales, to be settled within the
walls of the city and likely in the suburbs as well. These men were based on
what modern scholars call military lands. In this case, the ownership was
maintained by the government and these settlements were, in fact, on
public land.46 Following the fall of the Ostrogothic kingdom to Justinians
east Roman forces in 555, the remaining Ostrogothic soldiers were ejected
from Pavia, and the city was garrisoned by imperial troops. In addition,
under the rule of the restored imperial government, the local militia com-
posed of Italo-Romans was reactivated. When the Lombards invaded Italy
in 569, they captured Pavia, which then was defended both by regular
soldiers of the east Roman army and troops of the citizen militias. How
ever, the Lombard siege lasted for three years before the city finally
surrendered.47
During the post-Roman period, a fortress city would be defended, in the
worst case, only by its local urban militia force. This force traditionally was
drawn, in large part, from among the poorer able-bodied men who dwelled
within the walls of the city and in its environs. These were men who lacked
the wealth to undertake expeditionary service as part of the select levy
beyond the borders of the district in which they dwelled.48 At a minimum,
the urban militia of Pavia, in order provide an effective defense of the
walls of the city with its perimeter of approximately 3,100 meters, had
to reach a critical mass in the range of approximately 2,4002,500 able-
bodied men. These men, following imperial tradition, were trained to use
either bows and arrows or other missile weapons such as the crossbow. A
militia force, properly led and motivated, likely could defend the walls
successfully against an army, even one with the proper equipment, which
planned to storm the walls with fewer than 8,00010,000 men.49
For an attacking force to pose a threat to capture Pavia by storm, it
required a four- or five-to-one superiority over the defenders. This was the

47Christie, The Lombards, p. 79.
48Bachrach, Recruitment, pp. 5563.
49Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, 117. The important point brought out here
is that the order of magnitude of the forces required to defend a stronghold was based
upon the respective numbers of available defenders and attackers, as well as the technol-
ogy available to both sides. Since this technology remained largely static throughout the
early Middle Ages, the recognition, in principle, that it required one man to defend each
4.125 feet of wall can be taken as a constant. In the above-mentioned article, the ratio of a
minimum of four attackers to one defender that was required to pose a credible threat to
take a fortification by storm also is demonstrated to be technologically based.
case even in a situation where the defenders were composed overwhelm-

ingly of low-grade militia men of the general levy.50 In short, if the Lombard
capital were defended only by a bare minimum of some 2,500 militia men,
Charlemagne would have needed an attacking force in the neighborhood
of 10,000 effectives, supplied with the proper equipment, in order to pro-
vide a credible threat to storm the walls successfully. In such a circum-
stance, moreover, the attacking force could be expected to suffer very high
casualties and it still would not be certain of capturing the city.51
Pavia, however, was a flourishing urban and administrative center.
Several demographic and economic indices suggest that the local able-
bodied male population of the city and its environs likely was well in
excess of the minimum 2,4002,500 militia men required, in the worst
case, for the defense of the walls. Evidence for prosperity is provided by
the extensive program of building churches not only in the city itself, but
also in its environs, beginning in the middle years of the 7th century.52
Such a pattern of church-building within the walls surely may be taken as
an indicator not only of urban wealth but of both economic and demo-
graphic growth as well. In addition, a Jewish community had been estab-
lished at Pavia, almost certainly for the purpose of strengthening the citys
long-distance trading connections.53 Finally, the presence at Pavia of the

51Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117, provide estimates of losses based
upon how many men in the attacking force were likely, in a statistical sense, to be struck by
a missile launched by one or another defender.
52See Bullough, Urban Change, pp. 99104, and his list, pp. 119129. Notice should be
taken here of Paul the Deacons report (Hist., bk. VI, ch. 5) that Pavia was struck by plague
in 640. Paul tells his readers that the inhabitants were evacuated from the city and dwelled
in the countryside until the plague burned itself out. Two points require mention in this
context. First, the leaving of the city by the population recognizes the need to separate the
people from whatever was believed to have been the agent that was causing the plague.
Secondly, this is the contrapositive of establishing a cordon sanitaire, which the
Merovingians did, in order to keep the plague from entering the city. Regarding the use of
the cordon sanitaire, see two studies by Michael McCormick: Bateaux de vie, bateaux de
mort: Maladie, commerce, transports annonaires et le passage conomique du bas-empire
au moyen ge, SSCI, 45, 2 vols. (Spoleto, 1998), I, 6061; and Toward a Molecular History of
the Justinianic Pandemic, in Plague and the End of Antiquity: The Pandemic of 541750, ed.
Lester K. Little (Cambridge, 2007), 311. Secondly, even if the plague had been devastating to
the population of Pavia, and there is no basis for such a conclusion, more than a century
had passed between its outbreak and the Carolingian siege of 773. This period of time, as
many studies have shown, was more than sufficient for the full recovery of the citys popu-
lation by natural increase, not to mention immigration. Regarding plague recovery rates,
see Bernard S. Bachrach, Plague, Population, and Economy in Merovingian Gaul,
Australian Journal of Early Medieval History, 3 (2007), 2956.
53Alcuin, Epist., no. 172, recalled, ca. 800, that when he was a young man he assisted in
a debate at Pavia between Peter of Pisa and a Jew named Lullus. Bullough, Urban Change,
326 chapter five
administrative cadres of the Lombard central government, which con-

ducted, among other matters, the normal business of the royal court, all
strongly suggest that the city continued to be the bustling and crowded
center that Ennodius had described in the 6th century.54
An additional index of the continuity of prosperity at Pavia is provided
by the preservation of the Roman street plan. It is generally understood by
modern scholars that the survival of urban structures, e.g. the street grid
and houses along these thoroughfares, in late Roman western cities pro-
vides compelling evidence for continuity regarding the size and impor-
tance of the population into the early Middle Ages and beyond.55 To
characterize the economic and demographic situation in another way, the
streets of the city of Pavia had not been torn up in the period from the later
Roman era through Ostrogothic and Lombard occupation so that the land
within the walls could be used for agricultural purposes.56 It has been sug-
gested by some scholars that the destruction of the street plan is evidence
of some urbes being less fortunate or prosperous. This appears to have
been the case generally with regard to early medieval Britain.57
It is clear that the Lombards, following their Ostrogothic predecessors,
understood the fundamental military importance of the city in which they
chose to establish their capital. Within the walls of Pavia, there was con-
centrated a substantial military force composed of faramanni, who lived
sidebyside with those who provided the manpower for the traditional
urban militia. This unit of faramanni was a part of the royal obsequium and
served as presentales in the capital. They were provided with homes in
p. 90, takes the position that there was a Jewish community at Pavia. Regarding Jews and
long-distance trade, see Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, trans. Bernard Mial
(New York, 1939), pp. 255261.
54Harrison, The Early State, pp. 6263; 101102, provides a basic summary of the litera-
ture regarding the Lombard government at Pavia.
55Regarding the value of street plans as strong evidence for continuity, see Bryan Ward-
Perkins, From Classical Antiquity to the Middle Ages: Urban Public Building in Northern and
Central Italy, ad 300830 (Oxford, 1984), p. 180; and again Brian Ward-Perkins, The Towns
of Northern Italy: Rebirth or Renewal?, in The Rebirth of Towns in the West, ad 7001050, ed.
R. Hodges and B. Hobley (London, 1988), 20. Brian Ward-Perkins, Can the survival of an
ancient town-plan be used as evidence of dark-age urban life?, in Splendida civitas nostra.
Miscellanea di studi archeologici in honore di Antonio Frova (Rome, 1995), 223229, however,
is not doctrinaire in this matter and takes note of two bizarre cases (the ancient city of
Rhodes and a part of Antioch) which clearly are exceptions to the general rule of continu-
ity. See detailed methodological discussion of this point by Bachrach, Metz, p. 375, n. 100.
56Bullough, Urban Change, p. 98, credits the Lombard rulers with maintaining what
remained of the Roman plan.
57In regard to continuity at Pavia, see Bullough, Urban Change, p. 98, in relation to the
importance of the survival of the Roman street plan.
which to live with their families within the walls of the city itself. Approxi
mately one-twelfth of the land in the city, i.e. one-third of the northeast
quadrant or perhaps 90,000 square meters, was set aside for the habita-
tions of this group.58 These faramanni likely were settled in the same part
of the city and carried out the same military functions for the Lombard
kings that the Ostrogothic troops, settled in the city earlier, had been
assigned by Theodoric the Great. The land on which the faramanni were
settled remained public property, i.e. it belonged to the king.59
The faramanni, of course, were not a part of the local militia. Rather,
these troops based at Pavia and also in other areas institutionally were
the core of the Lombard expeditionary forces, which reinforced the
Lombard arimanni and Italo-Roman select levies on campaign.60
The Lombard defense of Pavia would not depend solely on the general lev-
ies of the local militia. The local militia forces, expeditionary levies, both
arimanni and Italo-Roman expeditionary levies, the above-mentioned
faramanni traditionally based at Pavia, and other elements of the kings
military household combined for the defense of the capital. Perhaps 10,000
or more able-bodied men were available to Desiderius for the defense of
his capital. The decision, see below, to vallate and contra-vallate the city of
Pavia by Charlemagne may be taken as prima facie evidence that he
regarded the effective strength of the Lombard forces defending the city as
capable of making effective sorties against a siege encampment that was
not properly fortified and defended.
Preparing to Besiege Pavia
Upon arriving at Pavia, Charlemagne began the process of preparing to

besiege this formidable city. First, following Carolingian standard operat-
ing procedure, Charlemagne oversaw the construction of fortified encamp-
ments (castra) for the short-term protection of his troops and equipment
58Here, I have tried to give some spatial precision to the topographical markers so
adroitly identified by Bullough, Urban Change, pp. 9597, and figs. 1 and 2. It would seem
that the men who planned the settlement would reasonably have taken the old Roman
walls into consideration. On the basis of this assumption, the locus Faramanni may be seen
to have extended westward along the north wall some 350 meters to the present Strada
Nuova, which marked the western boundary. Then it would have followed the Strada
Nuova south some 220 meters, to its junction with the modern Via Mentana. The southern
boundary along the Via Mentana then could be seen to run eastward, perhaps 300 meters,
to the eastern wall in the neighborhood of Foro Magno.
59See Bullough, Urban Change, p. 96, for the land remaining royal property.
60See above, Chapter Two regarding the organization of Lombard military forces.
328 chapter five
in the environs of the Lombard capital. Then, he likely followed his fathers
operating procedures and had the surrounding area thoroughly scoured
for supplies. Once the position of the Frankish army was secured, at least
on a temporary basis, and access to available local logistical resources had
been assured, Charlemagne ordered the construction of the vallation that
was to surround the city. As the sources, both those written north of the
Alps and those south of the Alps, make clear: ex omni parte circumdans
vallavit.61
Constructing a Siege Encampment
In addition to vallating the walls of the siege target, it was necessary, in

order to maintain an effective investment, for the besieging force to vallate
the rear of its own position. This is called a contra-vallation, and deprives
an enemy relief force of free access to the siege camp by blocking an attack
from the rear. It would have been imprudent in the extreme for Char
lemagne to have left his forces vulnerable to an attack from an enemy
relief force. Charlemagne was well aware of several potential, if not likely,
high-intensity external enemy threats against his position at Pavia. These
were posed by the Bavarians, the Avars, and the Byzantines, possibly in
one or another combination. Local forces, mobilized and commanded by
various of the Lombard duces, if unified, also could constitute a high-
intensity threat to the Carolingian position at Pavia. The cooperation of
any of these four elements could be disastrous to Charlemagnes siege
strategy if his encampment were not contra-vallated. In addition, the
contra-vallation also made resupplying the enemy stronghold far more
difficult, since the relief column would have to penetrate the contra-valla-
tion and then fight its way through the camp of the besieging force to
reach the vallation, which also had to be breached.
It may be noted that the Roman historian Livy (V.5.6), in his rather
detailed account of the lengthy siege of Veii, made clear that both valla-
tion and contra-vallation were of great importance to the Roman capture
of this key enemy city. Livys History, as noted above, was known at Char
lemagnes court. It is to be pointed out that the factual details provided in
61V. Hadriani I, ch. 34; AMP, an. 773, vallo firmissimo circumdedit; PCL, p. 218, Karolus
cum ingenti exercitu papiam potenter obsedit, et hedificavit munitiones in giro, et in tan-
tum ipsam coangustavit, ut nullus egrediendi aditus pateret obsessis.; PCT, ch. 53, undique
obsidione vallavit; and Saxon Poet, lines. 128129: Regius admotis exercitus undique
castris / Obsedit
Livys account of Roman operations at Veii are unlikely to have been accu-
rate. This, however, would not have been known to the Carolingians nor
would such misinformation have been relevant to the lesson being taught
regarding the proper manner in which to conduct a successful siege.62
What is important here is that Livys account was rhetorically plausible to
anyone who understood the realities of siege warfare.63
Charlemagnes need to protect his encampment from a relief force
was of paramount importance. The Bavarians, under the leadership of
Desiderius son-in-law, Duke Tassilo, certainly could not be ignored. Prior
to the Carolingian invasion of Italy, Tassilo, who had been more rather
than less hostile to the Carolingians, demonstrated the effectiveness of his
military forces in the conquest of Carinthia. Tassilos aims with regard
to establishing political autonomy in relation to the regnum Francorum
obviously would benefit greatly if Charlemagne were to fail in his efforts
against the Lombards. If Tassilo were to play a noteworthy role in Char
lemagnes failure, those aristocrats living within Bavarias borders who
supported the territorial integrity of the regnum Francorum would be dis-
advantaged as well. The defeat, or even the weakening, of Charlemagnes
position in Italy probably increased the possibility that Bavaria could be
established as an independent kingdom. This goal likely would be has-
tened if the pope found it necessary to rely on other than Frankish support
in order to deal with the prospect of future Lombard aggression.
The Avars, as noted above, had in the past cooperated both with the
Bavarians and with the Lombards, and even had served as Byzantine mer-
cenaries. They had excellent access to northern Italy through the low
Alpine passes from Pannonia into the region of Friuli. At this time, how-
ever, Duke Hrodgaud of Friuli does not seem to have been supporting
Desiderius. Whether Charlemagne was yet aware of Hrodgauds position
vis--vis the Frankish invasion cannot be ascertained.64 In any event, the
Avars were potentially very dangerous to Carolingian troop movements in
any part of the eastern regions of the Lombard kingdom. Under propitious
conditions, the Avars could range further west, even to the Cottian region
62See Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, p. 254.

63In regard to the importance of rhetorical plausibility, see Livy, bk. V, xxi, 9: Sed in
rebus tam antiquis si quae similia veri sint pro veris accipiantur, satis habiam Regarding
the idea of plausibility among Roman historians and rhetoricians, e.g. Cicero, and their
impact on the writing of history in pre-Crusade Europe, see Justin C. Lake, Truth, plausi-
bility, and the virtues of narrative at the millennium, Journal of Medieval History, 35 (2009),
221238.
64Harald Krahwinkler, Friaul im Frhmittelalter. Geschichte einer Region vom Ende des
fnften bis zum Ende des zehnten Jahrhunderts (Vienna, 1992), pp. 1519, 2955, 119121.
330 chapter five
from where papal estates likely were providing logistical support for the
Carolingian war effort. The Avars could strike fast, by surprise, and from a
distance. In fact, they could hinder virtually any operation that Char
lemagnes troops should find necessary to carry out, whether the mainte-
nance of siege emplacements or the guarding of supply trains destined for
feeding the troops who were undertaking the investment of Pavia.65
Charlemagne also could not ignore the threat posed by the Byzantines
under the leadership of Constantine V, who had effectively reformed the
east Roman army. The emperors military exploits were widely known and
well-appreciated in the West. At the very time that Charlemagne began his
invasion of Italy, Constantine was engaged in a large and successful mili-
tary campaign in the Balkans. Pavia, in effect, was within easy reach of the
Byzantine army.66 In fact, there is reason to believe that within a year of
Charlemagnes victory at Pavia, the Byzantines were regarded at Rome as
the major military threat to the Papal-Carolingian position in Italy. This
supposed danger to the position of both Charlemagne and of the pope,
perceived in 775, was fully consistent with Byzantine military capabili
tiesin 773. Finally, it is of considerable importance that there were still
enclaves of highly trained Byzantine military forces distributed through-
out northern Italy.67 A Byzantine invasion force, moving west from the
Balkans, certainly could obtain significant logistic support from bases,
such as that at Venice, in order to make operational their potential threat
to both Carolingian and papal resources.68
Returning to the situation at Pavia in the late summer of 773, the
Carolingians, lacking a proper contra-vallation of their siege positions,
would face a serious tactical problem with the approach of an enemy army
of any significant size. Should a relief force have materialized at Pavia, the
Lombard regular troops and militia men within the city undoubtedly
would follow standard operating procedure and sortie from behind the
walls, en masse. The aim would be to catch the besieging army in a pincer.
65Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, p. 47.

66For Balkan operations at this time and Constantines military reputation, see Georg
Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, 1957),
pp. 148155. With regard to Byzantine army reforms, see Treadgold, Byzantium and Its
Army, pp. 2829, who nevertheless generally underestimates (pp. 7075) the size of the
Byzantine army.
67T.S. Brown, Gentlemen and Officers: Imperial Administration and Aristocratic Power in
Byzantine Italy a.d. 554800 (Rome, 1984), pp. 82108. Cf. Treadgold, Byzantium and Its
Army, p. 70, who virtually ignores the Byzantine military presence in Italy after 751.
68V. Hadriani I, ch. 15, concerning Venice; and V. Stephani III, ch. 25, regarding Rimini
with the comments of Brown, Gentlemen and Officers, p. 98; and pp. 90, 93, for Genoa.
Such an attack by Desiderius forces would be timed to engage Char

lemagnes troops from the front just as the Carolingian army would have to
focus attention on dealing with the enemy relief force that was attacking
the siege encampment from the rear. Such a pincer, of course, would be a
problem for Charlemagne even after his men had constructed a contra-
vallation, but obviously a less serious problem if the proper defenses had
been built.
Charlemagne and his military staff, in addition to dealing with high-
intensity threats to their position, had to keep in mind low-intensity oper-
ations which were commonplace in all sieges. The expeditionary levies
and ducal military households based in the many Lombard-controlled cit-
ies, e.g. Tortona, Milan, Parma, Cremona, and Bergamo, constantly had to
be monitored. Their danger to Charlemagnes army, of course, would have
been magnified greatly if the rear of the Carolingian siege position were
not defended by walls. From a logistical perspective, a great many of
these Lombard forces were based within easy raiding distance of Pavia, i.e.
a three- or four-day march. In addition, an open camp invited amateur
thieving of resources, especially cattle and horses, by the local inhabitants
who dwelled in the countryside. By contra-vallating his position at Pavia,
Charlemagne nullified the potential effectiveness of many, if not most,
low-intensity threats, which would be thwarted by the Carolingian
fortifications.
The well-attested vallation of the 3,100-meter perimeter wall at Pavia
required that the Carolingian army construct a fortification that was
approximately 1,200 meters on each of the four sides of the city. Such a val-
lation placed Charlemagnes siege walls roughly 200 meters from the outer
defenses of the city of Pavia. At this distance, the men behind the vallation
were largely beyond the effective range of most Lombard handheld mis-
sile weapons. Artillery, of course, had a much greater range. However,
under normal circumstances, a vallation that was constructed beyond
artillery range ran the risk of losing its effectiveness both offensively and
defensively. In regard to the former, the Carolingian artillery emplace-
ments would have to be forward of the vallation. Defensively, the vallation
would be so far from the enemy fortress that it would be difficult to control
enemy movements.
Charlemagnes contra-vallation, which we must assume was, in fact,
constructed, provided for defenses that likely had a perimeter of about
6,400 meters, thus complementing the 4,800-meter vallation. With such
a defensive perimeter, the space between the vallation and the contra-
vallation provided protection for the Carolingian army on all sides. This
332 chapter five
was an area of approximately 110115 hectares, which effectively was

enclosed and protected not only from desultory enemy attacks but also
stood a good chance of being defended against a simultaneous operation
launched both from within Pavia and by a relief force. This fortified area
was comparable to that which was required to protect six Roman legions
of the late Republic or early empire, but excluding the practice fields that
were used for the exercise and training of mounted troops.69
Within this space, Charlemagnes army, which at Pavia initially likely
numbered in the 40,000 range at a maximum, could easily carry out the
duties of a normal besieging force. In the first instance, the Carolingians
were required to interdict entry into Pavia by relief forces, food convoys, or
messengers. Pavia was to be cut off from the outside world. Exit from the
city also was to be interdicted unless otherwise approved by a Carolingian
command decision.70 The second task of the besieging force, as will be
seen below, was to bombard the city with various types of artillery and
perhaps even to use sappers to dig tunnels under the walls. The aim was to
convince the defenders that defeat was inevitable so that they would sur-
render without the Carolingian army having to storm the walls.
Defensively, the vallation and contra-vallation protected not only
the military personnel under Charlemagnes command but many non-
combatants of all types. These ranged from the religious, e.g. bishops,
priests, and monks, to women, including those of ill-repute who tradition-
ally accompanied armies during the Middle Ages, and perhaps not
surprisingly also were to be found even at Charlemagnes court.71 Also pro-
tected were the animals needed for the military effort. These included rid-
ing horses, pack horses, and beasts of all types, used for pulling both carts
and wagons, i.e. oxen and mules. Although war horses were of little imme-
diate value for the siege itself, likely there were a considerable number of
these animals in the camp as mounted troops may have been of some tac-
tical importance in the first stage of Carolingian operations. In addition to
all these animals, there were also food animals, e.g. pigs, sheep, and cattle,
that required protection. Finally, all other foodstuffs within the siege
works had to be guarded from potential thievery.
69With regard to the army camp model, see, for example, J.H.W.G., Decline and Fall of
the Roman City (Oxford, 2001), pp. 8485.
70See the detailed examination of these matters with regard to Pippins siege of Bourges
in Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 228233.
71The ubiquity of such women cannot be overemphasized. Meretrices were to be found
even at Charlemagnes court. See for example, the discussion by Dutton, The Politics of
Dreaming, pp. 5859.
In the space between the vallation and the contra-vallation, buildings,

or at least lean-tos, had to be constructed to house the men and animals
during the summer and autumn campaigning seasons. Additional build-
ing efforts had to be undertaken if the siege were to be carried on through
the winter of 773774.72 In addition to building houses or barracks for the
men, corrals had to be constructed to keep both the military animals and
the food animals from wandering around the siege camp. Field kitchens
had to be established and bake ovens built for the processing of the armys
victuals. Various support services, such as those provided by smiths and
carpenters, required the construction of workshops with appropriate
space for the storing of supplies and fuel within the protected area.73
Further, medical facilities had to be built to care for the sick and wounded.
Finally, mention of the construction of at least one church is noted. It is
very likely, given the importance of various religious rites to Carolingian
military forces on campaign, that several more houses of worship were
built, to be staffed by the numerous chaplains who traditionally accompa-
nied the army.74 In short, Charlemagnes siege encampment at Pavia pro-
tected a population even larger than large cities north of the Alps, such as
Paris or Mainz.
Building a Siege Camp
In technical terms, Charlemagnes task of preparing the siege emplace-

ments at Pavia likely was little different either from the preparations
undertaken by Pippin for the siege of the Lombard capital in 756 or the
latters siege of Bourges 763. The circuit wall of the fortress city of Pavia
was approximately 500 meters greater than that of Bourges, but the
defenses were of comparable strength.75 Not only had Charlemagne him-
self been involved in operations at Bourges, but the Carolingian court
72The basic information for Western leaders regarding later Roman camp organization
and management was provided by Vegetius, DRM, bk.I, chs. 2125; further information was
provided in bk. II, chs. 10, 25.
73Useful information of a comparative nature is available concerning the encampment
of William the Conqueror prior to his invasion of England. See Bernard S. Bachrach, Some
Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest, in Anglo Norman
Studies VIII, ed. R. Allen Brown (Woodbridge, 1986), 125; and reprinted with the same pagi-
nation in idem, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002).
74See GK, ch. 17, for the church. Concerning the building of chapels, the use of portable
altars, and much else of a religious nature utilized during war by the Carolingians, see
D. Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of War, pp. 3263.
75Bullough, Urban Change, pp. 82130, passim.
334 chapter five
chronicler described the siege in substantial detail, as he also did in regard

to Pippins operations at Pavia in 754 and 756.76 A variety of sources,
including well-informed historical descriptions by Roman historians, were
available to Charlemagne and his advisers to provide information in regard
to the construction of the type of temporary fortifications required to sus-
tain a siege. Of primary interest, however, is Vegetius handbook De re
Militari, which was very important to the Carolingians.77 Yet, even if nei-
ther Pippins nor Charlemagnes advisers had consulted this text directly
at either the siege of Bourges or of Pavia, Vegetius provides the modern
researcher with the kind of basic information that was available to the
Carolingians, and which they could deploy in light of the knowledge and
technology that they had available to them.78
There was one important factor, however, that differentiated the initial
stage of Charlemagnes operations at Pavia from those of Pippin at Bourges.
In commencing operations against Bourges, Pippin had access to an exist-
ing Roman castrum in the environs of the city. He established his primary
base and headquarters there while building several additional castra to
protect his men and before beginning the process of vallating and contra-
vallating the fortress city of Bourges itself.79 It is very likely, however, that
all of the fortifications which Pippin had built at Pavia in 754 and 756 had
been leveled by the Lombards prior to 773. Therefore, Charlemagne had to
start de novo in order to build castra for the initial protection of his troops
prior to undertaking the construction of the vallation and contra-vallation
of the city.
These castra would of necessity be of a size and quality sufficient to
protect the Carolingian army while it prepared to besiege Pavia and to
build the vallation and contra-vallation discussed above. With a force at
Pavia of some 40,000 men as well as camp followers of various types (this
does not include Bernards army, which remained several hundred kilome-
ters distant in the northeast), Charlemagnes troops had to construct at
least six castra, comparable in size to those traditionally used by a similar
76See Fred. Cont., ch. 43; and the discussion by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 228233.
77Bachrach, The Lying Legacy, pp. 153193.
78Regarding Carolingian siege technology, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 107119. As with everything else regarding early medieval warfare, Halsall, Warfare and
Society, p. 223, ignores the information discussed in the work cited above, which identifies
several important aspects of Carolingian siege technology, and asserts that medieval
siege-craft was basic and usually conducted with a minimum of finesse.
number of Roman legionaries during the late Republic and early Empire.
On the whole, the protection of the Carolingian siege encampment at
Pavia required that an area of approximately 100 hectares be enclosed
with walls and ditches that could be defended effectively.80
In order to build these castra, as well as the vallation and contra-
vallation, Charlemagnes soldiers needed large quantities of basic con-
struction tools. When a Carolingian army was mobilizing for a campaign
concerning which the planners foresaw the need for siege operations, it
was standard operating procedure for the expeditionary levies to bring
with them war carts (carra ad hostem). These carried a wide variety of
construction equipment among the other impedimenta. One of the very
few Carolingian mobilization orders that has survived provides a glimpse
of the matriel that Charlemagne ordered to be carried in these military
vehicles:
In your carts (carris) there are to be various kinds of equipment, i.e., hatch-
ets (cuniada), saws for stone cutting (dolaturia), augers (tarratros), carpen-
ters axes (assias), spades for ditch digging (fosorios), iron shovels (palas
ferreas), and all the rest of the tools (utensilia) that are necessary for an army
on campaign (hostem).81
The need for the royal government to maintain substantial quantities of
this type of equipment also was well-recognized by Charlemagnes mili-
tary advisers. For example, Charlemagne required all of the 600 or more
villae which constituted that part of the royal fisc directly administered by
the court to maintain special storerooms for military equipment at the
headquarters of each of these installations. These camerae were to be used
only for the storage of equipment that was to be deployed on military
campaign.82 Charlemagne affirmed the requirement that each villa was to
have a sufficient number of carts, called basternae, which were to be used
for hauling both equipment and victuals on military campaign. These
vehicles, in addition to being far more sturdy than the carts normally used
for general agricultural and commercial activities, were to be of uniform
80For literature dealing with the size of Roman military camps, see Liebeschuetz,
Decline and Fall, pp. 8485. It is important to emphasize here that these were temporary
camps and did not require practice fields. If practice fields were included then 125150
hectares would have to be enclosed.
81See, for example, CRF., I, no. 75.
82With regard to the various types of tools that are mentioned in the formularies
and lists which were required to be completed as part of the inventory process, see, for
example, CRF, no. 32, ch. 42; and the discussion by Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?,
pp. 319343.
336 chapter five
size, i.e. they carried a maximum load of 500 kilograms, and they were to
be made waterproof.83
The steward of each villa not only was required to have available the
requisite number of basternae, but also was under standing orders to have
available the requisite iron tools designated for the use of the army (fer-
ramenta, quod in hostem pergunt).84 Obviously, these tools were similar
to those identified above, in regard to Charlemagnes mobilization order.
In addition to maintaining the appropriate complement of special tools
for military operations and the special storehouse in which to keep them,
royal stewards were to make sure that the tools were sufficient in number,
in good condition, and ready for service on campaign. Finally, when the
tools were returned to the villa after the campaign had been completed,
the steward was required to see to it that all this equipment was invento-
ried and returned to the above-mentioned storage facility.85
It is obvious that the steward kept written lists of this equipment, along
with the many other documents he was required to compile, so that the
records of the villa could be checked by the missi dominici or their subor-
dinates, who were sent regularly by Charlemagne to oversee the opera-
tions of the royal fisc. In particular, these agents of the central government
frequently saw to the making of inventories of the various resources found
at the villae of the royal fisc that were located within the boundaries of
their missatica. In short, there is evidence not only for royal commands to
have these matters examined, but a documentary record of these orders
being obeyed.86
The Costs of Construction
As noted above, substantial information was provided concerning the

nature of various types of encampments by Vegetius in his De re Militari.
Vegetius treatment of the subject therefore makes available to the
modern researcher information that also could be accessed by the Caro
lingians. These data enable the reader to estimate the quantities of labor
and matriel, as well as the amount of time and manpower required for
the construction of the castra of the type needed by Charlemagnes army
83See the discussion by Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations, pp. 1729.

84CRF, no. 32, ch. 42.
85CRF, no. 32, ch. 42.
86Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?, pp. 119133.
in the initial stage of the siege. A high priority had to be placed on protect-
ing the military personnel for whom the vallation and contra-vallation at
Pavia were to be constructed. It is important that much of the effort dedi-
cated to the building of these castra subsequently could be integrated into
the vallation and contra-vallation. Therefore, both projects will be dis-
cussed here in a manner that makes it possible for the reader to see the
interrelation of these efforts undertaken by Charlemagnes army at Pavia
in the autumn of 773.87
The various types of earthen walls with ramparts and ditches that were
commonly constructed during the later Roman Empire and, indeed, ear-
lier, are discussed in considerable detail by Vegetius. He describes defenses
that are to be used when there is no pressing danger, i.e. the kind of forti-
fied encampment that might be built for one night or for brief occupation
in the course of a march. For this very temporary type of ditch and wall
fortification, two methods are described. First, sods are cut from the earth
and from these a type of wall is built, three feet high above the ground.88
Then on the top of this rampart stakes or wooden posts are set up 89
or when the earth is too loose for it to be possible to cut the turf like a
brick, the ditch is dug in temporary style, five feet wide, three feet deep,
and with the rampart rising on the innerside .90
Vegetius also provides information regarding fortified encampments
that were to be constructed when enemy forces present a more serious
danger. Such encampments may have ditches anywhere from 9 to 17 feet
in breadth, according to Roman imperial measures as set out in the hand-
books of the Agrimensores, whose works have been discussed above.91
In terms of the construction of such a fortification, apparently, it was most
common
to fortify the perimeter of the camp with an appropriate ditch, i.e., one that
is twelve feet wide and nine feet below ground level. Above the ditch,
embankments are built [of wood] and filled with the earth that has been
dug out from the ditch; these walls rise to a height of four feet. Thus, the
87For a comparable project, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Some Observations on the

Administration and Logistics of the Siege of Nicaea, War in History 12 (2005), 249277.
88Vegetius, DRM, bk. I, ch. 24.
90Vegetius, DRM, bk. III, ch. 8. I have omitted, above, the simple ditch without a wall
(bk. I, ch. 24) which Vegetius suggests be nine feet wide and seven feet deep.
91It is worthwhile to note the fundamental influence exercised by Roman measure-
ments even among the Anglo-Saxons, as pointed out by Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo,
A Lying Legacy, p. 9. n. 33.
338 chapter five
ditch is thirteen feet deep [from the bottom to the top of the wall] and twelve
feet wide. On top of the wall stakes of very strong wood are fixed 92
In more elaborate fortified camps, battlements and turrets, constructed
of wood, were placed on top of the embankment itself.93 It may be noted,
for example, that the description of Pippins siege encampment at Bourges
by the court chronicler follows this latter pattern quite well.94
It would be rash to conclude that Charlemagne followed the prescrip-
tions either in Vegetius De re Militari or in some other military handbook
in a slavish manner.95 Rather, these data are intended to help the reader
catch a glimpse of the magnitude of the task that confronted the
Carolingians as they made their plans for building the siege emplacements
needed to pursue the effective investment of Pavia. The Carolingian
sources do not inform us whether Charlemagne or his various officers
ordered ditches to be dug to a depth of 9 Roman feet or to 12 feet, or
whether the earthen embankments that these men instructed their troops
to build were three feet or four feet above ground level. Nevertheless, it
can be concluded, with the benefit of hindsight, that no successful
Lombard sorties are recorded against these defenses and no efforts, either
by local thieves or relief forces, are noted in the historical record to have
broken through the Frankish siege emplacements.
Certainly, it is possible that the quality of the ditches and walls con-
structed by the Carolingians at Pavia in the autumn of 773 were below the
standards set in the later Roman Empire as described by Vegetius.
Nevertheless, even substandard work required the employment of a sub-
stantial quantity of very well-organized laborers and at least some men
with special skills. For example, such a labor force had to include men
with an effective command of surveying techniques. As in the later Roman
Empire, these skills were learned during the Carolingian era from the texts
of the Agrimensores, which were widely copied and well known to the
Carolingians, as well as through apprenticeship.96 In addition to having
92Vegetius, DRM, bk. I, ch. 24.

94See, for example, Fred. Cont., ch. 43; and the discussion by Bachrach, Early Carolingian
95It should be noted here that even on campaign, commanders were known not only to
carry books with them, but to consult Vegetius text directly. For the practice by Carolingian
commanders of carrying books useful for military purposes on campaigns, see Bachrach,
Lying Legacy, pp. 175191; and for specific mentions of Vegetius text used on a particular
campaign, see Bernard S. Bachrach, The Practical Use of Vegetius De Re Militari During
the Early Middle Ages, The Historian, 47 (1985), 239255.
96L.D. Reynolds, Agrimensores, in Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin
Classics, ed. L.D. Reynolds and P.K. Marshall (Oxford, 1983), 16.
various types of skilled workers, it was necessary, as noted above, that

there be available large quantities of tools in order to complete a task even
of marginal acceptability.97
In the estimates that follow, I have used a low standard so as to avoid
any possibility of seeming to exaggerate either the order of magnitude of
the Carolingians needs or their accomplishments. I have employed this
low standard despite the fact that there is no reason to believe that
Charlemagne was given to parsimony in regard to such matters. The con-
trary is rather more likely. For example, Charlemagnes effort to build a
Rhine-Main-Danube canal provides compelling evidence that he was will-
ing to expend whatever resources might be needed in order to sustain a
project that he regarded to be of military importance. Modern study of
this canal project also provides evidence that the Carolingians com-
manded a vast array of sophisticated construction techniques for projects
in the field, just as they did for the building of monumental churches.98 It
is clear, therefore, that the Frankish army could have constructed a siege
encampment at Pavia that, in Vegetian terms, was of the highest quality.
Nevertheless, in regard to what may perhaps be considered substan-
dard construction in Vegetian terms, digging approximately 10,000 meters
of ditches only five meters in breadth and perhaps three meters deep
required that approximately 150,000 cubic meters of earth be excavated.
This task alone is estimated to have required 500,000 man-hours of labor,
or 50,000 man-days of digging. Each cubic meter of earth weighed approx-
imately one ton. A hard-working man excavating with a shovel could move
about three cubic meters in the course of a ten-hour work day with the
help of a team of workers.99 Such estimates, however, rely on optimal con-
ditions because they are based on experiments done with 19th-century
hand tools. These hand tools, e.g. shovels, pickaxes, and crowbars, were, in
general, far superior, because of the quality of steel used, to the various
types of equipment that were available during the later 8th century, when
the iron was of inferior quality.100
97Regarding the work process and its costs, see Bernard S. Bachrach, The Cost of
Castle-Building: The Case of the Tower at Langeais, 992994, in The Medieval Castle:
Romance and Reality, ed. K. Reyerson and F. Powe (Dubuque, IA, 1984), 4662 (four plates);
and reprinted in idem, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe (London,
2002), with the same pagination.
98Hofmann, Fossa Carolina, pp. 437453. See also the information uncovered by
Paolo Squatriti, Digging Ditches in Early Medieval Europe, Past and Present 176 (2002),
1165.
99See Bachrach, The Cost, pp. 4662; and idem, Fortification of Gaul, pp. 4760.
100Bachrach, Logistics, pp. 6572, provides the references to the literature on
this work.
340 chapter five
This estimate of 50,000 man-days of work does not include the labor
required for cutting and preparing the wood required to build the revet-
ments within which the earthen walls were held. Nor does it include cut-
ting and shaping the wood for building the palisade or rampart that
usually crowned such an earthen wall, and it certainly does not include
estimates for the towers, i.e. propugnacula, of the type constructed by
Pippins engineers for the lengthy siege of Bourges in 763. At Pavia as at
Bourges, it seems likely that the vallation was continuously improved as
the siege wore on and lacunae in both offensive and defensive options
were identified.
Presumably, all of this carpentry work for Charlemagnes siege camp
was done in the environs of Pavia, as it had been done by Pippins men at
Bourges for the siege there. None of these materials were prepared in
advance by Charlemagnes men and hauled over the Alps.101 In addition,
estimates have to be made in regard to the labor, equipment, and resources
used to build shelters for the men, animals, the storage of supplies, as well
as for workshops.102 In short, rather than a mere 50,000 man-days of work,
Charlemagnes siege camp at Pavia, including the vallation and contra-
vallation, likely required in excess of 250,000 man-days of labor. This
amounts to four days of woodcutting, building, and miscellaneous work
for each day of digging, which is consistent with estimates for such work
during the later Roman Empire.103
These calculations, of course, are low estimates. Under real conditions,
all of the labor and equipment had to be organized so that tasks were car-
ried out in a properly-sequenced manner. The right men had to be at the
right place at the right time with the correct tools and the required raw
materials. Each time one or more of these elements was not in the right
place at the right time, the job was delayed and both time and labor were
wasted. With 20,000 men working in an efficient manner, while the other
members of the Carolingian army maintained military readiness in case of
an enemy sortie, the siege walls and defenses around Pavia, built along the
101For details regarding construction techniques for earthen fortifications, see, for
example, Erik Szameit, Zum frhmittelalterlichen Burgwall von Gars/Thunau. Bemerkun
gen zu den Fortifikationsresten und der Innenbebauung. Ein Vorbericht, in Frmit
telalterliche Burgenbau in Mittel und Osteuropa, ed. Joachim Henning and Alexander T.
Ruttkay (Bonn, 1998), 7178; and Heinz-Joachim Vogt, Die Wiprechtsburg Groitzsch: Eine
mittelalterliche Befestigung in Westsachsen (Berlin, 1987).
102Bachrach, Some Observations, pp. 125.
103For the logic that undergirds these estimates, see Bachrach, Some Observations,
pp. 249277.
lines of the model suggested above, could be constructed, in the best case,
in a period not exceeding about 15 days.104
Charlemagnes Army at Pavia
In order for Charlemagne to defend effectively a vallation of some 4,800

meters, constructed in the manner discussed above, against a mass sortie
by the Lombards, his army required a minimum defensive force of some
5,0006,000 effectives. A contra-vallation that was somewhat larger than
the vallation required a force of a somewhat similar order of magnitude,
i.e. about 6,0007,000 able-bodied men, in order to repel an attack by an
enemy relief force. A vallation, of course, needed more manpower for its
defense, i.e. in terms of the ratio of the number of men required in relation
to the extent of wall to be defended, than did a city wall. This was because
the defenders of the vallation lacked the interior lines of movement
needed for the rapid redeployment of troops as compared to the situation
faced by the defenders of city walls.105
For Charlemagne merely to defend the rather simple siege fortifications
outlined above against a Lombard or Bavarian relief force combined with
a coordinated sortie from Pavia, required that he deploy and support an
army of approximately 10,00012,000 effectives. For the Franks, however,
to present a credible threat to capture Pavia by storm, it was necessary for
the Carolingians to place a minimum of 40,000 properly-equipped troops
around the Lombard capital, if an estimate of Desiderius defense forces in
the neighborhood of 10,000 or even 8,000 men is reasonable. As will be
seen below, it took Charlemagne more than eight months to secure
Desiderius surrender. It is suggested here that the Carolingian position at
Pavia, for various reasons that will be discussed below, did not at the
beginning of siege operations constitute an overwhelming force. As a
result, Desiderius saw no reason to surrender immediately, and Char
lemagne was required to prepare to undertake what must be considered
an extended siege.
By contrast, Pippin would appear to have mustered overwhelming force
both in 754 and 756 and, therefore, obtained Aistulfs rapid surrender
under terms. Early in the autumn of 773, Charlemagne likely was not able
initially to deploy the 50,000 to 60,000 effectives at Pavia that were required
104See the information generated by Bachrach, Some Observations, pp. 249277.

342 chapter five
to provide a credible immediate threat to take the city by storm. Also, it

should be noted that even with an army of 50,000 men or more, an effort
to take the fortress city of Pavia by storm would result in a great number of
Carolingian casualties. Therefore, despite working to develop a position of
overwhelming force at Pavia, Charlemagne, like his father and grandfa-
ther, was eager, as will be seen below, to avoid having his army suffer large
numbers of casualties and shedding large quantities of blood unless abso-
lutely necessary. All other things being equal, soldiers who believe that
their commander has a strong interest in maintaining the safety and well-
being of his troops generally have high morale.106
Capturing Fortress Cities
During the ancient and medieval periods, i.e. prior to the development of
effective cannon, there were basically two ways to capture a fortress city
by military action if the defenders of a fortress refused to surrender when
placed under siege by an enemy army.107 The least difficult method, from
the perspective of organization and technology, was to mobilize large
numbers of men to storm the walls with scaling ladders, climb over the
top, and fight their way through the streets of the urbs until either the
remaining defenders surrendered or were killed. However, as mentioned
above, this method was the most costly in terms of casualties. This was the
case even when attacking forces were supported by siege towers, battering
rams, catapults, and handheld missile weapons.108
The second method used to capture a formidable fortification during
the pre-gunpowder age was by a siege that effectively starved the defend-
ers into submission. This was a far more complicated military operation
than an escalade. In order to carry out an effective siege, the attacking
force had to cut off food supplies to the defenders, perhaps even until the
besieged concluded that they were faced with certain death by starvation.
Under conditions of such abject privation, surrender became a reason-
able option for the besieged. Obviously, under such conditions, the
besieging force, in order to execute a successful investment, had to have

107Concerning the complexity of capturing fortress cities, see, for example, Paul
Bentley Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare (Bloomington, IN, 1998), pp. 12, 4950; and Constantin
Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons (Guilford, CT, 2005), pp. 7880, 248249.
108Regarding siege weapons, see Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, pp. 4950; and Nossov,
Ancient and Medieval Siege, pp. 248249.
available sufficient food and other supplies to maintain themselves in

order to sustain a blockade of this type. Such an offensive situation pre-
supposes that the besieging force commanded some sort of effective logis-
tical system.
Carolingian Logistic Support
For Charlemagne to maintain an effective siege of Pavia, his army required

effective logistical support over the course of several months. Within a
maximum of three or four weeks after the arrival of Charlemagnes army at
Lombard capital, his men likely had completed the vallation and contra-
vallation of Pavia. Perhaps at this time, as many as 40,000 effectives were
deployed in these strongly fortified positions, camp followers not included.
It is also likely that Charlemagnes troops carried out foraging operations
in the region similar to those that King Pippins forces had undertaken in
754 and 756. It is probable as well that these foragers managed to seize at
least a part of the recent harvest. However, it was impossible for the
Carolingian army to live off the land for a significant length of time.109 In
addition to a likely lack of sufficient quantities of easily accessible food-
stuffs available in the area, it may be assumed that much of the Lombard-
dominated countryside was potentially hostile and, therefore, dangerous
to the Franks. Small units of the Carolingian army deployed for foraging
likely would be in peril, at least on occasion.110
It is certain that Charlemagnes baggage train, which had crossed the
Alps some two months earlier, at this time no longer carried a significant
accumulation of foodstuffs to support a lengthy siege. Augmenting the
Carolingian food supply with what was captured from Desiderius army in
the clusae, may, however, have postponed any immediate need for vict-
uals. A 20-day supply of food for an army of some 40,000 men required
approximately 1,600 cartloads of wheat pulled by 3,200 horses or oxen. To
put the matter another way, a minimum of 40,000 kilograms of wheat, i.e.
eighty cartloads, had to reach the Carolingian siege camp at Pavia each
and every day, on average, merely to provide the minimum grain-based
109Concerning rations and their transportation, see Engels, Alexander, pp. 1416,
120121, who deals with the problems of foraging from a logistic perspective; Bachrach,
Animals and Warfare, pp. 716729; and Bowlus, Franks, pp. 2530.
110The obvious dangers inherent in foraging locally among a population that was hos-
tile are discussed by Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 130131.
344 chapter five
calories required to sustain a force of approximately 40,000 men.111 These

data not only do not include the non-combatants, but also ignore the feed-
ing of the horses. Of necessity, these animals, which over the long term
required grain rations, generally were kept within the siege encampment
and only taken out in order to graze.112
Specific documentary information regarding how the Carolingian army
was supplied at Pavia is lacking. Nevertheless, it is clear that Charlemagnes
army had to be fed regularly. This only could be accomplished in a consis-
tent manner with the administrative and material support of Pope
Hadrian. The pontiff could mobilize resources directly from assets that
Rome controlled and indirectly through sources which the Republic of
St. Peter could influence. In the former context, there was a massive com-
plex of papal landed wealth known as the patrimony of the Cottian Alps.
These estates, which included holdings in the Piedmont plain, surely must
have been a major source of supplies for Charlemagnes armies. It is likely
as well that Pippins forces, which, in both 754 and 756, faced logistic prob-
lems, at least in the short term, similar to those which were encountered
by Charlemagne in 773, also were provided with support through the
efforts of the pope at whose request the Franks had invaded Italy in the
first place.113
With regard to the role played by various religious houses in northern
Italy in supplying Charlemagnes army, note must be taken of Bobbio. This
monastery had excellent connections with the port of Genoa to which
grain could be supplied by sea. Bobbio also had easy access to the Po River
and thus to its tributary the Tincino, which passed by Pavia and also pro-
vided fresh water for the Frankish army. This monastery, which, among
other resources, controlled flocks of many tens of thousands of sheep,
maintained lands that were well-positioned to have provided substantial
quantities of supplies and especially mutton to Charlemagnes forces
besieging Pavia.114 It is noteworthy that the earliest surviving act given by
Charlemagne, following the fall of Pavia on 5 June 774, was a substantial
gift to Bobbio.115
111Engels, Alexander, pp. 1416, 120121; Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 716729;
and Bowlus, Franks, pp. 2530.
112Concerning the feeding of horses, see two studies by Bachrach: Some Observations,
pp. 249277; and The Siege of Antioch, pp. 2746.
113See Paul Fabre, Le patrimonie de lglise romaine dans les Alpes cottiennes,
Mlanges darchologie et dhistoire 4 (1884), 283420.
114Fabre, Le patrimonie, p. 407.
115DK., no. 80.
It is also likely that the very wealthy monastery of Farfa helped to pro-
vide logistical support for the Carolingians. This inference is drawn, in
part, from the fact that the abbot of Farfa supported Pope Hadrian and
played an important role in pressing the papal policy of confrontation
with King Desiderius just prior to Charlemagnes decision to invade Italy.116
Abbot Probatus of Farfa appears to have been the second head of this
important house during the 8th century, traditionally led by men from the
regnum Francorum who were not from Gaul.117 He appears, however, to
have been a close friend of Pope Hadrian.118 Farfa is thus to be considered
to have been in the joint mouvance of the papacy and of the Carolingians
at just the time when the monasterys resources were very much needed
by Charlemagnes army. The inference that Farfa materially aided the
Carolingians is sustained by the fact that Charlemagne gave substantial
rewards to the monastery following his conquest of the Lombard
kingdom.119
Most important from a logistical perspective is the fact that Farfas
assets were not confined to the southern reaches of the duchy of Spoleto,
50 or so kilometers north of Rome. Farfas outpost in the west, i.e. the
church of St. Peter at Pisa, was well-positioned to serve as a base for the
gathering and transporting of supplies to Charlemagnes forces at Pavia.120
If supplies from this western terminus were interdicted by supporters of
Desiderius, it is important that Farfa also commanded an important base
in the east. The monastery of St. Hyppolitus, which was located on the
extension of the via Salaria near Fermo, was even better positioned than
the church of St. Peter to serve as a staging base for the movement of sup-
plies to Charlemagnes forces at Pavia.121 The fact that the representatives
116For Farfas support of Pope Hadrian, and the popes use of Abbot Probatus and his
monks in the conflict with Desiderius, see V.Hadriani I, ch. 19.
117Richard Ring, The Lands of Farfa: studies in Lombard and Carolingian Italy, Ph.D.
thesis (Madison, WI, 1972), 208210; and cf. Constambeys, Power and Patronage, pp. 148
156, who works diligently against the state of the question to undermine the notion that
elements from north of the Alps, i.e. the regnum Francorum, exercised considerable influ-
ence at Frafa.
118CF, I. p. 18, where there is a clear indication that he had been educated at Rome and
served in the Schola Cantorum.
119DK, I, nos. 98, 99, 111. For a somewhat different approach, see Costambeys, Power and
Patronage, pp. 301307.
120Regesto di Frafa, ed. Giorgi and Balzani, nos. 155 and 156, provide sufficient anteced-
ent action to make clear that Farfas interests had been established at Pisa before the
Carolingian conquest.
121CF., p. 18; and Regesto di Frafa, ed. Giorgi and Balzani, no. 51; regarding the monastery,
see the brief mention by Costambeys, Power and Patronage, p. 152.
346 chapter five
of the expeditionary levies of Fermo had sworn allegiance to Pope Hadrian

following the Lombard retreat from Chiusa virtually assured the ability
of Farfa as a papal ally to use St. Hyppolitus as a base for the provision of
logistical support to Charlemagnes army.122 Finally, the defection of
Spoleto to the papal cause, discussed above, made certain the free move-
ment of supplies through the duchy to Charlemagnes army at Pavia.
It should be emphasized that none of these options for supplying the
Carolingian army at Pavia was easy to maintain. Most, if not all, of them
entailed the movement of large quantities of food, especially grain and
animals on the hoof, on a regular basis with primitive technology, whether
overland or by river, under potentially hostile circumstances. Additionally,
the rather poor productivity of the central Italian soils for the large-scale
production of cereal grains constituted a major problem with regard to the
availability of significant surpluses. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the
monastery of Farfa was able to accumulate substantial stores of surplus
grain through taking rents in kind from large numbers of small-scale pro-
ducers.123 The very fact that Charlemagne was able to maintain a close
siege of Pavia for at least eight months under what can only be described
as difficult conditions, i.e. through the winter, must be taken as prima facie
evidence for the sophistication of the military support system available to
the Carolingians while they operated in northern Italy.
It should also be noted that at least some of the troops whom Char
lemagne had mobilized from throughout the regnum Francorum and then
mustered at Geneva for the invasion of Italy were responsible for provid-
ing their own supplies. Those men who held Salic land, for example, were
required to provide food for themselves for three months of campaigning
as of the date of the commencement of the muster. In addition, they were
responsible for providing sufficient clothing for six months from that same
date. After the three-month obligation of self-supported food supply was
completed, it became the obligation of the government to provide the
necessary logistical support for these men.124
It is highly unlikely that each of the many thousands of fighting men
under Charlemagnes command actually carried, either on his back or by
some sort of other transport, thus incurring additional logistic costs, the
several hundred pounds of food, clothing, and equipment that were

123See the very interesting discussion of this point by Ring, The Lands of Farfa,
pp. 8789.
124CRF. nos. 74, 8; and 75. See the discussion by Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, p. 67.
required to meet his needs for a six-month or even a three-month cam-

paign.125 Rather, it is more likely that the taxes that were paid to the royal
government in the form of military supplies either were sold to the levies
or provided gratis depending upon particular arrangements. With the gov-
ernment handling the bulk of the transportation, again likely through its
taxing system, e.g. ambascatio, it would be assured, as best as possible,
that food would be available for these troops to purchase.126 Select levies
in expeditione, like the holders of Salic lands, also probably were required
to provide their own supplies for a period of time. However, for a lengthy
campaign, the government supported the army as a whole. These outlays
undoubtedly were a considerable burden both on the royal fisc and on the
taxpayers of the regnum Francorum.
Despite what perhaps would appear to have been Charlemagnes advan-
tages in the near term following the Lombard withdrawal from the clusae,
Desiderius seems not to have been without hope that his position could be
saved. The order of magnitude of the logistical needs of Charlemagnes
army surely was transparent to a military commander of Desiderius expe-
rience. A plethora of contingencies, both natural, e.g. snow, rain, or floods,
and manmade, e.g. relief forces and raiders, had the potential to disrupt
the flow of matriel to the Carolingian army. Over the long term, Char
lemagnes position could be made even more difficult than that of the
Lombards. The latter, who were ensconced safely behind the massive walls
of Pavia, already had in place a food supply that was sufficient at least for
eight months and probably even longer.
Properly led and motivated, local levies could be mustered in various
localities of the Lombard kingdom and deployed to interdict Carolingian
supply trains if only to obtain their cargoes as booty. In addition, the via
Emilia, which ran between the heartland of Farfas holdings in the Spoletan
duchy and Charlemagnes forces at Pavia, could be blocked either by the
Byzantines or the Lombards at places such as Rimini, Bologna, Modena,
Parma, and Piacenza.127 In the West, north of the Po, forces based in the
Lombard cities of Turin and Milan could be mobilized from among the
expeditionary levies of these regions. Such forces were positioned to cause
trouble for supply trains organized in the papal patrimony of the Cottian
Alps and destined for Charlemagnes siege camp at Pavia.
125Concerning rations and their transportation, see Engels, Logistics, pp. 1416, 120121;
Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, pp. 716729; and Bowlus, Franks, pp. 2530.
126Durliat, La polyptyque, pp. 183208.
127N.b. the Via Flaminia passes through Fermo and joins the Via Emilia at Rimini.
348 chapter five
Storming the Walls
The vallation and contra-vallation constructed to surround Pavia and

defend the Frankish siege encampment, taken along with the availability
of sufficient logistical support to feed the Carolingian army, provided
Charlemagne with the opportunity to lay siege effectively to the Lombard
capital. However, the Carolingians also needed to be able to threaten
Desiderius position by demonstrating a capacity based upon overwhelm-
ing manpower to storm the walls. In addition, Charlemagnes armies, e.g.,
Bernards force deployed in the northeast, might have to demonstrate
their capability to storm the walls of other Lombard fortress cities as well
as lesser fortifications.
The walls of Pavia were very similar to those of the other fortress cities
of the Lombard kingdom that were strategically located throughout north-
ern Italy, which either had been constructed or rebuilt during the later
Roman Empire.128 In general, walls of the type under discussion here were
about ten meters in height and three to four meters in thickness at the
base, tapering somewhat as they rose. The fortifications were reinforced
with elaborate systems of gate defenses and projecting towers that sub-
jected the attacking force to overlapping fields of fire from handheld
missile weapons and various missile-launching machines. Many of these
fortress cities also were further strengthened, either wholly or partially, by
substantial water-filled moats, and many others had dry ditches. In addi-
tion, it was the norm for such cities to maintain large supplies of grain in
specially-built grain storage facilities, and to have internal water supplies
that could not be cut off by a besieging force.129
Both later Roman and early medieval warfare was dominated offen-
sively by attacks on fortifications of various types and defensively by
efforts to hold these strongholds.130 However, in light of the elaborate and
massive defensive characteristics of urban fortresses and the difficulties
entailed in supplying a sufficiently large investing force, lengthy sieges
128Johnson, Later Roman Fortifications, pp. 117121, and esp. Map 44, p. 120.
129Regarding the monumental fortress cities inherited by the Romano-German rulers
of the early Middle Ages, see Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications; Blanchet, Les enceintes
romaines de la Gaule (Paris, 1897), pp. 13219; and Grenier, Manuel darchologie gallo-
romaine, 5, :281361. Also useful is Jean Hubert, Evolution de la topographie de laspect des
villes de gaule du Ve au Xe sicle, SSCI, VI (Spoleto, 1959), 529558.
130This fact is demonstrated with overwhelming numbers of examples by Peter Purton,
A History of the early medieval siege, c. 4501220 (Woodbridge, 2009); and see the review by
Bernard S. Bachrach in Speculum, 86 (2011), 259260.
were not very common.131 Rather, the most frequently used method of
attacking a fortification since ancient times was after the establishment of
a siege camp, to storm the walls by a direct assault. Such an effort, espe-
cially in regard to fortress cities, required the deployment of large num-
bers of well-trained men, who used very long ladders to scale the walls
of the enemy position under exceptionally difficult and dangerous
circumstances.132
As Charlemagne and his advisers undoubtedly were well aware, their
attacking forces could not merely forage in the countryside for ladders
that were suitable for scaling the walls of a particular fortress city. Rather,
ladders of the type required for an escalade had to meet a variety of excep-
tionally exacting standards. First, it is generally agreed that the ladders
had to have been constructed to a proper length for the task to which they
were to be set. If they were too short, the attacking force obviously could
not go over the top of the walls. If the ladders were too long, i.e. extended
too far above the walls, the defenders would have sufficient leverage to
push them over, along with the men who were engaged in scaling the
heights.133
An indication of the complexity involved in planning an escalade is
provided by Vegetius, who makes clear not only the need for the attacking
force to have available ladders of the correct length, but also describes in
considerable useful detail two methods traditionally used by the armies of
the later Roman Empire to measure the height of the walls. The less diffi-
cult of these methods was to affix a string, which already had been marked
off in the style of a measuring tape, to an arrow. Then, after the arrow was
shot to the top of the wall and lodged there, a man trained to decipher the
figures ran to the base of the wall and read the marking on the string that
hung down to the ground.134 In this way the height of the wall was clear,
but, of course, the man who read the measure must be considered to have
been in substantial danger.
The more complicated, but perhaps less dangerous, method was for a
trained specialist to wait for the sun to reach a point in the sky where the
walls cast a shadow on the ground. After measuring the length of the
shadow, a rod marked into ten Roman feet was put into the ground and its
131Purton, A History, pp. 1102.

132Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, pp. 12, 4950; and Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege,
pp. 4, 20, 25, 7580.
133Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege, p. 75; and Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, pp. 12, 109.
134Vegetius, DRM, bk. IV, ch. 30.
350 chapter five
shadow also was measured. Vegetius affirms that when it was known how
much of a height cast how long of a shadow, the height of the city walls
could be ascertained from the shadow cast by the pole,.135 In various forti-
fications one part of an enceinte likely was higher or lower than another.
Even where walls were built to the same height, a rather sharp slope of the
land in front of the walls, for example, made it necessary to use longer lad-
ders as contrasted to places where the terrain was flat. Consequently,
ladders of different lengths might be required when the same fortress was
being stormed.
Once the necessary measurements had been taken, ladders were con-
structed, which, in fact, were somewhat taller than the wall. This extra
length was required, in part, because the wall, the ladder, and the distance
from the wall at ground level to the base of the ladder form a right triangle.
The ladder constituted the hypotenuse set at a 75-degree angle, where the
length of the base is somewhat less than one-half the height of the wall.
Such detail had already been discussed by Polybius (9.19.67) as early as
the 2nd century b.c. and is affirmed according to modern usage, for exam-
ple, by those engaged in firefighting.136 In addition, the ladder must over-
top the wall by somewhere in the neighborhood of a meter or perhaps a
bit more. This extension was necessary so that the men moving from the
ladder to the enemy defenses were provided with a handhold to maintain
their balance while swinging from the ladder to the top of wall.137 With
these calculations in mind, a ladder that was to be used to scale a wall ten
meters in height had to be about twelve to thirteen meters in length.
Obviously, once the height of the walls had been measured, ladders that
were to be used for scaling the walls of a fortress city had to be constructed
to already well-known technical specifications. In the context of a siege,
there would be little opportunity to undertake experiments such as stress
135Vegetius, DRM, bk. IV, ch. 30.

136Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, p. 12; and Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege, p. 75.
Michael A. Wieder, Carol Smith, and Cinthia Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, 3rd ed.
(Stillwater, OK, 1992), p. 251, take note that fire service ladders are subject to harsh condi-
tions and physical abuse. Of importance in this context is that ladders can be subjected to
fire and to falling debris. These conditions permit the inference that the use of some mod-
ern information regarding wooden ladders developed for firefighting has value for under-
standing various essentials concerning ladders that were used in pre-modern sieges.
137In regard to moving from the top of the latter to the top of the wall, see Wieder,
Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, p. 258, where, however, the extension
above the top of the wall is even greater than that suggested for a siege ladder. If the siege
ladder extended too far above the wall, then the defenders would have too great leverage in
order to drive it off the wall.
tests to ascertain whether the newly-built ladders would be strong enough

to bear the weight of the men who would be deployed to assault the walls.
Problems inherent in using an inadequate ladder could and likely would
result in its failure, and a disaster for the men climbing it. Seriously over-
loaded ladders buckle or break.138 It is important that the Romans tradi-
tionally raised the walls of their fortress cities to a height of about ten
meters, in part, because it was well-recognized that it was difficult to con-
struct a safe ladder that was greater than ten meters in length.139
In order to construct a ladder 12 meters in length, the men assigned to
do this work had to find supplies of hard wood, e.g. white oak, which even
today remains common in northern Italy.140 The wood chosen had to be
sufficiently strong so as not to buckle or break while bearing the live
weight of at most five climbing men and their equipment, i.e. a maximum
of about 340 kilograms.141 First, nearby forests had to be scouted for appro-
priate trees. These trees had to be greater than 12 meters in height, as their
tops likely would be insufficiently thick to be useful. With the relevant
trees identified and felled, the remainder of the construction project was
controlled by the simple laws of physics, which the ancients had worked
out by trial and error over centuries. The rails of the ladder, 12 meters in
length and about 10 centimeters in diameter, had to be cut from the tree
and shaped into a pole. A ladder of this length requires, in addition to 2
poles, 33 rungs, each about 40 centimeters in length and 10 in circumfer-
ence. These rungs could be shaped from scrap wood. The final assembly of
the ladder required that 66 holes be drilled for the placement of the rungs
and then bindings, either iron or rope or some combination thereof, had
to be put in place in order to hold the ladder together.
The deployment of a ladder greater than ten meters in length is no
easy matter as made clear, for example, in Scipios effort to capture
New Carthage, and such efforts still are regarded as requiring considerable
138See Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, p. 244, regarding testing
for weight bearing limits; and p. 288, where it is noted, Failure to observe the ladder load
capacities may result in dramatic failure of the ladder.
139Polybius, 9.19, 67. See the discussion by Waschow, Kampf um die Mauer, pp. 3234;
Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, p. 12; and Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege, p. 75.
140Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, pp. 249250, indicate that fir
trees with a minimum of knots are generally agreed to make the best ladders. However, this
is in situations where there is time for the wood to dry, which takes about two years and
reduces the moisture content to between 9 and 12 per cent. Lacking dry fir, a heavier wood
such as white oak is necessary.
141Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, p. 244, indicate the safe
maximum weight to be on a ladder of the type described here at any one time.
352 chapter five
training.142 The total weight of the ladder, itself, was not the major issue. A
ladder of the size described above and constructed of freshly cut white oak
weighs only about 270 kilograms.143 However, to carry such a ladder
required at least six men because its length made it unwieldy. Each of the
six men assigned to a carrying team had to be in good physical condition
to jog about 200 meters (see below) over relatively rough ground. Speed
was of some concern so as to limit the time the men of the carrying team
were subject to assault from missiles launched by the defenders on the
wall. Moreover, each man in the team could not move at his own pace.
Rather, all of the members of the team had to coordinate their efforts, and
this required considerable training, as it still does in modern times among
professionals such as firefighters.144
Once the close environs of the city wall had been reached, the carrying
team had to set the foot of the 12-meter ladder at about five meters from
the base of the wall and then raise it up so that it rested against the top of
the wall at a 15-degree angle. The techniques for executing this maneuver,
like carrying the ladder itself, also required considerable training for the
team if speed and accuracy are to be developed. Modern observers call
attention to the need for teamwork, smoothness, and rhythm when rais-
ing ladders. It is well-recognized that raising the ladder is not an easy pro-
cedure, and is affected by weather, topography, and the number of men
available to do the job.145 A lengthy ladder of the type under consideration
here requires at least four men to raise it into place.146
It may be suggested that the Franks, who had been engaged in captur-
ing late Roman fortress cities for several generations prior to the invasion
of the Lombard kingdom in 773, possessed the necessary knowledge and
training to storm the walls of Pavia. They surely knew how to measure the
height of city walls, build appropriate ladders, manipulate them under a
142Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, p. 270; and Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege, p. 75.
143Wood Handbook: Basic Information on Wood as a Material of Construction with Data
for its Use in Design and Specification, U.S. Forest Products Laboratory (Washington, D.C.
1955), esp. p. 56, but also pp. 70, 156, 315, 322. See also Charles G. Ramsey and Harold R.
Sleeper, Architectural Graphic Standards for Architects, Engineers, Decorators, Builders, and
Fraftsmen, 4th ed. (New York, 1951).
144Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, pp. 262269, for a discussion
of different types of ladder carries and the number of men required in relation to the
length of the ladder.
145See Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, p. 274, for the
quotation.
146Wieder, Smith, and Brackage, Essentials of Fire Fighting, p. 282, provide some inter-
esting observations.
hail of enemy missiles, and carry out an escalade. The most serious chal-
lenge of all of the above would appear to have been to climb a very tall
ladder with a weapon in one hand and perhaps a shield in the other while
under missile attack and then to swing from the ladder to the top of the
wall ten meters off the ground in the face of enemy resistance. Both
ancient observers and modern commentators have recognized that the
difficulty of executing this part of the attack required both bravery and
extensive training.147
Defending the Walls
The first concern of the defenders of a fortress city, when faced with an
enemy preparing to storm the walls, was deploying as large a number of
men as possible armed with handheld missile weapons or with artillery
mounted on the walls and in the towers. The defenders goal was to inflict
as large a number of casualties as possible on the attacking force so that if
the escalade succeeded, the number of men who might eventually come
over the top of the wall would be insufficient to capture the city. For the
defense of their city, all of the able-bodied men dwelling in Pavia and in its
environs could be expected to participate in the defense of the walls, and
most of them likely used bows and arrows. In the Roman tradition, it is
noteworthy that men up to the age of 40 not only were required to own a
bow and quiver, presumably filled with arrows, but to train regularly with
this weapon.148 For many men, this training, in essence, supplemented the
widespread use of the bow for hunting purposes that was a commonplace
for most people, and especially for those who lived in the countryside or
even in the environs of a city.149
At relatively close range, the men with handheld missiles, first bows
and crossbows, and then spears, launched as many volleys as possible as
fast as they could at those men advancing as a mass toward the walls, obvi-
ously including those teams of men who were carrying ladders.150 Killing
147Concerning the complexity of an escalade, see Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, pp. 12,
4650, 252, 262264, 270271, 288; and the remarks of Vegetius, DRM, bk. IV, ch. 21.
148See, Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5556, with the literature cited there.
149Brunt, Did Imperial Rome Disarm Her Subjects?, pp. 260270, takes note that hunt-
ing was commonplace. With regard to the late Roman background for the early Middle
Ages, see Jorg Jarnut, Die frmittelalterliche Jagd unter rechts und socialgeschichtliche
Aspekten, SSCI, 31 (Spoleto, 1985), II,765808.
150See, for example, Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege, pp. 7880, 248249.
354 chapter five
or wounding one or two men of a ladder-carrying team would slow up the

advance, if not cripple the attackers ability to deploy their ladders against
the walls before replacements for the lost team members could be identi-
fied and put in place. It could be expected with some confidence that the
men shooting bows and crossbows in volleys from the walls and towers of
Pavia could hit targets composed of closely-packed masses of enemy
attackers with some consistency at distances up to 150 meters.151 As a
result, the defenders could inflict heavy casualties on the assault forces
(see below) throughout their advance toward the walls.152 Defenders in
the late Roman era, like those of the early Middle Ages, were prepared to
follow up their volleys launched at a considerable distance with other
defensive techniques at a closer range. The most common of these was to
drop stones and to pour boiling liquids on the men who reached the base
of the walls while they were climbing their ladders.153
It is possible to provide some estimates of the numbers of casualties
that the defenders likely could inflict on the attacking force by using prob-
ability theory based on empirical data, such as, for example, the types of
bows and arrows available to the defenders. For militia men, a conserva-
tive estimate suggests that the normal weapon was a self bow that did not
exceed in pull 23 kilograms on the high side, and with a low-side pull of
18 kilograms. Arrows for such bows likely varied in length from about 60
centimeters for the lighter bows to 76 centimeters. for the heavier ones. At
the lower limit, an 18-kilogram-pull bow with a 60-centimeter arrow, being
shot at point blank range, i.e. zero-degree elevation, has an effective range
of about 20 meters. At an elevation of 45 degrees, the maximum range for
this bow at ground level is approximately 130 meters. The strongest of
these bows, i.e. with 23-kilogram-pull and an arrow of 76 centimeters in
length, has a point-blank range of about 22 meters and at 45 degrees a
range at ground level of about 200 meters. An able-bodied militia man
who practiced likely could loose one arrow about every 15 seconds, or four
arrows per minute.154
With these figures in mind, it is likely that every 100 archers distrib
uted along the top of the wall over a distance of about 320 meters and

152See Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 1417, for a statistical analysis
based upon probability theory regarding the likely losses suffered by an attacking force.
153See, for example, Vegetius, DRM, bk. IV, ch. 6; Anon., Strategy, ed. Dennis, ch. 13, 13,
lines 6191, 121135; and, for a discussion of continuity with the early Middle Ages, see
Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 139140.
154Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, p. 6.
launching volleys of arrows would register a total of 128 hits. The target
population in this situation would be a mass of 400 men, who were distrib-
uted in the most efficacious way possibly to minimize their own casualties
while attacking the walls. The losses noted above would occur in the
course of launching six volleys of arrows in 90 seconds while the attacking
force was covering about 140 meters of open ground. This level of casual-
ties would be inflicted if the archers shot at a 45-degree angle with a
23-kilogram-pull bow and a 76-centimeter arrow. Each arrow in such a
case travels about 200 meters in about six seconds. However, once the
attackers came closer to the walls, i.e. within about 30 to 35 meters, some
of the archers, who were deployed at a height of ten meters above ground
level atop the walls or in towers, and thus saw their missiles benefit from
the force of gravity, could direct their aim at specific targets. In this situa-
tion, 100 archers likely would inflict an additional 50 or so casualties.
Therefore, for every group of 100 archers, as many as 45 per cent of every
group of 400 men in the attacking force likely would be wounded or killed
before they reached the walls.155
These estimates do not take into the consideration the casualties
inflicted by artillery, which could begin launching barrages at 400 meters,
or even at greater distances depending on the terrain.156 In addition, these
estimates do not consider the casualties inflicted by the defenders of the
city, both men and women, with stones and boiling liquids, e.g. water and
oil, poured from the top of the walls as the ladders were being maneuvered
into place and as the assault troops began their climb to the top.157 If all
the defenders atop a particular segment of the wall, and not only the 100
archers already mentioned, deployed various weapons at close range, they
likely were capable of rendering dhors de combat another 50 men of the
attacking force at the base of the walls and while they were climbing
the ladders. The total casualties for 400 men would likely be somewhere
in the neighborhood about 225 dead and wounded, while only about 175
would reach the top of the wall in order to engage the defenders in hand-
to-hand combat.158

156See Rihll, The Catapult, passim, concerning the ranges of various catapults.
157Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, p. 270; and Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege,
pp. 7880.
158Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 1417. These figures do not take into
consideration the casualties that might be inflicted on the defenders by the archers or artil-
lery which supported the assault units.
356 chapter five
The Verona Diversion
Not long after the Carolingian army completed the construction of its
siege positions at Pavia, Charlemagne obtained intelligence that Adelchis,
following the Lombard retreat from Chiusa, had not remained at the capi-
tal with his father. Rather, the Lombard co-ruler is reported to have contin-
ued on, probably along the via Fulvia through Placentia to Cremona and
then north-northeast to the strategically-located fortress city of Verona.
At this time, Charlemagne also learned that Adelchis had taken Queen
Gerberga, Carlomans widow, and her sons with him to Verona. The party
was accompanied by the influential magnate Autchar, who, after
Carlomans death, had led the deceased kings family into Italy.159
Adelchis redeployment to the very strongly-fortified city of Verona
placed the Lombard co-ruler and his associates directly on the road
through the Brenner Pass to the old Roman fortress city of Augsburg, well
inside the Bavarian frontier.160 As a result, Adelchis was within rather easy
reach of a potential relief force that could be mustered at Augsburg or
Regensburg and dispatched to Verona by his brother-in-law, Duke Tassilo
of Bavaria.161 In addition, the option of flight into Bavaria, a rather fre-
quent, if only a temporary, refuge for previous enemies of the Carolingian
house, likely also would have seemed from Charlemagnes perspective to
have been open to Adelchis and his party.162 Further, Byzantine armies,
then operating in the Balkans, easily could reach Verona through the low
alpine passes that led to Friuli.163 Thus, the decision by the Lombard duke
of Friuli whether or not to remain loyal to Desiderius while the Lombard
king was being besieged at Pavia was of considerable importance.164
A potential Lombard-Bavarian strategy may have been enhanced by the
close association at Verona of Adelchis and Autchar. The latter, as noted
above, was an influential member of one of the most important families at
Tassilos court. Charlemagne required little imagination to have visualized
159V. Hadriani I, ch. 31. See also ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 773.
160Regarding the Roman road through the Brenner pass and its history, see Hyde,
Roman Alpine Routes, pp. 118142.
161For Bavarian military access through the Brenner pass, see Bowlus, Franks, pp. 23, 36.
162With regard to Bavaria as a haven of sorts for rebels, see, for example, ARF, ann. 748,
753; and AE, ann. 741, 748, 753.
163Constantine V (741775) frequently campaigned in the Balkans, especially against
the Bulgars, and enjoyed considerable success. He was given the sobriquet the first Bulgar-
slayer. See the brief remarks by A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 2 vols.
(Madison, WI, 1952), I, 239.
164See the discussion by Gasparri, Il passaggo, pp. 3537.
such a Lombard-Bavarian combination as having very negative possibili-

ties, if left unchecked, for the overall success of Carolingian military opera-
tions in Italy.165 In addition, Verona was in a region close to several
territories where anti-Frankish sentiments certainly were not unknown.
For example, the policy of the Tridentine dukes since the later 6th century
not only had led them into conflict with the armies of the regnum
Francorum, but the dukes often drew themselves into close alliance with
the Bavarians.166 Somewhat more ambiguously, it is worth noting that the
sons of the erstwhile Friulian Duke Pemmo, i.e. Ratchis and Aistulf, had
suffered as a result of Carolingian policy. This situation might well have
been an indication that at least some magnates in the Friuli region would
join an alliance against Charlemagne.167
After his army had completed the vallation and contra-vallation of
Pavia, Charlemagne decided to move against Verona, which lay some 200
kilometers to the north. As one source emphasizes, however, Charlemagne
left most of his troops at Pavia.168 If this report is accurate, and there seems
no reason to doubt it, the column that was deployed from Pavia to Verona
under Charlemagnes direct command could not have numbered much
more than 8,000 to 10,000 effectives, i.e. about a quarter of the force that
remained at Pavia. Thus, perhaps 25,00030,000 troops were left at Pavia to
deter Desiderius from a massive sortie against the siege camp, to protect
against potential high and/or low intensity operations against Carolingian
siege emplacements, and to keep the relevant supply lines, which pro-
vided vital logistical support, open and safe.
With a maximum force of only 10,000 effectives, Charlemagne therefore
could not provide a credible threat to capture by storm a massively
defended fortress city such as Verona, which was protected by a 3,200-
meter perimeter wall.169 Verona, in fact, was considered by contempo-
raries to be the best fortified city in Italy.170 The population of Verona at
165Both Wolfram, Tassilo III, p. 162; and Bowlus, Franks, p. 36, appreciate Tassilos
potential to make the situation in Italy very difficult for Charlemagne. Neither scholar
underestimates the Carolingians ability to draw the same conclusion.
166Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI,2735.
167Concerning the careers of Ratchis and Aistulf, see Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders,
VII, 98, 117, 239242; and 206221, respectively. The domestic politics and the foreign policy
of the dukes of Friuli during the reign of Desiderius are not at all clear. Indeed, it is not even
clear who the dukes were. See Krahwinkler, Friaul, pp. 6566.
168V.Hadriani I, ch. 34, indicates that the plurimum partem was left at Pavia. See,
below, for the discussion of numbers.
169P. Marconi, Verona Romana (Bergamo, 1937), pp. 7981.
358 chapter five
this time is estimated by modern demographic specialists to have been in

the 30,000 range.171 In light of the population distribution characteristics
discussed above, there were likely somewhere in the neighborhood of
9,000 able-bodied men between the ages of 15 and 55 living within the city
walls. In addition, it should be noted that Adelchis was accompanied by
his military household.172 Yet, despite its rather small size, the force that
Charlemagne led north against Adelchis would appear, on the basis of
contemporary evidence, to have been of high quality and very well-
prepared for its mission. Hadrians Vita, for example, describes the troops
that Charlemagne led to Verona as fortissimi Franci.173
Charlemagnes strategic situation required that he gain control of
Verona. As noted above, the effective road links of this fortress city through
the Brenner pass to Bavaria and to the eastern Adriatic coast, not only
made it a natural staging area for military operations in several directions,
but also presented few difficulties for a relief army to reach and to raise the
siege at Pavia. During his campaign against Maxentius in 312, Constantine
the Great recognized the strategic necessity of having to capture Verona
before he could go on to conquer the rest of northern Italy. Charlemagne
faced many of the same strategic and tactical problems as had Constantine
not only with regard his need to capture Verona, but to do so quickly.174
Constantine, of course, was regarded by the Carolingians as the model
Christian ruler. Therefore, copying his behavior (the phrase traditionally
used by modern scholars in this context is imitatio imperii), which was
hardly limited to ceremonial acts, certainly was considered a wise course
171Bairoch, Batou, and Chvre, La population, p. 49.

172Agnellus, LPER, ch. 160, uses the term exercitus to describe what obviously are
Adelchis household troops.
173V.Hadriani I, ch. 34, aliquantis fortissimis Francis. Exactly what the contemporary
author of the Vita meant by fortissimi Franci is far from clear. For example, Charlemagne,
as seen above, had mobilized troops from throughout his kingdom. Thus, it might be haz-
ardous to understand the term Franci solely in ethnic terms. Indeed, from the perspective
of Rome, all of the people from the north, unless there was good reason to indicate other-
wise, were identified as Franci. In a similar manner, the term fortissimi likely should not be
thought of in terms of a force of heavily-armed mounted troops since soldiers of this type
would have been of little value either in the establishment of a siege at Verona or for the
purpose of storming the walls. The great strength of Charlemagnes force should likely be
seen in terms of its capacity to take Verona, e.g. those with the skill to build siege engines.
See the general observations by Bachrach, Siege Warfare, pp. 119133.
174The reconstruction of Constantines campaign against Verona provided by Edward
Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury with an intro-
duction by W.E.H.Lecky, 7 vols. (London, 1909), II, 229233, not only remains satisfactory
but is the most readable.
of action.175 What Charlemagne and his advisers, in fact, may have known
regarding Constantines campaign in northern Italy and more particularly
the siege of Verona in 312 is, however, more difficult to ascertain.176 For
example, the manuscript tradition of the panygerici, one of the major
sources for Constantines operations, is obscure, to say the least.177 Yet, the
175There is no doubt that Constantine and David were Charlemagnes heroes. The
importance of the former to the Carolingians rests, at least in part, upon papal tuition and
likely was closely connected to the development of a spectrum of ideas that ultimately
resulted in the famous forgery Constitutum Constantini. Lon Levillain, Lavnement de la
dynastie carolingienne et les origines de ltat pontifical (749757), BEC, 94 (1933), 231234,
associates the beginning of this process with the visit of Pope Stephen II to the Carolingian
court in 754. This view obviously is not uncontroversial. See the very useful summary of the
literature by Noble, The Republic, pp. 135137.
I would go just a bit further and note that the emphasis on Constantines faith
(Constitutum Constantini, chs. 37) was to find its parallel in the careers and very likely in
the spiritual lives of both Pippin and Charlemagne. The explicit statements that
Constantine handed over both the imperial regalia, including the imperial diadem, as well
as all of the Western provinces, including the city of Rome (chs. 1419) cannot be ignored.
The possibility must be entertained that the Carolingians were given the idea that the gift
of the empire in the West was in the popes hand. This was likely made obvious to
Pippinand Charlemagne as early as the winter of 754. Certainly by 777, Pope Hadrian was
making an explicit effort to identify Charlemagne with Constantine (CC., no. 60). For more
detailed discussion of this point, see Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities,
pp. 231255.
For early Carolingian cultural interests in Italy of a more general nature, see Pierre
Rich, Le renouveau culturel la cour de Ppin le Bref, Francia 2 (1974), 5970; regarding
the importance of romanitas, see, for example, Karl Hauk, Die Ausbreitung des Glaubens
in Sachsen und die Verteidigung der rmischen Kirche als konkurrierende Herrscher
aufgaben Karls des Grossen, Frhmittelalterliche Studien, 4 (1970), 147172; and for the
overall picture, see Eugen Ewig, Das Bild Constantins des Grossen in den ersten Jahr
hunderten des abendlndischen Mittelalters, Historisches Jahrbuch, 75 (1956), 146; and
reprinted in Ewig, Sptantikes und frnkisches Gallien, I, 72113. Also of value here is Percy
Ernst, Schramm, Die Anerkennung, Karls des Grossen als Kaiser (bis 800). Ein Kapital aus
der Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Staatssymbolik, in Beitrge zur allgemein Geschichte
I: von Sptantike bis zum Tode Karls der Grossen (814), (Kaiser, Knige und Ppste. Gesammelte
Aufstz zur Geschichte des Mittelalters), 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1968), I, 215263.
176The accounts of Constantines military operations in 312 that we have today also
were available to the Carolingians. In addition, the Carolingians may well have had infor-
mation regarding Constantines Verona campaign that are not available to us. However, it
is probably fruitless to speculate concerning what may perhaps have been known at
Charlemagnes court regarding the lost books of Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae;
Panegyricus XII (esp. chs. 810), however, is another matter.
177There seem to have been at least two and perhaps three ancient manuscripts of the
panegyrici still available in the 15th century, which are no longer extant. One ms. was at
Mainz and another at St. Bertin. The third is problematic. It is possible that in the 12th
century, there was a copy at the monastery of St. Aubin in Angers. See Michael Winterbottom
Panegyrici Latini, in Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, p. 289; C.E.V.
Nixon and Barbara S. Rodger, In Praise of Later Roman Emperors: The Panegyrici Latini.
Introduction, Translation and Historical Commentary with the Latin Text of R.A.B. Mynors
(Berkeley, 1994), 3537; and E. Galletier, XII Pangyriques ltins 3 vols. (Paris, 19491955), I,
360 chapter five
availability of detailed information to the Carolingians regarding Roman

military operations in northern Italy from other sources, e.g. Tacitus and
Suetonius, surely cannot be discounted.178 The point to be made here is
that the combination of natural and military topography in contexts in
which technology is not a significant variable goes a long way in condi-
tioning military strategy.
Whatever may have been the state of Charlemagnes knowledge regard-
ing Roman military campaigns in northern Italy in general, it is clear that
the first Christian emperor had found it necessary to march considerably
to the north of Verona in order to establish a siege. This was because in
order to encircle Verona, he had to cross the Adige, which could not be
done from the south.179 Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the
Adige could be crossed south of the city by Charlemagnes forces in 773.
Therefore, the Frankish army had to follow the same route earlier tra-
versed by Constantines troops. Such a detour was important not only
because it added several days to the march from the south, but because it
placed the Carolingian army within rather easy reach of the Lombard
forces based at Trent only 80 kilometers north of Verona.
As noted earlier, river crossings traditionally were regarded as the most
dangerous part of any march for an army. This was especially the case
when the possibility of an enemy attack could not be ignored.180 One fur-
ther point is clear. Verona was an even more formidable fortification in
773, when Charlemagne was faced with the need to capture it quickly,
than it had been more than four-and-a-half centuries earlier when
Constantine took the city as a crucial operation in the establishment of his
position as emperor. Theodoric the Great (d. 526) had extended the walls
and improved the internal defenses of Verona during the early 6th
century.181
XXXVIII-XLVIII. This collection generally is assumed to have been unknown to the

Carolingians. Thus, Peter Godman, Poets and Emperors: Frankish Politics and Carolingian
Poetry (Oxford, 1987), p. 36, makes a brief reference to Plinys panegyric to Trajan in his
discussion of Fortunatus but ignores the collection as a whole, even in terms of drawing
parallels between late antique and early medieval panegyric. More study of this topic is a
desideratum.
178See in this context the detailed study by Bernard W. Henderson, Civil war and
rebellion in the Roman empire a.d. 6970: a companion to the Histories of Tacitus (London,
1908).
179See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, II, 132.
180Vegetius, DRM, bk.III, ch. 7.
181Ward-Perkins, From Classical Antiquity, pp. 192193.
Despite the difficult strategic and tactical situation described above,

Charlemagne not only needed to gain control of Verona, but be had to do
it quickly. There were potential problems with regard to the weather.
Charlemagne and his advisers surely were aware, either from local intelli-
gence or from the widely published observations made by Pope Gregory
the Great, that during the late autumn, the Adige, which he had to cross,
was prone to exceptionally vigorous floods.182 The great flood of 589, for
example, was well-known not only to have ruined estates and rural vil-
lages, but also to have washed out roads. This flood is said to have been so
powerful that it even destroyed a part of the walls of Verona, which, of
course, had subsequently been rebuilt.183
In addition, Charlemagne faced continuing logistical problems, which
always could worsen. The Carolingian supply lines to Verona were
extended an additional 200 kilometers from Pavia. Levies from the
Lombard cities north of the Po, such as Brecia, Mantua, and Cremona,
which had not yet been subdued, posed a problem to the security of
Charlemagnes logistical support.184 The capacity of those northern dukes,
who may have remained loyal to Desiderius, to interdict Charlemagnes
supplies meant that a not-inconsequential number of Frankish troops had
to be deployed to protect Carolingian logistical assets being brought to
Verona. These soldiers had to be detached from the army facing Verona.
From a more general political-military perspective, the longer Adelchis
could hold out at Verona, the greater was the possibility that some sort of
a relief force would reach him. Also, in the context of a protracted siege,
Carlomans sons might escape to Francia, and, there be used by one or
another faction of magnates in order to undermine their uncles position
as ruler of a united regnum Francorum. Capturing the boys likely had been
among Charlemagnes initial concerns when relations with Desiderius
deteriorated and it was decided finally that an invasion of Italy was
necessary.
A lengthy siege of Verona also likely would lead the Lombards, or at
least some Lombards, to regard as suspect the ability of the Carolingian
military to succeed in Italy if Charlemagnes efforts were widely opposed.
182Gregory, Dialog. III, xix, 3; and Paul, Hist., bk. III, ch. 23, for the date.
183See the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, V, 261262, based on Gregory,
Dialog. III, xix, 3; and Paul, Hist., bk. III, ch. 23. For a more detailed modern study, see Paolo
Squatriti, The Floods of 589 and Climate Change at the Beginning of the Middle Ages: An
Italian Microhistory, Speculum 85 (2010), 799826.
184V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, makes clear that Charlemagne did not even try to bring these
cities under his control until after he had dealt with the situation at Verona.
362 chapter five
This, in turn, could lead Lombards who had defected to the Carolingians,
such as the duke of Spoleto, to return to the royal cause and support
Desiderius. Further, extended delays, not to mention setbacks, under dif-
ficult conditions were and remain a prescription for the deterioration of
troop morale, which might lead some Carolingian troops to desert their
king. Finally, given enough time and the opportunity to take advantage of
Carolingian difficulties, the Byzantines might consider the possibility of
intervening in Italy, with or without Avar support.
On the positive side, it is likely that Charlemagne and his advisors had
access to a great deal of information concerning the strategic situation at
Verona. Inhabitants of the regnum Francorum had been traveling, buying,
selling, visiting, and, on occasion, fighting throughout the north of Italy for
generations.185 As a major city, through which passed a number of main
roads, Verona was very well-known. By the later 7th century, and probably
earlier, the vulgar fame of Theoderic the Great, the Dietrich von Bern of
legend, who had extended the walls of city and improved its defenses,
attracted a wide interest regarding Verona among foreigners. In this con-
text, the old German language epic stories, which Charlemagne later
ordered to be collected but now are not longer extant, cannot be ignored
in regard to providing information regarding Verona.186 In addition, infor-
mation regarding the city, if needed, would surely be forthcoming at the
kings request from knowledgeable people living in the Lombard kingdom
who opposed Desiderius regime.
Charlemagnes intelligence sources undoubtedly would have known
that the Veronese were very proud that their city, which still preserved a
great deal of her late Roman aspect, including the amphitheater, the the-
ater, and the forum.187 However, among those buildings that were of great-
est interest to Charlemagne and his advisers were the horrea, i.e. the public
185Regarding Merovingian interests, see, for example, Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 1617, 85;
and Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, V, 228229.
186See the useful collection of material by H.J. Zimmermann, Theodorich der Grosse-
Dietrich von Bern. Die geschichtliche und sagenhafte Quellen des Mittelalters (diss. phil.
Bonn, 1972). It is perhaps of some tangential importance here, as Godman, Poets and
Emperors, p. 135, notes, that not one early Carolingian writer implies any resemblance
between his [Charlemagnes] achievements and those of the Ostrogothic king. In short,
Theodoric may have had a broad popular reputation, but among court intellectuals he was
not a proper model. See, in this context, Verena Epp, 499799: von Theoderich dem
Grossen zu Karl dem Grossen, in 799, 219229.
187Ward Perkins, Classical Antiquity, pp. 89, 91, 179, 182, 185, 219, 224, 226. 192193. Of
considerable importance in this context is the encomium Versus de Verona, ed. Pighi.
grain storage warehouses.188 At the time of Charlemagnes arrival in the

autumn, these facilities undoubtedly were quite full. A large part of the
harvest in the fertile flood plain of the Adige traditionally was completed
before the rivers autumn floods potentially washed away everything in
their path.189 Simply put, it is unlikely that the Carolingians would be able
to starve the defenders of Verona into submission in a short period of time.
Because a rapid capitulation of the city due to a lack of supplies was
unlikely, the quality of both the outer and inner defenses of the 3,200-
meter circuit wall of Verona assumed the utmost immediate importance
for Charlemagne. Regarding the outer defenses, a poem, written a quarter-
century or so after Charlemagnes investment of the urbs, emphasizes that,
It forms a square. Its walls are very strongly constructed. There are 48 tow-
ers fixed throughout the entire circuit Eight of these towers stand even
higher than all of the others.190 Of equal importance were the inner
defenses of the so-called castrum, actually the citadel, in which the church
of St. Pietro was located.191 This was the place where Theodoric the Great
had built his own palace.192 He also had much improved the walls of this
inner fortification.193
The castrum stood on a hill above the main part of the city and had
great strategic strength. This was the case, in part, because the two bridges
within Verona that crossed the Adige could be defended with both cata-
pults and handheld missile weapons by those who were deployed in the
castrum on the heights. Even if the greater part of the city, i.e. the lower
part, fell to the enemy, the citadel would remain defensible.194 There can
be no doubt that should Verona have to be placed under siege, Charlemagne
would have to take both the walls of the urbs itself and the castrum by
storm. The latter was the likely place of retreat for the remaining defend-
ers after the Carolingian army had taken control of the main walls.
188L. Simioni, Verona nellet precomunale, Atti dellAccademia dagricoltura, scienze,

lettere, arti e commercio, ser. 4, XII (1911), 404; and regarding grain storage in general, see
Geoffrey Rickman, Roman Granaries and Store Buildings (Cambridge, 1971).
189See the general information provided by Egidio Rossini and Carlo Vanzetti, La agri-
coltura del territorio veronese in et longobarda, in Verona in et gotica e longobarda
(Verona, 1982), 235255.
190See Versus de Verona, ed. Pighi, lines 46. Note the more poetic translation: In
Praise of Verona, in Poetry of the Carolingian Renaissance, ed. and trans. Peter Godman
(London, 1985), 180187, for the entire work.
191Ward-Perkins, Classical Antiquity, pp. 160, 166, 193, 225226.
192Simioni, Verona, pp. 406407.
193Ward-Perkins, Classical Antiquity, pp. 165166, 192193; and Simioni, Verona,
pp. 406407.
194Ward-Perkins, Classical Antiquity, pp. 166, 186190, 219220, 225226.
364 chapter five
Therefore, the total firepower that could be mobilized by the defenders

would be exceptional.
Charlemagne was faced with the problem of capturing a fortress city,
which, as noted above, was regarded as the strongest in northern Italy, in
the course of a very brief campaign. Veronas 3,200-meter perimeter wall
was strengthened by 48 mural towers.195 The success of Verona as a flour-
ishing city during the early Middle Ages is demonstrated by the mainte-
nance within the walls of the Roman street grid.196 When properly
deployed, its urban militia, supplemented by levies from the countryside,
was well-prepared to defend the walls successfully against an attacking
force of some 40,000 men.197 To put the situation more simply, a well-
equipped and well-trained force of the order of magnitude of more than
six Roman legions, as effectives were counted during the late Republic and
early empire, would not be sufficient to assure the capture of Verona by
storm.198 Parenthetically, it should be noted that if the Carolingians con-
templated establishing a lengthy siege, they would have to be prepared to
interdict supplies and reinforcements coming to the city by river boat on
the Adige. Thus, the Carolingian besieging force would find it necessary to
develop and deploy naval assets.199
Marching north with a minimum of equipment, it likely took
Charlemagne some two weeks to move his forces some 200 kilometers
along the Roman roads from Pavia to Verona.200 When Charlemagne
arrived, he was opposed by some locals of considerable importance. For
example, the monastery of St. Zeno, located between the Adige River and
the Via Gallica, somewhat less than 2,000 meters from the southern termi-
nus of Veronas walls in the area of the arena, was one such focal point of
195Marconi, Verona Romana, pp. 7981; and Simeoni, Verona, p. 401.

196Ward-Perkins, Classical Antiquity, fig. 3.
197Bachrach and Aris, Military Technology, pp. 117. Regarding estimates for the popu-
lation of the civitas of Verona, see Rossini and Vanzetti, La agricoltura, pp. 235238.
198Cf. Constantines campaign as discussed by Gibbon, Decline and Fall, II, 229233.
199Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 370, n. 2, is right to reject the notion, based
upon a suspicious datum clause of a Lombard charter, that Adelchis and his party were still
in control of Verona in April 774. Were this the case, one would have to assume either that
a Carolingian siege of the city had been in train since the late autumn of 773, or that
Adelchis controlled the north with free access to Bavaria and to the Byzantines for some
eight months. The first option is not impossible, if one were to assume that Bernards forces
had established such a siege. There is, however, simply no evidence to sustain such a view.
By contrast, V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, tells a very different story that was accepted by Hodgkin,
loc. cit. and is followed here.
200PCL, p. 218, makes a point of noting that the Carolingians moved very rapidly from
Pavia to Verona.
resistance. As a result, it suffered damage by Frankish troops lead by Count

Vulvinus, and some, if not many, of its estates subsequently were confis-
cated by Charlemagne.201 One recorded example is provided by a surviv-
ing act of Charlemagne which indicated that in 774, he gave the little
monastery (monasteriolus) of San Salvatore in Saint Sirmione, which had
been dependent on St. Zeno, to the monastery of St. Martin at Tours.202 Of
importance in this context was the close connection of the bishop of
Verona with this monastery, and the fact that Charlemagne, once the city
fell, chose a new bishop for this recently subdued see.203
Despite noteworthy opposition from at least some of the major ecclesi-
astical leaders of Verona, the situation was resolved with surprising rapid-
ity. The only report regarding Carolingian operations by a contemporary
indicates that When he [Charlemagne] arrived at that place [Verona],
Autchar and the wife and sons of the above-mentioned Carloman imme-
diately handed themselves over of their own free will to that same excep-
tionally kind king.204 Despite the laconic and undoubtedly pro-Carolingian
bias of this account, it is likely that Autchar and Gerberga quickly accepted
Charlemagnes terms of surrender. With regard to Autchar, as will be seen
below, this may have been part of some sort of complicated agreement
that ultimately was to bring this very able magnate into Charlemagnes
service as a high-level functionary and military commander.205
It is also clear that Adelchis escaped from Verona, likely with the help of
the Byzantines, who would seem to have had assets in the area. Initially,
Adelchis was escorted to the Adriatic coast and spirited off by ship to
Epirus in east Roman territory.206 However, he soon returned across the
Adriatic to Italy, again likely with Byzantine aid. Once back in Lombard
territory, he rejoined his father at Pavia, despite the ongoing close invest-
ment of the city by the Carolingians.207 How he slipped through the
201See, CDV, I, no. 117; and the discussion by Carlo Guido Mor, Dalla caduta cellimpero
al comune, in Verona e il suo territorio, 7 vols. (Verona, 19601969), II, 3031.
202CDV, I, 53.
203Maureen C. Miller, The Formation of A Medieval Church: Ecclesiastical Change in
Verona, 9501150 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 123.
204Vita Hadriani I, ch. 34; and cf. PCL, p. 218.
205A hint is provided by PCT, ch. 53, by the phrase, Autharius Francus ibidem latens se
cum eis regi dedit.
206PCL, p. 218, takes note of Adelchis successful flight from Verona; and Agnellus,
LPER., ch. 160, records the tradition that Adelchis fled to Epirus. PCR, ch. 7, which likely is
incorrect in declaring that Adelchis fled from Verona to Pisa at this time. By contrast, it is
probable that at a later date, i.e. after the fall of Pavia, he subsequently embarked from the
port of Pisa for Constantinople.
207ARF, an. 774.
366 chapter five
Carolingian lines to enter the closely-besieged city is unknown. Moreover,

before Desiderius surrendered Pavia several months later, Adelchis again
passed through the Carolingian siege lines and escaped from the city.
Shortly thereafter, he is reported to have been at the Byzantine capital.
While Adelchis resided in Constantinople, the imperial government was
prepared to use him as a pawn in various East Roman diplomatic initia-
tives concerning Italy.208
At this point in Charlemagnes operations against Verona, it cannot be
ascertained whether the Lombard kings soldiers refused to fight against
the Carolingians or if the citizens refused to sustain the defenses against a
siege, thus leading Adelchis to abandon the city and Autchar to surren-
der.209 In any case, when Charlemagne left Pavia, perhaps three weeks
prior to the surrender of Verona, he is unlikely to have known the disposi-
tion either of the militia elements within the Veronese citizenry or of
Adelchis regular troops, or exercitus.210 How likely these forces were to
impinge upon the prospect either of a protracted siege or a massive storm-
ing of the citys walls is unlikely to have been information that was acces-
sible to Frankish intelligence at this time.211
Charlemagne certainly knew, as mentioned above, that the harvest had
been largely completed.212 Thus, Verona would not lack food to sustain its
population during the course of a lengthy siege. Therefore, it is rather
more than likely that Charlemagne deployed at Verona such overwhelm-
ing force that Adelchis, his supporters, and perhaps most importantly the
local defense forces regarded resistance as hopeless. All of the indicators
noted above, especially the rapid surrender of the city without opposition,
suggest that Charlemagne commanded a force at Verona which could not
have numbered much fewer than 40,000 effectives and may well have
been considerably larger. In short, resistance, even in the short term, was
deemed fruitless by the defenders, and this likely can be attributed to their
being faced by an enemy force of overwhelming size.
208Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 370; VIII, 36. Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 4042,
introduces his readers to the long history of the legend of Adelchis, which, upon close
examination, may contain certain kernels of fact.
209PCL, p. 218, would seem to permit the inference that the Cives Veronenses only
gave themselves over to Charlemagne after Autchar and Gerberga had surrendered.
210Agnellus, LPER., ch. 160, uses the term exercitus to describe what are obviously
Adelchis household troops.
211See, below, regarding Autchars very curious career and the possibility that he was
Charlemagnes agent.
212Regarding the agricultural customs of the Verona-region, see Rossini and Vanzetti,
La agricoltura, pp. 238255, with the abundance of specialized literature cited there.
As seen above, Charlemagne could not have drawn down his own force
concentration at Pavia in order to mobilize even 20,000 men for opera-
tions against Verona. Consequently, it seems likely that he ordered
Bernard, whose army was still in the north, to provide somewhere in the
neighborhood of perhaps 30,000 troops in order to sustain a combined
operation against Verona.213 It is possible that a small part of Bernards
army remained to the north and east of the city to act as a blocking force
against possible Lombard initiatives from Trent or Friuli, or from a Bavar
ian, Byzantine, or Avar effort aimed at Charlemagnes troops deployed at
Verona. In later operations by Carolingian armies during Charlemagnes
reign, for which the sources are more forthcoming, the use of one or more
blocking forces in the manner suggested above, is well-documented.214 In
any case, the conclusion seems ineluctable that Bernards army, perhaps
reinforced by levies mobilized in the Chur region (see below), along with
the 10,000 or so effectives under Charlemagnes direct command who had
been drawn from the siege of Pavia, had sufficient manpower to frighten
the people of Verona and bring about the surrender of the city without
opposition.
Following the capture of Verona, Charlemagne gave orders for the
deployment of the third army, i.e. forces drawn from both Bernards army
and the army that was established at Pavia, to deal with the fortress cities
and lesser fortifications in the northeast. It was likely in this context that
the Frankish king also forcefully engaged the Carolingian government in
the affairs of the Chur region. Bishop Constantius of Chur was summoned
to Charlemagnes court. There, he was apprised of the fact that whatever
autonomy he may have enjoyed previously, presumably as a result of the
position of this territory on the frontier between the Bavaria and Lombard
kingdom was, in effect, at an end as a result of Charlemagnes recent mili-
tary successes.215 The capacity of the Chur-Raetien region to provide the
213V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, makes clear that after the fall of Verona, but before returning to
Pavia, Charlemagne had more than one army under his command.
214See Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 2530.
215DK., no. 78. The date of this act is controversial. It clearly was given prior to
Charlemagnes assumption of the title rex Langobardorum but after the Saxon campaign of
772, when Charlemagne was forced to begin thinking about an invasion of Italy. Those who
choose to date the act prior to Charlemagnes invasion of Italy have found it impossible to
find a compelling explanation for Carolingian use of the western passes rather than the via
Claudia Augusta. By dating this act in the context of the capture of Verona, it becomes clear
why the Via Claudia Augusta had not been used during operations in 773. See the discus-
sion by Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, p. 50; and Reinhold Kaiser, Churrtien im fhren
Mittelalter. Ende 5. bis Mittle bis Mitte 10 Jahrhundert (Basel, 1998), pp. 5053.
368 chapter five
logistic resources that were needed for the supply of Charlemagnes third
army operating in the northeast, would be essential to its success.216
Troubles at Home
Likely in late October, i.e. after he had arrived at Verona and perhaps even
after the city had surrendered, Charlemagne received a very hurried intel-
ligence report that the Saxons had launched a major surprise attack
through the Fulda gap against Carolingian assets in Hesse.217 Clearly, this
Saxon offensive was undertaken in a time frame that might divert
Charlemagne from fulfilling the goals of his Italian campaign. One might
even hazard the speculation that Tassilo worked as an intermediary
between his Lombard relatives and the Saxons to undermine Char
lemagnes Italian strategy. It should not go unnoticed that temporary alli-
ances between Saxons and Bavarians had been forged in the past for the
purpose of discomfiting the Carolingians. From a geopolitical perspective,
the Bavarians and the Saxon were natural allies against the Franks in some
situations.218
The Saxons, however, also had very good reasons of their own for attack-
ing the Carolingian kingdom in the autumn of 773. It was the very essence
of strategic wisdom for the Saxons to have waited until very late in the
campaigning season, when Charlemagne was thoroughly occupied in
Italy, to invade Hesse. The likelihood of any significant Carolingian coun-
teroffensive north of the Alps and east of the Rhine, at the approach of
winter, was not very great. The absence of Charlemagne from the regnum
Francorum surely further diminished the probability of a meaningful
offensive Carolingian military response in the very near term. The Saxons,
216Regarding the wealth of the Chur-region, see E. Meyer-Marthaler, Rtien im frhen

Mittelalter. Eine verfassungsgeschichtliche Studie (Zurich, 1948); and Kaiser, Churrtien,
pp. 195228.
217As will be seen below in Chapter Six, the Saxon invasion of Hesse was launched
toward the end of the campaigning season. Perhaps some two weeks would have been
necessary for news of the attack and its nature to have traveled 1000 kilometers or so from
the Weser frontier to Charlemagne, who, at this time, likely was somewhere between Pavia
and Verona. With regard to best-case transmission of information at great speed, perhaps
as many as 320 kilometers could be traveled per day. As indicated above, this type of opera-
tion was available using a relay of individual riders carrying a written message.
218ARF, ann. 743, 747, 748, read together and along with AE, ann. 743, 747, 748; Fred.
Cont., chs. 26, 27; and AMP, ann. 743, 747, 748, make clear the capacity of some groups of
Saxons and of the Bavarian ducal house to make common cause against the Carolingians
from time to time.
however, also were eager consumers for accurate information regarding

what the Carolingians were doing in Italy. This permits the suggestion that
Tassilo may well have been providing intelligence to the Saxons as part of
a combined Lombard-Bavarian strategy to divert Charlemagne from his
Italian goals.
Immediately after the fall of Verona, i.e. in late October, Charlemagne
could not as yet have had a full accounting of what had occurred in Hesse.
Even the order of magnitude of damage done to Carolingian assets by the
Saxons could not yet have been calculated effectively through the tradi-
tional inquest process, which it may be hypothesized that Abbot Sturm
oversaw.219 In this context, Charlemagne decided not to make a military
response to the Saxon offensive in the near term. Rather, he chose to pur-
sue his operations in the Lombard kingdom. He dispatched various units,
described in a well-informed account as cunei, to capture the fortress cit-
ies in the northeast of the Lombard kingdom. These forces were composed
essentially of expeditionary levies drawn from the armies that had mus-
tered at Verona, i.e. the forces that Charlemagne had brought from Pavia
combined with the units that Bernard had dispatched to aid the king.
These troops, which had been successful at Verona, may be considered, in
light of their new assignment, as a third army separate from the force
besieging Pavia and from the men who remained under Bernards direct
command as a blocking force.220
Some of these above-mentioned cities ultimately were seized as the
result of a protracted siege by one or another of the units of the third army.
Other cities fell more quickly by storm.221 Yet other cities capitulated with-
out providing opposition to the Carolingians.222 For example, Stabilus, the
219It is very important to emphasize, as Ramsey, Roman Imperial Post, pp. 6074,
makes clear, that it is one thing to send a relay of messengers and something very different
to have a single well-informed courier make a lengthy journey at great speed. In addition,
of course, such a well-informed courier not only would have to be thoroughly briefed but
the information would have to have been laboriously collected by inquests from many
sources in Hesse and the Fulda Gap before such a briefing could even take place.
220V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, reports that Charlemagne sent cuneos exercituum bellatorum
to capture various Lombard cities north of the Po. The use of the term cuneus makes clear
that a force formed in a wedge shape and carrying a ram, presumably to batter down a
wooden gate, was the authors point. Cf. Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, pp. 46, 57,
8891, for the usage of cuneus as a late Roman cavalry unit; and for this continued technical
use of the term, see Brown, Gentlemen and Officers, p. 92.
222PCL, p. 218, generalizes inaccurately (see below regarding Friuli) and asserts that all
of the Lombard civitates surrendered before Charlemagne returned to Pavia. This
Continuator attributes their rapid surrender to the fact that Veronam inexpugnabilem
had fallen to Charlemagne.
370 chapter five
duke of Trevisio, avoided conflict with the Carolingian third army and sur-
rendered immediately. As a result, he was permitted by Charlemagne to
continue to hold his office as dux.223 The duke of Friuli, by contrast, was
deposed, and Charlemagne replaced him with a certain Hrodgaud.224 The
duchy of Friuli, as noted above, was of exceptional strategic importance
because it blocked the easiest land route that the Byzantines could use to
move an army from the Balkans into Italy, i.e. along the right bank of the
Sava river from Sirmium through Sisak and Ljubljana to Grado.225 Whether
the duke of Friuli was replaced because he was thought to be in league
with the Byzantines cannot be ascertained, but the possibility cannot be
summarily dismissed.226
Various units of the Carolingian expeditionary force in Italy, perhaps
30,000 or more effectives, many of whom undoubtedly were drawn from
Bernards army, were deployed to take the above-mentioned fortified cit-
ies north of the Po. As alluded to above, considerable information regard-
ing the difficulties in dealing with the military topography of this region
was available to the Carolingians from the detailed account provided by
Tacitus about operations undertaken by various Roman generals in 69
a.d. While the Carolingian third army, now perhaps under Bernards com-
mand, undertook the lengthy and sometimes delicate operations, e.g.
negotiated surrenders, in the north, Charlemagne returned to Pavia in
order to continue the prosecution of the siege of the Lombard capital.
However, as seen above, Charlemagne very likely returned south with only
a part of the force that he had brought north with him to Verona. It seems
probable that some elements had been detached to serve in the third
army.227
Back at Pavia
The six weeks or more that Charlemagne had spent in the north to under-
take the campaign against Verona likely were considered by King
223Stabilis was clearly a duke before the invasion, as indicated by V. Hadriani I, ch. 20.
AP. an. 776, who makes no mention of Stabilis having been appointed by Charlemagne as,
for example, AE, an. 776, mentions the Carolingian ruler as having appointed Hrodgaud.
224AE, an. 776, makes clear that Charlemagne placed a new duke, Hrodgaud, in office at
Friuli. Cf. Krahwinkler, Friaul, p. 119.
225See Sandor Soproni, Roads, in The Archaeology of Roman Pannonia, ed. A. Lengyel
and G. Radan (Budapest, 1980), 207218; and see Bowlus, Franks, map 1, for an easily acces-
sible diagram.
226Cf. Gasparri, Il passaggio, pp. 3536, with regard to various combinations.
227V.Hadriani I, ch. 34.
Desiderius as a window of opportunity during which the Carolingian siege

of Pavia might be undermined. Desiderius certainly had no reason to sur-
render to Charlemagne before the latter had proved the effectiveness of
the Carolingian army in the north. However, nothing would seem to have
happened to give the Lombard ruler any hope of having his position
relieved, with the possible exception of the escape of his son Adelchis
from Verona and the latters welcome by the Byzantines.228 Adelchis posi-
tive contacts with the Byzantines may perhaps have led Desiderius to
believe that there was a possibility of meaningful military intervention by
Emperor Constantine V.
Desiderius also likely had been informed, perhaps through the efforts of
his Bavarian son-in-law, Duke Tassilo, or by Adelchis, or even by Autchar,
that the Saxons had succeeded in seriously damaging Carolingian assets
in Hesse. In light of the success enjoyed by the Saxons, the Lombard king
may have believed that Charlemagne would have to retaliate sooner rather
than later. In fact, the Frankish ruler, Desiderius likely hoped, might find it
prudent to discontinue operations against the Lombards and withdraw
his forces from Italy. As military threats were understood during this
period, it likely was clear to Desiderius that Charlemagne needed to pun-
ish the Saxons, not only for the purpose of deterring future operations, but
also to assure his Frankish subjects that they had not been abandoned.
Charlemagne certainly would find it necessary, as well, to demonstrate
the effectiveness of his military leadership both to the magnates of his
newly-united kingdom, at least some of whom were still likely to have held
pro-Lombard sympathies, and also to his own soldiers. In short, Desiderius
could hope, and perhaps even reasonably expect, that the Carolingians
would not be able to maintain a lengthy siege of Pavia through the winter
of 773774 as Charlemagne might be persuaded to return to the regnum
Francorum to protect his reputation in light of the success of Saxon mili-
tary operations in Hesse. What Desiderius likely was loath to consider was
Charlemagnes option to demonstrate the effectiveness of his military
228ARF, an. 774; and AE, an. 774, when read in concert with V. Hadriani I, ch. 34, would
seem to indicate that Adelchis not only had escaped from Verona but was able to move in
and out of Pavia despite the close Carolingian siege. Autchar, as will be seen below, made
his way to Pavia at some point following the fall of Verona, and was accepted as an adviser
by the Lombard King. In addition, also as will be seen below, Desiderius held out until June
before he surrendered. This information provides a basis both for concluding that
Desiderius was informed about what had happened at Verona and that he had been
informed concerning Adelchis contacts with the Byzantines.
372 chapter five
leadership by capturing Pavia and taking control of the Lombard

kingdom.
By the end of November or early in December, when the siege of Pavia
had been underway for more than two months, Charlemagne likely
received something of a more accurate estimate of the losses that the
Carolingians had suffered as a result of the Saxon offensive in Hesse.229
Surely, he learned that the fortress of Eresburg, which he had captured in
772, had been retaken by the Saxons.230 The fortress at Braburg on the
Eder had been attacked and damaged, but not lost. Similarly, the fortified
monastic complex at Fritzlar had been attacked and damaged, but also
managed to hold out. The most serious losses, however, very likely were
the civilian casualties, i.e. the dead, the injured, and those made prisoner,
the burned villages, the dispossessed agricultural workers who fled west to
safety, and the looted farmsteads. These assets provided much of the mate-
rial sinew to sustain Carolingian settlement beyond the Rhine and to pro-
vide logistical support to supply Charlemagnes forces for advancement
further to the east into Saxon territory.231
Charlemagne understood, however, that a winter campaign against the
Saxons at this time and without extensive preparations of the type he had
made in 772 was neither a viable strategic option nor a sound tactical
course of action. In light of the logistical support mobilized by Pope
Hadrian, Charlemagne chose to remain in Italy and to hold his position at
Pavia until he had succeeded in the conquest of the Lombard kingdom. Or,
at the least, he would remain until he had accomplished enough in Italy so
that he could claim victory. Many of the northern cities already had fallen.
It was becoming increasingly unlikely as well that either Tassilo or the
Byzantines would come to Desiderius aid. In short, a firm decision was
made by Charlemagne that he would delay dealing with the Saxon situa-
tion until after he had returned home triumphantly from Italy.
Rather than encouraging a rapid march north through the Alps, the set-
back that the Carolingians had suffered at Saxon hands in Hesse very likely
229For an accurate picture of the extent and impact of Saxon operations to have
reached Charlemagnes headquarters in a month to six weeks after the campaign had
ended would have been exceptional because of the inventories or inquests that were nec-
essary in order to obtain these data.
230Saxon success in the capture of Eresburg went unremarked by the Carolingian
chroniclers who were content, as will be seen below, to concentrate on the Saxon failure to
capture Braburg and Fritzlar. However, as is clear from ARF, an. 775; AE, an. 775; AM. an.
775; and AMP, an. 775, that Eresburg was in Saxon hands following their offensive of 773,
and that Charlemagne had to recapture it during the Carolingian invasion of 775.
231ARF, an. 773; AE, an. 773; and Saxon Poet, bk. I, lines 132135.
strengthened Charlemagnes resolve to conquer the Lombard kingdom.

In light of the potential for more or less serious mischief that various fac-
tions of Carolingian magnates could generate, Charlemagne surmised that
he could ill afford to sustain two noteworthy military reverses in the course
of two successive campaigning seasons.232 A retreat from Italy without, at
the very least, bringing the Lombard king to his knees as Pippin had done
in both in 754 and 776, surely would have been regarded as an important
and perhaps even a major failure, not only throughout the regnum Fran
corum but also in Bavaria, Rome, and Constantinople. The specter of Caro
lingian losses in Hesse, coupled with a failure in Italy, undoubtedly were
seen at Charlemagnes headquarters, in the siege camp outside Pavia, as
having the potential to lead to unrest at home. In addition, two military
failures might well curtail Charlemagnes options in dealing with Car
lomans sons, who, as a result of the surrender of Verona, were now his
prisoners.233
Charlemagne maintained the siege of Pavia throughout December and
January and into the early spring.234 During this period, the Carolingians
bombarded the fortifications of Pavia with various types of artillery, and it
is even likely that they made probing forays against carefully selected sec-
tions of the wall. However, as a later though well-informed source put it:
Throughout the entire winter, the royal army laid siege to the stronghold
and in various ways undertook many efforts against the enemy. However,
the besieging force was not able to break through the walls by force of
arms.235 As Easter was on the horizon, Charlemagne would seem to have
concluded that the situation was a stalemate, and he decided to go to
Rome to consult with Pope Hadrian.236
232See the views of Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 766, for a perhaps somewhat
exaggerated view of aristocratic power, influence, and discontent.
233It is generally believed that Charlemagne spared the lives of the boys and their
mother Gerberga. See Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VII, 370.
234ARF, an. 773.
235See Saxon Poet, bk. I, ll. 128131 (773), whose sources are traditionally underesti-
mated by modern scholars. Indeed, Einhard (VK, ch. 6), who is supposed to have been the
Saxon Poets source, indicated that the Lombards were worn down by a lengthy siege.
236DK., no. 79, indicates that Charlemagne was encamped outside Pavia as late as
19 February 774.
CHAPTER SIX
THE FALL OF PAVIA AND ITS AFTERMATH
Once Charlemagne decided that he would go to Rome, the appropriate

diplomatic and logistic arrangements undoubtedly were made with
Pope Hadrian. Those troops of the Frankish army chosen to accompany
Charlemagne to Rome undertook a line of march south through Tuscany
and into the duchy of Spoleto. These were regions that likely already were
providing a substantial part of Carolingian logistic support for the siege of
Pavia. From there, Charlemagne went on to the Holy City for his prear-
ranged meetings with the pope. The timing of the journey was arranged so
that Charlemagne, his family, and the many soldiers who accompanied
him would be able to celebrate Easter at Rome.1
This journey to the Holy City likely was thought of as a pilgrimage by
many of the soldiers and also may have been considered in this way by
Charlemagne himself.2 The very positive role religion is understood to
have played in maintaining morale among Christian soldiers should not
be underestimated.3 In terms of reinforcing the legitimacy of the
Carolingian cause and the just nature of the war fought in the name of
God, a visit to Rome which obtained the blessing of the pope in person
likely served as an elixir to raise the spirits of Charlemagnes men, who had
been enduring a lengthy and dreary, if not particularly dangerous, siege at
Pavia. Boredom can, indeed, undermine military morale.
Charlemagne arrived in Rome to a very royal, indeed, an imperial style
welcome on 2 April 774.4 The elaborate adventus ceremony, orchestrated
1V. Hadriani I, ch. 35. Charlemagne arrived with a very large military force at Rome on
2 April 774. He had in his train his wife and two children; see ARF, an. 773; and AE, an. 774.
This journey of some 600 kilometers from Pavia to Rome over good Roman roads in winter
likely took no less than four-and-a-half weeks and probably somewhat longer. Planning for
the journey, therefore, had to have been begun by mid-February at the latest.
2Regarding the importance of Rome as a pilgrimage center in the early Middle Ages,
see the works cited by Harrison, The Early State, p. 79, n. 55; and Jonathan Sumption,
Pilgrimage: An Image of Medieval Religion (Towowa, NJ, 1975), 217220.
3AE, an. 774, wants his readers to believe that the one and only reason for Charlemagnes
journey to Rome at this time was for prayer.
4V. Hadriani I, ch. 35, indicates that when Charlemagne arrived at Novae, about 50 kilo-
meters from Rome, he was met by several units of the papal militia flying their unit ban-
ners. This was probably no later than 31 March and perhaps a day or two earlier since in the
the fall of pavia and its aftermath375
by Hadrian in the imperial tradition, certainly demonstrated to

Charlemagnes soldiers, who had been drawn from many parts of the reg-
num Francorum, the very great esteem in which their king was regarded by
the pope.5 For the first four days of his visit, 25 April, Charlemagne is
reported to have been kept busy in rounds of religious observance and
other ceremonies connected with the Eastertide.6 On Wednesday, 6 April,
solemn face-to-face diplomatic negotiations between Charlemagne and
Pope Hadrian took place. These were intended, at least from the popes
perspective, to redraw the political map of Italy.7
It is very likely that men who represented the two principals had been
discussing matters concerning the distribution of political power in Italy
at least since the arrival of the Carolingian party at Rome on 2 April. The
resulting agreement, often referred to by modern scholars as the the
Donation of Charlemagne, in fact, probably had been under consider-
ation by both Charlemagnes and the popes representatives at least since
the Carolingian invasion of Italy in September of 773 or very shortly there-
after.8 The Donation was finalized, in the traditional manner of such
agreements, by an exchange of oaths between Charlemagne and Pope
Hadrian on Holy Saturday.9
same chapter, it is made clear that Charlemagne was in Rome by 2 April. The suggestion by
Noble, The Republic, p. 139, following Bertolini, Roma e i longobardi, pp. 113114, that per-
haps the pope was making a show of force in what was an uncertain situation likely rests
upon a misunderstanding both of the order of magnitude of Charlemagnes army and of
the size of the popes field army. Of course, this could have been the popes error, despite his
undoubted awareness of the logistical resources that Charlemagnes army had been using
and of the Carolingians success at Chiusa and at Verona. It is more likely, however, that
notions of the potential for a military confrontation between Charlemagne and the pope
are the result of a misunderstanding of the situation by modern scholars.
The surprise that the pope is alleged to have experienced regarding Charlemagnes
speed in arriving at Rome (V. Hadriani, ch. 35) would seem to refer to the rapid movement
by the Carolingian column from Novae to Rome. This, however, may well be a literary con-
ceit of sorts intended by the author of the Vita to suggest that Charlemagne was so religious
and so eager to meet with the pope that he raced off to St. Peter at great speed.
5See McCormick, Eternal Victory, pp. 374375, with regard to the adventus and imitatio
imperii. The fact that Charlemagne drew soldiers from throughout his kingdom for the
journey to Rome permits the inference that he wanted it widely known, not only by
Austrasian Franks, how highly he was regarded by the pope.
6V. Hadriani I, chs. 3540. It is not my intention here to mute the general view that
Charlemagne was pious. See, for example, Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, p. 101. But cf.
the rather more nuanced treatment by Noble, The Republic, p. 139.
7I do not believe that Fasoli, Carlomagno, I, 131 exaggerates when she thinks ofthismeet
ing as playing a role in settling the fate of Italy, at least for much of the early Middle Ages.
8Noble, The Republic, pp. 139144, provides a good guide to the literature and sources
while effectively sidestepping the numerous controversies that he catalogues.
376 chapter six
These negotiations and their resolution require attention because of

their relation to the success of the Carolingian invasion and conquest of
the Lombard kingdom. Of particular note is Charlemagnes apparent guar-
antee to allocate to the papacy a great many fortress cities located through-
out northern Italy, along with the landed resources that pertained to
them. This was to be done in connection with the drawing up and estab-
lishment of specific borders between those lands that would remain under
Charlemagnes domination in his role as rex Langobardorum, succeeding
Desiderius (see below), and those that would be held directly by Rome.10
The total array of what are traditionally described as concessions by
Charlemagne were to have important consequences for future Carolingian
military operations in various parts of the peninsula and the islands,
i.e. Sardinia and Corsica.
In 754, Pippin had made several agreements with Pope Steven II; some
of the groundwork may, in fact, have been discussed as early as 750751 as
a prelude to the replacement of the Merovingian dynasty.11 Charlemagne
also subsequently accepted these agreements, and, as a result, received
the title of patricius Romanorum. This title was an indication of his posi-
tion regarding matters that concerned papal authority in Italy and his
commitment to use the armies of the regnum Francorum to defend the
papacy.12 Of particular relevance was Pippins earlier promise to the pope,
obviously contingent upon the establishment of a Carolingian as rex
Langobardorum, that the lands and peoples of the Lombard kingdom
eventually would be divided between the Carolingians and the papacy.13
In regard to matters directly connected to the Lombard kingdom, it was
agreed that the new Carolingian ruler would support, with appropriate
10V. Hadriani I, ch. 42. It is a bit perplexing, of course, to recall that according to the
thinking embodied in the Constitutum Constantini, chs. 1419, the entire Western half of
the empire had been given to the pope. Thus, why was it necessary for Charlemagne to
grant (concessit) any of this territory to Pope Hadrian? Charlemagne should merely have
handed over to the pope whatever the Carolingian army had captured, and the pope then
would grant back to the new Lombard king what the papacy regarded as appropriate.
Whatever Charlemagne may have granted to the pope was regarded by the author of
Hadrians Vita, and presumably by his papal master, as in the right of the legitimate
Carolingian monarch to grant. It seems, in fact, if not in law or title, that Charlemagne was
behaving as though he were already the emperor in the West.
11Noble, The Republic, pp. 8086, covers this ground very well with a full discussion of
the many and various scholarly points of view. See also Sefton, The Pontificate of
HadrianI, pp. 7176.
12Noble, The Republic, p. 87.
13See Paul Kehr, Sogennante karolingische Schenkung von 754, Historische Zeitschrift,
70 (1893), 385441; and Noble, The Republic, pp. 8586, for further discussion.
military force if and when necessary, the integration into the papal state of
the remnants of Byzantine territory in northern Italy. These guarantees
would appear to have included, among other regions, acquisition of both
the Ravennate and the Pentapolis.14 These promises and guarantees made
by Pippin, very early in his negotiations with the papacy and later accepted
by Charlemagne, provided the quid pro quo for the papal edict, which was
intended to assure the eternal kingship of the Carolingian dynasty.
Carolingian military forces, in the papal view, were to be St. Peters army in
Italy until the end of time.15
With regard to the Carolingian campaign in 773774, the Donation of
Charlemagne, from the Frankish perspective, promised to the papacy all
the lands to which it was legitimately entitled but which presently
were treated as part of the regnum Langobardorum. The northern border
of the Donation was to be located south of a line from the island of
Corsica and Luni extending to Sori, Mount Baronde, Berceto, Parma,
Reggio, Mantua, and Monselice.16 Interestingly, the natural northeastern
terminus of this frontier is Venice, which was still in Byzantine hands, and
does not seem to have been mentioned in the pact. In addition to the
places mentioned above as forming the Luni-Monselice line, fortress
cities such as Bologna and Modena presumably would be handed over
to the pope.17 Finally, the entire exarchate of Ravenna as it once existed,
i.e. including the Pentapolis, as well as the provinces of Venetiae and Istria,
and the entire duchies of Spoleto and Benevento would be given to
St. Peter.18
Why Charlemagne agreed to this accord with Pope Hadrian during
Easter of 774, which would severely diminish the material rewards of his
projected conquest of the Lombard kingdom, is, upon initial reading,
somewhat perplexing. However, it is obvious from Hadrians subsequent
behavior that Charlemagne, by making the above-mentioned guarantees
to St. Peter, provided the pope with sufficient encouragement to give the

16V. Hadriani I, ch. 42. The arguments by Sefton, The Pontificate of Hadrian I,
pp. 71100, that Charlemagne agreed that he would only see to it that the papacy got what
legitimately belonged to it solve some otherwise difficult problems.
17See Grimal, Roman Cities, pp. 132134, and 192193, for Bologna and Modena, respec-
tively with extensive bibliography.
18V. Hadriani I, ch. 42. N.b. there is considerable overlap or redundancy in these descrip-
tions because boundaries changed over time, and the papacy wanted to assure a maximum
territorial settlement in its own interest.
378 chapter six
Carolingians his maximum support.19 In the context of the Carolingians

apparently stalemated siege of Pavia, it seems reasonable to suggest that
Charlemagne needed all the help he could get from the pope in the near
term and that this was not confined to logistical supply. Charlemagne
needed more soldiers.
Pope Hadrians continued enthusiasm for Carolingian operations
against Pavia may well have hinged upon Charlemagnes Donation. Or to
put the matter another way, why would the pope exchange one king for
another without first being assured, as best as he could, that the new rex
Langobardorum would be a strong supporter of papal policy and, at the
same time, a reduced military threat to Rome? Hadrian may even have
contemplated withdrawing his support for the Carolingians at Pavia, or at
least the kings negotiators could possibly have been made aware of such a
contingency during Easter 774, if Charlemagne failed to accept papal
terms.
The withdrawal, or perhaps even the diminution, of papal logistical
support likely would place Charlemagnes army in a seriously disadvan-
taged position. He might be forced to raise the siege of Pavia and return
north of the Alps burdened in domestic matters by the perception that he,
unlike his father who had been very successful against the Lombards, had
suffered a crippling military and political defeat in Italy. Alternately,
Charlemagne, lacking proper logistical support, might have been impelled
to conclude that it was necessary to risk an all-out attack on the city
by storming the walls in force, a tactic that he had been avoiding for some
six months.
The Luni-Monselice line, which Charlemagne accepted, was a border
that had been established through a papal-Lombard treaty some time
before 640, but which subsequently had been ignored.20 With a Carolin
gian guarantee, i.e. the so-called Donation of Charlemagne, to establish
political boundaries in terms of this ancient treaty, Pope Hadrian would
see himself propitiously positioned in legal terms, at least, to order the
requisition of logistical support for Charlemagnes army from the cities of
Tuscany, mentioned above. In addition, and more importantly, the pope
also could order the mobilization of the expeditionary levies from these
cities, which now in legal terms theoretically were under papal jurisdic-
tion, for military service at Pavia. Charlemagne, it is suggested here, was
19Noble, The Republic, pp. 141144.

assured of Hadrians military support by the exchange of oaths on Easter

Saturday.21
Perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, Pope Hadrian
could mobilize expeditionary levies from the duchy of Spoleto. Hadrian
had established Hildeprand as duke of Spoleto, and the latter had recog-
nized his subordination to papal authority.22 The pope also could mobilize
military forces from dependencies such as Reiti, Fermo, Osimo, Ancona,
and Citt di Castello in order to support a Carolingian attack on the
Lombard capital. The leaders of these expeditionary forces had already
sworn allegiance to St. Peter following the debacle suffered by Desiderius
at Chiusa.23 Of course, Charlemagnes military forces, which had accom-
panied him to Rome, now were available in the region to provide such
encouragement as might be needed to the popes new subjects. Hadrian
not only could test the new treaty in both Carolingian and papal interests,
but also could begin to habituate Duke Hildeprand to his proper role as a
functionary of the Republic of St. Peter. Indeed, Pope Hadrian was not
loathe to imply in a letter to Charlemagne, written very shortly after the
conquest had been completed, that he had provided the key support for
the Frankish victory over the Lombards.24
The Carolingians, as seen above, already had a large army at Pavia.
However, as suggested above, the force was likely insufficient either to
assure victory by an all-out storming of the walls or to convince Desiderius
and those who defended the city under his command that surrender was
the only reasonable course of action. Early in the siege, Charlemagne
likely was not willing to risk the extensive casualties among his own forces
that would result from a general attack on the walls of Pavia. In such an
operation, moreover, a positive result could never be considered a cer-
tainty. Now with the continuance of assured sources of logistical support
for his troops and substantial reinforcements in the form of expeditionary
levies from various of the Italian cities mentioned above, which had been
secured through the negotiations that brought about the Donation,
Charlemagnes position at Pavia was much improved. In addition, the

22V. Hadriani I, chs. 32, 33. At least with regard to the position of Duke Hildeprand, the
parti pris of the Vita is sustained by Regesto di Farfa, no. 100, which begins with the recogni-
tion In nomine domini Temporibus ter beatissimi et coangelici domini Adriani pontifi-
cis et universalis papae.
23V. Hadriani I, ch. 33. See Noble, The Republic, pp. 241253, for a brief but useful sum-
mary of papal government outside of Rome.
24CC. no. 53.
380 chapter six
presence of levies from the cities of the Lombard regnum in Charlemagnes

army likely would have a significant negative effect on the morale of
Desiderius as well as on the morale of those who supported him at Pavia
and elsewhere.
It is likely that Charlemagnes army was augmented significantly
when he returned to the siege at Pavia toward the middle of May. A very
much romanticized and in some ways an obviously corrupt description by
Notker the Stammer, the monk of St. Gall, purports to detail Charlemagnes
approach to Pavia shortly before King Desiderius surrendered.25 This
account, along with Desiderius decision to surrender shortly after
Charlemagne returned to Pavia from Rome, lends support to the inference
that the Carolingian army had been increased substantially as a result of
the kings visit with Pope Hadrian. Notker places his account regarding the
immense size and strength of Charlemagnes army in the form of a dia-
logue between King Desiderius and Autchar, the Bavarian noble, who, as
seen above, already had played a remarkable role at the highest levels in
Carolingian affairs.26
Notker indicates that when these two men learned that the dreaded
Charlemagne was coming near, they went up into a high tower from which
they could see anyone approaching from far and wide. Thus when the
baggage train came into sight, which according to Notker, was moving
even more quickly than had those of Darius and Julius Caesar, Desiderius
is described as saying to Autchar: Is Charlemagne in the midst of that vast
array? and Autchar answered: Not yet.27 This first bit of information
25GK, bk. II, ch. 17, provides this information and its value is certainly suspect. However,
it is important to remember that Notker knew men who had served in Charlemagnes army
(bk. II, ch. 1), and that oral tradition, however distorted, often maintains a kernel of truth
over the course of a century. This point is developed by Andrew B. Gallia, Reassessing the
Cumaean Chronicle: Greek Chronology and Roman History in Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
JRS, XCVII (2007), 5067. Regarding a more general approach to this subject, see Jan
Vansina, Oral Traditions as History (Madison, 1985). However, it should be remembered
that Notkers abbot at Saint Gall was Grimald, who had served at Charlemagnes palace. See
Goldberg, Struggle for Empire, pp. 169170.
26GK, bk. II, ch. 17, purports to describe Charlemagnes initial advance on Pavia, i.e. in a
strict chronological sense this should be placed in the very late summer or early autumn of
773. However, Notker makes clear that Desiderius surrendered to Charlemagne only a short
time after this scene, which depicts the advance of the Carolingian army on Pavia. Thus, it
is suggested here that the scene being described at this point in the narrative is related to
Charlemagnes return to Pavia in mid-May or later, i.e. following his visit to Rome, and not
in regard to his initial advance on the city the previous September or October.
27GK, bk. II, ch. 17. The matter of Autchar, who in Notkers orthography is the
Germanised Otkar, is discussed below. It should be noted that Hermoldus, VL, depicts a
provided by Notker clearly is intended to inform the reader, hyperbole

notwithstanding, that the Carolingians were, in light of their impedimenta,
well-prepared to sustain their siege of Pavia.
Notker continues the story: When Desiderius saw the army, itself,
which had been mustered from all the peoples of the vast Carolingian
imperium, he asked Autchar precisely: Now is this Charlemagne moving
forward proudly in the middle of that great mass of troops? Autchar
answered: No, not yet, not yet. Then Notker describes Desiderius as
becoming agitated, and saying: What can we do if even more soldiers
come with him? Autchar is described as answering: When he arrives, you
will see what he is like. Indeed, Autchar is quoted as saying I do not know
what will happen to us.28 The theme of overwhelming force, i.e. the con-
centration of a vast number of troops on a specific target, is played out for
Notkers listeners and/or readers. The expected response of the Lombard
king, i.e. panic, is duly noted.
Then, as the two men continued to talk, Charlemagnes household
troops, i.e. the men who served in the scola, are reported to have come into
sight. Notkar claims that when the Lombard king saw this force, Desiderius
was stupefied and thus asked rhetorically: Is it Charlemagne this time?
But Autchar once again answered: No, not yet, not yet. Indeed, according
to the Gesta, Charlemagnes household troops were followed by the bish-
ops and the abbots and the clerics of the royal chapel, along with their
support staffs. At this point, Notker tells his readers that Desiderius began
to crack under the strain: he longed for death, he began to hate the
light of day, he sobbed and stammered, and he wanted to hide in
the earth because he could not face the fury of an enemy that was so
terrible.29
Notker goes on to explain that Autchar also was growing fearful because
in happier days he had been a military expert and very well-acquainted
with strategy and the composition of the siege trains of the incomparable
Charlemagne. In these few words, Notker has provided an accurate prcis
of Autchars military background as well as information that obviously
also was known to Desiderius, who earlier had a distinguished military
career. Notker has Autchar explain in a rather poetic manner the tactics
that Charlemagnes army could be expected to use: When you see the
similar conversation between the Muslim ruler of Barcelona and one of his advisers during
the siege of 801 undertaken by Louis the Pious.
28GK, bk. II, ch. 17.
29GK, bk. II, ch. 17.
382 chapter six
fields grown full with swords and shields, the waters of the Po and the
Ticino flowing over the walls of the city, with the sword, in black floods
then it is sure that Charlemagne has come.30 Thus, using the irresistible
flooding of rivers as a metaphor for the movement of Charlemagnes army,
Notker makes clear that the Carolingians will storm Pavia like an unstop-
pable, natural inundation, before which man, i.e. the Lombard king, is
helpless.
To end a lengthy story and siege on a more mundane note, it is clear that
the defenders of Pavia had suffered considerably both from disease and
from the probing attacks of Charlemagnes forces during the course of the
Carolingian investment. The strength of the Lombards to resist at Pavia
had been gradually sapped over the course of the eight-month siege. By
contrast, the Carolingian army appeared immense, as it likely had been
augmented, as suggested above, by reinforcements provided through the
efforts of Pope Hadrian.31
In the Western tradition chroniclers who favor the victor almost invari-
ably maintain, often contrary to fact, that a small force led by the authors
hero defeated a much larger enemy army.32 However, in this instance,
Notker, who emphasizes that he had access to information from men
who, many decades earlier, had served under Charlemagnes command,
describes the immense Carolingian army, with obvious exaggeration, as
cowing the enemy into surrender.33 Overwhelming force, not the epic
courage of the few against the many, is seen as the essence of prudence
and the formula for victory by modern strategists, e.g. Clausewitz, as well
as by Charlemagne and other medieval commanders.34
By the latter part of May 774, i.e. not long after Charlemagnes return
from Rome to Pavia, Desiderius decided that further resistance to the over-
whelming forces of the Carolingian army would be futile. As a result, early
in June, he agreed to surrender. Charlemagnes terms were harsh, but not
30GK, bk. II, ch. 17. N.b. the phrase translated above as the fields grown full with shield
[and] sword is segetem campis inhorrescere ferream, and is intended to make clear the
root meaning of seges as a marsh reed, i.e. sedge, as picked up in the notion of the rivers
below or merely grain, but with the clear connection to segestre (segestris) meaning a cov-
ering for a shield made either of reeds or leather.
31V. Hadriani I, ch. 44; Saxon Poet, ll. 151152; and Notker, GK, bk. II, ch. 17.
32Regarding the Western tradition, see Bachrach, Early Medieval Military Demography,
pp. 320.
33See GK, bk. I, ch. 34; bk. II, ch. 1, regarding Notkers discussion of how he obtained
information from men who had participated in Charlemagnes military operations.
34This theme is struck in regard to Charlemagnes armies by Verbruggen, Art of Warfare,
pp. 283284.
brutal. Desiderius was required to give up the Lombard throne, and no

later than Sunday, 5 June 774, Charlemagne already styled himself Carolus
Dei gratia rex Francorum et Langobardorum.35 The city of Pavia was
handed over formally to the Carolingians two days later, i.e. on Tuesday,
7 June. This surrender was orchestrated in a solemn celebration richly
adorned in the later Roman Christian imperial tradition, imitatio imperii
at work, with a liturgy of victory granted by God.36
It is also likely that it was at this time that Charlemagne took control of
the Lombard royal treasure.37 Following his formal acquisition of the trea-
sure, Charlemagne, as commander of the army, ordered, also in the Roman
tradition, that the moveable wealth of the Lombard king be divided among
the men in the victorious army. It seems fair to conclude from the
court sources that the rank and file professional soldiers as well as expedi-
tionary militia men all benefited.38 Perhaps most importantly, again fol-
lowing Roman tradition in regard to a city that surrendered on terms,
Pavia was not looted and the inhabitants were not abused. Obviously,
Charlemagne maintained command and control of his forces. The com-
paratively bloodless nature of the fall of the Lombard kingdom is noted by
contemporaries.39
Whether Desiderius, his wife Ausa, and their daughter became
Charlemagnes prisoners on 7 June, when the Carolingians entered Pavia,
or earlier cannot be ascertained.40 However, the surrender of their per-
sons to Charlemagne clearly was an important part of the pact of surren-
der (pactus deditionis).41 Apparently, it had been agreed, as well, that the
members of the erstwhile Lombard royal family who surrendered would
not be executed or even physically harmed, but, at worst, would suffer
long-term or permanent imprisonment. Thus, Desiderius and his family
soon were transported north to the regnum Francorum. There, Desiderius,
35DK, no. 80.

36CM., p. 295; and CSBC, p. 487.
37ARF, an. 774; AE, an., 774; ALaur. an. 774; Cathulfus, Epist., I.
38See, for example, ALM, an. 775, which indicates that Charlemagne handed over the
royal treasure to his exercitus. The theme that only the upper-class supporters of
Charlemagne benefited from war through the distribution of plunder is a favorite of Reuter,
Plunder and Tribute, pp. 7594, who uses this Marxist clich as a support for his primitiv-
ist views on early medieval warfare.
39ARF, an. 774; AE, an., 774; AL. an. 774; and Cathulfus, Epist., I, opulentissimam quo-
que civitatem etiam papiam cum rege sine cruoris cum omnibus thesauris eius
adprehendisti.
40Einhard, VK, ch. 6.
41ARF, an. 774; AE, an., 774; AL. an. 774; and Cathulfus, Epist., I.
384 chapter six
his wife, and daughter are generally believed to have been given over into
the custody of Abbot Adalfrid of St. Amand. So far as can be ascertained,
the entire family lived in close confinement in a monastic context until
each of them ultimately was taken by natural causes.42
The influential Bavarian magnate Autchar, whom Notker identifies as
Desiderius interlocutor and close advisor at Pavia, is reported by at least
one source also to have been sent into exile by Charlemagne following the
surrender of Pavia.43 The story, however, may well be more complicated.
As seen above, Autchar had been a close and valuable supporter of King
Pippin. Along with Abbot Fulrad, Autchar had demonstrated special
expertise in both Italian and Bavarian matters. After Pippins death in 768,
Autchar served in the retinue of Carloman. In that kings service, he
returned to Bavaria, where a part of his family was influential, and appar-
ently put his knowledge of papal interests and contacts at Rome to work in
an effort to bring about a close working relationship between his principal
and Duke Tassilo, and perhaps the pope as well.
When Carloman died, Autchar emerged as the leading figure of his erst-
while entourage, who was dedicated to furthering the interests of the dead
monarchs heirs. Autchar led Queen Gerberga and her sons first to the
papal court at Rome in order to have Pope Stephen stand as co-father to
young prince Pippin. Then he brought Carlomans widow and sons to
Pavia. Autchar served at Desiderius side in the aborted defense of the clu-
sae at Chiusa and then retreated along with the Lombard king to Pavia.
When Adelchis led his exercitus to Verona, which had excellent overland
connections to Bavaria, Autchar went along with Gerberga and her sons.
Following Adelchis flight from Verona and his decision to seek support
from the Byzantines at Epirus, Autchar arranged for the surrender of
Verona to Charlemagne. Afterwards, Autchar either was set free by
Charlemagne or escaped and once again joined Desiderius at Pavia. There,
he was again among those who surrendered to Charlemagne.
The career of Autchar outlined above raises some important questions
concerning Charlemagnes methods of operation. Since King Pippins
death, Autchar consistently had taken positions that cannot have pleased
Charlemagne. Autchar supported Carloman, worked closely with Tassilo,
led the effort of Gerberga and her sons to undermine the unification of the
regnum Francorum, and advised both Desiderius and Adelchis. Yet, when
42See ALob, pp. 228229; but cf. ASM, p. 75.

43CM., p. 295.
Charlemagne had the opportunity to deal decisively with Autchar, i.e. fol-
lowing his capture first at Verona and then at Pavia, the king would appear
to have been exceptionally lenient. Autchar, both because of his obvious
personal abilities and likely also because of his family connections both
in Bavaria and in the region of Fulda, undoubtedly was regarded by
Charlemagne as a very valuable man.
The reader, therefore, may wonder if there possibly can have been more
to this intriguing story than what is immediately obvious from the few bits
of factual information, outlined above, which now are available at a
remove of 12 centuries. Following the fall of Pavia, as already noted,
Charlemagne is reported to have exiled Autchar. The latter subsequently
returned to Bavaria, where he is seen to resume a major role as leader of
his familys interests and as an important member in the entourage of
Duke Tassilo. Yet, some years later, Tassilo fell from power in a bloodless
coup dtat, and the Bavarian duchy, which heretofore, had been virtually
autonomous for a generation, was absorbed rapidly and peacefully into
the regnum Francorum. In the wake of this substantial change in the
Bavarian political situation, Autchars family emerged as a major benefi-
ciary of the new order with important governmental offices and military
commands.44 By the late 8th century, Autchar himself was raised by
Charlemagne to high administrative and military office in the Avar wars.45
It is clear that throughout his career, Charlemagne was regarded as a
prudent and insightful judge of men and events. He was seen as a ruler
who knew how to lead men and to make the most of the opportunities
that presented themselves.46 However, in the case of Autchar, especially in
the context of the surrender of Gerberga and Carlomans sons at Verona,
was Charlemagne also the maker of opportunities? Did Autchar, who had
served Pippin and Carloman well, become Charlemagnes agent and
return to Pavia under orders to undermine Desiderius determination to
44See Erich Zllner, Zur Bedeutung der lteren Otachare fr Salzburg, St. Plten und
Wien, Neues Jahrbuch der heraldisch-genealogischen Gesellschaft 1 (19451946), 2139, for
the basic research, and the nuances provided by Bowlus, Franks, pp. 47, 52, 74, 7880, 86,
202206, 252, 306307.
45See the observations by Bowlus, Franks, p. 47, where Autchar is identified as co-com-
mander of Charlemagnes army that defeated the Avars at Ybbsfeld in 788, i.e. the year after
Tassilo was deposed. At that time, according to Bowlus (p. 74), Autchar likely was count of
the region between the Enns and the Wienerwald.
46Concerning Charlemagnes personality, see Janet Nelson, Charlemagne the Man, in
Charlemagne, Empire and Society, ed. Joanna Story (Manchester, 2005), 2237, with the lit-
erature cited there. Cf. the image that emerges from F.L. Ganshof, Charlemagne, Speculum,
XXIV (1949), 520527, and reprinted in idem, The Carolingians, pp. 1727.
386 chapter six
resist, i.e. to influence the Lombard king toward capitulation? This,

after all, is the thrust of the conversation which Notkar constructed
between the Bavarian magnate and the Lombard king. Did Autchar remain
Charlemagnes agent once he returned to Bavaria and there work to
undermine Tassilos position in the 780s? Whether as a highly placed
royal agent or merely as the beneficiary of Charlemagnes foresight,
Autchars career casts considerable light on the kings ability to take
advantage of potentially useful people when the circumstances were
propitious.47
As soon as Pavia was in Carolingian hands and Charlemagne had
assumed the Lombard royal title, he sent high ranking royal envoys (comi-
tes) as missi dominici to all of the Lombard officials in the fortress cities
and other strongholds that already had surrendered as well as to those
places that had not yet capitulated.48 The message that Charlemagnes
missi delivered required those who had not yet surrendered to open the
gates of their fortifications or face the Carolingian army. In light of
Charlemagnes need to return home to deal with the Saxons this perhaps
was a threat that would not be realized immediately. Nevertheless, as will
be seen below, there are reports, perhaps exaggerated, that capitulation
was ubiquitous.
Consequently, Charlemagnes missi ordered all important officials, both
those from cities that previously had submitted to the Carolingians as well
as those from the cities which capitulated only after Desiderius surrender,
to submit themselves to the new rex Langobardorum at Pavia. According
to all reports, none of the Lombard dukes or other high officials chose to
47It should be emphasized that highly-placed and successful agents are known to have
gone unnoticed in Frankish affairs for a long time. For an early medieval high-level agent,
i.e. Archbishop Egidius of Rheims, who ultimately was caught and exposed, see the discus-
sion by Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 4550, 7881, 151.
48AP. an. 774 (p. 16), is usually misunderstood to be providing an erroneous reference
to Charlemagne putting Carolingian counts as administrators in all of the newly-acquired
cities. See the discussion by Donald Bullough, The Regnum Italiae in the Carolingian
Period, PBSR, XXIII (1955), 151, who certainly is correct in emphasizing that Charlemagne
gradually introduced new local administrative cadres throughout the regnum Langobar
dorum during a period of some two decades.
Nb. ARF, an., 774, makes clear (see below) that large numbers of Lombards came to Pavia
to submit themselves to Charlemagne in the wake of Desiderius deposition. These jour-
neys could hardly have been the result of a spontaneous and serendipitous intuition on the
part of large numbers of people. In short, it must be assumed that these Lombards who
went to Pavia were acting on the basis of orders delivered by Charlemagnes envoys. Here it
is argued simply that the term comes is used to describe these envoys. For the wide variety
of uses for the term comes by the early Carolingians dating back to the reign of King Pippin
I, see Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 912.
hold out, and all of the cities subjected themselves to Charlemagne.49 This
act of formal submission, recorded in the chronicles, undoubtedly required
some sort of ceremony which included an oath. In fact, it would seem that
several oaths were given by particularly important officials to the new
Lombard king.50
At this time, Charlemagne, as rex Langobardorum, appears to have
made only minimal changes in the administrative organization of the
kingdom and its personnel. The author of the Royal Annals is satisfied to
describe whatever changes that took place with the laconic observation
that Italy was subiugata et ordinata by Charlemagne.51 In terms of
personnel, those high-ranking officials, e.g. dukes, who had opposed the
Carolingians were replaced. Also, as noted above, the bishop of Verona
seems to have been replaced. Charlemagne also saw it as necessary to send
the bishops of Pisa, Lucca, and Reggio Emilia into exile.52 It is not clear
whether Charlemagne replaced the secular authorities in Lucca and
Reggio Emilia, but it is clear that Duke Alo was left in place at Pisa.53 At
lower levels of the Lombard administration, some functionaries likely also
were expelled from office. Most of these changes are not documented
until later, and, therefore, it is difficult to date them exactly. In regard to
military matters, Charlemagne placed Frankish garrisons in many impor-
tant places. For example, he established a Carolingian garrison (custodia
Francorum) at the capital city of Pavia, which he handed over to Frankish
iudices to administer.54
More subtle efforts, however, also were undertaken. Anselm, the abbot
of Nonantula, who had been forced into exile by Desiderius, was restored
to power by Charlemagne. This, however, had significant military implica-
tions because Anselm, prior to becoming a monk and abbot, had been
duke of Friuli and a military commander of some note. In addition, his
49ARF, an., 774. While this source is certainly biased in favor of Charlemagne, it is
hardly likely that any Lombard official was, in fact, foolish enough to resist after the fall of
Pavia, and, in addition, find sufficient numbers of men to support him to make such resis-
tance credible.
50ARF, an., 775, indicates that at least one duke, Hrodgaud of Friuli, gave several oaths,
or sacramenta, to Charlemagne. See Ganshof, Charlemagnes use of the oath, pp. 111124,
for the background. N.b. Ganshof does not deal with the oaths taken by Lombard officials
at Pavia in 774. Fouracre, Conflict, pp. 326, does not treat the process by which
Charlemagne legitimated his succession to the Lombard throne.
51ARF, an., 774.
52CC., no. 50.
53CC., no. 50.
54ARF, an., 774; and CM., p. 295. See, in addition, CC, no. 55, where Pope Hadrian refers
to the judices whom Charlemagne had placed in Pavia.
388 chapter six
sister Giseltruda, had been the wife of King Aistulf.55 Finally, the monas-
tery of Nonantula was strategically located only 20 kilometers east of
Modena and 30 kilometers north-northwest of Bologna, i.e. virtually
astride the via Emilia with all of the communication and transportation
benefits conferred by that geographical position for a Carolingian army
operating in the northern part of the peninsula.
Rewards to loyal supporters certainly were in order. In contrast to the
monastery of St. Zeno at Verona, which, as already noted, suffered because
of its opposition to Charlemagne, the new king of the Lombards made
clear his personal debt of gratitude and sentiments of amicitia to those
who had supported him. As mentioned above, Charlemagne gave exten-
sive resources to the monasteries of Bobbio and Farfa. These gifts had
long-term importance regarding the overall wealth of these houses.
However, they are not to be understood solely as rewards for the support
and service that Farfa and Bobbio had provided to the Carolingian war
effort during the conquest. These gifts were intended to help sustain the
capacity of these monasteries to provide military support for future
Carolingian operations in Italy. As the principals, i.e. Charlemagne, the
relevant royal officials, and the abbots of both monasteries all understood,
in the normal course of events, future Carolingian military operations
in Italy would be necessary. It should be noted, however, that neither
Farfa nor Bobbio were immediately given immunities at this time. This
was hardly problematic, since Novalesa only was granted immunities
after having been in the mouvance of the Carolingians for at least a
half-century.
Following the fall of Pavia and his assumption of the Lombard royal
title, Charlemagne also provided landed estates and other resources in
Italy to Frankish monasteries. Like the gifts to Bobio and Farfa discussed
above, these too were intended to strengthen Carolingian military organi-
zation in northern Italy. For example, the monastery of St. Martin at Tours
was given a substantial parcel of valuable land along with the island for-
tress (castellum) at Sirmione on Lake Garda, north of Verona.56 This strate-
gically-located stronghold had been a Roman naval base organized to
55The sources are V. Anselmi, esp. chs. 5 and 6; and Cat. Abbatum, p. 571. For basic work
on Anselm, see Karl Schmid, Anselm von Nonantola. Olim dux militum-nunc dux mona-
chorum, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, XLVII
(1967), 1122; and the observations by Krahwinkler, Friaul, pp. 6466.
56DK, no. 81. N.b. earlier documents refer to the fortifications at Sirmione as a castrum
and the land mass itself clearly as a peninsula. See, for example, Christie, From Constantine
to Charlemagne, p. 461.
sustain operations on Lake Garda and its environs. The base was protected
by a stone wall with a circuit of some 3,000 meters.57 At this time,
St. Martin also was given extensive lands located in the region between
Pavia and Padua along the Roman route east through Verona to the
Byzantine-controlled port at Venice.58 The stronghold at Sirmione likely
was established as the headquarters for St. Martins administration of
these resources.59
It is important that Gulfardus, the abbot of St. Martin, was provided
with an immunity with regard to these lands. As a result, local government
officials, who at this time largely were earlier Lombard appointees, were
not permitted to interfere with the administration of the monasterys
lands and particularly with their mobilization of resources for Carolingian
military operations. In short, the officials of St. Martin were to control the
mobilization of logistic support and the levying of local militia forces on
the lands held by the monastery.60 This award is in marked contrast to
Charlemagnes gifts to Bobbio and Farfa, and illustrates the kings pru-
dence in giving greater authority to long-trusted officials, e.g. the abbot of
St. Martin, while giving less authority to newly-acquired allies.
The monastery of St. Martin, with these new holdings in the Lombard
kingdom, was firmly integrated into Charlemagnes system of military
organization in northern Italy. St. Martin thus joined the monastery of
Novalesa and the bishop of Chur-Raetien, discussed above, as part of the
logistical and mobilization apparatus that was being structured to support
Carolingian military and administrative operations in Italy. As will be seen
below, the abbey of Farfa, which received lands from Charlemagne at this
57See Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, pp. 173, 314, 341343, with fig. 65,
which provides a very helpful map of the area and the outline of the fortress walls; and fig.
66, which provides a photograph of remains of these formidable stone walls. Christie
(p. 385) calls attention to late Roman military tombs at Sirmione. For a more general appre-
ciation of the strategic importance of this position, see Wilhelm Strmer, Zur strategischen
Bedeutung der Veroneser Klause und des Gardasees fr die Italienzge deutscher Knigs
im Hochmittelalter, in Geschichte und ihre Quellen: Festschrift fr Friedrich Hausmann zum
70 Geburtstag, ed. R. Hrtel (Graz, 1987), 2126.
58DK., no. 81.
59Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, p. 343, notes that the fortress at Sirmione
had been the center of an extensive iudiciara under the Lombards and that likely it had
served the same purpose under the Romans. For more detailed study of the early period of
the judiciara, see Gaetano Panazza, Judiciaria sermionense, e alcuini suoi reperti scul-
toreo-acrchitettonici, in Verona in et gotica e longobarda (Verona, 1982), 267282.
60DK., no. 81. Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, p. 387, apparently does not
understand the Carolingian military system and asserts, In Sirmiones case the district or
at least its role was demilitarized after 774 by its transfer into the possession of the monks
of St. Martin of Tours.
390 chapter six
time, also would soon be integrated into Charlemagnes system of military

organization for Italy. Immunities similar to those given to St. Martin
would be provided to Farfa, which was to be controlled by Frankish abbots
appointed by the new rex Langobardorum.61
In contrast to these various awards, Charlemagnes extensive gifts to
Archbishop Leo of Ravenna are somewhat perplexing. This support for
Archbishop Leo, about which we learn from Pope Hadrians complaints,
amounted to control over several cities in Emilia, i.e. Faenza, Forlimpopuli,
Forli, Cesena, Bobio (Sarcina), Comacchio, the duchy of Ferrara, Imola,
and Bologna, as well as the entire Pentapolis. If the author of Pope
Hadrians Vita is to be believed, Leo claimed that Charlemagne had exe-
cuted this package of gifts soon after the conquest. In fact, the archbishop
placed his officials throughout the cities of Emilia and the Ravennate and
sent his missus, Theophylactus, to the Pentapolis to secure that region.62
Although Leo claimed that Charlemagne had given him control of the
above-mentioned assets, Hadrian wrote to Charlemagne making clearthat
Archbishop of Ravenna was not telling the truth. It was Hadrians argu-
ment that these assets had been part of the Donation of Charlemagne
and, therefore, the new Lombard king could not have executed such a gift
to Leo.63
It is clear from the information that has survived that Charlemagne, in
fact, executed this gift and therefore is seen to have favored Archbishop
Leo at the expense of Hadrian in a manner that certainly appears to have
been contrary to the popes view of the Donation. It may well be that
Charlemagne had no intention of resting the security of the Carolingian
conquest of the Lombard kingdom, especially in the northeast, only upon
the good will and limited military assets available to the pope. Leo had
been a strong supporter of the Carolingians, perhaps in response to the
fact that he had been placed on the archiepiscopal throne of Ravenna by
Charlemagnes military forces. No less importantly, the prelate would
seem to have played an important role in providing information that
had helped Charlemagnes forces bypass the Lombard defenses at Chiusa
in 773.
61See, DK., nos. 98, 99, for Charlemagnes awards to Farfa in 775.
62CC., no. 49, and additionally nos. 50 and 51. It is not at all clear whether Charlemagne
met with Leo or his representatives at Pavia or shortly thereafter. However, it seems rather
unlikely that the archbishop based a major policy initiative, which he knew certainly
would not be accepted gracefully by Pope Hadrian, upon a complete fabrication that
Charlemagne, among others, easily could expose.
63CC., no. 49, 50, 51.
As seen from the vantage point of the Carolingian court, the popes
complaints concerning Charlemagnes behavior in the Ravenna matter are
implied to have been without justification. Charlemagne, in fact, is cred-
ited by two Carolingian accounts, which undoubtedly are no less biased
than the account in Hadrians Vita, with having been very generous to the
papacy at this time. Einhard observes that Charlemagne restored to
the Romans everything that had been taken from them.64 In a similar vein,
the author of the Annales Petaviani indicates that Charlemagne happily
returned (reddidit) to St. Peter the civitates that he was obligated to
return.65 Both Einhard and the anonymous annalist would seem to be
saying, but without a specific mention of the Donation itself, that
Charlemagne had fulfilled the promises that he made to the pope at Rome
during Easter week 774.
The accuracy of the papal sources is certainly problematic in light of
Hadrians complaints during the subsequent decade regarding the
Carolingian failure to carry out the terms of the Donation to Rome.66
Nevertheless, it is likely, in this context, that reddidit should be taken to
mean that Charlemagnes staff either provided the paperwork or approved
the necessary documentation, drawn up by the papal writing office, which
would enable Hadrians officials to administer the civitates mentioned
above.67 The question may perhaps arise in this context, i.e. in the late
spring of 774, regarding how far Charlemagnes writ ran in the newly con-
quered regions where papal, as contrasted to Carolingian gains, were at
issue.68
In the wake of his victory in Italy, Charlemagne surely appreciated
the fact that he enjoyed a great success in dealing with those figures
who had caused him problems in 773. Carlomans wife and sons are
seen to disappear from historical sight following their capture at Verona.
So far as can be ascertained, they never again were to reappear. The
Lombard royal family was imprisoned, and Autchar was sent into exile,
only to reappear later in roles very useful to Charlemagne. Nevertheless,
Charlemagnes success was far from total. Adelchis escaped.69 Desiderius
64VK, ch. 6. N.b. this observation is placed between the flight of Adelchis following the
fall of Pavia and the subjugation of Duke Hrodgaud of Friuli which took place in 776.
65An. 774 (p.16), laetus sancto Petro reddidit civitates quas debuit.
66See the discussion by Sefton, The Pontificate of Hadrian I, pp. 71100.
67AP, an. 774 (p.16).
68Classen, Karl der Grosse, pp. 1516, concludes that Charlemagne made promises to
Pope Hadrian I regarding the return of territory to the papacy that he never fulfilled.
69ARF, an. 774.
392 chapter six
son and co-ruler slipped out of Pavia sometime before his father surren-
dered. From there, Adelchis made his way to Pisa, where, with Byzantine
naval support, he reached Constantinople.70 There, he was royally wel-
comed, i.e. honored by the emperor, Constantine V, who granted him the
title of patricius. Clearly, the Byzantine government intended at some
future time to use Adelchis to further east-Roman interests in Italy when
an appropriate opportunity might arise.71
The Journey Home
The steps taken by Charlemagne to secure the Carolingian position in

Italy, at least in the short term, likely were completed by mid-July, when
the Frankish army began the long trek north.72 At this time, Charlemagne
had several major concerns. First, he was intent upon maintaining the
continued peaceful unification of the regnum Francorum. Now that
Carlomans sons were no longer a factor, the task likely would not be per-
ceived at the royal court to be as difficult as before Charlemagne left home
a year earlier. Secondly, Charlemagne knew that he had to punish the
Saxons for their devastating raid into Hesse. In light of his involvement in
Italy, he may even have reconsidered whether he wanted to continue to
pursue his new strategy, which required the conquest the Saxon territory
and its integration into the regnum Francorum. Finally, as he looked
toward the more distant future, he was undoubtedly aware that as the
ruler of two kingdoms, he had fulfilled one of the more important require-
ments for elevation to imperial status.73 He also understood, however, that
this could be done only with the ideological, administrative, and material
70PCR, ch. 7, is probably incorrect in declaring that Adelchis fled from Verona to Pisa.
Rather, it is likely that this account is a corrupted version of Adelchis second escape,
i.e. from Pavia to Pisa.
71ARF, an. 774. The use of men such as Adelchis was and continued to be basic Byzantine
policy for centuries. See Bachrach, Anatomy, passim.
72The chronology is treated in Appendix One.
73For the background, see two studies by Steven Fanning, Jeromes Concept of Empire,
in Images of Empire, ed. Loveday Alexander (Sheffield, 1991), 239250; and Bede, Imperium,
and the Bretwaldas, Speculum 66 (1991), 122. See also Robert Folz, The Concept of Empire
in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century, trans. S.A. Ogilvie (New York,
1969), p. 17, with regard to Charlemagnes adviser Alcuin. Concerning the Carolingians spe-
cifically, see Janet Nelson, The Lords Annointed and the Peoples Choice: Carolingian
Royal Ritual, in Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies, ed. David
Cannadine and Simon Price (Cambridge, 1987), 137180; and reprinted in eadem, The
Frankish World, 750900 (London-Rio Grande, 1996), 99131.
support of the pope and the mobilization of resources, both directly con-
trolled and indirectly influenced, by the Republic of St. Peter.74
As Charlemagne began the lengthy journey back across the Alps, his
advisers already were developing plans to further efforts aimed at the inte-
gration of the regnum Francorum under his unified rule. A calendar was
being established for the peregrination of the royal court, especially in
parts of Neustria which originally had been a part of Carlomans regnum
according to the Divisio of 768. In addition, prominent lay and ecclesiasti-
cal magnates were being contacted to attend the royal court at particular
times during this royal peregrination. In military perspective, plans were
underway for an extended campaign into Saxon territory. These, as will be
seen below, were to begin with a series of reconnaissances in force shortly
after Charlemagne and the royal entourage reached Frankish territory.
The Saxon Problem
Late in 773, as noted in the previous chapter, while Charlemagne was

undertaking what would be a lengthy investment of Desiderius in the
Lombard capital of Pavia, reports reached his siege camp from Francia
concerning the Saxon invasion of Hesse earlier in the year. Various groups
of Saxons had taken the field in what would appear to have been a coordi-
nated flurry of operations aimed at the capture and/or destruction of both
Carolingian military and civilian assets in the region of the Fulda Gap. This
Saxon military offensive, in light of its size and complexity, undoubtedly
had been orchestrated by the decision-makers at the Marklo general coun-
cil in consonance with the description, above, of Saxon constitutional
procedures.
As Charlemagne learned while in Italy, a very large Saxon army had
invaded Hesse late in the campaigning season of 773, likely in September
or perhaps even in October.75 The conclusion is ineluctable that the
Saxons held back this offensive not only until Charlemagne had commit-
ted his armies to invade Italy, but also until he had deployed his forces to
besiege Pavia. As Charlemagne also undoubtedly understood, a Saxon
invasion late in the campaigning season under these circumstances made
it impossible for him to respond effectively. He lacked the proper military
74With regard to the ideological aspects of this process, see Bachrach, Charlemagnes
Military Responsibilities, pp. 234240.
75ARF, an. 773; and AE, an, 773; for the large size of the Saxon army.
394 chapter six
organization to order the muster of a second major army, which could be

mobilized from within the regnum Francorum and sent into Hesse. He also
knew that personally, he could not lead a counteroffensive by redeploying
troops from Italy into Saxon territory during the remainder of the cam-
paigning season of 773 without undermining his prospects for a victory
over Desiderius.
Saxon Operations in Southern Hesse
The large Saxon army that invaded Hesse was divided into three corps. It
is likely that each of these major units was mobilized from among the
expeditionary levies of the various Gaue and from the military households
of the magnates who dwelled in one of the three Saxon regions, i.e.
Westphalia, Ostphalia, and Angraria. In light of the deployment of these
troops during the campaign, it is clear that each of these corps was capa-
ble of being subdivided into several smaller units. Such subunits likely
were drawn from among the men of one or another specific Gau, such as
Bckegau, Bardengau, or Weissgau, and were commanded by their respec-
tive satraps. As judged from the extent of the region under attack, i.e. some
40,000 square kilometers, in which a great many villages and farmsteads
are reported to have been devastated with fire and sword, it is likely that
numerous subunits of Saxon military forces were able to operate indepen-
dently throughout the Hesse district of the Fulda gap.76
As Charlemagne learned, the main Saxon military operations, as con-
trasted to attacks on civilian assets, focused on Carolingian fortifications.
76ARF, an. 773; AE, an, 773; and Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, chs. 2324 (pp. 160161), which tele-
scopes two invasions. There were a large number of Frankish settlements scattered
throughout the region. The size and disposition of these targets required that the Saxons
divide at least one of their corps into smaller units in order to attack these widely separated
places. Regarding Frankish settlement east of the middle Rhine, useful guides to the litera-
ture are provided by Johannes Ramackers, Die rheinischen Aufmarschstrassen in den
Sachsenkriegen Karls des Grossen, Annalen des historische Verein Westfallen, 142143
(19431951), 127; Karl Heinemeyer, Der Knigshof Eschwege in der Germar-Mark:
Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Knigsgutes im hessisch-thuringischen Grenzgebiet
(Marburg, 1970); Schlesinger, Early medieval, pp. 243260; Hans-Jrgen Nitz, Feudal
Woodland colonization as a strategy of the Carolingian Empire in the conquest of Saxony
reconstruction of the spatial pattern of expansion and colonist settlement in the Leine-
Weser region, in Villages, Fields and Frontiers, ed. B.K. Roberts and R.E. Glasscock (Oxford,
1983), 171184; idem, The Church as colonist, pp. 280321; Parsons, Sites and Monuments,
pp. 280321; and Matthias Hardt, Hesse, Elbe, Saale and the Frontiers of the Carolingian
Empire, in Transformations of the Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed.
Walter Pohl, Ian Wood, and Helmut Reimitz (Leiden, 2001), 219232.
These military targets were the fortress at Eresburg, which the Saxons had
lost to the Carolingians the previous year, and strongholds at Braburg
and Fritzlar on the Eder river. At least one Saxon corps was deployed to
attack Eresberg, which would appear to have been taken early in the cam-
paign, perhaps by storm.77 However, a siege with the use of artillery can-
not be ruled out, since the Saxons are seen to have learned how to construct
and operate traction catapults.78 The victors then regarrisoned Eresburg
with Saxon troops.79 The fate of the Carolingian garrison went unremarked
in Frankish accounts of the campaign. Thus, it is rather likely that most, if
not all, of the men whom Charlemagne had stationed there the previous
year, were lost.80 Such lacunae in our information, however, are to be
expected as the Carolingian annalists, in general, are prone to avoid men-
tioning the unpleasant details which usually accompany defeat when they
discuss Charlemagne at war.81
Before the Saxons advanced against the fortress at Eresburg, it was
necessary for them either to destroy or to capture the Carolingian
castrum likely at Herstelle. This stronghold, discussed above briefly, which
Charlemagne originally had built as a marching camp, was located at the
confluence of the Diemel and the Weser Rivers. It not only controlled
the river crossing, where the Franks had negotiated the treaty of 772
with the commanders of a Saxon relief force, but obviously stood along
the line of march from Saxon territory, to the north and east of the Weser,
and to Eresburg, further to the west. If the Saxons chose to bypass this
fortification at Herstelle, they not only would be endangering their lines of
77The Saxon success in the capture of Eresburg went unremarked by the Carolingian
chroniclers, who were happy, as will be seen below, to concentrate on the Saxon failure to
capture Braburg and Fritzlar. However, as is clear from ARF, an. 775; AE, an. 775; AM. an.
775; and AMP, an. 775, Eresburg was in Saxon hands following their offensive in 773 and
remained in Saxon hands until Charlemagne recaptured it during the Carolingian offen-
sive of 775.
78As will be seen below, the Saxons learned how to construct and operate catapults,
which could be deployed for the purpose of bombarding Carolingian fortifications. See the
discussion by Carroll Gillmore, The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet into the West,
Viator, 12 (1981), 18.
79ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775; AM. an. 775; and AMP, an. 775.
80N.b. the author of the ASM, an. 776, makes a point of mentioning that the Carolingian
garrison at Eresburg got home safely after the fortress was surrendered to the Saxons in
that year. In short, good news in a bad situation is not ignored.
81ARF, an. 772; and AE, an, 772, for example, record Charlemagnes capture of Eresburg
in 772. Then the authors of these same Annales for the years 775 record Charlemagnes
capture of the same stronghold from the Saxons once again. What happened at Eresburg
between these two Carolingians victories is left for the reader to infer. Or to put it another
way, both authors demonstrate a bias against recording setbacks suffered by Charlemagne.
396 chapter six
communication, but also the free movement of supplies and reinforce-

ments across the Weser. As with Eresburg, however, there is no mention in
the sources regarding the loss of Herstelle. This also is perhaps to be
expected in light of the parti pris of the Carolingian sources.82
The most difficult target that the Saxons faced, however, would appear
to have been the very formidable stone fortifications that were located at
Braburg on the Eder River. It was against this stronghold that the third
Saxon corps was deployed. This fortress town had been built earlier in
the century, and once had served as an episcopal administrative center
with its own bishop.83 In the autumn of 773, Braburg anchored the
82ARF, an. 772; AE, an. 772; and AMP, an. 772. N.b. I have continued to use the word
castra, i.e. a marching camp, which is found in the sources. However, after Charlemagne
moved the main body of his troops out of the region and the installation ceased to be a
marching camp, it is likely that the stronghold should be thought of as a castrum, or per-
haps a castellum. Needless to say, the same Carolingian writers, who say nothing of the fate
of the Frankish garrison at Eresburg, remain silent regarding the fate of Herstelle and its
custodes.
83According to the most thorough archaeological studies, Braburg is considered to
have been a stone fortification by the reign of Charlemagne, if not earlier. See on this mat-
ter several works by Norbert Wand: Die Braberg-ein frnkische Grossburg zum Schutz
des Edergebietes, in Fritzlar im Mittelalter: Festschrift zur 1250-Jahrfeier (Fritzlar, 1974),
4158; Die Braburg bei Fritzlar: oppidum-Bischofssitz in karolingerische Zeit Marburg,
1974); Die Braburg und das Fritzlar-Waberner Becken der merowingisch-karolingischen
Zeit, in Althessen im Frankreich, ed. Walter Schlesinger (Sigmaringen, 1974), 173210; and
Die Braburg bei Fritzlareine frnkische Reichsburg mit Bischofssitz in Hessen, in
Frhmittelalterlicher Burgenbau in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Tagung, Nitra vom 7 bis 10 Oktober,
1996, ed. Joachim Henning and Alexander T. Ruttkay (Bonn, 1998), 177188, which still com-
mand our respect.
In this context, I was dismayed by the methodologically suspect efforts embraced by
Joachim Henning, who employs inconclusive and ambiguous information discovered in
his recent work on Braburg as evidence to redate the stone fortifications to ca. 900. See
Joachim Henning, Civilization versus Barbarians? Fortification Techniques and Politics in
the Carolingian and Ottonian Borderlands, in Borders, Barriers, and Ethnogenesis: Frontiers
in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Turnhout, 2005), 2629; and Joachim Henning and
Richard I. MacPhail, Das karolingerzeitliche Oppidum Braburg: Archologische und
mikromorphologische Studien zur Funktion eine frmittelalterliche Bergbefestigung in
Nordhessen, in Parerga Praehistorica: Jubilumsschrift zur Prhistorischen Archologie15
Jahre UPA, ed. Bernhard Hnsel (Bonn, 2004), 221251.
Henning argues that the first fortification at Braburg was constructed of wood.
However, he provides no dendrochronological evidence regarding a date for this suspected
initial wooden palisade. On the basis of several radiocarbon samples, however, Henning
dates the palisade to the early Middle Ages. He presents no archaeological information
that permits the dating of this palisade to 722723, when Boniface is known to have had a
stronghold constructed at Braburg. These radiocarbon samples, which Henning can only
date to the early Middle Ages, permit a construction date as many as two centuries prior
to Bonifaces work. Finally, the erosion pattern at Braburg, as demonstrated by the labora-
tory studies done at the University of London, makes clear that no help may be obtained
for dating from stratification. In short, there is no reason to believe that Bonifaces fortifica-
tion was not built of stone and that the wooden defenses long pre-dated it. Hennings bald
southeastern sector of the newly-created Carolingian strategic limes that

had been put in place the previous year with the capture of Eresburg. This
strategy was being developed for the immediate purpose of securing con-
trol of the Fulda Gap west of the Weser. The road from Braburg to
Eresburg, which had been further developed by the march of Charlemagnes
army in 772, was the obvious route for the Saxon army to take as it began
its deployment to the west and south.
The circuit walls at Braburg measured approximately 1100 meters and
enclosed an area of some 80,000 square meters.84 According to the defen-
sive thinking that was prevalent during the early Middle Ages and consis-
tent with the available technology, an armed force somewhat in excess of
900 fighting men with the firepower that could be provided by bows and
arrows and crossbows was required minimally for the defense of the walls
alone. Thus, if Braburg were defended by some 9001000 effectives, the
Saxons would have required an attacking force in the neighborhood of
4,000 men, at a minimum, in order to provide a credible threat to storm
the walls successfully. However, even with another 5001000 men avail-
able to undertake an escalade, the Saxons could not be assured of taking
Braburg by storm since there are many intangibles in military operations,
and these cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty.85
Saxon military operations throughout the countryside, mentioned
above, are reported to have terrified the settlers who lived in the frontier
region. As a result, crowds of refugees sought safety at various strongholds
in the region as well as at Braburg. In this context, Braburg may be
assertion that the stone walls, previously studied extensively by Wand (see above), were, in
fact, constructed sometime between the late 9th and early 10th centuries, has neither
material nor documentary evidence to support it. Finally, I would suggest, in light of the
importance and effectiveness of Braburg as a stronghold during Charlemagnes Saxon
wars, as early as 772774, it likely had a stone wall within a half-century, at the latest, of
Bonifaces initial work there.
This is not the first criticism of Hennings methodology. See, for example, Gerhard Billig,
Zur Vorlage der Ausgrabungen auf dem Meissner Burgberg: Regionale Krise archolo-
gischer Methodik, in Burg-Strasse-Siedlung-Herschaft: Studien zum Mittelalter in Sachsen
und Mitteldeutschland. Festschrift fr Gerhard Billig zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Rainer Aurig,
Reinhardt Butz, Ingolf Grssler, and Andr Thieme (Leipzig, 2007), 1153. Further evidence
of the curious methodology used by Joachim Henning is to be found in Strong Rulers-
Weak Economy? Rome, the Carolingians and the Archaeology of Slavery in the first
Millennium ad, in The Long Morning of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early Medieval
Studies, ed. Jennifer R. Davis and Michael McCormick (Aldershot, 2008), 3453.
84See two studies by Wand, Die Braburg und das Fritzlar-Waberner Becken, pp. 173
210; and Die Braburg, pp. 4158.
398 chapter six
considered a well-fortified refugee center, or Fluchtsbefestigung.86 Some

what paradoxically, the males, both free and unfree, living in the region,
who under normal circumstances would have served as members of the
militia forces to defend the local area in which they lived, became refugees
and very likely fled to Braburg. As a result, these refugees, who as part of
their normal rural existence were well-acquainted with the use of the bow
and arrow, increased the number of fighting men who could be deployed
to defend the walls of the stronghold.
The Carolingian commander at Braburg, therefore, undoubtedly had
at his disposal a great many more than the 9001000 or so effectives
required to provide a minimum defense of the walls of the stronghold. In
the event of a direct enemy effort to attack Braburg, the total number of
Saxons necessary to storm the walls with scaling ladders had to be
increased over the nominal four to five thousand, mentioned above. Using
traditional ratios of attackers to defenders, if 1,500 able-bodied men
were deployed to defend the walls, then a force of between 6,000 to 7,000
Saxons would be required to pose a credible threat to storm the walls
successfully.87
According to the sources, which, of course, have a strong Carolingian
bias, the Saxons launched vigorous attacks against the walls of Braburg.
It is reported that this tactic was employed for several days, at least.
The fortifications, however, held, and the defenders effectively repelledthe
attackers onslaughts. As in regard to matters at Eresburg, noted above,
the sources are mute concerning whether the Saxon units which laid siege
to Braburg were equipped with catapults. The sources do make clear,how-
ever, that after several unsuccessful efforts to storm the walls, and such
operations tend to be exceptionally costly in dead and wounded for the
attacking force, it became obvious to the Saxon commanders that Braburg
would not be easily captured in the short term. As a result, the siege was
raised, and the Saxon force that had invested Braburg redeployed to con-
centrate its attention on the nearby fortified monastery at Fritzlar.88
The capacity of this Saxon force to remain in the field suggests that it
was not at this time suffering from a lack of logistical support. It is unclear,
however, whether these soldiers were equipped with a supply train orga-
nized in their home territories and composed of horse-drawn carts and/or
pack animals, or whether they were living off the land at a season of the
86ARF, an. 773; and AE, an, 773.

88ARF, an. 773.
year when food was most plentiful. It seems likely that the corps of Saxon
levies that had attacked civilian targets, e.g. farmsteads, where Carolingian
agricultural workers either had just harvested the new grain crop or were
about to do so, obtained a considerable supply of food and then shared
these victuals with the other Saxon units. These resources taken from
Frankish farmers could sustain substantial forces in the field, and thereby
limit the Saxon need for a well-developed logistical system at this time. In
this connection, the captured foodstuffs could be hauled in the vehicles
and by the draft animals that heretofore had belonged to the Franks.
The Saxon forces which had abandoned their attacks on Braburg sub-
sequently made a vigorous effort to destroy the fortified monastic com-
plex at Fritzlar. This religious house had been founded by Boniface ca.
732733, who also had established the Anglo-Saxon Wigbert as the monas-
terys first abbot.89 Two points of relevance to the present discussion
emerge from St. Wigberts Vita, although this text was written or perhaps
rewritten by Lupus of Frriers more than a century after the events under
discussion. When Lupus wrote in 836, he was still a monk at Fulda, and it
was well-known at that time that the remains of Saint Wigbert were kept
and venerated at Fritzlar. The first point made by Lupus is that the
Carolingian defenders at Fritzlar had sufficient warning of the Saxon inva-
sion to gather up Wigberts relics and transport them to safety at the mon-
astery of Hersfeld, located about 65 kilometers to the south, which at
the time apparently was thought to be out of harms way. Secondly,
this salvage operation was executed under the direction of Lull, arch-
bishop of Mainz and founder, or more accurately the refounder, of
Hersfeld.90
In strategic terms, the fortifications at Fitzlar were of rather limited
importance. They had been constructed fundamentally for the defense
of the religious structures within the walls and the population residing
both within the walls and in their immediate environs. Braburg was the
dominant fortress in the region. Thus, the possibility should not be ignored
that the monastery was targeted for attack by the Saxons for religious, as
contrasted to purely military, reasons. It has been argued, for example,
that the altar dedicated to St. Peter in the church at Fritzlar had been
made from the great oak dedicated to Thor, which Boniface had cut
89Our knowledge of St. Wigbert depends upon Lupus, V. S. Wigberti, which was written
in 836 at Fulda. For a brief summary of this Vita, see Wood, The Missionary Life, p. 66.
90Lupus, V.S. Wigberti, chs. 1325.
400 chapter six
down in 722.91 It is also possible that religious motivations were involved

insofar as the Saxons wished to retaliate for Charlemagnes destruction of
the Irminsul during the campaign in 772.92
Whether scholars are correct in arguing that the Saxons attacked
Fritzlar for religious reasons cannot, at this point, be proven. However,
it is clear that whatever religious motivation may have stimulated
Saxon behavior, religious revenge would not seem to have been of primary
importance in the scheduling of their operations. If the Saxons had been
motivated primarily by the idea of retaliating against the Franks for a reli-
gious insult, the church at Fritzlar and the fortifications which defended it
more likely would have been an initial target rather than a secondary one.
In any case, the monastic complex at Fritzlar had a strong defensive
perimeter of about 275 meters, which is reported to have been vigorously
defended. If the biased sources that report the successful defense of
Fritzlar are suspect, the archaeological evidence makes clear that the
Saxon attack ultimately failed.93
A force of some 200 effectives would have been sufficient to provide for
the minimum defense of the walls at Fritzlar against an attacking unit that
was four or perhaps even five times that number. It is clear, however, that
the earlier attacks on nearby Braburg could not have been undertaken in
a credible manner with fewer than several thousand Saxons. Therefore, it
is likely that the forces defending Fritzlar must have been of a sufficient
order of magnitude to repel an assault force that was considerably larger
than a thousand or so attackers. The fortifications at Fritzlar, like those at
Braburg, surely served as a haven for refugees. These, in turn, as observed
above, increased the number of able-bodied men who were available to
defend the walls against a Saxon attack.
The population center at Geismar, not far from either the environs of
Braburg or Fritzlar, undoubtedly was one of the major sources of refugees
who sought protection at these strongholds. Gaismar was a rather large
village, or perhaps it may even be considered a small town. Definitions in
such contexts tend to be neither sufficient nor necessary. Nevertheless,
Geismar was located approximately two kilometers due north of Braburg
91Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 292, discusses the various arguments regarding
Fritzlar and Bonifaces destruction of the Gaismar oak.
92See, for example, ARF, an. 773; and AE, an, 773.
93Heinz Stoob, Fritzlars Stadtgrundriss als Siegel seiner mittelalterliche Geschichte,
Fritzlar im Mittelalter: Festschrift zur 1250Jahrfeier (Fritzlar, 1974), 287320, provides a
helpful diagram of Fritzlars fortifications. It is clear that neither the fortifications nor the
church was destroyed.
and a similar distance north-northwest of Fritzlar. Archaeological studies

indicate that Geismar, which had no fortifications, had been the site of an
extensive settlement dating at least from the beginning of the Iron Age
and continuing through the early Middle Ages. Parenthetically, it is very
likely that the population of Geismar provided much of the labor force
that had been used to construct the fortifications and internal buildings
both at Braburg and at Fritzlar.94
The Saxons, having concluded they could not capture the stronghold
and particularly to gain control of the church at Fritzlar, with the wealth
stored within, therefore decided to burn it to the ground. This, too, failed.
However, the sources indicate that God terrorized the attackers. As this
story is told, it appears that a very strong rainstorm arose. This storm,
according to the account provided by the court sources, made it impossi-
ble for the Saxons to burn down the wooden parts of the buildings that
they had placed under attack. In addition, the storm is reported to have
been accompanied by substantial lightning strikes. These are seen to have
been the relevant instrument of Divine terror launched by the Christian
God against the pagan Saxons. The bias of the sources, in this context, is
noteworthy. The lightning is said to have struck only the Saxons and nei-
ther the Franks nor the monastic buildings. Such a pattern in a storm is
hardly impossible though perhaps unlikely.95
Such a view of reality should not be seen only as the post hoc imposition
of a topos by later writers. Rather, it is likely that the defenders of Fritzlar
also saw the storm and its effects as Gods support for Christians against
their pagan enemies. This understanding of the state of affairs in real time
must be assumed to have raised the morale of the Franks. The resolve of
the men who manned the walls of the fortifications during the course of
the enemy assaults almost certainly was strengthened.96 Conversely, the
94See, for example, several studies by Rolf Gensen: Frhgeschichte des Fritzlar
Raumes, in Fritzlar im Mittelalter (Fritzlar, 1974), 1040; Frhmittelalterliche Burgen
und Siedlungen in Nordhessen, pp. 313337; and Althessens Frhzeit: frhgeschichtliche
Fundsttten und Funde in Nordhessen (Wiesbaden, 1979).
95ARF, an. 773; and AE, an, 773, both allude to the terror sent by God. The latter, how-
ever, recounts the story of a dead Saxon who was found in a squatting position with the
tinder in one hand and the wood in the other as though he were preparing to blow on the
flame in order to set the church on fire. This frozen corpse may perhaps suggest someone
who had been struck by lightning. It is important to make clear that simply because rain
storms and lightning are used as topoi from time to time in such accounts does not mean
that such natural phenomena did not occur or that even, on occasion, they were of benefit
to one side in a military situation and a detriment to the other.
96ARF, an. 773; and AE, an, 773.
402 chapter six
intervention of natural forces in apparent aid of the Franks undoubtedly

undermined the morale of the Saxons and encouraged them to abandon
their attacks on the monastic fortifications at Fritzlar. The modern reader,
familiar with early medieval Christian values, should hardly be surprised
by the thrust of the Carolingian sources in this situation, which attribute
to Gods intervention the failure of the Saxons to capture the fortifications
at Braburg and Fritzlar. This was a propitious situation for Christian tri-
umphalism to be affirmed.97
This information from our narrative sources indicates that the Saxons
found it necessary to break off their siege operations against these strong-
holds. While low morale may have been a factor in the withdrawal of the
Saxons, logistical problems cannot be ignored. The Saxon campaign had
been begun late in the year, and although they may have acquired consid-
erable foodstuffs from local sources, it is likely that the invaders were not
prepared to invest Braburg and Fritzlar during the winter. It is unclear, in
fact, whether the Saxons even possessed a logistical infrastructure and
military organization that was capable of providing sufficient support to
sustain lengthy siege operations, with the construction of vallations and
contra-vallations, far distant from their home bases once the local sources
of food that they had been able to acquire from farmers in the countryside
were exhausted. Finally, it may be suggested that with large numbers of
Saxons mobilized for these operations, the number of able-bodied men
left at home to bring in the harvest may not have been sufficient. Therefore,
going home to help with the harvest may have become important to the
Saxon fighting men toward the end of the campaign.
The Saxon invasion of 773 had two very obvious and interconnected
strategic goals. The short-term or campaign strategy was to reverse the
results that had been achieved by the successful Carolingian offensive in
772. Through this effort, Charlemagne had gained military control of the
Fulda gap as far east as the Weser River. Charlemagnes campaign had
been focused on the capture of the fortress at Eresburg and the construc-
tion of a new advanced stronghold, probably at Herstelle. This resulted in
a defensive line that connected by road the strongholds at Braburg
and Fritzlar to the fortress at Eresburg, creating an incipient version of the
type of limes that the Romans had developed further to the west in the
Rhineland. The Saxons, therefore, recaptured and garrisoned Eresburg,
97In general, see the useful observations in regard to Christian triumphalism with
extensive bibliography by David M. Olster, Roman Defeat, Christian Response, and the
Literary Construction of the Jew (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 3050.
took and/or destroyed Herstelle, damaged both Braburg and Fritzlar, and
devastated much of the agricultural infrastructure of the region with the
likely intention of causing large numbers of Frankish settlers who survived
the invasion to abandon their farms and flee westward.
Taking revenge on the religious complex at Fritzlar may not have been
of primary importance for the Saxons. It is clear, nevertheless, that at this
time the destruction of the Christian institutions that Charlemagne had
begun to establish in Saxon territory was a high priority. Eigils claim in
his Life of Sturm that the Saxons were a perverse and depraved gens was
something of a clich by the later 8th century. However, the fact that those
Saxons, who earlier apparently had accepted Christianity, are depicted as
having lapsed into their previous errores, presumably of their own free
will, gave new meaning to this charge. In addition, Eigils claim that these
Saxons destroyed the churches that only recently had been constructed
through the missionary efforts of the monks of Fulda under Sturms lead-
ership is used to strengthen his case regarding the perfidious nature of the
enemy. In a more practical sense, however, the fact that Sturms preachers
had destroyed many Saxon idols and sacred groves may perhaps indicate a
kind of tit-for-tat process of retaliation.98
The long-term strategic goal of this Saxon offensive in 773 would appear
to have been to force the Carolingians to return to the status quo ante, i.e.
to the raiding and counter-raiding behavior that long had characterized
Saxon-Frankish relations prior to Charlemagnes invasion of 772. This situ-
ation was well-described by Einhard, who noted that for centuries the
borders between the Franks and the Saxons were contiguous and that
almost everywhere they were in flat and open country. As a result, Einhard
observed, killing, robbery, and arson were constant.99 Thus, the Saxons
strategy was to create a deterrent aimed at discouraging the new policy
that Charlemagne had initiated. They demonstrated in 773 that they could
reverse Carolingian gains, at least in the short term. The Saxons showed
that they could take and/or destroy Charlemagnes strongholds, they could
devastate the countryside, and they could harass in a very serious manner
the religious establishment.100
Whether the Saxons understood that the new Carolingian strategy was
aimed at the overall and ultimate conquest of their territory as contrasted
98Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, chs. 2324.

99VK, ch. 7.
100VK, ch. 7; and echoed by the Saxon poet, VKM, (an. 773) bk. I, lines 31, and 26,
respectively.
404 chapter six
merely to the creation of limes, i.e. a matrix of fortifications and roads, for
the purpose of controlling the frontier cannot be ascertained. What is
clear is that the Saxons understood that Charlemagnes strategy initiated
in 772 was something new. This had been made obvious by Charlemagnes
destruction of the Irminsul, and the Saxons wanted him to abandon this
course of action. To this end, they undertook a coordinated military cam-
paign with substantial operational assets, which were mobilized at some
considerable time following their annual council at Marklo in 773, while
Charlemagne was in Italy. This would seem to be evidence of Saxon flexi-
bility in their military planning.
In light of the invasion of 773, it is also clear that whatever previous
obligations the Saxon negotiators had undertaken in the treaty that they
had made with Charlemagne in the summer of 772 were abrogated by this
offensive. It must be assumed, in addition, that the representative council,
which met in 773 at Marklo in order to place the Saxon people, as a whole,
in a state of belligerency with the Carolingian regnum, was not unwilling
to place in jeopardy the lives of the twelve hostages, who had been turned
over to Charlemagne pursuant to the above-mentioned treaty. However
important either the hostages themselves or their families may have been
in Saxon society, it is clear that they were regarded as expendable. Nothing
more is heard of these hostages, and, as a result, it is prudent to assume
that they were executed, or perhaps, at best, enslaved under prejudicial
conditions, so as to maintain Carolingian credibility with regard to the
enforcement of treaty obligations.101
By the end of November or early December 773, i.e. well before the cam-
paigning season of 774 would begin, Charlemagne, as seen in the previous
chapter, certainly had been provided with information regarding the
extent of the damage in the Hesse region done to Carolingian assets by the
Saxon offensive. He surely knew that Eresburg and its Frankish garrison
had been lost and that the fortress not only was again in enemy hands but
had been provided with a special garrison by the Saxons. Herstelle, at the
very least, was occupied by the enemy. It may even have been destroyed.
Braburg and its environs had been damaged. Fritzlar was partially
101Regarding the early Carolingian treatment of hostages, see Bachrach, Early

Carolingian Warfare, pp. 35, 37. 39, 41, 44, 229, 238, 249; for background, see Kosto,
Hostages, pp. 123147; and Janet Nelson, Charelmagne and Empire, in The Long Morning
of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early Medieval Studies, ed. Jennifer R. Davis and
Michael McCormick (Aldershot, 2008), 233234, who discusses a hostage list from 805
which proves conclusively that some hostages who had been handed over to the
Carolingians were permitted to survive.
compromised as some enemy troops reached the church within the walls.
Numerous villages in the Fulda gap were totally or partially destroyed.
Large numbers of settlers had been killed or carried off as slaves. Sub
stantial quantities of material wealth, especially farm animals, had been
taken by the enemy as booty.
The Carolingian position in the Fulda gap certainly was considerably
weaker at the end of 773 as a result of Saxon military operations than it
had been even prior to Charlemagnes very successful campaign in 772. It
is likely, however, that the local authorities, led by Abbot Sturm of Fulda,
did whatever possible to provide support for the farmers and agricultural
dependents whose lands and capital resources had been devastated by the
Saxon invasion. Not only was the monastery of Fulda immensely wealthy,
but it had been the long-term responsibility of the church to help those in
need, even when its own economic interests were not directly involved,
and this certainly was not the case for Sturm and his monks.102
In more practical terms, increasing the size of the Christian population
of this frontier region by bringing Frankish settlers from the increasingly
overpopulated western reaches of the regnum Francorum was an impor-
tant strategic goal of Charlemagnes government. This population of
new settlers was expected to supply a growing manpower base for militia
forces, both those deployed only for the local defense and those more
wealthy men who also could be deployed for expeditionary purposes
against the Saxons. In addition, these new settlers were expected to pro-
duce food surpluses that could be used to provide logistical support for
further offensive military operations in the Saxon region. In short, a sub-
stantial effort was being made by the Carolingians to colonize the frontiers
with surplus population drawn from within the Frankish kingdom itself.
Saxon Operations in the North
It is clear that the main thrust of the Saxon invasion late in the campaign-
ing season of 773 was focused on the Fulda Gap and the fortifications at
Eresburg, Brburg, and Fritzlar. However, it is also the case that operations
102With regard to Fuldas great wealth, see Ulrich Weidinger, Untersuchungen zur
Grundherrschaft des Klosters Fulda in der Karolingerlzeit, in Strukturen der
Grundherrschaft im frhen Mittelalter, 2nd ed., ed. Werner Rsener (Gttingen, 1993), 247
265; and concerning the long-existing obligation of the church to help the poor and unfor-
tunate, see, for example, Peter Brown, Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire
(Hanover, NH-London, 2002).
406 chapter six
were undertaken against Carolingian assets in the north as far as the

region of the IJssel River. Carolingian missionary operations in the north
had long been based at the old Roman fortress city of Utrecht where, fol-
lowing the death of Bishop Willibrord, leadership passed to Gregory, who
was given Charlemagnes full support. The primary focus of this mission
when the Saxons attacked in 773 was, as it always had been, on converting
pagan Frisians to Christianity.103 However, efforts were being undertaken
also to project missionary operations across the frontier into Saxon
territory.
In fact, considerable success, as orchestrated from the base in Utrecht,
already was evident in Saxon territory by 773. This is illustrated by the
efforts of a certain Anglo-Saxon named Lebuin, who had been delegated
to lead operations on the Frisian-Saxon border along the valley of the
IJssel in the region of Deventer.104 Lebuin gained the support of some
locally-based magnates in the region. However, it is interesting that a lady
of considerable importance named Avaerhilda is the only aristocratic
patron to be singled out as a supporter of Lebuin.105 This is likely because
she was a Saxon, as her name would seem to indicate. In any case, with
local support, Lebuin oversaw the building of a church and a church house
at Deventer and nearby he arranged for the construction of a chapel at a
place called Wilp on the banks of the IJssel river.106
Since ca. 700, Deventer, which became Lebuins base of operations, had
been a growing center of riverine commerce with a surface area of some 12
hectares. These developments permit us to think of it as a merchant town
or, at least, as an emporium of sorts.107 From Deventer, Lebuin made peri-
odic journeys into Saxon territory. At least some of these efforts, and
particularly his most promising, would appear to have taken him almost
100 kilometers eastward into the region of Mnster.108 On one occasion, he
is credited with having traveled into the Weser valley far to the southeast,
103Concerning missionary operations in Frisia, see Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 107111.
104Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, 1112.
106Anon. V.S. Lebuini, ch. 3.
107Concerning the economic development of Deventer in regard to ceramics, see
Markus Sanke, Wikingerschutt aus Deventer und Zutphen, in Archologie als
Socialgeschichte: Studien zu Siedlung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im frhgeschichtlichen
Mitteleuropa: Festschrift fr Heiko Steuer zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Sebastian Brather, Christel
Bcker, and Michaeol Hoeper (Rahden, 1999), 254, 262263; and note the brief remarks by
Stphane Lebecq, Marchands et navigateurs frisons du haut moyen ge, 2 vols. (Lille, 1983)
I, 146147.
108Anon. V.S. Lebuini, ch. 3.
where he visited the Saxon spring council meeting at Marklo.109 Lebuin,

however, would appear to have enjoyed his greatest success in the
Sdergau, which bordered on the Ems river and included the settlement
which was to be developed into the city of Mnster under Charlemagnes
aegis. In the Sdergau, Lebuin is reported to have been able to convert
many pagans to Christianity. His mission is described as being success-
ful, in large part, because in this region he had gained the support and
protection of a Saxon magnate named Folcbert and the latters son Helco;
these men became Christians.110
Lebuins missionary work continued until his death in 773. He was bur-
ied in a tomb of some prominence in the religious center he had built
at the growing town of Deventer.111 This center and the town thrived until
the Saxon offensive of 773, at which time the former was destroyed
and Lebuins grave was desecrated. Its marker was carried off or burned,
and the tomb was buried in the rubble. The destruction of the Christian
enclave at Deventer was so thorough that when Luidger was sent from
Utrecht to restore the installation, it took considerable effort even to locate
Lebuins tomb. The dispatch of Liudger by Alberic of Utrecht to Deventer
with orders to restore the church and Lebuins tomb permits the inference
that whatever damage had been done to the site itself was not decisive.
The report of Luidgers success, even if severely biased, lends support to
this inference.112
Charlemagnes Response
When Charlemagne left Pavia during the latter part of July 774 and gradu-
ally wended his way north toward the regnum Francorum, he did so at the
head of his victorious army. He not only had his own wife and children
with him, but he had in his train the defeated and now-deposed Lombard
king, Desiderius, along with the latters queen, Ausa, and likely one of their
daughters. He also held Queen Gerberga, Carlomans widow, and her chil-
dren as captives.113 Once Charlemagne was north of the Alps, there is good
reason to believe that he celebrated his Italian victory a second time, and
109Anon. V.S. Lebuini, chs. 46.

110Anon., V.S. Lebuini, chs. 23.
113V. Hadriani I, ch. 44; ARF, an. 774; ALM, ch. 7 (p.117); ASM, p. 75; and ALob,
pp. 228229.
408 chapter six
on this occasion also carried out something of a triumph in the traditional

Roman style.114 This ceremony perhaps was held at Worms, where he pre-
sided at a court on 2 September.115 However, it is more likely that the tri-
umph was celebrated at the newly constructed palatium, which was
located at Ingelheim near the important cathedral city of Mainz. Ingelheim
was to become a central place for expressing Charlemagnes victory propa-
ganda, a tradition which may well have begun in 774.116
Ideas about victory in war in Merovingian and Carolingian Gaul
throughout the history of the regnum Francorum were thoroughly condi-
tioned by imperial thinking on this subject. A variety of Christian trium-
phalism dominated explanations regarding both victory and defeat. The
former, which is at issue here, was regarded as God-given and evidence of
His direct favor to the emperor or king who won the victory. Indeed,
Charlemagnes forebears, especially his grandfather, Charles Martel, and
his father King Pippin I, had traditionally recognized the role of God in
their victories, with phrases such as given by God or Deo auxiliante.117
Charlemagnes victory in Italy was for him, his magnates, his army, and the
people of the Frankish kingdom prima facie evidence of Gods hand in
Carolingian military success. Gods favor to the Carolingians resulted, at
least in part, from the kings piety.118 In light of Pope Hadrians letters, it
is clear as well that Rome was no less eager to emphasize Charlemagnes
God-given success in winning the Lombard crown.119
On the whole, there is nothing to indicate that Charlemagne was will-
ing to permit the rather localized military debacle in Hesse to detract from
the glory that had been attained by his victory in Italy. On balance, this
was a sound judgment even in terms of Realpolitik. Saxon operations in
Hesse were in fact, or at least could be treated as, no more than a tradi-
tional raid even if that had not been the case. Of course, these Saxon suc-
cesses could have assumed an enlarged or exaggerated significance, which
might have been damaging to royal prestige if the king also had failed in
114ARF, an. 774, uses the phrase cum magno triuimpho. The use of this type of termi-
nology by the early Carolingians is discussed by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 96, 141143, 148, 151.
115DK., no. 82; and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 169.
116ARF, an. 774. Regarding Ingelheim and Charlemagnes victory propaganda, see
McCormick, Eternal Victory, p. 369.
117This matter is discussed in detail by Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 147150.
118See the background provided by Olster, Roman Defeat, pp. 3050.
119For Pope Hadrians views on Charlemagnes God-given victory, see, for example,
CC., nos. 50, 53.
Italy. It is certainly likely that the Frankish ruler understood the negative
political dynamic that could possibly have been stimulated by two concur-
rent military failures. The Saxon offensive, however, was a setback for
Charlemagnes new strategy of conquering their territory. Its significance
likely was very well-appreciated by Charlemagne and his planners at the
royal court, who had developed a strategy of conquest and were working
toward the integration of the Saxon people and territory into the regnum
Francorum.
An evaluation of the situation in 774 makes clear that in contrast to
the Saxon invasion, the Carolingian victory in Italy brought about a
massive alteration of the political map of western Europe. Charlemagne
assumed the title rex Langobardorum, which he joined with that of rex
Francorum and patricius Romanorum. As the king of more than one peo-
ple, Charlemagne, as noted above, was positioned to be considered an
emperor. It is to be remembered that the information that already had
been placed in the forged Donation of Constantine established that the
right to dispose of the imperial title in the western part of the Roman
Empire was in the hands of the pope. In effect, the pope had the authority
to name a new Roman emperor in the west.120 Pope Hadrian, in fact, would
allude to this in a letter to Charlemagne no later than 777.121
No less important, however, is the fact that much of the information
regarding the papal prerogative, as adumbrated in considerable specific
detail in the Donation of Constantine, had been well-known at Rome
much earlier and likely was known initially to Pippin and then to
Charlemagne. This information, which was set out in the particular forged
document that now survives, dates from the pontificate of Pope Paul (757
767). Papal claims to have the gift of empire in their hands possibly may
even have formed part of the basis for negotiations between Pippin I and
the papacy even as early as the 750s.122
Pope Gregory III had indicated to Charles Martel as early as 739 that he
was willing to abjure Romes allegiance to the Byzantine emperor and to
transfer his allegiance to the Franks. By making this offer, Rome was estab-
lishing a basis, first, for establishing a Carolingian rex Francorum, and sub-
sequently for creating a member of the family as the new emperor in the
west. The fact that Gregory referred to Charles Martel as rex more than a
120This matter is discussed in detail by Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military

Responsibilities, pp. 231255.
121CC, no. 60.
122Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities, pp. 231255.
410 chapter six
decade before Pippin actually became king of the Franks in 751 provides
an early indication of the willingness of the pope to entertain the idea of
playing a role in the deposition of the Merovingian dynasty in order to
replace it with the Carolingian dynasty.123
Charlemagnes behavior, from the time that he learned of the Saxon
offensive in the autumn of 773 until he reached Ingelheim early in
September of 774, as recorded in the usual pro-Carolingian sources, betrays
nothing to indicate that he regarded this setback to his long-term strategy
east of the Rhine as anything more than a temporary problem. Clearly,
Charlemagne wanted to be seen by his own people as well as by his ene-
mies or potential enemies, e.g. Saxons and Bavarians, respectively, as well
as his possible adversaries at home, as a very prudent and calculating deci-
sion maker. He did not want to be seen to rush promiscuously from cam-
paign to campaign in a frantic or even frenetic manner. He appears even
early in his reign to have cultivated the image of a seasoned leader who set
his course and had a sound sense of priorities. The Augustan pattern
of festina lente, made popular in the Roman histories available to the
Carolingians, may be thought to have been his guide.124
It is clear that Charlemagne understood as early as the winter of 773
774 that, with his offensive military forces fully committed south of the
Alps, he was not in a position to deal with the Saxon offensive. He knew,
also at that time, that if he were to raise the siege of Pavia in order to rush
north from Italy with a large army, he likely would lose more than this
phase of the Lombard war. He understood that it would be impossible for
him to campaign in Saxony in an effective manner during December,
January, and February without the extensive logistical preparations that
were necessary for successful winter operations in hostile territory.
These fundamentals would have been obvious even to a commander of
far less ability than Charlemagne. In addition, there can be little doubt
that such fundamentals were well-understood by the experienced military
advisers, i.e. the seniores and special consiliares of the Magistratus charged
with planning Carolingian military operations. What stands out, however,
is the ability of the youthful Carolingian ruler to maintain his initial plan
123See the discussion by Noble, The Republic, pp. 4648.

124The question must arise as to whether Charlemagne himself projected this persona
or whether those writers in and around his court created such a persona for public con-
sumption. Ultimately, only his behavior on the ground, i.e. the pace of his actions, can
provide some insight into this knotty problem. It might be hazarded, however, that
Charlemagnes courtiers would have been extremely unlikely to depict him in a manner
that he found offensive.
with regard to Italy and not to be stampeded into a foolish response to

events in the north either by pride or anger, or perhaps even by contempo-
rary criticism. Charlemagnes prudence so early in his career is worthy of
emphasis.
An effective and immediate response to the situation faced by the
Carolingians in 773, whether only defensive or both defensive and offen-
sive, would have required that Charlemagne have available two armies
prepared to fight, if necessary, on two fronts at the same time. One very
large army, however divided and deployed, obviously had been needed for
offensive operations in Italy and a second force would have been needed
for defensive operations against a potential Saxon invasion. In principle,
this might be construed as preparing to fight on two fronts at the same
time. Indeed, if the second army were to engage not only in defending the
frontiers but also in retaliation against the Saxons, this strategy might be
seen as preparation for undertaking two offensive wars at the same time.
In this context, it is to be made clear that two front wars were long-
understood by Frankish kings as a strategic situation that was to be
avoided. This point even was reported to have been made clear by the
Merovingian ruler Chlodomer (d. 533) in a source easily available to the
Carolingian court. Chlodomer is alleged to have said:
I think that it is stupid counsel, if, as a
result, I may be defeated because I have left
some of my enemies behind me when I march against
the rest of them I shall win my victory
more easily, if I keep one army separated from
the other. Thus, having killed off one enemy,
the other can more easily be sent to his death.125
The Saxon invasion of Hesse in 773, which in both Bavaria and in Pavia
likely was hoped to lure the Carolingians into engaging in military opera-
tions on two fronts at the same time, ultimately was to have an impact on
Charlemagnes long-term strategic thinking. First, it is to be noted that the
Saxon effort to deter Carolingian advances east of the Weser failed. Upon
returning to Francia, Charlemagne reaffirmed his decision to conquer
the Saxon region.126 However, until this goal had been accomplished,
125Gregory, Hist., bk. VII, ch. 37. Chlodomers point is clear whether understood in tacti-
cal or strategic terms. For a discussion of the value of Gregorys work for the study of mili-
tary history, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Gregory of Tours as a Military Historian, in The
World of Gregory of Tours, ed. Kathleen Mitchell and Ian Wood (Leiden, 2002), 351363.
126AE, an., 775.
412 chapter six
Charlemagne understood that in the future, the command structure on

the frontier would have to be strengthened and perhaps even a mobile
field force would have to be stationed in the region so as to be able to make
a rapid response against enemy incursions. In light of the length of the
frontier, perhaps several such forces might be needed.
Charlemagne also likely understood, as his father Pippin had shown
in his military efforts in Aquitaine, that a capacity for winter campaigning
in the field with a large army was necessary.127 Of course, Charlemagnes
operations in Italy had shown that with the proper logistical support,
the Frankish army could sustain lengthy winter siege operations very
far from its home base. However, it is noteworthy that the cold and
snowy weather that prevailed in Saxon territory made campaigning there
during the winter season more difficult than had been the case for Pippin
in Aquitaine or in northern Italy, where the climate was considerably
warmer. This discrepancy between temperature in the north and south
still existed despite a significant warming trend that already had been
developing in various parts of the regnum Francorum for perhaps some
two centuries.128
Charlemagne also could appreciate, from the timing of the Saxon
offensive, that the decision-makers at Marklo had planned well. Likely,
this deliberative body was more flexible in its decision making than
Charlemagnes advisers, perhaps relying on the written sources discussed
above, previously had thought. Apparently, all general decisions made
by the Saxon Council did not have to be finalized at the spring meet
ing.Further, it is evident that in 773, the Saxons had been in possession
of good intelligence regarding the disposition of Charlemagnes army in
Italy. As suggested previously, such information may have well have
reached the Saxons through Bavarian conduits. Finally, the Saxons, as
Einhard, cited above, made clear, easily moved back and forth across the
Frankish frontier. As a result, they undoubtedly had intelligence regarding
the Carolingian forces based in and around the Fulda Gap and knew
that they were not adequate to stop a large-scale and well-coordinated
attack.

128See D.M. Metcalf, The Prosperity of North-Western Europe in the Eighth and Ninth
Centuries, The Economic History Review, XX (1967), 344357; and in more general terms
Neville Brown, The Impact of Climate Change: Some Indications from History, in Water,
Environment and Society in Times of Climate Change, ed. Arie Issar and Neville Brown
(Boston, 1998), 158.
Retaliation, Reconnaissance, and Reassessment
When Charlemagnes entourage reached Ingelheim, the victorious king

ordered his first overt military response to the Saxon invasion of 773. As
autumn was approaching and the harvest season in Saxon territory either
recently had arrived or was about to commence in the year 774,
Charlemagne ordered four substantial units to be detached from the army
that was returning from Italy. The orders given to these units all identified
in the court annals as scarae, were to ravage Saxon territory, i.e. to teach
the enemy a lesson. In addition, these forces were to obtain intelligence
for what Charlemagne already was considering, i.e. the next years military
operations in the Saxon region.129 The use of the term scara indicates that
these units were composed of professional soldiers. Obviously, the execu-
tion of this mission required very rapid movement in enemy territory, and,
therefore, unlike the special forces, which had turned Desiderius flank in
the clusae, these forces were mounted. It is likely that these escariti, the
effectives serving in the scarae, were detached for this mission from
Charlemagnes extended military household, which had been operating in
Italy alongside the king.130
The advance of these four scarae into Saxon territory from Ingelheim
entailed a lengthy march that required the Carolingian forces to skirt
the Taunus Mountains either to the west or to the east. In either case,
a march of some 150 kilometers, i.e. about five or six days under good
conditions, was required even before the scarae reached the Saxon fron-
tier. It seems very likely that these units were sent into the Fulda Gap
where most of the enemys operations had been undertaken during the
previous year. The scarae likely retraced the route taken by Charlemagne
in 772 and then crossed either the Diemel River or the Weser in order to
probe more deeply into the Saxon region. Once in enemy territory,
Charlemagnes units are reported to have set about seizing or burning
everything with which they came into contact and leaving devastation in
their wake.131
129ARF, an. 774; and AE, an, 774. See. Halphen, Etudes critique, pp. 148149.
130For the scara in general, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 8082, 191195,
with the relevant literature. ARF, an. 774, mentions the four scarae. By contrast, AE, an, 774,
refers to an army, or exercitus, which was divided into three units, but does not use the term
scara to describe any of these groups. In this context, it is worth noting that the author of
the AMP, an. 774, refers to these scarae as legiones, thereby indicating that they were pro-
fessional troops rather than militia men.
131ARF, an. 774; and AE, an, 774.
414 chapter six
Before a very long time had elapsed, however, what must have been
local Saxon forces were mustered and put into the field to oppose
Charlemagnes scarae. It is problematic whether the Saxons had advance
knowledge of this four-pronged Carolingian operation and if they had
such intelligence, how far in advance it was obtained.132 Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Saxons had sufficient time to put at least three substantial
forces into the field. As a result, three of the Carolingian scarae are reported
to have been attacked by enemy forces. According to the court annals, the
Franks managed with Gods help to emerge as victors in each instance,
despite what would seem to have been hard-fought engagements.133 It
has been suggested, and I tend to agree, that the heavily biased Frankish
sources which reported these encounters played fast and loose with the
truth. In fact, it is likely that at least one and perhaps more than one of
these scarae suffered considerably and may even have been defeated.134
Of the four units sent into Saxon territory, the three discussed above,
obviously suffered losses, if not outright defeat, in the battles they fought
with enemy levies. In addition, it is clear that none of these three units
would appear to have been able to return home with any or at least enough
of the booty they had previously collected in order for such an accom-
plishment to warrant mention in the sources. One of these units is known
specifically to have engaged Saxon levies in the area of Eresburg, and it is
not clear which, if either, of the two forces emerged victorious.135 By con-
trast, and this contrast is noteworthy, the court annals report that the
fourth scara did not encounter enemy forces, and was able to return home
with a great deal of booty and without any losses.136 It is clear that these
mounted units were not of sufficient size to engage effectively the types
of forces, most likely large numbers of militia levies deployed as foot sol-
diers, that could be mobilized rapidly by the satrap of a particular Gau.
132AE, an, 774, explains that Charlemagne ordered his forces into action after he had
come home but before the Saxons had learned of his return.
133ARF, an. 774; and AE, an, 774.
134Halphen, La conqute, p. 148.
135ARF, an. 774; AE, an, 774; and AP, an. 774. N.b. this notice of an encounter between
the Carolingians and the Saxons at Eresburg is called a bellum, and no result is recorded.
136The account discussed here is that provided in ARF, an. 774. N.b. AE, an, 774, as men-
tioned above, indicates the existence of only three units and would seem to make a con-
certed effort to cover up the serious difficulties that were experienced by the Carolingian
scarae. He reports that Charlemagnes forces devasted everything, burned, plundered,
killed a large number of Saxons, who tried to resist, and returned home with a vast quantity
of booty. As suggested above, it is not at all clear whether the operations undertaken by
these scarae were successful in general.
These scarae certainly were not equipped to lay siege to a fortress such as
Eresburg.
Is Charlemagne to be held accountable for the losses, and perhaps even
significant losses, suffered by three of the four scarae which he dispatched
from Ingelheim to undertake operations in Saxon territory? At one level,
of course, the overall commander must take ultimate responsibility for the
fate of his troops. However, at an operational level, each of the command-
ers of the four scarae under consideration here must take responsibility
for what happened in the field. Clearly, as the accomplishments of the
fourth scara, which escaped problems with the enemy and returned home
with considerable booty, make clear, Charlemagne does not appear to
have issued a general order that the escariti were to seek out and engage
the Saxons in combat. At the operational level, each commander was
responsible for his own actions, and it is highly unlikely that the men who
served in this operation and undoubtedly appreciated the traditional
unwillingness of early Carolingian rulers to sacrifice their soldiers for glory
would blame Charlemagne for the losses suffered by the three scarae dis-
cussed above.
Charlemagnes Winter Court
While Charlemagnes four scarae were operating independently in Saxon

territory during late September and early October of 774, the royal entou-
rage, likely following the Roman road on the left bank of the Rhine, wended
its way northward. By mid-September, the court was established in the
royal palatium located at Dren, about 150 kilometers from Ingelheim. At
Dren, Charlemagne met with several of his most important advisers in
order to reassess his previous plans and develop new ones where relevant
in order to deal with a broad spectrum of issues. One of the most promi-
nent of these visitors to the royal court was Abbot Fulrad of Saint Denis,
the Carolingians leading expert on Italian affairs. Charlemagne, upon
his departure from Italy in late July, appears temporarily to have left
Fulrad south of the Alps in order to assure that the affairs of the new
rex Langobardorum were in order. At Dren, when Fulrad met with
Charlemagne, the abbot surely had much to report on the situation in the
Lombard kingdom and with regard to Rome.137
137See, Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, nos. 170 (166); and 171 (167). It surely
would be an abuse of even a minimalist approach to assume that during these months
Fulrad and Charlemange spoke only about the grants that the king was making to St. Denis.
416 chapter six
With specific attention to Rome, Fulrad undoubtedly was asked to

advise Charlemagne regarding the situation in Italy in light of a series of
papal letters that had begun to reach the Frankish court within several
weeks of the armys return north of the Alps.138 Initially, Hadrian sent
two missi, Bishop Andrew and the papal chamberlain Anastasius, to the
Frankish court in order to get specific assurances that Charlemagne had
given the necessary orders for the proper and speedy execution of
theDonation. Clearly, the pope was perturbed greatly by the fact that
there had been some delay in the implementation of the transfer of
governmental jurisdiction in several areas that Charlemagne had prom-
ised would be handed over to Rome. In addition, Hadrian was very much
angered by the aggressive and, from the perspective of the pope, the
wholly unjustified actions of Archbishop Leo of Ravenna.139
After this first embassy, the new Lombard king sent a letter back to
Rome with the popes missi to assure Hadrian that all would proceed as
had been promised. Upon receiving this letter, the pope immediately wrote
again, beseeching Charlemagne to act with great dispatch to carry out the
terms of the Donation. In this letter, Hadrian also reminded Charlemagne
of the exceptionally important role that Rome had played in helping
the Franks to force the surrender of Pavia and, as a result, to conquer the
Lombard kingdom. Charlemagne then sent yet another letter, this one
with his own missus, to Rome further to assure Hadrian that all matters
regarding Italy were in the process of being put in the correct order.140
This missus, in addition, was instructed to inform the pope that
Archbishop Leo of Ravenna, about whose activities Hadrian already had
shown concern, had recently attended Charlemagnes court, and that they
had worked together in a very positive manner. It is clear that Charlemagne
regarded Leo as a valuable asset and perhaps even as an ally. Charlemagnes
highly positive relations with Leo did not please the pope. In a subsequent
letter, Hadrian made very clear to Charlemagne that he was worried
greatly by Leos activities. The pope saw these not only as inimical to
Romes mission as the leader in all spiritual matters in Italy, but also as a
threat to the authority of the new Lombard ruler because the archbishop
was undermining the integrity of the Donation.141
138CC., nos. 49, 50, 53.

139CC no. 53.
140CC, no. 53.
141CC, no. 53. Of the exchange of letters discussed here, only the final letter from
Hadrian to Charlemagne has survived. The initial letter delivered by the popes missi to the
It is clear from this exchange of letters that Pope Hadrian was not at all
satisfied with the manner in which the implementation of the Donation
was progressing and, as mentioned earlier, he was demonstrating increased
anxiety with regard to what clearly were Charlemagnes increasingly close
relations with Archbishop Leo of Ravenna. In yet another letter, carried by
his missus Anastasius, Hadrian claimed that Leo had acted illegally when
he established his administration over various cities and territories. The
pope sought assurance from Charlemagne that he had not made grants to
the archbishop that impinged upon the Donation. The pope then com-
plained that Leos missi, who were at the Frankish court, were telling lies
about the rights of the Ravenna church in these various territories, and
that other of the archbishops missi were acting illegally in these same ter-
ritories. Hadrian summarized the situation by asserting that Charlemagne
was bound to see to it that the lands seized by Leo were returned to the
Holy See.142
Tension in relations between Rome and the Frankish court were
increased further by Hadrians missus, Anastasius, who, in addition to the
letter discussed above, had been instructed to give Charlemagne an oral
message from the pope. However, Anastasius, in the course of his audi-
ence with Charlemagne, is reported by the king to Hadrian to have insulted
very gravely the royal majesty. As a result, Charlemagne, perhaps contrary
to normal diplomatic practice, had Anastasius detained at the royal
court. Charlemagne then sent two missi, Archbishop Wilichar of Sens and
the Abbot Dodo, to Rome with another letter. In this epistle, which unfor-
tunately no longer survives, Anastasius bad behavior was explained in
detail to the pope.143
Charlemagnes letter, in addition to detailing Anastasius unacceptable
behavior, called to Hadrians attention the criminal actions of a certain
Gausfrid, who had been given a papal recommendation and perhaps even
some sort of papal credentials so that he might be accepted at the
Carolingian court. In this same letter, Charlemagne also made clear to
Hadrian that he would be coming to Rome personally in October of the
next year, i.e. after he had completed his forthcoming invasion of Saxon
territory, in order to settle matters concerning the Donation. Hadrian
was placed on the defensive at this point because of the behavior of
Frankish court and the two letters set by Charlemagne to Hadrian are no longer extant. We
learn of all three of these lost letters from the popes letter that has survived.
142DK., no. 49.
143DK., nos. 50, 51, 52.
418 chapter six
Anastasius and of Gausfrid. As a result, in a subsequent letter, the pope left

the impression that he was mollified by Charlemagnes promise of a forth-
coming visit. Hadrian leaves the impression that Charlemagnes appear-
ance in Rome would result in solving all existing problems.144
Abbot Fulrads role in advising Charlemagne regarding his epistolary
exchanges with Pope Hadrian is underscored by the fact that the abbot
of St. Denis remained at the kings side during this entire period.145 In
fact, Fulrad remained at court not only through the early autumn and win-
ter of 774, but through the spring and most of the summer of 775, i.e. until
Charlemagne led his forces in an invasion of Saxon territory. Throughout
this period, Charlemagne authorized a series of charters in favor of
St. Denis. These grants, however, are not to be seen merely as an apprecia-
tion by a grateful monarch to the faithful adviser who helped to guide
Carolingian policy in Italian affairs. Rather, these acta are to be under-
stood as illustrative of royal policies involving the monastery of St. Denis
as a major cog in Charlemagnes kingdomwide administration.146
Charlemagne moved his court from Dren, still in the company of
Abbot Fulrad, to the royal villa at Samoussy. This villa not only was in the
heart of Carlomans erstwhile regnum, but was also the place where
Charlemagnes brother had died less than two years earlier.147 At Samoussy,
Charlemagne made clear his policy that aimed at making the monastery
of St. Denis the dominant power in the region of Paris and westward. An
undertone in these royal acta permits the inference that since Carlomans
death, some local government officials had not been obeying the law as
fully as required, either in the royal interest or in the interest of St. Denis.
First, Charlemagne confirmed the earlier gifts that had been made to
St. Denis in the pagi of Evreux and Chartres. Then, he made a major new
gift from fiscal lands located in various pagi throughout the western
reaches of Francia. In addition to this landed wealth, Charlemagne gave
St. Denis full authority over markets, taxes, and tolls which concerned all
of their lands or other facultates. Noteworthy is the right to deal directly
with all merchants operating in villae belonging to the monastery to the
exclusion of all local officials, i.e. comites, viscomites, vicarii, centenarii, and
exactores.148
144DK., nos. 50, 51, 52.

145DK. nos. 83, 84, 87, 88, 92, 93, 101, 102.
146DK. nos. 83, 84, 87, 88, 92, 93, 101, 102.
147DK. nos. 87; and Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, nos. 175 (171), for
Charlemagne at Samoussy in the company of Abbot Fulrad.
148DK, no. 87.
From Samoussy, the court moved on to the royal villa at Verberie, which
was located about midway between Paris and the long-established
Neustrian royal palatium at Quierzy; Charlemagne was still accompanied
by Fulrad.149 At Verberie, Charlemagne continued his policy of strength-
ening the position of St. Denis in the west. He dealt with problems that
had arisen because certain people were reported to have been withhold-
ing the tolls that legitimately were supposed to go to the treasury of
St. Denis, and ordered this illegal activity to cease and the perpetrators to
desist.150
After putting the full force of the royal government behind the reestab-
lishment of the authority of St. Denis in situations in which the rights of
the monastery had been undermined, Charlemagne took specific notice
of the famous fair of St. Denis. This important commercial institution met
annually outside Paris, in the environs of St. Denis itself. Charlemagne
guaranteed to the monks that no public official at the local level would be
permitted to interfere with their collection of tolls in regard to this market.
In issuing this act, Charlemagne was confirming a prior act of immunity
given by King Pippin. Charlemagne, however, makes clear that the count
of Paris and the kings missi were to work together to sustain the rights of
St. Denis by bringing anyone who violated this order directly to the royal
court for trial.151
During the summer, Charlemagne issued still further acta that were
intended to strengthen the position of St. Denis in the west. At issue in
Charlemagnes charter, given on 26 June, was a large complement of villae,
scores of estates identified in no fewer than twelve pagi, that previously
had been possessed by St. Denis but had fallen into the hands of others,
both laymen and clerics. Charlemagne ordered that all of these estates
were to be restored to St. Denis. He also extended the monasterys immu-
nity to include these same lands.152 A month later, on 28 July, Charlemagne
found in favor of Abbot Fulrad and St. Denis in a suit brought by
Herchenradus, bishop of Paris. This suit regarded possession of the mon-
astery of Plaisir, which likely had been an asset lost earlier by St. Denis and
now was being restored to the monastic fisc by Charlemagne.153
149DK. no. 88; and Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Resgesta Imperii, I, nos. 174 (170), regard-
ing the date. They do not seem to give sufficient consideration to the direction of
Charlemagnes travels after he left his winter quarters in 775.
150DK. no. 88.
151DK. no. 88.
152DK. no. 101.
153DK. no. 102.
420 chapter six
Charlemagne was interested not only in using St. Denis to serve as

the crowns major representative in Neustria. He also had use for Fulrad
and his resources in the southeast of the regnum Francorum. In two suc-
cessive grants made during mid-September 774, Charlemagne awarded
to St. Denis estates in Alsace and Alamania, where, it is important to
emphasize, Abbot Fulrad already had developed a well-established terri-
torial presence for St. Denis.154 In the first grant, Charlemagne gave to
St. Denis the exceptionally rich, and therefore very valuable, royal villa of
Herbrechtingen located about 25 kilometers north of Dillingen, where the
Breganz River flowed into the Danube.155 In the second grant, Charlemagne
gave St. Denis a royal villa at Kinzheim about 20 kilometers north of the
Carolingian palatium at Colmar.156 The obvious purpose of these grants,
from a political perspective, was to strengthen the position of his loyal
supporter Fulrad in areas that earlier had been awarded to Carloman by
the Divisio of 768, but which Charlemagne took into his possession in 771
following his brothers death.157
With the immunities that Charlemagne granted in these acta, St. Denis,
like all other immunists, was responsible for raising the militia levies,
both general and expeditionary, when the king proclaimed the bannum.
St. Denis also was responsible for securing the logistical resources from
their lands to support the army on campaign. As a result of building up
St. Denis holdings in the southeast, the central government did not have
to rely as heavily on local comital officials and their subordinates in these
areas, whose loyalty might not yet have been as fully vetted by Charlemagne
as had the loyalty of Abbot Fulrad.
From a strategic perspective, these lands provided various points dapuis
for the support of potential Carolingian military operations against Bavar
ian territory should Tassilo become a serious liability to Charlemagnes
interests. These holdings were too far from the Bavarian frontier itself to
play a direct tactical role in Carolingian offensive operations. However,
they would be of strategic value as magazines to provide logistical support
154DK. nos. 83, 84.

155DK. no. 83; Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, pp. 232233, collects the information regarding
Fulrads position in the region of Herbrechtingen.
156DK. no. 84.
157With regard to the acquisition of additional resources by Fulrad in this area, see
Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, pp. 97, 112, 118, 121, 141, 169, 175, 221, 227232. Hummer, Politics and
Power, pp. 5675, addresses the large question of how the early Carolingians took control of
Alsace, but fails to examine some of the more important micro-initiatives. Hummer obvi-
ously would have benefited from the study of Stoclets work.
in order to sustain an invasion force against Tassilo and, in addition, pro-

vide levies from these lands.158 It must be noted, as well, that St. Denis,
of course, gained substantial economic resources in the east as a result of
these and other gifts from Charlemagne.159 Among the more important of
these economic assets that can be counted to the monasterys advantage
was easier access to several iron mines in the region. The output of these
mines could provide raw materials for the manufacture of products that
were of substantial value. These included both weapons and agricultural
tools.160
The situation in Alsace was of considerable importance to Charlemagne.
Even before he provided additional resources to Fulrad in this region in
September of 774, he had installed, while returning from Italy in the sum-
mer of 774, a new abbot, named Amico, in the very rich monastery of
Murbach. This house was located in Alsace, approximately 20 kilometers
south of the royal palatium at Colmar.161 Charlemagne followed up this
158German scholars under the initial influence of Heinrich Bttner, Geschichte des
Elsass, 1 politische Geschichte des Landes von der Landnahmezeit bis zum Tode Ottos III
(Berlin, 1939), pp. 120123, have widely accepted the notion that Charlemagne was using
St. Denis to develop a cordon of bases around the Bavarian duchy. This idea was further
developed by Josef Fleckenstein, Fulrad von Saint-Denis und der frnkische Ausgriff in
den sddeutschen Raum, in Studien und Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte des grossfrnkischen
und frhdeutschen Adels (Freibourg im Brisgau, 1957), 139.
Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, pp. 418421, who, while calling attention to the Bttner-
Fleckenstein thesis and to various other scholars who have accepted it, rejects the kind of
long-term and deep strategic thinking at the Carolingian court that is inherent in this the-
sis. Stoclet chides these scholars for thinking in Clauswitzian terms, and claims that there
is insufficient information to support such theories. In this context, it is exceptionally
important, however, for us to understand that the early Carolingians firmly grasped the key
role that monastic holdings, which were strategically located in various regions far removed
from the mother house, could have for raising troops and especially for providing logistical
support. Regarding this matter, see Wilhelm Strmer, Zur Frage der Functkionen des
kirchlichen Fernbesitzes im Gebiet der Ostalpen vom 8. bis zum 10 Jahrhundert, in Die
Transalpinen Verbindungen der Bayern, Alemannen und Franken bis zum 10 Jahrhundert, ed.
H. Beumann (Sigmaringen, 1987), 379403.
159Lucien Musset, Signification et destine des domaines excentriques pour les
abbayes de la moiti spetentrionale de la Gaul jusqu la XIe s., in Sous la rgle de Saint
Benot. Structures monastiques et socits en France du moyen ge lpoque moderne (Paris,
1982), 167184, argues that economic motives encouraged St. Denis eastward expansion. In
general, I find that either/or arguments regarding motivation are less convincing that
both/and arguments.
160Stoclet, Autour de Fulrad, pp. 421434, like Musset, cited above, prefers the economic
motive for Charlemagnes grants and focuses, in particular, on the importance of iron min-
ing for the purpose of providing better equipment for Charlemagnes armies.
161See the conflicting views of Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 4652 and Hummer,
Politics and Power, pp. 114115, who debate the relative loyalty to Charlemagne of Amico as
seen in light of his putative family connections. Hummer has the better of the argument,
since Brunners views are sustained solely by prosopographic reconstructions of a rather
422 chapter six
appointment rather rapidly, and, early in 775, Amico was summoned to

the kings Easter court at Quierzy. There, the recently appointed abbot
presented to the king a dossier of documents, or auctoritates, for the
inspection of the relevant royal officials. These acta, issued by previ
ous principes, were examined and affirmed to indicate that the early
Carolingians, apparently including Charlemagnes now deceased brother
Carloman, had granted and renewed immunities for Murbach. On 4 April,
Charlemagne confirmed and granted a traditional immunity to Murbach.
This act freed the monastery from the intervention of local government
officials and left the abbot with the responsibility for mobilizing the
houses military contingents and logistical support when the royal ban-
num was proclaimed.162
Throughout the months following his return from Italy, Charlemagne
demonstrated his concern for strengthening his access to the northeastern
reaches of Italy through the Brenner pass, and also with the maintenance
of key military assets in the southeast of the regnum Francorum. These
interests were balanced, however, by his attention to the Saxon frontier.
While still at Dren in late September of 774, Charlemagne granted a blan-
ket immunity from the interference of public officials of the local admin-
istration (comites, vicecomites, vicarii, centenarii, and exactores) with the
monastery of Fulda headed by Abbot Sturm. This act eliminates any doubt
entertained by modern scholars that the monastery was to continue to
play a major, if not, in fact, the major, role in support of Charlemagnes
military operations in the Saxon territory in the near future. Charlemagne
set out the military rationale for this grant to Fulda in specific terms: We
believe that granting appropriate beneficia [in this case to Fulda] maxi-
mally increases the defense of our kingdom.163
At Quierzy, where Charlemagne established the Carolingian court for
the celebration of the Christmas holiday, various magnates attended a
placitum publicum, and the Saxon frontier again received considerable
speculative nature. In any case, it is clear, as both scholars agree, that Amico until his death
in 789 was a loyal supporter of Charlemagne.
162DK., no. 95. In developing very close relations with the monasteries within this
region at this time (see, for example, DK., no. 100, concerning Honau about 15 kilometers
north of Strasbourg), Charlemagne was both asserting his control over an erstwhile part of
Carlomans kingdom and following a policy that King Pippin had delineated. Josef Semmler,
Pippin III. und die frnkischen Kloster, Francia, 3 (1975), 88146, remains useful on this
topic.
163DK., no 85. On the same day, Charlemagne gave the monks of Fulda the right to elect
their own abbot subject to his approval. See, DK., no 86.
attention.164 Charlemagne arranged for Bishop Lull of Mainz to hand over

to royal control the monastery of Hersfeld. The prelate had refounded
Hersfeld and seen to the construction of its infrastructure of buildings and
a church on his own lands. In addition, he had given the monastery exten-
sive landed resources and overseen the peopling of the house with reli-
gious living under a monastic rule. The bishop is depicted in the extant
charter, under discussion here, as wishing to assure the survival of Hersfeld.
This house had been built in territory on the upper Weser river approxi-
mately 50 kilometers north of Fulda and, therefore, potentially within
range of Saxon raiders on the Frankish-Saxon frontier. On 5 January 775,
Charlemagne, having accepted Hersfeld under his protection, granted it
an immunity so that it would be free of local secular authority and also of
episcopal authority, i.e. free of Lulls direct influence.165
As a result of Charlemagnes acts, Hersfeld became, along with the
much larger and wealthier house at Fulda, an important cog in the admin-
istration of a frontier region that was to serve as a base for the projection
of Frankish military forces into Saxon territory.166 Charlemagne acted vig-
orously and quickly to help in sustaining Hersfelds independent role as an
important element of Carolingian military organization in this area. Soon
after taking the monastery under his protection, he granted to Hersfeld a
tenth part of income of the royal villa of Salzungen, located above the
Weser River in the pagus of Threngau. Previously, this tenth-part share
had been held by Bishop Lull directly as a beneficium from Charlemagne.
The Frankish king transferred this holding to Hersfeld, since it would be
easier for the monks to administer the territory from their monastery than
it had been for Lull, who was based at the fortress city of Mainz, more than
150 kilometers distant on the banks of the Rhine.167
Later in the summer, i.e. during the mobilization of the army for the
invasion of the Saxon region, see below, Charlemagne made additional
gifts to Hersfeld in open court. This was done so that the monastery would
be ready, under the terms of the immunity previously granted, to provide
the support required by the government for the planned military opera-
tions from its newly acquired estates. Charlemagne wanted to be sure that
the resources from this new gift would be readily available without any
164ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775.

165DK, no. 89.
166Lupus, V.S. Wigberti, chs. 2425, leaves the impression that Archbishop Lull, in his
efforts to obtain the relics of St. Wigbertus for Hersfeld, was trying to maintain a major role
in the region.
167DK, no. 90.
424 chapter six
loss of time or confusion. The king made it explicit that the authorities at
the monastery were to take immediate responsibility on 4 August, the
day the charter was given, for the resources that had been granted.168
As contrasted to matters regarding the Saxon frontier, Charlemagne
also was very concerned with the mobilization of military forces from the
various civitates and pagi located further to the west, i.e. well within the
traditional borders of the regnum Francorum. It will be remembered that
when Charlemagne mobilized his army for the invasion of Italy in 773,
troops from many parts of the kingdom were mustered, and clearly he
intended to follow the same policy for future operations in Saxon territory.
Thus, in addition to consulting with and strengthening the positions
of the abbots Fulrad and Sturm, Charlemagne also met with Bishop
Angilramnus of Metz. The latter, a long-time supporter of Pippin and
Charlemagne, later would commission the Gesta Episcoporum Mettensium
for what was projected as the Carolingian family bishopric.169
At the Christmas court and placitum, held at Quierzy, Charlemagne rec-
ognized and strengthened the immunities that previous rulers had granted
to the bishopric of Metz. First, Charlemagne called attention to the vast
geographic distribution of the resources controlled by the bishopric. Then
Charlemagne warned all those government officials, whose officia gave
them jurisdiction in regions on either side of the Rhine, either side of the
Rhne, and even on either side of the Loire, to stay clear of the holdings
and dependents of the church of Metz. In addition to mentioning the
usual lands, churches, and monasteries that traditionally were under the
control of an important bishop, Charlemagnes act draws specific atten-
tion to both vici and castella that were held by Angilramnus. Obviously,
these assets were of great importance in border areas where enemy raids
were possible and perhaps even likely.170
As made clear by the geographical extent covered in Charlemagnes
order to various government officials discussed above, the landed and
human resources of the church of Metz were extensive and distributed
widely over the length and breadth of the regnum Francorum. The church
of Metz obviously had significant resources even in Aquitaine, i.e. the
region south of the Loire and west of the Rhne. Because of the wide
168DK, no. 103.

169Regarding the Gesta, see the useful discussion by Goffart, Narrators of Barbarian
History, pp. 273378. For Bishop Angilramnus at Charlemagnes court at this time, see DK,
no. 91.
170DK, no. 91.
distribution of these resources, Charlemagne recognized that the bishop,

as an immunist in the course of carrying out his obligations to the central
government, might have difficulties in responding as quickly, effectively,
and thoroughly as required by the king to fulfill his obligation to obey the
bannum. As a result, Charlemagne provided Angilramnus with an immu-
nity that was not absolute, and gave royal officials operating at the local
level, e.g. counts, viscounts, vicarii, centenarii, and exactores, the responsi-
bility for monitoring the behavior of the bishops agents.171
As this charter makes clear, under normal conditions, when the king
proclaimed the bannum, the relevant free men (ingenui) holding land
from the see of Metz went to the military muster (hostis publicus) under
the leadership of the bishops delegate. A similar command structure was
in effect when the king ordered these men to carry out guard duty (wacta)
and construction work on bridges (pons componendus), which also
included road work. If, however, the agents of the bishop of Metz were
seen by the local officials of the royal government as having been remiss in
obeying the bannun with regard to the tres causae identified above, the
count was to confer with these agents. If they did not provide satisfaction,
then the count was to report the matter to the royal court, which then
would deal directly with the bishop. Despite the bishops position as an
immunist, it is clear from this act that officials of the royal government at
the local level maintained lists of the lands possessed by the episcopal fisc
of Metz in each civitas or pagus throughout the regnum Francorum and
also lists of the dependents on these lands who owed service to the gov-
ernment, such as the tres causae.172
Throughout the autumn and winter of 774 and into the spring and fall
of 775, Charlemagne continued to confer with the great ecclesiastical mag-
nates of the regnum Francorum. For example, in early May of 775, Abbot
Manasses of Flavigny was in attendance at the royal court.173 At about the
same time, Abbot Hitherius of Tours, whose monastery, as noted above,
had been given important military responsibilities in Italy, also attended
the royal court.174 Perhaps most interesting is the appearance of Abbot
Probatus of Farfa, who journeyed from the Spoleto region of Italy to
171DK, no. 91. This is important because under the conditions of a normal immunity,
only officials sent from the royal court, i.e. missi dominici, were empowered to impinge
upon an immunists prerogatives.
172DK, no. 91.
173DK, no. 96.
174DK, no. 97.
426 chapter six
Quierzy in July 775. There, Charlemagne extended to Farfa, whose abbot

he now regarded as fully trustworthy, an immunity for all of its lands.175
The policy that King Pippin had developed so well in the regnum
Francorum for the use of monastic and episcopal resources to aid in the
administration of the government, and especially for maintaining effi-
cient military operations, was now extended fully to a monastery in Italy.
As seen above, a strong contingent of prominent church leaders, both
bishops and abbots, attended Charlemagnes court during the period from
late summer 774, when the king returned from Italy, through the late sum-
mer of 775, when he launched his second invasion of Saxon territory.
However, the dozen or so men discussed here perhaps were only a rather
small percentage of the total number of ecclesiastical magnates who vis-
ited with the king, played a role in the placita over which he presided, gave
Charlemagne their advice, and provided information regarded as vital to
the security of the realm from the regions in which they operated.176 In
fact, we know the names only of those bishops and abbots in whose favor
surviving charters were given or who participated in court cases which
have left a record. It is likely that the few acta of this type, that have sur-
vived from these sessions in 774775, were only a small percentage of
those which actually were issued.
Just as we must recognize that we are rather poorly informed regarding
the names and affiliations of the churchmen who attended Charlemagnes
court during this period, it is necessary also to recognize that we are even
more poorly informed regarding names of the important lay figures who
participated in these royal placita. These lacunae exist because, in general,
we learn of the lay participants only from acta for which lay witnesses
(testes) were required. During the entire period between Charlemagnes
return from Italy and the beginning of the Saxon campaign, only one royal
act, given on 28 July 775, survives that required lay witnesses. From this
single document we learn the names of eleven comites: Agmo, Ghaerardus,
Haerericus, Haginus, Haltbertus, Hebroinus, Hermenaldus, Hilderadus,
Lambertus, Radulfus, and Theudbaldus, who were at the court. There is no
indication in this document regarding where any of these officials served
or why they were at court.177
175DK, nos. 9899.

176See Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 316323, regarding intel-
ligence gathering.
177See DK, no. 102; and Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 191 (187).
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SAXON WAR: PHASE TWO
As seen in the previous chapter, prior to his forthcoming invasion of the

Saxon region, Charlemagne met frequently at Quierzy throughout the
winter of 774775 with many of the great magnates of the regnum
Francorum.1 The Saxon poet avers that Charlemagne called a meeting
which was attended by all the great magnates (proceres) of the Frankish
kingdom; influenced by the continuing importance of imitatio imperii, he
characterizes this meeting as a gathering of the entire senatus.2 The use
of this term, however, does not seem to have been mere posturing by a
later 9th-century Saxon who was both a Christian and a Francophile. Pope
Hadrian I, in a letter to Charlemagne, also chose to characterize the meet-
ings attended by these magnates, which the king ordered to be held,
as a senate.3 One wonders whether the intellectuals who surrounded
Charlemagne frequently referred in conversation to these placita as meet-
ings of a senate.
According to the revised version of the court Annals, Charlemagne
averred, while at Quierzy, that he was going to carry the war to the perfidi-
ous and treaty-breaking (foedifragam) Saxon people. He made clear, as
well, that he was going to persevere in this policy until either they were
defeated and subjected to the Christian religion or until they all were
killed.4 These strong pronouncements underscore that whatever inten-
tion the Saxons may have had of deterring Charlemagne from his newly
initiated strategy of conquest would appear to have failed, at least in the
short term, as an invasion was, in fact, being planned by the Magistratus.
No less important, if accurate, is Charlemagnes apparent decision to make
public to an audience of Frankish magnates his long-term intentions in
regard to the conquest of the Saxon region. Information of that type likely
1AE, an. 775, indicates that Charlemagne held a consilium at Quierzy.

2VCM, bk. I, lines 177180 (An. 775).
3CC, no. 59.
4AE, an., 775. Halphen, La conqute, p. 149, argues that this was not Charlemagnes
immediate policy but the result of the Annalists hindsight. However, it must be noted that
the Annalist, though writing after the Saxon policy had succeeded, had among the mem-
bers of his audience men who had been at the court when the policy was instituted, and a
certain degree of rhetorical plausibility was a necessity.
428 chapter seven
would have been transmitted east of the Rhine, and thus the Saxons also
would have been apprised of Charlemagnes long-term war aims.
It was not traditional for the early Carolingians to make such pronounce
ments regarding long-term strategy in a public forum. Although it is clear
that Charlemagnes father, grandfather, and even his great-grandfather
developed and maintained made plans for the long term.5 This apparent
departure from custom by Charlemagne may perhaps permit several infer-
ences to be drawn. For example, it would seem that Charlemagne wanted
the Saxons to know the nature of his long-term plans, at least in general
terms, so they might behave rationally in light of the inevitable. It surely
was evident to the Saxons that the Carolingians possessed overwhelming
military superiority, and although they were for the most part pagans, they
may have understood that Charlemagne and his advisers believed that
God, i.e. some sort of supernatural force in the Saxon way of understand-
ing such matters, was on their side.
Charlemagne, however, also may have been aware of an undercurrent
of discontent or criticism among some of his fideles regarding the continu-
ance of a war of conquest east of the Rhine, when it was obvious that both
southern Italy and Spain were far richer regions. It is also possible that
some of Charlemagnes men may have believed, in light of the relative suc-
cess of the Saxons offensive operations in 773, that a long-term strategy of
conquering the land as far east as the Elbe, if not even beyond, i.e. perhaps
as far as the Oder, should be abandoned. The argument may well have
been made that Carolingian policy should be to maintain the status quo
ante with regard to the Saxons.6
A certain prudence among some of Charlemagnes advisers might sug-
gest that they wanted to avoid carrying out military operations on two
fronts, i.e. in the Saxon region and in northern Italy. Charlemagne may
well have thought it best to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the posi-
tion of his government in this regard, and make clear that he would per-
severe in this policy until either they were defeated and subjected to the
Christian religion or until they all were killed. With a sense of certainty
undergirding royal strategy, those magnates who vigorously participated
in Charlemagnes Drang nach Osten could visualize benefits that would
come their way in terms of the acquisition of new lands as gifts from a
grateful king. Strong support undoubtedly came from ecclesiastical
sources, Many bishops and abbots, as well as members of the lower clergy,

6AE, an., 775.
the saxon war: phase two429
surely supported a policy that would lead to the conversion of the Saxons
to Christianity.
Charlemagnes consultations with many Frankish magnates, both lay
and ecclesiastical, which had taken place during the winter and spring of
775 did nothing to deter his decision that the Carolingian army would
muster at Dren for a major invasion of the Saxon region.7 The important
royal palatium at Dren was located about 40 kilometers west of the for-
tress city of Cologne on the Rhine, where large quantities of supplies easily
could be stockpiled for the march eastward. However, it is clear that this
muster was not to take place at the beginning of May, which was the usual
date for a military mobilization. Rather, the troops would appear to have
been instructed to gather at Dren in July and most probably during the
second half of the month, i.e. after Charlemagne had completed the work
that had to be undertaken at Quierzy and the Saxon assembly had met at
Marklo.8
Charlemagne decided to begin the campaign during the summer, as
had been the case with Carolingian operations in 772, because he intended
to wait for the Saxons to make their military plans at Marklo. Saxon mili-
tary planning at the annual assembly, as discussed above, was undertaken
in a large public gathering with some 3,600 men representing the people
of the hundred pagi of the region, who were drawn from the three militar-
ily worthy sociopolitical groups in society. Not only were the deliberations
undertaken in public, but the gathering at Marklo itself was close to the
Frankish frontier. As a result, it likely was not difficult for the Franks to
learn the nature of the decisions that the Saxons had made. In fact, access
to the gathering at Marklo would appear to have been so easy that the
Anglo-Saxon missionary Lebuin was believed not only to have attended
the assembly, but is reported even to have addressed the representatives.9
7ARF, an. 775; AE, an. 774; and AMP, an. 775.
8It is noteworthy that the AAC, an.775; AGC, an. 775; and ANC., an. 775, all refer to the
muster at Dren as Magi campus. See Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, 8182.
If, in fact, the muster at Dren had been held on 1 May, the troops would have had to
have remained in camp for two months before beginning the campaign. For both logistical
and morale reasons, this must be considered to have been highly unlikely. Regarding the
muster, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Was the Marchfield Part of the Frankish Constitution?
Medieval Studies, 36 (1974), 7885; and reprinted in idem, Armies and Politics in the Early
Medieval West, with the same pagination. Regarding the problems of maintaining a large
force in an encampment for a lengthy period of time see Bachrach, Some Observations,
pp. 125.
9Anon. V.S. Lebuini, ch. 6. Whether Lebuin appeared in his priestly garb as reportedmay
perhaps be an exaggeration. In fact, the entire story may have been a pious creation.
430 chapter seven
With intelligence regarding Saxon plans for the forthcoming campaigning

season, i.e. whether or not they would undertake a mass mobilization,
Charlemagne would be able to plan his invasion in 775 as he had in 772.
By spending most of May at Diedenhofen and the month of June at
Quierzy, Charlemagne intended to give the Saxons no idea of the nature of
his plans for the 775 campaigning season prior to their meeting at Marklo.
Charlemagnes declaration that he would conquer the Saxons, noted
above, if accurate, obviously was a statement of general policy and not a
specific plan for military operations during the forthcoming season.
Adalhard of Corbie, Charlemagnes cousin, made clear in his De ordine
palatii that the Magistratus, which undertook the planning of particular
Carolingian military operations, placed great value in maintaining secrecy
even at the royal court itself.10 It is evident from the subsequent actions
of the Saxons at Marklo that the representatives concluded that a unified
military operation against Carolingian assets of the type launched late
in 773 would not to be undertaken in the spring of 775. Whether these
representatives at Marklo also concluded that Charlemagne had been
satisfied with the result of the raids carried out by his scarae the previous
autumn or they assumed that he would return to Italy in 775 cannot be
ascertained.
Mobilization and Invasion
Throughout the latter part of July, a massive Carolingian army began mus-
tering at Dren. One source observes that the army was composed of all
of the men of the regnum.11 This, of course, means, at the least, that all of
the territories within the traditional heartland of the regnum Francorum,
i.e. Neustria, Austrasia, Burgundy, and Aquitaine, were called upon to send
troops. It is possible that troops also were mobilized in Frisia, Thuringia,
and Alamania, which had been integrated or reintegrated into the Frankish
kingdom by the early Carolingians. It is certain, however, that no troops
were drawn from Bavaria since Duke Tassilo, as seen above, had not coop-
erated with the Carolingians since the campaigning season of 763, when
However, were it not known that foreigners could, in fact, gain access to the deliberations
of the Saxon assembly, then the tale of Lebuins behavior would lack rhetorical
plausibility.
10Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, p. 327.
11AE, an. 775. Cf. Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, line 200 (an. 775), where emphasis is given to
duces omnisque simul delexta iuventus.
he putatively deserted from the Carolingian army just prior to the initia-
tion of the siege of Bourges.
Charlemagne, in his consultations with his officials and magnates,
informed them of the date of the muster at Dren, and the types of troops
that they were required to mobilize for the campaign.12 The emphasis
in the pro-Carolingian sources that the army which Charlemagne mus-
tered was exceptionally large is highly significant and likely accurate.
Traditionally, as frequently noted, there is a tendency to portray the home
side as outnumbered by the enemy.13 In going against this tradition, it is
very likely that the Carolingian writers told the truth in an effort to main-
tain their rhetorical plausibility for an audience in part composed of mag-
nates and soldiers at the royal court who already knew that Charlemagne
adhered to the practice that we now call the doctrine of overwhelming
force.14
Charlemagne arrived at Dren from the west no later than 28 July.
He was still accompanied by Abbot Fulrad of Saint Denis.15 At this time,
however, the king was in no hurry to launch his long-planned invasion of
the Saxon region. A week later he was still at Dren where, as noted above,
he granted to the monastery of Hersfeld additional facultates to help the
monastery support the invasion. However, the time was drawing close for
the invasion to begin. On 4 August, Charlemagne ordered that Hersfeld
was to take possession of the newly granted resources, and, as a result, the
monastery would be immediately responsible for providing troops and
logistical support from these lands for the forthcoming effort against the
Saxons.16
When Charlemagne finally launched his second Saxon campaign, prob-
ably before the middle of August, the army not only was to demonstrate
exceptional mobility for so large a force, but also made clear its capacity to
secure a substantial matrix of related military objectives.17 In a period of
no more than 70 days, and perhaps even fewer, elements of Charlemagnes
army would march at least 1,000 kilometers over rough terrain, make

13Bachrach, Early Medieval Military Demography, pp. 320.
14See, for example, Verbruggen, the Art of Wafare, pp. 283284.
15DK. no. 102; and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, nos. 191 (187).
16DK, no. 103; and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, nos. 192 (188).
17From DK. no. 103, it is clear that Charlemagne was still at Dren on 3 August.
Charlemagne returned to Dren no later than 25 October (DK., no. 105). However, even if
Charlemagne left Dren on 4 August and returned on 24 October, the rapid movements of
the Carolingian army during the intervening period would be worthy of note. Cf. Bhmer
and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, pp. 8283.
432 chapter seven
at least 12 river crossings including the Rhine, Ruhr, and Weser, fight three
battles, capture two major fortresses, and accept the submission of three
very important Saxon leaders.18 In the course of this campaign, approxi-
mately six weeks were needed for the men with their equipment simply to
carry out their marches.
In accordance with Charlemagnes plan of operations, the Frankish
army likely was supposed to march an average of some 20 kilometers per
day for six days each week. Horses must be rested at least one day in every
seven. If conditions are particularly unfavorable, e.g. bad weather and
rough terrain, the horses require even more rest or they will break down
and be useless for anything but food. Thus, an average of approximately
120 kilometers per week is about the best an army composed in part of foot
soldiers and in part of mounted troops, and using pack horses and/or
horse drawn vehicles to haul supplies, could be expected to accomplish
over rough terrain in enemy territory for a period of about two months.19
The Capture of the Syburg Fortress
Charlemagne very likely led his large force east from Dren on a two-day
march to the Roman road that followed the west bank of the Rhine to the
neighborhood of Cologne, where fresh supplies easily could be made
available. From there, it was only a short distance northward to the erst-
while later-Roman military base and developing town at Neuss where the
Rhine was traditionally crossed for access to the lower valley of the Ruhr.20
This, in fact, was the route used for the Hellweg system of roads east of
the Rhine, and, in this western section, at least, the road long predated
Charlemagnes reign. The economic development of Neuss and much of
its subsequent prosperity in the Middle Ages can be attributed to its loca-
tion as a key crossing point of the Rhine.21 Although the Romans had
18The basic facts are found in ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775, but the so-called lesser
annals, as will be seen below, provide considerable useful detail.
19Concerning marching rates, see Engels, Alexander, pp. 1125; and Bowlus, Franks,
p. 346, n. 62.
20Concerning the late Roman fortress and settlement at Neuss, see Johnson, Later
Roman Fortifications, 148, n. 53; and J.E. Bogaers and C.B. Rger, Der Niedergermanische
Limes, Kunst und Altertum am Rhein 50 (1974), 147. Regarding Neuss as the basic crossing
point of the Rhine between Cologne and Xanten during the early and high Middle Ages,
see Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, pp. 179, 186.
21Regarding the Hellweg, see the useful introduction by Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship,
pp. 177181. This is not the place to discuss the various problems regarding the dating of this
road system or, indeed, even the part from the Rhine to the Ruhr.
constructed a fort at Moers-Asberg on the west bank of the Rhine in order

to control its confluence with the Ruhr, this general area, because of topo-
graphical concerns, was not regarded as being well-suited as a crossing
point.22
Charlemagnes forces, or at least a significant element of this large army,
crossed the Rhine rapidly, probably on a pontoon bridge, or perhaps even
several such bridges prepared by the kings engineers, and moved some
70 kilometers from the base at Neuss to the valley of the Ruhr at its conflu-
ence with the Lenne. The target of this operation was the formidable
Saxon fortress that had been established many years earlier at Syburg. This
stronghold is referred to as Hohensyburg or Sigiburg in various sources.
Syburg marked the western limit of Saxon penetration in the region of the
middle Rhine and had served for a long time as a well-defended base for
projecting raids into Carolingian territory.23
The Capture of Syburg
Syburg was a hilltop fortress built on a plateau more than 150 meters above
the banks of the Ruhr. This plateau represented a rather flat space on a hill,
the Hohensyburg, that rose to a considerably greater height in the east.
The Saxon stronghold enclosed some eight hectares, and within the walls
of the fortification itself were two additional hillocks, one on the west and
the other on the southeast. These rose approximately forty meters above
the plateau. Only future archaeological work, however, will be able to
determine whether one or both of these presumed natural features within
the walls were developed as internal fortifications, although the former,
purely on the basis of its location, would seem likely to have been fortified
in some manner. Above the plateau itself, the Hohensyburg rose rather
rapidly on the east and northeast to a height of 400 meters. The circuit wall
was about 1,600 meters.24 Therefore, to meet the requirements of the
22Regarding the fortifications at Moers-Asberg, see Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications,

p. 140, for the remains of the fort, and concerning the inauspicious situation of the lower
Ruhr valley for military operations, see Wells, German Policy, p. 150.
23AE, an. 775. See the discussion by Brandi, Karls des Grossen Sachsenkriege, pp. 89;
and Halphen, La conqute, p. 149, for this campaign. Regarding the stronghold, see Rafael
von Uslar, Studien zu frhgeschichtlichen Befestigungen zwischen Nordsee und Alpen (Graz,
1964), pp. 34, 36, 43, 64, 195; and Hans-Jrgen Brachmann, Die schsich-frankischen
Auseinandersetzumgen des 8. Jahrhunderts im Siegel des Befestigungsbaues, Zeitschrift
fr Archologie, 19 (1984), 217218.
24Uslar, Studien, pp. 34, 36, 43, 64, 195; and Brachmann, Die schsich-frankischen
Auseinandersetzumgen, pp. 217218.
434 chapter seven
period for adequate defense, Syburg likely had a Saxon garrison in the
neighborhood of 1350 men at a minimum.25
This fortification, to echo Vegetius understanding of such matters, was
strong not only through human endeavor but through nature as well.26
Three sides of this hilltop stronghold were very difficult to access due to
the rugged topography. On the east and northeast, as noted above, the
Hohensyburg rose to some 400 meters, or 200 meters above the fortifica-
tion itself. Access to the south and west of the defenses was very steep as
the hill rose to the fortified plateau more than 150 meters from the north
bank of the Ruhr in a distance of fewer than 60 meters. As a result, the only
likely direction from which the Carolingians could launch a large scale
attack on the walls was from the east, which saw the Hohensyburg rise
rather gradually, at least in comparison to the other parts of the defensive
perimeter, approximately 100 meters over a distance of about 300 meters.27
A lengthy siege of the Syburg fortress would likely have been very time-
consuming, and, therefore, Charlemagne decided to take it by storm. As
noted above, the army that Charlemagne ledthe revised court Annals
emphasized thiswas very large and all of these troops would not be
needed even if the walls were to be stormed.28 Also, as noted above, the
entire campaign was carried out rapidly. Therefore, the storming of Syburg
very likely was accomplished only or primarily with the use of scaling
ladders and surely without the construction of an agger made by excavat-
ing large quantities of earth and supporting it with a timber infrastruc-
ture.29 To build a proper work of this type also would have been very
time-consuming.30
It is possible that the defenses, both materially and in terms of casual-
ties, were softened up with missile weapons, both handheld and cata-
pults. The walls may perhaps even have been penetrated through the use
of artillery. In light of the time frame at issue, it must be concluded that
the Carolingian army stormed the walls of the castrum, likely from the
north, using only scaling ladders. According to one account, Syburg fell

26See DRM, bk.IV, ch. 1. Vegetius usage was adopted by Gregory of Tours. See, regarding
the latter, Bachrach, Gregory of Tours, pp. 351363.
27Uslar, Studien, pp. 3436; and Brachmann, Die schsich-frankischen Auseinander
setzumgen, pp. 217218.
28AE, an. 775.
29ARF, an. 776, make clear that under normal circumstances an agger was required
if the walls were to be stormed.
30See Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 142143, for some calculations regarding such projects.
to the Carolingians on the first assault.31 From the perspective of Carolin

gian campaign strategy, Charlemagnes attack on and rapid capture of
the fortress at Syburg recalls the plan that Pippin executed for his initial
operations in the Auvergne about fifteen years earlier as he prepared for
his lengthy conquest of Aquitaine.32
Following the capture of Syburg, Charlemagne disposed of those mem-
bers of the Saxon garrison who survived, although he did so in a manner
that would appear not to have interested those participants in the opera-
tion who provided information to the writers who later reported the
victory. The sources, however, do report that the king established a formi-
dable Frankish garrison in the castrum.33 This was a force composed of
high-quality troops, and it would seem that the garrison also was of con-
siderable size, as it is emphasized that these men were not deployed solely
to defend the stronghold. The garrison was to maintain, as well, a capacity
for independent offensive action in the field against enemy units that
might be of superior size, e.g. a force intent upon laying siege to the
fortifications.34
In addition, Charlemagne left sufficient workmen available at Syburg to
construct within the castrum itself a church dedicated to St. Peter. This
building was completed well before the end of the winter of 775776.35
Also mentioned is the church house, i.e. the place where the religious staff
was to be billeted. This house very likely served as the residence assigned
to the chaplains, who, as noted earlier, traditionally accompanied the
Carolingian army. In this context, one or more chaplains were detailed to
serve the spiritual needs of the garrison.36 It is clear from the order to
build a church and church house that the stronghold of Syburg was to be
integrated into Charlemagnes regnum, and perhaps it was to be used as a
base to support missionaries who were to be deployed in the Ruhr valley
for proselytizing efforts among the pagan Saxons in this region.37
31AE, an. 775.

33ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
34ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776. The operations undertaken by this garrison will be
discussed below.
35ARF, an. 776. It is possible that Charlemagne had a preexisting building turned into a
church, but both the text and the importance of religion to the king would seem to suggest
otherwise.
36See ARF, an. 776, for mention of the domus ecclesiae. It is possible that this too was
a new construction. Regarding chaplains, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 147,
151152, 157, 159.
37Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 1011, 58, does not deal with the situation at Syburg, and on
the whole tends to follow his hagiographic sources which downplay the role of the central
436 chapter seven
Both the church and the church house were constructed in an area that
was outside and to the east and north of the original stronghold at Syburg,
i.e. along the top of the Hohensyburg that rose to a height of some
400 meters. The area within which the church and the church house were
built has been characterized by archaeologists who have studied the situ-
ation as a Vorburg. The walls of the Vorburg enclosed, or at least more or
less enclosed (the archaeological record is not clear), an area of some
seven hectares, which almost doubled the size of the original fortified
space. The question remains to be answered by future archaeological work
as to whether the Vorburg originally had been built by the Saxons or as
part of a substantial enlargement of the fortress of Syburg by Charlemagne.
Such an expansion would provide room for the development of industry,
as was the case within the walls of the fortifications that surrounded the
monastery of Fulda. In addition, a larger fortification also could serve as a
Fluchtbefestigung, or fortified refuge, for a Frankish population that was to
be settled in this part of the Ruhr valley.
The Recapture of Eresburg
The next step in Charlemagnes plan for the subjection of the Saxon region
called for the Carolingians to recapture the key strategic stronghold
located at Eresburg.38 The Saxons had reoccupied and garrisoned Eresburg
after capturing it during their autumn campaign in 773. As seen above, one
of the scarae that Charlemange had deployed from Ingelheim in the
autumn of 774 to reconnoiter the area was engaged in and around
Eresburg in battle by a Saxon force. However, in the summer of 775, when
the Saxons who were deployed to defend Eresburg received information
that Charlemagne was advancing against them, the decision was made to
abandon the fortress. Before the Saxon garrison withdrew, however, these
troops are reported to have put this important stronghold into a condition
that made it impossible to defend.39 The Saxon Poet, a later source, notes
with considerable exaggeration that the Saxon troops who had been
government in orchestrating missionary activity. This Tendenz is consistent with Woods

overall primitivist view of government and administration during Charlemagnes reign.
38ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. Cf. the discussions by Brandi, Karls des Grossen
Sachsenkriege, p. 9; and Halphen, La conqute, p. 149.
39ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. This is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the
sources, which indicate that the Saxons did not engage the Carolingian army at Eresburg in
775 but destroyed the defenses which Charlemagne subsequently had rebuilt.
assigned to Eresburg destroyed the fortifications so that the Franks

would not be able to install a garrison (praesidium) there.40
It is important to take note of the behavior of the Saxon commander at
Eresburg, whether he acted on his own initiative or merely was following
orders from some higher satrapal authority. His actions give implicit rec-
ognition not only to the perceived size and strength of Charlemagnes
army, but also to the supposed effectiveness of its siege train. The Saxon
commanders decision to withdraw the garrison was based on the assump-
tion that the fortress inevitably would be taken by the Carolingians.
Recognizing that the Carolingian siege train was so formidable that trying
to defend fortifications, even formidable ones such as Eresburg, was an
exercise in futility, recalls Duke Waiofers response during the 760s to King
Pippins repeated successes against the great Roman fortress cities of
Aquitaine. Waiofer ordered that these urban fortresses in the territory that
he ruled be rendered indefensible and abandoned by his troops.41
The situation at Eresburg in the late summer of 775 was somewhat more
complicated from a tactical point of view than the broader-based strategic
problems that Waiofer faced. As has now been established, Waiofer lacked
a substantial army with which he could oppose Pippins forces in the field.
By contrast, when the Saxon garrison withdrew from Eresburg, a relief
force was on the march from the east. In light of the average pace at which
these troops could travel, the relief force would soon be at the Brunisberg
ford on the Weser, i.e. only some three or four days march from Eresburg.42
Since the Saxons enjoyed interior lines of communication, it seems highly
unlikely that the garrison commander at Eresburg and his superiors were
unaware that a relief army would arrive at Brunisberg only a few days after
Charlemagnes forces would arrive at Eresburg.43
Such a relief force surely would have been able to provide some support
to the defenders of Eresburg within a week or less of the establishment of
a Carolingian siege, and perhaps some units may have been able even to
arrive there before Charlemagnes army. The Saxons who garrisoned
Eresburg, however, seem to have grasped the tactical significance of the
rapid fall of the stronghold at Syburg and, as a result, decided to abandon
Eresburg to the Franks, at least at this time. Whether Charlemagne, in fact,
chose to take Syburg by storm in order to establish in the minds of the
40VCM, bk. I, lines 206208 (an. 775).

42ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
43ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775, provide the facts.
438 chapter seven
Saxons the capabilities of his army and thereby to dissuade them from
trying to defend Eresburg is a possibility that cannot be dismissed out
of hand.
The Saxon commander at Eresburg, whose name and/or rank have not
survived in the sources, apparently was convinced that the Carolingian
army could take the fortifications quickly, i.e. much in the same way that
Syburg had been taken. The Saxons likely concluded that Charlemagne,
after taking Eresburg, would move eastward toward the Weser, as he had
done in 772. There, undoubtedly, he would engage the Saxon relief force,
mentioned above, somewhere in the neighborhood of Brunisberg or per-
haps somewhat further south in the area of Herstelle. Thus, by withdraw-
ing from Eresburg and undermining its defenses, at least in the short term,
the Saxons can be seen as attempting to deprive the Carolingians, at least
temporarily, of a major fortified base to provide support for Charlemagnes
campaign operations further to the east. On an optimistic note from the
Saxon perspective, with Eresburg indefensible, Charlemagne would be left
without a potential safe haven should his army be defeated in the field and
he found it necessary to withdraw under adverse circumstances.44
Because of the difficult terrain, Charlemagnes march from Syburg
to the fortress at Eresburg on the Diemel River would be difficult even
under normal conditions. However, Charlemagnes army was operating in
enemy territory and likely was encumbered by a considerable supply train.
The best route to Eresburg required the Carolingians to march some
250 kilometers through the upper valley of the Ruhr, then east across the
substantial ridges of the Briloner Hohen into the valley of the upper
Hoppecke, an affluent of the Diemel.45 During the three to three-anda-half
weeks while Charlemagnes army was on the march toward Eresburg, the
Saxons, as noted above, had substantial opportunity to muster their local,
i.e. satrapal, forces, and perhaps even regional forces for defense purposes.
Charlemagnes operations obviously constituted an on rushing war as
understood by the Saxons.
When the Carolingian army arrived at the fortress of Eresburg, they
found, as noted above, that the garrison had withdrawn, and, indeed,
the fortifications had been rendered temporarily indefensible.46
44See ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775, regarding the battle at Brunisberg and the
discussion below, which makes clear that the Saxons had prepared to do battle there.
45ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. See the brief discussions of the terrain by Brandi,
Karls des Grossen Sachsenkriege, p. 9; and Halphen, La conqute, p. 149.
46ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
Therefore, Charlemagne ordered that the stronghold be refortified. Not

only was it necessary for him to detach troops and skilled workmen from
his army to carry out the required restorations, but he also established a
garrison (praesidium) to hold the fortress against a potential enemy coun-
terattack.47 The Saxon Poet refers to the garrison with the term legio, a
common synonym for scara, meaning professional soldiers. In fact, he
uses the plural, legiones, perhaps to suggest the order of magnitude of the
praesidium, i.e. it was composed of more than one unit. The poets classi-
cizing inclinations notwithstanding, the use of the plural here may well
have been an attempt to indicate that Charlemagne detached a very con-
siderable force to repair and to hold Eresburg.48
Carolingian Redeployment
After the capture, or more accurately the recapture, of Eresberg, this

time without enemy opposition, Charlemagne began the second phase of
military operations in the 775 campaign. Whereas the first phase had
focused on the taking of fortifications, Charlemagnes campaign strategy
in this second phase called for a radical operational reorientation. This, in
turn, meant that different types of troops became important. In the initial
stage of the campaign, Charlemagnes operations required the use of large
numbers of foot soldiers, or, at least, men trained to fight on foot, and siege
equipment, especially scaling ladders. The fact that these fortifications
were rather close to the borders of the Carolingian kingdom meant that
the problems inherent in providing logistical support for a large force and
the transport of equipment likely were minimal.
In the second phase, Charlemagne moved from having to be prepared
to undertake siege operations to field operations. These were to be exe-
cuted in parts of Westphalia, Ostphalia, and Angraria, and at a consider-
ably greater distance from the Carolingian frontier. These efforts, therefore,
required considerably more extended lines of supply. From Eresburg,
Charlemagne moved his army eastward around the foothills of the
Teutoburger into Westphalia. His line of march likely followed the easiest
route through the valley of the Diemel for about 50 kilometers to its
confluence with the Weser. At the Weser, Charlemagnes route turned
northward along the left bank of the river. By the time Charlemagnes
47ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.

48VCM, bk. I, line 209 (an. 775).
440 chapter seven
forces reached the banks of the Weser at Herstelle, where it is likely that
he had constructed a fortified encampment in 772, the king probably had
received intelligence from his scouts that a Saxon army was massed at
Brunisberg. This force, according to Charlemagnes scouts, were deployed
to thwart any further Carolingian advance into Saxon territory.49
The Battle of Brunisberg
The sources provide only jejune descriptions of both the Saxon and
Frankish deployments. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Saxons had distrib-
uted their troops in some type of prepared positions on both sides of
the Weser.50 The mountain at Brunisberg dominated the confluence
of the Nethe and the Weser Rivers.51 The combination of nature and of
manmade obstacles would appear to have been formidable. Upon draw-
ing near to the left bank of the Weser, Charlemagne found himself facing
an advanced Saxon position that was intended to block his access to the
ford and thus to the east bank of the river. The Saxons on the west bank
of the Weser would seem to have been deployed in battle-ready condition.
By contrast, those on the east bank of the river, i.e. the great mass of the
Saxon army, would appear still to have been in the process of deploying
when Charlemagnes forces arrived.52
When the Frankish army reached the vicinity of the ford, it was, by
necessity, deployed in a marching column because it had been on the
road. Nevertheless, having come within range of the Saxon advance force,
which was deployed on the left bank of the river, Charlemagne ordered an
attack against the enemy position. As the details that can be gleaned
regarding this engagement would seem to suggest, it was necessary for
Charlemagne to order his men to deploy from column to line in order to
engage the Saxons on a broader front with the likely purpose of envelop-
ing the enemy position. If the Carolingian units that were ordered to
attack had remained in column, they likely could have punched through
the Saxon phalanx. However, these troops would not have been able to
cross the river, as those Saxons on the left and right flanks, who would have
been engaged by the Frankish column, would have been able to envelop
49ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. Cf. the discussion by Brandi, Karls des Grossen
50ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
51See Halphen, La conqute, p. 149, regarding the topography.
52ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
elements of Charlemagnes attacking force, as was to be the case in the

battle of the Suntal mountains less than a decade later.53
If, however, the Carolingians deployed from column to line, Char
lemagnes forces would have greatly expanded their front. This maneuver,
therefore, would have enabled the Franks to envelop the Saxon force,
which obviously was considerably inferior in size to the Carolingian army
under Charlemagnes direct command. With the Saxons surrounded and
the river to their back, the force on the left bank of the river easily could
be cut to pieces.54 None of the Saxons deployed on the left bank are
reported to have retreated, much less to have retreated successfully.55 This
is important because in discussions of battles that took place on a river
bank, it was found to be a useful topos by early medieval writers to describe
men on the losing side as fleeing into the river and drowning in large
numbers.56
The second phase of the Carolingian attack would appear to have
followed hard upon the first. After likely enveloping and destroying the
Saxon vanguard, Charlemagnes troops surely were redeployed once again.
This time they moved from line to column in order to ford the Weser in
the face of the greater part of the Saxon army established on the right bank
of the river.57 Such a redeployment was necessary for two reasons. First,
the manmade ford at the confluence of the Weser and the Nethe Rivers at
Brunisberg, where the water nevertheless was rough, was of necessity very
narrow. As a result, the ford obviously could not accommodate a crossing
by a large army that was spread out in line formation. Secondly, the well-
known and prescribed method for a military force to cross a ford in the
face of the enemy required that it be in position to exercise maximum
shock in order to drive up the banks of the river. If the defenders could
hold the crossing force at bay, it could be destroyed by missile weapons.58
These operations at Brunisberg would seem to make it clear that the
53See AE, an. 782, with the discussion by Bernard S. Bachrach, Caballus et Caballarius
in Medieval Warfare, in The Story of Chivalry, ed. H. Chickering and T. Seiler (Kalamazoo,
1988), 173211; and reprinted in idem, Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade
Europe (London, 2002), with the same pagination, pp. 188189.
54It is clear that the Carolingians understood the value of envelopment tactics. See, for
example, the discussion of the battle of Andernach by Bachrach and Bachrach, Saxon
military Revolution, pp. 210211.
55ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
56For a particularly effective development of the topos, see Gregory, Hist., bk. III, ch. 7;
and Paul, Hist., bk. V, ch. 41.
57ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
58See, Vegetius, DRM, bk. III, ch. 7; and the discussion by Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. 7677,
with reference to additional sources.
442 chapter seven
Carolingians enjoyed considerable tactical flexibility, which only could be

attained through at least a modicum of training.59
In this second attack, the Carolingian army likely remained in column
after crossing the river and again was successful. The sources report that
the Saxons on the east bank of the Weser suffered serious casualties. More
important, however, for our understanding of Charlemagnes battlefield
tactics on the right bank of the river is the fact that a substantial number
of the defeated enemy managed to escape.60 This argues against the idea
that the Saxon army was enveloped by Charlemagnes attacking forces,
which only could have occurred if the Carolingians had redeployed once
again from column to line after crossing the river. One further point
requires notice. Why did the Saxons not envelop the Carolingian force that
attacked in column up the river bank? I would suggest that this column
drove right through the enemy phalanx as there was nothing to the front,
such as a river, to inhibit the charge. The Saxon foot soldiers, therefore,
could not pursue the Franks, much less execute an envelopment as they
were to do in the Sntal Mountains where the latter were blocked at the
front by the Saxons fortifications.
It made sound tactical sense for the Carolingians to have made use of a
deep column formation that was structured to punch through a numerous
enemy force deployed in a phalanx on the east bank of the river. The
Saxons during this period traditionally fought on foot drawn up into a
deep phalanx, which was broadened or deepened depending upon the
tactical situation at hand. In this case, the situation was defense of the
river bank, and the Saxon formation was intended to blunt or stop an
insufficiently forceful enemy charge. If the phalanx held, it was traditional
for the Saxons to envelop the attackers, whose momentum had been
greatly slowed or stopped. This Saxon defensive tactic was used whether
the enemy charge were executed by foot soldiers, mounted troops, or a
combination of both infantry and cavalry.61
Paradoxically, Charlemagnes tactical aims in regard to the second
phase of the battle of Brunisberg are made clear by what he did not do
with regard to the deployment of his forces against the Saxons who fled.
The Frankish king did not order a hot pursuit by his mounted troops
59See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 8586, 184187, 193201, 229230,
regarding training.
60ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
61Bachrach, Caballus et Caballarius, pp. 188189.
of those Saxons, their phalanx broken, who fled from the river bank.62
By all accounts, Carolingian mounted troops were especially effective in
handling pursuit duties of this type, especially against foot soldiers who
were on the run.63 In addition, it is well-known that in such circumstances,
the defeated force is likely to suffer very severe casualties, while the pursu-
ing force usually did not. An increase in the number of prisoners taken
and a greater quantity of booty captured also were the usual results of a
successful pursuit under the kind of circumstances that obtained on the
battlefield at Brunisberg.64
Charlemagne undoubtedly had good reasons for holding his troops
back. First, it is likely that at this time, he lacked fresh intelligence regard-
ing the situation in the region east of Brunisberg. In addition, he did not
know what course of action was going to be taken by the defeated Saxons
following their flight. Further, it is also likely that the better part of the day
had passed while his army marched to Brunisberg, and in the course of the
fighting in a battle that had two distinct phases on both sides of the Weser
River. As a result, further operations in enemy territory, the topography of
which likely was not well-known, might well be overtaken by nightfall.
Carrying out a hot pursuit of the enemy in insufficiently reconnoitered
territory during the night was certainly a prescription for disaster and a
situation to be avoided.
It was common knowledge that Charlemagnes grandfather, Charles
Martel, had not pursued a retreating Muslim army that he had defeated at
Poitiers in 732. Charles too faced the approach of sundown and operating
in a region that his scouts had not reconnoitered.65 As alluded to above,
one of the negative results of the lack of a hot pursuit tended to be the
failure of the victorious forces to capture noteworthy quantities of booty.
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the pro-Carolingian sources have
nothing positive to say in regard to the acquisition of booty following
Charlemagnes double victory at Brunisberg. Nor, in addition, do these
same sources allude either to the taking of numerous prisoners or the
massive slaughter of enemy fighting men.66
The likely Carolingian tactical deployment in the two phases of the
battle of Brunisberg, from column to line and then back to column, was
62ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775, make no mention of a pursuit.
63Bachrach, Caballus et Caballarius, p. 189.
64See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 171172, 185, 198199.
66ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775, along with all the other sources, are silent regarding
booty.
444 chapter seven
effective. Such maneuvers illustrate the training that had been imposed
on Charlemagnes army as well as the command and control exercised by
Frankish officers in the course of extended military operations with two
distinct phases during which the enemy was engaged. Effective Frankish
command and control at this time indicates continuity from the opera-
tions undertaken by Charlemagnes grandfather and father. It may be
recalled that these military virtues were demonstrated at the battle of
Poitiers by Charles Martels phalanx. It held firm against numerous Muslim
attacks throughout a long day of battle, and the Frankish troops avoided
being drawn from their position by enemy ruses such as the feigned
retreat.67 The effective training of the Carolingian army, which included a
strong majority of expeditionary militia forces, was not a new situation
but an established long-term pattern of behavior.68
Finally, it should be emphasized that the maneuvers executed by Char
lemagnes forces had to have been based upon fresh intelligence regarding
the deployment of the Saxons on the banks of the Weser. Frankish
scouts, therefore, likely had reconnoitered the Saxon position some time
beforethe Frankish army arrived at Brunisberg. It is also likely that the
first phase of Charlemagnes overall battle plan, i.e. to deploy from march-
ing column to line, envelop the comparatively small Saxon vanguard on
the west bank of the river, and destroy it, had been established well before
the enemy actually was engaged. The second phase of the battle, to rede-
ploy into column, cross the ford, and, scatter the main enemy force, but
not to pursue the fleeing Saxons, likely was established, in principle, when
the first phase was planned, but obviously could only be finalized after the
success of the initial operation. It must be emphasized here that it is likely
that Charlemagne vigorously insisted that there would be no hot pursuit
of the Saxons on the right bank of the river once they had been defeated.
The large size of the Carolingian army and the relative tactical complex-
ity of both phases of the plan, especially when considered together, sus-
tain the view that Charlemagnes operations at Brunisberg were not the
result of an on-the-spot improvisation. It should be made clear that the
Carolingians could modify one or another aspect of their troop deploy-
ment while in the field. Despite the primitive nature of battlefield
communications, a condition that would last well into the 19th century,

68See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 84131, concerning training and equip-
ment. Of course, there were instances in which training broke down. See, for example,
Bachrach, Caballus et Caballarius, pp. 188189.
Charlemagne was capable of sending messengers, either on foot or on

horseback, to various parts of the battlefield to give new orders to his unit
commanders. No less important, and perhaps even more effective, at least
on occasion, was the use of trumpeters and various types of flags or ban-
ners to send signals to the troops in the field.69
A further Carolingian intelligence advantage may perhaps also be
inferred. The rapid and successful crossing of the Weser at the Brunisberg
ford by Charlemagnes army clearly indicates that the Saxons had not
sabotaged the crossing. Among the traditional methods of sabotage that
were used during the early Middle Ages included the hammering of sharp-
ened wooden stakes into the riverbed or the digging of pits in the riverbed
which would thwart or slow down an enemys crossing. Charlemagnes
battle plan, as suggested above, depended upon the ability of his forces to
cross the Weser in good order so that the Saxon main force on the east
bank could be engaged effectively and driven from its positions. In light
of widespread knowledge regarding methods of sabotage, it seems likely
that Charlemagne had made sure that the ford was reconnoitered prior to
crossing. This perhaps even included an underwater examination before
Charlemagne committed his troops to the attack.70 Such an effort may
have been carried out at some time during the night before the attack,
but it also could have been executed following the first phase of the battle.
As the Carolingians well knew, current or fresh intelligence was of excep-
tional value in regard to tactical success in the near term.71
Redeployment
After establishing control of the ford at Brunisberg by occupying both

banks of the river, Charlemagne did not delay there for very long. He
ordered fortified camps to be constructed on both banks of the river. These
would serve as the Carolingian advance base at the confluence of the
69Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 129, 132, 150151, 177.

70Regarding various types of ruses and traps, some of which directly concern water,
see Gregory, Hist., bk. III, ch. 7; bk. VI, ch. 26, whose work, as frequently mentioned, was
well-known in the Frankish kingdom.
71Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 188190. Halsall, Warfare and Society,
pp. 147149, believes that Scouting seems to have been fairly minimal. However, in draw-
ing this conclusion, he fails to give necessary attention to the parti pris of the sources
and treats the information that he cites as plain text. See also the criticism of Halsall on
the matter of scouting in the early Middle Ages by Clifford J. Rogers, Soldiers Lives Through
History: The Middle Ages (Westport, CT, 2007), p. 147.
446 chapter seven
Weser and Renne rivers and provide control of the ford. Once these castra
were in place, they limited the ability of a Westphalian relief force to move
easily against the right flank of the Carolingian army under Charlemagnes
direct command that was to move north. The Carolingian forces deployed
at these fortifications had to be of a considerable size so that they could
withstand the attack of a large enemy force which intended to storm the
walls.72 The forces now based at Brunisberg could be supplied by boats or
barges moving along the Weser, and, as a result, Charlemagnes troops
would not have had a logistic problem. In addition, the possibility that
Frankish reinforcements might be sent to the region cannot be dismissed
out of hand.
After securing the ford, Charlemagne in effect divided his large army
into three corps. These units were of unequal size and each one was given
a particular mission. The first corps, as noted above, was deployed at
Brunisberg to hold this key position by providing temporary garrisons at
the newly constructed fortifications.73 Charlemagnes second corps, which
was the largest of the three, was led by the king under his direct command.
This force he committed to a twofold mission. Initially, a strike would
be made into Ostphalia at least as far north and east as the Oker river.
Charlemagnes primary goal would seem to have been to gain the submis-
sion of the local satrap Hessi, who ruled there. It was Charlemagnes aim to
have Hessi agree to a pact that would recognize Frankish ditio over the
region. If a treaty were not forthcoming, however, Charlemagne likely
intended to ravage the area. If this operation in western Ostphalia proved
to be successful, i.e. the Carolingians did not suffer significant casualties
nor waste a great deal of time dealing with the enemy, Charlemagne would
then turn his attention to the most westerly district of Angraria, i.e.
Bckegau, in order to obtain the submission of the satrap Bruno.74
Charlemagnes third unit was assigned to patrol the left, or western,
bank of the Weser north of the pass through the Wesergebirge as far to
the north and east as the region around Minden. This corps, to which
Charlemagne assigned a notable contingent of mounted forces, was
deployed as a blocking force. The duty of these troops, like that of the force
that had been stationed at Brunisberg, was to keep a Westphalian army
72ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.

73ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
74For Charlemagnes deployments, see ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. In light of the
rapidity of Charlemagnes troop movements, the specific geographical locations at which
he had his troops concentrate, and the specific sequence of these movements, it seems
likely that all these efforts were planned in advance.
from crossing the Weser in order to aid the Angrarians in Bckegau, i.e.
the forces which, as noted above, were led by Bruno. This third unit
constructed its fortified base at Lbbecke, close to the Weser and about 20
kilometers west-southwest of Minden. However, the third unit was handi-
capped to some extent by the fact that its horses could not be supplied
from bases in the rear, and, therefore, fodder would have to be obtained
through the tactically dangerous practice of foraging in enemy territory.75
As might be expected, the sources focus their main attention on the
military operations undertaken by the forces under Charlemagnes direct
command. This force is depicted as advancing eastward into Ostphalia,
i.e. very likely through the hilly terrain of the Weser Bergland and across
the Leine. The army then very probably skirted the foothills of the Harz,
leaving them to the south, and continued east to the banks of the Oker
river.76 The Saxons of this part of Ostphalia, i.e. in the region of Ohrum and
Schningen, had been rather well-known to the Carolingians at least
since 747. At that time, Charlemagnes uncle Grifo had sought and found
support in this region for his war against his brothers, Pippin and Carloman
the Elder, Charlemagnes father and uncle, respectively.77
In 747, these Saxons, on what would appear to have been rather short
notice, had mustered an exercitus that Pippin had found too formidable
to engage with the army that he had brought into the region.78 It would
be odd, indeed, if Charlemagne had not been thoroughly informed regard-
ing the relatively large quantities of manpower that the Saxons in this
region had available a quarter-century or so earlier, which were, in fact,
mobilized and deployed for the local defense.79 As a result, it is likely that
Charlemagne, having learned the lesson that his fathers failure in 747
taught, brought a very large army into this part of Ostphalia in 775.
The corps under Charlemagnes direct command was transporting its
own logistical support. It also was slowed by the rather difficult terrain as
it marched toward the Oker. Consequently, it likely took about a week, or
perhaps a few days longer, before this force had marched approximately
100 kilometers from the camp at Brunisberg to the Oker. This gave Hessi
75The basic facts are found in ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775, although the latter
confounds the unit deployed at Brunisberg with the mobile force sent north into the valley
of the Weser. Cf. the discussion by Brandi, Karls des Grossen Sachsenkriege, pp. 910; and
Halphen, La conqute, pp. 149150.
76ARF, an. 747; and AE, an. 747. See Halphen, La conqute, pp. 149150.
78ARF, an. 747; and AE, an. 747.
79For a later overview that seems to have represented court thinking, see AMP, an. 747.
448 chapter seven
and his supporters an opportunity to mobilize a large force, and as a result,

Charlemagne found a massed Saxon army deployed on the right bank of
the river. The Carolingian court sources are likely correct in indicating that
this Saxon army was composed of all the [fighting men] of the Austreleudi
(Ostphalians) under their leader Hessi. The Frankish sources depict
this Saxon army as a general levy that had been mobilized for the local
defense.80
In light of the terrain and the situation that developed on the banks
of the river, it is likely that this Saxon force had established its main
encampment in and around the agricultural settlement at Ohrum, about
20 kilometers west of Schningen. Charlemagnes force, which deployed
on the left bank of the Oker, was considerably smaller than the army with
which he had begun operations in August. One battle had been fought
to capture the fortress at Syburg, and a two-phased battle had been fought
at Brunisberg. The Carolingian court chroniclers are silent regarding
Frankish casualties in these encounters, which may be an indication that
these biased sources were covering up noteworthy losses suffered by
Charlemagnes army. In addition, Charlemagne had detached substantial
numbers of troops for assignment as garrisons at both the fortresses at
Syburg and Eresburg. He also had detached substantial numbers of skilled
workmen at both places to construct new buildings and to repair the walls
of these strongholds. Further, Charlemagne stationed a large unit at
Brunisberg following the two-phased battle there and the building of two
fortified camps. Finally, a substantial unit had been detached to operate as
a mobile field force on the left bank of the Weser with a fortified base at
Lbbecke.
Nevertheless, the Carolingian army, which now faced the Saxons, was of
sufficiently impressive size and carrying sufficiently threatening arma-
ment that Hessi and his men were thoroughly intimidated. As the author
of the revised annals put it: Hessi, one of the Saxon primores, came with
all of the Ostphalians to face Charlemagne. However, after what clearly
was a parlay of some sort, Hessi gave hostages and swore an oath of faith-
fulness (fidelitas) to Charlemagne as the king had commanded.81 It is
clear that Charlemagne was interested in obtaining ditio over the Saxons
of this region, as indicated by their swearing an oath of faithfulness.
80ARF, an. 775; AE, an. 775. N.b. Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, line 209 (an. 775), prefers the
term legio to denote the Carolingian force.
81AE, an. 775.
As noted above, the transfer of hostages to Charlemagne had the dual

purpose of providing surety for the agreement made by the Saxons and
serving as a symbol of their submission.
From a military perspective, the Saxons loss of nerve seems somewhat
surprising. Their defensive position on the river bank provided them with
a considerable tactical advantage. Crossing a river in the face of an
emplaced enemy was understood to be one of the most difficult maneu-
vers for armies to execute. Therefore, it seems clear, at the least, that
Charlemagne did not make the same mistake that Pippin had made in 747
by mobilizing too few men for his operations in this area.82 In addition,
Hessi may already have learned of the Carolingian victory at Brunisberg,
during which Charlemagnes men successfully crossed the Weser in the
face of a deployed Saxon phalanx and drove the latter out of their
positions.
On the whole, the situation favored the Saxons. If, for example,
Charlemagne were to undertake the difficult maneuver of crossing the
Oker River in the face of a well-prepared adversary established on the
opposite bank, he still would have to drive the Saxons from their emplace-
ments and either kill or capture those who had been defeated. If
Charlemagnes army were successful in these efforts without suffering
substantial losses, the Franks still would have to deal with those Saxons
who had managed to escape. In such circumstances, the Saxons surely had
the capacity to regroup. They also could expect reinforcements in order to
fight on their own soil against invaders. At the least, the Saxon survivors at
the Oker could harass the Carolingians on terrain that the Franks had not
yet effectively reconnoitered.
The easiest way to explain Hessis failure to fight is to conclude that
the Saxon leader was merely the local satrap, who at that time was in com-
mand only of the general levy of his own Gau. It must be assumed that the
Saxons on the banks of the Oker had not received significant reinforce-
ments when they encountered Charlemagnes main force in order to
face a very large Frankish army.83 Charlemagne perhaps was not overly
surprised when Hessi indicated that he was very much inclined to sue for
peace. The Saxons are reported to have offered to provide Charlemagne
with as many hostages as he might want and, in addition, they promised to
swear oaths of faithfulness to him. Charlemagne accepted the Saxon offer.
82ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.

83N.b. Hessi is called one of the primores of the Saxons in AE, an. 775.
450 chapter seven
Hostages were handed over, though the number has not been recorded
in the sources, and sacramenta were sworn. Presumably, all of the Saxons
then under arms on the banks of the Oker recognized that they would be
fideles of the lord king Charles. Whether these men spoke, or, for that
matter, swore as proxies, for those Saxons who were not there would be a
matter of some controversy.84
After dealing with Hessi, Charlemagne moved his forces more than
a hundred kilometers north-northwest across the lower course of the
Leine and into the Bckegau, i.e. the pagus of Western Angraria on the
frontier with Westphalia and in the general area of Hockeleve, Minden,
and Medofullio.85 There Bruno, who is styled one of the optimates of the
region and is said to have been accompanied by all the rest of the opti-
mates of the pagus, came to meet Charlemagne.86 Obviously, after some
sort of negotiations over which all the sources pass in silence, the
Angrarians are reported to have responded positively to an order from
Charlemagne. As a result of this iussum, the Saxons gave Charlemagne
hostages, just as Hessi had done in Ostphalia, and then swore oaths to be
faithful (iuramentis fideles) to him. According to one source, the
Saxons also swore to be faithful to the Franci in general.87
Following his success with Hessi and Bruno, Charlemagne decided that
it was time to end the campaign and to begin the march homeward. Before
returning to his main base camp at Brunisberg, Charlemagnes first step
was to link up with the force which he had deployed at the stronghold of
Lbbecke, which had been assigned to patrol the banks of the Weser in
order to block the possible approach of Saxon troops from the west.88
When he reached Lbbecke, Charlemagne learned that the unit which he
had deployed there only a short time earlier had barely won a hard-fought
battle within the fortification itself.89 In fact, these troops had been duped
very effectively by a Saxon ruse dguerre.90
84ARF, an. 775. AE, an. 775. Cf. Halphen, La conqute, p. 150.
85ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775. Cf. the discussion by Brandi, Karls des Grossen
86Optimates is the term found in ARF, an. 775. By contrast, AE, an. 775, uses primores.
N.b. Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, line 226 (an. 775), uses the term duces.
87ARF, an. 775; AE, an. 775; Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, lines 226227 (an. 775), from which
the quotations have been taken; and AMP, an. 775, regarding the Franci.
88ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775.
89The basic sources are ARF, an. 775; and AE, an. 775. The latter, however, is somewhat
confused.
90AE, an. 775; and Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, lines 240248 (an. 775). The point of this
report is to raise the question of a ruse dguerre. Cf. Nelson, Frankish Identity, p. 76, who
suggests that this episode should be taken to mean that Franks and Saxons did not look
The Carolingian stronghold had been compromised in a very bloody

battle, but in the end the position at Lbbecke had not been lost. As the
story unfolds, the Saxons would appear to have trained and equipped a
special force. This troop of Saxons either wore the uniforms of dead or
captured Frankish soldiers, or, at the very least, were dressed in the man-
ner in which the Franks traditionally were clad. In addition, the men in
this Saxon unit were provided with arms that would be recognized easily
as being of the type normally used by Frankish foot soldiers. Finally, these
Saxon special forces spoke the Frankish language or dialect sufficiently
well to fool at least some of Charlemagnes troops, who, after having con-
versed with them, believed that they too were Franks.91
Thoroughly, or, at the least, effectively, disguised as Frankish fighting
men, this Saxon special-forces team mingled with a detachment of Car
olingian foragers (pabulatores) who were returning to camp. These men
had been sent out to obtain fodder for the horses that were being main-
tained within the Frankish fortifications. At about three oclock in the
afternoon, when the pabulatores apparently were returning to the camp
laden with hay and/or grass after a rather lengthy and apparently tiring
mission, the disguised Saxons mixed in with them and helped to bring into
the stronghold the loads of fodder that had been foraged and which
probably were being transported in horse-drawn carts.92
The unwary foragers and many of the guards at the gate of the encamp-
ment, who apparently were caught sleeping at their posts, or at least were
in a semi-somnolent state, were cut down. With the advantage of surprise,
the Saxons were able to bring a considerable number of reinforcements
into the camp through the now unguarded gate. As the situation devel-
oped, the remainder of the Carolingian unit that was stationed within the
very different from each other. This observation misses the point made in the sources,
which stresses the effort made by the Saxons to blend in. With regard to other such ruses,
see Gregory, Hist., bk. X, ch. 9.
91AE, an. 775, confounds the force left in this encampment on the Weser with the
mobile force that fought a battle in the field at Lbbecke, 20 kilometers east of the Weser
and 75 kilometers north of Brunisberg. ARF, an. 775, always eager to omit instances that
illustrate Carolingian errors, does not discuss the effort of the Westphalians to take the
Carolingian castra under discussion here. The Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, lines 230258 (an.
775), does his best to make sense of the account in AE, loc. cit., but is of interest only
because of the detail he adds concerning Carolingian foraging practices. Cf. Halphen, La
conqute, pp. 150150, who follows AE in confounding the two encounters and further
confuses matters by concluding that the ninth hour of the day was already nighttime
rather than about three in the afternoon. N.b. the Saxon force discussed by Gregory of
Tours (Hist., bk. X, ch. 9) was deployed similarly.
92AE, an. 775; and Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, lines 240248 (an. 775).
452 chapter seven
fortifications was awakened by the noise and with considerable effort was
able to fight the invading Saxon force to a draw. Both sides are reported to
have been in a very mauled condition, and they agreed, presumably under
some truce deviceno flag, as such, is mentionedto end the battle.
They made an agreement (pactum) by which all fighting came to a halt,
and the Saxons were permitted to leave the encampment under what
would appear to have been a safe conduct of some sort.93
Charlemagne, upon arriving at the Lbbecke encampment, was told
the story regarding the ruse dguerre, and learned that the Saxon force had
retreated from the castra on the Weser not long before his arrival. Without
rest, but very likely with fresh horses, he is said to have led a mounted force
in hot pursuit of the retreating Saxons. According to the author of the
revised Annals, Charlemagnes troops caught up to the remainder of the
Saxon unit, which, upon spotting the pursuit, fled rapidly. Apparently,
they were in no condition to oppose the approaching Frankish force.
Charlemagne ordered his troops to undertake a rapid pursuit of the fleeing
Saxons, and a great many are reported to have been cut down. One result
of this victory thought noteworthy by the court sources was the acquisi-
tion of considerable booty due to the seizure of the Saxon camp to which
the fleeing enemy were trying to return.94
Charlemagne punished those Saxon troops who were captured, whom
curiously the Saxon Poet characterizes as auctores criminis for their ruse
dguerre.95 The reunited Carolingian army was now encumbered with
what may perhaps be considered a noteworthy quantity of booty as well as
Ostphalian and Angrarian hostages, and very likely some Westphalian
prisoners of war. In these circumstances, Charlemagne began the return
march to his fortified camp at Brunisberg. The Carolingian army obviously
went east to the left bank of the Weser and then south through the pass in
the Wesergebirge just beyond Minden. Another 20 kilometers took this
force through the pass to Rehmn, where the topography compelled them
to cross the river. Then in a straight if not always easy march of about four
to five days, i.e. about 60 kilometers through the heart of Weissgau, leaving
93AE, an. 775. Cf. Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, lines 248258 (an. 775), who has the Franks
win an outright victory with no pactum. Nevertheless, the Saxon poet, in what may perhaps
be characterized as a bit of Saxon nationalism (l. 251), quotes Vergil (Aeneid, 2. 390) to the
effect: Trickery or bravery, who might ask with regard to an enemy?
94AE, an. 775, reports Charlemagnes victory, but mentions no booty. By contrast, ARF,
an. 775, mentions that a large amount of booty was captured after Charlemagnes force
won the battle near Lbbecke and provides good reason to see two very separate military
actions that the author of the AE, an. 775, partially confounded.
95AE, an. 775; and Saxon Poet, VCM, bk. I, l. 262263 (an. 775).
Detmold to the west and Schieder to the east, Charlemagnes force arrived
at the fortifications that recently had been constructed at Brunisberg.
Shortly after Charlemagne reached Brunisberg, he is reported to have
left in order to meet with a party of important Westphalians. These men
neither their names nor their ranks are mentioned in the sourcesalso
agreed to provide Charlemagne with hostages.96 By late September, Char
lemagne concluded that he had done all that he had planned to do in the
Saxon region during the campaigning season of 775. Clearly, he had no
intention of remaining in the region through the winter, and obviously
he had not made preparations for such a possibility. He ordered the
encampment at Brunisberg to be abandoned, and the Carolingian army
began the 300-kilometer return march to the region of Cologne, a journey
that probably took about four weeks in light of the distance to be covered,
the transportation of booty that had been captured, including prisoners,
and the hostages who were being escorted back across the Rhine.97
It seems clear that Charlemagne believed that the Saxon campaign of
775 constituted a good beginning. Perhaps it should be seen as a second
beginning, in his efforts to conquer the territory east of the Rhine that
once briefly had been part of the Roman Empire.98 From Charlemagnes
behavior upon returning from these operations, it is clear that he was
focused on continuing his work to establish the infrastructure compo-
nents on the eastern frontier that he believed were necessary to accelerate
the integration of the newly-conquered parts of the Saxon region into the
regnum Francorum. An important part of this process, as Charlemagne
saw the situation, was to move along rapidly the conversion of the Saxon
gens so that these pagans might join the Christian family of peoples,
which, he seems to have believed, likely would encourage their peaceful
cooperation with the Franks.
Charlemagne, as seen above, had arranged for the building of a church
and church house at the newly conquered fortress of Syburg. He also saw
to the construction or rebuilding of a church at Eresburg, which he recon-
quered in 775.99 In working to sustain this policy of Christianizing the
96AE, an. 775.

97Charlemagne arrived at Dren on or beforeindeed, likely several days before
25 October. See DK, nos. 105 and 106 and cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I,
nos. 194 (190); 195 (191).
98Wells, German policy, pp. 238239.
99The fact that in 776, Abbot Sturm was given command of the fortress at Eresburg
certainly permits the inference that a church, or at least some sort of chapel, already had
been constructed there. See, Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (pp. 160161).
454 chapter seven
Saxons, Charlemagne worked with Abbot Sturm of Fulda, who already

had been given warrant to preach among the Saxons, probably after
Charlemagnes victory in 772. The Saxon invasion of 773 had undermined
these efforts temporarily.100 However, after Charlemagnes victory in 775,
Sturm once again was established by the Carolingian government to play
the leadership role in the missionary effort throughout much of Saxon
territory.101
Charlemagne understood, however, that the process of pacifying the
Saxons and converting them to Christianity would require at least another
campaign east of the Weser. To prepare for these military operations and
share with Sturm his ideas regarding the conversion of the Saxons,
Charlemagne summoned the abbot of Fulda to the royal court at Dren.
At this meeting, Charlemagne provided the monastery of Fulda with a
substantial quantity of additional resources. These included the monas-
tery of Holzkirchen located within the pagus of Wandsassin above the
Albstadt river, a tributary of the Weser. Among the facultates that per-
tained to Holzkirchen were the strongholds, or presidia, which belonged
to it and thus could serve as useful military bases, both defensively should
the Saxon break their treaties and offensively for the purposing of serving
as magazines for logistical support.102
Simultaneously, Charlemagne worked to strengthen the monastery at
Hersfeld, over which, as seen above, he had recently asserted his direct
authority. This house was much poorer than Fulda but somewhat closer to
the Saxon front. Hersfeld had been founded ca. 736 by Boniface.103 This
was eight years before Boniface founded Fulda in 744.104 The former, how-
ever, had never been given the opportunity to develop fully as a monas-
tery. Rather, it was maintained only as a hermitage.105 This truncated
development, it was widely understood, was because Hersfeld was
regarded as being far too exposed to Saxon military operations and thus
100Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, chs. 2324, as discussed above.

102DK. no. 106. See, for example, with regard to Holzkirchen, the basic work by
August Amrhein, Geschichte des ehemaligen Benediktinerklosters Holzkirchen, Archiv
des historischen Vereins fr Unterfranken und Aschaffenburg 38 (1896), 37131.
103Karl Heinemeyer, Die Grundung des Klosters Fulda im Rahmen der bonifa-
cianischen Kirchenorganisation, Hessisches Jahrbuch fr Landesgeschichte 30 (1980),
3943.
104Joesf Semmler, Die Anfnge Fuldas als Benediktinerund als Knigskloster, Fuldaer
Geschichtsbltter, 56 (1980), 181200.
105Heinemeyer, Die Grundung, pp. 3943.
less desirable than Fulda as the location for a major religious house.106
With Charlemagnes advances eastward at Saxon expense, Hersfeld was
less threatened.
Almost immediately upon his return, Charlemagne summoned to the
royal palatium at Dren the men who were responsible for the administra-
tion of Hersfeld. At Dren, he granted to the monastery additional landed
and other resources. In fact, two separate charters have survived, which
were issued to Hersfeld at this time.107 Charlemagnes assumption of per-
sonal control over Hersfeld likely was not primarily for religious reasons,
although the fact should not be ignored that a new abbey church and
other important building were constructed at this time.108 More to the
point, from a military perspective, it is important that Charlemagne
wanted a stable and secure administrative center and military base close
to the Saxon front to be developed in economic terms with the gifts of
landed estates mentioned above. With these assets, the monks of Hersfeld
were in a good position to provide logistical support for the Carolingian
army operating further to the east. They also would have responsibility for
mobilizing the militia forces of the general and select levies for the local
defense in these lands should the Saxons take the offensive as had been
the case in 773.
The dependents of Hersfeld could be called upon to serve in the militia
forces needed for the local defense. It is in this context that Charlemagne
licensed the construction at the site of the monastery a very substantial
earthen-wall complex, which was braced with timbers. The wall was
4.5 meters in width and was surrounded by a moat that was 10 meters
wide. The circuit of the wall created a perimeter that was approximately
800 meters and enclosed some 4.4 hectares.109 It seems likely that the eco-
nomic development of Hersfeld as a major monastic center had its origins
in Charlemagnes military strategy aimed at pursuing the conquest of
the Saxon region rather than as the immediate focus of his religious or
missionary policy.
106For a summary of this view, see Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 283.
107DK. nos. 104, 105. These acta were given by Charlemagne to provide a solid documen-
tary basis for the various grants of income-producing property and administrative rights
that he signed over to the monastery so that the monks could help provide the means to
support future Carolingian military operations against the Saxons and their territory.
108Concerning the church and other religious construction at Hersfeld, see the
very useful summary of the state of the question by Parsons, Sites and Monuments,
pp. 310312.
109For basic information on this fortification, see Rolf Gensen, Althessens Frzeit:
frhgeschichtliche Fundsttten und Funde in Nordhessen (Weisbade, 1979), pp. 80, 88.
456 chapter seven
Trouble in Italy
As Charlemagnes efforts to strengthen the eastern frontier during the late

summer of 775 make clear, he understood that further military operations
in Saxon territory would be necessary and was planning a third campaign.
However, just as in 773, when he became convinced that the situation in
Italy required his personal attention, Charlemagne was being forced by
circumstance to consider the possibility that operations in the Saxon
region would have to be postponed and that when the alpine passes
opened, he would have to campaign in the spring of 776 in the Lombard
kingdom. In fact, while Charlemagne had been undertaking military oper-
ations against the Saxons in 775, Pope Hadrian continued to send a stream
of complaints and warnings to the Frankish court regarding the failure of
Charlemagnes officials to implement the Donation in a satisfactory
manner.
The popes complaints, as discussed above briefly, had begun not long
after the kings return to the regnum Francorum in 774. Charlemagne
tended to ignore these communications as he planned the invasion of the
Saxon region during the winter of 774775 and executed the invasion in
the summer of 775. The tenor of Hadrians letters during the course of the
summer of 774 and through much of 775, including the period during
which Charlemagne was campaigning east of the Rhine, demonstrate an
accelerated sense of doom and recrimination. With increasing urgency,
the pope claimed that various forces in Italy and particularly Archbishop
Leo of Ravenna were undermining the terms of the Donation. By exten-
sion, these same forces, according to Hadrian, were greatly damaging the
credibility of Charlemagnes position as rex Langobardorum.110
In light of Hadrians pleas, Charlemagne had promised, prior to the
beginning of his second Saxon campaign, that he would go to Rome in
October 775 in order settle matters in Italy regarding the Donation.
However, by early September of 775, at the latest, as Carolingian military
operations against the Saxons were drawing to a close, it became obvious
to Charlemagne that he would not be able to fulfill his promise to Pope
Hadrian. Therefore, Charlemagne decided to send a missus to the pope.
The new king of the Lombards wrote to Hadrian, and the letter, which was
delivered by two missi, indicated that Charlemagne would dispatch yet
110Pope Hadrian, CC., no. 55, wrote in November 775 that the missus, whom Charlemagne
promised to send to Rome in the previous letter, had not yet arrived.
another missus to Rome in the autumn of 775. This missus would be

empowered to deal with the problems that the pope had identified in
his previous letters regarding the execution of the Donation. The popes
letter indicates that Charlemagne had promised that this envoy would be
dispatched with a royal mandatum so that he might act with full power in
the kings place.111 Since Fulrad was the Carolingians most senior expert
on Italian matters, the abbot of St. Denis likely was to be the missus,
although he is unnamed in the surviving correspondence. Charlemagne, it
is clear, wanted to avoid being personally involved in Italy at this time so
that he could continue military operations in the Saxon region.
Soon after returning to the west, late in the summer of 775, Charlemagne
established his court at Dren, and as noted above, worked on developing
the capacity of Hersfeld to play a key role in supporting his Saxon strategy.
While Charlemagne was temporizing in regard to dealing with the situa-
tion in Italy, Pope Hadrian was becoming increasingly anxious and, on
occasion, not a little strident in his complaints, warnings, and demands.
Late in October, he sent missi to Charlemagnes court with additional
letters. These texts, at least some of which have survived, left no doubt that
the pope was greatly disappointed by Charlemagnes inability to come to
Rome personally, as he had promised earlier in the year, i.e. prior to the
Saxon campaign.112
Perhaps more importantly, several of these letters informed Char
lemagne that the pope had obtained intelligence regarding the formation
of a coalition or, perhaps more accurately, a plot, by several Lombard mag-
nates who are depicted as being hostile both to the new rex Langobardorum
and to Rome. These men, according to Pope Hadrian, were plotting against
both Frankish rule in Italy and against the pope himself. According to one
letter, the dukes of Friuli, Spoleto, and Beneventum are identified specifi-
cally as being among the plotters. These men were thought to be in league
with Adelchis, the son of Desiderius who had escaped to Constantinople
in 774, and the Byzantine emperor, Constantine V.113
As Hadrian explained the situation in his communication to Char
lemagne, John, the Patriarch of Grado, had sent a sealed letter to Rome.
Johns letter provided information regarding the above-mentioned plot
that was intended to overthrow Charlemagnes regnum in Italy. The main
111Pope Hadrian, CC., no. 55.

112CC, no. 54. In this papal letter, dated 27 October 775, Hadrian indicates that the missi
whom Charlemagne had promised to send to Rome had not yet arrived.
113CC, no. 54.
458 chapter seven
point of the popes letter, which was sent to the Frankish court along with
Johns communication or a copy of it, would, however, not seem to have
been aimed primarily as a warning to Charlemagne regarding this plot.
Rather curiously, Hadrians purpose was to expand in detail on what he
regarded as the very dangerous and hostile behavior of Archbishop Leo of
Ravenna. According to Hadrian, when Johns messenger passed through
Ravenna on his way to Rome, he was seized by Leos agents. The arch-
bishop had the letter opened, i.e. the seals were broken, and he read it.
Then, as reported by Hadrian, Leo forwarded the opened letter to Rome.
The pope regarded Leos action as an indication of his ongoing nefarious
behavior and of his evil intent toward both Rome and Charlemagne.114
Although only the popes letter to Charlemagne has survived, it is obvi-
ous, prima facie, that nothing in Johns letter to Hadrian could be con-
strued as incriminating Leo in the supposed plot that was being hatched.
If such were the case, the archbishop certainly would not have forwarded
the letter to Rome after having it intercepted at Ravenna and read.
Nevertheless, the pope, in his own letter to Charlemagne, uses the fact that
the archbishop of Ravenna intercepted and opened the patriarchs epistle
as the basis for accusing Leo of spying in the interest of the plan to over-
throw the new rex Langobardorum. Hadrians letter to Charlemagne gives
special attention to the various ways in which Leo has worked to under-
mine Charlemagnes Donation. The pope details how Leos agents sub-
verted papal authority in the Pentopolis, in the cities of Emilia, including
Gavello, which is given special focus, as well as at Imola and Bologna.115
Hadrians letter reached Charlemagne by early November, just as the
situation in Italy would seem to have been worsening. At this time, Abbot
Fulrad is again seen to be at the kings side. It is evident from the popes
communications that Charlemagne had not sent the promised missus to
Rome, who was supposed to have been given royal authority, a mandatum,
to solve all outstanding problems regarding the Donation.116 More to
the point, it had long been clear to the Carolingians, as noted above, that
papal complaints regarding various dire threats posed by the Lombards,
Byzantines, and others traditionally were highly exaggerated. These com-
plaints simply could not be taken at face value. Their purpose, in general,
was to provide a basis for eliciting direct and rapid Frankish military
intervention.
114CC, no. 54.

115CC, no. 54.
116CC, no. 107.
Nevertheless, while papal warnings were highly suspect, they could

not be ignored summarily. Some sort of response was required by the
Frankish court. In this specific case, information regarding a supposed
plot to overthrow the new Lombard king, which may have been given
considerable substance in the letter originally sent by the Patriarch John,
certainly could not be ignored. As a result, Charlemagne sent two missi,
Possessor and Rabigaud, to the Lombard capital of Pavia. They were given
strict instructions by Charlemagne to avoid going directly to Rome at the
beginning of their mission and to avoid making personal contact either
with the pope or with his agents prior to ascertaining on their own the
nature of the situation. In short, Charlemagne wanted his missi to avoid
being influenced by Hadrian and his supporters.117
Possessor and Rabigaud were instructed first to visit Pavia. There
they were to ascertain the nature of the present political situation in
the Lombard kingdom as seen by Charlemagnes officials, or judices, at the
capital. Then, the missi were instructed to go to Spoleto and to Beneventum,
seriatim. There, they were to investigate the situation that the pope had
reported in his earlier letter, presumably on the basis of intelligence that
had been gathered by the patriarch of Grado. Finally, these missi were
instructed to make contact with the pope after Charlemagne had been
informed of the results of their mission to Spoleto and Beneventum. Thus,
Possessor and Rabigaud, following Charlemagnes orders, met with the
relevant Carolingian iudices at Pavia, and then went on to meet with Duke
Hildeprand in Spoleto. Finally, they met in Benevento with Duke Arichis,
the son-in-law of the deposed Lombard king Desiderius.118
Frustrated by the behavior of these missi in bypassing Rome and effec-
tively avoiding the popes emissaries, Hadrian, who had obtained intelli-
gence regarding the mission, wrote yet another letter of complaint to
Charlemagne. The pope made clear that he did not take kindly to having
been isolated by the Frankish court from this critical diplomatic process,
on which supposedly hung the vindication, if not the survival, of the
Donation. Charlemagne very likely had acted on the advice of Fulrad and
does not seem to have been perturbed by the popes highly negative reac-
tion. Hadrians four surviving letters to Charlemagne, written between
November 775 and February 776, make very clear, despite the diplomatic
language in which they are couched, that the pope was irate. However,
117We learn about the nature of this mission from two letters sent to Charlemagne
by Pope Hadrian (CC, nos. 55 and 56).
118See CC, nos. 55 and 56.
460 chapter seven
given Romes weak position, the best face which the pope could put on his
putative mistreatment by Charlemagne is to blame the kings envoys for
their lack of diplomatic skill and a proper understanding of protocol.119
The thrust of Hadrians letters nevertheless remained constant. They
reiterated the idea that a great plot was afoot in Italy. The primary aim
of the plot was to take the Lombard throne from Charlemagne and drive
out the Franks. A major subplot exposed by the pope was that the rebels
sought to deprive Rome of its rights and lands as guaranteed by Char
lemagnes Donation, which the new rex Langobardorum had issued legit-
imately in his capacity as ruler or the Lombard kingdom. With regard to
the Donation, it was Hadrians argument that the hostile and aggressive
behavior toward Rome of Archbishop Leo of Ravenna constituted prima
facie evidence for the effort to overthrow Frankish ditio. This would be
achieved, Hadrian contended, merely by the nullification of an extensive
component of papal rights granted by Charlemagne.120
As compared with the archbishops hostile actions described in the
popes earlier letters, Hadrians subsequent communications indicate a
clear worsening of Leos behavior. The archbishops attacks on papal inter-
ests are presented as escalating. Leo was charged with putting an army
into the field in order to enforce control over an increasing number of
lands and people which, according to Hadrian, rightfully were supposed to
be under papal jurisdiction. Hadrian also provides a lengthy list of papal
cities and territories that had been usurped by Archbishop Leo. This treat-
ment of Leos behavior is very much reminiscent of papal complaints
regarding the illegal seizure of papal territory by the Lombards in 773,
which ultimately brought about Frankish intervention.121 Obviously, Pope
Hadrian wanted Charlemagne to lead an army into Italy to settle matters
in the papal interest.
In January of 776, Pope Hadrian wrote to Charlemagne again. In this
letter, he describes what purports to be the details of the great plot.
Hadrian avers that this information was uncovered by his missi while on
a mission to Spoleto. In this letter, Hadrian reiterates that previously and
on numerous occasions, he had provided information to Charlemagne
regarding the plot. The pope implies, however, that the Frankish monarch
has not been paying sufficient attention. Hadrian notes that the papal mis-
sus Stephen found Duke Hildeprand in nefarious conversations with missi
119CC, nos. 5558.

120Pope Hadrians position is made clear in CC., nos. 5558.
121CC., no. 55.
who had been sent to Spoleto by Duke Arichis of Beneventum, Duke

Hrodgaud of Friuli, and Duke Reginbald of Chiusi. According to Hadrian,
these men were plotting the overthrow of Frankish rule in Italy.122
The first step in the conspirators plan, as the pope presented this infor-
mation to Charlemagne, was for the rebel dukes to unite their military
assets. Once this was accomplished, Hrodgaud and the others would ren-
dezvous with Adelchis, Desiderius son, who, after his escape in 774, had
been given an honored place at the Byzantine court. According to this
plan, Adelchis was to lead a combined Byzantine land and naval force,
provided by the emperor, to invade Italy late in March 776. The primary
military target of this invasion, as it is summarized in Hadrians letter, was
the city of Rome. The aim was to capture and loot the city, take the pope
prisoner, depose him, and place a cleric friendly to the rebels on the fisher-
mans throne. Once this had been accomplished, a Lombard, very likely
Adelchis himself, would be established as king of the Lombards by the
successful dukes with combined imperial and papal support.123
It might be a bit of an exaggeration to claim that Hadrians letters appear
to be somewhat hysterical in their tone. This is because previous popes
consistently had sketched highly exaggerated scenarios in the letters that
they wrote to Frankish rulers in order to gain Carolingian diplomatic and
military aid. The Carolingians obviously had become accustomed to such
hyperbole. As evidence for the continuity in this approach, Hadrian in his
January 776 letter to Charlemagne quotes from an epistle sent in 756 by
Pope Stephen II to King Pippin. In this letter, Stephen importuned the king
of the Franks to send military aid immediately to save Rome. More impor-
tantly, Stephen emphasized that the failure of Pippin to provide speedy
and effective support for Rome would result in God rendering an unfavor-
able judgment on his Frankish son. Hadrian raises with Charlemagne the
matter of his failure to enforce the Donation, which, it is evident, had
been proffered by the Frankish ruler under oath. The obvious implication
of Hadrians position is that the failure of Charlemagne to sustain his oath
amounted to perjury.124
Of course, Pope Hadrian knew that he was engaging in a certain amount
of hyperbole. These kinds of exaggerations would seem to have become a
papal norm when dealing with the Carolingians. However, none of the
papal planners could predict what effect scaling back the rhetoric might
122CC., no. 58.

123CC, no. 57.
124CC., no. 57.
462 chapter seven
have. By the time the pope wrote the last-mentioned letter, Charlemagnes
missi, Possessor and Rabigaud, had successfully carried out their diplo-
matic mission to Hildeprand and Arichis. They knew, and Charlemagne
also had been informed, that the dukes of Spoleto and of Beneventum had
chosen not to participate in whatever plots or conspiracies that were being
planned. These missi, after indicating to Charlemagne what they had
accomplished, were instructed by the Frankish court to inform Hadrian of
the success of their mission. In a meeting at Rome, they made clear to the
pope their findings and indicated that if he were not convinced he should
contact both Hildeprand and Arichis directly. The missi informed Hadrian
that Duke Hildeprand would confirm his position as a loyal supporter
of Charlemagne and also that the Beneventan duke would confirm his
decision not to support the rebels.125
Pope Hadrian, however, was very hostile to Duke Hildeprand at this
time. The latter, in fact, had withdrawn the oath by which he had recog-
nized the direct dependence of Spoleto on the pope. This pact between
Hildeprand and Hadrian, as discussed above, had been arranged in 773, i.e.
at about the same time that King Desiderius had suffered defeat in the
clusae and had retreated with his army to defend Pavia. Charlemagne had
supported, and may even have stimulated, Hildeprands diplomatic initia-
tive in regard to Rome and his acceptance of papal ditio. It is very likely
that Hildeprands actions in 773, along with Charlemagnes support for the
new duke of Spoletos position played an important role in convincing
Pope Hadrian that the Frankish king would make a very useful rex
Langobardorum. By the beginning of 776 and probably somewhat earlier,
however, Hildeprand had reversed his previous posture vis--vis the
pope and had recognized Charlemagnes ditio. This can be seen very
plainly in the fact that Hildeprand began dating his charters according to
Charlemagnes regnal years as both rex Francorum and rex Langobardorum
and that he ignored the pope in the relevant clauses of these acta.126
It would seem that Hildeprands brief period of dependence on Rome
not only was anomalous, but perhaps even had been a diplomatic maneu-
ver conceived at the Frankish court. As noted above, Hildeprand began his
career with a close connection to the Carolingians prior to assuming rule
of the ducatus of Spoleto. He then reaffirmed his earlier close ties with
125In CC., no. 57, Hadrian recognizes that Charlemagnes missi had passed this informa-
tion on to him, but claims that from the investigations of his own missus, Stephen, at
Spoleto, he had learned otherwise.
126Regesto di Farfa, nos. cvi, cvii, cix, cxi-cxv.
Charlemagne less than three years later by rejecting papal ditio and accept-
ing the ditio of the new Lombard king. Given these circumstances, it is
possible that he had been Charlemagnes man all along. It is very difficult
to believe that Hildeprand ever seriously considered supporting a plot to
overthrow Charlemagnes position in Italy, and the latter surely was aware
of the loyalty of his fidelis at Spoleto. In fact, Hildeprand offered to go to
Rome himself, perhaps under orders from Charlemagne, to explain the
situation to the pope. The latter, however, rejected the offer.127
Duke Arichis of Beneventum, by contrast with Hildeprand, had no posi-
tive connection with Charlemagne. He was, however, related by marriage
to Adelchis, who was his brother-in-law. There were rumors and perhaps
even more solid information that Adelchis had imperial support to take
the Lombard throne. Yet, Arichis ability to move against Charlemagne
perhaps was limited by the fact that his father-in-law, Desiderius, and his
mother-in-law, were very closely-held prisoners in the regnum Fran
corum.128 Finally, yet another point must be made clear in regard to the
plot to overthrow Charlemagne as rex Langobardorum and place Adelchis
on the throne. At the time the original plans for a revolt presumably were
being made, the provision of a Byzantine army and fleet for a supposed
invasion of Italy certainly was possible. However, in the autumn of 775, the
likelihood of a Byzantine role in military operations was slight. Constan
tineV, the east Roman emperor, died at Constantinople on 14 September
775. In light of the momentous nature of this event, information regarding
Constantines death surely was well-known in the west by the end of
October 775 or not long thereafter.129
Pope Hadrians efforts to manipulate the situation in order to obtain
Charlemagnes direct military intervention for the benefit of Rome were
based, however, upon some very real facts that were of very deep concern
to the papacy, as contrasted merely to unfounded fears. Archbishop Leo
of Ravenna, in effect, was running roughshod over papal claims in the
northeastern parts of Italy. These rights, the pope believed, or at least,
hoped, had been guaranteed to Rome by Charlemagnes Donation. In
fact, Leo was using his not-inconsiderable armed forces, inherited institu-
tionally from the excarch, whom, for all intents and purposes, he had
replaced as ruler of the region to sustain his expansionist efforts.130
127In CC., no. 57, Hadrian provides his version of Hildeprands offer.
128In CC., no. 57.
129See Appendix.
130Brown, Gentlemen and Officers, pp. 9798, 104.
464 chapter seven
In effect, Archbishop Leo was demonstrating that he wielded considerable

military strength and was someone who could not be ignored in relation
to the politics of northeastern Italy.
Leos direct attack on Hadrians claims regarding papal rights made the
archbishops behavior as intolerable to the pope as had been the seizures
of various cities orchestrated by King Desiderius several years earlier.
However, it is clear that the pope was in no position to counter Leos mili-
tary initiatives so far north of Rome with armed forces of his own. What
the pope did not know, or at least refused to recognize in his letters to
Charlemagne, was that Leo had, at least, a modicum of support at the
Carolingian court for these efforts. The archbishops personal visit with
Charlemagne north of the Alps was considered a success even in Rome.
At least one subsequent mission by Leos missi to the royal palace permits
the inference that the archbishops actions with regard to the seizure of
supposed papal territories were not disapproved, much less vigorously
opposed at the Frankish court.131
There is no reason to believe that Charlemagne was interested, at this
time, in curtailing Archbishop Leos operations in the northeast. Positive
ties had been developed between the Frankish court and Leo, despite
Pope Hadrians railing against the archbishops visit north of the Alps. This
state of affairs permits the inference that Charlemagne was interested
in developing a base of Carolingian power in the northeast around the
person of the archbishop of Ravenna and the resources commanded by
the archdiocese. It is clear that the secular aristocracy of the Ravennate
was very much hostile to papal domination. These important magnates
could be counted upon for military support by the archbishop should he
choose to pursue a course that was independent of Roman domination
but consistent with the policies of the new Lombard king in the northeast
of Italy.132
Abbot Fulrad was at Charlemagnes side during this entire period in
which letters were exchanged with the pope regarding the putatively
131The traditional view summarized by Classen, Karl der Grosse, p. 574, that
Charlemagne, in effect, ruled Italy including the lands of St. Peter, has been attacked by
Noble, The Republic, pp. 280281, who claims a certain autonomy for Rome. While Nobles
argument may have some support in the sources for the period after 781, it is not relevant
in the present context. By contrast, Nobles view (pp. 169170) that Ravenna was indepen-
dent of Rome during the period under consideration here is correct.
132T.S. Brown, The Church of Ravenna and the Imperial Administration in the Seventh
Century, EHR 94 (1979), 128, is not limited to the 7th century; and his arguments are
accepted by Noble, The Republic, p. 119, regarding the period now under consideration.
looming crisis and he had been long-aware of the extent and tenacity
of papal territorial aims. If Charlemagne needed any prompting in this
situation, it is likely that Fulrad advised the king to follow a course of
action that supported the development of close relations between the
Franks and the archbishop of Ravenna. In such a relationship, Charlemagne
not only benefited from Leos military strength in the northeast, but the
king also would appear not averse to seeing the overall power of Rome
limited, which under Hadrians leadership had come to be used in a par-
ticularly aggressive manner as, for example, in destroying the tripartite
alliance of 770.133
Charlemagne, as we have seen, had put Leo into office with the support
of Frankish armed forces. In turn, the Frankish invasion of Italy in 773 very
likely had benefited from intelligence regarding the clusae provided by an
important member of the archbishops familia. A strong pro-Carolingian
base of power in the northeast of the peninsula that was independent of
Rome could be of great use to the Carolingians as a bulwark against poten-
tial Byzantine, Bavarian, or even Avar military operations in the area,
while at the same time providing a base for the projection of Carolingian
interests into the Balkans. The papacy, which already had demonstrated
its inability to stop the advances of the archbishop of Ravenna, had no
noteworthy capacity to orchestrate military operations in the northeast-
ern parts of Italy for the purpose of lending support either to Carolingian
diplomacy or to any military strategy that Charlemagne might choose to
undertake.134
If, indeed, Hildeprand and Arichis had been interested in supporting
a plot to place Adelchis on the Lombard throne, as the pope claimed,
these dukes were encouraged effectively by Charlemagnes missi to see
their self-interest in not joining a conspiracy against the new rex
Langobardorum. It is also clear that following the death of Constantine V
in mid-September 775, there was very little likelihood that Adelchis would
be able to appear at Rome with a Byzantine army and fleet. The situation
at Constantinople in the immediate aftermath of the emperors death was
too fluid to expect a major offensive military operation to be orchestrated
in the west.135 In addition, from a purely military perspective, the papal
claim that a Byzantine force was to land at Ostia in March could be
133Concerning the vast nature of papal claims, see Noble, The Republic, pp. 142143.
134Noble, The Republic, p. 180, calls attention to the long-term potential of the Istrian
frontier to be a region of concern to Charlemagne and the inability of the papacy to exer-
cise military and political influence there.
135Ostrogorsky, History, 156157.
466 chapter seven
seriously doubted. Such a naval operation was inherently unlikely as it

would require the Byzantine invasion fleet to sail out of season and this
was very dangerous, if, in fact, not unprecedented.136
Charlemagne knew of the emperors death and the problems inherent
in a March invasion from the east. The pope also knew this, and so did
Arichis and the other Lombard dukes. Nevertheless, it is clear also that
several of the dukes in the northeast, led by Hrodgaud of Friuli, who was
supported by his father-in-law, Stabilius duke of Treviso, and Duke Gaido
of Vicenza, apparently were not dissuaded from their plan to drive
Charlemagne from the Lombard throne.137 Insofar as Hadrian had pressed
the case with Charlemagne for the existence of some sort of plot, and the
Patriarch John of Grado had provided credible intelligence to Rome
regarding that plot, the entire process of gathering information had been
useful in calling the attention of the Carolingians to the intentions of Duke
Hrodgaud and his co-conspirators. The Carolingian court, of course, had
to be diligent in teasing out accurate intelligence from the morass of exag-
geration and misinformation provided by the pope.
Charlemagne undoubtedly regarded Hrodgauds defection as a serious
setback to his policy in Italy. The king, as seen above, had placed Hrodgaud
in power as duke in 774, and either also had put Stabilius into office or had
permitted him to remain in control at Treviso after the fall of the Lombard
kingdom. As a result of his initial positive judgment regarding Hrodgauds
loyalty, Charlemagne may have been somewhat loath to accept Hadrians
intelligence regarding the dukes involvement in a treasonous plot. This
was especially so in light of the popes all too frequent exaggerations
regarding the perils faced by Rome. However, something had to be done
because of the great strategic importance of the region and the threat, in
the long term if not in the short term, presented by Byzantines, Avars, and
Bavarians to use the assets of the duchy of Friuli as an entry from the east
into the rest of northern Italy. It is to be remembered that the Byzantines,
by and large, also controlled the resources of the Venetian lagoon and
particularly its ports.138
136See Appendix.
137See, for example, ARF, an. 776; and AE, an., 776, regarding the plot, in general.
Concerning Duke Stabilius, see AP, an., 776.
138McCormick, Origins, pp. 523526, believes that Venice was more rather than less
independent of the East Roman government at this time. On the basis of hindsight, we now
know that no Byzantine fleet operated in the Lagoon during the period under discussion
here. However, neither Charlemagne nor the Venetians knew that this would be the case
between 776 and 806. At the latter date, of course, the Byzantine fleet was operating in the
Adriatic against the Carolingians.
By February of 776, something of a prelude or opening round of

Hrodgauds revolt may have occurred, or, at least, this is what Pope Hadrian
wanted to Charlemagne believe to be the case. Duke Reginbald of Chiusi,
whom the pope indicated in an earlier letter was a part of the plot, sent an
army to take control of strategically-located territory north of Rome. Pope
Hadrian makes specific mention of Citt di Castello, which Charlemagne
apparently had delivered directly into the hands of the papacy in 774.
However, despite the claim by the pope that Reginbald was part of the plot
to overthrow Charlemagne, the dukes participation is problematic. First,
it must be noted that Reginbald had been a Lombard office holder, as
a gastaldus, and perhaps garrison commander at the castrum of Citt
di Castello prior to Charlemagnes invasion in 773. Then, following
the Frankish victory, Charlemagne made Reginbald duke of Chiusi. This
suggests that as gastaldus, Reginbald had supported Charlemagne, and, as
a result, he had benefited from that relationship by a substantial increase
in rank and status.139
Secondly, Chiusi is only about 140 kilometers north of Rome and very
far removed from Vicenza, Treviso, and Friuli, where rebel power appears
to have been concentrated. Following the Roman roads, Friuli is some
600 kilometers northeast of the papal capital. Therefore, when Pope
Hadrian reported to Charlemagne that Reginbald was in revolt, it is
unlikely that the new Lombard king, closely advised by Abbot Fulrad and
perhaps also by Archbishop Leo of Ravenna, saw this action as connected
to events in the northeast. In addition, it was rumored at the time that
Charlemagne had given Reginbald permission to take control of Citt di
Castello, an action which would have been at papal expense.140 Subse
quently, so far as can be ascertained, Charlemagne neither attacked
Reginbald nor even disciplined him.141
Charlemagnes Response to the Plot
The specific information relayed by Pope Hadrian regarding the Lombard

plot or plots to revolt was, for the most part, old news when it arrived
at the Frankish court during the winter of 775776. It is likely that some
specific intelligence concerning a possible revolt had been provided to
Charlemagne in the letter from the Patriarch of Grado. Hadrians missi had
139CC., no. 58; Harrison, The Early State, p. 145; and Hlawitschka, Franken, p. 23.
140CC., no. 58. See, for example, the discussion by Noble, The Republic, p. 281.
141CC., no. 58; and the sources cited by Hlawitschka, Franken, p. 23.
468 chapter seven
delivered the latter to Charlemagne during the first week or two of

November 775. In addition, several of Hadrians letters, delivered earlier in
the autumn of 775, mention that the popes emissaries had been instructed
to give Charlemagne important information orally. These communica-
tions may also have provided specific details relevant to the ducal plot.
Whether we are to believe that Charlemagne trusted this information is
yet another matter.
We simply do not know the specific means by which Charlemagne
learned about one or another of these plots, if, in fact, there were more
than one. Nor do we know exactly when he concluded that there was, in
fact, a real plot which required that he take military action. Perhaps he
received intelligence in sufficiently compelling detail through a no longer
extant papal letter, or perhaps even through communications provided by
the archbishop of Ravenna. The latters base of power and the lands that
he controlled were much closer to Friuli and the other rebel cities than
were assets under effective papal control from which Hadrian was in a
position to obtain useful information.
By whatever means Charlemagne obtained the information that
impelled him to act, it is clear that relevant intelligence was available at
the Frankish court by late October 775. It was at this time that Possessor
and Rabigaud were sent to Italy by Charlemagne to discuss matters with
the dukes of Spoleto and Beneventum. These missi subsequently provided
their report to the king. This reconstruction of the chronology is sustained
by the fact that by mid-November 775, it is obvious that Charlemagne had
decided that it was necessary to lead an army into Italy in order to deal
with Duke Hrodgaud and his fellow conspirators.142 In more general stra-
tegic terms, this decision meant that a follow-up to Frankish operations in
the Saxon region, i.e. a third phase in the war of conquest, would have to
be postponed at least until the summer of 776 if not until even later.
Appendix
Bringing the News by Sea

The journey from Constantinople to Rome was a distance of 1405 nautical
miles, and the news of the emperors death in 775 undoubtedly was carried
by ship, or at least largely by ship, for most of the journey. In fact, the
142ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.

overland routes prior to arrival on the Italian peninsula itself were not
under effective Byzantine control.143 Since we are interested not only in
the speed with which the news could reach the pope but also the time it
would require for the news to reach Charlemagne (see below), it is to be
noted that the journey by sea from Constantinople to Ravenna was only
1285 nautical miles, i.e. a journey that was 120 nautical miles shorter than
the journey to Rome. It should be added that the movement of news over-
land from Ravenna, which was dominated by Charlemagnes fidelis,
Archbishop Leo, to the regnum Francorum, could be executed, as will be
seen below, far more rapidly than from Rome.
Scholars have long studied the myriad problems at issue in determining
average speeds for ships operating in the Mediterranean during the
ancient and medieval periods.144 As a result, there is considerable consen-
sus on numerous matters. For example, it is well-understood that the
direction of travel and the season of the year during which the journey
took place are the two most important variables or at least two of the more
important variables, along with the type of ship or ships under discussion.
In trying to make some viable generalizations, scholars have concluded
that in the Roman world, as throughout the history of much of the ancient
world, there was, in fact, a normal, or perhaps more accurately, an aver-
age speed for ships operating in the Mediterranean over long distances
under favorable conditions. This figure, it is widely agreed, was approxi-
mately 4.8 knots. The sailing direction for such an average speed is essen-
tially west to east, and the best season was summer.145 Sailing in the
143See McCormick, Origins, pp. 6873, for the blocking of the overland routes.
144The most useful study remains Lionel Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient
World, 2nd ed. (Baltimore-London, 1995); also of value is J.S. Morrison (with a contribution
by J.F. Coates), Greek and Roman Oared Warships (Oxford, 1996). For the medieval
Mediterranean, see the excellent work by John H. Pryor, Geography, technology, and
war. Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean 6491571 (Cambridge, 1988); and
also John H. Pryor and Elizabeth M. Jeffreys, The age of the dromon: the Byzantine navy
ca. 5001204 (Leiden, 2006).
The exceptional effort by Richard Duncan-Jones, Communication-speed and contact
by sea in the Roman empire, in Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (Cambridge,
1990), 729, is the only substantial attempt to provide a quantitative treatment of the
subject. Duncan-Jones concludes (p. 25), There is not enough Roman evidence about
voyage-time to show categorically what speeds were typical. Yet, even if this were possible,
each voyage, from the perspective of the historian dealing with a particular event, cannot
be adjudged to have been typical.
145Casson, Ships and Seamanship, pp. 270296; Morrison, Greek and Roman Oared
Warships, p. 345; Pryor, Geography, pp. 7175; Eickhoff, Seekrieg, pp. 146147, 153; and
McCormick, Origins, p. 482.
470 chapter seven
opposite direction, scholars generally agree, ships could attain only about
half the normal west-east speed, i.e. an average of 2.4 knots could be main-
tained, also during the summer.146
Using these latter data for calculating the speed of a journey from
Constantinople to Rome that began in mid-September, i.e. toward the end
of summer, an average rate of speed would mean that the news of
Constantines death would take about three-and-a-half weeks to reach
Pope Hadrian in the middle of October 775. A journey from Constantinople
to Ravenna would take about three weeks, and thus Archbishop Leo, who,
as seen above, was in close contact with Charlemagne, could have learned
of the emperors death early in October of 775. These estimates assume
that the ship bearing the official news of the emperors death from
Constantinople to the West traveled only during the day. If the message-
bearing ship stopped at Brindisi and the message was handed on to the
post system, the time for reaching either Rome or Ravenna likely could
have been reduced.
The above data represent the average for normal ship speeds traveling
from east to west during the later Roman Empire, of which the Byzantine
government was the direct heir. In this context, we are to understand that
the technology of ship building was continuously improving, although
very slowly. However, there were ships that could travel considerably faster
than so-called normal vessels, most of which were involved in mercan-
tile activity. A good example is the Liburnian galley. This light warship was
not a normal cargo carrying ship and was known to attain speeds greater
than the merchant ships discussed above. These galleys not only carried
two banks of oars but a main mast with a square sail, and a small mast
forward. This meant that the power of the rowers could be supplemented
significantly when the winds were favorable. By stripping a Liburnian gal-
ley of its military accoutrements, especially its ram in the prow and the
fighting castle which traditionally was positioned admidships, the ship
could attain even greater speeds.147 Increased speed likely also could be
146The halving of speed is commonly accepted. See, for example, Pryor, Geography,
p. 36; McCormick, Origins, p. 482; and Duncan-Jones, Communication, pp. 2728. It is of
some importance that Liutprand of Cremona reports (Antapodosis, VI, 4) that he traveled
from Venice to Constantinople in 14 days during the height of the sailing season, 25 August
to 7 September. It is argued by McCormick, Origins, p. 490, that this ship traveled only dur-
ing daylight hours.
147For an excellent description of these galleys, see Morrison, Greek and Roman Oar
Warships, pp. 165, 170175, 264, 317, 330, 345, and fig. 72; and in less detail, see Pryor,
Geography, pp. 5762.
attained by using the highest-quality oarsmen and regularly providing

replacements for tired rowers. It has been estimated that the Liburnian
galley could maintain a speed under oars and prepared for battle of
approximately five knots for a period of six hours.148 With its military gear
stripped and thus more similar to its original Illyrian origins, the Liburnian
galley undoubtedly could maintain even greater speeds and perhaps even
for a longer period of time.
How long into the Byzantine era this particular form of the galley
remained in service is open to question, as the term does not remain cur-
rent into the 7th century. Most of the Liburnians functions, however, were
assumed during the 7th and 8th centuries by the dromon. This ship was
developed in three basic configurations, and the smallest of the group,
which likely replaced the Liburnian galley, does not seem to have been
much different from it.149 The point at issue here, of course, is speed, and
dromon translates as racer.150
It is hardly likely that in the process of disseminating vital news such
as the death of the emperor who apparently was to play a key role in trying
to reconquer northern Italy, the Byzantine government held back any
available resources. It may be suggested that a stripped-down Liburnian
galley, or its 8th-century successor, the dromon, equipped with the finest
oarsmen would stop very briefly at various imperial naval stations and
bases along the course of the journey from Constantinople to Italy in order
to take on fresh crews of rowers, water, and food.151 With these resources
at its command, such a galley might be able to attain an average speed
moving east to west of four knots or perhaps even more. At these speeds,
148Morrison, Greek and Roman Oared Warships, pp. 317, 345.

149Casson, Ships and Seamanship, pp. 148150, for a description of the various types of
dromon, and cf. Morrison, Greek and Roman Oared Warships, p. 317, for a description of the
Liburnian. However, much of what previously has been said of the dromon is now under
discussion. See Pryor and Jeffreys, The Age, pp. 123128, for the substitution of the Liburnian
galley with the dromon.
150See Casson, Ships and Seamanship, p. 148; and the more generalized observations by
Pryor, Geography, pp. 5862, 7273; Pryor and Jeffreys, The Age, pp. 126127; and Eickhoff,
Seekrieg, pp. 146147, 153, for greater speeds attained during the Byzantine period.
151In regard to naval bases and stations, see the basic work by Hlne Ahrweiler,
Byzance et la mer, la marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance
aux VIIe-Xv sicles (Paris, 1966), 4592; and Eickhoff, Seekrieg, pp. 79113, where the naval
bases are discussed as well as ports that the Byzantines controlled. See also the collection
of geographical locations identified by Hlne Ahrweiler, Recherches sur ladiminstration
de lempire byzantin aux IXe-XIe sicles, Bulletin de Correspondance hellnique, LXXXIV
(Athens-Paris, 1960), 1109; and reprinted with the same pagination in Hlne Ahrweiler,
Etudes sur les structures administratives et sociales de Byzance (London, 1971), 8388.
472 chapter seven
the news of Constantines death could be carried by oar and sail in the
neighborhood of 100 nautical miles in the course of each 24-hour period
and reach Rome in approximately two weeks. The journey from Con
stantinople to Ravenna would be about a day or two shorter.
It has recently been argued, however, that the dromon sailed rather
poorly under less-than-ideal conditions, and its rowers in the lower bank
were seriously handicapped in even moderate seas. Added to these prob-
lems is the argument that the ability of a dromon to maintain high speeds
decreased proportionately in relation to the length of the journey, i.e. as its
oarsmen gradually tired.152 Therefore, some scholars have argued that
sending messages from Constantinople to places such as Rome or Ravenna
would have been done by sailing ships capable of riding the waves, hold-
ing the sea in rough weather and of pointing into the wind on a tack.153
This suggestion, however, does not take into consideration the relay model
suggested above. Of comparative interest in this context is the general
agreement by scholars that Viking ships, operating in the north and using
both oars and sails, could average ten knots under best-case conditions.
The Vikings generally did not have coaling stations, i.e. friendly bases or
ports, along the course of their journeys so that the ships could be sup-
plied and fresh oarsmen introduced.154
152Pryor and Jeffreys, The Age, pp. 333335, 338353.

153Pryor and Jeffreys, The Age, pp. 353354. The information provided by Duncan-Jones,
Communication, pp. 729, does not take into consideration these developments, and his
brief discussion of Venetian information ca. 1500 is insufficiently analyzed.
154Ohler, Reisen im Mittelalter, p. 141; and McCormick, Origins, p. 481, credits the value
of information regarding speed obtained by using modern replicas of northern ships.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FRIULI DIVERSION
Charlemagnes commitment to a campaign in Italy so very early in the

year in order to deal with a revolt obviously would have repercussions
other than the postponement of a third Saxon campaign. For example, it
is very likely that the Saxons learned, perhaps from Bavarian sources, that
several Lombard dukes were in revolt against Charlemagne. The Saxons
also likely were to conclude that Charlemagne would have to make an
early decision as to whether he would continue his operations east of the
Rhine or lead his army south into Italy. Because of the Franks apparent
need to establish an early timetable for operations in Italy, traditional
efforts by the Magistratus to keep military plans secret as long as possible,
i.e. in this case until after the Saxon assembly at Marklo, probably would
be compromised.1 The Saxons, therefore, very likely would learn early in
the spring of 776, well before the beginning of the traditional campaigning
season, that the Frankish army, or, at least, a substantial element of this
force, was to be committed south of the Alps and not east of the Rhine.
The Saxons may even have been informed that a Byzantine army and
fleet would be sent to Italy and that the Avars, as will be seen below, were
showing an interest in supporting the Lombard dukes in their revolt. In a
final assessment, it would be very clear to the Saxons, as they met in their
spring council at Marklo, that a major Carolingian field army would be
operating in northern Italy perhaps even as soon as the snow melt in the
passes made large-scale military operations possible. As a result, not only
would Charlemagne not be leading his forces into Saxon territory at the
beginning of the campaigning season, but the eastern frontier of the reg-
num Francorum would be more, rather than less, vulnerable to attack.
Therefore, despite all of the work that Charlemagne had done to develop
the resources of Hersfeld and Fulda to support military operations in the
Saxon region, it is likely that when the Saxon annual assembly met at
Marklo, it was decided that a strategy was to be undertaken which would
be aimed at reversing the military progress made by Charlemagnes army
in 775. The oaths that had been taken to be faithful to Charlemagne, the
1Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, p. 327.

474 chapter eight
hostages who had been handed over to the Franks in order to deter Saxon
rejection of their promises, and the treaties that had been made with the
Carolingian government were all to be cast to the side.
Mobilization for a Second Invasion of Italy
In late November or early December, Charlemagne moved the royal court

for the Christmas season from Diedhofen in the north of the regnum
Francorum south to Slestat. This royal palatium was 60 kilometers south
of the great Roman fortress city of Strasbourg and 20 kilometers north of
Colmar.2 The Strasbourg region was very well-situated for the mobiliza-
tion of an army that was being mustered to undertake an invasion of the
northeastern quadrant of the regnum Langobardorum. At places such as
Cologne, Bonn, Worms, and Speyer, and also lesser population centers
along the Rhine, the Roman road system funneled from the west and, to a
lesser extent, from the east into the great highway that followed the left
bank of the river. This network of roads provided the opportunity for the
rapid movement of troops overland. Additionally, once the Rhine had
been reached by various contingents, the river provided a fundamental
resource for the comparatively rapid and inexpensive transport of equip-
ment and, if necessary, foodstuffs.3 Rhenish population centers, such as
the fortress cities mentioned above, also were available to serve as maga-
zines to provide and to protect logistical resources for Charlemagnes army
en route to the mobilization center.
In planning the invasion route, Charlemagne and his Magistratus
undoubtedly had available a wide variety of late Roman itineraries, in
addition to the information that was provided by the milestones that
marked the Roman roads.4 In this context, attention should be given to
the work of the so-called Ravenna geographer, which was available to
Charlemagne from the library of Archbishop Leo. This text, likely only one
among many, set out an itinerary from Worms through Altrip, Speyer,
2DK., nos. 107109, indicates that Charlemagne was at Diedenhofen during much of
November 775, but no. 106 indicates that he had been at Dren earlier in that same month.
No. 110 makes clear that he was at Slestat in December. See Bhmer and Mlbacher,
Regesta Imperii, pp. 8384.
3Concerning the main road and its branches, see Von Hagen, The Roads, pp. 184191.
4In regard to milestones, see Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations, pp. 1729;
and concerning itineraries available to the Carolingians, see Albu, Imperial Geography,
pp. 136148.
the friuli diversion475
Porza, Strasbourg, Brisach, Basel, Kaiseraugst, Stein-am-Rhein, Konstanz,

Brugium Bodumo, to Arbon, and Bregenz. Additional itineraries were
available from the work of the Ravenna Geographer, who provided infor-
mation in regard to possible routes by which enemy intervention might
be deployed from the east, with particular attention given to the fortress
city of Augsburg.5 As will be seen below, Charlemagnes invasion route
undoubtedly followed the major Roman roads, in the environs of which
many monasteries had been established. These, like the various fortress
cities and lesser fortifications, were capable of serving as magazines to
provide logistical support for the Carolingian army while on the march.6
In logistical terms, the great Rhine road beyond Strasbourg significantly
facilitated movement further south through the rivers upper valley to
Brisach and Basel. The road then turned east at Basel and continued
through Kaiseraugst and numerous villages and larger population centers.
For the most part, these locations were protected by erstwhile Roman for-
tifications along the road to Konstanz, for a distance of some 150 kilome-
ters. Many of the strongholds along this road had been established as
military supply depots and bridgehead defenses during the later Roman
Empire. They were maintained more or less as settlements well after the
dissolution of imperial power in the region. Among the more important of
the several dozen which have been examined by scholars are Augst, Brugg,
Rheinheim, Bleiche, Lebern, Schlossbuck, Strick, Burg, and Pfyn.7
When the road reached the important late Roman urbs and early medi-
eval episcopal see of Konstanz on the southwestern shore of the lake with
which it shared its name, a decision had to be made whether to turn south
immediately or to continue east along the southern shore of the lake.8
If the line of march turned south along the road to Chur, a distance of
more than 100 kilometers, an initial march of approximately 80 kilometers
would bring the force to Pffers. There, a monastery had been well-
established during the 8th century.9 This monastery, like most if not all of
the potential stopping places for various units of the Carolingian army
5The Ravenna Geography, bk. IV, ch. 26, 3.4.

6With regard to establishing the location of monasteries and priories for logistical pur-
poses, see Strmer, Zur Frage, pp. 379403.
7Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 158165, with the map on p. 159; H. Schnberger,
The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey, JRS 59 (1969), 144197; and
H. von Petrikovits, Fortifications in the North-Western Roman Empire from the third to
the fifth centuries A.D., JRS, lxi (l97l), l782l8.
8Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 158165, with the map on p. 159.
9Kaiser, Churrtien, p. 129, karte 16, and pp. 140141.
476 chapter eight
along the route from Basel to Konstanz, undoubtedly had been provided
with magazines, e.g. grain storage facilities, to provide logistical support
for Charlemagnes soldiers on the march. The convent of Cazis and the
monastery of Disentis were 60 kilometers southwest and 35 kilometers
south of Pffers, respectively, and also offered the potential to provide
additional administrative and logistical services for Charlemagnes army.10
After reaching Pffers, the line of march hypothesized here, likely contin-
ued south another 25 kilometers to Chur.11
From Konstanz, as noted above, there was also an alternate route
to Chur. The main Roman road that followed the Rhine ran east along
the southern shore of Lake Konstanz approximately 25 kilometers to the
stronghold at Arbon. It then continued another 40 kilometers to the
fortified town of Bregenz at the eastern end of the lake. This route from
Konstanz through Bregenz to Chur was less direct and, thus, somewhat
longer than the route through Pffers. However, those units which fol-
lowed the lengthier route along the southern shore of Lake Konstanz
enjoyed the benefit of a better road for approximately 60 kilometers,
i.e. about a four-day march. Perhaps even more importantly, those troops
who took advantage of the Konstanz-Bregenz route, had the opportunity
to transport equipment and supplies by water to the far eastern shore of
the lake and the Roman road south.
Charlemagne and his advisers undoubtedly gave strong consideration
to the possibility of using the lakeshore route. It was widely recognized to
be highly desirable to give the draft animals which hauled or carried the
armys heavy loads as much rest as possible. In addition, a four-day march
eastward before turning south meant that additional time was given for
the snowmelt to continue and for swollen rivers and streams to subside.
When the fortress town of Bregenz was reached at the eastern end of Lake
Konstanz, the process of unloading the lake barges and reloading the carts
was protected by the garrison of the city and local levies of the region.
Bregenzs strategic location controlled the important road west from
Kempten. Troops loyal to Charlemagne stationed on the eastern shore of
Lake Konstanz were positioned, if necessary, to stop or delay Bavarian
forces based at Augsburg and its environs from moving west to harass the
Carolingian baggage train.12
10See Kaiser, Churrtien, p. 129, karte 16, and pp. 128140, regarding Cazis and Disentis.
11Kaiser, Churrtien, p. 143, karte 18.
12Although Kempten is located on the southeastern border of Swabia, it traded with
Bavaria, especially for salt, and was well within reach of aggressive elements launched from
At Bregenz, the somewhat-rested draft animals would once again

assume their burdens and continue to follow the Roman road, which
turned due south in the direction of Chur. This was the main road south
and, as a result, was of higher quality than the road through Pffers
to Chur. A march of some 40 kilometers from Bregenz would bring
Charlemagnes army through to the stronghold at Schaan, and the final leg
of 40 kilometers would find the Carolingian expeditionary force at the key
administrative and commercial center of Chur. As noted above, the region
of Chur was administered by Bishop Constantius, who served as the
Carolingian Rector of Raetia. Clearly, Constantius represents an early
example of a count-bishop, a type of administrator who would become
more important by the later 9th century.13
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Carolingian control of
the Chur region for the movement of Charlemagnes armies south into
Italy.14 As discussed briefly above, Charlemagne, in the context of his
capture of Verona in the autumn of 773, thoroughly integrated the Chur
territory into the administrative and military structure of the regnum
Francorum. He made it very clear that he had no interest in destroying
or diminishing the complex and productive infrastructure of the Chur
region. In fact, his aim was to further its development.15 The bishop of
Chur, Constantius, was raised to an elevated position within the Caro
lingian government and given the title Rector of the territorium Ratiarum.
In addition, Constantius himself was taken under Charlemagnes very
close personal protection (sub mundoburdo vel defensione nostra).16
The capacity of the Chur-Raetien region to provide the logistical
resources that were needed to supply Charlemagnes army was based on
the great wealth that the population generated from agriculture and trade.
A process of economic growth, in fact, had been in train throughout the
region for some three centuries following the dissolution of imperial
Roman authority.17 It is of basic importance to recognize that economic
Tassilos territory. It is not at all clear whether the Carolingians or the Bavarians controlled
the fortifications along the road between Kempten and Bregenz. Concerning these fortifi-
cations, see Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 54, 169.
13Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 163165, with the map on p. 159.
14A sound appraisal of the importance of the road systems radiating from Chur is pro-
vided by Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, pp. 5051.
15See E. Meyer-Marthaler, Rtien im frhen Mittelalter. Eine verfassungsgeschichtliche
Studie (Zurich, 1948); and Kaiser, Churrtien, pp. 195228.
16DK, no. 78.
17Regarding the wealth of the Chur region, see Meyer-Marthaler, Rtien; and Kaiser,
Churrtien, pp. 195228.
478 chapter eight
growth during the early Middle Ages was fundamentally dependent upon
a continuing increase in the size of the population. A growth in the num-
ber of workers was necessary to provide the labor force for an increase in
total production. This is the case because during the period between ca.
500800 there were no significant and widely diffused technological
advances in the Frankish kingdom that can be shown to have greatly
increased productivity.18 Therefore, it goes almost without saying that the
Chur region, which produced increased quantities of goods and services,
also was in a long-term cycle of demographic growth.19
The well-documented economic growth in Chur-Raetien resulted in the
continued increase in the size of the population. The rise of the demo-
graphic curve also meant that the number of able-bodied men eligible for
militia service also grew accordingly. These increases included men who
could be mobilized to serve in the general levy for the local defense and
also in the number of more wealthy men, who were obligated to serve in
the select levy, both for the local defense but, no less importantly, for
operations beyond their home region in expeditione. As a result, in 776,
Charlemagne could reasonably expect Constantius to make available a
substantial militia force from the territorium Ratiarum for Carolingian
military operations in northern Italy aimed at suppressing the ducal revolt.
In military perspective, the Rector of the Raetien region, like the Rector
in the alpine foothills who also was abbot of the monastery of Novalesa,
discussed in relation to the invasion of the Lombard kingdom in 773, had
several obligations. One was to play the key role in administering the orga-
nization of the local defense forces in case of an enemy invasion. Sec
ondly,he also was responsible, like the abbot of Novalesa, for supporting
Carolingian offensive military operations in whatever area these troops
might be needed beyond the frontiers of Rhetia. Alcuin, who was in a
good position to have accurate information, observed with the benefit
of hindsight, that throughout much of Charlemagnes reign, Bishop
Constantius and also his successor as Rector, a certain Remedius, did an
18For the positive view of technological development, see Kevin Greene, Technological
innovation and economic progress in the ancient world: M.I. Finley re-considered,
Economic History Review, LIII (2000), 2959; Andrew Wilson, Machines, Power and the
Ancient Economy, Journal of Roman Studies, 92 (2002), 132; A.M. Bautier, Les plus anci-
ennes mentions de moulins hydrauliques industriels et de moulins vents, Bulletin histo-
rique et philologique du comit des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2 (1960), 567626; and
Sarris, The Origins, pp. 280311.
19Kaiser, Churrtien, pp. 195228.
excellent job in carrying out their responsibilities in support of Carolingian

policies.20
The frequently-used and frequently-repaired Roman roads through the
relatively low Alpine passes in the Chur region provided comparatively
easy access from the Rhineland and Alamannic region to the north central
and northeastern reaches of the Lombard kingdom. Chur was only 150
kilometers north-northwest of Verona, which was the major strategic and
commercial terminus of the Via Claudia Augusta in northern Italy. This
road also connected Augsburg in Bavaria directly to Verona. As seen above,
Charlemagne and his advisers, like the emperor Constantine the Great
before them, understood very well the crucial strategic value of Verona.
Therefore, Charlemagne had made his highest priority the capture of
Verona before beginning the main phase of his siege of Pavia in 773.
Control of the route between Augsburg and Verona was essential to
the Carolingians. It was crucial that forces loyal to Charlemagne deployed
from military emplacements east of Chur and as far south as Mstair could
block Bavarian access through the Brenner pass to Verona. Mstair was a
key choke point, approximately 75 kilometers east-southeast of Chur and
only 150 kilometers almost due north of Verona.21 Troops mobilized at
Chur and in its environs, as the historian Ludwig Pauli among others
describe the journey, had comparatively easy access to Mstair through
the Schanfigg across the Strela pass (2353m) to Davos (about 1500m), then
over the Flela pass (2383m) into the Lower Engadin to Zernez (1472m)
and finally over the Ofen pass (2149m).22
Mstair, prior to its development as a religious center, which seems to
have begun under Charlemagne in 774, had served as a way station along
the Roman road, discussed above.23 Consequently, a base of sorts already
20See the discussion by Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, p. 50.

21See Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avaria, pp. 5052.
22Ludwig Pauli, The Alps, Archaeology and Early History, trans. Eric Peters (London,
1984), p. 196; and Kaiser, Churrtien, p. 178, who discusses the same route following
Overbeck, Geschichte des Alpenrheintals, I, 137. An interesting example of this route being
used in reverse took place in 1212 when Frederick II was moving north into Germany from
Verona and found the Brenner held by his adversaries. Thus, he moved west to Chur, fol-
lowing the route Pauli described above, and then took the Rhine road north. Regarding
Fredericks route, see E. Oehlmann, Die Alpenpsse im Mittelalter, Jahrbuch fr
Schweizerische Geschichte, IV (1879), 188.
23Pauli, The Alps, p. 230; and regarding coins, see Jos Diaz Tabernero, Die Fundmnzen
aus dem Kloster S. Johann, in Mstair, Kloster St. Johann, ed. Jos Diaz Tabernero and
Christian Hesse (Zrich, 2004), 11164, esp. nos. 14, and 5, which is a coin struck under
Charlemagnes father Pippin.
480 chapter eight
existed from which the Carolingians were in a position to oversee the

development of Mstair and its environs into an important economic and
military center. The rapid growth of Mstair under Charlemagnes influ-
ence is illustrated, for example, by the monastery of St. Johan and its
wealthy church, which became a special beneficiary of the kings largess.
Historians of early medieval art and architecture have emphasized that
Mstairs great wealth led to its development also as a major cultural cen-
ter, well before the end of the century. These accomplishments are dem-
onstrated not only by its large church, but also by extensive wall paintings
and perhaps even a contemporary life-size statue of Charlemagne which
also still survives.24
Carolingian control of the Via Claudia Augusta would seriously hamper
the Bavarians if Tassilo should decide to intervene in support of Hrodgaud
and the other rebel dukes in the northeastern reaches of the Lombard
kingdom. The Bavarian army would find it necessary to avoid the Brenner
and use passes further to the east. Therefore, Charlemagnes ability to
block Bavarian access to Verona through the Brenner certainly was of
considerable strategic importance from a defensive perspective. However,
it was equally important in terms of Carolingian offensive strategy.
Charlemagnes forces, by maintaining the capacity of the Carolingians to
make full use of the Brenner southeast of Chur, also denied Duke Tassilo
the ability to block Frankish exploitation of this route. Control of the
passes east from Chur to Zernez, as noted above, assured the ability of the
Franks to control the Brenner north of Mstair.
The Alpine geography discussed above, and a general understanding of
the weather conditions that traditionally obtained in the Alpine passes
during March and April, may be seen to have informed Carolingian
military planning by the Magistratus, which met at Slestat, where
Charlemagnes Christmas court was held. From Slestat orders were
sent for the mobilization of the army and its muster in the environs of
24Useful introductory material is provided by Kaiser, Churrtien, pp. 145149; and for
the artistic wealth of St. Johan, see Bullough, The Age of Charlemagne, p. 41, with particular
attention to the claim that the statue of Charlemagne is Carolingian, pp. 148, 155156. As is
reasonable, most treatments of Mstair, both scholarly and popular, focus on the relevant
artistic and architectural monuments and give relatively little attention to the sites mili-
tary or even commercial importance during the early Middle Ages. See, for example, Jrg
Goll, Das Kloster St. Johann in Mstair seit Karl dem Grossen, in Mstair, Die mittelalterli-
chen Wandbilder in der Klosterkirche, ed. Jrg Goll, Matthias Exner, Susanne Hirsch
(Munich, 2007), 2742, here 2729; and Louise Gndinger and Bernhard Moosbrugger,
Mstair: Das Kloster St. Johann in Mstair (Zrich, 1994), pp. 910.
Strasbourg for an early spring campaign in Italy.25 The decision to muster

the greater part of his army in the Strasbourg region makes clear that
Charlemagne intended to move directly and as quickly as possible, i.e. as
soon as the winter snows cleared in the central Alps, into the northeastern
sector of the Lombard kingdom.
In order to carry out this plan, it is obvious that Charlemagne intended
to use the Brenner Pass, rather than the more westerly passes that his
armies had crossed for the invasion of 773. The Brenner, which reached a
maximum altitude of only 1,370 meters, usually became clear earlier in the
year than the higher more westerly passes, e.g. Monte Cenis and the Great
St. Bernard. The Brenner, as discussed above, also connected directly with
the great fortress city of Verona, which for centuries, as also noted above,
had served as a hub for the Roman roads that provided easy overland
access to the northeastern reaches of the Lombard kingdom where the
rebel cities Vicenza, Treviso, and Friuli were located.
Planning the March against the Rebels
The exact timing of the beginning of Charlemagnes march into Italy from
Strasbourg would depend upon how quickly the Alpine passes, and most
particularly the Brenner, would be available for the movement of a large
force.26 In the course of planning his campaign strategy, Verona, as noted
above, was the most likely place for Charlemagne to establish a primary
base of operations, which was normal operating procedure. Pippin had
demonstrated this crucial aspect of campaigning throughout his career.
Charlemagne followed this strategy in the course of his campaign in
southern Aquitaine by building a castrum at Fronsac, and in his opera-
tions against the Saxons by taking control of and garrisoning the fortress
at Eresberg in 769 and 772, respectively. In 773, Charlemagne used the for-
tress of Susa as his main base after crossing the Alps.
Once the army began its march, Charlemagne had the opportunity to
mobilize additional forces, both expeditionary levies and the military
households of the magnates living in various localities to the south, as he
traveled with his army along the Roman road from the environs of
Strasbourg to Verona. As already noted, the Chur region was likely a fecund
ground for mustering additional troops. In addition, the fortress cities,
25ARF, an. 776; and AE, an., 776, for the Christmas court.
26See Appendix.
482 chapter eight
towns, and lesser settlements along the Carolingian line of march were
well-situated to add their forces to the army that had been mustered at
Strasbourg. Also of importance to the augmentation of this Carolingian
expeditionary force were the regular troops whom Charlemagne earlier
had stationed at Verona. Further, Charlemagne could count upon the
authorities of St. Martin to provide both regular troops and expeditionary
levies from the vast tracts of land between Pavia and Venice, over which
they had been given control in 774. As noted earlier, St. Martin had been
provided with a base in the fortress of Sirmione on Lake Garda, only ten
kilometers distant from Verona.
Under good road and weather conditions, a mixed force of mounted
troops and foot soldiers accompanied by a baggage train drawn by horses
and/or using pack animals could cover approximately 30 kilometers per
day for six days in each seven. This, of course, was the best-case situation.27
In the situation under discussion here, however, there was a need to main-
tain the march and to make available logistical support for large numbers
of men and animals under potentially adverse weather conditions in a
rather severe mountainous environment. Therefore, it is likely that the
Magistratus, when planning the campaign, rejected the best-case model
and relied on the more reasonable expectation that the pace of the march
would be perhaps about half that of the best case, or approximately
15 kilometers per day for six days in each seven.28 At this pace, the 500-
kilometer march from Strasbourg to Verona would take approximately six
to seven weeks. It is likely, therefore, that if Charlemagnes army departed
from Strasbourg rather early in April, it could establish its base at Verona
toward the later part of May.
Once the Carolingian primary base was established at Verona, the avail-
ability of both current intelligence regarding the disposition of the rebels
and detailed information regarding the military topography to the
northeast would play a major role in planning the next series of troop
movements that Charlemagne would order. At this time, it is almost cer-
tain that Charlemagne sought the advice and counsel of Abbot Anselm of
Nonantula.29 As discussed above, Anslem had been forced to flee from
27Bachrach, Animals and Warfare, 1:707764.

28See the very useful study by J.W. Nesbitt, Rate of march of crusading armies in
Europe: a study in computation, Traditio, 19 (1963), 167182.
29DK, no. 113, makes clear that Anselm was in attendance on Charlemagne in July 776,
when the monastery of Nonantula was provided with substantial gifts. At this time,
Charlemagne was returning to the north following his victory over the rebels. How
much earlier Anselm joined Charlemagnes court cannot be ascertained at this time.
Nonantula by King Desiderius, and subsequently was given asylum by

Charlemagne. After Desiderius surrendered and Charlemagne assumed
the Lombard throne, the new rex Langobardorum restored Anselm to his
position as abbot at Nonantula.
This dynamic regarding Anselm makes clear the abbots debt to
Charlemagne, who surely enjoyed having influential churchmen frequent
his court in order to provide, among other things, the proper religious sup-
port for his military ventures.30 However, Anselms debt to the king does
not, in and of itself, explain the abbots presence at Charlemagnes head-
quarters in the spring of 776. Nonantula was located in the environs of
Modena some 80 kilometers south of Verona. What is important, however,
is that prior to becoming a monk and abbot, Anselm had been duke of
Friuli and a military commander of some particular note.31 As a result,
Anselm was well-positioned to provide detailed information regarding the
fortifications, roads, bridges, and other key aspects of the military topogra-
phy of the Friuli region from the perspective of an experienced military
man who possessed first-rate local knowledge.
This information which Anselm could provide, of course, could not be
considered fresh intelligence. Yet, the greater part of the physical realities,
e.g. forts, roads, and bridges, upon which the military infrastructure of the
Friuli region was based, had been in place since the later Roman Empire.
Subsequently, it had been exploited both by the Ostrogoths and the
Lombards. As archaeologists have been able to demonstrate, the continu-
ity of the Roman military topography of the Friuli region, in fact, long sur-
vived Charlemagnes reign.32 In addition to his knowledge of the Friuli
region, Anselm was a major landowner in the area of Vicenza. Thus, he
was well-positioned to provide Charlemagne not only with extensive
information regarding the region and also with logistic support, but per-
haps also with fresh intelligence regarding the behavior of the rebel duke
and his supporters.33
The logic of the situation strongly suggests that Anselm was being rewarded for his
service.
30D. Bachrach, Religion, pp. 33, 34, 39, 40.
31The sources are V. Anselmi, esp. chs. 5 and 6; and Cat. Abbatum, p. 571. For basic work
on Anselm, see Schmid, Anselm von Nonantola, pp. 1122; and the observations by
Krahwinkler, Friaul, pp. 6466.
32Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, pp. 389397.
33See V. Anselmi, chs. 1, 3, and 5, and the discussion by Krahwinkler, Friaul,
pp. 6465.
484 chapter eight
The Rebels Strategic Position
Charlemagne undoubtedly was able to obtain useful information provided

by well-informed Lombards such as Anselm, and perhaps by Franks who
had served in Bernards corps, which had operated as a blocking force in
the northeast during military operations of 773774. Charlemagnes
Magistratus, therefore, was well-prepared to set out the line of march from
Verona to Friuli as well as the armys military objectives along the route.
This plan required that Charlemagne first engage the rebel duke Gaido,
who held the fortress city of Vicenza. Then the Frankish army, continuing
to move east toward Friuli, would initiate operations against the rebel
duke Stabilius, who held the fortress city of Treviso. Finally, after taking
Treviso and leaving no enemy bases astride their lines of communication
and supply with Verona, the Carolingians would be positioned to move
directly against Duke Hrodgaud, who commanded the fortress city of
Friuli.
Vicenza was only 50 kilometers, a three- or four-day march, east of
Verona, and Treviso was only another 60 kilometers further to the east-
northeast. By contrast, Friuli was 220 kilometers from Verona, approxi-
mately a three week march to the east depending on various conditions,
e.g. the weather, and especially in regard to the various fortifications that
were scattered throughout the region. The territories ruled by the dukes of
Vicenza, Treviso, and Friuli were populous and wealthy. As a result, their
dukes had the potential to mobilize considerable numbers of troops, both
militia men serving in the levies and professionals attached to the house-
holds of the magnates, to resist the Carolingians as Italian fortress cities
previously had resisted Frankish invasions during much of the course of
the 6th and part of the 7th centuries.34
Vicenza
The sources make it clear that Vicenza was much less important during
the Roman period than during the early Middle Ages. Prior to the dissolu-
tion of imperial power in the northeast of Italy, the fortress city of Vicenza
34See, in general, Georg Lhlein, Die Alpen- und Italienpolitik der Merowinger im VI.
Jahrhundert in Erlanger Abhandlungen zu mittleren und neuen Geschichte, ed. B. Schniedler
and O. Brandt (Erlangen, l932), 181; and Robert Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik der
Merowinger und des Knigs Peppin, in Das Reich: Idee und Gestalt. Festschrift fr Johannes
Haller, ed. H. Dannenbauer and F. Ernst (Stuttgart, l940), 95132.
is generally regarded to have possessed only piccolo territorio. Neither

the urbs nor its contado were of major economic importance, and the
population cannot be considered to have been large. As Gianpiero Bognetti
observed, it was Nellta romana non grand citt and certainly not
famosa like its neighbors Verona and Padua.35 This comparison, how-
ever, is somewhat misleading if projected into the Lombard period, when
Vicenzas importance increased considerably, while, by contrast, the
importance of neighboring Padua, as will be discussed below, decreased
considerably.
Both the early medieval military history of Vicenza and what the
Carolingians were in a position to know about that history undoubtedly
were of interest to the Magistratus, whose seniores understood the impor-
tance of what had happened in the past in making plans for the future.36
By ca. 570, Vicenza was regarded as of sufficient importance within the
framework of Lombard political and military decision-making, for King
Alboin to see to its establishment as the administrative capital of a duca-
tus.37 The initial settlement of Lombard troops within the walls of Vicenza,
as well as in the environs of the city, constituted prima facie evidence for
the maintenance of the defensive importance of the fortress.38 Although
Vicenzas circuit defenses likely did not exceed 2,000 meters, it was no less
formidable for its size.39
35Gianpiero Bognetti, Vicenza nellalto medioevo, in Vicenza nellalto Medio Evo, ed.
Gianpiero Bognetti, B. Forlati Tamaro, and G. Lorenzon (Venice, 1959), 3, for the quotations.
See also Aldo A. Settia, Vicenza di fronte al Longobardi e al Franchi, in LEt Medievale, ed.
Giorgio Cracco (Vicenza, 1987), 124. This is vol. 2 of Storia di Vicenza, 4 vols. ed. Girolamo
Arnaldi et al.(Vicenza, 19871991).
36See, for example, Gregory, Hist., bk. VI, 42; bk. VIII, ch. 18; bk. IX, ch. 25; bk. X, ch. 3;
and the discussion by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI, 309311. Concerning the opera-
tions of the Magistratus, see Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff,
pp. 313357.
37See Paul, Hist., bk. II, ch. 32; and Harrison, The Early State, pp. 120121.
38Paul, Hist., bk. V, ch. 39, treats the military forces of Vicenza in one of the many
Lombard civil wars. See the discussion by Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, p. 70.
39There are significant problems with regard to estimating the size and even the shape
of the late Roman and early medieval walls of Vicenza. A city plan drawn during the 1480s
(the so-called Peronio Map) makes clear that during the late 15th century, the grid of the
Roman street plan was still intact; this has be used to guide our understanding of the cir-
cuit of the fortifications during the period under consideration here. For the Roman back-
ground, see Alesio de Bon, Romanit del Territorio Vicentino (Vicenza, 19371938),
pp. 3746; Marisa Rigoni, La Citt Romana: Aspetti Archeologici, in Il Territorio-La
Preistoria, LEt Romana, ed. Alberto Broglio and Lellia Cracco Ruggini (Vicenza, 1987),
159188, esp. Il perimetro urbano pp. 162164. This is vol. 2 of Storia di Vicenza, 4 vols., ed.
Girolamo Arnaldi et al. (Vicenza, 19871991). Gian Paolo Marchini, Vicenza Romana,
Vicenza Illustrata, 2nd ed. (Vicenza, 1977), 128, provides a plan of the city walls (p. 16).
486 chapter eight
On the basis of a minimalist estimate, a defensive circuit such as that at

Vicenza could be defended effectively with a force of about 1,500 militia
men armed with missile weapons such as bows and crossbows. An attack-
ing force that presented a credible threat to take the fortress by storm
under such circumstances would have required a minimum strength of
6,000 and 7,500 well-trained men prepared with scaling ladders and will-
ing to suffer substantial casualties.40 However, troops mobilized at Vicenza
and from its contado were well-known to have participated in concert
with troops mustered at Treviso and to have operated as expeditionary
forces.41 These facts suggest that minimalist evaluations of potential
Vicenzan troop strengths in 776 are not likely to be on the mark.
Vicenzas military importance also had an economic component. For
example, there was a Lombard mint established in the urbs. However, its
importance, again as gauged by comparison to some of north Italys larger
urbes, remains controversial in some quarters.42 The extensive church-
building program that the city supported during the 8th century is also
indicative of Vicenzas surplus material wealth and the availability of sur-
plus labor. Eight churches, including the cathedral, have been identified as
flourishing within the circuit walls during the Lombard period. Several
more have been identified in the contado.43 Special mention is merited for
the new cathedral dedicated to St. Mary which was built during the
second half of the 8th century to replace the first cathedral church, dedi-
cated to Sts. Fortunato and Felice, which had been constructed during the
This plan is followed by Bognetti, Vicenza nellalto medioevo, p. 4, fig. 1. Also of interest
are M. Girardi, La topografia di Vicenza romana, Archivio Veneto-Tridentino, VI, (1925)
8687; G.P. Marchini, Vicenza romana, storia, topografia, monumenti (Verona 1979),
pp. 8992. For later information, see Franco Barbieri, Vicenza gotica: le mura (Vicenza,
1984); with regard to the medieval wall, see Fulvio Zuliani, Le Mura Medioevali, Vicenza
Illustrata, 2nd ed. (Vicenza, 1977), 4249; and Franco Barbieri, LImmagine Urbana, in
LEt Medievale, ed. Giorgio Cracco, (Vicenza, 1987), 247293, especially 256 regarding the
larger wall in the 13th century, and 290291, regarding the Peronio Map; also of interest is
the map, fig. 22, illustrating various phases in the expansion of the city in vol. 2 of Storia di
Vicenza, 4 vols. ed. Girolamo Arnaldi et al. (Vicenza, 19871991).
41See the discussion of these military operations by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI,
309311.
42Harrison, The Early State, pp. 120121.
43For a brief survey, see, for example, Giuseppe Lorenzon, Il gruppo monumentale dei
martiri Felice e Fortunato di Vicenza, pp. 1533; and B. Forlati Tamaro, Il Duomo de
Vicenza dal secolo IV al secolo XI, pp. 3559; both in Vicenza nellalto Medio Evo, ed.
Gianpiero Bognetti, B. Forlati Tamaro, and G. Lorenzon (Venice, 1959). See also Fulvio
Zuliani, Vicenza Paliocristiana e Altomedievale, in Vicenza Illustrata, 2nd ed. (Vicenza
1977), 2941; and Ettore Napione and Giovanni Papaccio, La diocesi di Vicenza (Spoleto,
2001), pp. 4169.
4th century. Following the construction of the new cathedral, a new mon-
astery dedicated Sts. Fortunato and Felice was built outside the walls.
Nearby, also outside the walls, a convent dedicated to St. Peter had been
constructed.44
Treviso
Sixty kilometers to the east-northeast of Vicenza, along Charlemagnes

line of march to Friuli, was the fortress city of Treviso, where Duke Stabilius,
Hrodgauds father-in-law, ruled.45 Knowledge of military matters, both in
the long and short term, regarding Treviso, like that concerning Vicenza,
surely would have been of value to the Carolingian Magistratus as they
planed the offensive of 776. Like Vicenza, Treviso had been fortified during
the later Roman Empire and, in addition, had benefited from renewed
attention to its defenses by the Ostrogothic ruler, Theodoric the Great
(d. 526).46 In addition, it seems likely that an arc of fortifications on the
hills from the Piave to the Brenta also helped to protect the city.47
Trevisos military importance, recognized early by Theodoric, should
not be underestimated. In 540, the remnants of the Ostrogothic military
under the leadership of Ildibad chose Treviso as its primary base of opera-
tions as they prepared to confront the Byzantine general Vitalius. At this
time, the garrison at Treviso was commanded by a nephew of Ildibad
named Baduila, who served as the count of the civitas. Ostrogothic mili-
tary forces at this time had been strengthened by deserters from the
44The basic work on the church of Vicenza and its contado is Attilio Previtali, Le chiese
del primo millennio nella diocesi de Vicenza (Vicenza, 2001). See also Zuliani, Vicenza
Paliocristiana e Altomedievale, pp. 2941; and Napione and Papaccio, La diocesi di Vicenza,
pp. 4169.
45The basic treatment of early medieval Treviso remains Stefano Gasparri, Dallet
longobarda al secolo X, in Storia di Treviso, 4 vols., ed. Ernesto Brunetta (Venice, 1989199),
II, Il Medioevo, ed. Daniela Rando and Gian Maria Varanini, 339.
46Angelo Marchesan, Treviso Medievale: Instituzioni, Usi, costumi, Aneddoti, Curiosit, 2
vols. (Treviso, 1923), vol. I augmented edition (Bologna, 1983, 1990), 2223, describes the
limits of Trevisos circoscrizione. See also the map which calls attention to antica bastita
romana. N.b. Trevisos Roman street grid can, in part, still be identified as it was bi-sected
by the cardo maximus (mod. via S. Margereta) and the decumanus (mod. via Martiri della
Libert). Regarding the improvement of the defenses at Treviso, see Cassiodorus, Var, bk. X,
no. 27.
47Gina Fasoli, Insediamenti, castelli, signorie locali, borghi, comuni (VIII-XIV secolo),
in La Valcavasia. Ricerca storico-ambientale, ed. Massiliiano Pavan (Comunita Montana del
Grappa, 1983), 299303; and regarding Fasolis hypothesis, see Gasparri, Dallet lon-
gobarda al secolo X, p. 8.
488 chapter eight
imperial army and also by important locally-based militia forces from

the region of Treviso itself. When Ildibads army was defeated and its
leader was killed, Baduila subsequently was elevated to the Ostrogothic
kingship.48
Following the dismemberment of Ostrogothic rule in Italy by the
Byzantines, the Lombards advanced west from Friuli in 569. In this con-
text, King Alboin saw the necessity of taking control of the fortress city of
Treviso prior to moving against Verona. He threatened the city with a
siege. Bishop Felix, who at this time seems to have been serving as count-
bishop, if this later formulation is permissible in the present context,
struck a bargain with the Lombard king, and the fortress was surrendered
on favorable terms.49 Bishop Felixs willingness to negotiate certainly was
a pragmatic response to the threat posed by Alboin. The Lombard king, in
this early phase of the invasion, likely commanded a force of overwhelm-
ing size, as he had not yet begun the process of distributing the greater
part of his army to military bases and as garrison forces throughout north-
ern Italy. The bishop and his advisers recognized that the Lombards could
easily take the fortress city by storm. In addition, and no less importantly,
there was little likelihood that an imperial relief force would arrive on the
scene to scatter the Lombard army and raise the siege.50
Felixs willingness to surrender the city without mounting strong resis-
tance should not be considered the norm with regard to Trevisos military
reputation, especially following the establishment of the Lombard king-
dom. The militarized populace of Treviso was composed of Lombard exer-
citales, locally-based militia forces, and the remains of imperial troop
contingents. This combined force, in fact, was prepared not only to under-
take defensive operations, but also to become involved in offensive mili-
tary campaigns. For example, late in the 6th century, Duke Ulfari of Treviso,
perhaps in concert with the Byzantines, and in alliance with Duke Mimulf,
who commanded the military forces based on St. Julians island in the lake
of Orta, played key roles in the revolt against King Agilulf. In the course of
suppressing this revolt, Agiluf found it necessary to attack Treviso, which
he captured only after a noteworthy siege.51 Finally, the military forces of
48Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, IV, 435, 437.

49See Paul, Hist., bk.II, ch. 12; and the discussion by Christie, Lombards, p. 77.
50By and large, as noted by Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, pp. 3032, there was little
imperial opposition to the Lombard invasion.
51These operations are discussed in some detail by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI,
346347.
Treviso, along with those of Vicenza, supported Duke Alahis of Trent in his
revolt against King Cunicpert in 689690.52
Trevisos importance as a military base was complemented by its
wealth. Perhaps most significantly, Treviso benefited greatly from trade in
high-value goods that moved across the Alps. Treviso was located in the
fertile plain north of the Adriatic. Thus, it is hardly surprising that it had
been designated by the Ostrogoths as one of the major grain depots in the
northern part of Italy, along with Tortona, Pavia, and Trent. Treviso also
played an important role in the trade of bulk goods.53 The citys flourishing
mint, like those in many of the market cities of northern Italy, also may be
taken as an indicator of its prosperity.54 This impression of economic well-
being is strengthened by what is known of the remains of Trevisos long-
term ecclesiastical building program.55
In addition to its propitious geographic location for commercial pur-
poses, Treviso also benefited from the decision of the Lombard king
Grimwald in 667 to destroy the erstwhile imperial fortress city of Oderzo.
Grimwalds edict divided into thirds the lands and population of Oderzos
urban center and contado. Treviso shared these resources with the duch-
ies of Friuli and Ceneda. Thus, Treviso gained control of a considerable
tract of land, which perhaps increased the size of its contado by some
thirty percent. This acquisition, therefore, not only resulted in a substan-
tial growth in the wealth of Treviso as a ducatus but also brought about a
dramatic increase in its population base.56 The latter, of course, led to an
increase in the size of Trevisos militia forces, both general levies for the
local defense and select levies, which could be deployed for the local
defense but also for expeditionary purposes.
During the second half of the 8th century, Trevisos already flourishing
economy was enhanced by the rapid emergence of Venice as an important
commercial emporium.57 Only 30 kilometers north of Venice, Trevisos
52See the discussion of these military operations by Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI,
309311.
53Cassiodorus, Var., bk. X, no. 27; for further discussion, see Christie, From Constantine
to Charlemagne, p. 401.
54Regarding the mint, see Harrison, The Early State, pp. 129121, with the literature cited
there.
55Introductory material is to be found in A.A. Michieli, Storia di Treviso, 2nd ed.
(Treviso, 1958), 2627. See also Giorgio Fedalto, Dalle origini alla dominazione veneziana
(1358), pp. 2835; and Pier Angelo Passolunghi, Il monachesimo in diocesi di Treviso,
pp. 309312; both published in Diocesi di Treviso, ed. Luigi Pesce (Venice, 1994).
56Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, VI, 43, based on Paul, Hist., bk. II, ch. 9.
57Among the most recent chroniclers of Venices rise to commercial importance during
this period is McCormick, Origins, pp. 526531.
490 chapter eight
location astride one of the most frequented land routes to western and
west-central Germany increased greatly in importance. Treviso served in
the capacity of a key intermediary between the flourishing trade that
came from the east through the Adriatic and the trans-Alpine north. It also
was positioned to transship goods that arrived from Venice overland both
west to the great city of Verona and east to Cividale del Friuli.58 Under the
Carolingians, Treviso also continued as a customs post.59 In a similar man-
ner, the mint that had flourished under Lombard rule at Treviso continued
to flourish and perhaps even grew in importance under the aegis of the
early Carolingians.60
Friuli
The fortress city of Cividale del Friuli was yet a further hundred kilometers
east-northeast of Treviso. Charlemagne and his advisers undoubtedly did
their utmost, consistent with normal Carolingian practice for obtaining
military intelligence, to obtain the basic but necessary information regard-
ing the military infrastructure of the Friuli region from Abbot Anselm
and perhaps from others loyal to the new Lombard king. It is clear,
for example, from the archaeological evidence that the fortified urbs of
Friuli, Hrodgauds capital city, was protected by a small but compact cir-
cuit of very high-quality stone defenses. The perimeter measured some
1,200 meters, including the unassailable high bluffs above the Natisone
river.61
Under normal conditions, the entire adult male population drawn from
those who lived within the city and its environs would be mobilized to
man the walls for the defense of such a fortress city. Such a locally
mustered force, composed of general levies, expeditionary levies, and the
obsequia of the duke and his magnates, would be required to provide a
minimum contingent of approximately 1,000 able-bodied men for such a
defense. Under such minimal circumstances, an attacking army that had
4,000 to 5,000 well-trained troops equipped with scaling ladders would be
58See the brief observations by McCormick, Origins, pp. 331332, 524526.

59Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, p. 397.
60McCormick, Origins, pp. 526527, 683, 683, provides a useful scattering of informa-
tion regarding Trevisos economic growth under the early Carolingians.
61For the dimensions of Friuli, see I. Weiss, Forum Iuli, RE, 7.1 (1910), cols. 6970; and
Neil Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, p. 256, fig. 46, who provides a very useful
diagram of the city.
required to present a credible threat to the defenders that their city could
be taken by storm.62 As will be seen below, however, it likely would have
required a Carolingian army in the neighborhood of 10,000 or more troops
to capture the fortress of Friuli by storm, much less to subdue the entire
region.
Fortress Friuli and its environs were no ordinary military targets. The
extensive archaeological evidence for Lombard settlement in the area
reveals that the city had a substantial number of flourishing suburbs.
Among the most important of these suburbs from which the military
manpower pool of defenders for Friuli potentially benefited was that of
San Giovanni, which had developed around the church of that name some
500 meters north of the city. This suburb spread out along both the east
and west banks of the Rio Emiliano, an affluent of the Natisone. To the
southwest of Friuli, beginning approximately 50 meters from the walls of
the city itself, was the suburb based on the church of San Stefano. Across
the Natisone and radiating to the southeast from the church of San
Martino, located on the riverbank, was yet another suburb that also was in
the process of demographic expansion. This evidence suggests that the
ducal capital and its region were very densely populated by late 8th-
century standards for the north of Italy. Therefore, the ducal government
was well-positioned to mobilize a much larger contingent of defenders
than the minimum 1,000 able-bodied men between the ages of 15 and 55 to
whom we alluded above.63
Friuli was the capital of this rich and populous region, and the duke
made his headquarters there. In 744, less than a generation prior to
Hrodgauds revolt, Ratchis, the then-duke of Friuli, correctly believed he
had sufficient resources at his command, as well as allies among various
other dukes, to make himself king of the Lombards. The ability of Ratchis
brother Aistulf (749756) to succeed him as rex Langobardorum may be
taken as yet another indication that the Friuli dukes enjoyed a strong base
of both economic and military power from which to project their influ-
ence considerably further afield.64
It is noteworthy, as the archaeological evidence cited above makes clear,
that large numbers of well-armed and presumably high-quality Lombard
62Bachrach and Aris, Medieval Technology, pp. 117.

63The basic work here is M. Brozzi, La popolazione romana nel Friuli longobardo (VI-VIII
sec.) (Udine, 1989), with the useful summaries by Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne,
pp. 255257.
64Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, pp. 4546.
492 chapter eight
troops were settled in the region. These included the supposed best of all
of the farae, i.e. military colonies believed by some scholars to have been
clan-based, which were deployed throughout the regnum Langobardorum.
The Foriulianorum exercitus, composed of all able-bodied men of all
classes and ethnic backgrounds, including the exercitales and faramanni
established in their military colonies, may be regarded as a formidable
defense force when operating locally as a general levy within the borders
of the duchy.65
For a Carolingian army to pose a serious threat to capture Cividale del
Friuli, however, was a strategic problem that went well beyond the obvious
military strength and prosperity of the city and its environs. Virtually the
entire Friuli region had seen the extensive construction of castra and cas-
tella, largely during the later Roman Empire, to defend against attacks
from the east. These same fortifications, which had remained in use under
Ostrogothic rule, were maintained by the Lombards. They defended,
for example, against Avar attacks in the 7th century. Since these strong-
holds were fully developed fortifications, however, and not simply linear
defenses such as those constructed to create the clusae in various alpine
passes, they could be used, as well, to defend against invaders from other
directions, not only from the east.66
From a tactical perspective, the major north-south rivers, e.g. the Piave,
Livenza, Tagliamento, and finally the Torre, which runs into the Natisone
about ten kilometers south of Oleis, also were formidable obstacles for an
invader to overcome. This was the case even in places where there were
no manmade defenses to control potential crossing points.67 However,
these rivers, especially when guarded by fortifications such as the castra of
Invillio, Gemona, Osoppo, and Ragogna on the Tagliamento, could hinder
severely the progress of the Carolingian units marching eastward from
Verona for an attack on Friuli.68 Also worthy of particular note, in tactical
terms, is the old Roman bridge that crossed the Livenza at Sacile. The road
across the bridge at Sacile was the direct route to Friuli from the west.
65Regarding the administrative circumscription of Friuli, see Donald Bullough, The

Counties of the Regnum Italiae in the Carolingian Period (774888): A topographical Study.
I, PBSR, XXIII (1955), 148168. For the bishop of Aquilia and the exercitus, see p. 159. Also
note, Harrison, The Early State, pp. 50, 81, 114, 116, 118, 208, 218; and Wickham, Early Medieval
Italy, pp. 38, 45, regarding Ratchis.
66Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, pp. 296, 389394, with the very helpful
map. fig. 80, p. 390.
67Bullough, The Regnum Italiae, p. 159.
68See Christie, From Constantine to Charlemagne, p. 390, fig. 80.
Historically, this bridge had served as a choke point that could be held
against an invading force which was marching either from the northwest
or the southwest toward Friuli, 70 kilometers further east. Of course, fight-
ing men based throughout the ducatus of Friuli who supported the
Lombard ducal revolt could be mobilized to harass the Carolingian
advance to the Livenza.69
From a strategic perspective, it is vitally important that the Bavarian
duke, Tassilo, controlled the region directly north of the Friulian duchy.
Therefore, even if Tassilo could not use the Brenner Pass to interpose his
forces between a Frankish army and its march to Verona, he could move
troops from further east into the Friuli region. The Carnic Alps, south
of the Gail, constituted the frontier between Bavaria and the Lombard
kingdom. This region could easily be penetrated through the passes at
Camporasso and Radice, only some 50 kilometers to the north of Friuli.70
In addition, Cividale del Friuli was accessible to support from the Avars
advancing from the east, Byzantine forces based in Istria, and those troops
which could use Venice as a base.
Charlemagnes Advance Eastward
While undertaking the march eastward along the Roman roads from
Verona to Vicenza and then to Treviso, Charlemagnes army additionally
had to be wary of problems that might be caused by forces which were not
attached directly to these rebel cities. There was always the potential that
dangerous adversaries could be mobilized from places both to the north
and to the south of Charlemagnes line of march. Troops levied in the
duchy of Trent, only 60 kilometers to the north of Vicenza, had the poten-
tial to cause serious difficulties. For example, such forces could cut down
large trees in order to block the roads. They also could harass Charlemagnes
baggage train, which would seem often to have lagged behind the main
body of troops on the line of march, as the devastating losses suffered at
Roncevilles in 778 demonstrate. Men from Trent also could endanger
Frankish foragers who might stray too far from the main force. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that contemporaries regarded the duke of Trent, along
69Bullough, The Regnum Italiae, p. 159, takes note of the importance of this bridge in
regard to military operations that took place in 680 and 776.
70Cf. Bullough, The Regnum Italiae, pp. 162164, and map in fig. 1.
494 chapter eight
with the duke of Friuli, as one of the two most powerful local rulers in all
of Lombard Italy.71
The dukes of Trent had a long and well-documented history of causing
trouble for Frankish armies, and this history was well-known to the
Carolingian court. In fact, the people of this duchy often had been on poor
terms with the Franks and had fought against them with some frequency.72
In addition, the Trentini saw themselves as enjoying some considerable
success against their enemies from the north. For example, they remem-
bered, eventually to be recorded in their written sources, the heroic stand
of Duke Ewin in 590, who held the fortress of Verruca against an excep-
tionally large Frankish force. This story was propagated further by the
chronicler Secundus of Trent. He emphasized this heroic perspective in
his now lost work, which, however, was echoed by Paul the Deacon in his
Historia Langobardorum.73
In a more practical sense, the dukes of Trent were capable of projecting
military forces mobilized in the duchy, considerable distances from their
home base. On one occasion, a force levied in the duchy is reported to
have moved many hundreds of kilometers across northern Italy into Istria,
on the east coast of the Adriatic, for the purpose of attacking Byzantine
military assets.74 Other forces from the duchy participated in concert with
the expeditionary levies of Treviso and Vicenza, as noted above, in several
revolts against one or another Lombard king. This history of military coop-
eration by these northern dukes makes clear that the loyalty of the armed
forces of the duchy of Trent toward the Lombard monarchy may have
been considered by Charlemagnes planners to have been open to ques-
tion. This situation, in turn, strengthens the inference that the duke of
Trents loyalty to the new rex Langobardorum, who, not incidentally, was a
Frank, might well have been considered suspect by the Magistratus.
There were similar dangers to Charlemagnes line of march from the
south. The primary military base within the duchy of Padua was, for exam-
ple, located at the fortress of Monselice, less than 30 kilometers south of
the junction of the Via Postumia, which connected Vicenza with Treviso.
Although the old Roman urbs of Padua had lost its military importance to
71See the discussion by Harrison, The Early State, p. 191.

72See the survey by Holtzmann, Die Italienpolitik, pp. 95132. For a somewhat over-
simplified but nevertheless useful summary of events in 590, see, for example, Christie, The
Lombards, pp. 8889.
73Paul, Hist., bk III, ch. 31.
74Brown, Gentlemen and Officers, p. 72.
the Lombard castrum nearby at Monselice, military forces based in the

region, both Lombards and Italo-Roman militia troops from the area, can
hardly be considered to have been negligible.75 Forces from this region
both at the time of the Lombard invasion and afterward were known to
have undertaken noteworthy military operations.76 However, it is also the
case that the archbishop of Ravenna held large estates in the contado
of Padua and, thus, it is likely he could levy militia forces from the region
in support of Charlemagne.77 The role of Monselice as being part of
Charlemagnes Donation to Pope Hadrian seems not to have been of
importance at this time.
In addition to the potential threat from troops levied in the region of
Vicenza itself, Charlemagne had to take into account the possibility
of attacks by Byzantine soldiers who would be using Venice as their
base of operations, and local militia forces mobilized from the islands of
the lagoon. Throughout the course of the 8th century, various types of
military forces mobilized at Venice and in its environs had been and
remained formidable. Such forces had shown themselves capable of
launching military operations on land, operations at sea, and combined
land-sea efforts.78 Venetian military forces under Duke Maurice even had
gone to war with King Desiderius in the early 770s.79 Treviso, only 30 kilo-
meters north of Venice, had grown rich, in part, because it was a key sta-
tion along the trade route from the Adriatic to west and west-central
Germany. The Venetians, whether in support of the east Roman govern-
ment or merely to protect their own commercial interests, had good
reason to keep Treviso from falling completely under Charlemagnes
control.80
Campaigning against the Rebels
In light of the chronology of the campaign, it is likely that Charlemagnes

army departed from the Strasbourg area toward the middle of April, or
75Christi, From Constantine to Charlemagne, pp. 277, 387388.

76See Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, V, 429; and Christi, From Constantine to
Charlemagne, pp. 277, 38788.
77For discussion of the landholdings of the bishop of Ravenna in the region of Padua,
see Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, p. 99.
78Brown, Gentlemen and Officers, pp. 91, 93, 104.
80With regard to connections between Venice and Treviso, see McCormick, Origins,
pp. 169, 331, 334, 683, 685.
496 chapter eight
perhaps even a week earlier.81 The date of departure depended in the final
analysis on reports regarding the weather further south along the Via
Claudia Augusta and particularly concerning conditions in the Brenner
Pass itself. It is likely that scouts and messengers using the Carolingian
tractoria system which was in operation in this part of the Alps provided
the Frankish court, now serving as a military headquarters, with frequent
if not constant updates regarding the weather, particularly the state of the
snow melt along the likely line of march southward.82
After arriving at Verona, having marched through Chur to Zernetz and
the Brenner Pass, Charlemagne, as suggested above, likely was prepared to
open hostilities late in May against those rebels who continued to oppose
him. It is clear that the plans developed at Slestat by Charlemagnes
Magistratus initially called for the capture of the rebel fortress cities
located furthest to the west, namely Vicenza and Treviso, respectively,
along the route to Friuli, and the march would continue on to Hrodgauds
fortress city. It also should be emphasized that it was necessary for
Charlemagne to capture those many lesser strongholds, e.g. castra and
castella, along this same route that were in enemy hands. Each and every
fortification that remained under enemy control along Charlemagnes line
of march was in position to harass his army and most especially his bag-
gage train, as well as his supply lines and communications with Verona.
In order to pose a credible threat to take the urban fortresses and to
protect themselves against potential problems from Lombard, Byzantine,
or even Avar forces, which might support the rebels, it is very likely that
Charlemagne followed standard Carolingian operating procedure and
mustered a large army. He mobilized troops from the heartland of the reg-
num Francorum, and undoubtedly raised troops along his line of march
south from Strasbourg, in the Chur region, and in the area of Verona,
including Lake Garda. It seems likely, as well, that military forces mustered
in the duchy of Spoleto were brought north to join Charlemagnes army.
By early June, Abbot Probatus of the monastery of Farfa was already in
Charlemagnes entourage, and there is no reason to believe that he had
only recently arrived. Following the fall of Vicenza either late in May or
early in June, the king granted Farfa extensive landed properties and, more
importantly, reaffirmed the immunities that had been granted earlier,
81See Appendix.
82See Clavadetscher, Verkehrsorganisation, pp. 159178; Strmer, Zur Frage, pp. 383
401; Dannenbauer, Paraveredus-Pferd, pp. 5573; and Schneider-Schnekenburger,
Churrtien, pp. 111121.
which had delegated to the abbot extensive military obligations such as

providing, and perhaps even leading, expeditionary levies to support
Charlemagnes military operations against the rebel dukes.83
Charlemagnes Tactics
Three very obvious and well-understood tactics were available to

Charlemagne in his campaign to take control of those fortress cities of
the northeast that were in revolt. In fact, Charlemagne already had used
two of these in the course of his military operations in Italy while cam-
paigning in 773774. Charlemagne could choose to establish a siege, seria-
tim, of each of the fortresses that was in revolt. Following standard
operating procedure, such an effort would be similar to the investment,
with vallation and contra-vallation, that he had established at Pavia for
some eight months in 773774. The use of this tactic, however, likely would
be very time-consuming and result in Charlemagnes army possibly taking
many months to capture all three of the rebel cities. However, it is likely
that in addition to other sources of logistical support, Charlemagne likely
could count on Archbishop Leo of Ravenna to provide much of what the
Carolingian army might need if and when he was called upon.
A second option was for Charlemagne to appear before the walls of
Vicenca with overwhelming force and present a credible threat to the
defenders that his army could storm the defenses and take the city, with all
of the horrific consequences that the inhabitants could expect as a result
of a foolish decision to resist. This was the tactic apparently Charlemagne
had employed successfully at Verona in 773. However, if the defenders
refused to surrender, it likely would become necessary to storm the walls.
In the course of such an action, the Carolingian army probably would suf-
fer substantial casualties. However, even after Vicenza was taken, the need
to capture two more fortress cities was still in prospect. The storming of
the walls of three such strongly defended targets could have dire conse-
quences. The number of effectives available to Charlemagne would be
sharply depleted and cause potential problems if, for example, there
were an Avar invasion in support of the rebels. Finally, the morale of
Charlemagnes soldiers undoubtedly would suffer as they witnessed large
numbers of their relatives, friends, and neighbors killed and wounded.84
83CC, no. 111.

84Regarding the morale factor, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 132141.
498 chapter eight
A third tactic, which Charlemagne had not employed in Italy but which
he had threatened to employ in Aquitaine, was to assert that he would
devastate the countryside. Underlying this tactic was the assumption that
the populations of the rebel Lombard cities would care more for their
wealth and prosperity, if not for their lives, than for supporting what
some scholars anachronistically have considered a nationalist revolt.
Of course, this third tactic could be used in concert with one or even both
of the other two, noted above. Indeed, many medievalists, as noted earlier,
hold the unsustainable opinion that Charlemagne undertook offensive
military operations for the purpose of obtaining booty in the form of
material wealth and slaves in order to sustain the insatiable greed of the
Carolingian aristocracy.85
When the territory that was to be considered for devastation belonged
to the ruler and the people to be slaughtered were his subjects, it was
regarded as best to avoid this tactic of systematic destruction. Charlemagne,
of course, was rex Langobardorum. This idea of not destroying ones own
land and subjects can be traced in the West, at least as far back as Alexander
the Great in the late 4th century B.C.86 With regard to the importance of
this idea among the Franks, it is seen to be firmly operative both in the
actual behavior and prescriptive actions of Clovis (d. 511) as early as the
beginning of the 6th century.87 Whether Charlemagne needed more than
his own personal experience and values to have qualms regarding this
approach to conquest is not clear. However, there was considerable infor-
mation available to the Carolingians from historical texts that were to be
found in the royal library regarding both Alexanders and Clovis ideas as
well as those of other important military leaders.88
Charlemagne very likely understood the limitations of a strategy of
devastation if the threat to ravage the countryside were ignored and the
enemy failed to submit. Nevertheless, initially, he rejected the option
either of establishing a formal siege Vicenza or of storming the walls,
85This perspective has been ruthlessly pressed by Reuter, Plunder and Tribute,
pp. 7594; and The End, pp. 391405, who tends to give little attention either to context or
to the parti pris of the sources in the pursuit of this argument. For a refutation of Reuters
views in this regard concerning the early Carolingians, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian
Warfare, pp.150, with a focus on both context and on the bias of the sources.
86For a discussion of Alexanders views, see J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander
the Great (London, 1958), p. 285.
87Bachrach, Anatomy, pp. xvii-xviii.
88With regard to the importance of histories to the Carolingians in military matters, see
Bachrach, The Lying Legacy, pp. 153193; and for reference to the relevant texts, see
Bachrach, Anatomy, p. 171.
and chose to employ the tactics of devastation.89 It is clear that after

Charlemagne threatened to devastate the region, Duke Gaido and his sup-
porters initially refused to surrender. The Frankish army, therefore, was
unleashed in a campaign of selective destruction, which in the short term,
was intended to undermine the economy, i.e. the production of goods and
services, of the region, and bring about economic distress among the
inhabitants.90 Once it was clear to the leading figures at Vicenza that
Charlemagne was willing to ravage the countryside, the city capitulated
very rapidly. By 8 June, Charlemagne held court there.91
Charlemagnes initial decision to threaten, and then to employ, the tac-
tic of devastation suggests that he was in a very great hurry to obtain the
surrender of Vicenza. He rejected the siege option, which could have been
very time-consuming, and the option to storm the walls, which likely
would have resulted in a large number of casualties. The main reason for
Charlemagne to seek a rapid conclusion to the war and to avoid significant
casualties is suggested by intelligence that he received which indicated
that the Avars were looking favorably upon the invitation by the rebels to
intervene in the war. A prominent Lombard noble named Aio, whose fam-
ily possessed major land holdings in the regions of Verona, Vicenza, and
89See CRF., no. 88, where Charlemagne calls attention to the thoroughness of the
devastation and hardship caused by his army in consequence of his campaign against
the rebel dukes. This capitulary was issued on 22 February 777, i.e. approximately eight
months after Charlemagne had returned from his victory over the rebels. Efforts to
date this document (see Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 35) to February 776 are undermined
because, as the document itself makes clear, Charlemagnes officials already had
gathered considerable information concerning the devastation wrought by Carolingian
military operations. For further discussion of the chronology of this invasion, see
Appendix.
90CRF, no. 88. There is a tendency to link the very broad-gauged and generally unreli-
able claims by Andrea of Bergamo (Hist., ch. 4) that the Carolingian invasion caused mas-
sive suffering throughout the Lombard kingdom with a letter written by Pope Hadrian (CC.,
no. 59), which takes note of famine in the northwest of the kingdom, to Charlemagnes
capitulary, loc. cit. However, this interpretation is undermined because of Andreas well-
deserved reputation for making gross exaggerations. The fact that the popes letter deals
with an entirely different part of the Lombard kingdom, i.e. the northwest rather than the
northeast, undermines its value as evidence for the impact of Charlemagnes military
operations during the revolt. See the discussion by Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 3537.
McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 111113, argues that this capitulary, often referred to as the
notitia italica, was issued in February of 774, while Charlemagne was besieging Pavia and
before the surrender of Desiderius. This argument is undermined by the fact that the
actions ordered by Charlemagne in this document require a functioning Carolingian
administration being operative in the Lombard kingdom which was under his command
and could respond to his orders.
91DK, no. 111.
500 chapter eight
Friuli, had given his support to the rebels, and at this time was serving as
Duke Hrodgauds liaison with the Avars.92
The situation at Treviso seems to have been little different from that at
Vicenza. Duke Stabilius rejected the initial Carolingian demand that he
surrender, and the region was ravaged. Stabilius, despite what had hap-
pened at Vicenza, may have delayed because he had some reason to
believe that a relief force was coming from the east. Such a force might be
composed, in part, of troops mobilized from among the expeditionary lev-
ies of Friuli and, in part, of Avars. It is also possible that Stabilius may have
expected that Byzantine troops might have been able to move north from
Venice, which had substantial economic reasons for maintaining the free-
dom of Treviso from close Carolingian control.
With regard to the latter possibility, it is likely that Charlemagne, fol-
lowing traditional Carolingian campaign tactics, took the precaution of
calling upon his ally, Archbishop Leo of Ravenna. Leo was positioned to
interpose his well-trained exercitus as a blocking force along the Roman
road between the Venetian lagoon and Treviso.93 Charlemagne also may
have undertaken some aspects of a siege, such as cutting off Treviso from
contact with the outside as Carolingian troops were in the process of rav-
aging the countryside. However, when no external support materialized
for Stabilius, and likely soon after obtaining information regarding the
extent of the devastation inflicted by Charlemagnes army, Treviso also
surrendered.94
Moving quickly eastward following the fall of Treviso, Charlemagnes
army crossed the border into the duchy of Friuli and continued the tactic
of devastating the land and its population. The aim, once again, was to
obtain the rapid surrender of the rebels before the Carolingian army would
find it necessary to march an additional 100 or more kilometers east
through the maze of fortifications discussed above to reach Friuli itself.
If Charlemagnes army found it necessary to lay siege to Hrodgauds main
92Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avara, p. 52. The fact that Aio was closely connected to the
Verona region likely meant that his neighbors were aware of his activities, and there can be
little doubt that such information was passed on to Charlemagne.
93The capacity of the forces of Ravenna to engage those of Venice is not at issue.
According to Agnellus, LPER., ch. 152, for example, a bloody battle was fought between
Byzantine forces based in Venice and a Ravennate army late in the pontificate of Archbishop
John V (726744). In this battle, the Ravennate army was successful. For additional infor-
mation regarding clashes between Ravenna and Venice, see McCormick, Origins, p. 868,
no. 137.
94The author of the AP, an. 776, believes that Treviso was placed under siege, but pro-
vides no details other than noting its capture.
fortress, the city of Friuli, not only would Carolingian supply lines have
been extended over 200 kilometers east from Verona, but if the defenses
were properly defended, the Franks could face considerable casualties
should the decision be made ultimately to storm the walls.
Charlemagnes strategy of devastating the land rather than inducing a
rapid surrender lured Duke Hrodgaud into leading the Foriulianorum exer-
citus into meeting the Carolingian army in the field.95 Charlemagne
undoubtedly was pleased that Hrodgaud came out to fight, especially so in
light of the fact that as yet there was no intelligence that Avar reinforce-
ments had arrived from the east. Surely, none of the Frankish planners
looked positively upon the possibility that the Carolingian army would
have to face an Avar force of mounted archers on the flat lands of north-
eastern Italy, which were well-suited to the tactics of these erstwhile
Steppe horsemen who made their home in Pannonia.96
Hrodgaud led his army west some 50 kilometers from his capital at
Cividale del Friuli to the famous Roman stone bridge over the Livenza,
where he intended to make his stand.97 The battle that ensued, in its initial
stage, likely saw the great numerical advantage enjoyed by the Carolingian
army diminished somewhat by the narrow front that was created by
Hrodgauds defense of the Livenza bridge. Charlemagnes forces, of course,
had the capacity over time either to commandeer river boats or build pon-
toon bridges. This meant that the Frankish army eventually would out-
flank Hrodgauds position and with such an envelopment bring to bear
overwhelming force against the Lombard rebels.98 In short order, there
was, in fact, a battle. Hrodgaud was killed and his army soundly defeated.
Within the course of a field operation that lasted perhaps three weeks,
Charlemagne put an end to the Lombard revolt as the fortress of Friuli sur-
rendered without opposition.99
95See ARF, an., 776; AE, an., 776; AP, an. 776; and Andrea, Chron., ch. 4, for a battle rather
than a siege, motivated by devastione Francorum.
96Regarding Avar military tactics, see Walter Pohl, Die Awaren, Ein Steppenvolk in
Mitteleuropa, 567822 n. Chr. (Munich, 1988), pp. 170174, and passim.
97Andrea, Hist., ch. 4, identifies the place of the battle in the context of much
pro-Lombard and anti-Frankish rhetoric. See the discussion by Barbero, Charlemagne,
pp. 3435, 352.
98Regarding early Carolingian tactical use of various types of river craft, see Bachrach,
Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 137, 204, 256257.
99See ARF, an., 776; AE, an., 776; and AP, an. 776, for Hrodgauds death. The speed with
which Charlemagne effected this campaign is reflected in the account that is provided by
the author of the ARF, an. 776. Unfortunately, the chronology provided by this text is inac-
curate. See Appendix.
502 chapter eight
Rearranging the Administration
As seen in Chapter Six, Charlemagne appears to have made only minimal

changes in the personnel of the conquered Lombard kingdom. Or, at the
least, the surviving information following his assumption of the royal
title in 774 provides little evidence for large-scale changes.100 Clearly, the
dukes of Beneventum and Spoleto were maintained in place. Hrodgaud,
as already discussed, was placed in charge at Friuli, his father-in-law
Stabilius was given control of Treviso, and Reginbald was made duke in
Chuisa. Pavia was retained as the capital of the regnum Langobardorum
and Carolingian judices were placed in charge of the administration there.
Finally, Charlemagne cultivated close relations with the archbishop of
Ravenna and permitted him to extend his administrative control over cit-
ies that previously had been in Lombard hands but which the papacy
wished to control. Leo was proving to be a useful ally.
Insofar as can be ascertained, Charlemagne also would seem to have
made rather few important changes in the administration of the Lombard
kingdom following his victory over Hrodgaud and the other rebel dukes.
The author of the Royal Annals indicates that Charlemagne transferred to
Frankish administrators the cities that he had captured, i.e. Vicenza,
Treviso, Cividale del Friuli, and the other places that had revolted. These
would appear to include many lesser strongholds such as the numerous
castra and castella that dotted the countryside of the Lombard kingdom,
and most probably those in the Friuli region.101 There is no reason to
believe that Duke Reginbald was replaced at Chuisa, despite the charges
that Pope Hadrian had leveled against him.
Unlike the settlement in 774, however, Charlemagne is reported to have
taken a great many Lombards as prisoners and perhaps some as hostages
to ensure the good behavior of their families.102 Some of these Lombards
were distributed throughout the regnum Francorum, e.g. in monasteries
100Hlawitschka, Franken, pp. 2325.

101ARF, an. 776. AE, an. 776, tells much the same story. AM, an. 776, calls attention to
castella that were recaptured. The various men whom Charlemagne placed in command in
these fortified centers have not yet been identified. The claim by Andrea of Bergamo, Hist.,
ch. 4, that these dukes were left in place has been rejected by modern scholars. See, for
example, Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 35.
102Kosto, Hostages, pp. 127133, emphasizes that at least some of the sources make a
clear distinction between a captive and a hostage. However, he notes that this is not the
case with all sources. It is perhaps useful to suggest that all hostages are captives, but not
all captives are hostages. Some captives could be prisoners of war and others merely felons
held for their crimes.
and on villae of the royal fisc.103 A certain Lombard aristocrat from Friuli
named Warnefrid, who was taken north of the Alps as a prisoner, has
received considerable attention from modern scholars because he was
Paul the Deacons brother.104 Other Lombard landholders also were taken
to Francia, and some were held as prisoners north of the Alps for many
years.105 Charlemagne also expelled other Lombards who apparently had
participated in the revolt from their native cities and forced them into
internal exile, i.e. within the borders of the regnum Langobardorum.106
Aio, who had been the rebel dukes legate to the Avars, remained with
them in Pannonia for several years, and it is very likely that at that time
he was accompanied by an entourage, i.e. some part of his military
household. Eventually, however, Aio was reconciled with Charlemagne
and returned to the Lombard kingdom.107 In distinguishing between hos-
tages and captives, it is difficult to classify men such as Peter of Pisa, the
grammarian, and Paul of Friuli, who later was made patriarch of Aquilia;
these men are reported to have traveled north with Charlemagne. Whether
they should be considered prisoners, hostages, or honored guests seems to
be a question of little relevance. Rather, after they arrived in Francia with
Charlemagnes army, they soon made a very useful contribution to the
intellectual life of Carolingian court. There they won the respect and
approval of Charlemagne.108
An important, though often unnoticed, result of Charlemagnes success
in the northeast of Italy was that the Bavarians would seem to have been
somewhat chastened. What, if any, efforts Duke Tassilo may have under-
taken in support of the ducal revolt, which was originally was aimed at
placing his brother-in-law, Adelchis, on the Lombard throne, or in encour-
aging Avar participation in military operations against Charlemagnes
assets, came to naught. This likely was due, at least in part, to effective
Frankish control of the Alpine passes which might have been used by
Tassilos troops. However, in 777, the year following his victories over the
Lombard rebels and over the Saxons (see below), Charlemagne planned to
103These points are made by the author of the ASM, an. 776. See also CRF., no. 32, ch. 12.
Barbero, Charlemagne, pp. 3435, calls attention to the account by Andrea of Bergamo,
Hist., ch. 4, that no changes were made, and rejects it.
104Wallace-Hadrill, The Frankish Church, p. 200.
105See CC., no. 208 (p. 279).
106See, for example, ASM, an. 776.
107Bowlus, Italia-Bavaria-Avara, p. 52.
108Costo, Hostages, pp. 132133, discusses these two cases in a manner that makes
clear the difficulty in making clear-cut distinctions.
504 chapter eight
invade northern Spain. In order to sustain these operations, Charlemagne

was able to mobilize the expeditionary forces of Bavaria.109 This was the
first time since 763, when Tassilo had deserted the Carolingian army just
prior to the siege of Bourges, that the rex Francorum was in a position to
mobilize the expeditionary forces of the Bavarian ducatus.
Return to the North
Charlemagne began the journey home after defeating the Lombard rebels
and making some changes in the administrative personnel in the north-
east of the kingdom. By the latter part of July, Charlemagne was at Patris
Giaigio, likely somewhere between Vicenza and Verona or, as some schol-
ars suggest, perhaps as far west as the military base at Sirmione.110 At Patris
Giaigio and before turning north to return to Francia by means of the
Brenner Pass, Chur, and the great Rhine road, the king granted to Abbot
Anslem and to the monastery of Nonantula extensive landed resources
from the newly-acquired Lombard royal fisc. These resources, for the most
part, were located in the Modena region. At this time, Charlemagne
also confirmed the gifts that King Desiderius earlier had made to that
monastery.111
109See, for example, ARF, an. 778.

110DK., no. 113. The identification of Patris Giaigio as located considerably to the west of
Verona is based upon the widely-held supposition that Charlemagne was at Ivrea on 17
June 776 (Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, p. 85). This act, however, which sup-
posedly was executed at Ivrea (DK., no. 112) in 776, has a faulty datum-clause. The clause
reads Data XV kal. iul. anno decimo regni nostri; [actum] Eboreia civitate; in dei nomine
feliciter. First, the tenth year of Charlemagnes reign was 778, not 776. Secondly, there is no
mention of Charlemagnes regnal year as rex Langobardorum. However, even if one were to
ignore these and other less important errors in the datum-clause, and there is no reason to
do this, it would have been difficult for Charlemagne to have held court at Vicenza on 9
June (DK, no. 111, where the datum-clause is sound) and at Ivrea, more than 300 kilometers
to the west, only seven days later. For Charlemagne to have made this rapid journey averag-
ing about 45 kilometers per day, he would have had to have traveled only with a small
number of bodyguards and to have had available frequent changes of horses. Such an effort
would only be undertaken if there were some pressing need to do so, and no source, includ-
ing the charter at issue, indicates that such a situation existed. Indeed, a really pressing
need would likely have had military implications, and Charlemagnes army could not
march 300 kilometers during a seven-day period. N.b. McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 188
197, provides good reason to modify our understanding of Charlemagnes itinerary on the
basis of a more careful examination of the datum-clauses and the scribes who executed
them. In dealing with DK, no. 112, McKitterick (pp. 195196) does not, however, treat the
problems created by the faulty datum-clause.
111CC, no. 113.
Following this meeting with Abbot Anselm, Charlemagne and most of

the Carolingian army, which had been mobilized from various parts of the
Frankish kingdom, likely was on the road north toward Francia. At this
time, probably somewhere north of Chur, Charlemagne learned that the
Saxons once again had broken their treaties.112 Even this limited report
made clear to Charlemagne that a third and perhaps a rather different
complex of military operations would be necessary to effect his policy of
conquest, conversion, and integration. Whether he would be able to
undertake these in what remained of the campaigning season of 776 or
whether he would have to postpone operations against the Saxons until
777 would depend upon further intelligence regarding the military situa-
tion that was still in the process of emerging.
Appendix
The Chronology of the Friuli Campaign

According to the Annales regnum Francorum, an. 776, Charlemagne
attacked the Friuli region, killed Duke Hrodgaud, captured the fortress
city of Friuli, crushed the Lombard revolt, replaced compromised
Lombard officials, celebrated Easter at Treviso on 14 April 776, and then
rushed back across the Alps to deal with a Saxon attack on Eresburg.
There is widespread scholarly acceptance of this treatment of both the
sequence of events and the chronology.113 In light of the distances the
Carolingian army marched, the time of the year in which these operations
are known to have occurred, and the complexity of the military situation,
both the sequence of events and the chronology provided by the Annales
must be regarded as highly suspect. A hint is provided regarding the dubi-
ous nature of this chronology by the reviser of the Annales, who wrote at
the royal court several years later. Among other aspects of the story, he
rejects the statement that Charlemagne celebrated Easter at Treviso
in 776.114
112ARF, an., 776; AE, an., 776, indicates that Charlemagne was already north of the Alps
when he received the news of the Saxon invasion. See also AP, an. 776.
113See, for example, Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, pp. 8485, and more
recently Krawinkler, Friaul, pp. 122, 125. Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 34, believes that
Charlemagne crossed the mountains and appeared in Friuli in February or March 776.
114AE, an., 776, Nb. it is the custom of the reviser to include such information, and its
omission for 776 is important.
506 chapter eight
It is clear, on the basis of charter evidence, that Charlemagne spent

Christmas 775 at Slenstat in the area of Strasbourg.115 The march from
this area along the great Rhine road to Chur and then on to Zernetz and
Mustair over the Brenner Pass to Verona, the shortest and easiest route,
had to cover a distance of approximately 500 kilometers. An additional
220 kilometers had to be covered to march from Verona to Friuli. The
march from Friuli back to Treviso, where Easter is purported to have been
celebrated, required moving the army approximately an additional 150
kilometers. The entire distance, calculated above, between the Strasbourg
area and Treviso required a march of at least 870 kilometers, and this does
not include the armys march to and from Vicenza, which Charlemagne
also captured.
At an average pace of 20 kilometers per day for six days out of every
seven, this march, excluding a diversion to Vicenza, would have taken
approximately seven weeks. At this rate of speed, Charlemagnes army,
presumably having left the Strasbourg region on or about the first of
January, would have been able to cover the 870-kilometer marching dis-
tance calculated above by the last week of February. To put it another way,
after taking account of this time on the road according to this chronology,
only seven weeks were available for the Frankish army to march back and
forth to Vicenza, to capture the fortress cities of Vicenza, Treviso, and
Friuli, and to establish Frankish administrations in these cities and the
lesser strongholds that Charlemagne also captured before leaving for
home.
This chronology obviously represents a best-case situation. First, it is
necessary to come to terms with the notion that Charlemagne was able to
muster a large invasion army in the Strasbourg region during the months
of November and December. By December, at the latest, weather condi-
tions throughout much of the regnum Francorum were hardly conducive
to extensive travel, much less to the mustering of thousands of troops from
throughout the realm. This, of course, was recognized by the Frankish
kings who were usually snugly ensconced in winter quarters by mid-
November.116 In light of the traditional calendar for the mobilization of
troops, the proclamation of the bannum in winter would have required a
special effort and, as a result, could be expected to have attracted special
attention.117 The sources, however, do not mention such a special effort.
115DK., no. 110.

116See, for example, ARF, passim, for the royal court established in winter quarters.
117See Bachrach, The Marchfield, pp. 7885.
This is important because Charlemagne won a great victory in Italy over

the rebels, and as we have seen, the sources tend to give greater attention
to his successful operations as contrasted to his less notable efforts.
Secondly, we must deal with the problems encountered by an army of
substantial size crossing the Alps in January and early February, even over
the easy Brenner Pass. Comparatively small groups, led by the German
emperor, as compared to relatively large armies of the type traditionally
mobilized by the early Carolingians, are known to have crossed the
Brenner in February during the 11th and 12th centuries. However, even the
Brenner does not seem to have been attempted by such smaller royal par-
ties in January during this period.118 Of some considerable importance in
this context is the additional fact that the western European climate was
considerably warmer ca. 1100 than it had been ca. 800.119 This permits the
inference that even the Brenner opened earlier during the high Middle
Ages than was the case during the early Carolingian era. It should be noted
as well that none of the Carolingian narrative sources, which often men-
tion particularly cold or particularly warm weather, have anything to say
about these matters in regard to the winter of 775776.120
Thirdly, attributing an average pace of 20 kilometers per day, as above,
for a substantial military force with horse-drawn vehicles and pack ani-
mals crossing the Alps in the dead of winter is excessive. In light of what
we know concerning armies on the march under somewhat easier condi-
tions, it is more likely that an average a pace of only 15 kilometers per day
could be maintained. Yet, this too is perhaps somewhat optimistic.121
If approximately 500 of the 870 total kilometers of the march were
negotiated at a pace of 15 kilometers per day as compared to the 20-
kilometer average used in the above calculations, another nine days would
be added to the time for the march. As a result, the seven weeks suppos-
edly used to capture the rebel cities and other strongholds as well as the
118Brhl, Fodrum, gistum, servitium, I, 453455, lists the dates for the Romezge of the
Ottonian and Salian kings. In all, he has found one example in which the journey was
begun in January. However, the timing of this journey brought the royal party to the Alps in
February or even later. See also Tyler, The Alpine Passes, p. 43.
119Michael McCormick, Paul Edward Dutton, and Paul A. Mayewski, Volcanoes and
the Climate Forcing of Carolingian Europe, A.D. 750950, Speculum 82 (2007), 867895,
provide references to the most recent literature on the early medieval warm period. In this
context, see M.K. Hughes and H.F. Diaz, The Medieval Warm Period (Boston, 1994), 109342;
and idem, Was There a Medieval Warm Period? Climatic Change, 26 (1994), 109142.
120McCormick, Dutton, and Mayewski, Volcanoes, pp. 867895, rely heavily on the
presumed propensity of medieval annals to comment on unusual weather.
121See the valuable study by Nesbitt, Rate of march, pp. 167182.
508 chapter eight
march to and from Vicenza would be reduced to about five and a half
weeks.
The use of Sachkritik, above, to cast doubt on the traditional chronol-
ogy, is lent considerable support from a variety of written sources. Thus, as
noted above, the author of the Annales q.d. Einhardi, an., 776, in his revi-
sion of the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, rejected the chronology con-
structed by the latter author. However, he was not the only Carolingian
historian to do this. The authors of the Annales Petaviani, an. 776; Annales
S. Maximiani, an., 776; and Annales Mettenses priores, an. 776, all of whom
had access to the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, also rejected this chro-
nology. In short, this chronology is not embraced by any Carolingian nar-
rative source other than the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776.
Additional doubt is cast on the chronology constructed by the author of
the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, by an exchange of letters between
Pope Hadrian and Charlemagne early in the winter of 776. Pope Hadrian
wrote early in February, i.e. shortly after 7 February, to Charlemagne, who,
if the above chronology is to be accepted, was already on the march to
Italy. The pope provides no indication that he has any information regard-
ing Charlemagnes mobilization for an invasion of Italy, much less any
indication that this Carolingian invasion force had likely crossed the
Alps.122 This letter, if it had to be carried from Rome through the Alps,
likely did not reach Charlemagne until mid-February 776 or perhaps even
somewhat later, in light of the speed of the tractoria discussed above
under difficult conditions.
Toward the end of February, or perhaps somewhat later, Charlemagne
responded to the popes above-mentioned letter. Charlemagne made no
mention in his letter that he had been on the march for several weeks,
at least, and was in Italy.123 Indeed, if the chronology constructed by
the author of the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, is to be accepted,
Charlemagnes army already had passed through the Alps and was in
northern Italy at this time. The only point of significance in Charlemagnes
letter to the pope was a complaint. He charged that papal agents, in league
with Duke Allo of Pisa, were involved in selling Christians as slaves to the
Muslims through the medium of Byzantine merchants.124 When Pope
Hadrian replied to Charlemagnes letter, he made clear that his agents
were not involved in this slave trade and that he had tried to stop it. What
122CC., no. 58.

123CC., no. 59.
124CC., no. 59.
is important about this second papal letter, which likely was written some-
time early in March 776, is that it makes no mention of Charlemagnes
invasion or his supposed great victory already won against the rebels,
as suggested by the chronology constructed by the Annales regni
Francourm.125 Had the pope been in possession of such information, con-
sistent with previous and subsequent communications to Charlemagne,
he undoubtedly would have indicated that extensive prayers were being
said for the success of these military efforts and that additional prayers
had been said for their positive results.
The doubts raised by Sachkritik concerning the sequence of events and
the chronology provided by the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, as well
as the rejection of this chronology by all of the other Carolingian narrative
sources which treat the campaign, deserve serious consideration. Further,
the information found, or, more importantly, not found, in the exchange of
letters between Charlemagne and Pope Hadrian during this period tends
to support the argument for revision. Finally, two of Charlemagnes firmly
dated charters also strongly support rejection of the chronology provided
by the Annales regni Francorum, an. 776. Charlemegne was at Vicenza,
only 60 kilometers west of Treviso, on 8 June 776. At that time, he issued a
charter in favor of the monastery of Farfa.126 Clearly, the Carolingian army
was not racing home following the supposed celebration of Easter, two
months earlier, at Treviso on 14 April. Charlemagne issued a charter in July,
in the environs of Verona, for Abbot Anselm and presented an extensive
grant to the monastery of Nonantula, three months after Easter.127
If the Carolingian victory over the rebels was in fact complete by mid-
April 776, what was Charlemagne still doing in northern Italy three months
later? If, however, we reject the dubious chronology provided by the
Annales regni Francorum, an. 776, as contemporary and near-contempo-
rary Carolingian writers did, it seems likely that Charlemagnes sojourn at
Vicenza in early June 776 may be used to date his capture of that fortress
city. The charter issued in July indicates the end of the campaign against
the rebel dukes and marks the beginning of Charlemagnes return to
Francia. With this chronology at the end of military operations estab-
lished, the beginning of the campaign in April, when the Brenner almost
surely was open, would have brought Charlemagnes army to Verona in
May and placed the capture of Vicenza early in June.
125CC., no. 59.

126DK., no. 110.
127DK., no. 113.
CHAPTER NINE
THE END OF THE SAXON WAR
By the latter part of July 776, probably when Charlemagne was leading the
Frankish army along the Roman road in the neighborhood north of Chur
on the way toward Konstanz, he learned from a messenger (nuntius) that
the Saxons once again had risen in revolt.1 From this message, it was clear
to Charlemagne and his military advisers that in the course of the annual
Saxon council that had met at Marklo in the spring of 776, i.e. after the
Carolingians had begun their march into Italy, the representatives of the
Gaue agreed upon the mobilization of a very large army, ingens exercitus,
to invade the regnum Francorum.2 As will be seen below, Charlemagne
was not yet fully aware of the Saxon campaign strategy, and apparently
this would remain the case for several weeks. Therefore, Charlemagne
took the initial step of ordering the mobilization of a large army at Worms
from where he could advance into any part of the Saxon territory.
Upon receiving news of enemy military operations against Frankish
assets, Charlemagne, of course, immediately understood that the Saxon
leaders once again had broken their oaths (sacramenta) to recognize
Carolingian ditio. It also was clear that they had broken their promise
to support the efforts of the Franks to proselytize throughout Saxon terri-
tory in order to make converts to Christianity. This last conclusion was
based upon information that the numerous churches, or at least many of
them, which missionaries under the leadership of Abbot Sturm of Fulda
had constructed in the Saxon region during the previous three years, had
been destroyed.3 It was obvious also that once again the Saxons had
1ARF, an. 776, indicates that Charlemagne was in Francia when he received the news.
By contrast, AE, an. 776, indicates that Charlemagnes forces had barely crossed the Alps
when he learned of the Saxon offensive.
2Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159). As the discussion below of Saxon military operations
during this campaign makes clear, Eigil was probably not exaggerating when he reported
that the Saxon army of invasion was very large.
3Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159). It is hoped that future archaeological work will be able
to identify some of these churches and provide useful chronological information. Of
course, it must be recognized that Eigil may have been exaggerating either the numbers of
churches that had been built or the numbers that had been destroyed or both. It is unlikely,
however, that no churches had been built or that none had been burned to the ground
by the Saxons.
the end of the saxon war511
decided to abandon what likely would be an unpleasant fate for the hos-
tages whom they had given into Carolingian custody the previous year.4
Once north of the Alps and aided by the good weather of the summer
season, i.e. the various annals have nothing to say about either bad weather
or drought as is their wont, Charlemagne very likely moved his forces at a
rapid pace on the march homeward. The immediate goal was the royal
palatium at Worms, where Charlemagne, as noted above, decided that a
very large army was to be mustered for a new campaign against the
Saxons.5 On this march north, the Frankish army probably averaged very
good time, i.e. in the neighborhood of 20 kilometers per day for six days in
every seven. By the end of the first week of August, at the latest, the army
probably had reached Strasbourg, approximately 150 kilometers north of
Konstanz. At this pace, Charlemagne likely was established in the royal
palatium at Worms, about 100 kilometers north of Strasbourg, by mid-
August, where he established the court and detailed planning for the
Carolingian response to the invasion of the Saxon region was begun.6
Intelligence Gathering
Charlemagnes ultimate response to this Saxon invasion of 776 would

depend upon the quality and quantity of the intelligence that he would
receive regarding the military situation broadly understood. Obviously, he
could only decide on significant countermeasures which had a hope of
being effective on the basis of information that was both accurate and
fresh. Charlemagne would learn over time that the council at Marklo had
made a decision to muster two very large Saxon armies. One already was
in the field when Charlemagne arrived at Worms, and a second would
appear to have been in the process of mobilizing but was not yet on the
march, or, more accurately, had not yet engaged with Frankish assets.
The Magistratus would figure out that one Saxon army already was
operating along what may be considered the central corridor between
Saxon territory and Cologne, while the second army was preparing to cam-
paign further to the north in the valley of the Lippe. The earliest news that
4ARF, an. 776, provides this information. However, it is unclear whether this is an
inference drawn by the author of these Annales or evidence that the Carolingians early on
had intelligence which indicated that a conscious decision had been made by the Saxons,
perhaps at Marklo, to abandon the hostages.
5Regarding the mobilization at Worms, see AN, an. 776; AA., an., 776; and AG., an., 776.
6Brhl, Worms, pp. 128129.
512 chapter nine
Charlemagne received, however, concerned a substantial and devastating

Saxon raid undertaken by the first Saxon army or elements of this force.
These enemy units raided into the middle reaches of the Rhineland east of
the river. This operation may well have been completed by the end of July
or early August. Subsequently, Charlemagne would learn that elements of
this same force would lay siege to and capture the fortress at Eresburg,
undertake an effort to capture the fortress at Syburg, and project an attack
on the monastery of Fulda, perhaps with the further aim of moving against
Frankfurt.
The Rhineland Raid
Military operations undertaken in the Rhineland constituted the first epi-

sode of Saxon military operations in 776. Early intelligence regarding these
operations likely made clear to Charlemagne that substantial enemy
forces had advanced as far west into the regnum Francorum as the right
bank of the Rhine. The invaders, however, are not reported to have crossed
the river. Such an operation, of course, would have been a substantial
undertaking, especially if Carolingian local militia forces were mobilized
on the west bank of the river to thwart such a landing. According to the
best account that has survived, these Saxon troops ravaged the territory
along their line of march westward destroying capital resources, e.g.
homesteads, farm buildings, and churches, and killing whomever they
encountered while advancing toward the Rhine. Nothing is said either of
the Saxons taking prisoners or of capturing large quantities of booty.7
Even more interesting and perhaps indicative of this phase of the
Saxons campaign strategy is the report that on their return march east-
ward, this same invasion force again is reported to have killed all of the
people, i.e. men, women, and children, with whom it came into contact.8
Because of the devastation inflicted on the land during the westward
phase of the operation, the Saxons undoubtedly followed a somewhat dif-
ferent route on their return march eastward. This was necessary to assure
the availability of adequate supplies in the countryside for Saxon foragers
to acquire. In addition, by using a different route on their return march,
7Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159). The capacity of the Saxons to raid as far west as the
Rhine is noted again in 778, when they ravaged the region around the stronghold of Deutz,
across the river from Cologne. See, ARF, an. 778; and AE, an., 778.
8Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159). AE, an. 778, illustrate in detail the kind of damage such
a raid could accomplish in the Rhineland.
the Saxons were able to inflict additional casualties and to destroy addi-
tional elements of the Carolingian economic infrastructure.
From this information, it may be suggested that the Saxons who under-
took this operation in 776 were, at least in part, following an overall strat-
egy similar to that which they had employed in 774. The Saxons aim in
both instances was to make it overwhelmingly clear to the Carolingians
that they had the capacity to inflict significant damage both to the human
and material resources of the Franks. The operations in 774, however, were
focused on the Frankish-Saxon border region, e.g. Eresburg, Fritzlar, and
Braburg, while their effort in 776 extended deep into the regnum Fran
corum all the way to the east bank of the Rhine. This latter operation
clearly indicates that Saxon military forces had a considerable offensive
capacity and an effective range well beyond the borders of their home
territory. The overall strategic result that the Saxons sought in 776 was
similar to that which had been developed in 774. The plan was to force
Charlemagne to reverse his strategy of conquering the Saxon region and
converting its inhabitants to Christianity.
The Saxons effort to inflict extensive, if not massive, destruction on
Frankish property and to cause a large number of casualties, despite the
possibility that our sources may have exaggerated both, indicates a short-
term tactical aim of creating chaos and instilling terror in the surviving
inhabitants. Such a goal was consistent with vindicating Saxon long-term
strategy of deterring Frankish eastward movement, conquest, and settle-
ment. On the whole, considerable disorganization undoubtedly had been
brought about as a result of the large-scale casualties suffered by the popu-
lation. These losses would have made it very difficult for the authorities,
both secular, e.g. counts and viscounts, and ecclesiastical, e.g. bishops and
abbots, to muster either militia forces for the local defense or to put expe-
ditionary units into the field in order to execute operations beyond their
home pagi for the purpose of opposing the invading Saxon forces in the
field.
If, despite the problems discussed above, Frankish militia forces could
be levied east of the Rhine, the destruction by the Saxons of material
resources such as carts and wagons, as well as food supplies, also would
undermine the ability of the locals to provide logistical support. It must be
recognized also that expeditionary forces which might be mobilized west
of the Rhine would have to put in place extraordinary measures in order
to gather sufficient quantities of supplies while in their home territories
so that they could operate effectively east of the river, where the logistic
system very likely had been disrupted. Traditionally, as pointed out above,
514 chapter nine
magazines were prepared for expeditionary forces along their line of

march.
An additional insight can be gained concerning the composition of this
Saxon invading force and, by extension, regarding its tactics from the fail-
ure of Eigil in his Life of Sturm or any of the several other sources which
treat the invasion of 776 to claim that these invaders seized booty and/or
carried off prisoners. Traditionally, one of the purposes of Saxon raids, as
discussed above, was the acquisition of prisoners to be enslaved. There
would appear to have been a significant demand for slaves both east and
west of the Rhine frontier.9 Boniface had reported to Pope Gregory III that
Christian slaves had been traded to the pagan Saxons by Christian mer-
chants contrary to papal injunctions.10 In addition, the erstwhile Roman
fortress city of Utrecht and episcopal see, located on the northern reaches
of the Rhine frontier, had served as a center for the collection of royal tolls
on the slave trade, presumably on trade going both east and west, since the
later 7th century.11
Frankish captives taken by the Saxons generally were Christians. The
sale of these captives to pagan groups beyond the frontiers of the regnum
Francorum was regarded by the clergy as an affront to Christianity. This
activity received attention in the sources, also written by clerics, if only to
highlight the suffering of the victims for their supposed misdeeds, i.e. pre-
vious sinful behavior, which brought down Gods wrath on them and
resulted in their enslavement.12 By not taking either booty or slaves, it is
clear that operationally, the Saxon troops involved in the campaign under
discussion likely were under strict orders to move rapidly and therefore
without significant impedimenta. This permits the inference that this ini-
tial phase of the Saxon invasion in 776 was undertaken by a large mounted
force, likely organized into several independent columns to maximize its
devastating impact on the region and to minimize its supply problems.
To conclude in regard to this part of the Saxon invasion, these initial
operations were intended to have a strategic impact, i.e. to cause substan-
tial damage to Frankish material assets and to kill large numbers of
9See CRF., no. 20, ch. 19; and no. 90, ch. 7.
10Epist. no. 28, ed. Tangl.
11DK., no., 59; and the discussion by Michael McCormick, New Light on the Dark
Ages: how the Slave Trade Fueled the Carolingian Economy, Past and Present, 177 (2002),
43. Boniface reported to Pope Gregory III that Christian slaves were traded to the pagan
Saxons by Christian merchants contrary to papal injunctions (Epist. no. 28, ed. Tangl).
12For the lack of booty and slaves, see Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159); ARF, an. 776; and
AE, an. 776.
people. The aim was to instill disorientation, terror, and hardship among
those who survived. By sowing chaos in the region, at least in the short
term, an effective Carolingian military response from forces based east of
the Rhine against other Saxon forces, either already operating against
Frankish assets on the frontier or preparing to deploy (see below), likely
would be delayed or perhaps even forestalled entirely. In addition, because
of the substantial material and human destruction visited on the region
between the Weser and the Rhine, Carolingian forces mobilized in areas
west of this theater of operations would, also in the short term, be handi-
capped in logistic terms when trying to move east through those areas that
had been devastated. In this sense, the Saxon operations described above
may be seen, at least in part, as a scorched earth tactic, which was
intended to inhibit a rapid Carolingian military response.
Saxon Siege Warfare
On the basis of the way in which the various Frankish annalists organize
their information and the geographical disposition of the theaters of mili-
tary operations, it would seem that the second Saxon effort in 776 was a
siege of the fortress town of Eresburg. This was not the first time that the
Saxons had engaged in siege warfare. Operations in 774 against Eresburg,
Fritzlar, and Braburg provide the earliest evidence for a concerted effort
by Saxon forces to capture Frankish fortifications during Charlemagnes
reign, and, in effect, to undertake a campaign strategy that was dominated
tactically by siege warfare. The failure to capture either Fritzlar or Braburg
in 774 undoubtedly reinforced among the Saxons the widely recognized
fact that storming fortifications using scaling ladders was very costly in
terms of casualties. These facts can be seen to have encouraged the Saxons
by 776, at the latest, to acquire various types of machinae which could be
used against enemy fortifications.13 It is perhaps not surprising that during
the campaign of 776, we hear for the first time that the Saxons deployed
ingenia against Carolingian fortifications. It seems clear that the Saxons
had obtained the most advanced catapult technology available during the
early Middle Ages.14
13ARF, an. 776.

14While there is no doubt that this type of catapult represented the most modern tech-
nology, the use of the term trebuchet to describe it is very controversial. See Carroll
Gillmore, The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet into the West, Viator, 12 (1981), 18;
516 chapter nine
When Charlemagnes military advisers, i.e. the seniores and consiliores

serving in the Magistratus, learned that the Saxons had available to them
this modern siege technology, which had become available in the west
only a half-century or so earlier, they probably were surprised.15 In light of
this new equipment available to the Saxons, Charlemagne and his advisers
surely drew the obvious conclusion that the Saxons were getting support,
and especially technological aid, from the outside. There were several
sources from which the Saxons could have obtained this advanced tech-
nology. The lever or traction catapult was known to the Avars, who, during
Carolingian operations in Italy discussed in the previous chapter, had
been involved, at the least, on the periphery of the Lombard revolt in 776,
and surely were interested in undermining the Carolingians opportuni-
ties for military success.16 The Avars thus may have been cooperating with
the Saxons, perhaps through some intermediary such as the Bavarians. In
addition, the traction catapult possibly was known also to the Bavarians
themselves, who for a short time during the campaign of 763 had partici-
pated in Pippin Is mobilization prior to the siege of Bourges where the
this modern technology was used.17
The Byzantines are a possible third Saxon partner for the transfer of
this advanced siege machine technology.18 Clearly, like both the Avars and
the Bavarians, the Byzantines had good reason to support the Saxons to
the detriment of the Carolingians and as a means of diverting Frankish
interests from Italy and the Balkans. Charlemagnes great success in con-
quering the Lombard kingdom not only endangered what remained of
the Byzantines holdings and influence in the north of Italy, but also
threatened their dominant position on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.
Although the surviving written sources say nothing about direct contact
and the detailed discussion of the terminology by David S. Bachrach, English Artillery
11891307: The Implication of Terminology, EHR, 121 (2006), 14081430. As a result of this
labeling problem, I have refrained from using the term trebuchet. For background pur-
poses, Tracey Rihill, The Catapult: A History (Yardley, PA, 2006), is highly recommended,
and one hopes that her next study will cover more material relevant to the early medieval
period.
17For Bavarian involvement in the campaign against Bourges, see Fred. Cont., an. 763;
and regarding the use of catapults there by the Frankish army, see Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, p. 232.
18Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Evolution of Slavic Society and the Slavic Invasions in Greece:
The First Major Slavic Attack on Thessaloniki, a.d. 597, Hesperia, 50 (1981), 378390; and
Michael Whitby, The Emperor Maurice and his historian: Theophylact Simocatta on Persian
and Balkan Warfare (Oxford, 1988), pp. 118119.
between the Saxons and Constantinople, a plethora of archaeological evi-

dence links the east Roman Empire with northeastern Europe even as far
north as Scandinavia.19
Since Charlemagne likely would know that the Saxons had not acquired
the catapult technology under discussion here from the Franks, the
Carolingians reasonably could conclude that at least one foreign govern-
ment was taking a substantial interest in supporting military operations
against the regnum Francorum. The depth and complexity of such support
can be deduced from what is known of the early medieval traction or lever
catapult itself. From an eyewitness description of how these catapults
were constructed, we learn that in comparison with later Roman and
other early medieval siege machines, this catapult was of great size.
These machines had quadrangular bases that tapered toward the front
and at the base, (lit. at the ends), presumably near the corners for
purposes of balance, were affixed thick [but hollow] cylinders that were
thoroughly covered in iron and timbers of the size [used in the construc-
tion] of a large house were [inserted into these cylinders and] nailed into
place. The arm of each of the catapults apparently was a beam that was of
a size similar to that used for the frame of the machine. Then slings were
hung from the back side of the timbers that were used as the arms and
from the front [of these timbers] strong ropes hung down .20
The operation of this catapult also was complex, and the same eyewit-
ness who described the machine also provided an account of how it was
operated. At the front of the timber firing arm was a crosspiece from which
dozens of ropes hung down. When preparation was being made to launch
a missile, which might weigh more than a hundred kilograms, a team of
several dozen or more men pulled down of the ropes. The size of the team
depended both on the size of the machine and the weight of the missile
19See, for example, Ulf Nsman, Exchange and politics: the eighth-early ninth century
in Denmark, in The Long Eighth Century: Production, Distribution and Demand, ed.
I.L. Hansen and C. Wickham (Leiden, 2000), 63, for the movement of goods from the east-
ern Mediterranean through west-central Europe to emporia at Ribe and Hedeby. This may
well be thought of as the reestablishment of trade between the eastern Mediterranean
and northern Europe through central Europe that had flourished during the 6th century
and earlier. See Ulf Nsman, The Justinianic era of south Scandinavia: an archaeological
view, in The Sixth Century: Production, Distribution and Demand, ed. Richard Hodges and
William Bowden (Leiden-Boston-Kln, 1998), 255277. In more general terms, see Birgit
Arrhenius, Connections between Scandinavia and the East Roman Empire in the
Migration Period, in From the Baltic to the Black Sea: Studies in Medieval Archaeology, ed. D.
Austin and L. Alcock (London, 1990), 118137.
20John, Mir. S. Demetrii, XIV, 151. For further commentary regarding these details, see
518 chapter nine
to be launched. Prior to launching, the sling at the rear of the timber firing
arm in which the missile was loaded was held down to the ground by the
man in charge of controlling its release. As our eyewitness report indi-
cates, it was by pulling down [the ropes at the front end] and then releas-
ing the sling [at the rear end], that they [the machines] propel the stone
up high [into the air] with a loud noise. Thus, it is averred, perhaps with
some exaggeration, that when the ropes [at the front and the sling] were
released, they [the machines] sent up many very large stones so that no
construction built by men could survive under their impact.21
In order to protect the crews who operated these machines from enemy
arrows that were shot by the defenders who manned the walls of the city,
it is emphasized that wooden planks were attached on three sides [of the
frame of the machine] and thus the men inside were vulnerable only to
missiles that came from above. In addition, it was clear that a besieging
force traditionally took measures to protect both the machines and the
crews which operated these devices from destruction by enemy missiles,
especially by incendiaries. Both fire arrows and incendiaries packed into
clay pots presented a particular danger. Consequently, it was the norm to
place on top of the planks that were nailed to the frame of the machine
freshly skinned hides. These bloody hides, taken from very recently
slaughtered animals, acted as a not easily flammable liquid-coated shield
against fire.22
The complex construction of these machines to workable specifica-
tions and the training of crews, each composed of several dozen men and
also provided with substitutes should some operators be incapacitated,
permits the inference that the Saxons, who had no previous experience
with this technology, were aided by military advisers provided by whom-
ever had made the technology available. The forging of the various metal
parts, discussed above, had to be done well in advance of the commence-
ment of military operations, and likely could not be undertaken on any
significant scale while siege operations were in progress. By contrast, the
cutting down of appropriately large trees often could be accomplished
while the siege was in progress if there were suitable forests nearby.23
However, several machines had to have been constructed long before any
21John, Mir. S. Demetrii, XIV, 151.

23Regarding the building of less-complicated machinae on the siege site, see Bachrach,
Anatomy, pp. 136140. It is to be noted, however, that seasoned wood was likely to provide
better results than green wood.
military campaign was to begin because the training of crews required a

considerable amount of practice in order to operate these catapults prop-
erly. In light of these conditions, it likely was the case that foreign military
advisers were distributed among the Saxons who were deployed to lay
siege to Carolingian fortifications in order to help out with regard to this
new technology.
The complexity of the situation regarding the traction-lever engine, i.e.
building the machines, training the crews, and transporting the equip-
ment, may perhaps account for what would appear to have been the rather
late start of the Saxon offensive against the Carolingians in 776. The
Saxons normal pattern of behavior, as discussed above, was to begin their
raiding operations in the spring after the great representative council was
held at Marklo. It is also possible that there was considerable delay in
launching military operations in 776 because of the size of the Saxon
effort. There was a decision to mobilize a very large army, ingens exercitus,
in the initial phase of operations and, as will be seen below, a second army,
also very large according to our sources, was to be deployed in the valley of
the Lippe in order to deal with the expected Carolingian counterattack.
The Attack on Eresburg
The earliest information that Charlemagne received concerning the mili-

tary situation in the Fulda gap likely was based upon a report that the for-
tress at Eresburg had been placed under siege by a very large Saxon army.
How long the siege lasted is impossible to ascertain. However, it would
seem that the Saxons brought overwhelming force to bear against the
Frankish garrison (praesidium) which Charlemagne had deployed in 775
to defend the fortress and also to help patrol the limes between Eresburg
and Braburg. This conclusion concerning the order of magnitude of
the Saxon force not only is in consonance with the report that they had
mobilized an ingens exercitus, but also because Charlemagnes troops
surrendered on terms. This permits the inference that the garrison did not
provide much resistance prior to capitulation.24
The act of surrender itself strongly suggests that the Carolingian garri-
son, sooner rather than later, saw the hopelessness of its position. Such a
24N.b., the parti pris of the author of the ARF, an. 776, is evident here as he uses iniqua
to describe the terms offered by the Saxons to the garrison. He does not, however, indicate
the fate of the garrison. By contrast, the author of AE, an. 776, says that the garrison was
driven out of Eresburg by the Saxons. On the one hand, this suggests some fighting had
520 chapter nine
failure of nerve can easily be understood for two reasons. First, as sug-
gested above, the Saxons had the equipment that was needed to soften up
the target with an artillery bombardment and, over time, make parts of
the walls and/or the gates indefensible. As an eyewitness to the operation
of these lever-traction machines observed, likely with some exaggeration,
no construction built by men could survive under their impact.25
Secondly, the Saxon army, because of its large size, posed a credible threat
to take the fortifications at Eresburg by storm, i.e. to execute a successful
escalade, and this likely would have been the case once the walls had been
degraded by bombardment with powerful catapults. As a result, the
Carolingian garrison chose not to put up much of a fight. Most impor-
tantly, the garrison commander negotiated terms, called a placitum in the
court sources, with the Saxon leader. The Frankish troops upon their sur-
render were permitted to return home unharmed under a guarantee of
safe conduct. The fact that this agreement was honored by the Saxons is
worthy of note since the Carolingian writers traditionally treat them as a
perfidious congeries of oathbreakers.26
After the garrison had been sent on its way back to the regnum
Francorum, the Saxons are reported to have begun the process of render-
ing the stronghold at Eresburg incapable of being defended. With more
than a modicum of exaggeration, the court annalist claims that the Saxons
destroyed the walls (muros) and the works (opera) at the fortress. This
latter term, opera, at the least, likely refers to the wooden walkways or scaf-
folding attached to the inside of the walls where the defenders would be
deployed in case of an attack, as well as the stairways by which these
installations were reached. The term, however, may also refer to external
fortifications, e.g. some sort of barbican, which were intended to strengthen
the position of the defenders.27
Unlike the author of the Annales regni Francorum, the author of the so-
called Revised Annals does not mention any destruction having taken
place with regard either to the walls or the infrastructure.28 This claim
taken place, and on the other hand, permits the inference that the garrison survived to
return home. In no case is there reason to believe that the garrison was slaughtered. Indeed,
the author of the AMP, an. 776, claims that the Frankish garrison (custodia Francorum)
returned home safely, despite the fact that he indicates that the Saxons had conquered
(conquisierunt) the castrum.
26See, for example, in the context of this invasion, ARF, an., 776.
27ARF, an. 776.
28Much has been written regarding the biases of the various annals. See, for example,
Collins, The Reviser, pp. 191213; and concerning the different perspectives of the author
regarding the fortress also likely is an exaggeration in light of the destruc-

tive capacity of the Saxons catapults, discussed above, and the defenders
rapid capitulation. By contrast, the Revisers contemporary, the author of
the Annales Mettenses priores, does claim that the castrum at Eresburg was
destroyed, but he does not elaborate upon what particular type of damage
was done.29
In light of the fact that the greater part of the Saxon force that besieged
Eresburg moved off rather quickly to lay siege to the Frankish stronghold
of Syburg (see below), it is likely that whatever major destruction that may
have been directly inflicted on the walls of the fortress had been caused by
the bombardment of Saxon catapults during the initial phase of the siege.
A demonstration of such firepower likely would have been necessary
to encourage the rapid surrender by the defenders. It is also probable that
after the Frankish garrison at Eresburg surrendered, the Saxons removed
the wooden gates of the fortress and probably burned them. In addition,
they may have also burned the scaffolding, discussed above, which per-
mitted the defenders to man the walls. By contrast with the damage
hypothesized above, the actual systematic destruction of a large stone for-
tress, stone by stone as discussed earlier, is an immensely time-consuming
and labor intensive operation.30 Moreover, when, as will be seen below,
Charlemagne recovered Eresburg, there is no reason to believe that he
found it necessary to rebuild the walls of the stronghold from the founda-
tion up.
Fulda and Frankfurt
From the intelligence reports regarding Saxon operations in the regnum

Francorum that were trickling into Charlemagnes headquarters at Worms,
it was clear that the invaders, early in their military operations, were enjoy-
ing some considerable tactical and strategic success. However, all the news
was not bad. The situation concerning Fulda and its region, which was in
the course of unfolding with regard to defensive military operations being
orchestrated by Abbot Sturm, certainly looked much more positive from
of the ARF and of the AE, see McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 2743, with the extensive
literature cited there.
29AE, an. 776; and AMP, an. 776.
30Concerning reports in contemporary sources regarding the destruction of fortifica-
tions and the contrary evidence provided by both archaeological studies and later written
accounts, see Bachrach, Military Organization, pp. 133.
522 chapter nine
Charlemagnes perspective. The abbot of Fulda commanded the military

forces that were obligated to serve from throughout much of the territory
between Fulda, at least as far north as Braburg and Fritzlar, and west
toward Marburg and Frankfurt. In this context, Eigil takes note of Sturms
response to a Saxon exercitus, which, in light of the timing and geographi-
cal location of subsequent events, had been detached from the very large
army which successfully had besieged the fortress at Eresburg.31
This smaller exercitus, which, nevertheless, is described as being com-
posed of a multitudo of viri, moved south approximately 70 kilometers
from Eresburg into the Lahngau, which was on the main route to Frankfurt.
The multitudo was encamped on the banks of the Lahn River, likely in the
area of the community of the Lahntal about seven kilometers north of
Marburg, which the Carolingians had yet to fortify, and approximately
80 kilometers north of Frankfurt.32 In light of this line of march from
Eresburg, the main strategic target of this force likely was the important
town and royal palatium at Frankfurt itself, which controlled the key con-
nection in this region between the Main and the Rhine rivers.33
Once encamped on the Lahn, however, the leader of this Saxon exer
citus decided that a special force of picked men, i.e. a unit of electi viri, was
to be detached from the multitudo under his command in order to make a
surprise attack on Fulda some 50 kilometers to the east.34 According to
Eigil, the tactical goal of this operation was to capture the monastery and
its purpose was to burn it to the ground. All of the monks who lived there,
whom Eigil refers to as servi in this context, were to be killed.35 Eigil, in
evoking the servus Dei idea, seems to be emphasizing that the monks were
holy men not soldiers, i.e. military personnel. His intent was to condemn
as an atrocity the Saxon plan to kill non-combatants. While, as Abbot
Sturm was to learn, meting out death and destruction may well have been
the overall Saxon plan, it went without saying that the great wealth of
the monastery made it a booty-rich target. The famous arcum which
housed St. Bonifaces relics had been constructed, in large part, of gold and

33See Elsbet Orth, Frankfurt, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der Pfalzen,
Knigshfe und brigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im deutschen Reichs des Mittelalters,
I Hessen (Gttingen, 1985), passim.
34Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 159). It is interesting that Engelbert, Die Vita Sturmi, p. 109,
refers to these fighting men as Schsische Guerillas, but unfortunately misdates this
entire episode to 778.
silver.36 The monasterys wealth, in general, was very widely known both
to Christians and to non-Christians because of the popularity of Fulda as
a pilgrimage site, which brought large numbers people to the shrine who
undoubtedly gossiped about what they saw.37
At this point, we cannot ascertain with any certitude why Eigil empha-
sized that it was the Saxon plan to destroy the monastery at Fulda and
to kill its monks rather than simply, or even primarily, to loot its wealth
and carry off the brothers to be sold as slaves. It may be hypothesized,
however, that the Saxons wanted to take revenge on St. Bonifice. As dis-
cussed earlier, he had gained great fame among Christians for having
made a vigorous and successful attack on the Saxons famous religious
symbol at Geismar. Though Boniface was long dead, the Saxons, who
undoubtedly knew that the saints relics were at Fulda, may have believed
that they could exact a measure of revenge if they captured the remains of
this great enemy. Once in Saxon hands, the relics could be destroyed in
some elaborate ritual, or perhaps even carried off and held for ransom.
It also may have been the case that at least some Saxons wanted to kill
Sturm and his monks because the abbot and the brothers at Fulda were
leading the proselytizing effort in Saxon territory, and apparently they
were enjoying considerable success in this cause. Eigil claims not only that
the monks had been baptizing Saxons, but also implies that substantial
numbers of converts had been made because of these efforts. In addition,
he makes clear that numerous churches and their support buildings were
being constructed in Saxon territory. Finally, the Fulda missionaries would
seem to have been sufficiently successful in their preaching and in their
effort to convert the Saxons to Christianity that Sturm, apparently follow-
ing Charlemagnes instructions, developed what may be considered a
parish organization of some sort.38
Both successful proselytism and infrastructure investment, which
required the expenditure of considerable human and material resources,
permit the inference that in some places high-ranking Saxons were pro-
viding protection for the Fulda missionaries and also resources for their
36Concerning the arcum, see Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 21 (p. 159).
37See Willibald, V. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (pp. 521522); and D. Heller, Das Grab des hl.
Bonifatius in Fulda, in Sankt Bonifatius (Fulda, 1954), 139156.
38Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 23 (p. 158), uses the curious phrase parochias episcopales, and
it is not clear whether Eigil here is describing the contemporary situation ca. 776 or later
conditions.
524 chapter nine
ecclesiastical building projects.39 Support for such an inference is pro-

vided by the somewhat earlier activities of the Saxon magnates Fulcbert
and his son Helco. They are reported to have lent their protection to
the missionary activities of Lebuin in the Sdergau not far from Mnster,
i.e. in Saxon territory north of the region in which the Fulda monks
worked.40 Developments such as these undergird Martin Lintzels more
broadly-based view that wealthy Saxon aristocrats, perhaps even satraps,
not only had become Christians but were helping to sustain the efforts
of the Carolingians to absorb the Saxon region into the regnum Francorum
by helping to bring about the conversion of the rank and file of the
population.41
The rapid success reportedly enjoyed by Sturms monks might well sug-
gest that the Saxons, or at least many of them, were ripe for conversion. It
is to be noted that Christianity is depicted in the Carolingian sources,
undoubtedly with some, if not a great deal of, exaggeration, as being
exceptionally attractive to the pagan peoples living east of the Rhine
and north of the Danube. This apparently had been the case earlier in
the 8th century, i.e. in the period of Bonifaces efforts.42 As reported in
various saints lives, Carolingian missionaries, despite occasional setbacks,
enjoyed great success in baptizing very large numbers of pagans who
dwelled beyond the borders of the Frankish kingdom.43
The problem of conversions and the need to stop the process, as seen by
the Saxons, may have been becoming acute. Those Carolingian sources
that treat the efforts of Saint Boniface, at least one of which was written
within a decade or so of his death, dwell almost obsessively on the large
number of converts whom he had brought to the baptismal font or to
some other convenient water source.44 All these narrative texts, however,
39Richard E. Sullivan, The Carolingian Missionary and the Pagan, Speculum 28 (1953),
705740; and reprinted with the same pagination in Richard E. Sullivan, Christian
Missionary Activity in the Early Middle Ages (Aldershot, 1994), 706708, regarding mission-
ary centers and organization.
40Anon., V.S. Lebuini, chs. 3, 4.
41See the imaginative suggestion regarding class divisions among the Saxons by Martin
Linzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens, I, 96127. For a non-Marxist appreciation of these
divisions, see Goldberg, Popular Revolt, pp. 467501.
42Rudolph, V.S. Leobae, ch. 9, makes this point but may be basing his conclusion on
information regarding subsequent successes. Although pagans eager to become Christians
was well-developed as a topos, it cannot be concluded that no pagans were eager to
become Christians.
43See, for example, Anon., V.S. Lebuini, ch. 3; and Alcuin, V.S. Willibrordi, ch. 8.
44See, for example, Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, chs. V(p. 485486), VI (pp. 488, 492), and
VIII (p. 512) regarding thousands of men, women, and children baptized in Frisia; Eigil,
may perhaps be seen to embody an embedded success topos.45 Therefore,

it is important to emphasize that in 739, Boniface sent a written report to
Pope Gregory III which apparently indicated the large number of pagans
whom he and the missionaries working under his direction had bap-
tized.46 When the pope referred to this report, which is no longer extant,
he did not provide an exact figure for those who had been baptized, but
characterized the number as in the neighborhood of 100,000 pagans.
Obviously, not all of these people were Saxons.47
It is perhaps possible that Boniface and his missionaries, who, of course,
were literate, maintained lists of those who had converted and also kept a
running tally of the number of souls in each village who had been brought
to God. With the availability of such lists, claims that converts backslid
into pagan practices or other irregularities of the type that are mentioned
in the correspondence between Boniface and various popes, could be veri-
fied in specific cases, and efforts could be made to set the situation right.48
In this context, it is to be emphasized that large numbers of extensive lists,
both of people and of resources, were kept by the Carolingian government
as well as by churches, monasteries, and even lay magnates. These were
fundamental to the detailed administration maintained by Carolingian
bureaucrats both at the central and local levels.49
The 100,000 figure for converts during the generation prior to Bonifaces
death may be credible since it would be difficult to identify anything in
the missionarys letters overall to sustain the view that he was a man prone
to gross exaggeration. In light of the numbers of converts over the course
of a generation by Boniface and his men, it might be suggested that the
V.S. Sturmi, ch. 15 (p. 147) for large numbers; and Rudolph, V.S. Leobae, chs. 9, 17, for great
multitudes.
45It is curious that Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 5964, does not focus on these claims of
success as a missionary, but suggests that these sources depict Boniface as an organizer and
administrator. I think it is more likely that Boniface was both a successful missionary in
converting pagans and an excellent organizer and administrator.
46The report is mentioned by Pope Gregory III (Epist., no. 45, ed. Tangl).
47Pope Gregory III (Epist., no. 45, ed. Tangl). This was not the first detailed report that
Boniface had been commissioned to make by Rome. See Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. V
(p. 482).
48In a letter to Boniface, Pope Zacharias (Epist., no. 68, ed. Tangl), takes the missionary
bishop to task for supposedly rebaptizing converts who had been baptized by ignorant
priests who had mangled the ritual. The very idea that such people, who putatively had
been baptized by incompetent priests, could be identified in order to be rebaptized would
seem to presuppose that there was a list, or even several lists, of such converts.
49Regarding these lists, see the observations by Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296; and
Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?, pp. 319343.
526 chapter nine
number of Saxons converted by the Fulda missionaries may perhaps be

estimated. For example, if Sturms missionaries were only half as effective
as Boniface had been, the Fulda effort may have accounted for as many as
seven or eight thousand converts between 772, when the Saxons agreed to
their first pact with Charlemagne, and the revolt in 776. In returning to the
Saxon commanders goal of obliterating Fulda and killing its monks, his
aim may have been to put a stop to their successful missionary efforts and
thereby to protect the religion and also the culture of his people from what
he saw to be catastrophic foreign influence.50
From a tactical perspective, it is puzzling that the commander of the
large Saxon exercitus, which had been detached from the even larger main
army of invasion, should have decided to launch a surprise attack against
Fulda with what must be considered a comparatively small special-forces
team. The obvious tactical alternative was for the Saxons to overcome the
monastery and its environs by deploying the overwhelming force inherent
in the multitudo of viri who were encamped at Lahntal. Some possible
explanation for the decision to use a small attacking force may perhaps be
forthcoming from an examination of the military situation at Fulda, which
the Saxon commander undoubtedly had his men reconnoiter. In this con-
text, our exploratores are the archaeologists, whose numerous studies over
the course of the last century have made it clear not only that the monas-
tery of Fulda had not been built in the wilderness, but was also a center of
considerable size and importance in a developed region.51
The monastery was established in 744 on a promontory at the conflu-
ence of the Fulda and Waides Rivers, where archaeologists have found
that a bridge had survived from the later Roman iron age.52 At this key
crossing point, a village had been developed by the early 8th century and
perhaps even earlier. It is generally believed that new settlers came from
the south in the region of Wrzburg, where demographic expansion
50For a useful examination of some of the problems one encounters in trying to under-
stand Saxon religion, see James Palmer, Defining paganism in the Carolingian World,
EME, 15 (2007), 402425.
51Following the end of World War II, a spate of publications regarding Fulda and its site
were published. See in this context J. Vonderau, Die Ausgrabungen am Domplatz zu Fulda
im Jahre 1941: ein merowingischer Gutshof auf dem nachmaligen Klostergelnde,
Verffentlichungen der Fuldaer Geschichtsvereins (Fulda, 1946); H. Hahn, Ausgrabungen am
Fuldaer Domplatz im Jahre 1953, Sankt Bonifatius. Gedenkgabe zum zwlfhunderertsten
Todestag (Fulda, 1954), 641686, here at 641646, where much previous archaeological
literature is summarized. See also Willi Grich, Ortesweg, Antsanvia und Fulda in neuer
Sicht, Germania, 33 (1955), 6888.
52See Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 288, regarding the bridge.
already was so extensive that people were motivated to move into less
cultivated and perhaps more dangerous areas, i.e. closer to the danger
from Saxon raids for purposes of colonizing new lands.53 Population
growth is important in a military context because of the contribution of
able-bodied males to militia forces.
Well before the monastery of Fulda was established, moreover, there
already was in this area a population of some importance that was led by
Christian magnates, viri nobiles.54 The populus settled in this area and
their aristocratic leaders, styled optimates by Pope Gregory III, not only
attracted the attention of Rome, but the pontiff addressed them in a circu-
lar letter, ca. 738. This permits the inference, at a minimum, that the pope
and his advisers believed that among the inhabitants of what would come
to be known as the Fulda region, there were Christians who could read
and understand Latin. Those, who could not, the pope would appear to
have assumed, could when necessary, find men who not only were able to
translate the papal letter into Frankish, but also could explain the mean-
ing of the epistle.55
It seems likely that the creation of this settlement in this area had been
orchestrated by the Carolingian Mayor of the Palace, i.e. Pippin II or his
son Charles Martel. However, if this were not the case, it is clear that sub-
sequently the property came into the hands of Carloman the Elder,
Charlemagnes uncle, and was designated as the caput of a villa belonging
to the Carolingian fisc. As a result of this tenurial history, Boniface found it
necessary to obtain permission from Carloman in order to have Sturm
build the monastery at Fulda. In the now-lost charter (carta) that Carloman
issued, which is discussed in Eigils Life of Sturm, scholars have taken note
that the monastery was given all of the land attached to the royal villa
within a radius of four Roman miles from the caput.56 In addition, many of
the nobiles of the region were encouraged, if not coerced, by Carloman,
53Schlesinger, Early Medieval Fortifications, p. 245. Concerning settlement in the

more southerly regions of Saxon territory, see Hans-Jrgen Nitz, Feudal Woodland
Colonization as a Strategy of the Carolingian Empire in the Conquest of Saxony, in Villages,
Fields and Frontiers: Studies in European Rural Settlement in the Medieval and Early Modern
Periods (Oxford, 1983), 171184.
54Regarding these magnates dwelling in the region surrounding Fulda, see Eigil, V.S.
Sturmi, ch. 12 (p. 143). The men are addressed, as above, in Carlomans no longer extant
charter, which was used by Eigil.
55See the letter from Pope Gregory III to optimates et populum Graffeltis (Epist.,
no. 44, ed. Tangl).
56Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 12 (p. 143). The details are reviewed by Parsons, Sites and
Monuments, p. 290.
528 chapter nine
through the efforts of his nuntii sent to a meeting to which these local
magnates had been summoned, to grant lands and other resources to the
newly founded monastery.57
The village and fiscal administrative center at Fulda had seen, early in
its history, the construction of a cadre of stone buildings. In fact, at least
one of these edifices was provided with a heating system, which recalls
the use of Roman technology. There was a main house, which also was
constructed of stone. The latter building measured 32.75 by 17.65 meters,
and provided more than 575 square meters of living space. According
to the archaeologists reports, this main building had six rooms and was
constructed in the manner of a post-Roman villa rustica.58 The full nature
of settlement in the environs of the caput of the villa has yet to be ascer-
tained, and we still await future archaeological work which will provide
important information regarding the settled areas beyond the confines of
the monastic complex at the time of the Saxon invasion in 776.
The extensive building efforts that are known to have been pursued at
Fulda strongly suggest a substantial population of monastic dependents
and perhaps even free settlers dwelling near the villa center. The surplus
labor provided by these people obviously had to have been employed to
make possible these high-quality and expensive construction projects.
The Fulda settlement would have been similar to the large village or small
town at Geismar, discussed above,that depended on the Braburg-Fritzlar
complex, which undoubtedly also was built by the surplus labor that was
provided by the people who were living there.
In addition, Eigils reference, noted earlier, to workshops having been
constructed at Fulda permits the inference that there was a population of
skilled laborers attached to the monastery. Whether these men were free
or unfree, or perhaps even slaves, has not as yet been ascertained. The
location of skilled workers based at a monastic complex, would, of course,
seem to have been the norm or, at least, a high priority desideratum as
illustrated, for example, in the Plan of St. Gall, which, drawn up during
the early 9th century, bore many characteristics of a model for Benedictine
monasteries.59
The population in the Fulda area, both the optimates, who commanded
military households, and people of lesser wealth and status who could be

58See Hahn, Ausgrabungen am Fuldaer Domplatz, pp. 641643, who provides a sum-
mary of earlier work.
59For the general view that the plan of St. Gall was a model, see Wallace Hadrill, The
Frankish Church, p. 343.
mobilized for service in the general and select levies likely constituted a
formidable armed force. This extensive system of locally-based defense
forces could be mobilized rapidly because a substantial early warning sys-
tem had been developed to provide information regarding the approach
of an enemy force. Of particular importance was Charlemagnes insistence
that each villa attached to the royal fisc maintain the capacity to spread
relevant information through the use of signal fires.60 According to Char
lemagnes orders, these forces of professional and militia troops from the
Fulda region were to serve under Sturms command, who would appear to
have been appointed to an office that later would be characterized as that
of a count-abbot.61
The capacity of Sturm to mobilize a large and effective force in the
region (see below), may not have been decisive in determining the plan of
the Saxon commander to launch a surprise attack by electi viri on the mon-
astery.62 The monastery of Fulda itself was very well-fortified. There was a
stone perimeter wall of approximately 875 meters in circumference and
enclosing a surface area of about 4.75 hectares.63 Three of the walls of the
stronghold at Fuldathose on the west, north, and eastwere strength-
ened by a moat or ditch, fossa in Latin. This important component of the
defenses had been constructed in a V-shaped manner 4.25 meters wide
and 1.4 meters deep.64 If filled with water, these ditches were of sufficient
depth to make it impossible, or at least very difficult, for an attacking force
to wade through them to the stone walls above. In addition, if enemy
troops tried to wade across the ditch, it would be a very slow process. In
this context, the ditch would constitute an especially effective killing
ground to be used by the defenders, who were protected by the walls and
using missile weapons. The fourth or south wall, some 300 meters in
length, ran along the north bank of the Waides River, which, of course,
served, in this context, as an important defensive asset or water filled
moat. The size of the river and the position of the defenses on its bank
60CRF, no. 32, ch. 27; and concerning scarae, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 8082.
61See, for example, Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5254; and idem, Early
Medieval Europe, in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, The
Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein
(Cambridge, MA, 1999), 290291.
63Regarding the wall, see Hahn, Ausgrabungen am Fuldaer Domplatz, pp. 676, 681;
and see the easily available plan provided by Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 289, fig. 4.
64Regarding the moat, see J. Vonderau, Die Ausgrabungen am Domplatz zu Fulda
19081913, Verffentlichungen des Fuldaer Geschichtsvereins 16 (Fulda, 1919), p. 30.
530 chapter nine
would have made an assault on the south wall without boats very difficult,
if not impossible. This would be the case even for men who would be will-
ing and able to swim across the river with their weapons.65
It will remain for archaeologists in the future to ascertain whether the
fossatores, whom Sturm employed to construct canals to move water from
the Fulda and Waides Rivers into the monastic complex, also were used to
construct the ducts required to fill with water those sections of the moat
that were not directly connected to either river.66 However, knowledge of
the combination of a stone wall and moat (whether or not the latter was
fully filled with water), which could be defended by the militia forces
raised in the area, likely convinced the Saxon commander that a surprise
attack with a unit of picked men was preferable to a full-scale siege. The
latter, of course, would be both time-consuming and costly in dead and
wounded to the attacking force, while not assuring success even in the
longer term. If the surprise attack failed, the Saxon commander could
institute a siege with a greater number of men if he so chose.
The defenses at Fulda, when seen in a comparative dimension, leave no

doubt of their military importance.67 In fact, the Fulda stronghold was
similar in a wide variety of ways to fortifications constructed in other
parts of Charlemagnes kingdom. These too were built as defenses for
those curtes where the caput of a royal fiscal villa was located.68 Information
regarding other of Charlemagnes curtes, however, is not provided by
65Vonderau, Die Ausgrabungen am Domplatz, p. 30.

66The Carolingians, like their Merovingian predecessors, enjoyed considerable exper-
tise in hydrology as part of their late Roman legacy. See the recent review of these matters,
but without direct reference to Fulda, by Ellen Arnold, Engineering Miracles: Water
Control, Conversion and the Creation of a Religious Landscape in the Medieval Ardennes,
Environment and History, 13 (2007), 477502, with the extensive scholarly literature cited
there.
67There has been some debate regarding Fuldas defenses, which is followed easily in
the discussion by Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 291. Some scholars have argued that
these defenses were some sort of anti-cattle hedge, i.e. German Zaun. See, however, the
effective argument by Fred Schwind, Die Franken in Althessen, in Althessen im
Frankenreich, ed. Walter Schlesinger (Sigmaringen, 1975), 262263, who makes clear that
one did not build a Zaun with stone walls and a moat.
68J. Vonderau, Die Ausgrabungen am Domplatz zu Fulda im Jahre 1941: ein merowing-
ischer Gutshof auf dem nachmaligen Klostergelnde, Verffentlichungen der Fuldaer
Geschichtsvereins (Fulda, 1946), discusses the settlement as a villa center.
archaeological evidence. Rather, Charlemagnes missi dominici were

required to produce contemporary descriptions in written reports to the
central government regarding the quality and repair of fortifications that
normally were in place to defend these royal installations.69
At the caput of the royal villa at Annapes in the northeast of the regnum
Francorum, the administrative center was based within a substantial
fortification, i.e. a large courtyard, or curtis which was defended or pro-
tected by a very strong wooden wall (strenue munitam). This curtis could
be entered only through a stone gateway (porta lapida) which was sur-
mounted by a gallery from which the entrance could be defended by fight-
ing men deployed above the gate and equipped with various types of
missile weapons.70 Within this curtis or courtyard there was a smaller
courtyard (curticulum) which also was provided with a wooden wall for its
defense.71 Fragmentary descriptions of other curtes found in various
reports to Charlemagnes court provide similar information. In most cases,
there were two concentric walls and stone gate complexes, including gal-
leries above the gates from which liquids such as hot oil could be poured
down on those attackers who tried to crash through these entryways.72
When we look at the information provided in these reports with regard
to the buildings located within these fortified curtes, we find a situation
similar to that found through archaeological excavations at Fulda. For
example, one of the buildings at Annapes is reported to have been a very
finely constructed large house built of stone (ex lapide factam optime).
The house was so impressive that it was characterized in one of these
reports as a sala regalis..73 Within the inner courtyard at Annapes there
were 17 other houses constructed of wood and provided with the required
amenities (fireplaces? outhouses? sleeping lofts?).74 The entire commu-
nity dwelling within the curtis was served by a common kitchen which
was established in its own building. Also within the walls was a separate
building for the baking of bread, biscuits, and other such products. Finally,
69Regarding the value of these reports in relation to the capitulary legislation,

see Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?, pp. 319343. For further comparative purposes, see
the organization of papal defenses for their fiscal assets in the area around Rome during
the later eighth and early ninth centuries as discussed by Whitehouse, Sedi medievali,
pp. 864876.
70Of particular importance with regard to Annapes is Brevium Exempla, ch. 26
(CRF., no. 128). For further discussion of this document, see Metz, Das karolingische
Reichsgut, pp. 2645; and Verhein, Studien zu Quellen, pp. 363385.
71Brev. Exempla, ch. 26.
72Brev. Exempla, chs. 31, 33, 35.
73Brev. Exempla, ch. 26. See Brhl, Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium, pp. 9597.
532 chapter nine
there were within the courtyard also two storehouses for grain, a stable,
and three barns.75
These contemporary descriptions of Annapes and other administrative
centers make clear that such installations had the potential to serve as a
refuge for the local population of the area should the region become the
focus of an enemy attack.76 It seems likely that each fortified villa center
was situated to play a role in defense of the regnum, i.e. as a hard point
situated, at the least, to delay enemy operations until a field force could
come to the rescue.77 The military units likely to be used in such situations
were scarae, which were based in military colonies throughout the coun-
tryside in the regnum Francorum.78 Some support for this interrelated sys-
tem of static defense in the curtes and mobile relief forces established in
casernes is indicated by Charlemagnes insistence, noted above, that each
of villas was to be provided with the capacity to employ signal fires that
were to be tended day and night.79
The Saxon campaign against Fulda failed. According to Eigil this was
due, in large part, to the efforts of Abbot Sturm. It is clear that initially,
Sturm learned of the large Saxon exercitus that was encamped in the
Lahngau. Shortly thereafter, he also obtained intelligence regarding the
plan to launch a surprise attack against Fulda with electi viri. How this
latter information reached Sturm is not made clear by our sources. By
contrast, intelligence regarding the approach and arrival of the Saxon mul
titudo in the area of the Lahntal likely can be attributed to the effective
deployment of the local men throughout the region in which they lived
who were detailed to perform wacta, i.e. watch service.80
Obtaining details regarding the Saxon plan itself is another matter. It is
tempting to suggest that if some Saxons could be outfitted and armed so
that they could pass as Franks, i.e. at Lbbecke, it seems likely that some
Franks could be prepared to pose as Saxons.81 As a result, some Franks

76Jean Chapelot and Robert Fossier, The Village & House in the Middle Ages, trans.
Henry Clere (London, 1985), p. 131, not only fail to appreciate the defensive capability of
Annapes, but do not seem to understand Carolingian military thinking.
77Concerning the nature of defense in depth, see Bachrach, Early Medieval Europe,
pp. 276278, with the literature cited there.
78CRF, no. 32, ch. 27; concerning scarae, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 8082.
79CRF, no. 32, ch. 27.
80See Ganshof, Frankish Institutions, p. 64.
81Regarding the differences and similarities with regard to Frankish and Saxon, see
Wolfgang Haubrichs, Sprachliche Differenzen und Kongruenzen zwischen Sachsen und
Franken innerhalb der Westgermania, Studien zur Sachsenforschung, 12 (1999), 123142.
could enter the enemy camp and acquire vital intelligence. For example,
monks from Fulda accompanied by an entourage, including among oth-
ers, teamsters, scribes, cooks, soldiers, and exploratores, had been operat-
ing among the Saxons for several years. Such retinues, which had a
considerable military component, could be quite large. The retinue led by
Boniface into Frisia in 754 is referred to by Eigil as the bishops comitatus,
and the fighting men are identified by Willibald as pueri.82 The losses suf-
fered by Bonifaces retinue, put at as many as 53, suggests that the entire
comitatus may have included more than a hundred men.83
It is also clear that in the recent past, missionaries sent among the
Saxons from Fulda had brought about the conversion of at least some
pagans to Christianity, the establishment of parishes or parish-like admin-
istrative districts, and the construction of churches. Of course, not all
monks can be assumed to have learned the Saxon dialect or language well,
or even to have learned it at all. However, it is likely that some members
of these missionary units, and especially the milites Christi themselves,
had learned the Saxon tongue and, indeed, learned it well. In this context,
it is fundamental that preaching to the Saxons, whether prior to their
conversion or following it, was done in the Saxon idiom.84 In addition,
some of the Fulda-based groups which proselytized among these pagans
may have had in their midst, both monks and others who were men of
Saxon background and who previously had accepted Christianity. In gen-
eral, by ca. 776, there likely was no great dearth of Saxons who had become
Christians.85
When Sturm learned that the Saxon exercitus had encamped in the
Lahngau about 70 kilometers south of Eresburg and about 80 kilometers
north of Frankfurt, he developed a military plan,or consilium, to defend
the region for which he had been given command responsibility by
Charlemagne.86 He determined that it was necessary for the military
82Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 15, (p. 148); and Willibald, V.S. Bonafatii, ch. VIII (pp. 512, 514).
83For various figures of those killed, see Anon., V.S. Lebuini, ch. 2; and E martyrologio
Fuldense, ed. Levison, p. 60. Sullivan, The Carolingian Missionary, p. 706, argues that these
missionary groups were small. However, the sources he cites, with the exception of the
information concerning Bonifaces last mission, mention only the missionaries themselves
and not their support staffs. That these clerical sources should not belabor the matter of
the missionary retinue is hardly surprising, as cooks and grooms generally do not merit
attention. The topos that a few milites Christi spiritually conquered vast numbers of pagans
is an analogue of the heroic myth of the lone warrior or the small army emerging victorious
over numerically superior forces.
84Sullivan, The Carolingian Missionary, pp. 714715.
85See, for example, Anon., V.S. Lebuin, ch. 3.
534 chapter nine
forces under his command to be mobilized to oppose the invaders. As Eigil

put it, gente nostra congregatos contra Saxones.87 The mustering place
was established on the Wetter River, very likely at Laubach, approximately
30 kilometers west of Fulda.88 It may be noted that more than 40 years
earlier, both the optimates, men such as the dominus Ortis and the com-
mon people (populus) in this region had been converted to Christianity
and had been integrated into the religious and also the political fabric of
the regnum Francorum.89
At this point, Sturm did not yet know the nature of the Saxon plan.
However, his personal explorations while seeking out the proper place for
the establishment of the monastery at Fulda and his subsequent activities
in the region, provided him with an excellent understanding of the topog-
raphy of the area and its well-developed road system.90 He understood
that from their Lahntal base, the Saxons could continue south to Frankfurt
or turn east toward Fulda, which was only some 50 kilometers distant.
Therefore, he ordered the defense forces of the region to muster in an area
from which he could move troops which had been mobilized further west
to interdict a Saxon march on Frankfurt or to deploy them to the north in
order to block an enemy force from reaching Fulda. In this way, from
Laubach, Sturm controlled the interior lines for troop movement and
communications, a considerable tactical advantage.
If this force that Sturm mobilized was in accord with the traditional
practice, it likely was composed, in the broadest institutional terms, of
three types of fighting men. There were, of course, the local levies of the
area, i.e. men who lacked sufficient wealth to serve in expeditione, but
were required and often eager to defend their homes. There were the expe-
ditionary levies, i.e. the men who possessed sufficient wealth to serve in
military operations beyond their home territory. Such men likely were
drawn from areas as far north as Braburg and Fritzlar. These populi are
well-documented in places such as Fulda itself, as well as in Wetterau and
the Lahngau. Other locations, e.g. Botharis, Nistresis and Suduodis in
87Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 160). The word omitted above is nonnullos. This provides
firm evidence that Eigil is condensing the time frame in this context. First, it is clear that
Sturm mobilized the forces of the region. Secondly, as will be seen below, he went into
battle. At that time only some of the levies had been mobilized. As Eigil put it, gente
nostra nonnullos congregatos contra Saxones.
89See the letter from Pope Gregory III to the magnates and people of this region. (Epist.,
no. 44, ed. Tangl); and regarding Ortis, see Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 8 (p. 140).
90Concerning this road system, see, for example, Grich, Ortsweg, pp. 6888.
southern Hesse and northern Thuringia are known also to have been able
to provide fighting men.91 Finally, there were the professional soldiers
maintained in the military households of the magnates of the region.
These, of course, included Sturms own socii.92
At present, it is not possible to ascertain the order of magnitude of
Sturms forces. However, many regions of southern Hesse and northern
Thuringia, in addition to those mentioned above, were densely populated.
For example, there were numerous settlements, thickly distributed, along
the course of the lower Ohm River. The area of the Lahn valley, north of
that rivers confluence with the Ohm, also was densely populated.93 The
same can be said for the Kassel region, which saw major settlement and
economic growth beginning in the mid-7th century. By the mid-8th cen-
tury the entire Kassel basin was fully settled and places for the future
settlement of excess population rapidly became a desideratum. This not
only meant that the inhabitants of such crowded areas could provide sub-
stantial numbers of militia men for military operations, but the Saxon
region to the east likely was seen by many as a opportune place for new
settlements.94
At some point following the Saxon arrival at Laubach, Sturm learned of
the enemy plan to send a special force in a surprise attack against Fulda in
order to destroy the town and kill the monks. Eigil outlines the sequence
of Sturms actions. First, the abbot ordered the mobilization of the levies
of the region to muster at Laubach.95 Secondly, he sent a group of the
Fulda monks accompanied by a military escort, likely composed of ele-
ments from his own military household, i.e. his socii, with the relics of
St. Boniface to Hammelburg, approximately 50 kilometers to the south.
He likely judged Hammelburg to be safely beyond the likely theater of
military operations. This plan would seem to have taken into consider-
ation the possibility that the forces which Sturm mobilized might fail to
defeat the Saxons in the field. It also took into consideration the possibil-
ity that the Saxons, having defeated the levies under the abbots command,
91Pope Gregory III, Epist., no. 44, ed. Tangl.

92See Bachrach and Bowlus, Heerwesen, pp. 122136.
93The closely-packed settlements in these regions are discussed in the synthesis by Rolf
Gensen, Althessens Frhzeit: Frhgeschichtliche Fundsttten und Funde in Nordhessen
(Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 1638, and see especially the Map. Abb. 15, p. 37.
94Concerning Kassel, see Karl Heinemeyer, Knigshofe und Knigsgut im Raum
Kassel, VMPIG, 13 (Gttingen, 1971), 145146.
536 chapter nine
would attack the fortifications at Fulda itself. Should these unfortunate

events occur, Bonifaces relics would nevertheless remain safe.96
Eigil refers to the group of monks to whom Sturm entrusted Bonifaces
relics as milites Christi, whereas earlier he had referred to those monks
whom the Saxons planned to slaughter as servi. In this same context,
Eigil describes the encampment of the monks who were transporting
St. Bonifaces relics in traditional Roman military terms. He notes, for
example, that the milites Christi had their tents (tentoria) placed within
the walls, in circuitu of the marching camp that was established, castra
metati sunt, for defensive purposes by their military escort.97 In short, if a
unit of Saxons picked up the trail of this party of monks, the milites Christi,
and their armed escort, the secular milites who accompanied the party,
would be able to defend St. Bonifaces relics from behind the walls of their
marching camp.
As soon as Sturm sent off the party of monks and soldiers with the rel-
ics, he went, likely accompanied by a substantial part of his military
household, to Laubach, where, as noted above, he had ordered the levies
of the region to muster. Sturms strategic aim was to keep both the Saxon
exercitus and the electi viri from obtaining their military objectives in the
Fulda region, especially the destruction of the monastery and the extermi-
nation of the monks. It is noteworthy, here, that Eigil does not use the
traditional Roman military term consilium to describe the Saxon plan, but
calls it a conspiratio. This undoubtedly was intended to recall to his read-
ers and listeners the term used by Cicero for an illicit plan constructed for
illegal or immoral purposes.98
The tactical means devised by Sturm to keep the Saxon army from car-
rying out its plan and to stop the special unit from moving against Fulda
was to meet the enemy in battle and either to destroy it in detail or, at
least, to render it incapable of further operations against the monastery.
About five or six days after sending the monks and their military escorts
on their way to Hammelburg with St. Bonifaces relics, Sturms forces faced
the Saxons on the field of battle. Interestingly, Sturm engaged the Saxons
despite the fact that the full complement of the Fulda regional levies,
according to Eigil, had not yet arrived at the mobilization site.99 Whether
Eigil imposed here the topos, which dictates that the side fighting for what

99Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 24 (p. 160), gente nostra nonnullos congregatos contra Saxones.
is right (the home side) deploys a force inferior in numbers, and defeats
the side representing evil, which traditionally is recorded to have mobi-
lized a great multitudo of soldiers, cannot be ascertained.
Tactically, Sturm was committed to keeping his army between the
Saxon forces and Fulda. In this posture, he could not consider avoiding
combat simply because the full complement of levies had not yet been
mobilized. The respective locations of the Saxon camp in the Lahntal and
Sturms choice of Laubach as the mobilization site for the Frankish levies
under his command, when seen in light of his plan to block an enemy
from reaching Fulda, permits some inferences regarding several likely
developments prior to the battle. The Carolingian fortress at Amneburg,
located on the river Lahn, approximately 30 kilometers due north of
Laubach, was a tactically viable location for Sturms initial deployment
and base of operations after leaving Laubach, in his effort to block the
Saxon advance. Amneburg was located only 20 kilometers east of the
Saxon encampment in the Lahntal and, thus, directly across the route to
Fulda. Following traditional Carolingian campaign strategy, reliance on a
strong base from which to project forces into the field also sustains the
suggestion that Amnenburg was of tactical importance in this context.
On the basis of these inferences, it seems that the battle, which is dis-
cussed briefly below, likely took place in the environs of Amneburg or
slightly further to the west.
In making this conjecture, moreover, both the military topography and
the geography of the theater of operations are supported by considerable
written information regarding the fortress at Amneburg. This stronghold,
located atop a hill of 150 meters overlooking the valley of the Ohm, first
enters the surviving written record when it was visited by Boniface
ca. 721.100 At this time, the fortress was under the joint command of twin
brothers, Dettic and Deorulf, who, along with some of the local popula-
tion, already had been converted to Christianity and integrated into the
Carolingian military system. Boniface tutored the brothers on the proper
forms of Christian worship and converted the remainder of the people
living under their jurisdiction. He then arranged for the construction of
a church dedicated to St. Michael the Archangel and oversaw the building
of a small monastery (monasteriolum) within the walls of this hilltop
fortress.101
100For useful introductions, see Schlesinger, Early Medieval Fortification, pp. 243244;
and Parsons, Sites and Monuments, p. 285.
101Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VI (p. 498).
538 chapter nine
Eigil tells the story of the Frankish victory under Sturms leadership
very simply. The Fulda levies, he informs his readers, attacked the Saxons,
contra Saxones bellum inire. This description permits the inference that
the Saxon forces were engaged by Sturms men while on the march and
perhaps in a surprise attack. It is clear that Sturms troops did not storm
a fortified enemy encampment, or castra, which would have been built
for protection during the night. Whether or not the Saxons were taken by
surprise is not indicated, but this is not unlikely since Sturms men knew
the terrain very well. In any case, the Franks won the day on the field of
battle and sent the enemy survivors (victos) in flight to their own terri-
tory, ad proprias aufugisse terras.102
From the discussion above, it is clear that Sturm is depicted as having
enjoyed considerable success in the matter of intelligence gathering, mili-
tary planning, and troop deployment. His victory in the field would seem
to be the logical conclusion to effective preparation. From this account of
a not-so-small episode in the operations undertaken by locally based
Carolingian forces, it seems clear that the military institutions which
had been established along the frontiers of Saxon territory for the local
defense not only were effective, but, under able leadership, could and did
work very well. This type of victory not only likely played an important
role in raising the morale of the populations at the local level, but also gave
Charlemagne and the central command based at Worms confidence in
their locally mustered troops.
The Siege of Syburg
As discussed above, after the fortress of Eresburg was captured and

destroyed, the immense Saxon army that had undertaken the siege was
divided into at least two parts. One corps, already discussed, moved on
toward Frankfurt and threatened Fulda. A second large contingent, fol-
lowing the successful siege of Eresburg, moved west-northwest and estab-
lished a siege of the fortress at Syburg in the valley of the Ruhr.103 These
two fortresses, Eresburg and Syburg, are approximately 85 kilometers
distant from one another as the crow flies, i.e. the distance from the banks
of the upper Diemel to the valley of the Ruhr, approximately 35 kilometers
east of the Rhine. However, in order to undertake the march from Eresburg

103ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.
to Syburg, the Saxon forces with their supplies, equipment, and especially
their catapults had to cross the difficult highlands of the very extensive
Arnsberger forest to the area around Meschede, where a convent later
would be constructed, before entering the winding and heavily wooded
valley of the Ruhr, which could be followed west to Syburg only with con-
siderable difficulty.104
The report that the Saxons deployed their catapults at Syburg makes it
likely that their troop movements across the Arnsberger were rather
slow.105 These machines perhaps could have been hauled on some sort of
wagon bed drawn by teams of horses or oxen from Eresburg. However, this
is unlikely, given the large size of these machines. Rather, it is more prob-
able that they were disassembled after the siege of Eresburg and trans-
ported in pieces by carts or wagons to Syburg and then reassembled in
order to be deployed against the walls of the castrum. Of course, some of
the larger wooden elements of these machines, e.g. those of a size used in
building houses, may have been abandoned at Eresburg. Thus, trees had to
be identified in the forests near Syburg which were suitable for use. These
trees then had to be cut down, shaped, and new catapults, in effect, had to
be constructed or assembled. It is of some importance that seasoned wood
was superior to green wood for building catapults.106
There undoubtedly was a considerable period of delay during the time
from the Frankish surrender of Eresburg and the establishment of the
siege of Syburg. This delay would have been caused by the difficult line of
march and by the need to rebuild, or at least to reassemble, the catapults
that had been used at Eresburg. In addition, this delay likely was sufficient
to enable Charlemagne to learn about what was happening to this key for-
tress in the valley of the Ruhr. Syburg was only 35 kilometers east of the
Rhine, and very well-positioned as a base for the projection of Saxon raids
into Frankish territory.
When the Saxon siege of Syburg was finally established with the recon-
struction of the catapults and the building of a siege camp, or castra, the
Saxon commander offered the Carolingian garrison terms of surrender.
These are reported to have been similar to those that had been offered
104The difficulties of maintaining a march safely and rapidly through the valley of
the Ruhr are noted in some useful detail by Wells, German Policy, p. 150. The Hellweg that
was fully developed somewhat later avoided all but the lower reaches of the Ruhr valley.
See Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, pp. 179180.
105Regarding the catapults, see ARF, an. 776.
106D. Bachrach, English Artillery, pp. 14081430.
540 chapter nine
to and accepted by the garrison at Eresburg. The Carolingian commander

at Syburg, however, refused these terms. In addition, the Frankish custodes
at Syburg, following the initial but failed negotiations and despite the
large Saxon army undertaking the siege, effectively withstood several
assaults against the walls of the fortress.107
The position of the Carolingian garrison was helped immeasurably by
the fact that the Saxons catapults were not functioning well after the
march west from Eresburg. Therefore, when the artillery assault began
against Syburg, at least some of the machines failed to operate properly.
Their missiles are reported to have landed on the positions of the Saxon
besieging force rather than on the walls of Syburg.108 This mishap strongly
suggests that the catapults, or at least some of them, either had been dam-
aged in transit or had been disassembled and reassembled at Syburg in a
manner that undermined their effective function. Perhaps the problems
or at least some of these were due to the use of new green wood for some
parts of the machines mixed with seasoned wood that had been trans-
ported in the Saxon baggage train.
Such problems with complicated ingenia were not rare either during
the later Roman Empire or Middle Ages, even for those who believed that
they were helped by God.109 It cannot be assumed that the garrison sub-
scribed to the claim, later made by the court annalist, that the malfunction
of the enemy equipment had been willed by God.110 We can assume,
however, that whatever reasons the Frankish defenders of Syburg believed
were the cause of the enemy artillery malfunction, their morale was
undoubtedly raised by this failure. Similarly, it may be concluded that
Saxon morale was weakened both by the failure of their equipment and
the wounds and deaths caused to their own troops by the malfunction.111
The decision by the Carolingian commander at Syburg to reject terms
of surrender likely was encouraged by the initial failure of the Saxon artil-
lery to damage the walls of the fortress. Until these machines were made
effective, it was clear to the defenders that the Saxons would have to try to
take Syburg by storm. According to the court annals, the Saxons, in fact,
made several efforts to storm the walls, and these all failed as well. It is also
107ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.

108ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.
109See Rihll, Catapults.
110ARF, an. 776.
111For a broad-ranging discussion of morale in early Carolingian armies, see Bachrach,
likely that given the time that it took for the Saxon army to move across
the Ansberger forest from Eresburg to Syburg and to establish a siege of
the latter fortification, Charlemagne had learned of the situation. He could
well have sent a message from Worms to Syburg, which had been inte-
grated into the Carolingian defensive system the previous year, instructing
the garrison commander to hold out as long as possible because help was
on the way.
Likely in the same time frame that Charlemagne obtained information
concerning the siege at Syburg, he also learned that the position of the
Frankish garrison was to become even more precarious. The king received
intelligence, likely not yet available to the commander at Syburg, that
massive enemy reinforcements were moving west from Saxon territory
toward the Weser. These Saxon troops were headed for the pass at Dornen,
which would provide them with access to the upper reaches of the valley
of the Lippe and ultimately to the valley of the Ruhr. As the author of the
revised court Annales put it: an immense multitude of that perfidious
people were on the way to that region, i.e. the area in which Syburg was
located.112 Under circumstances in which a very large enemy army would
undertake an escalade, the fortress at Syburg likely could be effectively
stormed, even if the attacking force were to suffer substantial casualties in
this effort.
Charlemagnes Response
With this intelligence at hand regarding Saxon operations in the north,

Charlemagne ordered a large but highly mobile force, i.e. one that could
strike swiftly, as the sources make clear, to be deployed immediately into
the valley of the Ruhr in order to raise the siege at Syburg.113 This strategy
of sending ahead an advance strike force against the enemy before plans
for the main operation had been fully developed is reminiscent of
Charlemagnes effort in 774. In that year, as in 776, Charlemagne, while
returning from a successful campaign in Italy, learned that the Saxons had
attacked Frankish assets. Thus, after establishing his headquarters at
112The location of this Saxon force and the time frame for action implied in AE, an. 775,
make clear that these were reinforcements.
113ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776, telescope the actions taken by Charlemagne and con-
found what had to have been an early rapid deployment of a comparatively small force,
similar to that in 774, and the main army, which took considerable time to mobilize and
could not have been in the field early enough to relieve the siege at Syburg.
542 chapter nine
Ingelheim, he dispatched four scarae, i.e. units of professional soldiers

attached to the royal household and sometime called legiones in the
sources, with orders to harass the enemy. In light of the similarities
between the situations in 774 and in 776, it is likely that Charlemagne also
sent several scarae to carry out the latter operation, perhaps even the same
units that had been deployed two years earlier.
In order to maintain a rapid pace and maximize available logistic assets
along their route, the march of this strike force from Charlemagnes head-
quarters at Worms would cover some 350 kilometers. To maximize speed,
it would follow the Roman road along the left bank of the Rhine as far
north as the area of Neuss, where a major crossing of the river had been
established, and avoid the difficult crossing directly at the confluence of
the Ruhr at Moers-Asberg/Deuisberg. However, from Neus, this force
would march to the Ruhr and advance up the valley some 35 kilometers to
Syburg. As noted above, this fortress stood on a substantial hill almost 150
meters above the river bank at the confluence of the Ruhr and Lenne.114
The entire march could have been effected in approximately two weeks.
This is a rather minimum estimate of the travel time in which a mounted
force would move at a pace of approximately 30 kilometers per day for six
in every seven days. By using supply magazines established both at the
great fortress cities along the Rhine, e.g. Mainz and Cologne, and royal
palatii at places such as Ingelheim, these scarae could travel light and fast.
The deployment eastward from Neuss into the valley of the Ruhr and
region around Syburg, about 70 kilometers, would take approximately
three days.115 For this part of the march, the strike force would require
pack horses or mules, as they could not rely upon functioning Carolingian
supply magazines so close to the area under attack, and, in addition, the
relief force would have to be very careful to avoid enemy ambushes if they
were to send out foraging parties.
From a Carolingian tactical perspective, the siege of Syburg likely could
be raised if the investing force were to be caught in a pincer between
the relief column sent from Worms and the garrison troops based at the
fortress, who at the appropriate time would sally from their fortifications
114Neuss would appear to have been the customary crossing point of the Rhine in the
direction of the Ruhr rather than Moers-Asberg/Deuisberg at the confluence of the Rhine
and the Ruhr. See the discussion by Bernardt, Itinerant Kingship, pp. 179, 186. Concerning
the difficulties for military operations along the lower course of the Ruhr, see Wells,
German Policy, p. 150.
115ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776, both emphasize a very rapid response and they credit
Carolingian success to the swiftness of their action.
and attack the Saxons. A potentially successful variation of this strategy

could be executed if the besieging army learned of the approach of a large
relief column in sufficient time to abandon the siege and retreat in order
to avoid being caught in a pincer movement between the two Carolingian
forces.
The latter possibility would seem to have been somewhat unlikely.
Rather, the besieging force, which on several occasions tried to storm the
walls, probably was at least four or five times larger than the garrison at
Syburg. This hypothesis rests upon the fact that for the Saxon commander
to draw the conclusion that his forces were of a sufficient order of magni-
tude to take the fortress by storm, the attacking force had to outnumber
the defending force by a ratio of 45:1.116 Consequently, the Saxon besieg-
ing army very likely was larger than the combined forces of the Carolingian
garrison and the scarae that was sent to raise the siege.
The Relief of Syburg
The development of the initial course of the siege is rather clear from the
surviving sources. As mentioned above briefly, the Saxons offered the gar-
rison at Syburg terms of surrender, which were similar to those that had
been offered to and accepted by the garrison at Eresburg. These terms
were refused. Then, the Saxons undertook to bombard the walls of Syburg
with their catapults. These machines, or at least some of them, failed to
work properly, and some missiles are reported to have fallen on the attack-
ing force itself. When the artillery proved to be a liability, or at least not the
asset that it was expected to be, the Saxons decided that it would be neces-
sary to storm the walls.
In preparing for the escalade, the Saxons undoubtedly constructed scal-
ing ladders and, in addition, it is reported that they prepared large shields,
or clidae, to protect themselves while crossing the killing ground between
their camp and the Frankish fortifications.117 The term clida would appear
from the context to be a synonym for tentorium as discussed above in
regard to the sieges of Pavia. The remainder of the military operations at
Syburg and how the siege was broken is discussed in some detail by the
author of the court annals. However, this account occasionally appears

117ARF, an. 776. Clida is an exceptionally rare word, likely developed from clipeus, a
shield.
544 chapter nine
to be confused and has misled some modern researchers into thinking

that the report of what happened is rife with miracles and short on
facts.118
Concerning the latter phases of the operations that resulted in the rais-
ing of the siege, the court annalist writes:
One day, as the Saxons were preparing to attack the Christians within the
stronghold, Gods glory manifested itself above the church house (domum
ecclesiae), located within the fortifications, to a large number of witnesses,
including those who were among the forces defending Syburg and those
who were moving forward to attack. Indeed, many of the eyewitness among
the defenders are still alive today. These eyewitnesses say they saw an image
(instar) of two shields (duo scutorum) flaming (flammantes) in a red color
(colore rubeo) and moving back and forth over the church.119
It is clear that the evocative language of the annalist in this segment of his
account is intended through the use of a presumed portent to sustain his
overall view that the Carolingians won because of divine aid. However,
a more secular reading of the facts, as probably provided to the annalist
by numerous eyewitnesses, permits a very different understanding of
these shields colored fiery red. Rather, it would seem that a flag or banner
of some sort bearing the image of two flaming red shields was raised above
the church, the highest point within the fortifications, and was being
moved to and fro either by the wind or by a person making a wig-wag
signal, which probably is more likely.
The use of signals of various types, including flag signals, was well-
known during the early Middle Ages, as had been the case during the later
Roman Empire. Charlemagne, as noted above, is known to have placed
great importance on the use of signals and fire signals in particular. Of
special interest, however, are the flammulae, signals that were made with
flame-colored flags attached to long poles. These were used by the
Romans during the later empire and discussed by Vegetius, whose military
handbook, as frequently noted above, was well-known to the Carolingians
and often copied in their scriptoria. Vegetius also notes that sometimes
signal flags were hung from beams on towers of forts and cities and were
moved about in order to provide information.120
118See, for example, Collins, Charlemagne, p. 4950, who selectively dismisses some
parts of the account as miraculous aid while accepting other parts without question or
explanation.
119ARF, an. 776.
120DRM, bk. II, ch. 1, where the focus is on their use by mounted troops; and bk. III,
ch. 5, where their use is discussed in more general terms. Of course, it is possible that the
The depiction of two shields on this flag permits the inference that two
forces are being indicated by this signal. In consonance with this rationale,
one of these shields, it may be suggested, was the symbol for the garrison
troops who were at that time still ensconced within the walls of the for-
tress. The second shield, I suggest, referred to the relief force that had been
sent by Charlemagne to raise the siege. This interpretation, therefore,
regards the flag as the signal for the two forces to attack the enemy together,
i.e. to execute the type of pincer movement already discussed. As will be
seen below, this interpretation of the signal flag waved two and fro on the
roof of the church, or perhaps the church house, helps us to understand
the subsequent phase of the engagement despite the court annalists less
than clear account of the siege.
The author of the Annales regni Francorum writes regarding this next
phase of military operations:
When the pagans, who were outside the walls of Syburg and on the attack,
saw the signal depicted on the military banner (signum), they immediately
broke ranks in disorder and began to be terrified with fear. Thoroughly terri-
fied, the large enemy force (multitudo) began to flee en masse back to their
fortified encampment (castra). In the course of their terrified flight, some of
the retreating Saxons crashed into each other and some were killed as they
looked back and ran into the spears on the shoulders of the men in front of
them. Others also were killed accidentally while fleeing and thus were
judged by Divine vengeance.121
This episode depicts the Saxons who were on the attack against the walls
of Syburg and, therefore, marching across the killing ground between
their fortified encampment and the Frankish defenses. The Saxons
approach very likely was up the gradual slope of the Hohensyburg from
the north, i.e. the same direction used by the Carolingians when they took
the fortress in 775. When these Saxons, who were preparing to storm the
walls, saw the signal flag raised above the church, at least some of them
quickly understood that they were about to be caught in a pincer move-
ment between two shields. As a result, they retreated as fast as they could
author of the ARF was implanting a Vegetian idea and that none of these signals were used
by the Carolingians. However, it is just as reasonable to suggest that the Carolingians, who
knew Vegetius work and many other Roman texts of military value as well, simply used
these flag signals as they used other types of signals. For a discussion of this problem
regarding the use of Vegetius by various later authors to depict contemporary affairs
and the relation of Vegetius to these military operations, see two articles by Bachrach,
The Practical Use of Vegetius, pp. 239255; and A Lying legacy, pp. 154193.
121ARF, an. 776.
546 chapter nine
to their encampment, which also likely was on the north side of the for-
tress, so as not to be trapped out in the open between the two Frankish
forces that either were about to advance against them or already were to
be seen undertaking the beginning of field operations.
From this reconstruction, it is clear that the Carolingian relief force dis-
cussed above had arrived and was prepared to attack the Saxons. On the
previous night, some elements of the relief force likely would have had
time to enter the fortress in order to prepare the plan for the joint attack
and to agree upon the signal to be used. Because the Saxons had not closed
off communications to Syburg by erecting a proper vallation but merely
had constructed a fortified siege camp, or castra, members of the relief
force would have had rather easy access to the fortress in order to make
the above-mentioned plan. As suggested above, they might even have
been able to enter at night unseen by the enemy.
After describing the retreat of the Saxons to their own camp, the author
of the Annales regni Francorum recognizes that he cannot provide a clear
and cogent account of what followed. He writes:
How greatly God wrought His might upon the Saxons for the deliverance of
the Christians defies description. The greater the Saxons suffered from ter-
ror, the more the Christians were strengthened and praised almighty God.
God promised to make manifest his power over his servants. Thus, the
Saxons fled from the field and the stronghold at Syburg was saved. The
Franks pursued and killed the fleeing Saxons as far as the Lippe river.122
Before summarizing the last phase of the investment of Syburg and the
defeat of the Saxon attacking force, three points require either affirmation
or reaffirmation. As noted above, the Saxon army that was besieging
Syburg likely enjoyed a numerical superiority of at least 45:1 over the
garrison and as a result, they stormed the walls on several occasions.
The sources describe the Saxon force as very large. Although the plateau at
Syburg was approximately 15 hectares in area, the walls of the stronghold,
including the Vorburg where the newly-constructed church dedicated
to St. Peter was located, enclosed approximately 12 hectares in a roughly
triangular circuit of some 1,600 meters.123 This permits the inference that
at a minimum, the Carolingian garrison numbered in the neighborhood
of 1,350 custodes. In light of this estimate, the attacking force likely was
122ARF, an. 776.

123Uslar, Studien, pp. 34, 36, 43, 64, 195; Brachmann, Die schsich-frnkischen
Auseinandersetzungen, pp. 217218; and Best, Gensen, and Hmberg, Burgbau in einer
Grenzregion, pp. 335337, abb. 8.
somewhere in the neighborhood of about 6,500 effectives.124 Once these

estimates have been taken into consideration, an unsupported counterat-
tack by the Syburg custodes, which not only drove the Saxons from the
field but led them to abandon their fortified siege encampment, or castra,
and to flee north under the pressure of hot pursuit to the Lippe valley,
simply is not credible.125
The majority of the Carolingian garrison troops at Syburg very likely
were foot soldiers. The capacity of these men to maintain an effective pur-
suit of the enemy from the environs of Syburg in the valley of the Ruhr for
a distance of some 25 kilometers to the banks of the Lippe also is not cred-
ible. By contrast, the force sent by Charlemagne to relieve the siege would
have lowered the numerical odds enjoyed by the Saxons. In addition,
because the relief force almost certainly was composed of mounted troops,
it would have had the capacity to maintain a vigorous pursuit of the flee-
ing enemy troops over a considerable distance.
To summarize: it seems likely that the Carolingian relief force sent from
Worms arrived at Syburg in a timely manner. Elements from this force
then were dispatched secretly into the fortress to arrange a plan with the
defenders for a simultaneous attack against the Saxon besieging army.
A flag displaying two flaming red shields was to be used as the signal for
the commencement of the joint operation described above. When the
Saxons advanced into the killing zone between their encampment and
the fortress in order to storm the walls, a flag signal would be raised high
above the ramparts by the garrison troops. The latter would sally from
behind the walls while a simultaneous attack was executed by the escariti,
who were deployed under cover in the environs of the fortress. The tactical
aim was to catch the enemy attacking forces, which were in the no mans
land between their camp and Syburg, in a pincer.
The plan would seem to have worked well. When the Saxons were slog-
ging forward against the walls of Syburg, the flag with two flaming red
shields depicted on it was raised as the signal. Some of the enemy either
would seem to have understood the significance of the signal, or, as is per-
haps more likely, saw the approaching Carolingian mounted forces. As a
result, they fled from the field, where they were about to be trapped. Those
who could returned to their fortifications. However, the castra was rather
quickly abandoned, and the surviving Saxons fled north toward the Lippe.

125The AE, an. 776, also report that the garrison troops sallied forth against the Saxons.
548 chapter nine
The scarae, likely accompanied by a small cadre of mounted troops from

the garrison, pursued the retreating Saxons and probably slaughtered
many of them as was normal in such an operation.126
Harassing the Saxon Main Army
After raising the siege at Syburg, the second objective for the relief force
that had been sent from Worms and was composed of mounted troops
organized into several units was to harass those Saxons who, after crossing
the Weser, were headed for the valley of the Lippe.127 The Carolingian
strategy in this second phase was to keep the Saxon forces, which for logis-
tical purposes had to be operating in several distinct and separated march-
ing columns, from forming into a cohesive and unified offensive force.
Such an operation, tactically, would naturally focus upon undermining
the enemy supply system, harassing its lines of communication, and
making opportune strikes against units, such as baggage trains or foraging
parties, that became separated from the main forces and, thus, could be
attacked rapidly before reinforcements could arrive.
The Saxons, however, would appear to have acquired intelligence that
the Carolingian mounted force, which had relieved the siege of Syburg,
was in the field. As a result, the Saxon commanders ordered various defen-
sive measures to be taken in the upper valley of the Lippe. These measures
were intended to thwart any effort by a Carolingian army, especially a very
large force, to move eastward along the valley of the Lippe to the Weser
and beyond. The sources report, for example, that the Saxons cut down
trees and built caesae.128 In this context, caesae is simply the classical term
for abattes, i.e. a patterned distribution of large trees that were felled and
placed in position to block roads and paths.129
These obstacles were intended to hamper the movement of the
Carolingian forces, especially mounted troops. Traveling on horseback
greatly reduces a units maneuverability in difficult terrain, and caesae
limit the capacity of such troops to move in heavily wooded areas.
126Concerning the slaughter of retreating troops, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian

Warfare, p. 195.
127See ARF, an. 776, for a somewhat confused rendering of the second operation
undertaken by Charlemagnes strike force.
128ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776.
129Concerning abattis, see Gregory, Hist, bk.II, ch. 9, and cf. bk.III, ch. 28, and bk. IV,
ch. 42.
However, no less importantly, caesae were especially effective in slowing

down and even stopping supply trains composed of both two- and four-
wheeled vehicles, i.e. carts and wagons. These, of necessity, accompanied
all large Carolingian forces operating in enemy territory, where water
transport was not available and the region was thinly inhabited so as to
undermine the results of foraging that might be obtained in more thickly-
populated areas.130 Finally, fighting men could be deployed among these
large piles of trees concealed in a sort of camouflage of branches and
leaves. From such deployments, Saxon troops could do considerable dam-
age from ambush, especially with bows and arrows.131
The Saxons tactical response in using caesae to slow up and perhaps
even thwart the military operations of the Carolingian troops who had
relieved the siege at Syburg and were advancing into the valley of the
Lippe likely was influenced by what they had learned in 774. From these
operations, undertaken only two years earlier, the Saxons had seen that
Charlemagnes initial response to an enemy offensive was to deploy a
rapid strike force of mounted troops to harass and perhaps even to terror-
ize the region into which they were deployed. The Saxons knew, moreover,
that once beyond their own territory, such a Carolingian mounted unit
would be required to maintain a supply train composed either of wheeled
vehicles or pack animals, and undoubtedly the movement of a such an
encumbered force could be hampered by the use of caesae.
The commanders of the Carolingian force operating in the valley of the
Lippe as well as the planners in the Magistratus, who very likely had pro-
duced the consilium for this operation, surely were no less aware of Saxon
defensive tactics than the latter were aware of Frankish offensive cam-
paign strategies. Therefore, as part of planning for operations in the valley
of the Lippe, it is likely that a proper logistical system was put in place to
support Charlemagnes advanced force. In this context, it is important to
take notice of what would become an increasingly important military
base maintained by the Carolingians at Lippenham on the east bank of
the Rhine at its confluence with the Lippe. This site initially is likely to
have taken on greater importance as a supply base following Pippins
capture in 758 of the Saxons erstwhile fortifications at Sythen, only 50
kilometers upstream from the confluence of the Lippe and the Rhine.132
130Concerning Carolingian supply trains, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,

pp. 230231.
131Gregory, Hist., bk. II, ch. 9.
132Concerning Pippins capture of Sythen, see ARF, an., 758; and AE, an., 758.
550 chapter nine
From the Rhine, the Lippe valley to Sythen was under Carolingian con-
trol, and this stronghold at Lippenham was only about 50 kilometers north
Syburg. It is probable, therefore, that the supplies required to support the
Carolingian strike force in the valley of the Lippe had been gathered at
Lippenham and shipped by boat eastward on the river to Sythen.133 As a
result of such a plan, the supply train for logistical support required by
Charlemagnes strike force for military operations further east into the
Lippe valley would be greatly shortened. Beyond Sythen, it is also possible
that riverborne assets could be projected even further upriver using old
Roman installations at locations such as Haltern and Oberaden to provide
safe harbors and convenient landing places.134
The failure of the narrative sources to supply details regarding how this
Carolingian force was provided with logistic support is not an unusual
lacuna in such accounts. However, it is clear from the success of their
military operations (see below) that the logistical needs of this force, as
these material realities can be established by Sachkritik for both men
and horses, were met. Had these forces or even their animals suffered from
a lack of supplies, which resulted either in their defeat or even in the
absence of success worthy of note, much less in substantial suffering from
want, it is very likely that the narrative sources would have provided some
relevant and disparaging comment. The parti pris of these clerical sources
in emphasizing the negative, especially when Charlemagne was not
personally involved, as in the case of the need for fodder at Lbbeke, is
well-established.
In the course of their operations in the Lippe valley, Charlemagnes
rapid strike force also encountered fortified positions that the Saxons had
established throughout the region. These fortifications may have been
intended as permanent strongholds or they may have been temporary
marching camps, i.e. castra. Whatever the long-term strategic intentions
of the Saxons may have been in building these firmitates, they had, in
the immediate present, a twofold tactical purpose. First, like the caesae,
they were structured to thwart the advance of an enemy force and particu-
larly of an enemy mounted force. Secondly, they were intended to stop
133As discussed above, the Carolingians maintained many different types of river boats
and the most famous of these is the Utrecht-type. See Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 249254, with the scholarly literature cited there.
134See Wells, German Policy, pp. 150151, provides a longer list of erstwhile Roman
installations.
a Carolingian force from launching a surprise attack on Saxon troop

encampments and supply depots.135
Of course, Carolingian mounted troops were well-trained to dismount
in order to engage the enemy on foot. Therefore, they could fight as infan-
try if the tactical situation arose and storm these castra as foot soldiers.136
From a tactical perspective, the Saxon firmitates, for all intents and pur-
poses, not only slowed down Charlemagnes strike force but also under-
mined its capacity to deliver a mounted attack of any type, much less a
decisive mounted attack. In any case, our sources report that the Car
olingians were successful, ultimately, in overrunning these fortified Saxon
positions. This would seem to be prima facie evidence that these troops
did, in fact, dismount and fought on foot. In effect, as Charlemagnes sub-
sequent unhindered march, discussed below, the advanced Carolingian
force would seem to have broken up or thwarted the formation of any
numerically significant Saxon troop concentrations along the Lippe route
eastward toward the area around Paderborn.137
Charlemagnes March to the Lippe
From his headquarters at Worms, Charlemagne proclaimed the bannum

to mobilize a very large army at Worms. The decision to muster at Worms
was made by Charlemagne before he and his advisers had a complete
picture of the Saxon invasion. Because of the scorched earth operations
undertaken in the eastern Rhineland, especially in the region between
Eresburg and the Rhine, the Magistratus likely believed that the
Carolingian army would find it necessary to undertake operations which
would concentrate on the Fulda gap, as had been the case in 772. However,
when information arrived regarding the attack on Syburg and of the move-
ment of a very large Saxon army across the Weser which was moving
toward the valley of the Lippe, Charlemagne had to plan for large-scale
operations much further to the north despite the fact that his muster had
been established at Worms. Likely, he had also learned by this time that
Sturm had been successful in defending the region between Mainz and
Frankfurt.
135ARF, an. 775, for the description of the Saxon defenses.

137ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776.
552 chapter nine
It was probably very late in the summer or perhaps even early autumn
when Charlemagnes main force, i.e. the new levies mustered at Worms,
was ready to move north toward the valley of the Lippe. This force is
described in the Carolingian sources as an immense army, and may be
taken as a further indication of Charlemagnes dedication to the doctrine
that modern scholars call overwhelming force.138 Since Charlemagne
knew that the Saxon troop concentrations with which he sought to deal
had been operating in the valley of the Lippe, it is likely that the easiest
and fastest route to that region from Worms was utilized. Such a line of
march went north some 350 kilometers to Xanten along the Roman road
that bordered the Rhine and then eastward some 165 kilometers to the
region of Paderborn.139
This first and most lengthy segment of the march north was along the
Roman road on the left bank of the Rhine from Worms to Xanten. This
phase would have required Charlemagnes army to have been on the
march for some four weeks to reach Xanten at the confluence of the Rhine
with the Lippe. However, despite the reported great size of Charlemagnes
force, this army would have had no trouble obtaining adequate supplies
en route. Magazines established along the road that followed the Rhine at
various fortress cities and towns, e.g. Speyer, Mainz, Koblenz, Andernach,
Bonn, and Cologne, would be available to provide the troops with food
and shelter if necessary. Supplies also easily could be brought along the
Moselle from Metz and Trier to depots established on the left bank of the
Rhine. The dozens of villae belonging to the royal fisc established in this
region were well-prepared to provide support for the army. In addition,
monasteries traditionally were required to send large quantities of food
and other supplies, which, in the present situation, could be used to
sustain the royal army on its march northward. There is no reason to
believe the support of these military operations was some sort of excep-
tion.140 This was especially the case for the royal monastery of Lorsch, over
which Charlemagne had taken control in 772.141 It is also worthy of note
138ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776.

139ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776, make it clear that Charlemagne held both his meeting
with the magnates and the muster at Worms and that the ultimate strategic destination
was the headwaters of the Lippe.
140Regarding the obligation of monasteries to provide logistical support for the royal
army, see Durliat, La polyptyque, pp. 183208. This subject is also treated by Bachrach,
Military Lands, pp. 95122.
141See the discussion by Mayke de Jong, Charlemagnes Church, in Charlemagne:
Empire and Society, ed. Joanna Story (Manchester, 2005), 121.
that over this stretch of the route from Worms to Xanten, much of the
armys impedimenta could be transported by boat down river along the
Rhine at least as rapidly as the army itself could march overland, but with
far less strain on either the men or animals.142
The general success of the logistical aspects of Carolingian operations
during this march, while the army was in Frankish territory, is clear as
Charlemagnes forces obviously arrived in the north without any incident
that was thought worthy of mention in the sources. More to the point,
however, is the fact that any failure by the Carolingian government to have
provided adequate supplies for its army on the march while in friendly
territory could eventually lead the troops, of necessity, to resort to forag-
ing. This type of behavior traditionally brought unfortunate consequences
for local populations, and resulted in the disapproval of the government or
at least of the army by those who had suffered in such a situation.143
Clerical writers, who often were hostile to the military in principle, not
only made a point of reporting such failures, which resulted in armies
harming their own countrymen, but frequently exaggerated the damage
that they did.144
In light of the traditional behavior of clerical writers in regard to the
unwarranted destructive behavior of armies on the march, it is impor-
tant, therefore, to emphasize that none of the Carolingian sources that
deal with the military operations of this very large army during the cam-
paign of 776 breathes a word about looting or even regarding foraging in
friendly territory. In fact, all of the destruction that the Saxons had done
early in the invasion to the infrastructure and food supply east of the
Rhine, as discussed above, would seem to have no identifiable effect on
the supply of an army, which, in this context, likely drew its logistic sup-
port exclusively from resources located to the west of the river.
Operations in the Valley of the Lippe
As a result of the plan undertaken by the second Saxon army, noted above,
the valley of the Lippe was to develop as the main area for military opera-
tions during this campaign. Therefore, the primary Carolingian base
142Regarding riverine operations, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,

pp. 249254.
143Cf. Reuter, Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare, pp. 1335, whose arguments were
discussed above in detail.
144This is discussed by Bachrach, Gregory of Tours, pp. 351363.
554 chapter nine
initially would appear to have been established in the old Roman fortress
town of Xanten on the left bank of the Rhine at its confluence with the
Lippe.145 Following the dissolution of Roman imperial authority in Gaul,
Xanten had become an important religious and commercial center under
the Merovingians during the early Middle Ages.146 This was due, at least in
part, to its location on the main trade route between the Mediterranean
and Scandinavia. At its southern terminus in the Frankish kingdom, this
route saw the landing of ships at the emporia of Arles and Marseilles,
where goods were transshipped for movement north along the Rhne and
then, after a relatively short portage, placed on ships going down the Rhine
and beyond to northern emporia such as Ribe. Xanten, to be precise, was
located on the most northerly segment of this trade route that ran from
Cologne through Neuss, Nijmegen, Durstede, and Utrecht either to the
mouth of the Rhine or through the Vecht canal which led to the Iselmeer
and the North Sea.147
Frequently, the Romans had constructed advanced bases on the east
bank of the Rhine, e.g. Mainz-Kastel and Cologne-Deutz, to facilitate logis-
tics for operations beyond the frontier. It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that Charlemagne also established a forward position opposite Xanten.
This was at Lippenham east of the Rhine, with direct access to the Lippe
river. This base, which is referred to by specialists in the local history of the
area a Brckenkopf, was built over the old Roman fort at Bislich that had
served as the forward position for the imperial army opposite Xanten.148
On the occasion of military operations in 776, as would be the case
frequently thereafter, the main phase of the Carolingian armys march
eastward likely began, after the Rhine had been crossed, from Lippenham
rather than from Xanten itself.149
With sufficient lead time for preparations of at least a month and prob-
ably an even longer time frame in which to work, substantial supplies
not only would have been available at Xanten, but also much food and
equipment likely already had been ferried across the Rhine to the base at
145See Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 146, 147; Wells, German Policy,
pp. 123127; Gundolf Precht, The Town walls and defensive systems of XantenColonia
Ulpia Traiana, in Roman urban defences in the west, ed. John Maloney and Brian Hobley
(Oxford, 1983), 2939; and Ingo Runde, Xanten im frhen und hohen Mittelalter:
Sagentradition-Stiftsgeschichte-Stadtwerdung (Vienne, 2003), pp. 3774.
146See Runde, Xanten, pp. 27231, for the Merovingian and Carolingian periods.
147See Lebecq, Marchands; and idem, The role of monasteries, pp. 6778.
148Runde, Xanten, pp. 236238, with the extensive literature cited there.
149ARF, ann. 779, 784, 799, 810; and AE, ann. 779, 784, 799, 810, indicate that Charlemagne
frequently used Lippenham as his forward base in this area.
Lippenham. Some supplies could probably even have been advanced to

the Carolingian fortress at Sythen approximately 50 kilometers upriver
from Lippenham.150 The fact that this mobilization of logistic support for
Charlemagnes very large army took place during the harvest season,
when food supplies were most abundant, should not be ignored as a factor
in facilitating the campaign as a whole despite the reported great size of
Charlemagnes very large force. It may have been the intent of the plan
developed by the Magistratus to move this force at a time when foodstuffs
were plentiful and easily available.
Carolingian operations in the valley of the Lippe arguably also were
facilitated by the fact that the Romans had carried out extensive building
operations in the region for the purpose of projecting imperial forces fur-
ther to the east. The stone remains of many of their major fortified
encampments, lesser castra, and storage depots continued to be visible
not only throughout the Middle Ages but beyond. Among the many
Roman camps and bases that modern scholars have identified in the
valley of the Lippe, four stand out for their size and complexity. Approx
imately 30 kilometers east of the base at Bislich (Lippenham) was the for-
tified camp at Holsterhausen. Another 18 kilometers upriver, the largest of
the bases, Haltern, was sited, not far from the Carolingian stronghold at
Sythen. Yet another 36 kilometers to east are the remains of the Roman
base at Oberaden. Finally, on its march eastward, Charlemagnes forces
would come to the last of the major bases, Anreppen on the south bank
of the Lippe.151 Just across the river from Anreppen, Charlemagne estab-
lished a fortified encampment at Lippstadt, about ten kilometers north-
east of Paderborn.
Our present state of knowledge has led to the conclusion that the
Romans had not built paved roads in the valley of the Lippe to connect
these major fortifications and the minor ones in the area.152 Nevertheless,
further archaeological efforts likely will be necessary to demonstrate this
negative view conclusively. Whatever future results may indicate regard-
ing paved roads, however, it is important to emphasize that Roman troops
marched and counter-marched and Roman vehicles were drawn over this
150King Pippin had taken Sythen from the Saxons in 758. See ARF, an. 758, AE, an. 758;
and AMP, an. 758.
151See the brief observations by Wells, German Policy, p. 150, who also identifies several
other bases, e.g. Annaberg, Hofstatt, and Beckenhausen.
152Regarding the lack of paved Roman roads in the Lippe valley, see Josef Hagen,
Rmerstrassen der Rheinprovinz, 2nd ed. (Bonn, 1931), p. 484; which has been accepted by
Wells, German Policy, p. 150, n. 1.
556 chapter nine
ground for several decades, and these efforts obviously had necessitated
the construction of some sorts of roads, even if they were not paved.
The topography of the Lippe valley assured that whatever roads that
been developed along the banks of the river during the period in which
the Roman army operated there would continue to be important. The
banks of the Lippe are exceptionally flat as compared, for example, with
terrain in the river valleys to the south, such the Ruhr, and, therefore,
provided the most easily-traversed route between the Rhine and the
Weser north of Mainz.153 Merchants and travelers continued to use
the valley of the Lippe for centuries after Roman military operations in the
region had ceased.
Early medieval awareness of and, more importantly, use of old Roman
fortifications, from great fortress cities such as Cologne to much lesser cas
tra and castella, both in the Rhineland and in regions to the west is not
controversial.154 However, recent research has made clear that not only
the Carolingians but also the Ottonians utilized the sites of erstwhile
Roman fortifications that had been constructed beyond the Rhine and
even as far east as the Elbe more than eight centuries earlier. Although
much archaeological excavation remains to be done, it is now clear, for
example, that the strongholds at Hhbeck and Magdeburg, which later
were to serve as part of Charlemagnes frontier defenses along the Elbe
River, were established on sites dating back to the Roman era. These two
sites were integrated by Charlemagne into a line of strongholds, many of
which have yet to be fully excavated and may also provide Roman sub-
strata, from Weinberg near Hitzaker at the confluence of the Elbe and the
Jeetzel in the north, to Halle on the Saale in the south. As the archaeologist
Matthias Hardt has described the situation: It seems to be clear that
Charlemagne planned to give his imperium a border-line modeled on the
Late Antique limes along the Rhine and the Danube.155
Of course, old fortifications were not the only Roman remains that
Charlemagne used, restored, or imitated. In addition to the maintenance
of the Roman roads, discussed above, it is clear, for example, that Char
lemagne used Roman port facilities and in a very particular example, saw
153Concerning the topography, see Wells, German Policy, pp. 149150.

154A good place to start in regard to such fortifications is Schnberger, The Roman
Frontier, pp. 144197; and Petrikovits, Fortifications, pp. 178218. With regard to the early
Middle Ages, see, for example, Bachrach, Imperial Walled Cities, pp. 192218.
155Hesse, pp. 224232, and p. 231, for the quotation.
to the repair of the Roman lighthouse at Boulogne.156 The new fortifica-

tions and other monumental buildings that Charlemagne ordered built
generally were constructed according to Roman measurements and the
use of the techniques passed on through the corpus of texts known as the
Agrimensores, which were of fundamental importance.157 As far as imita-
tion goes, it is well-documented that significant elements of the great hall
at Aachen, although not the entire structure, were copied from the then
still-extant and still-used great hall built by Constantine the Great at
Trier.158 Nevertheless, among such examples, which could be expanded
exponentially, it is perhaps not fully justified to tease apart in too stark a
manner practical and symbolic motives, especially in the matter of Roman
remains that did not have obvious military value.
The march of Charlemagnes large army from Lippenham to the head-
waters of the Lippe at Lippespringe, a distance of some 200 kilometers,
would have required an operation that lasted at least two weeks.159 Food
supplies and various types of equipment could be sent along the Lippe
River, which was navigable all year round at least to the region of Lippstadt,
about 20 kilometers east of Paderborn. This ability to use the river for
transport very likely played a role, as will be seen below, in Charlemagnes
decision to build a major military and administrative installation at
Paderborn.160 East of Lippstadt to the source of the river at Lippenspringe
in the hills of the Teutoburger forest, the river was not navigable during
the later part of August and throughout September.161 Thus, it is important
that the chronology as reconstructed above, independent of the navigabil-
ity variable, has Charlemagnes army moving east along the banks of the
Lippe during the second or perhaps even the third week of October. This
would have enabled the Carolingians to make full use of the river for the
transport of supplies and equipment.
156Ekkehard Eickhoff, Maritime Defence of the Carolingian Empire, in Vikings on the

Rhine: Recent Research on Early Medieval Relations between the Rhineland and Scandinavia,
ed. Rudolf Simek and Ulrike Engel (Vienna, 2004), 5064, and 52 regarding the lighthouse.
157This is so obvious that it is taken as a given. See, for example, Matthias Hardt, The
Limes Saxoniae as Part of the Eastern Borderlands and of the Frankish and Ottonian-Salian
Empire, in Borders, Barriers, and Ethnogensiss: Frontiers in Late Antiquity and the Middle
Ages, ed. Florin Curta (Turnhout, 2005), 43.
158See, for example, the stimulating general observations by Irving Lavin, The house of
the Lord: Aspects of the Role of Palace Triclinia in the Architecture of Late Antiquity and
the Early middle Ages, Art Bulletin, 44 (1962), 127.
159ARF, an. 776, and AE, an. 776.
160Wells, German Policy, p. 149.
558 chapter nine
Before beginning his march up the valley of the Lippe, Charlemagne

undoubtedly had learned that the Carolingian strike force, which had
been rapidly deployed more than two months earlier to relieve the siege at
Syburg and to harass the main Saxon army, had done its job well. As the
author of the revised Annales put it, very likely with some exaggeration:
all of the efforts that the enemy had been making in order to prepare to
resist had been rendered useless. The author goes on to attribute the
Carolingian success to the swiftness of the attack by this strike force. In a
military context, the phrase swiftness of the attack emphasizes the
rapidity of the action, which may be seen to have made it impossible for
the enemy to respond in a satisfactory manner.162
While moving east from Lippenham, Charlemagnes main army likely
was divided into two marching columns in order to take advantage of
the flat land on both the right and left banks of the river. By using this
deployment, Charlemagne not only shortened his marching column, an
important option for maintaining the cohesion of a very large force, but
also protected on both flanks the ships that undoubtedly were carrying
the great bulk of the armys supplies up the river. This use of river boats
and the use of both banks of the river for the army was an important
aspect of campaign operations that Charlemagne would not hesitate to
use again as the circumstances warranted.163
From a logistical perspective, it is important to reemphasize that the
Carolingians commanded the appropriate riverboat technology, largely
inherited from the Romans through the Merovingians, to execute supply
operations on the Lippe. Archaeological investigations in the lower
Rhineland have identified barge-type craft that were quite suitable for
moving both supplies and men on rivers such as the slow moving Lippe.
These were flat-bottomed craft, examples of which measured fifteen
meters in length and two meters in width. They had a sufficiently shallow
draft that they could be beached on the river bank, i.e. they did not require
quays, while at the same time being able to carry somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of four-and-a-half metric tons of cargo.164 Each barge, therefore,
162The author of AE, an. 776, wants his readers to believe that all this had been accom-
plished by the swiftness of his [Charlemagnes] actions. However, as argued, above,
this should not be taken literally. Rather, it is an indication that Charlemagne as overall
commander was responsible for the victory.
163ARF, an. 791 and AE, an. 791, discuss in some detail Charlemagnes use of this deploy-
ment in terms that give reason to conclude that this was his normal practice under appro-
priate conditions.
164For one such barge found in the environs of Krefeld-Gallup north of Cologne, see
Renate Pirling, Romer und Franken am Niederrhein (Mainz, 1986), pp. 187189. For similar
could carry a maximum load comparable to that of nine Carolingian war

carts.165
Meeting the Saxon Army
Further eastward, at the headwaters of the Lippe, Charlemagne con-

fronted the Saxon army. This force was the above-mentioned immense
multitude of perfidious people whose mobilization and intended line
of march into the valley of the Lippe had been reported to Charlemagne
earlier in the campaign. The author of the court Annales emphasizes that
this formidable mass of enemy fighting men, which is characterized as
having been mobilized from every region of Saxony, was thoroughly terri-
fied by the Frankish army.166 The author of the Annales Petaviani, how-
ever, adds the information that it was the men from the leading families
who realized that resistance was futile and came to Charlemagne plead-
ing for peace.167 The abject terror, reportedly experienced by the Saxons,
both the leading men and the rank and file, may be an exaggeration
intended for propaganda purposes to increase respect for Charlemagne.
However, it is clear that there was no great enthusiasm among the Saxons
for fighting against Charlemagnes very large army at the headwaters of
the Lippe in the autumn of 776.
Various Carolingian sources emphasize, in one or another way, that the
immense multitude of Saxons repented for having violated their previous
agreements with Charlemagne. The Saxons are reported to have indicated
to Charlemagne that if their apologies were accepted, they would be loyal
in the future. In this context, it is of some importance that the author
of the Revised Annals and later Einhard in his Vita Karoli use the tradi-
tional late Roman terminology of supplicatio, a ceremony which had been
maintained by the Merovingians for the purpose of asking or begging for
mercy. Charlemagne is said to have found the mass of the Saxon people
suppliant (supplicem) and begging for forgiveness (poscentem). Then,
craft, see Julia Obladen-Kauder and Axel Preiss, Ein Flusskahn aus der Zeit Karls des
Grossen, in Fundort Nordrheinwestfalen, ed. Heinz Gnter Horn et al. (Mainz, 2000),
378380.
165See, Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations, pp. 1729.
166ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.
167AP, an. 776.
560 chapter nine
still following later imperial form, Charlemagne is shown to act mercifully

(misericorditer) and, as a result, he pardons them.168
The views expressed in these sources and attributed to Charlemagne
have a lengthy history in Roman tradition, which was so greatly admired
by the Carolingian court. For example, Cicero in one of his well-known
works (de Officiis, I.35), observed that Wars should be undertaken only
with the purpose of living in peace (pax) and in security (sine inuria). He
goes on to note that after a victory has been won, those enemies, who
have not shown themselves to be cruel in war (non crudeles in bello) or
savage (immanes), are to be spared.169 In a more practical sense, Suetonius
in his Life of Augustus (ch. 21), which also was very well-known to the
Carolingian court, made clear that the emperor exacted oaths from those
whom he had defeated so that they would keep faithfully to the peace
terms that they had sought.
According to some accounts in the Carolingian sources, many of the
Saxons, in addition to seeking forgiveness and peace, indicated that they
wanted to become Christians. Other court accounts suggest that all of
the Saxons wanted to become Christians.170 The result of this supposed
desire to convert is variously reported. For example, one annalist indicates
that a countless number were baptized.171 Two other annalists indicate
that a great multitude were baptized.172 From a theological perspective
the most likely course of events is to be found in the report provided in the
Revised Annals, i.e. Charlemagne arranged for the baptism of all those
who declared a desire to become Christians.173 This point is echoed in a
less-specific context by Einhard.174 In support of this position, the deci-
sion taken by Charlemagne to bring about the conversion of the Saxons by
force is generally agreed to have been made several years later.175 Whatever
168See, AE, an. 776; and Einhard, VK, ch. 7. Regarding Carolingian maintenance of later
Roman forms in regard to supplication, see the brief background discussion by Geoffrey
Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France
(Ithaca-London, 1992), 26. This is a subject that requires further examination for the late
antique era.
169For the availability of de Officiis to the Carolingians, see L.D. Reynolds, Cicero, in
Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L.D. Reynolds (Oxford, 1983),
130131.
170See, for example, AP, an., 776; ARF, an. 776; ASM, an. 776; AM, an., 776; and Einhard,
VK, ch. 7.
171AM, an., 776.
172AP, an., 776; and ASM, an. 776.
173AE, an. 776.
174VK, ch. 7.
175See Hen, Charlemagnes Jihad, pp. 3351, who argues in an effective manner that
Charlemagne was following a Muslim model for the treatment of non-believers when he
may have been accomplished in this short time frame, there is little reason
to believe that very much catechizing was done in the field.176 In addition,
the regulation that baptisms should be carried out during Easter and
Pentecost obviously was not rigorously followed.177
In general, it is agreed that Charlemagne acted mercifully, presumably
as both a good Christian king and Roman emperor should. He is not
reported to have punished anyone. Rather, he would seem to have issued a
general pardon or amnesty.178 The Carolingian royal sources, with their
obvious parti pris, indicate that the Saxons agreed to a treaty that included
the following terms:
1. The entire territory (patria) of the Saxons, it is claimed by the court
annalists, was surrendered by all the Saxons to Charlemagne and to
the Franks (reddiderunt patriam). The justification for claiming that
the entire patria was surrendered was the fact, or at least the reported
fact, that the Saxons who faced Charlemagne at Lippenspringe had
been mobilized from all parts of their territory (venientes ex omni
parte) and, therefore, represented the entire gens.179 This very broad
representation of the Saxon people likely provided the basis for the
observation by one annalist that the greatest part of the Saxon land
was conquered.180 Clearly, in the minds of the Frankish writers, the
fact that the leading men had surrendered was only part of the basis for
the establishment of Frankish ditio over the Saxons and their territory
(see below).
2. In addition to the many conversions alluded to above, at least one
source indicates that all of the Saxons promised to become Christians,
sposponderunt se esse Christianos.181 This claim would seem to be
issued this capitulary. However, it should be emphasized that Charlemagne had under-
taken extensive military operations in Muslim territory as early as 778. Therefore, he did
not have to await the appearance of Theodulf of Orleans in his entourage to explain Muslim
practices.
176Richard E. Sullivan, Carolingian Missionary Theories, the Catholic Historical Review,
42/3 (1956), 273295; and reprinted with the same pagination in idem, Christian Missionary
Activity in the Early Middle Ages (Aldershot, 1994), 284287, regarding the problem of
educating pagans in the faith prior to baptism.
177In a letter to Boniface dated 1 December 722 (ed. Tangl, no. 18), Pope Gregory
II provided a clear statement of this regulation but added that exceptions could be made
when a person was in peril of death.
178AE, an. 776; Einhard, VK, ch. 7, indicates that for some time this was Charlemagnes
normal response to the perfidious Saxons.
179AE, an. 776.
180AM, an., 776.
181ARF, an. 776.
562 chapter nine
accurate insofar as the chapters of the first capitulary de Saxonibus,

issued several years after Charlemagnes victory at Lippenspringe,
takes as its starting point the assumption that all Saxons already were
Christians, even if they were not very good Christians.182
3. Finally, all of the Saxons are reported to have agreed that they were to
be subject to Charlemagne and to the Franks (sub dicione Caroli regis
et Francorum subdiderunt).183
In order to secure this treaty, by which they surrendered their patria, the
Saxons are reported to have given a pledge (wadium) of some kind with
their own hands. Finally, Charlemagne ordered the Saxons to turn over to
him and to the Franks numerous hostages to guarantee the treaty. The
number of hostages is not recorded, but the impression is given that a
great many people were involved.184 As will be seen below, Charlemagne
regarded this treaty as having made the Saxons a people subject to his rule
and their land part of the regnum Francorum.
Charlemagnes overall strategy with regard to the integration of the
Saxon territory into the regnum Francorum will be discussed in the
next chapter. However, attention is drawn in the sources, at this point, to
several actions that he took before bringing operations to an end in 776.
Of primary importance was the construction of new fortress at Pader
born on the Lippe not far from the old Roman military installation at
Anreppen. Like Anreppen during the Roman occupation of the area,
Paderborn was to serve as the major eastern base for further movement
of military assets eastward along the central route from the Rhine to
the Weser and eventually to the Elbe.185 Charlemagne is reported to have
deployed a large garrison there, which was composed of at least two
scarae.186
Charlemagne also is reported to have ordered the construction of a sec-
ond fortress, variously referred to in a limited number of the minor annals,
182This is a very complicated matter. See CRF, no. 26; and the observations by Hen,
Charlemagnes Jihad, pp. 3351.
183ARF, an. 776.
184ARF, an. 776. Concerning hostages, see the useful general observations by Kosto,
Hostages, pp. 123147.
185ARF, an. 776; and AE an. 776. See two useful introductory studies: Birgit Mecke, Die
Pfalzen in Paderborn, Entdeckung und Auswertung; and Sveva Gai, Die Pfalz Karls des
Grossen in Paderborn, Ihre Entwicklung von 777 bis zum Ende des 10. Jahrhunderts, both
in 799, 3, 176182 and 183196, respectively.
186AE, an. 776.
as contrasted to the court annals, as burgum Karoli, urbs Caroli, and

urbs Caroli et Francorum.187 These references in the minor annals, which
are confounded with Paderborn, very likely was the royal establishment
called Karlburg located on the Main River approximately 100 kilometers
east of the key Frankish base and palatium at Frankfurt. Karlburg also was
about 65 kilometers south-southeast of Fulda and some 25 kilometers
northeast of Wrzburg.188 The Karlburg site had already been settled
during the later 7th century, and served as the caput of a Frankish fiscal
installation. Its defenses measured some 200 meters by 1000 meters, and
was served by a river port on the Main that measured 400 meters by 75
meters. A cloister dedicated to St. Mary was established at Karlburg
before ca. 740.189
At about the same time that Carloman the Elder established Sturms
monks at Fulda, Pippin placed Karlburg under the administrative control
of the bishop of Wrzburg.190 It is in this context that the initial construc-
tion of mortared stone wall defenses would seem to have been established
at Karlburg, i.e. the building of the walls has been attributed to the efforts
of Pippin and dated to the period between the death of Charles Martel in
741 but prior to 751.191 It is likely that in 776, Charlemagnes order, discussed
above, resulted either in the construction of improved fortifications or, as
187See AP, an., 776; ASM, an. 776; and AM, an., 776, respectively, for the terminology
cited above. It is commonly believed that this foundation is either an otherwise unknown
Karlburg that was built somewhere in the valley of the Lippe and subsequently destroyed
in 778 or simply another name for Paderborn. Although none of the major sources uses
the name urbs Karoli or one of the variations mentioned above, the AM, an. 776, does
say that this place was constructed on the river Lippe. This seems to be an obvious confu-
sion with Paderborn as authors of the three minor annals, cited above, fail to mention
Paderborn, which was on the Pader River about 3,000 meters from the banks of the
Lippe. The basic view which builds on this confusion is provided by Manfred Balzer,
Paderborn im frhen Mittelalter (7761050): Schsiche Siedlung, Karolingische Pfalzort,
Ottonisch-Salische Bishofsstadt, in Paderborn, Geschichte der Stadt in ihrer Region, I, ed.
Jrg Jarnut (Paderborn-Mnchen-Wien-Zrich, 1999), 1323, 3035. See also Karl Hengst,
Die Ereignisse der Jahre 777/778 und 782. Archologie und Schriftberlieferung, in Kaiser
Krnung: Das Epos Karolus Magnus et Leo papa und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn 799,
ed. Peter Godman, Jrg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek (Paderborn, 2002), 6466, who continues
to treat the minor annals as ostensibly accurate.
188The basic work on Karlburg is synthesized by P. Ettel, KarlburgEntwicklung eines
kniglich-bischflichen Zentralortes am Main mit Burg und Talsiedlung vom 7. bis zum 13
Jahrhundert, Chteau Gaillard 18 (1998), 7585. Ettel, however, fails to identify Karlburg
with burgum Karoli, discussed below.
189Ettel, Karlburg, pp. 7880.
564 chapter nine
seems more likely, he established the site as a military administrative cen-

ter of some sort, which, in turn, merited the urbs designator in the minds
of some writers. Karlburg is to be seen as a counterpart of the urbs at
Paderborn, which is located much further north but with a similar strate-
gic purpose.
Through the Carolingian period, the fortified area at Karlburg remained
small but thickly populated. The mortared stone wall enclosed only
1.3 hectares until the 10th century, when a new wall was built to enclose
the entire villa center, i.e. six hectares. The early Carolingian fortifica-
tion as a whole, though small, was formidable, as it was provided with
a substantial moat which measured 5.3 meters in width and had a depth
of 1.9 meters.192 The strategic aim in strengthening Karlburg was done
in the context of providing a base where troops could be mobilized
to thwart Saxon raids south into Hesse from the direction of Erfurt
and also south along the valley of the Fulda river through Hersfeld,
Fulda, and Hammelburg in the direction Wrzburg. In addition, troops
based at Karlburg could be used to patrol the Thuringian road which
ran through lands inhabited by Slavs who might become problematic
at any time.193
In addition to the orders given in 776 regarding Paderborn and Karlburg,
the sources also give attention to already-existing fortresses. Eresburg,
which, as seen above, had been captured and had its defenses weakened
in the initial stage of the enemy invasion of 776, was ordered reoccupied,
rebuilt (or, more obviously, repaired), and strengthened. In addition,
Charlemagne then saw to it that a very strong force of custodes also was
established as a garrison at Eresburg.194 As a final step in the immediate
restructuring of the frontier defenses, Charlemagne affirmed his appoint-
ment of Abbot Sturm to command of the Fulda gap with his headquarters
at Eresburg. The abbot, Eigil makes clear, was accompanied by a substan-
tial part of his own military household (socii) at this time.195
Following these initial efforts, military and religious, to consolidate his
successes during this third, and what Charlemagne would then seem to
have regarded as the final, phase of the Saxon war, he returned to the

193Regarding Slavs in this area, see Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 139).
194ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.
195Eigil. V.S. Sturmi, ch. 25.
heartland of the regnum Francorum. There he established his court at

Herstal where planning was begun for the permanent integration of
the Saxon territory and its people into the regnum Francorum. In addition,
discussions were undertaken in regard to the possibility of launching an
invasion of the Iberian peninsula in 778.196
196ARF, an. 776; and AE, an. 776.

CHAPTER TEN
INTEGRATION OF THE SAXON TERRITORY
Following his bloodless victory over the Saxons in the upper Lippe valley,
Charlemagne established his court at Herstal late in the autumn of 776.
There, a great deal of planning had to be undertaken in order to further,
and indeed to ensure, the effective integration of the Saxon region into
the regnum Francorum. Carolingian military superiority was clear to the
planners of the Magistratus. In the course of three separate military
campaignsin 772, 775, and 776Charlemagnes forces had defeated
several Saxon armies and forced the surrender of large numbers of the
enemy. When the Saxons chose to fight against Charlemagnes expedition
ary forces, they too were soundly defeated. Following these victories,
various representatives of the Saxon people, sometimes even in largenum
bers, and including members of the leading families, swore to recognize
Frankish rule. The men who agreed to subject themselves to Charlemagnes
ditio arranged to have hostages transferred to the Carolingians in order
to guarantee these treaties.1 Finally, substantial numbers of Saxons are
reported to have accepted Christianity and been baptized.
In 773 and again in 776, however, when Charlemagne was campaigning
in Italy, Saxon armed forces in large numbers orchestrated major military
operations against Frankish assets. The first was executed along the border
of Saxon-Frankish territory and resulted in the loss of newly acquired
Carolingian fortifications at Eresburg and likely at Herstelle as well as the
destruction of significant assets at Deventer. Frankish homesteads and
churches were destroyed, booty was taken, large numbers of people were
killed, and many Christians were captured for sale into slavery. In the sec
ond campaign, the Saxon army executed a scorched-earth strategy as far
west as the Rhine and also once again captured the fortress at Eresburg,
which the Carolingians had retaken the previous year. Despite these
enemy successes in the short term, it was clear to the Carolingian court
that the capacity of Charlemagne to mobilize overwhelming military force
each time he faced the Saxons required them, either sooner or later
1One surviving list from 805 (CRF., no. 115) records 37 Saxon hostages. See the discus
sion by Nelson, Charlemagne and Empire, pp. 223234.
integration of the saxon territory567
to assume a posture of abject surrender. The Saxons accepted terms on

each occasion, which, as subsequent events would prove, certainly were
not popular in some quarters, or perhaps even among the great majority
of the population.
While planning for the integration of the Saxon region into the regnum
Francorum, Charlemagne and his advisers obviously recognized that the
Saxons, however hostile, could not effectively oppose traditionally large
Carolingian expeditionary forces on the field of battle.2 In addition, it
was clear that Saxon-held strongholds could not withstand Carolingian
attacks, and that these assets routinely were captured by Charlemagnes
armies. However, the Carolingian General Staff also was fully aware that
the greater part of the military forces of the regnum Francorum, which
operated beyond the borders of their home civitates or pagi, were com
posed of part-time militia troops obligated to serve in expeditione. Orga
nizationally, this meant that the Carolingian army was not structured to
maintain a permanent and dense military occupation of Saxon territory.
In order to solve this problem, the Carolingians were seeking to orches
trate the peaceful integration of Saxon territory into the regnum Francorum
and the conversion of the population to Christianity. This meant, at least
in the near term, that it was necessary to make the defeated Saxons adhere
to the various treaties to which they had agreed. No more revolts were to
be tolerated.
Many of the weaknesses of Saxon society, and the infrastructural back
wardness of the territory in which they lived, contributed greatly to the
success of Carolingian military operations. These weaknesses also made a
policy of integration attractive. The economy of the Saxon region was
underdeveloped by Frankish standards.3 In addition, the Saxon territory
also was severely underpopulated by comparison with ingentes populi liv
ing within the frontiers of the regnum Francorum, or at least this was the
opinion attributed to Boniface and accepted by his biographer Willibald.4
The Carolingian court understood that there would be a considerable
advantage to utilizing the thinly inhabited Saxon territory as a region in
which excess Frankish population, already evident in parts of the regnum
Francorum, could be resettled profitably.
2Regarding the capacity of the Carolingians to mobilize large armies, see Bachrach,
Charlemagnes Expeditionary Forces, pp. 142.
3See, Drfler, Rural Economy, pp. 133148; and Steuer, The Beginnings, pp. 159181.
4Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. 6 (p. 451).
568 chapter ten
The thinning of the population east of the Rhine had started by the late
3rd century, when Constantius Chlorus began settling barbarians in the
northeastern parts of Gaul for the purpose of increasing the number of
agricultural workers.5 A second wave of emigration from the east (einer
frnkischen Neubesiedlung) also can be identified in the Rhineland
throughout Germania secunda and the northern part of Germania prima
during the last third of the 5th century.6 By the end of the 6th century and
into the early Carolingian period, however, the regnum Francorum was
undergoing substantial population growth, and, as a result, a process of
sending colonists eastward was already well underway by the second half
of the 8th century if not earlier.7
The Kassel region on the Fulda river, just south of the Weser, as men
tioned earlier, not only had been settled from the west beginning in the
later 7th century, but by the mid-8th century this area is regarded by mod
ern scholars as having been fully occupied, if not overcrowded. Similarly,
the region around Wrzburg had become crowded. Serious population
growth in this area likely began under the rule of the pagan dux Gozbert
during the last quarter of the 7th century, or perhaps even earlier. This was
well before the appearance of the Anglo-Saxon missionary Killian in ca.
685. He is reported to have been attracted to the Wrzburg region by the
large population of pagans to be converted.8 Either late in the seventh or
early in the 8th century, as seen above, settlers were sent north from
the Wrzburg region to the region around Fulda. Consequently, when
Charlemagnes war to conquer the Saxon territory was begun in 772,
5See, for example, Patrick Prin, La progression des Francs en Gaul du Nord au Ve si
cle: Historie et archologie, in Die Franken und die Alemannen bis zur Schlacht bei Zlpich,
ed. Dieter Geuenich (Berlin-New York, 1998), 5981.
6Horst Wolfgang Bhme, Franken und Romanen im Spiegel der sptrmischer
Grabfund im nrdlichen Gallien in Die Franken und die Alemannen bis zur Schlacht bei
Zlpich, ed. Dieter Geuenich (Berlin-New York, 1998), 3158, p. 58 for the quotation.
7This initial stage has been charted by Christopher Loveluck, Rural settlement hierar
chy in the age of Charlemagne, in Charlemagne, Empire and Society, ed. Joanna
Story (Manchester, 2005), 230258; and in two studies by Franz Theuws: Centre and
Periphery in Northern Austrasia (6th-8th centuries). An Archaeological Perspective, in
Medieval Archaeology in the Netherlands: studies presented to H.H. van Regteren Altena,
ed. J. Besteman, J. Bos, and H. Heidinga 4169; and Changing settlement patterns,
burial grounds and the symbolic construction of ancestors and communities in the late
Merovingian southern Netherlands, in Settlement and Landscape, ed. C. Fabech and
J. Ringtved (Aarhus, 1999), 337349.
8See, PK, chs. 35, whose anonymous author emphasizes that Killian was much taken
by the beauty of the region and of the numerous pagans who dwelled there. Concerning
the complexity of this text and its possible value for the study of missionary work in the
region, see Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 160161.
regions such as the Fulda valley were in position to export settlers further
to the east.
Even on the eastern frontiers of the Frankish kingdom, population
growth is made manifest by the early 740s. In 742, for example, Boniface
sought papal permission to establish bishoprics at Wrzburg, Erfurt, and
Braburg. These efforts were fully supported by Pope Zacharias, and
constitute prima facie evidence for large populations in these locations,
both the towns themselves and their environs.9 This conclusion is war
ranted both by documentary and material evidence.10 However, most
importantly, the Church maintained the position over the long term, i.e. it
was established by the sacris canonibus, that it was essential that only
very populous areas were to be established as episcopal seats. Indeed,
not even modicas civitates were to have bishops.11 In affirming Bonifaces
judgment that Wrzburg, Erfurt, and Braburg were worthy of being
established as episcopal seats, the pope recognized that the canonical
threshold of populorum turbae had been reached at all three of these
places.12 Bonifaces reputation at Rome for providing accurate informa
tion was unquestioned by several popes, and there is no reason to believe
that he exaggerated the size and/or density of the population in the region
of Wrzburg, Erfurt, and Braburg.
9For reference to the exchange of letters between Boniface and the pope and the lat
ters surviving letter confirming the establishment, see Epist., no. 51, ed. Tangl. Two of the
popes letters confirming the establishment of bishops at Braburg and at Wrzburg sur
vive (Epist., nos. 52, 53, ed. Tangl), but the letter to the bishop of Erfurt apparently has been
lost.
10Regarding Wrzburg, see Karl Dinklage-Krumpendorf, Wrzburg im Frhmittelalter,
in Vor-und Frhgeschichte der Stadt Wrzburg, ed. Peter Endrich (Wrzburg, 1951), 63154,
esp. 6871; and concerning Erfurt, which had been an important central place of the
Thuringian kingdom and region, see Hardt, Hesse, p. 221; and p. 220, n. 10, in regard to
Buraburg.
11See Epist., no. 51, ed. Tangl. The observation by Timothy Reuter, Saint Boniface and
Europe, in The Greatest Englishman: Essays on St. Boniface that the Church at Credition, ed.
Timothy Reuter (Exeter, 1980), 92, n. 72, that this was an old canonical provision is correct.
But his claim that it was only appropriate for Mediterranean Christianity fails to appreci
ate either the growth of population in the West or the established reliability of Boniface in
reporting to the pope.
12See Epist., no. 51, ed. Tangl. The caution by Loveluck, p. 269, that The association of a
bishopric with an urban centre may suggest, but does not prove, that the town was densely
populated is not hypercritical. However, it would seem that those scholars who would
assume that the canons were being ignored or abused should be required to prove that any
particular see under discussion was not densely populated. In the particular case of
Boniface and Zacharias regarding Wrzburg, Erfurt, and Braburg, it would be unwar
ranted to argue, without firm evidence to the contrary, that the pope was being duped by
his representative with whom he worked very closely, with whom he continued to work
very closely, and whom it would be fair to say that he trusted implicitly.
570 chapter ten
The Churchs long-established policy that episcopal sees were to be

established only in places with large populations was based upon several
fundamental and intertwined motives that engaged both economic and
spiritual realities. In the most obvious sense, it was generally understood
that a large and presumably flourishing population was necessary to pro
vide for the economic needs of the church. The construction and the
maintenance of a cathedral and the physical components of the episcopal
infrastructure, such as the bishops residence, dwellings for the clergy and
their servants, and the schools, were costly in terms of the expenditure of
both surplus human and material resources. It was necessary to have large
numbers of prosperous Christians in each diocese to pay the bills. In addi
tion, there was no point in making a material investment of such an order
of magnitude if there were not large numbers of Christians, or perhaps
potential converts, in the area who required the services provided by the
church and would benefit from them. Finally, it would surely undermine
the prestige of the Church if, for example, a large, newly built and, indeed,
expensive cathedral were not very well attended at the appropriate times
of the year.
While the pressure on resources even in relatively newly settled areas
would be relieved by the establishment of new settlements in Saxon terri
tory, much older areas of the regnum Francorum would likely benefit even
more. This was especially the case in such very thickly settled areas as the
Seine valley and particularly in the very fertile but very crowded Paris
basin.13 Overpopulation in some areas meant that the full capacity of the
labor force was not being utilized because there was not sufficient work
for all. In addition, on occasion, local overpopulation could result in the
maldistribution of food resources.14 Stress caused by excess population
also had an impact on other infrastructure resources, e.g. the institutions
for maintaining law and order as well as churches and clergy to serve an
excessively large population.15
13See, in general, Verhulst, Carolingian Economy, pp. 2328; and with specific attention
to the Paris basin, see G.M. Schwarz, Village Populations According to the Polyptyque of
the Abbey of St. Bertin, Journal of Medieval History, 11 (1985), 3141, with the important lit
erature cited there.
14See the useful observations by McCormick, Origins, pp. 1011.
15The argument is not being made here that the Carolingian court was familiar with
modern concepts regarding equilibrium that address the relation among overcrowding,
failure to make full use of labor resources, and social conflict. However, Charlemagne and
his advisers were aware that overcrowding caused problems in various localities, and, as
will be seen below, they supported the settlement of excess population in places where the
New Frankish settlements in Saxon territory and the reorganization of

the already existing settlements of the conquered peoples would under
gird the economic development of the region and increase the tax base
of Charlemagnes government.16 Of primary importance, in this regard,
were ongoing, though apparently gradual, efforts to establish the bipartite
villa organization then prevalent in the regnum Francorum but unknown,
as yet, in the Saxon region.17 In addition, by extending the borders of
the Frankish kingdom further to the east and to the north, closer
links could be forged with both Slavic peoples and Scandinavians, respec
tively. Economic growth in these areas was well-illustrated even before
Charlemagnes reign by an increasing number of emporia. The continuing
success of these market centers since the early 7th century surely was of
importance in the thinking of Charlemagne and his advisers.18 One index
of such interest is made clear by the fact that the Carolingian government
maintained administrative control of the emporia and fairs within the
Frankish kingdom.19
people and the government could benefit by the opening up of new lands for settlement to
an already available work force.
16For some important observations regarding the difficult subject of land taxes, see
Goffart, Frankish Military Duty, pp. 166190.
17Regarding the introduction of the bipartite system of agricultural exploitation into
Gaul from the eastern Mediterranean during the 5th century, see Sarris, The Origins,
pp. 280311. Concerning the establishment of the bipartite estate throughout the
Carolingian empire, see, for example, R. Ktzschke, Karl der Grosse als Agrarpolitiker, in
Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel zum 70 Geburtstag am 24 Dezember 1949 dargebracht von
Freunden, Fachgenossen und Schlern (Mnster, 1952), 181194; Walter Schlessinger,
Vorstufen zu einter Untersuchung ber Hufe, in Ausgewhlte Aufsze von Walter
Schelssinger, 19651979, ed. H. Patzer and F. Schwind (Sigmaringen, 1987), 485541; and
the review article by Werner Rsener, Zur Erforschung der frhmittelalterliche
Grundherrschaft, in Structuren der Grundherrschaft im Frhen Mittelalter, ed. Werner
Rsener, 2nd ed. (Gottingen, 1993), 928. These studies, along with the vast literature they
cite, make it clear that the bipartite estate played a key role in both demographic and eco
nomic growth throughout the Carolingian empire. Verhulst, The Carolingian Economy,
pp. 3160, summarizes these results. Cf. the curious study by Henning, Strong Rulers-Weak
Economy?, pp. 3353, who would seem to argue that the bipartite estate was inimical both
to demographic and economic growth. Henning, however, neither treats the works cited
above, nor does he address the mountain of information that has been developed to dem
onstrate expanded settlement areas and large surpluses of both human and material
resources throughout the Carolingian empire. This reader was left with the impression that
Henning has projected backward onto Charlemagnes reign his distaste for the East
German regimes planned economy and the failure of the Communist system within which
it operated.
18Concerning the importance of the emporia in the north, see, for example, Clarke and
Ambrosiani, Towns, pp. 545.
19McCormick, Origins, pp. 606612.
572 chapter ten
On the whole, Charlemagnes government could expect to obtain

significant economic opportunities from the integration of the Saxon
region into the regnum Francorum. Most importantly, the lions share of
lands in these newly conquered areas would be integrated into the royal
fisc.20 In addition, the royal coffers would be augmented from the collec
tion of tolls made available from the growth of trade.21 Those segments of
Frankish society which were involved in various types of commerce, e.g.
large monastic houses, also would expect to benefit.22 Some cadres in the
Frankish kingdom would enjoy access to an increased number of markets
for the sale of their goods in the Saxon territory. They also would benefit
through the growth of contact with both Slavs and Scandinavians, who
themselves were involved in the establishment of emporia and the devel
opment of long-distance trade connections.23
From a religious perspective, an increase in contact with both Slavs and
Scandinavians, who were pagans, would provide opportunities for the
Carolingians to garner new converts for the Christian faith. This would be
done, as the subsequent efforts of Anskar and Arno of Salzburg demon
strate, through the type of missionary work that had succeeded so signifi
cantly during the first half of the 8th century.24 This pattern of missionary
work was undertaken under the overall leadership of the Carolingian gov
ernment, which provided both economic support and military security.
The leadership in the field maintained by various Anglo-Saxons such as
Willibrord, who worked in Frisia, Boniface, whose work focused further to
the south and east, and the monks of Fulda and Hersfeld in the conversion
of the Saxons during the later 8th century provided models for the future.25
20With regard to the expansion of the Carolingian fisc into Saxon territory, see, for
example, Karlheinz Mascher, Reichsgut und Komitat am Sdharz im Hochmittelalter
(Cologne, 1957).
21Regarding tolls, see Kaiser, Steuer und Zoll, pp. 117; and Stoclet, Immunes ab omni
teloneo.
22See, for example, Jean-Pierre Devroey, Un monastre dans lcomomie dchanges:
les service de transport a labbaye de Saint-Germain-des-Prs au IXe sicle, Annales,
Economies, Socit. Civilisations, 3 (Paris, 1984), pp. 570589; and reprinted with the same
pagination in idem, tudes sur le grand domaine carolingien (Aldershot, 1993).
23Concerning commercial development during the period, see Inge Skovgaard-
Peterson, The Historical Context of the First Towns in Northern and Eastern Europe, in
Eighth Viking Congress, Arhus 1977, ed. Hans Bekker-Nielson, Peter Foote, and Olaf Olsen
(Odense, 1977), 918; and Clarke and Ambrosiani, Towns, pp. 545.
24See the discussion by Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 8486, 123137, 168171, regarding
the matter of models presented in the accounts of Arnos and Anskars activities.
25See the discussion by Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 8486, 123137, 168171, who, how
ever, tends to give far too little attention to the role of the government in the process. For a
In addition to economic and religious concerns, broadly understood,

Charlemagne had both a military and a political interest in exploiting
newly acquired lands. Among the lower strata of society, Frankish settlers
and those Saxons who accepted Christianity would be required to make
appropriate contributions to the local defense through participation in
the general levy. Those settlers who met certain minimum wealth require
ments also would serve in Charlemagnes expeditionary forces.26 At the
higher levels of society, holdings that had been confiscated from Saxons
who were not cooperative, and other types of empty land, would be used
by Charlemagne to reward loyal secular and ecclesiastical magnates with
a variety of real assets. Grants to men who displayed conspicuous loyalty
to the Carolingians and an eagerness to support royal policies obviously
would be the most favored beneficiaries.27
These newly settled magnates, sustained by the additional wealth avail
able from large tracts of land and living on a potentially, if not actively,
hostile frontier, surely were encouraged, if only in their self-interest, to
maintain large numbers of professional soldiers in their military house
holds. These motives may well have swelled the magnate military contin
gents to a size greater than those of landholders living in the interior. The
assets of the latter were less threatened by enemy raids and the potential
for significant invasions than those living on the frontier.28 Therefore,
consistent with the norms of Carolingian military organization, these
frontier magnates would be in a position to make significant contributions
to the defense of these newly conquered lands. This would be realized
both through the mobilization of their dependents and through the
deployment of large numbers of professional troops from their military
households to serve in Charlemagnes expeditionary forces in future
campaigns.29
more realistic appraisal of the role played by the government, see Reuter, Saint Boniface,
pp. 7682.
26Concerning the imposition of Carolingian military organization throughout the
Saxon region, see Bachrach and Bachrach, Saxon Military Revolution, pp. 186222.
27Very early on in the process of absorbing parts of the Saxon region into the Frankish
Kingdom, the Carolingians began to settle magnates and those from the lesser ranks of
society in the area east of the Weser as far as the Harz mountains. See Nitz, Feudal
Woodland, pp. 171184.
28Regarding the military households of Carolingian magnates, see Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, pp. 5965; and concerning the increased size of magnate military
households on the frontier, see David S. Bachrach, The Military Organization of Ottonian
Germany, c. 9001018, Journal of Military History, 72 (2008), 10611088.
29See, for example, Cullen Chandler, Between Courts and Counts: Carolingian
Catalonia and the Aprisio System, EME, 11 (2002), 1944.
574 chapter ten
In order to confirm the wisdom of this settlement strategy, Charlemagne

merely had to look back to the efforts of his father, King Pippin, who
had followed such a plan in Aquitaine during the 760s.30 In fact, earlier
Frankish kings going back to Clovis (d. 511) followed similar policies. The
Carolingians not only were aware of these institutions from contemporary
experience but could read about these efforts by Merovingian kings in
well-known texts such as the Ten Books of History written by Gregory of
Tours.31 This strategy, as employed by the Merovingians in the regnum
Francorum, was, of course, merely a continuation of normal Roman impe
rial practice as it had operated in Gaul.32 Charlemagnes early success in
the utilization of this type of military settlement policy in the Saxon region
may well have played an important role in his continued employment of
this strategy on the frontiers of his regnum from Spain to the Balkans dur
ing the course of his lengthy reign.33
Finally, the integration of the Saxon region was important with regard
to the role of the Carolingians as restorers of the Roman Empire in the
West. The Emperor Augustus (d. a.d. 14) claimed at the end of his reign
that the region as far east as the Elbe River was part of the empire. Indeed,
this claim was made in the widely disseminated Res gestae divi Augusti
(V.26).34 The fact that Augustus claims were severely flawed would seem
to have been irrelevant both to subsequent Roman historians and to their
early medieval readers. The conquest myth was propagated by Roman and
early medieval writers, and some of these works were available to the
Carolingian court. Among the former are Velleius Paterculus (Hist., II, 97);
Tacitus (Ann., I, 59); Suetonius (V. Aug., 21); and Eutropius (bk. 7, ch. 9).35
No less important is the fact that the esteemed early medieval author
Cassiodorus recorded Augustus claim that the region as far east as the
Elbe was part of the Roman Empire.36 Paul the Deacon provides a version

32See Bachrach, Military Lands, pp. 95122.
33With regard to Spain, see Chandler, Courts and Counts, pp. 1944; and Bowlus,
Franks, pp. 4689.
34See the discussion by Wells, German Policy, pp. 36; and for more information con
cerning the text and its diffusion, see P.A. Brunt, Augustus, Emperor of Rome, 63 B.C.-14 A.D.:
Res gestae divi Augusti: the achievements of the divine Augustus (Oxford, 1988).
35The recognition by Florus, Epitome, bk. II, ch. 30, that following Varus defeat the
Romans were forced to establish their frontier on the Rhine, and Tacitus observation
(Germ., ch. 41) that the Romans no longer had an interest in the Elbe when he was writing
in the early 2nd century, indicates this area was regarded as having been lost.
36Cassiodorius, Chron, 589 (p. 135).
of the claim as well.37 In general, it is widely believed by modern scholars

that Charlemagne knew or believed that at one time the Elbe had been the
eastern border of the Roman Empire in Germania.38
Charlemagnes reconquest of the area east of the Rhine, which earlier
had reverted to the status of Germania libra in the wake of Varus defeat in
a.d. 9, provided useful evidence for those who took an interest in the
resuscitation of the Roman Empire in the West by the Carolingians. For
example, following Charlemagnes second victory in Italy in 776 and his
conquest of the Saxons later in the same year, Pope Hadrian I wrote to the
Frankish king: Behold! a new Constantine, Gods most Christian emperor,
has arisen in these times.39 Both the allusion to Charlemagne as christian-
issimus imperator Dei and the characterization of the Frankish king as
novus Constantinus make clear that in the popes view more was at stake
than congratulating Charlemagne for one or even two major military vic
tories. This language makes palpable a papal program for reviving the
Roman Empire in the West that included Germania as far east as the Elbe,
under Charlemagnes rule.40
Integrating the Saxon Territory
Much had to be accomplished in the course of planning for the integration

of the conquered Saxons and their territory into the kingdom of the
Franks. Charlemagne and his advisers knew that a spectrum of govern
mental structures, both lay and ecclesiastical, would have to be developed
and imposed with varying degrees of vigor on the Saxons. First, the aceph
alous nature of Saxon society would be radically altered. Integration into
37Paul, Romana, bk. VII, ch. 9 (p. 101).

38See, for example, Raimund Ernst, Die Nordwestslaven und das frnkisches Reich:
Beobachtungen zur Geschichte ihrer Nachbarschaft und zur Elbe als nordstlicher
Reichsgrenze bis in die Zeit Karls des Grossen (Berlin, 1976), 5870. He is followed by Hardt,
The Limes Saxoniae, p. 230.
39CC, no. 60. There is some controversy regarding the date, which the editor Gundlach
places in May 778. For example, Barbero, Charlemagne, p. 76, suggests a date just after his
victory over the Lombards. In dating this letter, it seems likely that the death of Archbishop
Leo of Ravenna on 14 February 777 and Hadrians desire to reassert his authority over the
Exarchate together may have played a role in this approach to Charlemagne by the pope.
For a discussion of Pope Hadrians efforts to regain control of the Exarchate, see Noble, The
Republic, pp. 170171.
40The matter of reviving the Roman Empire in the West is among the most controver
sial topics in the reign of Charlemagne and the bibliography is enormous. For a useful sum
mary of a wide variety of views, see Noble, The Republic, pp. 277291; and Bachrach,
Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities, pp. 231255.
576 chapter ten
the regnum Francorum meant that Charlemagne was king of all the people
of the region. Secondly, paganism would be extirpated, the Saxons were to
become Christians, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy was to be imposed on
the people throughout their lands. Perhaps the Saxon council that met
annually at Marklo would be permitted to continue in some form or
another. However, its independence would be curtailed severely, espe
cially in regard to making decisions concerning peace and war. On the
whole, Charlemagnes officials, in order to make possible the governance
of the Saxon people and the region in which they lived, would have to
impose new institutions and perhaps maintain, in one or another form,
old ones that could be useful.
Problems to Be Solved
As noted above, the emperor Augustus as well as subsequent writers

claimed that the region between the Rhine and the Elbe was part of the
Roman Empire. However, the territory eastward from the Rhine to the
lower Elbe, which was recognized by the Carolingians and others such as
Bede as the Saxon region, never had been integrated into the Roman
Empire. This region had not seen a division of its territory into civitates for
administrative purposes. No administrative centers (urbes), walled or
open, had been constructed. The land had not been centuriated and no
high-quality paved Roman roads had been built.41 Nor, indeed, was it a ter
ritory in which large towns had been developed and maintained by the
indigenous population at any time during the eight centuries between the
reigns of Augustus and Charlemagne.42
Additionally, this newly conquered Saxon region was rather thinly pop
ulated, especially by comparison with lands further to the west which had
been part of the Roman Empire and were occupied by the subjects of the
Frankish kings. The Saxons tended to live in small and scattered villages or
even rather isolated homesteads.43 Simply put, the territory inhabited by
41Scholars are generally agreed that when Charlemagne initiated his campaign to
conquer the Saxon region, it was divided into approximately 100 administrative districts,
i.e. pagi. See Goldberg, Popular Revolt, p. 477, n. 47, for the state of the question.
42This is made clear in the numerous essays published in ber allen Fronten:
Nordwestdeutschland zwischen Augustus und Karl dem Grossen, ed. Frank Both and Heicke
Aounil (Oldenburg, 1999).
43It is no easy matter to identify significant Saxon settlements in the pre-conquest
period. Going back to the 4th and 5th centuries, there are numerous finds of Roman coins
the Saxons, demographically and in terms of a fixed large-scale infrastruc

ture of habitation sites, high quality roads, and well-developed ports, was
primitive by comparison with the situation inherited from the Romans
within the regnum Francorum itself. In terms of material development,
the Saxon region during this period of Carolingian conquest would
appear to have been very similar to Germania libra when Arminius turned
traitor and won a decisive victory over the Roman governor Varus in the
Teutoburger forest some 800 years earlier.44
Mapping Saxon Territory
The Carolingians needed to establish effective secular and ecclesiastical

administrative systems in Saxon territory if the region were to be inte
grated successfully into the regnum Francorum. To effect this policy, it was
required that Charlemagnes government have access to a substantially
accurate corpus of information regarding both the physical and human
geography of the territory that was to be administered. This was an espe
cially difficult task with regard to the territory in question between the
Weser and the Elbe because it was largely terra incognita to the Franks as
compared, for example, to much of the area between the Rhine and the
Weser. The entire Saxon region, however, had to be mapped. Information
had to be acquired regarding the location of Saxon villages, or, at least,
those sites of the greatest importance, and the homesteads or estates of
various magnates, whether so-called satraps or merely primores. Roads
in Saxon territory, however inferior to those that had been built in the west
by the Romans, had to be identified and improved. Navigable waterways
had to be explored and charted. In short, itineraries similar to those used
and other artifacts in what can be considered Saxon territory. These may, in some cases, be
indicative of settlement localities. See, for example, two studies published in Sachsen und
Angelsachsen, ed. Claus Ahrens (Hamburg, 1978): Friedrich Laux, Sachsen und Rmer,
pp. 5157, with maps 1 and 2; and Peter Schmid, Siedlungs- und Wirtschaftsstruktur
auf dem Kontinent, pp. 245261, with maps 11 and 12. For Saxon settlement in the region of
the upper Lippe in the 8th century, see Balzer, Paderborn im frhen Mittelalter, pp. 79.
With regard to coastal areas, see K. Brandt, Niedersachsen, in Archologische und
Naturwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen an lndlichen und frhstdtischen Siedlungen im
deutschen Kustengebiet vom 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis zum 11. Jahrhundert n. Chr., 2 vols.,
(Weinheim, 1984), 1, Lndliche Siedlungen, ed. Georg Kossack, Karl-Ernst Behre, and Peter
Schmid 147166. This list of studies in no sense is to be considered exhaustive.
44Peter S. Wells, The Battle That Stopped Rome (London, 2003) pp. 107108, provides a
useful summary of Arminius service to Rome and the rewards that he received.
578 chapter ten
by the Romans, which were well-known to the Carolingians, had to be

created.45
During the winter of 776777, Charlemagne is reported to have ordered
Saxons ex omni parte Saxoniae to attend his court which was to be held
the next year at Paderborn, the newly constructed Carolingian military
base and administrative center on the upper reaches of the Lippe River.46
The identity of these people, summoned from all parts of the Saxon terri
tory, is not immediately obvious. In an apparent effort to clarify this mat
ter, the Reviser of the court Annals indicates that Charlemagne summoned
the senate and people of the Saxons to his court.47 The use of this well-
known classical phrase seems likely to have been intended to mean that
Charlemagne ordered the Saxons to assemble their annual representative
council composed of magnates, free men, and semi-free men, which tradi
tionally met at Marklo. In the spring of 777, however, the meeting was to
be held at Paderborn, not Marklo.48 In order to make possible this meet
ing, Charlemagne had to have his orders transmitted to the members of
the Saxon council: the senators, i.e. so-called Satraps and primores, and
the people, i.e. free men and lidi.49
It is noteworthy that the author of the court Annals believed it was
important to emphasize that orders were dispatched to all parts of the
Saxon region and also to emphasize that, as a result, vast numbers of the
inhabitants responded to these orders. This report would seem to indicate
that if, indeed, only council members were summoned, a great many oth
ers, perhaps many who had not been invited, also came to Paderborn.50
Traditionally, twelve representatives from each Gau were summoned to
the Council from each class, i.e. the magnates, the free, and the semifree.
This means, as observed above, that 36 representatives had to be sum
moned from each of the approximately one hundred Gaue or pagi, for a
total in excess of 3,500 representatives in all.51
The accounts provided both by the author of the court Annales and by
the Reviser raise two very obvious questions. First, from what source or
45Concerning the Carolingian use of Roman itineraries and other relevant technology,
such as that provided by the texts of the agrimensores, see Bachrach, Carolingian Military
Operations, pp. 1729; and the key study by Albu, Imperial Geography, pp. 136148.
46ARF, an. 777.
47AE, an. 777.
48ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777.
49See, Springer, Lebuins Lebensbeschreibung, pp. 223224, 228231.
50ARF, an. 777.
51Concerning the structure of the council, see Springer, Lebuins Lebensbeschreibung,
pp. 223224, 228231.
sources did Charlemagnes government obtain the names of those people

who served in the council, whom the king wanted to summon to
Paderborn? Our information in this regard is primarily negative. Saxon
society was acephalic, i.e. it lacked a central government, and there is no
reason to believe that anyone in the region, except for alien missionaries
and some members of their entourages, were literate. We can be reason
ably sure that the Saxons kept no written records, e.g. census data or lists
of council members, indicating which men held the office of satrap,
which men were primores, and which were free or semi-free. Even if only
satraps and primores were summoned and not large numbers of the pop-
ulus, access to this even more limited group surely would still have required
the Carolingian government to acquire a considerable quantity of detailed
information over a relatively short period of time, i.e. since 772 at the
earliest.
The second question that requires an answer stems from the first
and is closely related to it. It was necessary for the relevant officials at
Charlemagnes court not only to obtain the requisite information regard
ing the names of the people who were to be summoned, identified by their
rank or status, but also to obtain information regarding some sort of basic
geographical location regarding where they lived, e.g. the name of a spe
cific place. With these data in hand, it must be concluded that lists which
included this information were compiled by Charlemagnes court officials
in consonance with traditional Carolingian administrative practice of
making a vast array of lists for all types of governmental operations based
upon inquests.52
Simply having the name of a place in Saxon territory obviously was
insufficient to guide a messenger from the royal court to that particular
location. For example, let us assume that Charlemagnes officials learned
that a particular Saxon who was to be summoned lived in the village of
Bardowick. We know that Bardowick was located on the banks of the
Ilmaneu, a tributary of the Elbe some 15 kilometers from the confluence of
the two rivers at Geesthacht.53 For royal officials based at Charlemagnes
court to take action, additional information regarding the route to be
taken to Bardowick had to be available. For example, the direction of travel
52Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296.

53By the later 8th century, Charlemagne had established a base at Bardowick and
shortly thereafter at Geesthacht. See Uta Reinhardt, Bardowick, in Die deutschen
Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der Pfalzen, Knigshfe und ubrigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige
im deutschen Reichs des Mittelalters, 4, Niedersachsen (Gttingen, 1999), 117.
580 chapter ten
from the court to Bardowick, the approximate distance from the court to
Bardowick, and the average time required under normal circumstances to
travel from one place to the other all had to be known. In addition, some
landmarks likely had to be identified along the route to Bardowick. The
question must be addressed: how did all of this geographical information
became available to the bureaucrats at the Carolingian court so that they
could provide guidance to the kings messengers regarding how they were
to find the man from Bardowick? The case of Bardowick, of course, is only
a single example of what would have to have been accomplished in several
thousand cases in regard to the particular Saxons, or even groups of
Saxons, who were summoned to the meeting at Paderborn.
There were roads of various quality throughout Saxon territory. Most of
these routes, with the possible exception of the Hellweg, the Thuringian
road discussed earlier, and perhaps some surviving remnants of Roman
military roads (limites) built centuries earlier in the interior, likely should
be considered rather primitive trails.54 There were a scattering of wooden
trackways built with thick planks (Ger. Bohlenwege) over various types of
roadbeds. Of particular note are the sunken roads (Hohlwege), which are
in great need of further study. However, we are far from knowing as much
as we should regarding the road map of the Saxon region prior to the
Carolingian conquest.55 The relatively low quality of roads east of the
Rhine is suggested here by comparison with the well-marked Roman
54Regarding possible remnants of Roman military roads, see Bernd W. Bahn, Frhe
Verkehrslinien im Dreieck Memleben-Merseburg-Dornburg, in Burg-Strasse-Siedlung-
Herrschaft: Studien zum Mittelalter in Sachsen und Mitteldeutschland. Festschrift fr
Gerhard Billig zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Rainer Aurig, Reinhardt Butz, Ingolf Grssler and
Andr Thieme (Leipzig, 2007), 231250; and concerning the early history of the Hellweg
during the Merovingian era, see Berthold Schmidt, Das Westsaalegebiet im Verband
des frnkischen Staates und die ostexpansion des 9./10 Jahrhunderts, Zeitschrift fr
Archaeologie 18 (1984), 2332.
55Hagen, Rmerstrassen, pp. 481495, briefly treats Die Rechtsrheinischen
Rmerstrassen in immediate proximity to the river. With regard to Roman military
roads in the interior, which were intended to connect the fortifications in the valley of the
Lahn as well as providing communications between the fortifications built by Drusus
on the Weser and the Elbe, see Florus, Epitome, bk. II, ch. 30; and for Roman military roads
east of the Weser, see Valleius Paterculus, Historia, bk. II, ch. 120. See also Bahn, Frhe
Verkehrslinien, pp. 231250. Regarding wooden roads, see, for introductory purposes,
Thomas Szabo, Der bergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter am Beispiel des
Strassennetzes, in Europische Technik im Mittelalter 800- bis 1400: Tradition und Innovation.
Einhandbuch, ed. Uta Lindgren, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1996), 2543. In regard to the Saxon
territory, see Herbert Krger, Die Vorgeschichtliche Strassen in den Sachsenkriege
Karls des Grossen, Korrespondenzblatt des Gesamtvereins fr deutsche Geschichte und
Altertumskunde, 80 (1932), 223282.
system of roads with milestones still available throughout the greater

part of the regnum Francorum. Not only did the Frankish government
see to the maintenance of these roads but also had Roman maps, e.g.
itineraries.56
We can be equally certain, moreover, that the Saxons, who were not lit
erate, had no picta or itineraria, i.e. pictorial or written road maps, similar
to those used by the Romans, the Merovingians, and the Carolingians, for
any part of their territory.57 Consequently, during the process of integrat
ing the Saxon territory into the Frankish kingdom, it was necessary for
Charlemagnes government to have this region mapped. Legati sent from
the court to summon Saxons to a royal placitum or to muster Saxons for
military service had to have exact knowledge regarding where they were to
go and the most efficient and most rapid routes to use in order to reach
their destinations. It is noteworthy that by no later than 782, Saxon fight
ing men were being mobilized by Charlemagne and his officials for service
in Carolingian offensive military operations, indicating that much neces
sary information had been collected by that date.58
It may seem remarkable that Charlemagne, so early in the process of
integrating the Saxon region into the regnum Francorum, already had
established a system by which he could summon the key people who lived
in the newly annexed territory to the royal court or to a military muster.
Indeed, he may even be seen to have established what might fairly be char
acterized as regulations, or statua, for summoning the relevant represen
tatives of the Saxon people to his court and for other purposes as well.59 In
addition, it is clear that Charlemagne and his advisers obviously were suf
ficiently aware of the political geography of this Saxon territory so that
they not only knew the identity of the men to whom Carolingian legates
were to be sent but also where these people lived and how to make contact
56Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations, pp. 1729.

57Concerning picta, see Bachrach, Carolingian Military Operations, pp. 1729; and
Albu, Imperial Geography, pp. 136148.
58ARF, an. 782; and AE, an. 782. Cf. Carroll, The Bishoprics of Saxony, p. 221, n. 9, who
assumes that the earliest evidence for Charlemagnes use of Saxon troops is to be dated to
the year 787.
59There is an obvious lacuna in the survival of Charlemagnes capitularies for the early
part of his reign. CRF, no. 19, dates from 769 or a little later and then there is a hiatus until
no. 20, which was issued in March 779. This lacuna is much more likely due to the loss of
documents than to a failure of Charlemagne to issue capitularies in the decade under con
sideration here. N.b. AE, an. 777, refer to Charlemagne having issued statua for the Saxons
prior to the meeting at Paderborn in the spring of 777, and these documents likely were
capitula. Cf. Ganshof, Recherches, pp. 6667.
582 chapter ten
with them.60 An investigation of the various means by which Charlemagne

and his advisers obtained a wide variety of information regarding the
Saxon region enables us to identify some of the more important sources
that were available to the Carolingians and how these data were accessed.
Intelligence Gathering
Basic information regarding some of the physical and human geography

of the newly conquered Saxon territory likely was made available to
Charlemagne and his advisers through four very obvious sources: the sol
diers who had served in the region, missionaries who had preached in the
area, merchants who traveled through the region for business purposes,
and cooperative Saxons, e.g. religious converts, opportunistic primores,
and prisoners, whether taken in battle or as hostages. The sources which
provide such information traditionally are considered human intelli
gence by modern scholars. This type of information may be juxtaposed,
for comparative purposes, to technically based sources, which in the
present context would be already existing written accounts that recorded
useful information and physical or material remains that could be identi
fied and used in one or another way to establish maps, plan campaigns,
or to support military operations.
Soldiers
At least some members of the Frankish army who had participated under
Charlemagnes command in military operations in Saxon territory can be
assumed to have possessed potentially useful geographical and demo
graphic information regarding the various localities in which they had
served. In addition, it had been the case that during the previous genera
tion, Carolingian armies under the command of Pippin and his brother
Carloman the Elder had campaigned in various parts of the Saxon region.
Many Carolingian soldiers, and perhaps even a great many of those troops
who had participated in such operations during the 740s, were still living
and potentially could be debriefed by the principals of the Magistratus
or members of their staff. It may be wondered whether the Carolingian
60ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777, both report on the great number of Saxons who
responded to Charlemagnes summons.
leadership, in pursuit of the ideology of imitatio imperii, followed the tra

dition of the Roman army, known to Charlemagnes court from Latin
sources, and saw to the drawing up itineraries and perhaps even maps
(picta) regarding the lines of march that they followed.61
For soldiers and especially officers, i.e. men who had the officium of
command, a professional appreciation of matters that were of military
concern likely spurred their interest in seeking various types of geographi
cal information. Among the most important types of information required
for the execution of successful military operations was intelligence con
cerning the roads or routes that were necessary for a particular line of
march. Also crucial was the need for soldiers on campaign to identify the
location of noteworthy population concentrations, e.g. villages and
perhaps what may perhaps be considered small towns. In military terms,
these centers might be a cause of danger to a column of soldiers or to
smaller units foraging at a considerable distance from the main army
because of the comparatively large number of armed Saxons dwelling in
such a place. However, knowledge of the location of such population cen
ters also was important because stores of food likely could be found in
such places by soldiers on the march. Finally, a high priority had to be
given to information that dealt with river fords, easily available sources of
fresh water for men and animals, and the identification of potentially dan
gerous terrain such as the bogs and swamps of the type that facilitated
Arminius ambush of Varus army in the Teutoburger forest.
During the 740s, the armies of Pippin and his brother Carloman the
Elder operated offensively with great effectiveness throughout the south
ern reaches of Saxon territory that bordered on Thuringia and eastward in
the direction of extensive Slavic settlement in the region of the Thuringian-
Saale River in the area of Merseburg.62 In defensive perspective, these
efforts had two strategic goals. With regard to Saxon raiding capacity, it
was necessary to protect already existing Frankish settlements in the
disputed territory of the frontier region and to keep the enemy from
61See the discussion by Albu, Imperial Geography, pp. 136148, regarding the influ
ence of late Roman texts on the Carolingians with regard to map making. The itineraries in
the possession of Boniface may have been based upon texts executed for Charles Martels
naval and military operations in the Ijselmeer. Klebel, Herzogtmer und Marken,
pp. 153, has argued that Charlemagnes armies were able to execute pincer movements
because they had maps.
62See, Paul Grimm, Handbuch vor- und frhgeschichtlicher Wall-und Wehranlagnen,
Part I, Die vor- und frhgeschichtlicher Burgwlle der Bezirke Halle und Magdeburg (Berlin,
1958), pp. 3946.
584 chapter ten
penetrating across the border into Thuringia, which already had been
integrated into the regnum Francorum.63 With regard to the Slavs, who
were well-established on the left bank of the Elbe, there was a need to
protect the far eastern flank of the regnum Francorum and those Christians
settled in the region from enemy incursions. In this context, the early
Carolingians created a defense in depth, with dozens of strongholds which
continued to be improved and ultimately came to be called the Sorbian
March.64
Pippin and Carloman, following up on their military successes against
the Saxons in 743, 744, and 748, developed a defensive system which has
come to be called the Germar Mark.65 The limes of this Mark would seem
to have been anchored in the north at the Carolingian fortified center of
Phlde, which later became a royal palatium, just south of the Harz
Mountains. The defensive line then ran some 30 or so kilometers south
east to a stronghold at Nordhausen. From there, the Mark ran about 20
kilometers to the fort at Tilleda, then another 20 kilometers to the strong
hold at Wallhausen, and then a further 20 kilometers almost due south to
Alstedt.66 From the military base at Alstedt, these defended lines of com
munication and defense extended south to the fort at Ritterburg, which
controlled the ford of the Unstrut. The Thuringian Road ran from the
Rhine at Mainz and continued north from the economic, military, and reli
gious center at Erfurt to the Elbe.67
Strongholds from Phlde to Wallhausen were strategically sited within
a days marching distance of each other, and were positioned to interdict
enemy movements westward from Saxon territory through the Harz
Mountains. The Mark in this area therefore provided a protective screen
for the extensive Frankish settlement that had been established between
63Karl Heinemeyer, Der Knigshof Eschwege in der Germar-Mark: Untersuchungen

zur Geschichte des Knigsgutes im hessisch-thringischen Grenzgebeit (Marburg, 1970),
pp. 3035.
64Berthold Schmidt, Das Westsallegebiet im Verband des frnkischen Staats und die
Ostexpansion des 9/10 Jahrunderts, Zeitschrift fr Archologie, 18 (1984), 2332.
65Michael Gockel, Mhlhousen, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der
Pfalzen, Knigshfe und brigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im Deutschen Reichs des
Mittelalters, II Thringien (Gttingen, 2000), 287; and Heinemeyer, Der Knigshof Eschwere,
pp. 1639.
66Michael Gockel, Altstedt, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der Pfalzen,
Knigshfe und ubrigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im Deutschen Reichs des Mittelalters, II
Thringien (Gttingen, 2000), 27.
67Michael Gockel, Ritterburg, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der Pfalzen,
Knigshfe und ubrigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im Deutschen Reichs des Mittelalters, II
Thringien (Gttingen, 2000), 412413.
the Weser River and the Harz Mountains in the wake of the successes
gained by Carloman and Pippin during the 740s.68 From Nordhausen
through Alstedt, the limes provided a strengthened line of communication
and transportation so that the key fords on the Helme River, a northern
tributary of the Unstrut could be defended. Alstedt was built some 50 kilo
meters from the confluence of the two rivers, and Ritterburg dominated
the key ford of the Unstrut and protected the Thuringian Road, which ran
south from there all the way to the Rhine.69
From a strategic perspective, it is important to emphasize that the
strongholds discussed above were effectively positioned to take advantage
of the natural topography. For example, once enemy forces, e.g. Saxon
raiders, penetrated the Harz in the area of Germar Mark and bypassed
the forts at Nordhausen, Wallhausen, Tilleda, and Altstedt, they still had
to cross the Helme River. Beyond the river, such a raiding party was
then faced with the need to negotiate two successive and difficult upland
regions, the Windleite and the Hainleite, and a third highland, the
Kyffhuser, which dominated the topography in the area near Tilleda.70
This difficult terrain meant that Saxon raiders would have to wend their
way through the Harz, bypass the Carolingian fortifications of the Germar
Mark, cross the Helme, and penetrate the Windleite or Hainleite or the
Kyffhuser to reach the Frankish settlements to the south.
Saxon raiders, if successful in the offensive phase of their operations,
would be seriously disadvantaged in returning home with any spoils they
may have been able to acquire. Laden with booty, the Saxons would have
to move rather slowly over well-known routes through mountainous areas,
where they would be easy prey to the Frankish troops deployed from the
garrisons of the above-mentioned strongholds. Even if such a party of
Saxon raiders successfully passed through the uplands on their return
home, they still would have to cross the Helme, where the Franks could lay
ambushes at the fords. The type of strategic situation created by the forti
fications of the Germar Mark in combination with the terrain is to be con
sidered a defense in depth.
In addition to protecting the approaches to Frankish settlements east of
the Weser, the Germar Mark also helped to defend the Thuringian road.
68Nitz, Feudal Woodland, pp. 171184.

69Michael Gockel, Nordhausen, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen: Repertorium der
Pfalzen, Knigshfe und brigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im Deutschen Reichs des
Mittelalters, II Thringien (Gttingen, 2000), 319385.
70For additional information regarding Tilleda, see Paul Grimm, Tilleda, eine
Knigspfalz am Kyffhuser, 2 vols., 1, Die Hauptburg (Berlin, 1968).
586 chapter ten
Both Alstedt and Ritterburg were established within sight of this impor
tant commercial artery, which ran from the Rhine some 400 kilometers to
the Elbe. This road, which, as noted above, began at Mainz, crossed the
Main southeast of Frankfurt at Aschaffenburg, then ran north-northeast
through Hammelburg just north of where the Frankish-Saale flows
into the Main. It crossed the Thuringer Wald and continued north and
east in the direction of Erfurt until it reached Ritterburg on the Unstrut
50 kilometers further to the north. Less than a hundred kilometers to
the north the road extended to Magdeburg.71
South of the defended limes that constituted the Germar Mark, there
was another defensive line, based in part on fortifications established at
Mhlhousen on the Unstrut in the north. Mhlhousen had been a densely
populated location at least since the early 6th century under Thuringian
control, and by the mid-8th century was supported for military purposes
by the fortified royal centers of Tutinsode and Schlotheim.72 Further east
and south was the Carolingian fortified palatium at Eschwege on the
Werra, which was supported by the fort at Frieda.73 It may be noticed that
Alstedt, which helped to anchor the northern frontier in the southeast,
also was part of a line of fortifications that extended all the way west to
Eschwege. In this configuration, the protective screen of the Germar Mark
and the royal center at Mhlhousen may be seen as being triangular in
form with Alstedt at the apex. Needless to say, the defended limes from
Alstedt to Eschwege protected the left flank of the Thuringian road from
Saxon raiders who might continue to move south after crossing the Harz
and penetrating the Germar Mark.74
The numerous Frankish settlements, royal fiscal centers, and fortifica
tions located within the Germar Mark and in its environs had been estab
lished largely through Carolingian military operations in the 740s. It is
generally agreed, however, that the fortress at Nordhausen had been
established by ca. 720 and that fortified royal curtes such as Berga and
Wallhausen already were in place to provide support for the military oper
ations executed by Pippin and Carloman during the 740s.75
In short, Frankish soldiers who fought in the southern reaches of the
Saxon territory and those who later garrisoned the fortifications of the
71See Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, pp. 6566, with the literature cited there.
72Gockel, Mhlhousen, pp. 261264.
73Gockel, Mhlhousen, pp. 261264.
74Gockel, Mhlhousen, p. 287.
75Gockel, Nordhausen, pp. 359360.
Germar Mark, parts of which were located only 100 kilometers from the
Elbe, were well-positioned to provide detailed information for mapping
purposes that was of military importance regarding the region in which
they had fought and in which they served. It seems likely that Carolingian
military planners had operated in the region between the Germar Mark,
based largely on the Helme, and the Elbe to the north in the environs of
Magdeburg. The complex integration of fortifications, roads, and fords
may permit the inference that the region had been mapped in some very
useful ways.76
To the east of the Germar Mark in the region centered on Merseburg
and encompassing territory in the area of the Unstrut, Thuringian Saale,
and Elbe rivers, Pippin and then Charlemagne developed another exten
sive system of fortifications. This mark was intended to block Slavic move
ment south and westward toward the valley of the Helme and Frankish
Christian settlements that had been established with people who had
been recruited from further to the west. It also provided a bulwark against
attacks into the Thuringian region. This defensive system, which has been
discovered by archaeologists and discussed largely by archaeologists
there are no written sources concerning these settlements and fortifica
tions for this early periodwas composed of at least nineteen fortresses,
some of which were of considerable size, e.g. Merseburg had a perimeter
defensive wall of more than 1,500 meters.77 This overall defensive com
mand, or at least a part of it, likely was the responsibility of Count Isembard
of Thurgau, who is seen to be in office as early as 770.78
This eastern Mark, which dominated the Thuringian Saale, is relevant
to Charlemagnes strategic thinking regarding the pacification and inte
gration of the Saxon territory insofar as the eastern and southeastern flank
of the extended regnum Francorum could be considered as fundamentally
secure by the Carolingian military planners of the Magistratus. In addi
tion, these fortifications and settlements indicate the capability of the
76Concerning the development of localized verbal maps in German-speaking areas

which came to be written down during the later 8th century, see Bachrach, Charlemagne
and the General Staff, pp. 328338.
77The basic work here is Grimm, Die vor- und frhgeschichtlicher Burgwlle, pp. 3944.
Grimms conclusions have been adopted fully by Karlheinz Mascher, Reichsgut und Komitat
am Sdharz im Hochmittelalter (Cologne, 1957), pp. 14, who treats subsequent develop
ments in the Ottonian period; and Gerhard Billig, Die Burgwardorganisation im ober-
sschisch-meissnischen Raum; Archologisch-archivalisch vergleiscende Untersuchungen
(Berlin, 1989), p. 15.
78See Michael Borgolte, Die Grafen Alemanniens in merowingischer und karolingischer
Zeit: Eine Prosopographie (Sigmaringen, 1986), pp. 150156.
588 chapter ten
Carolingian government to maintain, to mobilize, and to invest consider

able material and human resources in order to construct and garrison
these fortifications. It is important to our understanding of Carolingian
strategic thinking that this complex of at least 19 strongholds was begun
during the joint reign of Pippin and Carloman as Mayors of the Palace in
the 740s, and was continued by the former after having become king in 751.
All of the fortifications were fully in place by ca 780 at the latest.79
In addition, before the mid-8th century, there was sufficient excess
Christian population living west of the Rhine to maintain a policy of set
tlement in the east. These settlers were able to produce crops and to
defend this highly developed Mark on the Slavic frontier.80 Using the
Anglo-Saxon formula embedded in the Burghal Hidage regarding the
provision of garrison troops for the 30 strongholds defended by Alfred
the Great, it can be estimated that the 19 fortresses constructed on the
Thuringian Saale and in its environs required a minimum of approxi
mately 9,000 effectives.81 It is also important to reiterate that this exten
sive investment of human and material resources as well as the movement
eastward of thousands of settlers was not recorded in the various contem
porary and near-contemporary chronicles and annals. This must give
pause to those scholars who neglect the archaeological record.
Undoubtedly, the geography and the topography of the eastern region
of the Carolingian frontier on the Thuringian Saale was well-understood.
Further to the west, it is likely, as well, that the geography and the topogra
phy of the region between the Helme and the Elbe was well-known to the
Carolingians as a result of a generation or more of military operations
and settlement. By contrast, the more northerly routes into the valley
of the Weser and eastward would appear to have been less well-known.
Carolingian campaigns under Charlemagne and his predecessors had not
penetrated as far east into Saxon territory along what may be considered
the central route from the Rhine to the Elbe, as had been the case in the
79Grimm, Die vor- und frhgeschichtelicher Burgwlle, p. 38. Here Grimm follows Walter
Schlesinger, Die Entstehung der Landesherrschaft: Untersuchungen vorwiegend nach mittel-
deutschen Quellen (Dresden, 1941), p. 79. See also Geographus Ravannae, ed. Schnetz, bk IV,
ch. 25.2; and the observations by Billig, Zur Vorlage, pp. 1153.
80Schlesinger, Die Entstehung, p. 79.
81Concerning the figures for the Burghal Hidage and its broadly based applicability for
the defense of fortifications in pre-Crusade Europe, see Bachrach and Aris, Military
Technology, pp. 117; and regarding the defense perimeters of the 18 strongholds thus far
identified as constituting the Saale Mark, see Grimm, Die vor- und frhgeschichtlicher
Burgwlle, p. 44.
south.82 The most important penetration eastward in this area was accom
plished in 775 when Charlemagne personally led a force into Ostphalia at
least as far north and east as the Oker river in the area of Ohrum and
Schningen.83
The Oker, a southern tributary of the Aller, was, in this area, approxi
mately 100 kilometers south of the Elbe at Hohbuoki, where Charlemagne
subsequently saw to the construction of a major fortification as part of
the so-called limes Saxonicum.84 Pippin had operated in this region in 747,
and Charlemagne very likely benefited from the knowledge that the
Carolingians had gained at that time.85 Also, during military operations in
775, Charlemagnes forces campaigned in the most westerly district of
Angraria, i.e. Bckegau, in the region of Minden on the Weser.86 Units
from this army also operated on the Weser further to the north in the
region of the Wesergebirge and at Lbbecke about 20 kilometers west-
southwest of Minden in the area of Hockeleve and Medofullio.87
Missionaries
Modern research has established that missionaries, like their counterparts

in the military, tended to establish bases or centers from which they oper
ated in pagan territory.88 In general, such bases were protected both by
defenses and by troops, which were provided either by local magnates or
by the Carolingian rulers. Boniface made clear that without the military
protection provided by the Carolingian Mayors of the Palace, his mission
ary activities would not be possible.89 The close working relationship
82Wells, German Policy, pp. 149150, discusses three basic military routes from the
Rhine to the Elbe. The southern route began at Mainz, the central route began at Vetera
(Carolingian Xanten), and the northern route went by water from the lower Rhine through
the Ijselmeer to the North Sea and the estuary of the Elbe.
83For Charlemagnes deployments, see ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775. Charlemagne may
well have benefited from the operations undertaken in this region by his father. See ARF,
an. 747; AE, an. 747; and the discussion by Halphen, La conqute, pp. 149150.
84See ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775. For a fuller discussion of these limes, see Hardt,
The limes Saxoniae, pp. 3436.
85ARF, an. 747; and AE, an. 747. See Halphen, La conqute, pp. 149150.
86For Charlemagnes deployments, see ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775.
87ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775. Cf. the discussion by Brandi, Karls des Grossen
88Sullivan, The Carolingian Missionary, pp. 706709.
89See, for example, the letter from Boniface to Bishop Daniel of York (Epist, no. 63, ed.
Tangl); and for a broader discussion of military support, see Sullivan, The Carolingian
Missionary, pp. 709711.
590 chapter ten
between missionaries and professional soldiers is evident from the earlier

discussion of Abbot Sturms activities. The abbot of Fulda was well-trained
as an explorator and commanded a significant military household of socii,
whom modern scholars rightly consider to have been composed of profes
sional soldiers.
Sturm was acquainted with the methods required to evaluate the ter
rain for various purposes, such as the desirability of one or another par
ticular place where a settlement might safely be developed. As indicated
by his choice of Fulda itself it is clear that he understood the importance
of good transportation opportunities, both by land and water, and that he
regarded it as important to know the location of potentially hostile neigh
bors, such as the pagan Slavs in the region, who also were discussed above.
It is noteworthy that while accepting Sturms recommendation for the
building of the monastery at Fulda, Boniface also had the Fulda area
surveyed (conspectus cunctis loci ilius commodis et utilitatibus immen
sis exploratis). Among those in the large entourage which Boniface
mobilized (congregata hominum multitudine) for his visit to Fulda,
there undoubtedly were men with the military competence to serve as
exploratores.90
As the allusion to Bonifaces efforts in regard to surveying makes clear,
Sturms talents and interests in these technical geographical matters were
not unique among clergy. In addition to his review of the physical geogra
phy at Fulda, Boniface either surveyed personally, or, at the least, had
someone in his entourage carry out a survey, of the lands bordering the
Ijselmeer (litora inspiciendo circuit).91 This effort resulted in the drawing
up of a lengthy list of the districts, each identified by its particular name,
as these areas were separated by specific canals and other waterways.
Finally, Willibald, Bonifaces biographer, who possessed a copy of this doc
ument, makes clear by the terminology that he uses that this list of water
ways and place names constituted some sort of itinerary, or, as he put it,
per ordinem replicentur.92 Moreover, it is likely that considerable work
had been done earlier in regard to mapping this area when Charles Martel
led several combined land and sea operations into the Ijselmeer and along
its coasts.93
90Eigil, V.S. Sturmi., ch. 13 (p. 144).

91Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 463).
92Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 463), makes clear that he had access to this list.
93With regard to these operations, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,
pp. 250252.
Like the soldiers, who had participated in various military operations,

Carolingian missionaries and clerics also had information regarding par
ticular parts of Saxon territory. The best known area was the southern seg
ment of the Saxon region which bordered on Thuringia. Carolingian
military operations in this area, as noted above, saw to the acquisition of
territory east of the Rhine as far as the Helme River and the foothills of the
Harz Mountains. Areas that the army conquered were soon settled with
Christians from the west, who were provided with a full complement of
clerics to provide religious support. In addition, missionaries were sent to
convert the Saxons and even some Slavs who had come west and dwelled
in the region. It is not clear from the exchange of letters between Boniface
and Pope Zacherias whether these Slavs were renting land from the
Church or merely dwelling in the area and paying tribute.94
Missionary work and the subsequent establishment of churches were
carried out in consonance with successful military operations. Along the
frontier between the southern reaches of Saxon territory and Frankish-
ruled Thuringia, Carolingian religious efforts were orchestrated both by
the bishop of Wrzburg, who, as seen above, had established the original
settlement at Fulda, and the bishop of Erfurt, whose people operated in
the area as far east as the Harz Mountains. The Fulda and the Werra rivers
met in the area of Hilwartshausen to form the Weser, and their valleys
were thoroughly settled by the Franks. This region of dense settlement
extended along the Fulda at least as far north as Kassel about 15 kilometers
south-southeast of Hilwartshausen by road but almost twice that distance
along the banks of the sinuous Fulda River itself. Along the lower reaches
of the Werra, about 50 kilometers from Hilwartshausen, was the fortress at
Eschwege, discussed above, and to the east on the upper reaches of the
Unstrut was the major base at Mhlhousen, also discussed above.
Carolingian missionary activities, like Carolingian military operations,
in the northern and the central areas of the region would seem to have
been considerably less well-developed as compared with the southern
segment of Saxon territory. For example, the early efforts of Bishop
Kunibert of Cologne (d. ca. 663) to establish a missionary base at Soest in
the region between the Ruhr and Lippe rivers would seem to have failed.95
By contrast, the work by Lebuin, discussed above, brought him during the
94See the letter, in which answers are given to a list of questions posed by Boniface to
Pope Zacharias (Epist., no. 87, ed. Tangl) regarding Slavs living in Christian territory.
95See Reuter, Saint Boniface, p. 74.
592 chapter ten
later 760s and early 770s as far east as the river Ems and the area where the
urban center and bishopric of Mnster later would be developed. Lebuins
effort extended Carolingian missionary operations in this area a hundred
or so kilometers east of the Rhine but well short of the lower reaches of the
Weser. Further to the south, significant missionary activity east of the
Weser in the central segment of Saxon territory had been in train only
since ca. 772773. Therefore, it may be suggested that missionaries likely
had not acquired very much geographical and topographical information
regarding the area east of the Weser prior to 777.
Merchants
Those merchants who operated in the region between the Rhine and
the Elbe, and even in lands further to the east and north, were posi
tionedto serve as a third source of information to Charlemagne and his
planning staff. The southern frontier between Saxon and Frankish terri
tory was traversed by the important Thuringian road, which was well-
known for its merchant activity (mercandi causa).96 This route went east
from Mainz to the village and later the Fulda priory at Hammelburg
and then northeast, first following the lower course of the Frankish
Saale River and then turning sharply north-northeast across the Werra in
the direction of Erfurt.97 From Erfurt, at this time, at least one major
route led north-northeast across the Unstrut at the royal palatium at
Ritterburg.98
Frankish merchants using this route during the 8th century may have
reached the Elbe another 90 kilometers almost due north of Erfurt at
Magdeburg, where Charlemagne established a major base very early in the
9th century or perhaps even during the later 8th century.99 In this area, the
salt trade was of great importance, and there likely was a production facil
ity at Stassfurt, 30 kilometers south of Magdeburg on the Bode River,
where Charlemagne established a base sometime before 806. There may
96See the discussion by Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 139).

97For modern work, see Grich, Ortesweg, pp. 6888.
98Gockel, Ritterburg, pp. 412413.
99Hardt, Hesse, pp. 229230, provides a brief but very useful summary of work on
Magdeburg. For more detail, see Heike Ppplemann, Im Rhythmus des Elbestromes-Der
Magdeburger Raum vor 805, and Michael Kleinen mit einer Einleitung von Matthias
Springer, Vom Grenzhandelplatz zur StadtMagdeburg zwischen 8051251, both in
Magdeburg. Die Geschichte der Stadt, 8052005, ed. Matthias Puhle and Peter Petsch
(Dssel, 2005), 2940, and 4346, respectively.
have been salt works even at Magdeburg itself.100 The importance of the
salt trade cannot be overestimated at this time. Frankish merchants,
apparently based at Wrzburg, were trading with the densely populated
Slavic settlements on the east bank of the Thuringian Saale River at Halle,
where salt was produced even under the early Carolingians. These Slavic
settlements were established in the 7th century and were only 70 kilome
ters south-southwest of Magdeburg.101
Further to the north, most but not all trade between the Rhine and the
Elbe would seem to have been in the hands of the Frisians, whose activi
ties in the region have been charted in considerable detail.102 It has been
argued persuasively that the Frisian duke Radbod (d. 719) controlled the
coast of the North Sea at least to the mouth of the Weser and that Frisian
authority extended some 25 or so kilometers up the Ems River.103 In fact,
during the course of the 7th and 8th centuries, Frisian settlements, as evi
denced by various excavated cemeteries, were thickly established east
ward along the left bank of the Elbe. Four cemeteries have been identified
in the area of the mouth of the Elbe on the left bank. Another four
cemeteries have been found along the left bank of the river as far south-
southwest as the Ilmenau, which enters the Elbe about 150 kilometers
from the North Sea.104
100It is to be noted that before 806, both Stassfurt and Magdeburg were important
Carolingian bases. Indeed, in 806, Charlemagne had a fortified bridgehead constructed on
the right bank of the Elbe opposite Magdeburg in order to control the river crossing and
project forces eastward without having to be concerned by the danger of a river crossing at
a ford. Concerning the bridgehead, see ARF, an., 806; and for the establishment of a mili
tary base at Stassfurt prior to 806, see CRF., no. 168.
101Matthias Becker, et al., Landschaft im Wandel: Untersuchungen im Gewerbegebiet
und der A 14 bei Halle/Saale-Queis, Germania 82 (2004), 205206. For more detailed infor
mation regarding salt production in the region, a subject in urgent need of continued
research, see Karl Riehm, Vom Solquell zum Solbrunner: Eine topogaphische Studie zur
Grndsgeschichte der Stadt Halle, Jahrsschrift fr mitteldeutsche Vorgeschichte 57 (1973),
107209. How early the Carolingians established a base at Giebichenstein, at the center of
the Halle settlements, remains unsettled. See Johannes Schneider, Zur Stratigraphie der
Oberburg Giebichenstein, Ausgraben und Funde 16 (1971), 3943.
102Stphane Lebecq, Routes of change: production and distribution in the west (5th-
8th century), in The Transformation of the Roman World, ad 400900, ed. Leslie Webster
and Michelle Brown (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1997), 74, fig. 30. However, it should be empha
sized that the corpus of information produced by archaeological work is constantly
growing.
103H. Halbertsma, The Frisian Kingdom, Berichten van de Rijksdienst voor het
Oudheidkundig Bodemonderzoek 1516 (19651966), 74.
104Friedrich Laux, Schsische Grberfelder zwischen Weser, Aller und Elbe. Aussagen
zur Bestattungssitte und religisem Verhalten, Studien zur Sachsenforschung, 12 (1999),
145, Abb. 3 and 151.
594 chapter ten
Cooperative Saxons
A fourth and final potential major source for obtaining human intelligence
by Charlemagne and his advisers to be evaluated in regard to the geo
graphical and demographic situation in the newly conquered territory
were cooperative Saxons and perhaps also some Slavs residing in the
region. Regarding the latter, of special interest likely were Slavs in the
Hannoversches Wendland.105 Attention likely also was given to groups of
Slavs settled further west, who spoke the Frankish dialect, and, who, as
Eigil notes, were willing to provide Sturm with useful geographical infor
mation.106 In addition to these Slavs, who seem not to have been overly
friendly with the Saxons, Frankish intelligence gatherers probably could
expect converts to Christianity to be forthcoming with information,
at least concerning the places where they resided. Also likely to be
helpful were those magnates discussed above, who are recorded as wish
ing not only to convert to Christianity but to give their support to
Charlemagne.107
Prisoners of war and hostages probably constituted a third group of
Saxons who might be helpful. We may think of the Ostphalians, either
those captured by Charlemagne or handed over by Hessi as hostages in
775. In fact, Hessi swore faithfulness (fidelitas) to Charlemagne, which
required him to do what the king had commanded and, thus, he could
hardly have refused to provide information when interrogated.108 Similarly,
Bruno, who operated in the area of Minden and also swore to be faithful to
Charlemagne, likely was not in a position to avoid providing information
when questioned by royal officials.109 Whether Bruno and Hessi are to be
considered among those Saxon magnates who sought accommodation
with Charlemagne is not clear. If they were not, they may well have pro
vided inaccurate or false information when questioned.
The sources, when they discuss hostages and prisoners, do not discuss
the matter of torture. However, there is a substantial likelihood that the
Carolingians, like the Merovingians, and, indeed, the Romans, used tor
ture when seeking information from prisoners who were not otherwise
105Hardt, The Limes Saxoniae, pp. 3738.

106See, for example, Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 7 (p. 139).
107Goldberg, Popular Revolt, p. 476, concludes that by 785, Charlemagne would seem
to have won over the majority of the Saxon edhilingui (aristocracy) to accepting Christianity
and Carolingian lordship.
108AE, an., 775.
109ARF, an., 775; and AE, an. 775.
forthcoming in regard to providing useful information. It was well-under

stood that torture generally could convince those suffering great pain to
provide accurate information, especially about local matters that could
easily be checked in the short term. If, by some chance, the Carolingians
had scruples regarding torture, and there is no basis for such an argument,
these likely were limited to the treatment of Christians and surely did not
apply to pagans.110
Intelligence Acquisition
The identification above of the four basic sources for the acquisition of
human intelligence by Charlemagne is not simply an exercise in identify
ing possible sources of information. Charlemagne, as his contemporaries
make clear, was committed to debriefing or having debriefed as many
sources of human intelligence as possible on a regular basis. This is made
clear by Charlemagnes cousin, Adalhard of Corbie, who devoted an entire
chapter of De ordine palatii to the efforts of the royal court to obtain intel
ligence for military purposes.111 He emphasizes that the king gave orders
that each person who was summoned to attend the royal court for what
ever purpose was to bring with him all of the information that he could
gather. Adalhard emphasizes that the king was concerned that this effort
at intelligence gathering was to be maintained in a most conscientious
manner, i.e. studiosissime. Each man who was coming to court was to
garner information from the region in which he lived and, in the present
context, it is important that Charlemagne indicated that information also
was to be gathered from beyond the frontiers.112
The king further emphasized in these orders, which are summarized by
Adalhard, that all avenues for the acquisition of information were to be
accessed. The king commanded that the men who came to court were to
use their own people as sources, but also that they were to try to secure
information from strangers. Adalhard goes on to note that friends as well
as enemies were, as we would say today, to be debriefed. Attempts to get
110Edward Peters, Torture (Oxford, 1985), devotes several interesting pages (3639) to
torture in the early Middle Ages but does not deal with matters of military intelligence dur
ing this period. Whether the putative limitations on torturing free men that may have
existed in early medieval Europe were enforced is not at issue. Rather, forfeited hostages
hardly can be considered to have had any rights at all. For a general treatment of Carolingian
hostages, see Kosto, Hostages, pp. 123147.
111Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. 36 (lines 619634).
112Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. 36 (lines 619634).
596 chapter ten
information from enemies would seem to permit the inference that coer
cion was not to be eschewed, although Adalhard makes no specific men
tion of torture. In a departure from the traditional view that information
provided by slaves was not to be given much importance, Adalhard notes
that for Charlemagne the status of a person who was to be interrogated
was not to be a restriction on the search for information.113
Adalhard emphasizes that the rulers under whom he served, i.e.
Pippin I and Charlemagne, were exceptionally eager to obtain informa
tion. Indeed, the latter is depicted as personally debriefing, i.e. undertak
ing an interrogatio, of everyone who came to court. Each of these men was
questioned systematically in regard to what was happening in the region
from which he had come and concerning whatever other intelligence he
might have obtained that could be of value to the government. Adalhard
gives special attention to the effort by the king to ascertain whether these
visitors to the royal court were in possession of any information that was
worthy of consideration, or what might be called military intelligence.114
This type of restless energy and a fundamental spirit of practically ori
ented inquisitiveness are clearly two of the several positive dispositions of
character and behavior attributed to Charlemagne by his closest confi
dants, i.e. men such as Einhard and Alcuin. These attributes are reaffirmed
in rich detail by numerous contemporary anecdotes that later in the 9th
century were collected by Notker at his monastery of St. Gall. Heinrich
Fichtenaus defense of the value as historical evidence of the anecdotes
collected by Notker regarding Charlemagne is highly persuasive because
these stories, he shows, are fully consistent in spirit and tone with the
information that is provided by other more contemporary sources.115
Technical Intelligence
The use of the modern term technical intelligence to treat information

that was available to the Carolingians from sources other than live human
intelligence may be somewhat controversial. Modern specialists are
113De ordine palatii, ch. 36 (lines 621626).

114Adalhard, De ordine palatii, ch. 36 (lines 619634). The suggestion by McKitterick,
The Frankish Kingdoms, p. 79, regarding the portrayal of government in De ordine palatii as
idealized misses the point. A handbook, by its very nature, is an attempt to present vari
ous operations in a correct manner so that those who follow its prescriptions will be
successful.
115Of the many attempts to sketch the personality of Charlemagne, that by Fichtenau,
The Carolingian Empire, pp. 2546, is the most complete.
fixated on various types of machines and electronic devices. However, that

being said, the sources of technical intelligence that are to be discussed in
the present context are of two basic types. First, there are the many
written sources, such as Latin historical and geographical texts, to which
the Carolingian court had access. These, of course, are the historiae and
the res gestae antiquorum that Einhard made clear were read aloud to
Charlemagne and his advisers.116 As an adjunct to the Latin histories,
which as Alcuin noted were fundamental, some attention probably should
be given to the now lost barbara et antiquissima carmina.117 These are
presumed to have been poetical works in the Germanic language, which
Charlemagne ordered to be collected so that copies could be written down
to be kept at the court for consultation.118 Even epic poems crafted for
entertainment purposes are known, on occasion, to have contained some
accurate information.
Secondly, there were the material remains of Roman infrastructural
components. These included fortifications, roads, bridges, and canals,
which either survived in more or less usable condition or were identifiable
from their ruins. The ability of the Carolingians, like their Merovingian
predecessors, not only to recognize but to utilize Roman infrastructural
components is made clear by the several examples discussed above,
e.g. the continued use of the Vecht canal, which connected the Rhine with
the North Sea, and the lighthouse at Boulogne. Monuments such as these,
and particularly milestones, often provided information of geographical
116VK, ch. 24. N.b. as Halphen makes clear in his edition, p. 72, n. 1, this recognition of
the importance of the study of history is not found in Suetonius biography of Augustus.
117Alcuin, Epist. no. 149, ed. Dmmler.
118Einhard, VK, ch. 29. One may wonder whether there were two types of carmina at
issue, the supposed vernacular texts and those that were exceptionally old. In any case,
Charlemagnes order that these carmina were to be written down not only emphasizes the
fundamental role played by writing at the Carolingian court, but also permits the inference
that the reading of these texts was thought to have more than entertainment value by the
king and his advisers. Having these texts written down may be considered part of a
Carolingian historical habit. To put a finer point on this matter, Charlemagne did not seek
to maintain at his court men who performed these songs and no mention is made of
jongulars either singing or reciting these vernacular carmina as being an important part
of court entertainment. By contrast, Charlemagne did maintain at court a cadre of poets,
many of whom were key administrators and advisers, who produced high-quality Latin
texts. Concerning oral culture with regard to the barbarian carmina, see the romantic
observations by Michael Richter, The Oral Tradition in the Early Middle Ages (Turnhout,
1994). With regard to the Latin poetry, see two works by Peter Godman, Poetry of the
Carolingian Renaissance London, 1985); and Poets and Emperors: Frankish Politics and
Carolingian Poetry (Oxford, 1987).
598 chapter ten
importance, especially when understood in light of the available written

sources and contemporary human intelligence.119
Missing Material Sources
It must be made clear, however, that Charlemagne likely had access to

far more information about the topography and geography of the Saxon
region from technical sources than now is available to us. Some material
sources, which, for example, were above ground in the 8th century,
e.g. Roman marching camps, are no longer visible on the surface. During
the past 1,200 years, many of these manmade features of military topogra
phy in the countryside have been eroded, and others have been flooded by
changes in the course of one or another river as well as by the changing
configurations of the sea coast. Still other artifacts have been plowed over
until they can no longer be recognized even through the use of aerial pho
tography.120 Roman artifacts known during the early Middle Ages that
have been covered over still await the archaeologists spade. The discovery
and excavation of the elaborate constructions at Kalkreis, where after
almost 2,000 years, archaeologists finally have identified the battlefield
where Varus legions were slaughtered, should give all scholars hope that
much more information which still was visible in the 8th and 9th centu
ries is still to be found.121
Missing Written Sources
While it is likely that more Roman artifacts remain to be discovered in the

region between the Weser and the Elbe than have been uncovered thus
far, it is unlikely that many lost Roman written sources, some of which
are known to have been available during the early Middle Ages, will be
found. In general, the manuscripts of the Latin historical and geographical
sources that provide information regarding the Romans in Germania are
incomplete.122 However, some manuscripts were less incomplete during
119With regard to milestones, see, for example, Bachrach, Carolingian Military

Operations, pp. 1529.
120Wells, The Battle, pp. 4651, explains how both natural occurrences and modern
intervention obscured the field of battle at Kalkriese, which had been the object of both
professional and amateur searches for more than two centuries.
121Wells, The Battle, pp. 4355, provides a useful summary.
122See Joachim Herrmann, Griechische und Lateinische Quellen zur Frgeschichte
Mitteleuropas bis zur Mitte des 1. Jahrtausends u.z., 4 vols. (Berlin, 19881991), passim.
the early Middle Ages. It is important, for example, that today only 37 of
the 142 books of Livys Roman History, written during the reign of Augustus,
survive.123 However, the early medieval Christian historian Orosius pos
sessed a copy of Livys History that was far more complete than that which
we possess today, and, in addition, he makes explicit reference to no lon
ger extant parts of this work.124 In addition, scholars have found it possible
to identify parts of Livys work regarding the German region in Orosius
text, where the latter does not call attention to his reliance on the Roman
writer but clearly used his History.125
In addition to Latin works that were available to the Carolingians, but
which are less complete today than they were during the early Middle
Ages, there are sources which are no longer extant but which may have
been available in one or another form to Charlemagne and his advisers.
One such very important source is the Bella Germaniae, in 20 books, writ
ten by Pliny the Elder, who did military service on the Rhine frontier and
died in 79 ad.126 The fate of these 20 books or any part of them during the
early Middle Ages is, as yet, unknown. It should be emphasized that Plinys
work, in general, was very highly regarded at Charlemagnes court. His
major study, The Natural History, which provides substantial amounts of
geographical information, was available at the Carolingian court to
Charlemagne and his advisers.127 If, in fact, the German Wars or even some
parts of this text were still extant during the 8th century, we should expect
that Charlemagne would have sought to have had a copy, while the abbots
and bishops whom he appointed to serve throughout the realm would
have been eager to provide him with the text if they knew it.
The Roman Map of Saxon Territory
With regard to the mapping of the Saxon territory by the Carolingians, it is

noteworthy that the Roman military had identified three basic routes from
123L.D. Reynolds, Livy, in Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L.D.
Reynolds (Oxford, 1983), 205214.
124See, for example, Orosius, Hist., bk. I, ch. 10; bk. 4, ch. 20; bk. V. ch. 3 (twice), 20; bk.
VII, chs. 3, 9, 10, 19, 29, 34, where the author calls attention to information provided by
Tacitus that is extant in none of the latters surviving manuscripts.
125Orosius, Hist., bk. 6, ch. 21, lines 1216. Cf. Florus, Epitome, bk. 2, ch. 30, lines 2128.
126See regarding this text, Nicholas Purcell, Pliny the Elder, in The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, 3rd ed., ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford, 1999),
11971198.
127L.D. Reynolds, The Elder Pliny, in Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin
Classics, ed. L.D. Reynolds (Oxford, 1983), pp. 309310.
600 chapter ten
the Rhineland to the Elbe. The Carolingians also identified these same cor
ridors eastward, likely from a combination of human intelligence, written
sources, and material remains. Two of these routes, the southern which
began at Mainz and the central which began at Vetera (Xanten), were
land-based and led in the direction of Kassel on the Fulda River, Minden
on the Weser, and then to Magdeburg on the Elbe.128 The third eastward
conduit was largely a water route, which originally had its Rhine base at
Fectio (Vechten). Later, the main base was moved a few kilometers south
ward to what was to become the fortress city of Utrecht. This route led
from the Rhine through the fossa Drusiana (the Vecht canal) and the
Ijselmeer into the North Sea and finally to the estuaries of the Ems, Weser,
and the Elbe.129
As will be discussed below, Charlemagne and his advisers also were able
to identify these routes and to use them. Charlemagnes commanders and
the king himself very likely were familiar with the primary characteristics
of Roman military topography and certainly could identify numerous
imperial fortifications of various types depending upon their state of pres
ervation. In his well-known De re Militari, Vegetius very clearly described
the structure and dimensions of various types of Roman fortifications.
These included both temporary castra constructed as marching camps
and also more permanent strongholds. Within these categories, noted
above, Vegetius further explained the purposes for which each type and
subtype was used by the Roman army.130
In the Rhineland, following the dissolution of imperial power in Gaul
during the later 5th century, many of these strongholds continued in use.
It is important that the Ravenna Geographer, whose work had been pro
duced in the archiepiscopal library, provided two useful itineraries of the
Rhineland. These were based on the text of the so-called Ostrogothic geog
rapher, Athanarid, which also was available at Ravenna. One of these itin
eraries provided a guide, which listed 20 fortifications in order northward
along the Rhine road from the fortress city of Mainz to the base at Vechten.
The second provided an itinerary from Worms southward into the Alps
and included both major fortress cities such as Speyer and Strasbourg as
128See the brief outline by Wells, German Policy, pp. 149151; and the useful account by
Wolfgang Schwarz, Rmische Kaiserzeit, in Ur-und Frgeschichte in Niedersachsen, ed.
Hans-Jrgen Hssler (Stuttgart, 1991), 238284, with particular attention to the map (abb.
122, p. 239).
129See, Wells, German Policy, pp. 111116.
130DRM, bk.I, chs. 2125.
well as minor centers such as Breganz.131 In regard to Charlemagnes

understanding of the role played by these fortifications during the
later empire, it is appropriate to cite the judgment of Matthias Hardt,
based upon extensive archaeological investigation of the Limes Saxoniae:
It seems clear that Charlemagne planned to give his imperium a
border-line modeled on the Late Antique limes along the Rhine and
Danube.132
The Southern Route
As noted above, the Carolingian southern route, eastward along the fron
tier between Saxon territory and Thuringia, began, like its Roman fore
bear, at Mainz. It utilized the Thuringian Road, saw major advance bases
established at Wrzburg and Erfurt, and was protected by the in-depth
distribution of strongholds that constituted the Germar Mark along with
its ancillary fortifications. The Romans had constructed military bases
throughout the region east and northeast of Mainz. Some of the strong
points that modern scholars have identified were constructed along the
lower Main and others followed the Wetter, a northern tributary of the
Main.133
This complex of roads and strongholds permitted Roman troops to
move easily into the Wetterau region, which, as seen above, played a
key role in the Saxon march toward Frankfurt and also in regard to Abbot
Sturms defense of the area. Among the numerous Roman military
bases in the area, e.g. Bad Nauheim, Friedberg, Frankfurt, Heddernheim,
Hochst-am-Main, Praunheim, Rdgen, and Wiesbaden, several saw the
establishment nearby of considerable civil settlements or canabae.134 It is
of interest that during the later Roman Empire as well as in both the
Merovingian and Carolingians periods, fortifications, royal palatii, villa
centers, and churches were established at many of these same places. The
most famous of these, of course, is Frankfurt.135
131Geographus Ravannae, ed. Schnetz, bk. IV, ch. 24.2 (p. 60), ch. 26.3 (p. 61).
132Hardt, Hesse, pp. 229230, calls attention to excavations done in the wake of the
Second World War. However, much remains to be examined.
134Concerning material evidence in the area, see the summary by Wells, German Policy
p. 153.
135For Frankfurt, see Elsbet Orth, Frankfurt, in Die deutschen Knigspfalzen:
Repertorium der Pfalzen, Knigshfe und brigen Aufenthaltsorte der Knige im deutschen
Reichs des Mittelalters, I Hessen (Gttingen, 1985), 144150.
602 chapter ten
The Central Route
The central route began at Roman Vetera, Carolingian Xanten, on the

left bank of the Rhine at its confluence with the Lippe. This route had
been much more thoroughly developed by the Romans for penetration
eastward to the Elbe than had been the southern route. On the east bank
of the Rhine, just opposite the major base at Vetera, the Romans built a
second or forward base at Bislich, Carolingian Lippenham, on the Lippe
River in order to facilitate the transport of men and matriel eastward.
From Bislich a lengthy series of major and minor bases, ports, and depots
followed the course of the Lippe eastward toward its source at Lippespringe.
Among these fortified sites and civilian settlements, four stand out for
their size and complexity. These are located along the banks of the Lippe
at Holsterhausen, Haltern, Oberaden, and Anreppen.136 The Carolingian
civitas at Paderborn, discussed above, was constructed only a few kilo
meters from the Roman military base at Anreppen and, in addition,
Charlemagne constructed a fortified palatium in the environs of Haltern.137
From a military base at either Anreppen or Paderborn, it was only a
long days march of some 30 kilometers south-southwest to the foothills of
the Teutoburger range. A march of another 50 kilometers to the northeast
would bring such a force to Minden, where, as seen above, Charlemagne
had operated with considerable knowledge of the area in 775. It is of inter
est here, as well, that in his Annales, which were to be found in the library
of Fulda, Tacitus provides potentially useful information regarding both
Roman military construction and topography in the area of Minden. In
A.D. 16, as Tacitus tells the story, Germanicus after establishing his fortified
encampment, or castra, on the left bank of the Weser, sent his exploratores
to identify a ford where the armys mounted troops later would cross the
river. He also sent his scouts to identify a location where a bridge would be
constructed so that the Roman foot soldiers could cross the river dry
shod.138
136For an examination of these fortifications and settlements, see Wells, German Policy,
pp. 161222; and with more recent results, see S. von Schnurben, Untersuchungen zur
Geschichte der rmischen Militranlagen an der Lippe, Bericht der Rmisch-Germanischen
Kommission, 62 (1981), 5101.
137Hans-Werner Peine, Befestigte Hfe und Wallburgen im Mnsterland-Knigtum
und Adel im 9. bis 11. Jarhundert, in 805: Liudger wird Bischof: Spuren eines Heilligen
zwischen York, Rom und Mnster, ed. Gabrielle Isenberg and Barbara Romm (Mainz,
2005), 4554, here 5152.
138Annales, bk. 2, ch. 14. The basic study of Germanicus campaign remains
E. Koestermann, Die Feldzge des Germanicus 1416 n. Chr., Historia, VI (1957), 429479.
According to Tacitus, Germanicus forces crossed to the east bank of the

Weser and successfully engaged the enemy on the plain of Idistatvisus.
Tacitus goes on to describe in considerable detail the topography of the
area surrounding the plain where the battle was fought. He references the
winding course of the river in this area, the flat land where the battle was
fought, which had to accommodate the maneuvers of at least 30,000 men,
and the surrounding hills, some of which were forested and others which
were bare.139 This topographical information, certainly when combined
with the identification of the remains of the large Roman castra capable of
providing protection for several legions, built by Germanicus men and
perhaps the ruins of a bridge all in the neighborhood of a ford, could be
useful to Carolingian exploratores.
Charlemagne subsequently established his base at Minden sometime
before 806, and frequently used it as a key locality from which to cross the
Weser.140 Thus, the question may be asked whether he made a decision to
establish a base at Minden that was totally independent of information
that was to be found in his Roman written and material sources. Or is it
more likely, that, at least in part, he thought Minden was a good place for
a base because of his knowledge and appreciation of Roman generalship
with regard to the identification of strategically located sites? Future
archaeological studies may perhaps result in the identification of relevant
Roman ruins at Minden, which later were to serve one or another military
purpose for Charlemagne.
It is noteworthy that the Roman general Drusus (d. 9 b.c.) is reported to
have constructed permanent fortifications (praesidia), as contrasted
to marching camps (castra), on the banks of at least two rivers east of
the Rhine, i.e. the Weser and the Elbe. Drusus is also credited with having
provided these strongholds with garrisons (custodes).141 As noted above,
the focus of both Roman land routes to the east, the southern and central,
were seriatim Kassel, Minden, and Magdeburg. Thus, archaeologists
139Annales, bk. 2, ch. 16.

140See, for example, Wolfgang Bockhorst, Rehme 753785, in Rehme: 1250 Jahre Orts-
und Heimatgeschichte eines Minden-Ravensberger Dorfes, ed. Andreas Huneke and Rico
Quaschny, 2nd ed. (Bielefeld, 2003), 4451.
141Florus, Epitome, bk. II, ch. 30, discusses these fortifications. Actually, Florus names
three rivers, the third being the Meuse. Some scholars, however, believe that Florus con
fused the latter with the Ems. See the discussion by Wells, German Policy, p. 97, n. 1. Cf.
Hermann, Griechische und Lateinische Quellen, 3:540, who believes that Florus was con
fused and provided information that is anachronistic. However, Hermann does not directly
examine the matter of permanent fortifications and garrisons on the Weser and Elbe.
604 chapter ten
interested in identifying Drusus praesidia may perhaps find, as a result of

future excavations, that key Roman military bases were built on the Weser
at Minden and on the Elbe at Magdeburg. We already know that the Franks
developed Kassel, Minden, and Magdeburg into important bases and ulti
mately into major centers of population, commerce, and industry.142
Information regarding Drusus fortifications on the Weser and the Elbe
is provided by Lucius Annaeus Florus in his Epitome. This was a brief his
tory of Romes wars over a 700-year period, and was available at the royal
monastery of Lorsch.143 In January of 777, Abbot Gundelandus of Lorsch
was summoned to attend Charlemagnes court at Herstal at just the time
that the Saxon region was being mapped.144 In light of the interest shown
by Charlemagne and his advisers in ancient histories, the possibility can
not be ruled out that Gundelandus brought the Epitome with him to the
court. It may even be suggested that Gundelandus, like so many of the
high-ranking Carolingian ecclesiastics discussed above, may even have
participated in the planning that was to undergird the integration of the
Saxon territory into the regnum Francorum.
Also of potential value to Charlemagnes planners in regard to the cen
tral route was the Historia written by the high ranking Roman officer
Velleius Paterculus ca. a.d. 30. Like Florus, Velleius also makes clear that
the Romans built military roads east of the Weser. In addition, he takes
note of the ability of a Roman army, including cavalry units, to maintain a
winter encampment at the headwaters of the Lippe.145 Charlemagne
would later find it useful to establish a winter encampment even further to
the east on the Weser as an element of his campaign strategy against some
rebellious Saxons.146 The availability of Velleius Historia to Charlemagne
and his Magistratus is evident from the fact that a ms. was housed in
the library of the closely controlled royal monastery of Murbach.147
142With regard to roads, see the interesting work by Bahn, Frhe Verkehrslinien,
pp. 231250, which deals with an area further to the south.
143For the manuscript history of Florus work, see P.K. Marshall, Florus, in Texts and
Transmission, pp. 164166.
144DK., nos. 113, 114.
145Historia, bk II, chs. 104, 106, 120, 121.
146ARF, an. 797.
147For the ms. of the Historia at Murbach, see Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative
(2.94131), edited with an introduction and commentary by A.J. Woodman (Cambridge,
1977), p. 3; and cf. Reynolds, Velleius Paterculus, pp. 431433. For the close control of
Murbach by the Carolingians since the time of Charles Martel, see Ingrid Heidrich, Die
urkundliche Grundausstattung der elsssischen Klster St. Gallens und der Reichenau in
der ersten Hlfte des 8 Jahrhunderts, in Die Grndungsurkunden der Reichenau, Vortrge
und Forschungen 24, ed. Peter Classen (Sigmaringen, 1977), 40, 6162.
Successive abbots of Murbach, Haribertus and Amicus, are documented

as having visited with the king at Blanzy in January 772 and at Quierzy in
April 775, respectively.148
The Northern Route
The third and final route, i.e. the northern route, established by the
Romans began with the development of a military base on the lower Rhine
at Fectio (Vechten). In consonance with the construction of this base,
Drusus built a canal, the fossa Drusiana, which followed the course of the
river Vecht from the Rhine into the Ijselmeer. This route provided easy and
shielded access to the North Sea coast, which eventually provided access
to the estuaries of the Ems, Weser, and Elbe rivers.149 During the 3rd cen
tury, the Roman fort at Utrecht replaced Fectio as the northern Rhineland
base for administration and use of the canal.150 Utrecht, which grew into a
flourishing commercial town and monastic center during the later
Merovingian era, became even more important under the Carolingians.151
The Vecht canal, which was kept in operation for centuries following
the dissolution of Roman imperial authority in Gaul, provides an excellent
example of how the combination of material and written information, i.e.
technical intelligence as contrasted to contemporary human intelligence,
was utilized during the early Middle Ages in general and by the Carolingians
in particular. First, as the history of the Vecht canal makes clear, important
knowledge of hydraulic engineering was maintained from the later Roman
Empire through the early Middle Ages and beyond. The work done by
Charlemagnes engineers in their efforts to construct a Rhine-Main-
Danube canal also demonstrates this continued access to Roman hydro
logical engineering techniques.152 In addition, numerous Roman written
148Regarding the abbots visits with Charlemagne, see DK., nos. 64, 95.
149Wells, German Policy, pp. 101116.
150A.E. van Giffen, Three Roman Frontier Forts in Holland at Utrecht, Valkenburg and
Vechten, in The Congress of Roman Frontier Studies 1949, ed. Eric Birley (Durham, 1952),
3140; and Marjo Montforts, The Beginnings of Utrecht: Roman Fort and Vicus, in Utrecht,
Britain and the Continent: Archaeology, Art and Architecture, ed. Elisabeth de Bive
(Londons, 1996), 111.
151See, for example, Huib L. de Groot, Utrecht and Dorestad: Fifteen Miles apart, a
world of difference, in Utrecht, Britain and the Continent: Archaeology, Art and Architecture,
ed. Elisabeth de Bive (London, 1996), 1121; and Johana Maria van Winter, The First
Centuries of the episcopal see at Utrecht, in Utrecht, Britain and the Continent: Archaeology,
Art and Architecture, ed. Elisabeth de Bive (London, 1996), 2229.
152Hofmann, Fossa Carolina, pp. 437453.
606 chapter ten
sources available to Charlemagne and his advisers not only mention the
fossa Drusiania and discuss its strategic significance, but describe how
various Roman generals undertook naval operations from the Rhine to the
estuaries of the Ems, Weser, and Elbe.153
Much useful information was provided regarding the use of the north
ern corridor by the Roman officer and historian Velleius Paterculus, men
tioned above. He describes a complicated and well-planned combined
land and sea operation undertaken in a.d. 4 by Tiberius, the future
emperor.154 This campaign, according to Velleius account, had two inter
connected purposes. First, it was the aim of Tiberius operation to demon
strate Romes thorough control of Germania, i.e. the region between the
Rhine and the Elbe, preparatory to the installation of a civilian governor
by Augustus. The warrant of this governor, Varus, would be to establish a
civil administrative system in the conquered region. Tiberius, therefore,
sought maximum exposure for the army, and marched some 400 Roman
miles, about 600 kilometers, diagonally across the region from the naval
base at Vetera on the Rhine to the banks of the Elbe at its confluence with
the Ultava. There, a meeting was effected with the fleet that had sailed
down the Rhine, through the fossa Drusiana across the Ijselmeer, along
the North Sea coast, and ultimately up the Elbe River to the environs of the
Bohemian frontier. The second purpose of this joint operation was to test
the capacity of the Roman military to move substantial numbers of men
and large quantities of matriel by ship from the region of the lower Rhine
to the frontier of Bohemia, where Tiberius planned to undertake a major
military operation in the near future.155
From Velleius account and others, which detailed Roman naval opera
tions initiated from the lower Rhine at Fectio, the Carolingians could
understand how the movement of large numbers of men and substantial
quantities of supplies by water through the Vecht canal and the Ijselmeer
153Wells, German Policy, pp. 111116.

154Historia, bk. II, ch. 106.
155Historia, bk. II, ch. 106, and cf. Wells, German Policy, pp. 159160. It is enlightening
that C.R. Whittaker, Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire (London, 2004), p. 81,
in his efforts to downgrade Roman geographical knowledge claims Velleius gives the dis
tance between the Rhine and the Elbe as four hundred miles, when it should be about two
hundred and fifty. Whittakers estimate, of course, is the shortest distance between the two
rivers, while the distance between the two points in ultimate distance is more than 800
Roman miles. The problem here, of course, is that Whittaker fundamentally ignores the
context in which Velleius is recording distance. By contrast, Ronald Syme, Military geogra
phy at Rome, Classical Antiquity, 7 (1988), 242, who does not neglect context, sees Velleius
observation as evidence for accurate military intelligence.
to the North Sea and the rivers of Saxon territory was strategically useful
and technically feasible.156 In addition, Pliny, whose Natural History was
available in Charlemagnes library, described the terrain along the North
Sea coast.157 It is hardly surprising that Charlemagne understood the
importance of the northern route and pursued a strategy of strengthening
the Carolingian military position in the Ijselmeer. Charlemagnes planners
had available to them a historical rationale to support the strategy of oper
ating along the North Sea coast. Earlier, this strategy had been developed
by the Frisians under Duke Radbod (d. 719). Later, it had been taken over
by Charles Martel, and was developed further by King Pippin.158
As seen above, Boniface used the Vecht canal to speed his journey
northward into the Ijselmeer, and following his death, his body was
brought back to the Rhineland through the canal with a significant stop at
Utrecht before going on to Mainz, where his last campaign into the Frisian
region had begun.159 The treasure, discussed below, that Liudger captured
from the Frisians, also was shipped from the northeastern coast of
the Ijselmeer to Utrecht through the canal. Finally, it may be noted that
within a decade or so of the meeting at Paderborn in 777, if not earlier,
Charlemagne utilized the northern water route and deployed troops by
ship into the valley of the Elbe, well east of the Ems, as part of a pincer
movement, which recalls Tiberius earlier effort.160
Frisia played an important role in the development of the northern
route. Initially, it is to be emphasized that during the later 8th century,
Frisia was one of the most densely populated regions of the regnum
Francorum and also was flourishing economically.161 Two centers of devel
opment in Frisia, Medemblik and Dokkum, not surprisingly were of con
siderable military importance to Charlemagnes control of the Ijselmeer.
These two settlements considerably eased access to the North Sea coast
156Wells, German Policy, pp. 101116, provides a guide to the sources regarding the use of
the northern route.
157Hist. Nat., bk. IV, ch. 4.
158See J.C. Besteman, Carolingian Medemblik, Berichten von de Rijksdienst voor het
Oudheidkundig Bodemonderzoek, 24 (1974), 43106, here, 4649.
159Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (pp. 467469).
160Regarding operations on the Elbe, see, for example, ARF, ann., 780, 783, 784, and in
789 specific mention made of naval operations for a pincer movement. Some additional
insight is to be gained from Ernst Nickel, Magdeburg in karolingisch-ottonischer Zeit,
Zeitschrift fr archologie, 7 (1973), 104107.
161For an exceptionally important synthesis in this regard, see H. Slicher van Bath, The
Economic and Social Conditions in the Frisian Districts from 900 to 1500, A.A.G. Bijdragen,
13 (1965), 97133, here 97105.
608 chapter ten
and Saxon territory. By the late 7th century, Medemblik, like Durstede to
the south, had developed into an emporium. Also established there was a
ducal villa belonging to Radbod, which served both as a palatium and the
caput of an important fiscal enterprise. These installations had been taken
over by the Carolingians under Charles Martel, and were improved by his
son Pippin.162
Dokkum, the second important Carolingian center in northeastern
Frisia, served as Bonifaces base. Sometime before 754, Boniface had con
verted numerous Frisians in the region to Christianity, and these converts
were securely integrated into the traditional Carolingian military organi
zation. This is obvious from the response made to the murder of Boniface
and some 50 of his companions by pagans from the more northeasterly
part of Frisia, i.e. in the area of Gronigen. Information regarding the
murder is reported to have been disseminated throughout the pagi and
vici of the entire Frisian provincia, and, in response, a maxima exercitus
was mobilized (congregantes) for an expeditio to retaliate against the
pagans.163
This formidable militia levy of fighting men, characterized by Willibald,
perhaps somewhat romantically, as a force composed of bellatores, crossed
into the territory of the pagans. It was necessary for ships to have been
commandeered in order to transport this force into enemy territory, since
the men who had raided Bonifaces camp and killed the missionary leader
had found it necessary to invade Christian territory in the Dokkum area by
ship.164 The pagans initially sought to stop the invaders but were greatly
outnumbered. As a result, they were unable to oppose the Carolingian
expeditionary force effectively in the field. Shortly after the battle began,
the pagans are reported to have fled, and as was usual in such cases, those
fleeing suffered extensive casualties (magna clade corruerunt). Following
the victory, the pagans villages were looted and not only were their male
and female slaves (servi and ancilliae) carried off as booty, but so too
were their wives (uxores) and children (filii). The failure of the source to
mention the fate of the pagan fighting men, i.e. apparently they were not
162H. Halbertsma, The Frisian Kingdom, Berichten van de Rijksdienst voor het
Oudheidkundig Bodemonderzoek, 1516 (19651966), 69108; and J.C. Besteman, North
Holland ad 4001200: turning tide or tide turned?, in Medieval Archaeology in the
Netherlands: Studies presented to H.H. van Regteren Altena, ed. J.C, Besteman, J.M. Bos, and
H.A. Heidinga (Assen/Maastricht, 1990), 91120.
163V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (pp. 466467).
164As is made clear in Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 466).
reduced to slavery, permits the conclusion that, for all intents and pur
poses, they were annihilated.165
Administratively, the Dokkum region itself would appear to have had a
special military designation (officium prefecture), which had been
placed under the command of a certain Abba, who was given the title
praefectus.166 This official also had other responsibilities as, for example,
in regard to the initial phase of construction of a monumental memorial
to Boniface located at the place where the now sainted missionary had
been killed. Some sense of the work being done there is evidenced by an
immense mound which was constructed in the area through the use of
corveyed labor drawn from among the inhabitants of the district. Also
there were established in this area at least several churches and numerous
priests (servi Dei).167 Like much of Frisia, this area suffered from a lack of
fresh water. Abbas men, however, were able to locate a particularly attrac
tive and abundant source of fresh water, which, of course, was necessary to
sustain the growing population of the area. Needless to say, the discovery
of this water source is reported as a miracle.168
Planning for the Paderborn Meeting
Charlemagnes staff had the opportunity to work at Herstal through the

Christmas season and continued their efforts at the old Roman fortress
town of Nijmegen through the Easter season and into the early summer.169
In addition to the many administrative tasks that were the normal
business of the Carolingian central government, a high priority undoubt
edly was given to the analysis and systematization of the vast array of
information which made it possible for the king successfully to summon
large numbers of Saxons, including the members of their Council,
from throughout all of the region to the newly constructed Carolingian
165V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (466467).

166V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 470). There is much controversy regarding the officium of
praefectus. See, for example, the useful discussion by Karl August Ekehardt, Prfect und
Burggraf, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fr Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung 46
(1926), 163205, here 163174, who unfortunately does not deal directly with this text.
167V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 471). Halberstama, The Frisian Kingdom, p. 75, discusses
the excavations which identified the exact location of this mound.
168V.S. Bonifatii, ch. VIII (p. 471).
169Regarding the location of the court during these seasons, see ARF, an. 776; and AE,
ann, 776, 777. The court was still at Nijmegen on 7 June 777 as demonstrated by the date of
a grant issued by Charlemagne at that time (DK., no. 117). Regarding the late Roman fortifi
cations at Nijmegen, see Johnson, Late Roman Fortifications, pp. 145, 242.
610 chapter ten
civitas at Paderborn.170 In addition to commanding the Saxons to come to

Paderborn, a general assembly of Franks from throughout the kingdom
also was summoned to meet there at the same time.171 Perhaps most
importantly, at least in military perspective, Charlemagne ordered the
mobilization of a huge army to muster at Nijmegen.172 Charlemagnes
reasoning for the mobilization of an ingens exercitus would appear to have
been that he did not trust the Saxons, despite the fact that they had agreed
under oath the previous year to recognize his ditio, i.e. to become his sub
jects, and, in addition, had given hostages.173
While Charlemagnes staff sifted through the available intelligence to
make possible some of the practical aspects of the integration of the Saxon
region into the regnum Francorum, the king and his advisers can be seen
also to have worked on various other matters of strategic importance. For
example, Abbot Sturm spent the Christmas holiday at Herstal. The public,
or published, reason for his stay at court was a grant by Charlemagne to
Fulda of extensive royal fiscal resources located at Hammelburg. Fulda
also was provided with an immunity in regard to these facultates, which
required the monastery to mobilize the military and economic resources
in the region that it controlled for both defensive and offensive pur
poses.174 It was probably at this time, as well, that Charlemagne reaffirmed
his assignment of Sturm to command of the fortress at Eresburg and, by
implication, the defenses of the Fulda Gap.175
If Charlemagnes plans with regard to the Saxons were to go smoothly at
the Paderborn meeting, Sturms area of command likely would not be
directly affected in the immediate future by matters that were to be worked
out on the banks of the Lippe during the summer of 777. Charlemagne,
however, wanted to be sure that the central route between the Rhine and
Saxon territory was secure should some Saxons not engaged at Paderborn
seek to launch raids into the regnum Francorum while the main Carolingian
army was occupied well to the north. It is important to emphasize, in this
context, that Hammelburg, where there was a habitation center and
religious installation, controlled the fords of the Frankish Saale River, a
northern affluent of the Main. These fords were of importance to the
170Regarding the normal business of Charlemagnes central administration, see

Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us?, pp. 319343.
171ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777.
172AE, an, 777.
173AE, an, 777.
174Concerning Sturms presence at Herstal early in January 777, see DK., no. 116.
175Eigil, V.S. Sturmi, ch. 25 (pp. 160161).
maintenance of movement northward along the road from Wrzburg

through Fulda to Hersfeld and north into Saxon territory.176
Charlemagnes concern with the southern sector of Saxon territory
while he was focused primarily on more northerly areas surely demon
strates that the king was attentive to strategic matters in a broad context.
While at Paderborn, Charlemagne also met with Abbot Fulrad, the
Carolingians leading expert on Italian affairs. This permits the inference
that matters south of the Alps also were not being ignored.177 In addition,
as will be seen below, by spring of 776 if not earlier, the Carolingian court
had been keeping close track of matters in the southwest of the regnum
Francorum, and was in contact with Muslim factions from south of the
frontier in northeastern Spain, particularly Barcelona.
By contrast with Charlemagnes public dealings with Sturm and discus
sions with Fulrad, the kings arrangements at Nijmegen with the Rector of
the church of St. Martin in Utrecht would appear to have been of more
immediate importance with regard to matters in the north. The royal villa
at Leusden in the area of Amersfort, which was being held by Count
Wiggerus of Utrecht in beneficium as part of the comital ministerium, was
transferred to the church of St. Martin along with numerous other royal
properties in the area of the emporium at Durstede. With the acquisition
of this property and an immunity, St. Martin became responsible for
administering the provision of both troops and logistic support for
Charlemagnes military forces from its newly acquired resources.178 From
a military perspective, these grants were intended to refine the adminis
trative system in the region of the Vecht canal, which not only played a key
role in long-distance commerce to the north but was of vital importance
for the rapid transportation of Carolingian armed forces into the Ijselmeer
and to the coast of the North Sea on the border of Saxon territory.
Due to the fragmentary nature of the documentary record, we simply
do not know how many more such grants were made at this time, either to
St. Martin at Utrecht or to other important individuals or institutions. It is
176Regarding the fords at Hammelburg, see Dieter Berger, Alte Wege und Strassen
zwischen Mosel, Rhein und Fulda, Rheinische Vierteljahrsbltter, 22 (1957), 176192.
177The first information that we have for Fulrads attendance at the royal court in the
summer of 777 comes from a grant made by Charlemagne to St. Denis (DK., no. 118).
However, there is no reason to believe that Fulrad did not come to court earlier in the year.
It is perhaps of some importance that Charlemagne had to have been in contact with his
officials in Italy at this time because he mobilized expeditionary forces from the Lombard
kingdom for military operation in Spain which took place in 778. See ARF, an. 778.
178See DK., no. 117.
612 chapter ten
possible, for example, that the extensive grants made to Fulda in the
area of Dokkum were initiated at this time. However, the evidence on this
point is not conclusive.179 It is clear, nevertheless, that Charlemagnes
attention was drawn at this time to Alberic of Utrecht, who also bore con
siderable administrative obligations, including those of a military nature
at Medemblik on the Ijselmeer about 50 kilometers north of the present
city of Amsterdam.180 Medemblik was an ideal coaling station or maga
zine to support Carolingian troops who had been transported through the
Vecht canal and were operating on the Ijselmeer with the aid of Frisian
ships and sailors.181 It is to be remembered that throughout the coastal
region of Frisia, it was difficult to obtain fresh water. Therefore, it was
essential to have available water supplies for troops, who were being trans
ported to undertake military operations along the North Sea coast or fur
ther inland, at well-established settlements.182
From the base at Medemblik, a fleet, once resupplied both with fresh
water and food, easily could sail northeast some 20 kilometers across the
Ijselmeer to the closest landfall at Stavoren, on the coast of Westergo. Such
a fleet, following the most efficacious route, would then hug the coastline
of Westergo north to Ostergo, where Charles Martel had campaigned both
with a fleet and on the land. The preferred route then continues further
north and northeast for some 40 kilometers before it turns almost due
south another ten kilometers into the Lauwerszee. This Zee, or bay, had
been created during the previous century through the washing out of
swamps and mud flats by the aggressive action of the North Sea.183 Such a
fleet would make landfall in the environs of the mouth of the Ee River
about ten kilometers downstream from Dokkum. From the estuary of the
Ee, again after taking on fresh water, the fleet could sail northeast across
the Lauwerzee, a distance of about ten kilometers, in order to continue
north of the coastal mud flats, i.e. the Gronigen Wadden and Uithuizen
179Slicher van Bath, Economic and Social Conditions, pp. 109110.

180Besteman, Carolingian Medemblik, pp. 4647.
181Concerning Carolingian naval operations in this area under Charles Martel, see
182The problem of obtaining fresh water on sea islands and along the coast is not only
obvious, but was noted by Willibald, V.S. Bonifatii, ch. IX (p. 471).
183With regard to the Lauwersee, see W. Roeleveld, De bijdrage van de aardweten
schappen tot de studie van de transgresieve activiteit lands de zuidlike husten van de
Noordsee, Transgressies en occupatiesgeschiedenis in de kuntgebiedgen van Nederleand en
Belgi: colloquium Gent 57 September 1978, ed A. Verhulst and M.K.E. Gottschalk (Ghent,
1980), 291312.
Wadden, for a distance of about 50 kilometers, before entering the estuary

of the Ems at Emden on the right bank of the river.
The estuary of the Ems, which today is wide open as a result of the cre
ation of Dollart Bay by sea action later in the Middle Ages, largely was
clogged with swamps and mud flats during the 8th and 9th centuries. The
main channel of the Ems in the Carolingian era ran along what is today the
right bank of the river.184 The Carolingians had been taking a strong inter
est in the estuary of the Ems for almost three decades prior to the planning
of military operations in 777. Between ca. 750 and the end of the century,
the Carolingians constructed a base at Emden on the right bank of the
Ems. This settlement not only had obvious military and commercial pur
poses but also controlled the entrance to the river itself.185
Charlemagnes attention to the north at this time, as evidenced by the
development of resources in the Ijselmeer, and the longer term Carolingian
interest in the estuary of the Ems through the period in which the
settlement at Emden was made, raises an important question: was the
Magistratus giving consideration to sending a force into Saxon territory
along the northern route? This question is given further urgency by
Charlemagnes decision in 777 to mobilize the army at Nijmegen, rather
than further south, i.e. much closer to the Lippe valley and Paderborn.
It is was well-understood that during the late spring and early summer
segment of the sailing season in this area, an abundance of ships was
available at the very busy port of Durstede which boasted several kilo
meters of wharfs.186 Many of these ships, e.g. proto-hulcs and proto-
cogs, could easily be commandeered by Charlemagnes officials, as had
been the case for operations undertaken by Charles Martel in the north
eastern reaches of the Ijselmeer, to transport both men and supplies
through the Vecht canal, the Ijselmeer, the North Sea and into the estuary
of the Ems in order to operate against a potential Saxon effort to resist
184Karl-Ernst Behre and Werner Haarnagel, Niedersachsen, pp. 6882.

185Slicher van Bath, Economic and Social Conditions, p. 117; and Werner Haarnagel,
Die frhgeschichtliche Handelssiedlung Emden und ihre Entwicklung bis zum Mittelalter,
in Archologische und naturwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen an lndlichen und frh-
sttischen Siedlungen im deutschen Ksten gebiet vom 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis zum 11
Janrhundert n. Chr., 2 vols. (Weinheirm, 1984), 2, Haldelspltze des frhen und hohen
Mittelalters, ed. Herbert Hankuhn, Kurt Schietzel, and Hans Reichstein, 114135, who
emphasizes economic matters, in accord with the topic treated in the volume as a whole.
He does take note of the consensus that the area was Christianized by the efforts of Liudger
in the later 8th century.
186Regarding the port facilities at Durstede, see the discussion by Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare, p. 253, with the relevant literature cited in the notes.
614 chapter ten
Charlemagnes main force that was moving east through the valley of the
Lippe.187
The movement of several units, or scarae, of Carolingian troops from
their mobilization base at Nijmegen into the mouth of the Ems with land
fall at Emden was not a complicated maneuver. Written information
regarding this region was available in Plinys Natural History, which was to
be found in the royal library.188 Charlemagnes planners also had access to
a corpus of information from various Latin historians regarding Roman
military operations along this route. The most detailed account was pro
vided by Tacitus, who discusses Germanicus campaigns of the years 15
and 16.189 As mentioned above, Tacitus works easily could be made avail
able to Charlemagnes planners at the royal court through the aegis of
Abbot Sturm.
Without the benefit of technical intelligence based on Roman sources,
it was clear to the Carolingians that the Frisians, even before they were
conquered by the Franks, dominated the North Sea coast and its environs
at least as far north as the mouth of the Weser river and perhaps even as
far as the Elbe.190 Charlemagne, therefore, likely could expect to obtain
intelligence and navigational information from Frisian merchants who
plied their trade along the course of the Ems. These merchants knew that
by using flat-bottomed boats, the entire length of the Ems from the North
Sea almost to the rivers source was navigable throughout the entire year.
Indeed, when Liudger, one of Charlemagnes important officials in this
area, who later was established as bishop of Mnster, is known to have
operated from the estuary of the Ems along the entire course of the river.191
Charlemagne enjoyed significant advantages over both the Romans and
the Frisians in operating on the Ems. He controlled a land route from the
west to the river as well as settlements in the valley of the Ems. As dis
cussed earlier, the missionary Lebuin (d. 773) oversaw the conversion to
Christianity of many pagan Saxons, including various magnates, e.g.
Folcbert and his son Helco, who lived in the Sdergau. This region, having
187Concerning Charles Martels operations and the available ships, see Bachrach, Early
188Concerning the availability of the Natural History at Charlemagnes court, see L.D.
Reynolds, The Elder Pliny, in Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics (1983),
308.
189Wells, German Policy, pp. 154, 241242.
190Halbertsma, The Frisian Kingdom, p. 74.
191Joseph Prinz, Mimigernaford-Mnster: d. Enstehungsgeschichte e. Stadt, 2nd ed.
(Mnster, 1976), p. 33.
its eastern border on the Ems, was about a hundred or so kilometers

east-southeast of Lebuins base at Deventer on the Ijsel river.192 It is likely
that Lebuin came to the Sdergau because there had long been a trade
route that began at the Roman fortress town of Utrecht, passed through
Deventer, and continued eastward to the Ems river and probably
beyond.193
At a strategically located stopping place along this route was a settle
ment called Mimigernaford, which was in existence before the later 8th
century. Roman coins and other artifacts indicative of commerce have
been found there and suggest early settlement of the area.194 Mimigernaford
controlled a convenient ford (thus the name) of the Aa, which is a
left affluent of the Ems, some 15 kilometers from the junction of the two
rivers. Ultimately, Mimigernaford was to become the important city of
Mnster.195 In addition, it is also of operational significance in terms of
Carolingian campaign strategy that there was an important settlement at
Warendorf, located on the Ems itself, and only about 30 kilometers east of
Mimigernaford. This settlement was developed perhaps late in the 7th
century and certainly expanded in the course of the 8th century. Waren
dorf likely served as the riverine terminus of the road from the west and a
military base for the Carolingians.196
Charlemagnes strategic interest in the Mnster area is well-docu
mented, although the chronology is difficult to establish. Charlemagne is
known to have built a stronghold at Mimigernaford, but excavations have
led to the conclusion that it is unlikely that this fortification was con
structed on Cathedral Hill (Die Domhgel) at any time prior to Liudgers
192Anon. V.S. Lebuini, chs. 23.

193Prinz, Mimigernaford-Mnster, pp. 1213, 33, discusses the complex of river routes
along the Ems and the Weser and also various of the land routes.
194Jrgen Pape and Bernhard Sicherl, Die vorgeschichtliche Besiedlung auf dem
Domhgel, in 805: Liudger wird Bischof: Spuren eines Heilligen zwischen York, Rom und
Mnster, ed. Gabrielle Isenberg and Barbara Romm (Mainz, 2005), 171172, regarding
Roman coins and other relevant artifacts.
195For background, see Eckhard Freise, Vom vorchristlichen Mimigernaford zum hon-
estum monasterium Liudgers, in Geschichte der Stadt Mnster, 3 vols., ed. Franz-Josef
Jakobi (Mnster, 1993), I, 117. Concerning the origins of Mnster, see Martin Kroker, Die
Siedlung Mimigernaford und die Domburg im 9 und 10 Jahrhundert, in 805: Liudger wird
Bischof: Spuren eines Heilligen zwischen York, Rom und Mnster, ed. Gabrielle Isenberg
and Barbara Romm (Mainz, 2005), 229240; and Joseph Prinz, Mimigernaford-Mnster,
pp. 812.
196Concerning the settlement at Warendorf that is of interest in the present situation,
see Wilhelm Winkelmann, Eine westflische Siedlung des 8. Jahrhunderts bei Warendorf,
Germania, 32 (1954), 189213.
616 chapter ten
development of the monastery across the river in 792.197 Undoubtedly,

Mimigernaford became important because it controlled the strategically
located ford of the Aa. The inhabitants could provide support for both
commercial and military operations along the course of the Ems and also
as a base for projecting military efforts further to the east.198 What is
important here, however, is whether Mimigernaford by 777 already had
been incorporated into Charlemagnes strategic thinking or it was only
part of a plan being discussed by the Magistratus aimed at the further
development of the area for military and commercial purposes in the near
future.
To put the matter another way, was Mimigernaford sufficiently well-
developed in 777, with or without a fortress, so that it could be used to
support troops being moved south along the Ems in the direction of
Paderborn? By 792793, a monastery was founded at Minigernaford and a
monumental stone church was constructed there.199 In 805, Mimigernaford
was established as the cathedral seat of a new bishopric.200 In light of
the construction of a great monastic church in the early 790s, which
required an immense investment of human and material resources, and
Romes long-standing rules for establishing a cathedral seat only in a pop
ulous and flourishing location, as discussed above, it seems likely that
Mimigernaford already was flourishing by 777. It seems hardly likely that a
major urban center capable of supporting an episcopal seat was devel
oped from virtually nothing in the course of fewer than three decades.
Additional support for the development of the Mimigernaford district
is suggested also by 7th- and 8th-century cemeteries in the area, as well as
the growth of the important and strategically located settlement at
Warendorf nearby, mentioned above.201 Therefore, it is suggested here
197Pape and Sicherl, Die vorgeschichtliche Besiedlung, pp. 169174.

198The place name, which makes clear the importance of the ford, was established
much earlier than Liudgers development of a monastic complex there. See Bernd Thier,
Mimigernaford zur Zeit Liudgers (792/797 bis 809), in 805: Liudger wird Bischof: Spuren
eines Heilligen zwischen York, Rom und Mnster, ed. Gabrielle Isenberg and Barbara Romm
(Mainz, 2005), 175176.
199Concerning the great monastic church at Mnster, see van Winter, The First
Centuries, pp. 2526. The Mnster monastic church was likely modeled on the monastic
church at Utrecht.
200Kroker, Die Siedlung Mimigernaford, p. 228; Prinz, Mimigernaford-Mnster,
pp. 229234; and Arnold Angenendt, Liudger: Missionar-Abt-Bischof im frhen Mittelalter
(Mnster, 2006), pp. 105126.
201Regarding the cemeteries in the district, see Angelika Speckmann, Haus und
Hausrat zur Zeit Liudgers, in 805: Liudger wird Bischof: Spuren eines Heilligen zwischen
York, Rom und Mnster, ed. Gabrielle Isenberg and Barbara Romm (Mainz, 2005), 3942.
that Charlemagne, when planning was being undertaken for the Paderborn
meeting in 777, could expect to have had available a base for the support
of military operations at Mimigernaford on the banks of the Aa River
approximately seven kilometers south of the Ems. It is also likely that, if
needed, he would able, as well, to maintain military assets at Warendorf
on the river itself.
It addition to troops from Mimigernaford and Warendorf, it was possi
ble for Carolingian units mustered at Deventer, and also men from at least
as far west as Utrecht, to move into the valley of the Ems. The route from
Utrecht crossed the Veluwe region, bounded on the west by the Rhine and
the east by the Ijssel, which had seen significant demographic and eco
nomic development since the later 6th or early 7th century.202 Carolingian
military forces, like merchants, could move along the well-used road from
Utrecht to Deventer. This route would take Charlemagnes forces through
the important settlement at Kootwijk in the Veluwe region, where iron is
known to have been produced and likely swords as well as various types of
tools are known to have been manufactured.203 Indeed, it is likely that
merchants from the lower Rhine region, searching for business, may have
accounted, at least in part, for the economic and demographic growth of
both Mimigernaford and Warendorf.
In light of the infrastructure established by the Carolingians and their
Frisian subjects, a formidable army would be able sail south along the
course of the Ems as far up river as the modern town of Wiedenbrcke,
where the rivers navigability became questionable at various times of the
year during the Roman Empire and early Middle Ages. This route, of
course, had been used many times by Roman military forces and was well-
known to Frisian merchants in the 8th century. In addition, the Emsmarsch
surrounding the left bank of the river saw significant settlement by both
fishermen and farmers in the 7th and 8th centuries.204
Carolingian troops mobilized in the west, after debarking in the general
area of Wiedenbrke, would find it necessary to march only about 30 kilo
meters overland through the southern reaches of the Teutoburger range.
As a result of a deployment of this type, these units would be able to come
202H.A. Heidinga, Medieval Settlement and Economy North of the Lower Rhine:
Archeology and History of Kootwijk and the Veluwe (the Netherlands) (Assen/Maastricht-
Wolfeboro, NH, 1987), 1220, 52, 55, 8788, 162163, 168173.
203See Heidinga, Medieval Settlement, p. 24, regarding iron mining.
204See, for example, regarding settlement in the valley of the Ems, Brandt,
Niedersachsen, pp. 159161.
618 chapter ten
up behind the Saxons, who were expected to be attending the meeting at

Paderborn. Such a maneuver, in fact, constitutes a pincer movement,
which would trap the Saxons, should they become bellicose, between the
troops arriving through the valley of the Ems and those in Charlemagnes
main force moving east through the valley of the Lippe. Pincer movements
had been used by the early Carolingians, and were to be a hallmark of
Charlemagnes operational armentarium over the course of his reign.205 In
fact, he used an extended pincer movement in 778, the next year, for his
offensive in Spain.206
No surviving source indicates that the Magistratus was considering the
launch of a northern pincer to catch the Saxons from behind at Paderborn
as a contingency should they have chosen to cause trouble at the assem
bly. Such planning, of course, was not alien to Charlemagne, who was to
use a similar sea and land pincer strategy in 789 with a fleet operating on
the Elbe and a land force marching east from Cologne.207 The silence of
the sources regarding the situation in 777, however, should not surprise us
for two reasons. First, it was General Staff doctrine to keep secret not only
its military plans but its deliberations as well. A policy was maintained by
Charlemagne and his advisers with regard to secrecy that today we call
a need to know basis and very few people, even at the royal court, had
reason to be informed regarding early discussions concerning the deploy
ment of a force along the northern sea and river route into Saxon ter
ritory.208 Secondly, since, as will be seen below, the Saxons caused no
difficulties at Paderborn, there was no reason for any source to mention a
Carolingian force, which may have advanced on Paderborn from the south
through the Ems valley, if such had been the case.
Despite the lack of direct information in this context, it is the obligation
of the historian to try to make sense of various disparate facts. In this
case, Charlemagnes decision to muster his army at Nijmegen rather
than at Xanten and the timing of his development of a more nuanced
military organization in the northern region with the help of St. Martin
of Utrecht requires attention. In addition, at this time, it is to be noted
that Charlemagne was closely cooperating with Alberic of Utrecht, in
205Regarding Charlemagnes extensive use of pincer movements, see Verbruggen,

LArme, pp. 433435; and idem, Art of War, pp. 313319. For the early Carolingians, see
Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 42, 193.
206ARF, an. 778.
207ARF, an. 789.
208See the discussion by Bachrach, Charlemagne and the General Staff, p. 327.
whom he showed great confidence. For example, after the king had
employed Alberic as a missus to Italy and evidenced satisfaction with
his performance, he appointed him archbishop of Cologne.209 This
appointment was made some time between the mobilization at Nijmegen
and the completion of the proceedings at Paderborn during the summer
of 777.210
Perhaps the most important information that survives regarding
Charlemagnes attention to the Ijselmeer at this time and the Carolingian
potential to project military forces into the valley of the Ems from the
north concerns the long-established base at Dokkum, in the area where, as
noted above, Boniface had been martyred. In 777, Charlemagne appointed
Liudger, a Frisian cleric attached to the diocese of Utrecht, to command
Carolingian resources and military assets at Dokkum, described above.
Liudger had a very close and productive working relationship with Alberic
prior to the latters appointment as archbishop of Cologne. In addition, his
extended family had enjoyed a long-term and very positive relationship
with the Carolingians. His career provides a useful example of how loyal
and able local aristocrats gained preferment from Charlemagne and his
forebears.211
When Liudgers family first appears in the sources, they are identified as
pagan Frisian aristocrats who flourished on the borderland with the
Saxons. They possessed extensive lands in Frisia, north of Utrecht, and to
the south at Werden in Westphalia.212 Early in the conflict between the
Carolingian mayors of the palace and the Frisian Duke Radbod, Wrssing,
Liudgers paternal grandfather, not only sided with Charlemagnes great
uncle Grimoald but led his family to convert to Christianity.213 Liudger was
born in 742.214 As a boy and young man, his interest would seem to have
been focused on getting a good education and becoming a cleric. Like his
mothers uncles, also aristocratic Frisians, Liudger attended the monastic
school at Utrecht, where he developed a close relationship with Gregory,
209See Liudger, V.S. Gregorii, ch. 14.

210For the raising of Alberic to the archiepiscopal seat of Cologne at this time, see
Wood, Missionary Life, p. 110.
211See Angenendt, Liudger, pp. 8890; but Basilius Senger, Liudger, Leben und Werk
(Mnster, 1984), remains useful.
212Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, chs. 4, 27, 13, 5, 8; with discussions by Angenendt, Liudger,
pp. 8890; Senger, Liudger, pp. 13; and Wood, Missionary Life, pp. 108109.
213Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, chs. 13.
214The date is established by Senger, Liudger, p. 16, but should be taken only as an
approximation.
620 chapter ten
the master of the school, and the latters nephew, Alberic, the future arch
bishop of Cologne.215
In 767, Liudger was sent to York, where he was made a deacon, and stud
ied with Alcuin. Shortly after returning home to Utrecht, he sought per
mission to return to England to continue his studies with Charlemagnes
future adviser. He remained at York for a period of approximately three
years.216 Both Liudger himself and those who wrote about him give par
ticular attention to his very strong interest in books, especially in their
acquisition and the establishment of libraries.217 This, of course, was a pas
sion that he shared with Charlemagne among many others connected to
the royal court and among both the secular and religious aristocracy. There
is no reason, however, to believe that Liudgers interests were limited
strictly to books on religious matters.218
Upon returning from England, Liudgers initial assignment, initiated by
Alberic, who, following Gregorys death, had been appointed to lead the
Utrecht diocese, was to restore the religious and missionary center at
Deventer. As noted above, this town had been seriously damaged as part of
the Saxon offensive in 775. Liudger apparently did very well at Deventer.
Therefore, Alberic taking into consideration Liudgers performance gave
him warrant to lead a missionary effort into the still pagan reaches of
Frisia far to the north, i.e. beyond Dokkum. Along with this assignment to
convert the pagans, Liudger was ordered to destroy pagan shrines, i.e. the
fana deorum and the varias culturas idolorum, that information avail
able to Alberic indicated were to be found throughout the countryside in
this region.219
Unlike operations at Deventer, a growing commercial center just west
of the Saxon frontier, this mission into the hostile pagan hinterland of
Frisia was intended to do great damage to the religious centers of the
pagan inhabitants. In order to carry out this mission, Liudger undoubtedly
was required to lead, or at least to be accompanied by, a considerable
armed force. It is probable that Liudger maintained a military household,
i.e. a force of socii and pueri similar to those led by Sturm and Boniface.
However, it is also possible that elements of a Frisian expeditionary force,
which had acquitted itself very well in 754 while avenging the death of
215Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, ch. 9.

216Regarding Liudgers ordination and first tour of study with Alcuin, see Altfrid, V.S.
Liudgeri, I, ch. 10; and chs. 1112, concerning the second tour of study at York.
217Wood, Missionary Life, p. 109, gives special attention to this point.
218See, for example, Bachrach, Charlemagnes Military Responsibilities, pp. 231255.
Boniface, was mobilized for the purpose of supporting Liudgers mission

and also was deployed to the north at this time.220
Altfrid, the author of Liudgers Vita, credits his principal with the
destruction of numerous pagan shrines during the mission, but has noth
ing to say regarding the conversion of large numbers of pagans to the
Christian faith at this time. Altfrids failure to employ this topos, discussed
earlier in relation to Boniface and others, would seem to permit the infer
ence that Liudger enjoyed comparatively little success in regard to this
part of his mission. Liudgers efforts both at Deventer and in the north
would seem to have had a decidedly administrative cast, even a secular
orientation, and little is said by Altfrid in this context regarding either his
principals spirituality or his missionary charisma during this early phase
of his career.221
This impression is heightened by Altfrids focus on Liudgers acquisition
of a great treasure (thesaurum magnum) that belonged to the pagans.
Although the missionary is reported to have seized this wealth in gold and
silver, there is no mention of the military or paramilitary action which
very probably had accompanied such a success in hostile territory. In any
case, Liudger is described as having the treasure loaded on boats, which
then sailed through the Ijselmer and the Vecht canal to Utrecht. There
Alberic saw to the transfer of the treasure to Charlemagne. The latter,
very pleased with Liudgers success and honestyall such treasure
belonged to the king under the laws of booty acquisition which the Franks
borrowed from the Romansgraciously donated one-third to the church
of Utrecht.222
Liudgers mission, however, was not limited to destroying pagan shrines,
maintaining the Carolingian military position in the Dokkum region, and
looking after the safety of the Anglo-Saxon missionary Willehad who was
operating in the dangerous pagan-dominated region of Drenthe. Liudger
was charged, as well, with the construction of a monumental memorial to
the martyred Boniface and also with building a new church, which was to

221With regard to this early phase of Liudgers career, cf. Angenendt, Liudger, pp. 9697;
and in more detail, Alois Schrder, Das geistliche Bild Liudgers, in Die Kirche in Mnster
im Wandel der Zeit, ed. Alois Schrder (Mnster, 1994), pp. 337. It is to be noted, in this
context, that at this time Liudger was only a deacon and that several priests were serving
under his leadership. See V.S. Liudgeri, I, ch. 16.
222Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, ch. 16. Regarding the laws governing booty and its distribu
tion, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 139140, and the discussion in the rele
vant notes.
622 chapter ten
be dedicated to Saints Paul and Boniface. This part of his mission, Liudger
seems to have carried out in an exemplary manner. Of course, as with all
saints lives, the reader must always be wary of the hagiographers poten
tial to exaggerate the accomplishments of his principal, even when these
are tinged with a secular hue.223
Charlemagnes concern with Bonifaces legacy obviously brought into
conjunction, and perhaps into potential conflict, the interests of the dio
cese of Utrecht with those of the monastery of Fulda and, therefore, the
overall interests of both the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, respec
tively. Charlemagnes appointment of Alberic as archbishop of Cologne
strongly suggests that the Carolingian court was orchestrating a major
reorganization in regard to the northern archdiocese. In this context, it
would be a serious misunderstanding of Charlemagnes overall policies to
ignore the military responsibilities of Alberic and Lull, archbishops of
Cologne and Mainz, respectively, and of their subordinates, e.g. men such
as Liudger and Sturm.
The Meeting at Paderborn
It cannot be established whether Charlemagne sent a force either up the

Ems River or from Deventer to Mimigernaford, which then arrived at
Paderborn to threaten the Saxons from the rear and, thus, to cut off any
line of retreat they may have hoped to utilize. However, it is clear that
before the end of June 777, Charlemagnes huge army successfully negoti
ated the march from Nijmegen to Xanten, where the Rhine was crossed to
enter the valley of the Lippe, and then on to Paderborn.224 At Paderborn,
Charlemagnes expeditionary forces linked up with the scarae, which
223Altfrid, V.S. Liudgeri, I, chs. 17, 22; and concerning Willihads activities, see Anon., V.S.
Willihadi, ch. 6. Wood, Missionary Life, p. 90, naively accepts the view propagated in
Willihads Vita, that Charlemagne did not know about the missionarys early activities in
Frisia.
224ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777. DK., no. 117, for Charlemagne still at Nijmegen on 7
June 777. Cf. Bhmer and Mhlbacher, Regesta Imperii, I, no. 211 (206). ARF, an. 777; and AE,
an. 777. The march from Nijmegen to Paderborn, some 220 kilometers on the road, for a
large army likely took at least three weeks. Cf. AN, an. 777, which indulge a rhetorical con
ceit and indicate that Charlemagne held a campus magis, i.e. a Mayfield, at Paderborn.
Concerning these problems, see Bachrach, The Marchfield, pp. 7885; and Matthias
Springer, Jhrliche Wiederkehr oder ganz anderes: Mrzfeld oder Marsfeld, Rhythmus
und Saisonalitt: Kongressakten des 5. Symposions des Media Vistenverbandes in Gttingen,
1993 (Sigmaringen, 1995), 297324, who begins his study by accepting the formulation
regarding the Marchfield by Bachrach, supra.
had been deployed in 776 to garrison the new civitas. The crowds at
Paderborn, composed of Frankish representatives to the royal placitum
from throughout the kingdom, large numbers of Saxons from throughout
their territory, and the royal army, must have been huge, and their peaceful
and efficient management no small task if only from a logistical
perspective.225
The various court and other Annales emphasize that Saxons came from
all parts of their territory to Paderborn.226 Thus, it is perhaps not surpris
ing that various royal sources vie with each other to describe the great
number of Saxons who were baptized at this time. For example, terms and
phrases such as the minimalist multitudo were easily outdone by max
ima multitudo, multa milia, and innumerabilis turba.227 In addition to
permitting and perhaps even encouraging these baptisms, Charlemagne
imposed a rigorous agenda, likely worked out by royal officials during the
winter and spring meetings held at Herstal and Nijmegen. The relevant
Frankish representatives at the magnum plactium, held at Paderborn in
the summer of 777, undoubtedly approved, at least in principle if not in
detail, Charlemagnes basic policies which were aimed at integrating the
Saxons and their territory into the regnum Francorum.228
At Paderborn, Charlemagne issued a series of decrees (statua) to pro
vide a Carolingian administrative structure to the newly acquired
Saxon region.229 First on the list, the original of which no longer survives,
was the requirement that each Saxon male, not only those who had
become Christians, was required to take an oath by which he swore faith
fulness (fidelitas) to Charlemagne, to the kings sons, and to the Frankish
225As discussed above, even if the only Saxons to attend the assembly at Paderborn
were the members of the Representative Council, this would account for some 3,600 men.
This, of course, does not include the servants who naturally would accompany the 1,200 or
so primores.
226ARF, an. 777.
227These sources are: ARF, an. 777; AE, an. 777; AP, an. 777, and AMP, an. 777,
respectively.
228Concerning the working out of detailed plans at the royal court, see Bachrach,
Charlemagne and the General Staff, pp. 313357. It is interesting to note that various of
the sources use different terms to describe the meeting called by Charlemagne to which
Franks came from throughout the regnum. For example, the author of the ARF, an. 777,
uses two terms, synodum publicum and placitum; AE, an. 777, uses generalem con
ventum; AP, an. 777, magnum placitum; and AMP, an. 777, conventum. McKitterick,
Charlemagne, pp. 222233, provides a useful introduction to assemblies, and takes (p. 271)
note of Charlemagnes meticulous strategic planning.
229The author of AE, an. 777, uses this term.
624 chapter ten
people.230 The Saxons, thus, recognized Charlemagnes ditio.231 Or, as

another source put it, they surrendered themselves to the potestas regis.232
Through this oath, the Saxons became Charlemagnes subjects in the tra
dition of oath-taking to the sovereign that had been borrowed by the
Merovingians from the Romans and was continued by the Carolingians.233
As noted above, Suetonius emphasized in his well-known Life of Augustus
(ch. 21) that it was the custom of the emperor to exact oaths from those
whom he had defeated so that they would keep faithfully to the peace
terms that they had sought.
Among the other statua which the Saxons are alleged to have sworn to
obey was the injunction that they were to respect the Christian religion
and obey all of Charlemagnes decrees.234 The Saxons word, sworn or oth
erwise, was not highly respected by the Franks. Therefore, it is of consider
able importance that Charlemagnes new subjects are reported also to
have agreed to penalties should they fail to adhere to their oaths. First, any
free man who broke his oath was to lose his ingenuitas, i.e. his status as a
free man, and if he were a property owner, he was also to lose his allodium,
i.e. the property he possessed in freehold. The author of the court Annals
further claims that such a punishment for breaking ones oath, in fact, fol
lowed Saxon custom (mos), and that the Saxons pledged obedience with
their own hands.235
230ARF, an. 777. Whether we should think of these no longer extant statua as having
been promulgated in a now lost capitulary depends largely upon how one defines capitu
lary. The loss of these statua, however characterized, likely depended upon the fact that
they were time-conditioned and effectively superseded by Capitiulatio de partibus Saxoniae
a few years later. A useful summary of recent thinking regarding capitularies in general is
provided by McKitterick, Charlemagne, pp. 233237.
231AMP, an. 777.
232AE, an. 777.
233For background dealing with the use of oaths, see the study by Auguste Dumas, Le
serment de fidlit et la conception de pouvoir au Ier au IXe sicle, Reuve historique de
droit franais et tranger, 4e ser. X (1931), 3051, 289321; and more recently, A.D. Lee,
Treaty-making in Late Antiquity, in War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History, ed.
Philip de Souza and John France (Cambridge, 2008), 107119.
234ARF, an. 777.
235ARF, an. 777. It is important to note that Ammianus Marcellinus (bk. XVII, 1, 13; and
bk. XVII, 12, 21), whose account of later Roman interaction with the northern barbarians
was available to the Carolingians, indicated that both the Alamanni and the Quadi made
their promises according to their own customs. Whether the Saxons also did so, therefore,
becomes problematic insofar as various Carolingian writers (see below) may have bor
rowed this trope. However, since this barbarian behavior was known to the Carolingian
court, it is also possible that, in Roman style, Charlemagne and his government required
the Saxons whom they had conquered to follow the imperial tradition in these matters.
With somewhat different terminology, the author of the first section of

the Metz Annals emphasizes that the punishments for oath breaking, in
the present context, were established according to the lex and consuetudo
of the Saxons themselves. He also emphasizes that each Saxon offered his
pledge (pignus) with his own hand (per manus). If the men broke their
oaths, the author of these Annales claims that they not only would lose
their ingenuitas and possessiones, but that they would be handed over to
Charlemagne as slaves, i.e. tradiderunt in servitium.236 This formula, it
should be noted, established a fate very different from that of a person,
even a servus, who either handed himself over in obsequio, i.e. se tradidit,
or was handed over in obsequio as a dependent.237
By contrast with the authors of the court Annals and the first part of the
Metz Annals, the Reviser of the court Annals treats the arrangements
made by Charlemagne with the Saxons at Paderborn somewhat differ
ently. He does not give primary focus to the behavior of individual Saxons,
although he does not even hint that each individual was not to be bound
by his oath. Rather, the Reviser gives his attention to the Saxon people as a
whole, whom he claims, inter alia, cannot be trusted. He is of the opinion
that traditionally the Saxons prommissiones are fraudulentae. As a result,
he stresses that violations of Charlemagnes statua would result in depriv
ing the Saxons of their fatherland (patria) and of their freedom (liber-
tas).238 By substituting libertas for ingenuitas and patria for possessiones
and allodia, the Reviser wants his readers to understand that Charlemagne
intended to impose a collective punishment on the Saxon people if they
failed to obey his statua. According to Charlemagnes statua, the Saxons
and their territory were now a part of the regnum Francorum, and those
who did not obey were considered to have been in a state of rebellion
(rebellis extitit).239
Widukind the Rebel
Reports in the court sources that large numbers of baptisms took place
at Paderborn and that there was widespread oath-taking, even if exagger
ated, may perhaps be taken as some sort of surrogate for quantitative
236AMP, an. 777; and ARF, an. 777.

237For a discussion of the obsequium terminology in a variety of contexts, see Bachrach,
Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 8083, 138139, 164169, 209211.
238AE. 777.
239ARF, an. 777.
626 chapter ten
evidence, as the court writers had to maintain a modicum of rhetorical

plausibility even with regard to conversions. Whether Charlemagnes
officials recorded the names of the Saxons who swore oaths of faithfulness
is certainly possible. Some years after this episode at Paderborn, the
Carolingian government demonstrated that it had available the adminis
trative personnel to sustain such an effort throughout the entire regnum
Francorum, which obviously was a much larger task than recording
the names of the Saxons who took oaths.240 It is also possible that
Charlemagnes officials identified the properties possessed by these oath
takers so that confiscations could be executed if the occasion for such
action arose. This recording and describing of possessions, well-known to
modern scholars from surviving polyptychs, would have been a process
rather similar to that of making inventories, which had been a common
practice with regard to royal property since the divisio undertaken follow
ing the death of Charles Martel, and it is likely that the process had been
instituted considerably earlier, i.e. it is unlikely that the Mayor of the
Palace was an innovator in this matter.241
In any case, the accounts provided by the royal and other sources focus
on demonstrating the mass acceptance by the Saxons of Charlemagnes
policy as articulated in his statua.242 It is generally agreed by modern
scholars that the preponderance of Saxon magnates had been co-opted by
Charlemagne. They were willing, it has been argued effectively, not only to
accept Christianity, but they were willing, as well, to support the integra
tion of the Saxon territory and people into the regnum Francorum.243
240See, Ganshof, Charlemagnes Use of the Oath, pp. 111124.

241See, Ganshof, The Treaty of Verdun, pp. 289302.
242Martin Lintzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens, pp. 96127, argues that the rank and
file of the Saxon population opposed the Franks and Christianity. Lintzel sees this opposi
tion as the means by which the populus, which was practicing class warfare against the
Saxon magnates who had been co-opted by Charlemagne, focused their ideology. Insofar
as Lintzel identified the attachment to paganism of the lower classes and a willingness to
accept Christianity by the upper classes, his argument would seem to be sound. However,
Lintzels reductionist argument, i.e. that such conflict in Saxon society must be seen as a
superstructural manifestation of the fundamental frictions caused by class structure, gen
erally has not been accepted. See, for example, the discussion by Goldberg, Popular
Revolt, pp. 473475.
243The view that Charlemagnes policy was highly successful among the Saxon mag
nates is summarized by Lintzel, Die Unterwerfung Sachsens, pp. 96127, with a strong
body of evidence, although his Marxist problematic (see above) to explain their co-option
has not been accepted by non-Marxist scholars. See Goldberg, Popular Revolt, pp. 476
477, n. 47. Cf. Carroll, The Bishoprics of Saxony, p. 221, who believes that Charlemagnes
efforts were not successful among the aristocracy, and that there was widespread upper-
class opposition.
However, it is clear also from the court sources that a Westphalian mag
nate (primor) named Widukind, and a few others (pauci allii), refused to
accept Charlemagnes statua.244 Widukind, it is explained, fled from Saxon
territory into Nordmannia along with the members of his military house
hold (sociis suis). There, he is reported to have received the protection of
Sigfried, rex Danorum.245
The author of the revised Annales claims that Widukind fled because he
was conscious of the great number of crimes (multorum sibi facinorum
conscius) that he had committed.246 This may permit the view that prior
to 777, Widukind, had been a particularly nasty enemy. However, prior to
his defection in 777, Widukind was not mentioned in any surviving writ
ten source. This obviously reflects negatively on his supposed importance
in 777 or before as compared, for example, to other Saxon magnates who
do appear in the sources. Men such as Hessi and Bruno, discussed above,
had been identified in these same sources as playing important roles
among the Saxons. Therefore, this silence regarding Widukind prior to 777
would seem to permit the inference that the Reviser was projecting the
rebels well-documented post-777 behavior into the pre-777 period.247 In
short, it is suggested here that Widukind and the pauci, who failed to
appear at Paderborn, were not regarded at the time as of great importance
when and if reports of their behavior, in fact, had reached Charlemagne
and his advisers. Indeed, the fact that Widukind and a few others found it
necessary to flee strongly suggests that they greatly feared to remain in
Saxon territory.
It is not obvious how in 777, the Carolingian court considered these
defections and also how they viewed the willingness of King Sigfried to
give the rebels protection. It is clear, however, that Charlemagne and his
advisers have left no evidence that would lead to the conclusion that they
regarded either these disaffected Saxons or the neighboring Danes to be a
potential military problem, at least in the near term. Charlemagne had
begun the reorganization of the northeastern frontier under the direction
of Liudger. In addition, at this time, the situation was regarded as suffi
ciently secure to permit Liudger to spend three months each year at
244ARF, an. 777, here seems to be speaking about men who were similar in status to
Widukind. Later, as will be seen below, the author discussed Widukinds military
household.
245ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777.
246AE, an. 777.
247Regarding Widukinds post-777 behavior, see Martin Lintzel, Karl der Grosse und
Widukind, in idem, Ausgewhlte Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1961), I, 199224.
628 chapter ten
Utrecht for the purpose of participating in the overall administration of

the region, not simply of the northeastern frontier.248 Similarly, as we have
seen, Charlemagne had strengthened the central sector of the Saxon fron
tier under the command of Abbot Sturm.
Perhaps the most important direct evidence that the Carolingian court
regarded the Saxon problem as solved is provided by a poem, De conver-
sione Saxonum, written in 777 by one of Charlemagnes courtiers, likely
Angilbert.249 The poem has been characterized accurately as a virtual
panegyric on that victory over the Saxons.250 The focus of the poem is on
the dual victories of the conversion of the Saxons from their unfortunate
and dangerous paganism to Christianity and on Charlemagnes great mili
tary successes won with Gods help. The former emphasizes the mass bap
tism of Saxons in the baptismal church, which had been newly constructed
and dedicated at Paderborn.251
The latter aim is even more clear. Angilbert emphasizes Charlemagnes
victories, a thousand triumphs won with the spears of war and shields
covered with bloody gore. Charlemagne is credited with dragging the for
est worshipping phalanxes of the enemy into the heavenly kingdom; sav
age wolves have been converted into tender sheep.252 Recognition of this
great victory also came from Rome, where Pope Hadrian, as discussed
above, now recognized Charlemagne as the new Constantine. There was
no doubt, either at the Carolingian court or in Rome, during the summer
of 777, that the Saxons not only had been conquered but that they had
been pacified and converted to Christianity.253

249The basic argument for Angilbert as the author is made by Karl Hauk, Karolingische
Taufpfalzen im Spiegel hofnher Dichtung, in Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften
in Gttingen I. Philologisch-historische Klasse (1985), 197. Various other scholars have sug
gested different authors, e.g., Dieter Schaller, Der Dichter des Carmen de conversione
Saxonum, Tradition und Wertung: Festschrift fr Franz Brunhzl zum 65. Geburtstag, ed.
Gnter Bernt, Fidel Rdle, and Gabriel Silagi (Sigmaringen, 1989), 2749, has argued for
Paulinus of Aquileia. Susan A. Rabe, Faith, Art, and Politics at Saint-Riquier: The Symbolic
Vision of Angilbert (Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 5462, reviewed the various arguments and
convincingly defended Hauks views. However, the identity of the author is not crucial to
the present discussion. Rather, the date, which is not controversial, is of the utmost
importance.
250See Rabe, Faith, p. 62, for the quotation.
251Rabe, Faith, pp. 6266, provides a reliable Latin text and useful English translation.
252See De conversione Saxonum, lines 4346, for the quotations.
253Modern scholars equally have been convinced that Charlemagne and his advisers
regarded the Saxon problem as solved in 777. This view is so widespread that it even has
been incorporated into textbooks. See, for example, Margaret Deansley, A History of Early
Medieval Europe, 2nd ed. (London, 1963), pp. 359360.
Looking toward the Future
Angilberts poem and the popes letter provide direct contemporary

evidence for the very positive view of the Saxon situation both at
Charlemagnes court and at Rome, respectively. Indirect evidence for the
conclusion that the Saxon region was regarded as having been pacified is
provided by the kings plans for military operations in 778. These plans, of
course, were made in 777. As the situation came to Charlemagnes atten
tion, Yusuf ibn Abd al-Rahman, the autonomous governor of much of the
northeastern part of the Iberian peninsula, with his capital at the coastal
city of Barcelona, was killed in battle in 776. As a result, the Umayyad ruler
of Muslim Spain, Abd al-Rahman I (756788), who had been advancing
his control of the Iberian peninsula northward from his capital at Cordoba
for the previous two decades, was making preparations to impose his rule
on Yusufs erstwhile principality.254
In response to the threat posed by Abd al-Rahman I, Yusufs successor
at Barcelona, Sulayman ibn al-Arabi, and a variety of local Muslim leaders
who were based in erstwhile Roman fortress cities such as Saragossa,
Huesca, Gerona, and Pamplona, quickly united in a plan to seek aid from
Charlemagne. Their aim was to have the Frankish king provide military
protection against Abd al-Rahman I so that they could maintain their
autonomy, likely now under Charlemagnes ditio.255 This, of course, was a
risky option for Yusufs successors because they were Muslims and the
overwhelming majority of the population in northeastern Spain was
Christian. In a sense, the Muslim rulers in Barcelona and the other fortress
cities mentioned above were in a position not dissimilar to the Arian
Visigothic ruler in Aquitaine, Alaric II, who was defeated and killed by
Clovis in 507. The latter enjoyed the support of the majority of the popula
tion, who were Roman Christians, and subsequently this eased the inte
gration of Aquitaine into the regnum Francorum.256
The Muslim delegation seeking help from Charlemagne, which included
Sulayman as well as the son and son-in-law of the deceased Yusef, arrived
at Paderborn in the summer of 777.257 Patterns of diplomatic negotiations
254Collins, The Arab Conquest, pp. 175178; and abridged in Collins, Charlemagne,
pp. 6567.
255Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 6566.
256Bachrach, Clovis, pp. 1142.
257ARF, an. 777; AE, an. 777. See the discussion by Collins, Arab Conquest, pp. 176177,
for the identification of these various men.
630 chapter ten
during this period, which were conditioned, in large part, by the speed of
communications for sending messages and travel times for larger parties,
are well-understood with regard to the regnum Francorum by modern
scholars.258 It is likely, therefore, that these Muslims initiated contact with
the Carolingian court through the use of lower-level legates during the
previous year, and perhaps even after Charlemagnes bloodless victory in
the Lippe valley over the Saxons in 776. Obviously, these initial contacts
were looked upon favorably by Charlemagne and, thus, after some consid
eration, the Muslims were encouraged to send a high level delegation to
the royal court at Paderborn for further negotiations.259
Charlemagnes decision during the summer of 777, after meeting with
Sulayman and his allies, to send two large armies into Muslim territory
surely permits the inference that the Frankish king had considerable con
fidence in the capacity of his military organization to mobilize large num
bers of troops. He believed that he would be able to sustain the Carolingian
tradition that required the deployment of overwhelming force. Not only
were military forces available from the heartland of the regnum Francorum,
i.e. Austrasia, Neustria, Aquitaine, and Burgundy, but for the first time
since the desertion of Tassilo in 763, troops from Bavaria also were to be
mobilized. In addition, Charlemagne planned to muster an expeditionary
force from the newly conquered regnum Langobardorum. Finally, from a
strategic perspective, the extreme southern regions of the Frankish king
dom, e.g. Provence and Septimania, which bordered on Muslim territory,
were being called upon to provide expeditionary levies.260 It seems clear
that Charlemagne believed that the projected military operation south of
the Pyrenees had a strong likelihood of being successful and that neither
the Saxon situation nor the situation in Italy was problematic.
258See Andrew Gillett, Envoys and Political Communication in the Late Antique West,
411533 (Cambridge, 2003), and McCormick, Origins, pp. 852972.
259The delegation in 777 is recorded by ARF, an. 777; and AE, an. 777, but none of the
sources discuss the necessary preliminaries required for such a high level group of Muslims
to travel the length of the regnum Francorum. Safe conduct instruments had to be issued,
the route to be taken had to be established, i.e. mapped out with an itinerary, and arrange
ments had to be made in advance for the provision of food and lodging. This journey, which
covered a minimum of 1,500 kilometers, could not have been accomplished in fewer than
two and half months. The round trip was some 3,000 kilometers.
260ARF, an. 778.
CONCLUSIONS
The early Carolingians, Charlemagnes great-grandfather Pippin, his grand

father Charles Martel, and his father Pippin, commanded extensive human
and material resources in a rapidly growing economy, which made possi-
ble the success of their long-term strategy to reunite the regnum Francorum.
For almost a century, these Frankish leaders mobilized effective fighting
forces with which they sustained both large and small scale military oper-
ations on a regular basis not only throughout Gaul and across its trans-
rhenish frontier, but also from the coasts of the North Sea to the foothills
of the Pyrenees and northern Italy.
Early Carolingian armies on occasion marched and counter-marched
well in excess of 2,000 kilometers in the course of a single campaign.
Tactically, these forces fought effectively in the field against both mounted
troops and foot soldiers, executed noteworthy riverine and blue-water
operations, and successfully besieged numerous erstwhile Roman fortress
cities. In addition, they fortified the Germar Mark to block Saxon raids
into Thuringia and areas further to the West. They also built defenses
further south to defend against the Slavs. This construction of numerous
fortifications and the deployment of thousands of troops to garrison them
ultimately would be called the Sorbian march, which, of course, had offen-
sive potential for launching operations into Slavic territory.
In 768, following the death of Charles Martels son Pippin, who had
become king of the Franks in 751, the regnum Francorum was divided
between his two heirs, Charlemagne and Carloman the Younger. The
latter died prematurely in 771, but during the three years that each
ruled the equally divided resources of the Frankish kingdom, the brothers
demonstrated noteworthy difficulties in working together in a productive
and effective manner. Nevertheless, during this period, Charlemagne,
without military support from Carloman, undertook a successful cam-
paign to repacify southern Aquitaine, which exhibited restiveness follow-
ing Pippins death. Also during this period, Carloman sent an army to
Rome in order to undermine Charlemagnes diplomatic successes there,
presumably by force if necessary. This effort failed.
632 conclusions
Charlemagnes Long-Term Strategy
The early Carolingians had pursued a highly focused long-term strategy of

reuniting the regnum Francorum under their direct rule. As a result, they
did not seize opportunities, or apparent opportunities, either to conquer
territory that had not been part of the Frankish kingdom or to execute
raids in wealthy regions beyond the frontiers for the purpose of acquiring
masses of booty in order to placate a supposedly insatiable aristocracy.
Charles Martel, for example, after winning a significant victory at Poitiers
in 732, made no effort to lead his armies into Spain despite the death in
battle of the Muslim governor and the great wealth available on the Iberian
Peninsula. In a similar vein, King Pippin, who found it necessary in 754
and 756 to invade northern Italy in order to protect the papacy, did not,
after receiving the surrender of Pavia, make an effort to take control of
the Lombard kingdom. Rather, he led his armies back across the Alps to
continue the process of reunifying the Frankish kingdom. Finally, the
early Carolingians, whose eastern frontier suffered frequently from Saxon
raids, pursued a policy of constructing static defenses, e.g. the Germar
Mark, and undertaking punitive expeditions. A strategy of conquest was
eschewed as the Saxon region never had been a part of the regnum
Francorum.
Charlemagne, like the court historians who have provided us with infor-
mation regarding early Carolingian military strategy, was aware of the suc-
cessful and focused long-term efforts undertaken by his forebears. When
raised to the kingship, he understood the workings of the Carolingian
General Staff, the Magistratus, and also the substantial array of military
and economic assets available for royal exploitation through a well-
developed bureaucracy. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Charlemagne
also developed a long-term strategy that was no less ambitious than that
which had been pursued so successfully by his predecessors. Charlemagne,
in fact, can be seen early in his reign, i.e. the period treated in this book, to
have begun the task of bringing under Carolingian control as much of the
territory of the erstwhile Roman empire as he believed was consistent
with his resources. His ultimate goal was to become Roman emperor in
the west.
Before Charlemagne became king, it was clear not only to him but also
to his father that it was possible for the Carolingians to rule the west or at
least a substantial part of what had been Roman imperial territory. This
idea initially was fostered by the papacy before Charlemagne was born.
According to a report by a court historian, who was patronized by Duke
conclusions633
Childebrand, Charlemagnes great uncle, Pope Gregory III in 739 sent the
keys of St. Peters tomb along with other high-value relics to Charles
Martel. More importantly, the pope followed up these gifts with the offer
of a treaty. The pope proposed that Rome would abandon its allegiance to
the east Roman emperor and transfer it to the Frankish Mayor of the
Palace. If the treaty were to be brought to fruition, it would be Charles
duty, among other things, to replace the emperor as protector of the
papacy. On occasion, Rome referred to Charles as king even though he was
only Mayor of the Palace, thereby intimating that a Carolingian with papal
support could, in fact, be elevated to be rex Francorum.
Charles did not take up this papal initiative, which likely would have
diverted his efforts from the Carolingian long-term strategy of unifying the
Frankish kingdom. At the time, such an arrangement with the pope likely
would also have cost him Lombard military support, which he found use-
ful in operations against Muslims and their allies in southeastern Gaul.
However, both Pope Zacharias (741752) and Pope Stephen II (752757),
who, following Charles Martels death, sought close relations with Pippin
in order to secure Carolingian military support, followed up Gregorys
efforts. These popes gave their blessing to what would be the successful
Carolingian effort to depose King Childeric III, the reigning Merovingian
monarch, and have him replaced by Pippin, Charlemagnes father. In addi-
tion, Pope Stephen also established Pippin and his sons, Charlemagne and
Carloman the Younger, in the officium of patricius Romanorum, which
required that Frankish armies protect the papacy.
It was well-understood that this office, patricius of the Romans, was in
the imperial gift or could be made available by the emperor to a subordi-
nate through a properly executed mandatum. The popes warrant to exe-
cute imperial functions in the west on a scale far greater than the ability to
award a particular imperial office apparently first saw the light of day in a
fully developed form during the papacy of Paul (757767), whose curia
produced the document popularly known as the Donation of Constantine.
According to this document, Constantine the Great, upon departing for
Constantinople, is seen to have bestowed on the papacy the right to award
the imperial title in the west.
The fact that the Donation of Constantine was a forgery is irrelevant
in regard to its contemporary importance. Charlemagne accepted as fact
that the papacy would play a key role in his effort to vindicate a long-term
strategy to become emperor in the west. Some sense of Charlemagnes
strategy would seem to have been known outside the kings inner circle
by 775 at the latest. At this time, i.e. following Charlemagnes assumption
634 conclusions
of the Lombard royal title, the Northumbrian scholar Cathwulf, who had
connections with some members of the Carolingian court, observed that
the king of the Franks was in the process of being raised by God to be
ruler of the regnum Europae. This phrase, the kingdom of Europe, was a
contemporary synonym for the western half of the Roman Empire. Two
years later, following Charlemagnes receipt of the title rex Langobardo
rum, and the conquest of the Saxon region, Pope Hadrian referred to the
Frankish ruler, who now ruled two kingdoms, as novus Constantinus.
Campaign Strategy
The execution of Charlemagnes long-term strategy to secure the imperial

title would depend in the final analysis upon the success of a series of
military campaigns meticulously planned by the Magistratus. These cam-
paigns would focus on the establishment of Carolingian rule over large
swathes of territory that lay beyond the borders of the Frankish kingdom,
but which once had been a part of the Roman Empire in the west.
Charlemagne selected as his highest priority the conquest of the Saxon
region, a territory that extended as far east as the Elbe. It was well-
documented in Roman histories available to the royal court that during
the reign of Augustus (d. a.d. 14) this territory, although then not inhabited
by Saxons, was regarded as part of the Roman Empire.
During the century prior to Charlemagnes accession to the Frankish
throne, the early Carolingians had pursued a defensive strategy in dealing
with the Saxons. Their territory had never been a part of the Frankish king-
dom and there was no imperative to integrate it into a reunited regnum
Francorum. By contrast, it was Charlemagnes aim to reverse the strategy
that had been pursued by his father and grandfather and to undertake the
necessary diplomatic steps and military operations that would bring the
entire Saxon region under his direct rule as a part of the regnum Francorum.
In this process of political integration, Charlemagne intended also to bring
about the conversion of the Saxon people to Christianity, which was a
policy that was widely supported both by leaders among the Frankish
clergy and by the papacy.
Military Operations in Aquitaine
Before Charlemagne could begin planning military operations against the

Saxons, he learned, while celebrating Easter at Rouen, that Hunoald, the
conclusions635
son of Waiofar, who had ruled Aquitaine prior to the regions conquest
by King Pippin, had risen in revolt. At the time, Charlemagne was accom-
panied only by elements of the obsequium regalis, a rather small force,
and requested military aid from Carloman. The latter refused. Therefore,
Charlemagne marched south with this relatively small force and estab-
lished his initial base of operations in the fortress city of Angoulme. From
there, he issued orders to his counts in Aquitaine and further afield to
mobilize their expeditionary forces for a campaign in the region of the
Garonne. As made clear by the court sources, Charlemagne mustered a
very large and well-equipped army, with which he marched further south
and oversaw the construction of a fortified base at Fronsac. From this
stronghold, his forces were deployed so that they could strike across the
Garonne into Gascony.
In the course of marching south, Charlemagne pursued a strategy that
was aimed at crushing Hunoalds revolt and having Duke Lupus of Gascony
reaffirm his subjection to Carolingian rule. By mobilizing a very large army
from the pagi under his control, Charlemagne was positioned to deploy
overwhelming force and thereby to convince his adversaries or potential
adversaries that resistance would be futile. The Gascons were well aware
of Pippins recent successes in Aquitaine, and concluded that it would
be hopeless to oppose a Carolingian army in the field or, if combat were
avoided, to keep Charlemagnes forces from ravaging the duchy. In addi-
tion, the fortress cities of Gascony, though high quality late Roman bas-
tions, were no more likely to survive a Carolingian siege than those located
north of the Garonne had been earlier in the decade. As a result of Char
lemagnes sound planning and Duke Lupus rational response to the
proven capacity of Carolingian military assets, the revolt was crushed with
the surrender of Hunoald, bloodshed was avoided, and Gascon loyalty was
reaffirmed.
Lombard Diplomacy
The Divisio of 768 had left Carloman with exclusive control of Carolingian
policy in Italy. Charlemagne, however, refused to recognize his fathers will
in this matter, and shortly after his coronation participated, at the popes
request, in sending a high-level legation to Rome. In the autumn of 769,
the Lombard king Desiderius offered Charlemagne an alliance along
with the hand of his daughter Gerperga in marriage. After substantial
negotiations, conducted by Bertranda, the queen mother, and Abbot
Sturm of Fulda, a tripartite alliance among Charlemagne, Desiderius, and
636 conclusions
Pope Stephen III was solidified. This pact was intended to keep the peace
in northern Italy and to provide Charlemagne with a major role as arbiter
of Carolingian policy with regard to both Rome and Pavia.
The initial alliance between Charlemagne and Desiderius had con-
vinced the pope to agree to the tripartite pact. Moreover, Charlemagne
demonstrated its benefit to Rome in the near term by deploying Carolingian
armed forces both to Ravenna and to Beneventum in the successful sup-
port of papal interests. These efforts, moreover, were vindicated without
the need for overt military action. Carloman, however, was overwrought
by Stephens adherence to this alliance. Therefore, with the support of an
anti-papal faction at Rome, he worked to destroy the tripartite pact and
sent an army to Rome to threaten the pope. Through a series of diplomatic
maneuvers, Stephen and Desiderius undermined Carlomans initiative,
and his military commander, Dudo, understanding that prudence was
necessary, returned peacefully to Francia. Although there was no blood-
shed due to military operations, several of the Roman aristocrats who had
opposed Pope Stephen and the tripartite pact were imprisoned, exiled, or
killed.
The Saxon War-Phase One
Following the premature death of Carloman in 771, Charlemagne began

the process of reestablishing the unity of the Frankish kingdom under his
sole rule, monarchia, by barring his brothers sons from their inheritance.
He also set the Magistratus to work planning for the opening of hostilities
with the Saxons. Charlemagnes aim in this initial operation was to make
clear that a new offensive strategy, one of conquest, was being initiated. In
this first phase, Charlemagne is reported to have mobilized a large army
with which he began the process of conquest by establishing limes along
the Fulda Gap. He captured the Saxon fortress town of Eresburg, which
was linked by a well-used road to the Carolingian fortress at Braburg. This
line was extended further into Saxon territory as Charlemagne also saw to
the construction of a fortification probably at Herstelle, which at that time
controlled an important crossing of the Weser River.
From an offensive perspective, establishing control of the Fulda Gap
made possible the safe and rapid movement of Carolingian military forces
from the valley of the Fulda overland to Eresburg. Also in an offensive
vein, the stronghold constructed at Herstelle could serve as a forward base
for the projection of troops from Eresburg to the Weser, and would enable
conclusions637
Charlemagnes forces more easily to penetrate Saxon territory further to

the east. The limes planned for the Fulda Gap, like the Germar Mark estab-
lished further south, would in the future hamper Saxon raids into Frankish
territory. Carolingian troops established at Herstelle were positioned to
control the river crossing and also to serve as a base from which Carolingian
troops serving in the garrison of Eresburg could be warned of Saxon forces
approaching the Fulda Gap.
After these efforts at Eresburg and Herstelle were completed, Char
lemagne marched his army eastward and captured the Irminsul, a famous
and wealthy Saxon religious shrine. During several centuries of conflict
between the Franks, both Merovingians and Carolingians, and the Saxons,
no Frankish army had attacked this shrine despite the fact that it was
within easy reach of the Rhenish frontier. There would seem to have been
some sort of tacit agreement that the Irminsul and its treasure were off
limits. Therefore, by destroying the Irminsul itself and looting the shrine,
Charlemagne made it abundantly clear that the Carolingians were under-
taking a new and very different approach to dealing with the Saxons.
While encamped in the area of the Irminsul, Charlemagne learned that
a Saxon army had arrived on the banks of the Weser, and he led his troops
eastward to meet the enemy. When Charlemagnes forces reached the
Weser, probably in the region around Herstelle, the Saxons became aware
of the great size of the Carolingian force. Therefore, despite the Saxons
superior tactical deployment on the east bank of the river from which they
were well-positioned to block a Carolingian advance across the Weser,
their leaders concluded that engaging Charlemagnes army would be
highly imprudent. They requested a meeting and accepted terms. As a
result, the Saxons were spared a battle with the Franks, which likely would
have resulted in a massive defeat, and the subsequent ravaging of their
territory or at least some of the region east of the Weser. The Saxons,
Westphalians in this case, gave de jure recognition of Carolingian control
of the region from Eresburg to Herstelle, and provided hostages to guaran-
tee the treaty. It is noteworthy that Charlemagne did not demand that a
tribute be paid, and this is consistent with the Carolingian view that this
territory now was part of the Frankish regnum. One does not demand trib-
ute from ones subjects, only taxes.
War with the Lombards
After completing this first phase of military operations against the Saxons,
Charlemagne planned to advance beyond the Weser in order to obtain the
638 conclusions
submission of satraps who were established further to the east. However,

the diplomatic situation in Italy, which had begun to deteriorate following
the election of Pope Hadrian early in 772, began to unravel even more rap-
idly. Hadrian was bent on destroying the tripartite pact, and Desiderius,
who was committed to its survival, took increasingly aggressive actions
aimed at discouraging papal opposition. From the early summer of 772
until the late summer of 773, Charlemagne worked diligently through
diplomatic channels to avoid the destruction of the alliance. However, the
popes effective diplomatic maneuvering managed to isolate Desiderius,
and the result was a war which, in effect, was unwanted.
The Conquest of the Lombard Kingdom
Charlemagne did not want to go to war in Italy, which, at the least, would
mean postponing a second campaign to further his Saxon strategy.
Nevertheless, several months prior to a final decision, the Magistratus
began planning for a possible invasion the Lombard kingdom. The abbot
of Novalesa was summoned to the royal court and having been granted an
immunity, assured Charlemagne that he would be prepared to provide
logistical support for a Carolingian invasion force, or at least for its initial
phase in the Alps.
Pippins two successful invasions of the Lombard kingdom in 754 and
756 provided considerable information for the Magistratus, and the plans
approved by Charlemagne required the mobilization of two large armies.
One, under the command of Bernard, Charlemagnes uncle, was deployed
south of Alps in the eastern reaches of northern Italy as a blocking force to
keep potential support from reaching Desiderius. This was an innovation
in Frankish campaign strategy in regard to Italy as the political situation
potentially was more threatening to Carolingian operations in 773 than
had been the case either in 754 or 756.
The second large army was maintained under Charlemagnes direct
command. Its main elements marched through the Alps to confront
Desiderius forces, which were deployed in the clusae at Chiusa to the
south of the Carolingian fortress at Susa. However, like Pippin in 754,
Charlemagne divided his army, and sent a special force to outflank
Desiderius position from the west. This pincer movement, which was
based upon sound intelligence, likely provided both by local sources and
by the archbishop of Ravenna, was successful. As a result, when Desiderius
was informed that his army had been outflanked, he ordered a rapid
conclusions639
retreat. Some elements of the Lombard rearguard were engaged, likely by

the Carolingian special force, and the duke of Spoleto was killed. However,
like Charlemagnes military campaigns in Aquitaine and in the Saxon
region, his success at Chiusa was largely a bloodless victory as neither the
Carolingian nor Lombard main forces engaged.
Following his victory at Chiusa, Charlemagne marched south, and
established a close siege of the Lombard capital of Pavia. He vallated and
contra-vallated this formidable erstwhile Roman fortress city. Shortly after
the siege was in place, however, Charlemagne learned that Adelchis,
Desiderius son and co-ruler, was ensconced with his military household
at Verona. This fortress city was a key element in regard to control of
communications between Bavaria in the north, ruled by Desiderius
son-in-law, and to the east, from which both Lombard forces and Avar
mercenaries could move against the Frankish army besieging Pavia.
Charlemagne understood the threat, and drew troops from his command
at Pavia and from Bernards army in the east. With this combined force,
a third army, he threatened to take Verona by storm. The threat was
successful, and the city surrendered. In the process, Charlemagne cap-
tured Carlomans sons, who had escaped to Italy with their mother follow-
ing their fathers death. Adelchis, however, escaped.
The third army, which had brought about the capture of Verona, was
then deployed by Charlemagne to obtain the surrender of the fortress
cities and lesser strongholds in the northern and eastern reaches of
the Lombard kingdom. Charlemagne himself returned to Pavia in order
to continue the siege of Desiderius capital. Several months of desultory
fighting followed, and it became clear to the defenders that there were
insufficient Frankish forces investing the city to assure its fall if Char
lemagne were to order the walls to be stormed in an all-out attack. There
fore, Desiderius saw no immediate reason to surrender, and would seem to
have hoped that the Franks would tire of the siege and return home.
Charlemagne also understood that he lacked the overwhelming force that
would require the Lombards to capitulate. He knew, in addition, that if he
did order an all-out attack, his army would suffer very heavy casualties,
and, therefore, this was an option that he was loath to exercise. He also
was aware that despite serious losses, such a Carolingian effort might, in
fact, fail to take the city.
As the stalemate continued at Pavia, Charlemagne decided to go to
Rome during Easter to meet with Pope Hadrian, who already was orches-
trating Carolingian logistical support to sustain the siege of Pavia.
Charlemagne asked the pope to provide sufficient numbers of fresh troops
640 conclusions
for the siege of Pavia to guarantee that Desiderius would surrender his
capital when faced with overwhelming force. The pope agreed in return
for the so-called Donation of Charlemagne, by which the Frankish king
swore that after deposing Desiderius and becoming king of the Lombards,
he would hand over to Rome vast swathes of territory throughout north-
ern Italy. Charlemagne then returned to Pavia with a very large army,
amusingly described by Notker. Desiderius, upon recognizing that Char
lemagnes forces were sufficiently numerous to assure that an all-out
assault on the walls would succeed, eschewed further resistance and
surrendered.
Charlemagnes decision to take control of the Lombard kingdom and
assume the royal title was a second major departure from early Carolingian
long-term strategy. It was, however, fundamentally consistent with his
own aims, as northern Italy obviously had been an important part of the
Roman Empire in the west. In addition, the possession of two royal titles
was, prima facie, an important attribute for any ruler who ultimately
planned to be elevated to the imperial office. Although it is highly likely
that Charlemagne planned to take control of northern Italy at some time
in the future, it is not clear whether, when he began the Italian campaign
in the late summer of 773, this was fundamental to his immediate war
aims. However, as the Donation required by Hadrian in return for rein-
forcements was based upon Charlemagnes accession to the Lombard
kingship, he rapidly acquiesced in the matter.
Once Pavia surrendered and the third army obtained the capitulation
of the remaining Lombard fortifications in the north, Charlemagne made
rather minor changes in the administration of the kingdom. His adversar-
ies, who held important administrative positions, were replaced, his active
supporters were rewarded, and those who were permitted to remain in
office swore fidelitas to the new king. The Lombard royal fisc was placed
directly under Carolingian royal control and some military adjustments
were undertaken. For example, the monastery of St. Martin at Tours was
given extensive lands and major military responsibilities in the region of
Verona. The monasteries of Farfa and Bobbio were provided with immuni-
ties by which they were integrated into Carolingian military organization.
At this time, Charlemagne was eager to return to the Frankish kingdom
as the Saxons, or at least some Saxons, had violated the treaty made in 772.
They had retaken Eresburg and likely had destroyed Herstelle. Braburg
and Fritzlar had been besieged, but unsuccessfully, and much of the fron-
tier had been devastated with substantial loss of life and the destruction
or capture of capital assets. Likely of particular concern to Charlemagne
conclusions641
was the carrying off of Christians to be sold as slaves by the pagan Saxons.
The sources also take particular note of the losses inflicted on the mer-
chant settlement and missionary base at Deventer, particularly in regard
to its physical infrastructure.
The Saxon War: Phase Two
As Charlemagne led his army on the lengthy march northward from Italy,
Carolingian military planning initially focused on punishing the Saxons
for their attacks on Frankish assets and reestablishing momentum for his
strategy of conquest. The need to obtain fresh intelligence was crucial.
While celebrating a triumph at Ingelheim for his victory in Italy, Char
lemagne deployed four scarae into the Saxon region. Their mission was
to retaliate for the Saxon attack by ravaging parts of their territory. In
addition, these scarae, undoubtedly composed of mounted troops capable
of rapid movement, carried out an extensive reconnaissance, especially in
the region of Eresburg. Although it is unlikely that these operations
resulted in bringing much booty back home, they are credited with caus-
ing substantial damage in parts of the Saxon region. The subsequent
success of phase two of Charlemagnes Saxon campaign permits the infer-
ence that the reconnaissance undertaken by these scarae provided the
Magistratus with useful detailed intelligence regarding the enemys
defenses.
Charlemagnes invasion of the Saxon region with an exceptionally large
army rather late in the summer of 775 was conceived as having two dis-
tinct phases. Initially, the Saxon fortress of Syburg was captured by storm
and this was followed up by the recapture of the fortified town of Eresburg,
which did not resist. In fact, the garrison fled. With these fortifications in
Carolingian hands, Charlemagne advanced along the Weser to Brunisberg,
where he defeated a Saxon force in a two-phased battle, which gave the
Carolingians control of the ford. There, Charlemagne established a base
with fortifications on both sides of the river and stationed a substantial
force to hold the position.
Charlemagne then divided the remainder of his very large army into
two groups. The main force, under Charlemagnes direct command,
advanced into Ostphalia and brought about the surrender of the satrap
Hessi and then moved into Angraria and did the same with Bruno. In both
cases, the Saxon armies mobilized to oppose Charlemagne surrendered
without opposition. They swore oaths to be loyal to Charlemagne and the
642 conclusions
Franks and handed over hostages. The third unit of Charlemagnes army
was deployed along the west bank of the Weser with a fortified base at
Lbbecke in order to act as a blocking force should the Westphalians try to
attack the left flank of the Carolingian army operating in Ostphalia and
Angraria. This blocking force was engaged by the enemy, but the battle
resulted in a stalemate. Later, while these Westphalians were in retreat,
they were destroyed by elements of the large force that had been under
Charlemagnes direct command.
The Friuli Diversion
As the Magistratus was in the process of preparing to undertake the plan-

ning of a third phase of operations in the Saxon region, it became clear to
Charlemagne that a plan had been developed, likely in Constantinople
under the aegis of Constantine V, to place Adelchis on the Lombard throne.
Before this effort could be undertaken, however, Constantine died, and
with him the prospect of a Byzantine army and fleet operating in support
of those Lombard dukes who were willing to revolt against Frankish rule.
As soon as the Brenner Pass cleared in the spring of 776, Charlemagne led
a large force against the three rebel dukes who remained loyal to Adelchis,
and seriatim, the Carolingian army, after establishing its base at Verona,
secured the surrender of the fortress cities of Vicenza and Treviso.
Charlemagnes forces then defeated Duke Hrodgaud of Friuli in battle,
and his fortress capital capitulated shortly thereafter.
The End of the Saxon War
While Charlemagne was punishing those who had supported the ducal
uprising and rewarding those who gave him support, e.g. Archbishop Leo
of Ravenna, intelligence reached him that the Saxons once again had
revolted. This was, in fact, a massive Saxon effort, for which at least two
large armies were mobilized. The Saxon aim was to reverse the gains won
by the Carolingians during Charlemagnes previous campaigns. One Saxon
army, divided into several units, ravished Frankish settlements east of the
Rhine and succeeded once again in retaking the fortress at Eresburg. Their
investment of Syburg failed as a Carolingian relief force arrived in time to
drive off the besiegers. Saxon operations in the Fulda region were thwarted
by the efforts of Abbot Sturm. He led the Carolingian defense and, with an
expeditionary force mobilized in the region, defeated a large Saxon army
conclusions643
which sought to destroy the monastery at Fulda and would seem to have
planned to advance on the royal palatium at Frankfort.
The second Saxon army, advancing westward into the valley of the
Lippe, was harassed by Charlemagnes scarae, which had relieved the siege
at Syburg. While these operations were being undertaken, Charlemagne
had been mustering an immense force at Worms, which marched north to
Xanten and then, upon crossing the Rhine, advanced up the valley of the
Lippe. There, the Carolingians began construction of a large military base
at Paderborn and confronted the large Saxon force that had moved down
river in the direction of the Rhine. This was the second army which had
been mobilized for an attack on Frankish assets in the north. However, as
in previous instances, when the Saxons realized that they faced over-
whelming force with no chance for victory, they immediately sued for
peace. The supplicants admitted their wrongdoing, promised to become
Christians, accepted Charlemagne as their ruler, and recognized that the
Saxon territory was to become a part of the regnum Francorum.
Integration of the Saxon Region
The integration of the Saxon region into the Frankish kingdom, which also
required the conversion of the populace to Christianity, was understood
by Charlemagne and his advisers to be a difficult task. First, and perhaps
most importantly, it was evident that the Saxons were prone to violate
their oaths and even to sacrifice hostages when they believed that such
behavior was in their interest. However, it also was clear to Charlemagne
and his advisers as well as to Pope Hadrian, that the Saxons had been con-
quered. Confidence in a sustained long-term victory likely rested upon the
uncontroversial fact of overall Carolingian military superiority. The Saxons
could not effectively oppose Charlemagnes large armies in the field nor
could they hold their fortresses against large and well-equipped Frankish
forces.
From Charlemagnes perspective, the integration of the Saxon region
into the regnum Francorum would provide peace and order. It was nec
essary, therefore, for a royal administrative structure to be imposed
throughout the conquered territory so that commands from the central
government could be conveyed to the people, taxes could be collected,
missionaries could effect the conversion of pagans, and Saxon fighting
men could be mobilized for service in Charlemagnes armies. To execute
these basic functions of government, it was necessary to acquire and
644 conclusions
systematize information regarding the human and physical geography of

the region. The Carolingian government would have to identify places of
Saxon settlement, to become familiar with the various systems of roads,
however primitive these may have been, to learn about the courses of riv-
ers that criss-crossed the region along with their navigability in various
seasons of the year, and to identify passes through the mountains.
The Carolingians had numerous assets from which to obtain the infor-
mation that was needed. For example, much information regarding
the physical geography of the region between the Weser and the Elbe was
to be found in Roman texts available to the royal court. In addition,
the remains of Roman fortifications were scattered throughout the coun-
tryside and especially along the banks of various rivers. Contemporary
human intelligence assets also were available, as the Carolingians could
debrief fighting men who had campaigned in Saxon territory during the
past thirty or forty years. Missionaries who had been working among
the Saxons during this same time period also were in a position to provide
valuable intelligence to Charlemagnes government. Further, those
merchants who traveled through the region between the Rhine and the
Elbe potentially were fonts of information regarding the location of
villages, the nature of the roads, and the courses of rivers. Finally, friendly
Saxons, who already had converted to Christianity and, perhaps most
importantly, Saxon aristocrats, who wished to become a part of the
Carolingian regime, were in a position to provide vital information.
Campaign Tactics
Strategically, major offensive military campaigns, especially those intended

to conquer and occupy enemy territory, were focused on fortifications.
Therefore, especially once enemy territory had been taken, a defensive
strategy based upon the holding of fortifications was developed to thwart
enemy war aims. Charlemagnes predecessors had invested substantial
human and material resources in the construction of large numbers of for-
tifications and additional human resources in garrisoning these strong-
holds. In some cases, these fortifications also served as refuges for the local
population when there was an enemy attack. At the most elementary
level, the caput of each villa of the royal fisc was fortified and signal fires
were maintained to warn of enemy incursions.
On the frontier, complexes of fortifications were constructed. The
Germar Mark likely was begun by Pippin and Carloman the Elder and
conclusions645
seems to have been completed ca. 780 under Charlemagnes watchful eye.
This march, composed of more than a dozen strongholds, protected the
southern reaches of the frontier between Saxon and Frankish territory in
the area of the southern Hartz and along the Saale. It is noteworthy that no
Saxon attacks are reported in this region. Further south on the frontier
between the Franks and the Slavs, in excess of thirty fortifications were
constructed by the early Carolingians prior to Charlemagnes accession
and he added many more. The Germar Mark and the Slav March, later
called the Sorbian March, were conceived on the principle of defense in
depth. This tactical strategy made enemy offensive military operations
very difficult, while providing bases for the projection of Carolingian
offensive forces into enemy territory.
Charlemagne also benefited from other early Carolingian defense ini-
tiatives. Among these, river valleys such as the Lahn and Kinzig were given
a high priority. Along the course of the former for a distance of some
150 kilometers, the Carolingians maintained strongholds at Dietkirchen,
Gronauer Schloss, Amnenburg, and Dreihausen, with its eastern termi-
nus at the great fortress of Kesterburg on the Christenberg. Along the
much shorter and less vulnerable valley of the Kinzig, the Carolingians
maintained fortifications at Glauberg and Alte Burg. Charlemagne also
supported these assets and contributed to the defense of the Lippe valley
by maintaining control of the stronghold at Sythen and building a signifi-
cant military and administrative complex at Paderborn. Like the marches
discussed above fortifications in the river valleys also had offensive poten-
tial for supplying and projecting military forces eastward into enemy
territory.
Offensive Campaign Tactics
In addition to taking advantage of and improving upon the complexes of

fortifications built by the early Carolingians for defensive purposes,
Charlemagne employed campaign tactics that were intended to bring
enemy strongholds under his control in order to dominate their territory.
In 769, operations in Aquitaine depended upon convincing the duke of
Gascony that he would be unable to hold the fortress cities of the region
should he choose to oppose Carolingian rule and support the revolt by
Hunoald. In the Saxon campaigns, the fortress of Eresburg was a focal
point. Charlemagne captured it, lost it, recaptured it, lost it again, and
finally recaptured it. The Saxons, moreover, showed no reluctance to
646 conclusions
engage in siege operations, as indicated by their recapture of Eresburg

and the siege of Syburg. Charlemagnes initial military operations in the
Lombard kingdom saw the surrender of numerous fortress cities as well as
the capitulation of Pavia. His success in crushing of the ducal revolt
depended on the surrender of Vicenza, Treviso, and Friuli.
Armies under Charlemagnes direct command which faced the enemy
in the field were uniformly successful. When the Carolingians encoun-
tered a difficult situation, as in the clusae south of the Alps, Charlemagne
executed a pincer movement which saw his special forces outflank
the Lombard defenders at Chiusa. As a result, the Lombards undertook
a headlong retreat. In operations at Brunisberg, Carolingian armies
destroyed the Saxon vanguard and then charged the enemy main force
that was deployed on the right bank of the Weser. No further combat
took place during this aspect of the campaign. In general, however, most
enemy forces chose to avoid combat, and, as with Carolingian success in
siege operations, the Saxons usually surrendered on terms and without
resistance.
Charlemagnes military operations, whether the capture of various for-
tress cities, towns, or lesser strongholds, or the surrender of enemy forces
in the field, tended to result in small numbers of casualties. Carolingian
success in winning essentially bloodless victories was due to Charlemagnes
insistence that very large armies be mobilized to execute the campaign
tactics planned by the Magistratus. Charlemagne not only was an adher-
ent of what modern scholars call the doctrine of overwhelming force, but
also was a good steward of his troops well-being. As a result, he tried to
limit Frankish casualties. In addition, he understood that no rational
enemy commander would try to hold a fortress when the defenders were
outnumbered by six or seven to one. Similarly, when Charlemagnes forces
greatly outnumbered his enemies in the field, he understood that the
enemy had no choice but to surrender or be destroyed. In accepting
the capitulation either of fortresses or armies in the field, Charlemagne,
like his father, demonstrated a tendency to be lenient with those who
had rejected military action and surrendered.
Fundamental to Charlemagnes campaign strategy was the use of forti-
fied bases from which to project his forces against the enemy. These bases
served as magazines to provide additional logistic support when necessary
and as potential refuges for his forces should a serious reverse of some sort
be suffered and a retreat was required. During the Aquitanian campaign,
Charlemagne first used the fortress city of Angoulme as his base, and
there he ordered the mobilization of a very large army from throughout
conclusions647
the region. He then built a stronghold further south at Fronsac from which
his forces could strike across the Garonne. During the Saxon campaigns,
Braburg was used initially as a base to project Carolingian forces that
were deployed against Eresburg, with the aim of establishing limes
between these two strongholds for control of the Fulda Gap. Then, from
Eresburg, Charlemagne projected his forces eastward. He saw to the
establishment of temporary fortified bases at Brunisberg and at Lbbecke.
In Italy, Charlemagne initially used Susa as his base for operations against
Desiderius at Chiusa and then established his siege camp at Pavia. In
crushing the ducal revolt, Charlemagne established his main base at
Verona.
Charlemagnes campaign tactics, when appropriate, also called for the
use of blocking forces. During initial Carolingian operations against King
Desiderius, Charlemagne deployed his uncle Bernard with a substantial
army in the eastern reaches of the Lombard kingdom. This force was
deployed to minimize the potential for Bavarians, Avars, or Byzantines
to come to the aid of Desiderius at Pavia. Charlemagne also deployed a
blocking force during his second Saxon campaign. He established a corps
from his very large army to operate along the west bank of the Weser with
the aim of keeping Westphalian troops from attacking the Carolingian
left flank as he advanced into Ostphalia and Angraria. This blocking force
was based at the above-mentioned stronghold which was constructed at
Lbbecke.
Battle Tactics
Carolingian military operations focused, in general, on fortifications. In

order to capture various strongholds, Charlemagne utilized a matrix of
tactics. During the opening stages of operations in Aquitaine, Charlemagne
threatened to ravage Gascony should Duke Lupus disobey his orders and
choose to defend the fortress cities of the region against the Carolingians.
Charlemagnes aim was to avoid having to lay siege to these formidable
strongholds. The threat was effective because Duke Lupus understood
that over time he could not hold these bastions against a dedicated
Carolingian effort. Consequently, Charlemagne found it necessary neither
to ravage the Gascon countryside nor to besiege the many fortress cities of
the duchy.
In seeking to crush the ducal revolt in Italy, Charlemagne initially
threatened to ravage the countryside in the environs of Vicenza and
648 conclusions
Treviso if they did not surrender. The rebel dukes, apparently hoping to
be saved by a relief force, initially refused to capitulate, and Charlemagne
ordered his armies to ravage the region. When those who supported
the revolt came to understand the great damage that was being done
to their capital infrastructure, the dukes surrendered to Charlemagne.
The situation regarding Friuli followed a somewhat different course.
Charlemagne began by ravaging the duchy, and in response Duke
Hrodgaud led an army out to meet the Franks. This force was defeated
decisively, the duke was killed, and Friuli surrendered without putting
up any resistance. During this campaign, Charlemagnes basic tactical
goal was to avoid the establishment of a siege that could be both lengthy
and costly.
When neither the threat of ravaging enemy territory in the environs of
a stronghold nor the actual execution of this tactic was sufficient to obtain
the capitulation of the defenders, Charlemagne employed other tactics.
Because he habitually mobilized very large armies, the option to storm the
enemy position with overwhelming force often convinced the defenders
to surrender as was the case in regard to Verona in 773. When the defend-
ers proved foolishly stubborn, Charlemagne did, in fact, have his forces
storm the walls as was the case both in regard to Sythen and Eresburg.
When he lacked sufficient manpower either to cow the defenders of a
fortress city into surrender, e.g. Pavia in 773774, or to storm the walls, he
established a sophisticated siege with a vallation and contra-vallation.
Eventually, when Pope Hadrian provided reinforcements for the Carolin
gian army, Desiderius surrendered because he knew that his position
would succumb to overwhelming force if an all-out attack were launched
against Pavia.
Not all of Charlemagnes military operations were focused on fortifica-
tions, and there were battles in the field. Some such battles, however,
developed in the course of defending or attacking a fortification, as was
the case at Syburg, where a pincer movement was used, and in the course
of advancing against Friuli, where Charlemagnes army enveloped the
forces of Duke Hrogaud which were defending a bridgehead. Among other
tactics used by Charlemagne was an attack in line to envelop the Saxon
vanguard which was defending the ford Brunisberg and an attack in col-
umn to smash the remainder of the Saxon force that was deployed on the
right bank of the Weser. Since Charlemagnes armies were very large and
generally greatly outnumbered their adversaries, the latter usually either
surrendered or fled, and, as a result, Charlemagnes forces had relatively
little opportunity to employ sophisticated battle tactics on a regular basis
conclusions649
of a type that might be needed when ones forces were rather more evenly
matched by those of the enemy.
Large Armies
During the first decade of Charlemagnes reign, Carolingian military forces

undertook offensive operations from the North Sea to the duchy of
Beneventum south of Rome and from the Gascon frontier on the Garonne
to the region between the Weser and the Elbe in the east. In the campaigns
treated in this study, armies under Charlemagnes direct command tra-
versed in excess of 10,000 kilometers. For major military operations,
Charlemagne, as noted above, mobilized large armies, and the sources
consistently recognize that the expeditionary forces which Charlemagne
personally commanded were large, or even very large. The phrase ingens
exercitus is a commonplace.
It is noteworthy that this type of formulation is contrary to the tradi-
tional classical and medieval topos which requires that the forces of the
home side are to be reported as smaller than those against whom they
fight. The purpose of such distortion, i.e. the David and Goliath model, is
to magnify the glory that is gained in victory and to avoid blame in defeat.
By contrast, the sources, which are thoroughly biased in favor of the
Carolingians, recognized that Charlemagne commanded large armies,
which gives substance to the view that he pursued a strategic orientation
which modern scholars characterize as the doctrine of overwhelming
force. Charlemagne relied upon large armies, in part, because he sought
to compel his adversaries to accept terms and thereby, when possible, to
avoid combat and the large numbers of dead and wounded which accom-
panied such engagements. Avoidance of losses, of course, is one of the
main purposes for deploying overwhelming force, and in these efforts
Charlemagne often was successful.
Military Administration
Charlemagnes ability to mobilize large armies rested, in part, on the fact

that his regnum had a large population, which likely was in the 20-million
range. By contrast, Alfred the Great (d. 899) ruled the kingdom of Wessex,
which had a total population of fewer than a half-million men, women,
and children. However, simply ruling a large, populous, and rich kingdom
does not entirely account for Charlemagnes very large and successful
650 conclusions
armies. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that Charlemagnes mili-

tary operations, as well as those of his subordinates, were made possible
by the efforts of thousands of royal officials, who worked diligently and
effectively to facilitate the mobilization and support of these armies.
At the heart of Charlemagnes military administration were the various
bureaux of the central government. From a military perspective the most
important of these was the Magistratus, Charlemagnes General Staff,
which meticulously planned all offensive military operations based upon
the extensive gathering of intelligence regarding the enemies and would
be enemies of the Carolingians. Also of great importance for the success of
Charlemagnes armies was the royal fiscal administration under a count
based at the court who, along with his numerous clerks, oversaw the func-
tioning of the royal fisc. This bureau not only saw to the provisioning of
the royal court, but played a key role in arranging logistical support for
Charlemagnes armies from more than 600 villae, which were under the
direct control of the central government.
At the local level, Charlemagne commanded several hundreds of
comital governments, each of which included viscounts, vicarii, centenarii,
as well as lesser officials and an army of clerks, who produced large quanti-
ties of paperwork in regard to the mobilization of fighting men among
other matters of administrative importance. These local bureaucrats were
charged with mustering the expeditionary levies in their pagi and to
organizing logistical support for these fighting men. Similar tasks were
undertaken by the hundreds of stewards and their staffs of those elements
of the royal fisc that were held directly by Charlemagne. In addition, royal
officials oversaw the administration of villae that had been granted by the
king as beneficia to various of his vassi and fideles. The work of these fiscal
officials at the local level was complemented by the administrations of
hundreds of ecclesiastical institutions, both episcopal and monastic.
These church bureaucrats also mobilized troops and organized logistical
support, either according to obligations inherent in the immunities they
had been granted by the king or as subjects of comital jurisdiction.
The ability of Charlemagne to mobilize very large armies also depended,
in part, on the fact that his authority was not challenged at the local level,
where expeditionary militia forces, which composed the numerical bulk
of his armies of conquest, were mustered. The failure of lay magnates,
whether royal officials or not, and clerical magnates, immunists or not,
to comply, or even to comply less fully than ordered, with their military
obligations had the potential to undermine Charlemagnes efforts to
mobilize large armies. Charlemagnes accomplishments in maintaining
conclusions651
control at the local level in order to sustain large armies is noteworthy in

light of his rather recent acquisition of approximately half of the Frankish
kingdom following the death of his brother in 771.
In displacing Carlomans legitimate heirs, Charlemagnes monarchia
certainly was open to challenge. It is important to emphasize, therefore,
that whatever negative views some or perhaps even many Frankish
magnates may have harbored in regard to Charlemagnes policies or even
to his rule, in general, were muted while Carolingian armies carried exten-
sive military operations both in Italy and in the Saxon territory. One finds
no echo in the sources of this period, which, on occasion, in later times
provide evidence for opposition, both active and passive, to royal power
and authority in the regnum Francorum.
It also is of considerable importance that Charlemagnes armies were
highly disciplined. In this regard, there is tendency among medieval
authors, and especially clerical authors, to highlight a lack of military
discipline even among Christian troops in the armies of the early Middle
Ages. Such reports often are complemented by an emphasis on the dam-
age done, especially by soldiers foraging for supplies or seeking booty, to
innocents and more particularly to the assets and personnel of the church.
In the Carolingian accounts of Charlemagnes operations during the
period under discussion, despite the fact that they generally were authored
by clerics, there are no reports of a lack of food for the troops due to
administrative failures. Also, there are no reports regarding the harass-
ment of the peasants in the countryside, the sacking of cities or smaller
population centers by Carolingian armies as a result of a lack of discipline
or an obsessive search for booty. In addition, archaeologists have not dug
up evidence of significant material damage.
Only in regard to the Italian campaign of 776 is it reported that the
Carolingian army ravaged enemy territory. This operation clearly demon-
strates that the sources were not unwilling to report such information,
despite their bias in favor of Charlemagne. These operations in 776, how-
ever, were, in fact, the result of a tactical decision taken by Charlemagne
to encourage the rapid surrender of the enemy and to forestall the lengthy
siege of at least two fortress cities, which in the long term likely
would have caused even greater damage and loss of life. It is important
to reiterate here that these operations did not result from a failure of
logistical support or from a lack of discipline among the troops. Moreover,
it is noteworthy that following these operations and the crushing of the
ducal revolt, Charlemagne ordered that any of his Lombard subjects
who believed that they had suffered unwarranted losses as a result of
652 conclusions
these operations, i.e. collateral damage, were to be reimbursed at govern-

ment expense.
Leadership
Early in his career, Charlemagne led all major military operations. These
were planned in detail by the Magistratus. On rare occasions, one or
another count can be identified leading a small military operation such as
those undertaken in Ravenna and Beneventum in 771. During the siege of
Verona, while Charlemagne was in direct command, one of his counts is
seen to secure a base of operations at a local monastery. With the excep-
tion of Bernard, Charlemagnes uncle, who commanded the blocking force
during military operations in Italy in 773774, seculars are rarely noticed
carrying out the officium of command or identified by name as leading
troops. This is the case even in regard to operations that get considerable
attention. For example, the successful garrison commander at Syburg is
not named nor is the officer who led the pincer movement at Chiusa.
Some of Charlemagnes military commanders who were clerics are
named. During this period, Abbot Sturm is given considerable attention
both for his defense of the Fulda region in 776 and for his diplomatic
efforts, carried on in concert with Bertranda, in regard to the crafting
the tripartite alliance. Moreover, Charlemagne gave Sturm overall com-
mand of the Fulda Gap with his headquarters at Eresburg. Liudgar, who
later was made bishop of Mnster, is seen to command military forces
in the region between Utrecht and the valley of the Ems, where he was
delegated authority to pay particular attention to Frisian pagans. This
effort had religious and diplomatic aspects as well as entailing military
obligations. By contrast with Sturm and Liudgar, Abbot Fulrad of St. Denis
would seem to have been limited to diplomatic service as Charlemagnes
leading expert on the papacy. However, his monastery was charged with
undertaking a broad spectrum of military obligations throughout the
Frankish kingdom.
Clerical leadership in the mobilizing of Charlemagnes military assets
went far deeper than acting as commanders in one or another military
operation. Bishops and abbots, as a result of immunities provided by
Charlemagne, had the overall responsibility for mustering the military
forces that were required of them from throughout their lands as well as
securing the food stuffs and equipment that were needed to supply impor-
tant elements of the Carolingian army while on campaign. Usually, royal
conclusions653
officials were barred from direct interference in the operations of immune

bishops and abbots. However, when the resources of one or another eccle-
siastical institution, e.g. the bishopric of Metz, were so vast and so widely
scattered throughout the length and breadth of the regnum Francorum,
Charlemagne instructed his counts and their subordinates to monitor the
success with which the immunists carried out their duty.
A Final Word
The Carolingian military under Charlemagnes command, as it had been

under the leadership of his father, King Pippin, was an awesome matrix of
efficiently-run institutions staffed by at least several thousand loyal and
able administrators and undergirded by a flourishing economy. Foremost
among these administrators were the counselors of the Magistratus and
their staffs. Charlemagnes dedication to an offensive strategy based on
overwhelming force, and a defensive strategy of holding territory devel-
oped by his forebears and based on defense in depth, were fundamental to
Carolingian military success. Based in large part on his orientation toward
being prudent, Charlemagne avoided wasting his troops in high-profile
efforts to attain personal glory. As a result, he assured the loyalty of the
men who fought under his command. Even in Charlemagnes early cam-
paigns, we can see one of Europes greatest military figures in the making.
Charlemagne, like Scipio, was a general, not a warrior.
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INDEX
Aa, river, ford on6157 Agilofing, ducal family of Bavaria188

Aachen, great hall at557 Agilulf, Lombard king488
Abba, commander of Dokkum region609 Agmo, count426
Abattes, trees used to block roads548 Agnellus306
Abbo, abbot of Fleury53 n196 Liber pontificalis ecclesiae
Abbo, rector of Maurienne and Ravennatis306
Susa28990 Agriculture1217, 1268
Abbots29, 31, 356 and climate change15
and administration44 handbooks on13, 14
appointment of43 Roman agriculture13
and military mustering6523 surplus in15
and support for military operations224 and trade15
Abd ar Rachman, Umayyad governor of Agrimensores14, 3378, 557
Spain126, 136, 629 Aiguebelle300
Acephalous societies200 n101 Aio, Lombard noble499, 500 n92
Adalfrid, abbot of St. Amand384 exile of503
Adalhard of Corbie, cousin of Aire, fortress city127, 130
Charlemagne20, 28, 30 n105, 31, 60, Aistulf, Lombard king257, 274, 277 n93,
1878, 246, 430 2912, 311, 491
De ordine palatii20, 29, 30 n105, 80, 430, military assets of2912
5956 and siege of Pavia31114
Adelchis, son of Desiderius89, 139, 141, 151, Al Hakam I, emir95
155, 157, 274, 307, 318, 356, 371, 391, 457, Alahis, duke of Trent489
461, 463, 642 Alamania
and Constantine V392 Carlomans kingdom in109
escape from Pavia3912 Carolingian forces in4
at Verona3568, 364 n199, 639 Carolingian troop mobilization
escape from Verona3656, 371, 639 from430
Adige, river36061, 364 Charlemagnes interests in189
Administration estates of St. Denis monastery in420
assets of1721 Tassilo of Bavarias influence in140
documentation of1821 Alaric, Visigothic king174
local administration4344 military forces of173
and military operations17 Alaric II, Visigothic ruler in Aquitaine629
and royal power43 Alberic of Utrecht407, 612, 61820
surviving texts on20, 21 appointment as Archbishop of
Admonitio Generalis (capitulary)100 Cologne622
Ado of Vienne302 n170 Albertville300
Adour river129 Albinus2745
Adour valley, wine production in127 Alboin, Lombard king485, 488
Adrevald of Fleury36 Alcuin35, 52, 4789, 596, 620
Adriatic, Charlemagnes influence on81 Admonitio Generalis100 n378
Afiarta, Paul, cubicularius in the papal correspondence with
household1645, 175, 248, 252, 266, 269 Charlemagne1057
imprisonment of268 Propostitions for Sharpening Youth80
Agen121 and Vegetius works1056
Aggers, earthen ramparts434 Alexander the Great497
692 index
Alfred the Great, king of Wessex100 n38, Annales Mettenses priores508, 521
132, 649 Annales Petaviani391, 508, 559
military forces756, 133 Annales qui dicitur Einhardi91, 93, 101, 117,
naval forces of133 508
strongholds of588 Annales regni Francorum91, 93, 116, 5089,
Alo, duke387 520, 5456
Alpine passes, Carolingian control of480, Annales S. Maximiani508
503 Annalist, of the Saxon court417 n4
Alps299 Annapes, royal villa, fortifications of5312
crossing of507 Annecy300
geography of, and Carolingian military Annua dona (tax)45
planning480, 481 Anreppen602
Lombard defenses in293 Roman military base at555, 602
trade routes through48 Anselm, abbot of Nonantola274, 387,
Alsace421 4823
estates of St. Denis monastery in420 and Carolingian intelligence
Alstedt, Germar Mark at5846 gathering490
Alte Burg, Carolingian fortifications Charlemagnes grants to504
at223, 645 Ansfredus152
Altfrid, the author of Liudgers Vita621 Anskar572
Altrip, Ravenna geographers itinerary Antioch326 n55
through474 Anti-pope267, 280
Ambascia, carting service227 Antiqua consuetudo, Roman legislation
Ambushes549 used by Carolingians22
Amico, abbot of Murbach4212 Aosta290, 297
Amicus, abbot of605 Carolingian enclave at281
Ammianus Marcellinus69, 1045 Aquitaine
Amnenburg, Carolingian fortifications Carlomans campaign in631
at221, 537, 645 Carlomans kingdom in109
Anastasius, papal chamberlain41618 Carolingian conquest of3, 314
Anathema, papal sentence of2723 Carolingian ditio in58, 89
Ancona Carolingian military operations in4, 64
Lombard militia forces from321 n249, 86, 9011, 1158, 243, 6345
papal military forces from379 Carolingian troop mobilization
Andernach, magazines at552 from430
Andrea of Bergamo499 n90, 502 n101 Charlemagnes kingdom in109
Andrew, bishop and papal missus416 Charlemagnes military assets in1245
Angers116 Frankish place names in125
Angilbert, poet628 Hunoalds revolt in635
De conversione Saxonum6289 Lupus assets in12530
Angilramnus, bishop of Metz4245 Pippins conquest of90, 114, 243
Anglo-Saxon (language)199 revolt in (769)11518
Angoulme118, 125 Arbon
Carolingian base at137, 635, 646 Ravenna Geographers itinerary to475
Charlemagnes army at118 stronghold at476
Angoumois, Frankish military colonists Arc, valley of290
in125 Archaeological sources, Carolingian967
Angraria, Saxon region of240, 394, 450 Archers2845
Carolingian army field operations effectiveness of355
in439, 446, 589 rate of fire3545
Angrarians, oath of faithfulness to see also arrows; bows; bows and arrows;
Charlemagne450 crossbows
Animals, use as food332 Arichis, son in law of Desiderius and Duke
Annaberg, Roman camp at555 n151 of Beneventum141, 158, 4613, 465
index693
Arimanni, elements of Lombard standing 4802, 496, 506, 511, 513, 5346, 538,
army31112, 327 613
Aristocracy2532 obsequium regalis7, 116, 635
Bavarian39 operating procedures223 n177, 234,
education of123 2367, 301, 312, 314, 3278, 496
political power of26 in Ostphalia4478, 589, 641, 642
and royal power24 n81, 256, 368 at Pavia3412, 3812
service aristocracy28 planning288309
training of346 provisioning of6573
Arminius, Roman equestrian and military Saxon campaigns177245, 41314,
officer of German descent216, 575, 583 42755, 510
Armor225 scarae41315, 430, 436, 532, 5423, 548,
Army, Ashanti74 614, 622, 641, 643
Army, Bavarian signalling5445
and Carolingian Lombard special forces304, 413, 6389
campaign316 structure of567
Army, Byzantine Sturms Fulda defense forces5346
conflict with Ravennate army at Syburg4326, 546, 54851
500 n93 tactics301, 4402
Army, Carolingian training4424
administration of64952 at Verona358 n173, 36068, 639, 648
advanced strike forces5412 Army, Edward III, king of Englands73
in Angraria6412 Army, Hrodgauds501
in Aquitaine635 Foriulianorum exercitus501
battle tactics6478 Army, Lombard264, 326
Bernards command of296300, 308, Arimanni of311
310, 316, 334, 348, 364 n199, 367, at Chiusa2913, 296, 304 n178
36970, 638 in Friuli4912
at Brunisberg440445, 641 Carolingian intelligence on3167
at Chiusa2913, 6389 demobilization of3178
combat losses448, 646 expeditionary militia317
combat strength625, 756, 7880, military strategy31718
2956, 304, 3412, 649 at Pavia331
command structure2967, 415 supply of294
communications284, 4445 weapons of291
discipline650 Army, Merovingian
at Eresburg184, 219, 225, 234, 241, invasion of Italy318
4369, 448 military demography318 n25
intelligence gathering305, 4445 Army, Ostrogothic324
Italian campaigns2789, 283309, at Pavia327
474501 Army, Ravennate
journey home after Lombard ducal conflict with Byzantine Empire500 n93
revolt50511 Army, Roman69 n264, 324
Lippe valley operations5519 Italian campaigns360
logistics2878, 3437 operating procedure315
at Lbbecke4502 Rhine bases of554
manning284 riverboat technology558
military operations against routes from the Rhineland to the
Desiderius310373 Elbe599601
mobilization2789, 2837, 424, 47481, Army, Saxon510, 511
510 at Brunisberg (775)44045
mounted troops549, 551 Carolingian harassment after relief of
muster of277, 283 n107, 2846, 295, 316, Syburg54851
346, 369, 394, 4245, 42931, 474, catapults used by53940
694 index
composition of514 Austrasia

Eresburg437, 51922, 642 Carlomans kingdom in109
at the Fulda Gap414 Carolingian military forces from430,
in the Lippe valley643 630
at Lbbecke451 Charlemagnes kingdom in109
military capability of513 Mayor of the Palace in2
military objectives514 taxation in46 n163
military strategy515 Austreleudi (Ostphalians)448
mobilization of394, 511 Autchar, duke and Bavarian magnate142
at Ohrum447 3, 147, 191, 262, 299, 307, 3801, 3845,
in Ostphalia447 exile of384, 391
Rhineland raids51215 and surrender of Pavia3856
siege engines51520 surrender at Verona3656
special forces451 Avaerhilda, aristocratic patron of
structure of394 Lebuin406
Syburg434, 5438, 642 Avar Kingdom109
tactics of442, 514 Christian conquest of111
Army, Viking Great Army133 Avars300, 308
Arno of Salzburg572 catapults used by516
Arnsberger forest, Saxon forces at539 cooperation with Saxons516
Arrows defeat at Ybbsfeld (788)385 n45
fire-arrows517 intervention in Lombard ducal
manufacture of323 revolt499501
Artillery120, 225, 331, 434 and Lombard revolt against
in siege operations355 Charlemagne473
Artillerymen284 military collaboration of32930
Aschaffenburg, Thuringian Road at586 as threat to Carolingians466
Ashanti, armies of74 Aventinus163 n76
Ashlar construction322 Avigliana305
Asinarius, abbot of Novalesa147, 153 Avignon, siege of60
Assassination40, 41 Axes, carpenters335
Assemblies, and military planning29, 30
Assias (carpenters axes)335 Bad Nauheim, Roman military base at601
Asturias, Charlemagnes influence on81 Baduila, Ostrogothic king and commander
Athanarid, Ostrogothic geographer600 of Treviso garrison487
Attack in column, military strategy648 Baggage trains95, 240, 317, 343, 380, 476,
Attack in line, military strategy648 482, 493, 496, 540, 548
Attigny189 vulnerability of301
Charlemagnes court at1789, 182 Baghdad, caliph of9
council of (762)147 n24, 153 n44 Balkans109
Auch, fortress city121, 130 and Charlemagnes regnum81
Roman circuit walls at134 n122 Christian conquest of111
Audbert156 Constantine Vs campaign in330
Augers335 Ballistae, catapults291, 294
Augino, revolt against Adelchis274 Baltic Sea, trade on114
Augsburg299 Banners, in military communication445
Bavarian forces at476 Banu Qasi, Muslim clan94
Via Claudia Augusta at479 Baptism247, 561
Augst, stronghold at475 of Saxons244, 5235, 5601, 566, 623,
Augustine106 n412 625, 628
Augustus, Roman emperor32, 69 n264, Barbarians568
170 n98, 216, 574, 576, 606, 634 of Germania libra315
Aurel, Asturian king123 Barcelona113, 629
Ausa, wife of Desiderius383, 407 as Frankish military target194
index695
Muslim ruler of381 n27 Bernard, Charlemagnes paternal

siege of60, 124, 381 n27 uncle188, 195, 246, 280, 301 n170, 370,
Bardengau, Saxon Gau394 638
Bardowick57980 and Carolingian military leadership
Barges, in military transport71, 558 at652
Basel, Ravenna geographers itinerary as military commander2968
through475 military strategy316
Basque region127 at siege of Verona367
Basques10 Bertranda, mother of Charlemagne86,
in Lupus military forces131 148, 1503, 155, 1579, 179, 246
at Roncevalles92 in tripartite alliance negotiations158
Bastards193, 25960 61, 162 n72, 164
Charles Martels193 Bible
Basternae, war wagons68 n260, 3356 and military intelligence gathering196
Battering rams168, 223, 237, 295, 342 Old Testament199
Battlements338 Bigorre, fortress city130
Bavaria39 Biscay, Bay of127
Carolingian military campaigns in4 Bishops29, 31, 356
Carolingian military forces from504, and administration44
630 appointment of43
Carolingian relations with109 count bishops477
Charlemagnes policies on42021 and military logistics224
church in145 and military mustering652
cooperation with Saxons368, 516 Bislich, Roman fort at554, 602
Frankish control of142 Blacksmiths333
frontier of493 Blanzy, Charlemagnes court at (772)191
integration into regnum Francorum151, n69
385 Bleiche475
political situation in316 Blera
revolt in3940 fortress at264
threat to Carolingians466 Lombard capture of270
Bayonne, fortress city127, 12930 Blocking forces299, 300
Roman circuit walls at134 n122 Boats
Bazas, fortress city130 flat-bottomed614
Beams, wooden, in roofing184 inflatable240
Barn, fortress city130 prefabricated240
Beckenhausen, Roman camp at555 n151 Utrecht type550 n133
Bede199202, 576 Bobbio, monastery of388
on the battle of Poitiers3 and Carolingian military logistics344
Ecclesiastical History199 immunities of640
Beneventum, Duchy of158, 173 Leo of Ravennas control of390
Carolingian forces in636 Bocholt210
Charlemagnes influence on81 Bodumo, Ravenna Geographers itinerary
and the Donation of Charlemagne377 through475
duke of457 Bohlenwege, wooden trackways580
Beowulf100, 1023 Boiling liquids, in siege defense3545
Berald, abbot of Echternacht Bologna
156 and Carolingian military logistics347
Berceto, and the Donation of and the Donation of Charlemagne377
Charlemagne377 Leo of Ravennas control of390
Berga, fortifications at586 papal authority in458
Bergamo Boniface, St., and pope4, 113, 208, 514, 524,
Lombard troops from299, 331 537
Bermund, Asturian king123 as administrator525 n45
696 index
baptism of Pagans5245 Brigantium, see Brianon

base at Dokkum608 Briloner Hohen438
fortification of Braburg399 Brisach, Ravenna Geographers itinerary
founding of Fritzlar monastic through475
complex399 Brittany, integration into Charlemagnes
founding of Hersfeld monastery454 kingdom114
Frisia retinue of533 Brugg475
and Fulda monastery527 Brugium, Ravenna geographers itinerary
Ijselmeer surveys590 through475
memorial to6212 Brumath, royal palatio at237 n221, 246
missionary activities of572, 589 Brunisberg, battle at (775)44045, 646
murder of608 Carolingian army at44555
relics of5223, 5256 ford at437
tomb of184 Saxon deployment at44041
use of Vecht canal607 topography of440
Bonn Saxon defeat at641
magazines at552 Saxon fortifications at211
Roman road system at474 Bruno, Saxon satrap4467, 450, 594, 627
Books, military338 n95 surrender of641
Booty1, 589, 194, 239, 2424, 313, 319, 405, Bckegau, Saxon Gau394
443, 452, 566, 608, 621, 632 Carolingian forces in589
laws of Booty acquisition621 pagus of Western Angraria450
Bordeaux, fortress city119, 121, 127, 129 Building operations, equipment for118
mint at128 Braburg
Roman road at120 bishopric at569
Roman circuit walls at134 n122 Bonifaces fortifications at396
Boulogne, Roman lighthouse at557, 597 Carolingian base at219, 647
Bourg Saint Maurice301 n166 Carolingian expeditionary levies
Bourges, Pippins siege of142 n3, 243, 314, from534
334, 340 defense of3978
Bows120 as refugee center398
manufacture of323 Saxon attack on372, 3958, 4034, 640
Bows and arrows172 n102, 233, 324, 398, strategic significance3967
486 Braburg-Fritzlar
in ambushes549 Charlemagnes army at232
in siege defense3534 fortified complex at227, 229, 231
Breganz476, 601 Bureaucracy, Carolingian18, 19
military logistics4767 Burghal Hidage588
Ravenna Geographers itinerary to475 Burgundy
Brenner Pass299, 358, 422, 479 n22, 4801, Carlomans kingdom in109
493, 496, 507 Carolingian military forces from630
Carolingian army at496 Carolingian troop mobilization
Tassilos control of250 from430
Brescia Novelasas lands in147
Lombard troops from299 Burial rituals314
revolt against Desiderius274 Bypassing, military strategy of322
Bressanone146 Byzantine Empire112, 495
Brianon302 and Adelchis392
Bribes, and conversion to Christianity244 Carolingian campaigns against289
Bridges4923 cooperation with Saxons5167
construction of73 incorporation into papacy377
maintenance of72 military capability of330
pontoon433, 501 military colonies of312
Roman597 naval forces of173
index697
as threat to Carolingians312, 473 Carolingian court, historical sources of91

as threat to Rome4656 Carolingian dynasty410
wealth of7
Caesae, trees used to block roads5489 Carolingian empire
Calculus, finger calculus20 n66, 80 demography of917
Camouflage549 economy of917
Campania military organization57
fighting men from167 and the papacy633
levy of171, 271 n75 political expansion110, 111
Camporasso, Alpine pass at493 population of10, 11
Canabae, civil settlements601 as restorer of the Roman Empire5745
Canals72, 1834, 6056 scale of9
and military defenses530 treaty obligations404
Roman597 see also regnum Francorum
Capitularies23, 31, 44, 499 nn89, 581 n59 Carpenters333
Charlemagnes246, 29 Carpentry340
de Villis53, 67 n259 Carts85, 284, 287, 332, 549
Pippin Is120, 125, 129 basternae335
surviving copies25 military transport68, 227
wish-lists245 Cassiodorus574
Carantania, Tassilos military operations Castella118, 120, 134 n122, 396 n83, 424,
in250 496, 502 n101
Carcassonne127 definition of119 n46
Carinthia, Bavarian conquest of329 in Friuli region492
Carloman, brother of Charlemagne29, in Gascony134
176, 290 in Lombard Kingdom502
acts of152 in the Rhineland556
and Aquitaine revolt116 at Sirmione388
and Charlemagne110, 117, 137, 13941, size of96
152, 179 Castra
death of9, 159 n63, 1812, 1867, 189, Barbarian315
420 at Bourges334
division of the regnum Francorum108 Brunisberg4456, 451 n91
114, 117, 631 Chiusa291
inheritance of7, 8 definition of119 n46, 396
invasion of Italy178 Eresburg2346
Italian policy1418, 153 in Friuli region492, 496
kingdom of108 n2, 109, 160 n4 in Fulda region536
and Novelsa monastery148 in Gascony134 n122
papal policy156, 180 at Irminsul shrine239
as patricius Romanorum115, 142, 152, in the Lippe valley5501, 555
156, 1623, 169 n94, 176, 180, 633 in the Lombard Kingdom31112, 314,
sons of24751, 262, 263, 267, 26970 502
and Stephen III179 at Lbbecke452
stronghold construction588 Monselice495
and the tripartite alliance15961, 248, at Pavia311, 327, 3347
636 Roman556, 600, 6023
Carloman the Elder, Charlemagnes on route between Susa and Chiusa301
uncle50 n184, 209, 290, 447, 563 size of96
and Fulda monastery5278 at Syburg539, 5467
Carmina (poetical works in the Germanic use of313
language), and technical Catalonia
intelligence597 Charlemagnes influence on81
Carnic Alps493 Frankish military target194
698 index
Catapults237, 295, 342, 434, 5201 establishment of Saxon regulations581

design of517 estate organization of534
operation of51719 foreign policy264, 2813
operational failure of540, 543 grants of61012, 4201
Saxon use of395, 539 and Hadrian87, 2556, 258, 265,
technology515 26970, 275, 280, 3739, 391, 409,
traction516 41618, 427, 45664, 467, 5089
transport of539 historiography1 n1
Cathwulf180 n14 intelligence gathering of40, 317, 58298
Cavalry63, 131 leadership6523
Cazis, convent of476 and Leo of Ravenna4645, 502, 642
Cemeteries, Frisian593 local administration4344
Ceneda, duchy of489 Lombard policy148176, 249, 258, 271,
Centenae, military bases in regnum 2767, 307, 309, 465, 5024, 640
Francorum312 long term strategy6314
Centenarii43, 418, 422, 425, 650 and Lupus, duke of the Gascons120
Csanne, Carolingian army at303 124, 1357
Cesena, Leo of Ravennas control of390 marriage of147, 149, 151, 1537, 1603,
Chalon-sur-Sane, Carolingian army 172, 2589, 262, 282, 635
at290 military assets1245
Charlemagne military career of85
and Alberic of Utrecht6189 military education1045
and Alcuin106 military leader97102
anathematization of162, 169 n94 military operations, overview of8085
and Anselm of Nonantula4823 military policy31, 280, 310, 387, 389,
Aquitaine revolt11518 394, 454, 532, 552
and the aristicracy2533, 3642, 64 military strategy835, 21220, 2345,
n247, 789 3189, 322, 328, 3302, 3578, 361,
assets of79 3723, 4024, 41013, 431, 4378,
and Autchar3845 4403, 446, 476, 4813, 495501, 511,
authority of31, 65051 54043, 564, 573, 607, 618, 634, 6445,
Bavarian policy42021 6479, 654
capitularies of246, 29, 499 n89, 562, monarchia18991, 249, 254, 267, 277,
581 n59 319, 636, 651
and Carloman110, 117, 13741, 152, 179, as novus Constantinus575, 634
182 Paderborn statua of6235
charters of177, 455, 509 and the papacy115, 319, 3923
as christianissimus imperator Dei575 papal policy180, 2578, 41618,
coinage reforms55 633
confiscation of St. Zeno monasterys patricius Romanorum115, 117, 142, 152,
estates365 159, 161, 172, 180, 257, 262, 27071, 275,
control of Carlomans regnum18991 280, 289 n125, 376, 409, 633
and Desiderius86, 139, 193 n74, 2467, political strategy3845, 38990, 573
254, 261, 268, 2768, 282, 303, 3069, repudiation of Gerperga271, 278
407, 6356 rex Langobardorum88, 367 n215, 376,
destruction of Irminsul shrine2389 378, 383, 387, 390, 409, 458, 460,
ditio over Ostphalian Saxons448 4623, 497, 634, 640
division of the regnum Francorum108 royal acts426
115, 117, 632 Saxon policy371, 392, 4089, 411, 423,
Donation of Charlemagne375, 3779, 4278, 4534, 457, 505, 510, 562,
3901, 4167, 45661, 463, 495, 640 61011, 634, 6367, 641
and ducal revolt4648, 473509, 642, settlement strategy573
648 spiritual life359 n175
economic assets445 statue of, at Mstair480
index699
and Sturm of Fulda111, 14850, 159, Christians238

1826, 195, 225 n183, 422, 424, 564 in the Holy Land82
and the tripartite alliance247 n3, 251, at Roncevalles92
254, 259, 263, 271, 276, 635, 638 as slaves514, 566
unification of regnum Francorum217 in Spain113, 629
visit to Rome (774)3738 Christopher, primicerius of pope Stephen
Vita Karoli92 III1578, 1619, 171, 1745, 180, 192,
Charles the Bald33 n117 2489, 266
Charles the Fat22 n74, 72 blinding of1756, 269
Charles Martel, grandfather of overthrow of175
Charlemagne1, 2, 4, 52 n192, 88 n337, Chronica di Novalesa3056
126, 290, 409, 6078, 6323 Chur475, 477, 479
alliance with Lombards139 Carolingian army at476, 496
appropriation of church property8 n32 integration into regnum Francorum477
and aristocracy28 levies from367
battle of Poitiers (732)443 Chur-Raetien region
conquest of Burgundy290 and Carolingian military logistics4778
control of Bavaria142 economy of478
defeat of Abd ar Rachman, Umayyad logistical support for Carolingian
governor of Spain126, 136 military389
and Fulda monastery527 Church
victory over Abd ar Rachman126 mansus holdings of18 n61
Charles the Younger, Hildegardes eldest and military logistics224, 650
son260 n35 and royal fisc50
Chaumuzy, royal court at147 Church lands, inventories of39
Chiavri296 Churches
Childebrand, duke198, 6323 construction of333, 533
Childeric III, Merovingian king4 establishment of591
deposed by Carolingians633 rural129
Children Saxon destruction of510, 566
murder of512 Cicero93, 536
as slaves608 de Officiis560
Chilperic, military strategy319 n27 Citt di Castello467
Chiusa2913, 300, 304 n178, 322 Lombard militia forces from321
Charlemagnes encampment at314, 320 papal military forces from379
Charlemagnes scarae at305 Civilians
Lombard forces at300, 303 casualties372
Lombard fortifications at309 and military operations319
Roman road from317 murder of512
strategic importance of467 Saxon attacks on394, 399
Chlodomer, Merovingian king411 Civitas200, 204, 224, 2846, 425, 487, 602,
Chlotar I, Frankish king243 610, 623
Christenberg, river221 Civitates118, 1245, 130, 167, 169, 283, 288,
Christianity 312, 317, 391, 424, 567, 576
conversion to89, 90, 226 n188 Clergy, Carolingian, and the state197 n91
expansion of216 Clerks, in Carolingian bureaucracy19
and military morale374 Clidae, shields543
and missionary activity81 Climate, European507
Pagan conversion to87, 21213, 4067 Climate change15
Saxon conversion to11213, 213 n149, Clotilde, Queen150
216, 2445, 429, 4534, 5236, 614, Clovis49, 239 n233, 497
624, 626, 628, 643 at battle of Vouill315
Slav converts to146 defeat of Alaric II629
triumphalism in402, 408 military strategy319 n27, 320
700 index
settlement policy574 at Bourges (763)334

Clusae, fortifications291, 31112 at Pavia33033, 337, 34041
at Susa2914, 2967, 300 see also vallation
Coblens22021 Copii, large numbers of expeditionary
Codex Theodosianus (compilation of levies124
Roman Imperial law)22, 288 Copper54
Coinage Corbny, Charlemagnes council at
reforms in55 (771)18990
royal556 Cordoba629
Col de Sestrires, Carolingian army at303 Cordon sanitaire, in plague control325
Cologne n52
archbishop of622 Corsica376
Carolingian army at432, 453 and the Donation of Charlemagne377
magazines at542, 552 Cosmographer of Ravenna306
population size67 n258 Cosmography306
Roman road system at474 Countryside
Columella, Lucius Junius Moderatus, destruction by armies656, 6970
Roman writer on agriculture13 ravaging of, military strategy6478
Columns, (military formation)778, Counts29, 31
4404 and communications23
Comacchio and military planning31
Leo of Ravennas control of390 Couriers368 n217, 369 n219
Lombard capture of269 Court chronicler, Carolingian3334, 338
Lombard control of256 Court fines, governmental income from48
Combat Cremona, Lombard expeditionary levies
close quarter206 in331
mounted2067 Creontius, referendarius of duke
training in35 Tassilo163 n76, 261
Combined operations (land-naval)618 Crossbows120, 233, 324, 352, 486
Comes199, 386 n48 Crusades111 n13
Comites418, 422, 426 Cuniada (hatchets)335
Commerce, in regnum Francorum572 Cunicpert, king, Alahis revolt against489
Communications214 Cursus publicus, Roman courier service21
Consensus fidelium26 n87, 29 Curtius Rufus105
meaning of30 n102
Consilia, military plans60 Dagobert I, king48
Consorans, fortress city130 death of59
Constantine V, Byzantine emperor89, Danes, Charlemagnes influence on81
268, 282, 330, 371, 457, 642 Danewerke, defensive wall205
and Adelchis392 David and Goliath model649
death of463, 4656 Davos479
first Bulgar-slayer356 n163 Dax, fortress city127, 130
death of469, 472 mint at129
Constantine the Great, Roman Roman urban circuit walls at134 n122
emperor633 De Saxonibus (capitulary)562
campaign against Maxentius3589 De Villis (capitulary)53
Constantinople, sea journeys from46872 Deception, as military strategy5323,
Constantius, bishop of Chur, Rector of 45052
Raetia367, 4778 Defense
Construction equipment335 in depth132, 219, 5845, 645, 654
Consuetudines antiquae, tax for repair, e.g. static532
of roads and bridges46 n162 Demography, military615
Contra-vallation295, 3134, 3278, 33032, Deorulf, commander of the Amneburg
337 fortress537
index701
Descriptiones, (inventories)8 Dietkirchen, Carolingian fortifications

Desiderius, Lombard king at221, 645
alliance with Charlemagne635 Disease, at siege of Pavia382
army of1645, 168 Disentis, monastery of476
and Carloman164 Ditches322, 3378
Carolingian policy13942, 154, 163, 169, at Eresburg231
264, 271, 278 Fulda529
and Charlemagne86, 139, 193 n74, at Pavia348
2467, 254, 261, 268, 2768, 282, 303, Divisio, of the regnum Francorum
3069, 407, 6356 (768)10815, 13940, 145 n17, 188, 257,
Charlemagnes delegation to (770)148, 420, 631, 635
151, 153 Documentation, written,
control of Rome270 and administration1821
court of187 Dodo, abbot and missus of Carloman
custody at St. Amand3834 1634, 168, 169 n94, 1746, 180, 248 n5,
embassy to Rome2513, 255 266, 417
envoys to Carolingians2656 Dokkum609
gifts to Nonantula504 Bonifaces base at608
and Hadrian512, 268 n62, 269, 278 and control of the Ijselmeer6078
imprisonment of306, 463 Dolaturia (saws)335
military action against Hadrian2558, Doli, military ruses106
264 Dollart Bay, creation of613
military strategy3178, 37071 Domus cultae, papal military
papal policy157, 2578, settlements171, 31112
263, 269 Dona46, 57
and siege of Rome1745, 274 Dona annualia (tax)45
surrender at Pavia88, 380, 3823 Donar, Germanic god238
and Tassilo of Bavaria144 Donation of Charlemagne375, 3779,
tripartite alliance180 n14, 247 n3, 251, 39091, 4167, 45661, 463, 495, 640
253, 26061, 263, 266, 269, 273, 636, Donation of Constantine633, 409
638 Donus, magister militum170 n99
war with duke Maurice495 Dora Baltes298
Dettic, commander of the Amneburg Dordogne, river11820
fortress537 Dornen, Saxon forces at540
Deutz, Saxon raid on512 n7 Drau, river145
Devastation Dreihausen, Carolingian fortifications
in 2nd Italian campaign at221, 645
499501 Drenthe, pagan dominated region621
as military strategy497501 Dromon (ship)4712
Saxon devastation of the Drusus, Roman general603
Rhineland51215 fortifications constructed by580 n55
Deventer406 Dudo, military commander636
Carolingian forces at617 Duke Gratiosus for defense
church at406 of Rome171
route to Utrecht617 Dunkirk Transgression15
Saxon assault on566 Dren
Saxon destruction of Lebuins tomb407 Charlemagnec court at, (774)1389, 148
Diedenhofen217 n27, 415, 418, 422, 431, 4545, 457,
Charlemagnes court at259 n34, 265, 474 n2
430, 474 n2 muster of Carolingian army at43031
Diemal, river2189, 222, 2356, 237, 242, royal palatium at429
395, 413, 438 Durstede613
Carolingian army at439 emporium at611
Dienstadel, service aristocracy28 toll station at48
702 index
Dust clouds, and military scouting population size734

228 English Channel, trade in114
Dux199, 2012 Ennodius, description of Pavia326
Envelopment tactics44041
Ealdorman199 Envoys, and communication23
Earth, use in military fortifications134 Episcopal sees, and population
Eauze, fortress city130 size56970
Ebbo, archbishop of Rheims36 Eresburg (Obermarsberg)215, 229, 414
Economic assets447 Carolingian base at439, 564, 647
and military campaigning45 Carolingian military campaigns
Economic growth, and population at23036, 4369
size478 church at453
Eder, river211, 2189, 221, 227, 3956 as fortress town184
Education manning requirements2334
and bureaucracy19 military topography236
of aristocrats346 perimeter wall233
Edward III, king of England, armies of73 Saxon attack on372, 395, 512, 515,
Ee, river612 51921, 566, 640
Eggihard, official killed at Roncevalles92, Saxon defensive strategy2324
101 Saxon destruction of fortifications436
Egidius, archbishop of Rheims386 n47 7, 520
Eigil, biographer of Sturm of Fulda195 Saxon forces at2301, 642
n83, 2256, 2445, 510 n2, 5223, 5335, Saxon fortifications at211, 231
538, 564 Saxon hilltop fortress at21821
Life of Sturm227, 2445, 403, 514, 5278 Erfurt
Einhard412, 939, 106 n415, 2156, 304, bishop of569, 591
373 n235, 391, 560, 5967 Carolingian advance base at601
Vita Karoli32, 912, 99101, 559 Thuringian Road at586, 592
Elbe, river216, 587, 614 Escariti, Carolingian professional
as border of the Roman Empire5745 soldiers315
and Charlemagnes regnum81 Eschwege, Carolingian fortified palatium
Frankish merchants on592 at586, 591
Frisian settlements on593 Estates
military routes on598 n82 bipartite12, 14, 534
Roman fortifications on6034 officials of13
Roman naval operations on605 see also facultates
Elipandus, bishop of Toledo52 Eudo-Waiofer clan289
Emden, Carolingian base at613 Eustratius, bishop of Albano272
Emilia Eutropius105, 574
Leo of Ravennas control of390 Ewin, duke494
papal authority in458 Exactores418, 422, 425
Emporia (market sites)478, 114, 571
Ems, river20910, 593, 6146 Facultates, estates50, 51, 108, 279, 286 n114,
and Carolingian logistics617, 619 418, 431, 454, 610
estuary of600, 61213 and division of the regnum
Roman naval operations on605 Francorum1089
Emsmarsch, settlements in617 Faenza
Encampments, defensive3378 Leo of Ravennas control of390
Engineers284, 295, 605 Lombard capture of269
and military planning31 Lombard control of256
England, Anglo Saxon Fairs571
Anglo-Saxon regna in200 n102 Fair of St. Denis48
Carolingian influences53 Famine499 n90
Carolingian trade with48, 114 Faramanni, Lombard troops3267
index703
Fardulfus, abbot of St. Denis412 Food supplies, in military operations97,

Farfa, abbey of275 n88, 388 287, 3437
Charlemagnes grants to4967 Foot soldiers62
logistical support for Carolingian Foragers451
military345, 38990 Foraging447
immunities of426, 640 and military logistics553
Fastrada, queen and wife of Forli, Leo of Ravennas control of390
Charlemagne41, 189 Forlimpopuli, Leo of Ravennas control
Fectio, Roman base at605 of390
see also Vechten Fortifications967, 1189, 121
Feigned retreat, military tactic131, 135 Carolingian219 n167, 220 n168
n126 and military logistics644646
Felix, bishop of Urgal52, 488 Roman134 n122, 597
Fenestrelle, Carolingian army at3034 Saxon132, 209
Fermo see also castra; castellae; towers, walls
expeditionary levies of346 Fortress cities17, 119, 121, 124, 125 n127, 127,
Lombard militia forces from321 12930, 134, 165, 364
papal military forces from379 capture of31011, 3423
Ferrara, duchy of Fosorios (spades)335
Leo of Ravennas control of390 Fossa Drusiana (the Vecht canal)6056
Lombard capture of269 on Roman route to the Elbe600
Lombard control of256 Fossatores, canal builders184, 530
Ferries, in military transport71 n271 Frankfurt221, 601
Festina lente, as military clich218 Carolingian army at230, 231 n199
Fideles8, 44, 50, 81, 162, 190, 193, 304, 309 as Saxon military target512, 522
n198, 428, 450, 650 Roman military base at601
in administration50 Saxon attack on52130
and communications23 Franks
Fields of fire, overlapping167, 348 Christian238
Fir, for siege ladders351 n140 definition of358 n173
Fire signals544 king of3
Fisc, royal109, 4954, 67 n259 Merovingian200 n101
Fishing128 relations with Saxons403
Fitzlar Fredegar198
as Saxon military target400 Chronicle198
Carolingian defenses at400, 401 Fredegars Continuator, Carolingian court
strategic importance399400 chronicler311, 313
Flags, in military communication445, Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor479
544, 547 n22
Flammulae, flag-signals5445, 547 Fredus, fine49
Flanking movements304, 3078 Freising
Flooding, and military church of144
operations361, 363 Tassilos council at152
Florus, Lucius Annaeus105 Friedberg, Roman military base at601
Epitome604 Frisia
on Roman fortifications east of the baptism of Saxons in524 n44
Rhine603 n141, 604 Bonifaces retinue to (754)533
Fluchtsbefestigung, refugee center398 Carolingian military campaigns in4
at Syburg436 Carolingian troop mobilization
Flela pass479 from430
Flgellanze, pole weapon2067 and development of routes from Rhine
Fodder232, 447 to Elbe607
Folcbert, Saxon magnate407 Liudgers holdings is619
conversion to Christianity614 missionary work in572
704 index
Frisians111 n13 recruitment from2245

control of North Sea614 wealth of1845, 405
conversion to Christianity608 Fulda gap111, 186, 211, 218, 229, 397, 636
Elbe settlements of593 Carolingian control of402, 636
trading activities of593 Carolingian forces in405, 413
Fritzlar231 Carolingian settlers in405
Carolingian expeditionary levies Charlemagnes strategy219
from534 Saxon military operations in368,
Carolingian stronghold at211, 219 3934, 405, 642
river crossing at227 Sturms survey of590
Saxon assault on372, 4035, 395, 399, Fulda river219, 227, 236, 526, 591
640 diversion of183
Friuli89, 466, 4893, 642 Frankish settlements on591
Aios holdings in500 and military transport2278
alliance against Charlemagne357 Fulrad, abbot of Saint Denis41 n151, 70
Carolingian campaign in473509 n269, 1423, 153, 163, 1878, 267, 280,
Carolingian devastation of500, 501 4156, 41820, 424, 431, 4645, 467, 611,
Charlemagnes administration of502 652
defenses in490 as Charlemagnes missus457
duke of274, 299 n160, 300, 370, 387, 457
Foriulianorum exercitus492 Gadaone, see Csanne
Hrodgaud at484 Gaido, duke484
Lombard troops from299 opposition to Charlemagne466
as military target491 Gaiseric, sacking of Rome174
population size491 Garonne, river118, 12021, 130
strategic importance370, 483, 492 valley of1267
surrender of501 Gascony119
Frodoenus, abbot of Novalesa153, 284, Carolingian ditio in589
2789 churches in129
Fronsac, Charlemagnes fortress at11921, commerce in1278
220, 647 demography126
Frontinus (Sextus Julius Frontinus)35, economic importance128
99100, 102, 106 geography of130
Strategemata35, 102, 105 military institutions in13031
Frothar, bishop of Toul37 n132 Muslim threat to126, 136
Fuel, for smelting55 population growth129
Fulda111 revolt in635
as Carolingian military base2246 Roman fortifications in132
defense forces at529 wine production1267
defensive walls at52930 Gateways, defensive531
as pilgrimage site522 Gau, Saxon term for civitas or pagus200
Carolingian army at23031 205, 20910
population of5289 and military mobilization394
Saxon attack on512, 52130, 5328 representatives of578
Fulda, monastery of143 n9, 182, 195, 522, Gaul568, 633
622 climate change in15
buildings at528 riverine network287
Charlemagnes grants to610, 612 road system in69 n264
establishment of526 Roman military operations in689
immunites of422 trade in119
landed endowment of185 Gaulskopf, Saxon fortifications at211
militia troops from185 Gausfrid4178
missionaries from5246 Gauzibert, bishop of Chartres152
monks from533, 536, 572 Gavello, papal authority in458
index705
Geismar Goldsmiths1845
refugees from400 Government1621
settlement at401 and Dienstadel28
Gemona, castra at492 surviving texts on20, 21
General staff, Carolingian military, see Gozbert, pagan dux568
Magistratus Grado370
Geneva Grain
Carolingian army at290 depots489
on march to Mont Cenis301 production127
mustering of Carolingian army Gratianopolis, see Grenoble
at2834, 295 Gratiosus, duke, Commander of the army
Roman roads at302 of Rome169, 175
Genoa, and Carolingian military Graves, Saxon208
logistics344 Great Oak, at Geismar, Bonifaces
Geographical information destruction of238
and military logistics583 Great Saint Bernard Pass290, 2979, 302
Charlemagnes access to598 n170, 304, 481
and technical intelligence597 Great warrior, concept of100102
George, bishop of Amiens2746, 278, 280, Gregory I, pope, Gregory the Great361
282 Gregory III, pope409, 527, 561 n177, 633
Gerberga, wife of Carloman187, 19091, Gregory of Tours106 n412, 136, 197, 239
2479, 263, 299, 356, 3845, 407 n233
flight to Rome249 Ten Books of History66, 197, 198 n93,
pro-Lombard policy299 318, 574
Germania, Roman control of606 Grenoble
Germania libra575, 577 Carolingian army at290
Germania prima, emigration from568 Roman roads at302
Germania secunda, emigration from568 Grifo, uncle of Charlemagne447
Germanicus614 Grimald, abbot of St Gall380 n25
Weser encampment of6023 Grimwald, Lombard king489
Germar Mark211, 584, 587, 601, 6312, 637, Gronauer Schloss, Carolingian stronghold
6445 at221, 645
Gerperga, wife of Charlemagne86, 139, Gronigen Wadden, coastal mud flats612
147, 15051, 153, 156, 1601, 172, 187 n52, Guard duty425
188, 1923, 2467, 2534, 2589, 262, 635 Gubbio, Lombard capture of (772)264,
Charlemagnes repudiation of26061, 270
263, 271, 278 Guides, in military operations305
Gerold, Count of Middle Rhine region188 Gulfard, abbot of Saint Martin at
n58 Tours2745, 389
Gerona, Muslim leader of629 Gundelandus, abbot of Lorsch604
Gers, river121 Guntarius, rector of
Gesta Episcoporum Mettensium424 Saint-Aubin116 n35
Ghaerardus, count426 Guntram, Burgundian kingdom of289
Ghent, levies from284
Gironde, river130 Hadrian I, pope
Gisela, sister of Charlemagne139, 141, 151, anointing of Carlomans sons24751,
1545, 157 2623, 267, 26970
Giseltruda, sister of Anselm and wife of authority over the Exarchate575 n39
King Aistulf388 and ducal revolt4648
Glauberg, Carolingian fortifications at223, and the Byzantine Empire268
645 and Carolingian military logistics344
God, and military victory408 5, 372, 374, 37882, 63940
Gold184 Carolingian policy24951, 2578, 262,
as booty313 283
706 index
and Charlemagne87, 2556, 258, 265, Herchenradus, bishop of Paris419

26970, 275, 280, 3739, 391, 409, Hermenaldus, count426
41618, 427, 45664, 467, 5089 Hersfeld
co-father to Theudo250 Carolingian garrison at229, 231
and defence of Rome2713 earthen wall complex at455
and Desiderius2512, 268 n62, 269, 278 monastery of4234, 431, 4545, 457
and the Donation of St. Wigberts relics at399
Charlemagne4167 Herstal160,
election of187, 192, 248 Charlemagnes court at177, 192, 195, 259
and Hildeprand320, 462 n34, 276, 565, 604, 609
Lombard policy257, 264 Herstelle440
and papal independence256 Carolingian forces at637
and papal rights464 Carolingian stronghold at215, 4023
and Paul Afiarta266 n57 Charlemagnes castra at2346, 240,
Plenaria iustitiae, policy252, 256 3956
support for Carlomans sons247 fortifications at636
and the tripartite alliance247, 2512, Saxon assault on395, 566
255, 263, 266, 268, 638 Hesse
and Tassilo, duke of Bavaria146 n20 Carolingian expeditionary levies
Vita of358 from535
Haerericus, count426 Frankish settlements in394 n76
Haginus, count426 population size535
Hainleite, upland region585 refugees from397
Halle Saxon invasion of368, 3712, 393407,
Carolingian fortifications at556 411
salt production at592 Hessi, Saxon satrap446, 4489, 594, 627
Slavic settlements in593 Hildegarde, concubine and wife of
Haltbertus, count426 Charlemagne1889, 193, 2467, 254,
Haltern602 25960
fortified palatium at602 death of254 n25
Roman camp at555 fecundity of258 n35
Hammelburg Hildeprand, duke of Spoleto32021, 379,
control of Saale River fords61011 460, 462, 465
St. Bonifaces relics at5356 pact with Pope Hadrian462
Thuringian Road at586, 592 seizure of power in Lombard
Hannibal102 kingdom320
Haribertus, abbot of605 support for Charlemagne4623
Harun al Rashid, Caliph of Baghdad82 Hilderadus, count426
Harz mountains447 Hilduinus, abbot of St. Denis42 n151
silver resources in54 Hilwartshausen, Frankish settlement
trade in197 n92 in591
Hase, river209 Himiltrude, wife of Charlemagne140 n3,
Hatchets335 149, 160
Heating systems, Roman528 Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims8 n32,
Hebroinus, count426 289, 50 n184, 51 n184, 52 n192, 224 n179
Heddernheim, Roman military base at601 Hisham I, emir95
Helco, Saxon magnate407, 524 Historians, medieval123 n68
conversion to Christianity614 Historical analysis, of
Hellweg road system432, 539, 580 Carolingians9093
Helme, river585, 587 see also Sachkritik
fords on585 Historical texts
Helmgarius152 and technical intelligence1978, 597
Herbrechtingen, royal villa of420 Roman216
index707
History, in military training198 Hurry up and wait, military clich of218

Hitherius, abbot of Tours425 Hydraulic engineering183, 605
Hochst-am-Main, Roman military base Hydrology530 n66
at601
Hockeleve450 Iberian peninsula, governor of629
Carolingian forces in589 Iburg, Saxon hill fort at209, 211
Hofstatt, Roman camp at555 n151 Idolatry245
Hhbeck. Roman camp at556 Ijselmeer612
Hohbuoki, fortification at589 Bonifaces survey of590
Hohensyburg4336, 545 Carlolingian interest in613
Hohlwege (sunken roads)580 Carolingian military campaigns4
Holsterhausen, Roman camp at555, 602 Roman route to the Elbe600
Holy Land, Christians in82 Roman fleet at606
Holzkirchen, monastery of454 Ildibad, Ostrogothic military leader4878
Honau, monastery of422 n162 Imitatio imperii34, 239, 242, 375 n5, 383,
Hoppecke, valley of438 427, 583
Horrea, public grain storage warehouses at Imma, wife of count Gerold188 n58
Verona3623 Imola
Horse meat, as food208 Leo of Ravennas control of390
Horsemen62, 225 papal authority in458
Gascon131 Incendaries295
Horses85, 95, 207 in siege defense518
breeding of57 n212 Ingelheim
and communications21, 22 magazines at542
draft horses57 palatium at408
in military campaigns432 Ingenui (free men), muster of425
pack horses57, 208, 225, 284, 332, 482, Inn, river145
542 Innechin, monastery at145, 147
riding horses225 Intelligence
ritual killing of208 military483
Romano-German classification of208 technical intelligence5968, 605, 614
n133 transmission of368 n217
stud horses57 Intelligence gathering,:
supplies for447 Carolingian1969, 51112, 58298, 641
as tax payment57 Lombard280
and transport205 Saxon22830
war horses567, 225, 305, 332 Inventories626
Hostages307, 404, 44850, 4523, 474, 511, and division of the regnum
562, 566 Francorum108 n1
symbolism of242 of fiscal properties52
Hrodgaud, duke of Friuli370, 387 n50, 461, of royal estates8
502, 642, 648 Invillio, castra at492
death of501 Ireland
liaison with Avars500 Carolingian trade with114
opposition to Charlemagne4668 wine trade128
subjugation of391 n64 Irminsul, Saxon shrine218, 220, 2145
Hucbald, count158 as Carolingian military target230
Huesca, Muslim leader of629 Carolingian military operations
Hungary111 against2379, 637
and Charlemagnes regnum81 destruction and sacking of59, 400, 404
Hunoald of Aquitaine64 n249, 1158, Iron54
1212, 125, 635 iron mines421
Hunting, and battle103 n388 production of617
708 index
Isembard, count of Thurgau587 Kunibert, bishop of

Isre, valley of290 Cologne591
Isidore of Seville198 Kyffhuser, upland region585
Istria, province of, and the Donation of
Charlemagne377 Ladders
Italy, Lombard Kingdom in, see Lombard in firefighting350 n136
Kingdom scaling ladders168, 225, 342, 398, 434,
Iterius, referendarius of Charlemagne158 490, 515
Itineraries (written maps)xvii, 61 n234, in siege operations349, 35054
306, 307 n189, 4745, 577, 581, 583 Lahn, river2212
Roman600 Lahn valley
Ivrea298 as military route2213
Frankish fortification of221
Jerusalem, pilgrims to82 Roman roads in580 n55
Jesi, Lombard capture of264, 270 Saxon army at526, 537
Jews Laisa-Battenberg, ford at2212
communities in Pavia325, 326 n53 Lake Konstanz476
communities in regnum Lambertus, count426
Francorum113 Land, confiscation of33 n117
John V, archbishop of Ravenna500 n93 Landricus, abbot of Jumiges285 n114
John, patriarch of Grado4579, 466 Lanslebough300, 301 n166
Josephus105 Latifundia, (estates of large area)12, 53
Joshua, biblical book of196 Laubach, Sturms forces at534
Josiah, king of Judea100 Lauwerzee612
Julius Caesar69, 102, 105 Law
Gallic Wars69 n264 Ripuarian56
Justice system, profits from489 Roman34 n120, 46 n163, 121
Justinian312, 324 Laymen29
and military recruitment18 n61, 19
Kaiseraugst, Ravenna Geographers Le Role, religious house at129
itinerary through475 Lead54
Kalkreis, Varus battlefield at598 in roofing184
Karlburg, Carolingian fortress at5634 Leadership
Kassel aristocratic training in35
fortress at236 military303 n175
Frankish development of604 Lebern475
Frankish settlement in591 Lebuin, Anglo-Saxon leader and
population size535, 568 missionary2023, 406, 5912, 6145
on Roman route from the Rhineland to death of407
the Elbe600 at Saxon council at Marklo429
Kempten476 Lectoure, fortress city130
Kesterburg, fortress at221, 645 Lenne, river209, 433, 447
Killian, Anglo-Saxon missionary568 Leo, archbishop of Ravenna266, 3057,
Killing grounds529, 543, 545, 547 4167, 456, 458, 460, 4635, 467, 46970,
Kinzheim, royal 502
villa at420 and Carolingian military logistics497,
Kinzig, valley of2234 500
Koblenz, magazines at552 Charlemagnes gifts to390
Knigsnhe, closeness to the king28 death of575 n39
Konstanz library of474
episcopal see of475 Leusden, royal villa at611
Ravenna Geographers itinerary Libri manuales, handbooks14
through475 Liburnian galley4701
Kootwijk, iron production at617 Lidi, Saxon semi-free class206
index709
Lige, royal court at148, 150, 152 Carolingian military operations

Lighthouse, at Boulogne557 in6356
Limes, military fortifications on strategic Charlemagnes administration of502
scale402, 404, 586, 6367, 647 Charlemagnes invasion of (773)87,
at Braburg519 278309
at Eresburg519 Charlemagnes 2nd invasion of
of Germar Mark584, 585 (776)473509
Limes Saxoniae601 Charlemagnes policy on115, 117 n39,
Limes Saxonicum589 13976, 213, 2539, 271, 273, 276,
Line formation44041, 4434 27983, 361, 367 n215, 376, 416, 466,
Lippe valley 468, 473, 636, 640
Carolingian control of550 Charlemagnes strategic interests277,
Pippins invasion of (758)209 279
Roman castra in555 Charlemagnes war with278309,
Saxon forces at511, 643 637641
topography556 cooperation with Avars300
water transport5578 Desiderius policy on14041, 264, 268,
Lippenham 277, 638
Carolingian attacks from223 diplomacy6357
Carolingian military base at549, 5545 ducal revolt in89, 45668, 473509,
Roman forward base at602 642, 6478
Lippstadt, Carolingian fortification at555 famine in499 n90
Literacy, and Carolingian bureaucracy19 frontier of493
Liudger, bishop of Mnster and Gerbergas flight to19091, 193, 356
commander at Dokkum614, 61920, integration into regnum Francorum58,
622, 627, 652 81, 88
family of619 invasion of Italy (569)324
military household of62021 Merovingian campaigns in58, 318
at York620 militarization of local population320
Liutperga, wife of Tassilo, Duke of military organization in172 n103
Bavaria144, 146, 261 military strategy of326
Liutprand, Lombard king5, 111 opposition to Charlemagne457
Livenza, river492 and papacy114, 1412, 144, 152, 1548,
battle at501 1612, 164, 252, 255, 264, 267, 269,
bridge on4923, 501 2756, 278, 281, 375
Livy105, 599 Pippins campaigns in90, 174, 2904,
Roman History3289, 599 31114, 632
Ljubljana370 Pippins policy on112, 114, 276, 376
Logistical determinism6573 Roman military campaigns in360
Logistics, military6573, 80 royal treasure of59, 383
written sources on97 seed-grain ratio in12
Lombard Kingdom surrender to Charlemagne3837
aristocracy in274, 317, 31920 threat to papacy180
booty from589 see also Adelchis; Aistulf; Army,
Byzantine intervention in114 Lombard; Gerperga; Desiderius;
alliance with Carolingians139, 140 n3, Liutprand; Pavia; Tripartite alliance;
1412, 144, 2567, 263, 266 Treviso: Turin; Vicenza
attack on papal assets163, 2645, London, Viking raids on133
26972, 273, 2756 Lone warrior, myth of533 n83
Carlomans control of access to10910 Longlier182
Carlomans policy on140, 1428, 153, Looting319 n27
157, 163 at Irminsul shrine239
Carolingian hostages Lorsch
from5023 Florus Epitome at604
710 index
royal monastery at552 magazines at542, 552

Louis the German72 population size67 n258
Louis the Pious, king of Aquitaine36, 42 on Roman route from the Rhineland to
n151, 124, 224 n180 the Elbe600
siege of Barcelona (801)381 n27 Thuringian Road at586, 592
Lbbecke Manasses, abbot of Flavigny425
battle at45052 Mandatum1212
Carolingian army at45051 Mansus holdings18 n61
Carolingian base at447, m642 Mantlets313
Carolingian forces in589 Mantua, and the Donation of
Lull, archbishop of Mainz399, 423, 622 Charlemagne377
Lullus, Pavian Jew325 n53 Mapping599
Luni-Monselice line378 of Saxon territory57782
and the Donation of Charlemagne377 Maps61, 3067
Lupus, duke of Gascony12025, 135 making of583 n61
assets in Aquitaine125130 and military historyxvii
subject to Carolingian rule635 Peutinger Map307
military assets13034 Roman581
military strategy of134138 verbal587 n76
opposition to Charlemagne1357 see also Inineraries, Picta
Lupus of Ferrires33 n117, 399 Marching, military321, 439, 504 n110,
Lyons, Carolingian army at290 5067
population size67 n258 and military logistics231 n199
speed of3012, 321 n36, 482, 511, 542
Machinae, siege engines291, 293, 314, 515 two-column558
Magazines420, 552, 612, 646 Marcus Agrippa69 n264
in Carolingian Saxon campaigns514 Markets478
for grain storage476 royal control of47
and military logistics71, 221, 542 Marklo, Saxon council at2034, 206, 210,
Magdeburg587 218, 222, 393, 404, 407, 411, 42930, 473,
Carolingian fortified bridgehead at593 51011, 519, 576
n100 Marmoutier, monastery of52
Frankish development of604 Marriage, papal attitudes to262
Roman camp at556 Marseilles, toll stations at48
on Roman route from the Rhineland to Martigny, monastic center297
the Elbe600 Martin, archbishop of Ravenna3067
salt production at593 Mathematics13
Thuringian Road at586 Maurice, duke of Venice495
Maginardus, abbot of St. Denis41, 42 n151 Maurienne, bishop of153
Magistratus, Carolingian military General Maxentius358
Staff3031, 6061, 102, 118, 197, 243, 296, Measurement, units of, Roman337
307, 410, 427, 430, 4734, 480, 482, 496, Medemblik612
511, 516, 549, 551, 555, 582, 587, 604, 613, and control of the Ijselmeer6078
616, 618, 632, 634, 636, 638, 6412, 650, magazines at612
652, 654 Medofullio450
Maguelonne, count of123 Carolingian forces in589
Mail, mail coats225 Melle, silver mines at54
Main, river221, 223, 563 Mercenaries6
Roman military base on601 Avar300 n162
Thuringian Road at586 and intelligence gathering197, 582,
Main-Kinzig route, to Fulda228 5923, 614, 644
Mainz221, 423 in Lupus military forces131
archbishop of622 Meretrices (prostitutes)332
Charlemagnes court at160, 177 Merovingian dynasty376
index711
and Carolingian kingship32 and intelligence gathering197, 582,

deposition of410 5912
kings of574 relationship with Soldiers58990
military resources59 in Saxon Territory58992
Merseburg, Carolingian fortifications Moats184
in587 at Fulda529
Messengers21, 368 n217, 369 n219 at Hersfeld455
Metz at Karlburg564
bishopric of424 at Pavia348
monastery424 Modena300
population size67 n258 and Carolingian military logistics347
Michael, archbishop of Ravenna158 and the Donation of Charlemagne377
Milan Moers-Asberg, Roman fort at4323
and Carolingian military logistics347 Monasteries, and military logistics224,
fortress city173 n103 388, 421 n158, 422, 4256, 431, 4756
Lombard troops from299, 331 Pippins control of2 n5
Milestonesxvii, 597 Moncontour1167
on Roman roads474 Mongols, post system of22
Military handbooks, Roman35 Monselice
Military history and the Donation of Charlemagne377
medievalists attitude to84 at4945
methodology of83 Mont Cenis Pass1478, 153, 163, 180, 278,
scope of845 28990, 300, 3034, 322, 481
Milites, regular soldiers1667, 169, 171 Mont Genvre Pass3014
stipendium of166 Monte Casino, monastery of274
Militia troops130, 171, 185, 224 Monte Pirchiriano296
from Fulda185 Lombard fortifications at300
Mimigernaford, modern Mnster61516 Montefeltro, Lombard capture of264, 270
Carolingian stronghold at615, 617 Morale, military314, 342, 497, 540
economic growth617 and natural phenomena402
Mimulf, duke488 and religion374, 4012
Minden446, 450 Mornac-sur-Charante116 n35, 117
Carolingian army at452 Mortar, use in military fortifications95
Carolingian base at603 Moselle, river, and military transport552
Frankish development of604 Mount Baronde, and the Donation of
on Roman route from the Rhineland to Charlemagne377
the Elbe600, 602 Mounted troops2845, 286 n114
Roman ruins at6034 Moutier300 n166
Mining assets545 Mhlhousen586
Mints55 Carolingian base at591
Bordeaux128 Mules179, 542
Narbonne129 Mummolus, Gallo-Roman general289
Toulouse129 Munera46, 57
at Trevsio48990 Munera militaria, Roman tax for support
Vicenza486 of the army46
Miracles239, 609 Mnster615
Misdirection, military strategy223, 243 bishopric of592
Missi dominici, high-ranking envoys18, development of city at407
235, 31, 434, 512, 82 Lebuins journey to406
Missile weapons291, 324, 342, 434 Murbach, monastery421
Missionaries2023 abbot of605
Anglo-Saxon112 immunities of422
conversion of Saxons to Vellius Historia at604
Christianity591 Muslims94, 113, 611, 629
712 index
and Carolingian foreign policy282 Pippins grant to153

Carolingian operations against633 Novempopulana, Roman province121, 130,
control of Barcelona124 132
delegation to Carolingian court Noyon, Charlemagnes coronation at114
(777)62930 Numeracy, education in1920
in Gascony136
prohibition of alcohol127 Oak
raids in Gascon Duchy126 great oak dedicated to Thor399
treatment of non-believers560 n175 use in siege ladders3512
war against113 n21 Oaths34
Mstair47980 breaking of6245
Mutationes22 of faithfulness34
and Lombard capitulation387
Namatius80 n306 Saxon6234, 626, 642
Naples, citizen levy from171 n99 Oberaden555, 602
Narbonne127, 130 Obermarsberg plateau (Eresburg), military
mint at129 encampment on233
Roman road at120 Ober-Marsberg231
Nethe, river44041 Obsequium (military household)6, 7
Neumagen, royal court at153 Octodurus297
Neuss4323 Octrioli, Lombard capture of270
Rhine crossing at542 Oderzo, fortress city, Grimwalds
Neustria destruction of489
Carlomans kingdom in109 Odilo, Agilolfing duke of Alamannia188
Carolingian military campaigns4 n58
Carolingian military forces from430, Odilo, father of Tassilo of Bavaria267
630 Ofen pass479
Nevers, royal assembly at (763)142 n6 Offa, king of Mercia82, 110
New Carthage, Scipios siege of351 Ohm, valley of537
Niedersachsen203 Ohrum, Carolingian forces in448, 589
Nijmegen Oil, boiling, use in siege defense531
Charlemagnes court at609 Oker river4468
levies from284 Carolingian forces at4489, 589
muster of Carolingian army at610, Oker, Carolingian army at448, 449
6134 Saxon army at44850
Nonantula, monastery of388 Oloron, fortress city130
Charlemagnes grants to504, 509 Onagri, catapults291, 294
Nordhausen Orosius, Christian historian599
Germar Mark at5846 Orta, lake of488
stronghold at583, 586 Osoppo, castra at492
Nordmannia627 Ostergo612
Normandy, Carolingian military Ostia, bishop of280, 394
campaigns4 Ostphalia, Saxon region240
North Sea Carolingian army in439, 4467
Carolingian military campaigns4 Ostphalians448
Roman route to the Elbe600 and intelligence gathering594
trade on114 Ostrogoths
Notker of St. Gaul22 n74, 35, 36, 37 n132, military colonies of312
42, 72, 106 n415, 3802, 386, 596 military forces at Treviso487
Gesta Karoli35, 36 n125 Otkar, magnate142
Novalesa, monastery at1478, 153, 163, 180, Otricoli, Lombard capture of (772)264
278, 290, 301, 638 Otto the Great37 n132
logistical support for Carolingian Ottonian kings, Romezge
army279, 389, 303 n173, 638 of507 n118
index713
Overwhelming force, military doctrine Lombard expeditionary levies in331

of78, 234, 314, 3412, 366, 3812, 431, Passes, Alpine, and military strategy493
497, 520, 552, 635, 646, 6489, 654 Patricius Romanorum, office of633
Ox carts95 Patrimony of the Cottian Alps344
Oxen85 Patris Giaigio, Charlemagne at504
Paul I, pope144, 146, 251, 409, 633
Pabulatores, foragers451 Paul the Deacon5745
Paderborn Historia Langobardorum494
Carolingian administrative installation Paul of Friuli, patriarch of Aquilia503
at557 Pavia, capital of the regnum
Carolingian civitas at602, 610 Langobardorum182, 389, 502
Charlemagnes court at578 as Byzantine military target330
Carolingian fortress at643, 645, 562 Carolingian defenses at331, 339
Paderborn meeting; magnum plactium and Carolingian military logistics3437
(777)6228 Carolingian siege encampment
preparations for60922 at32836
Padua389 economy3256
Paganism576, 626 n242 fall of374392
Pagans81, 87, 238 fortress city96
conversion to Christianity89, 11213, grain depot at489
21213, 4067, 524 n42, 5256 Lombard castra at31112
military operations against111 n13 Lombard defense of299
murder of Boniface608 Lombard relief force at330
Slavic pagans590 Lombard siege of (569)324
Pagixvii, 1718, 24, 31, 43, 48, 70, 85, military demographics325
200205, 218, 225, 230, 232, 279, 283, Pippins castra at311
2867, 296, 312, 418, 419, 424, 429, 513, Pippins military action against144
567, 576 n41, 578, 608, 635, 650 siege of60, 878, 237, 295, 31092
Palas ferreas (iron shovels)335 as siege target3227
Palisades, defensive, at Eresburg231 street plan326
Palladius, Rutilius Taurus Aemilianus, urban militia of3245
Roman writer on agriculture13 walls at3223, 327, 34853
Pamplona113 Peace, and population growth1267
destruction of city walls936 Peasants42
muslim control of95 Pemmo, Friulian duke357
Muslim leader of629 Pentapolis
Panygerici, manuscript tradition of359 and the Donation of Charlemagne377
Papacy4, 112 Leo of Ravennas control of390
Charlemagnes policy on180, 2578, Lombard forces at264
41618, 6323 papal acquisition of377
and Lombards114, 1412, 144, 152, 1546, papal authority in458
158, 1612, 164, 252, 255, 264, 267, 269, Perosa, Carolingian army at304
278, 281 Perugia, levies from1679, 171, 271 n75
Pippinss support for139 Peter, missus of Pope Hadrian265, 26870,
Papal cities, Lombard capture of26970, 275
273, 275 Peter of Novalesa, St.147
Parchment, reuse of21 Peter of Pisa, the Grammarian325 n53,
Paris70 503
population size67 n258, 68 n262 Pffers, monastery at4756
Parish system129 Pfyn475
establishment of533 Phalanx, military formation2067
Parma Piacenza, and Carolingian military
and Carolingian military logistics347 logistics347
and the Donation of Charlemagne377 Piave, river492
714 index
Picta, pictorial maps581, 583 at Pavia325 n52

Piedmont plain Justinianic10 n37
Carolingian army at304 Plaisir, monastery of419
papal holdings in344 Plenaria iustitiae, papal policy of156, 252
Pilgrimage374, 522 Pliny the Elder599
Pincer movement, military strategy78, Bella Germaniae599
2968, 300, 308, 5423, 545, 547, 583 n61, The Natural History599, 607, 614
618, 638, 646, 648 Pliny the Younger, Panegyric to Trajan360
Pinerolo, Carolingian army at304 n177
Pippin I (d768), father of Charlemagne1, Plow, heavy14
35, 20, 86, 90, 155, 277 n93, 6078 Plowing14
administrative control of Karlburg563 Plunder569
Aquitaine military operations118, 243 Po, river298, 370
Aquitaine policy1289, 574 and Carolingian military logistics344
Bavarian policy145 valley of298
capitularies of120 Poems, epic, and technical
capture of Iberg fort209 intelligence597
death of7, 631 Poets, as advisers597 n118
division of the regnum Francorum78, Phlde, Limes of Germar Mark at584
10814 Poitiers
Gascon campaigns136 battle at (732)3, 126, 136, 443
gifts to Fulda185 population size67 n258
grants of153 Pole weapons2067
invasion of Lombard kingdom2914, Polybius350
31114, 632, 638 Pompey94 n355
Lombard policy114, 313 Population growth, and military
military action against Saxons111 recruitment527
military strategy11112 Population size
and missionaries203 n110 and economic growth478
and the papacy11415, 139, 1412, 144, and military logistics649
157, 257, 276 Port facilities, Roman, Carolingian use
as patricius Romanorum180 of5567
as rex Francorum3, 4 Porza, Ravenna geographers itinerary
royal access to ecclesiastical lands52 through475
Saxon policy21213 Possessor, missus of Charlemagne459,
Saxon tributes to567, 207 468
siege of Bourges314, 334 Potentes2631, 34, 36
siege of Pavia237 and local administration44
siege tactics313 Praedae, (plunder)56, 58
spiritual life359 n175 Praeparamenta, building equipment118
stronghold construction588 Prandulus, royal vestiarius251, 252 n17
and Waiofer122 Praunheim, Roman military base at601
war against Grifo447 Presentales, Lombard Arimanni based
Pippin II, great grandfather of close to Pavia311, 326
Charlemagne2, 4, 60, 527 Primores5789
Pippin, son of Carloman1567, 187, 247 Prisoners of war237
Pippin the Hunchback, son of and intelligence gathering58294
Charlemagne42, 140 n3, 150, 193 n76, use as slaves514
260 Probatus, Abbot of Farfa275 n88, 345, 425,
Pirates80 n306 496
Pissasco, Carolingian army at3045 Procopius, early Byzantine historian322
Placenamesxvii Propugnacula, towers340
Placitum, surrender terms520 Proselytization523, 533
Plague Proskynesis ceremony33, 122
index715
Prostitutes332 Charlemagnes monarchia of18991,

Provence 249, 254, 267, 277, 319, 636, 651
Carolingian military campaigns in4 commerce in572
Carolingian, expeditionary levies divisio (768)10815, 13940, 145 n17, 188,
from630 257, 420, 631, 635
Novelasas lands in147 emporia in16
Provins, population size67 n258 integration of Saxon territory into89,
Punic wars74, 102 242, 562, 566630, 6434
Pyrenees119 local government200 n102
Carolingian military campaigns in4 magnates in4289
military history of823
Quadrivium, (arithmetic, geometry, music overpopulation570
and astronomy)20, 35 political reorientation in1868
Quentovic48 population size67, 74, 1256
Quierzy, Charlemagnes court at2789, Saxon raids in194, 195, 206, 215, 510
422, 424, 427, 429 unification of87, 111, 213, 217, 254, 258,
3923, 6312
Rabigaud, missus of Charlemagne459, Rehmn, Carolingian army at452
468 Reicharistokratie267
Radbod, duke607, 619 Reiti, papal military forces from379
control of North sea coast593 Religion
ducal villa of608 and military morale374, 4012, 428, 435
Radice, Alpine pass at493 as motivation for military action399,
Radiocarbon dating analysis396 n83 400, 403
Radulfus, count426 Religious houses, and local government44
Ragogna, castra at492 Remedius, Rector of Raetia4778
Ramparts337 Rennes, population size67 n258
Ratchis, duke of Friuli357, 491 Res ecclesiarum (estates of the church)8
Rations, military3434 Res gestae divi Augusti574
Ravenna Restriking (coinage)55
Carolingian forces at636 Retreat, military manoeuvre315
Carolingian military leadership at652 Rheims cathedral, Carlomans donations
as Carolingian power base465 to181
and the Donation of Charlemagne377 Rheinheim475
siege of (772)264 Rhine, river211, 216, 221
Ravenna Geographer600 Carolingian armys crossing of4323
itineraries of474 Great Rhine road475
Ravenna: monastery of306 and military logistics474
archbishop of266, 3057, 390, 4167, military routes on598 n82
456, 458, 460, 463, 4645, 467, 46970, military transport on474, 553
474, 497, 500, 502, 575 n39 Roman bases on554
geographical library of306 valley of104, 210
Ravennate, papal acquisition Rhineland
of377 central route from Rhineland to
Refugee centers398 Elbe6025, 610
Refugees, from Saxon attacks398, 400 northern route from Rhineland to
Regensburg, population size67 n258 Elbe6059
Reggio, and the Donation of Roman itineraries from600
Charlemagne377 Saxon devastation of51214
Reginbald, duke of Chiusi461, 467, 502 Saxon raids in51115
Regnum Francorum1, 3 southern route from Rhineland to
aristocracy in39, 267 Elbe601
Bavarias incorporation into385 Rhine-Main-Danube canal339, 605
borders of81 Rhodes, city of326 n55
716 index
Richard, Count of Rouen285 n114 pass of, western Pyrenees128

Rimini, and Carolingian military Rotlandus, (Roland)195
logistics347 Rouen1156
Rio Emiliano (river)491 population size67 n258
Ritterburg toll stations at48
fort at584, 586 Rouenais, Carolingian military recruitment
Germar Mark at584, 586 in2856
royal palatium at592 Royal fisc2, 9, 36, 43, 4954, 109, 3356,
Thuringian Road at586 347, 503, 529, 552, 572, 644, 650
River crossings221 n170, 360, 432, 441, 449 Ruhr, river209, 438, 539
sabotage of445 Carolingian army at432
River systems, and military transport71 Ruse dguerre45052
Riverboat technology, Roman558 Ruses, military106
Rivers, as defensive assets52930
Rivoli305 Saale, river586
Charlemagnes scara at308 Carolingian fortifications on5878
Roads69 n264 Thuringian Road at592
blockage of5489 Sben, bishopric of146
and communications69 n264 Sabotage, of river crossings445
construction of73 Sachkritik935, 97, 5089, 550
Hellweg road system432 St. Aubin, Angevin monastery at116 n35
maintenance of22, 72 St. Bertrand de Comminges, fortress
and military transport72 city130
Roman22, 69 n264, 70, 71 n274, 72, 116, 120, Roman urban circuit walls at134 n122
132, 287, 290, 2978, 300304, 4747, 479, St. Boniface, monastery of, Fulda149
481, 487 n46, 493, 542, 552, 5556, 580, St. Denis, fair of419
597, 604 St. Denis, monastery of48
Saxon577, 58081 Charlemagnes policies41821
sunken580 logistical obligations of420
Thuringian Road5846 Pippin Is council at108
Rdgen, Roman military base at601 Sts. Fortunato and Felice Cathedral,
Roland101, 195 Vicenza4867
see also Rotlandus St. Germain-des-Prs, monastery of68
Roman Empire n260
European trade5167 military obligations of224 n180
militarization of civilian population165 San Giovanni, suburb of Friuli491
naval bases of3889 St. Hyppolitus, monastery of, and
settlement policy574 Carolingian military logistics3456
Rome143 St. Jean de Maurienne300, 301
Aistulfs attack on174, 293 Carolingian army at290
army of166, 17071 magazine at300
Charlemagnes legation to139 St. Johan, monastery of480
defenses of1678 St. Julians island488
gates of1678 St. Lizier, Roman urban circuit walls at134
Lombard blockade of2645, 2701 n122
military schola at166 n86 St. Martin at Tours365
Ostrogothic assault on173 Charlemagnes gift to3889
population size170 logistical support for Carolingian
urban militia of1645 military389
Vandal attack on173 St. Martin in Utrecht52, 618
Visigoth attack on173 and military logistics611
walls of1678 Rector of611
Roncevalles San Martino, suburb of Friuli491
battle at38, 91, 131, 1012, 493 St. Mary, cathedral, Vicenza486
index717
St. Maurice, monastic center297 population size567

St. Michael the Archangel, church at roads in577, 58081
Amneburg537 Roman military activity in186
St. Peter, altar dedicated to, Fritzlar399 surrender to Charlemagne561
St. Peter, church, Pisa, and Carolingian trade in197 n92
military logistics345 Saxon war177245, 42755, 51065, 6367,
St. Peter convent, Vicenza487 6413
St. Peters tomb, keys of632 Saxons
St. Pietro, Verona363 alliance with Bavarians368
St. Rmi, basilica of181 class structure626 n242
San Salvatore monastery, Saint constitution of199
Sirmione365 conversion to Christianity112, 213 n149,
St.-Svin de Lavedan, religious house 216, 226, 2445, 4534, 5236, 5601,
at129 566, 576, 591, 614, 624, 628, 643
St. Savior, monastery in Brescia274 idols of403
San Stefano, suburb of Friuli491 intelligence gathering22830, 411
St. Vincent of Marseilles, monastery35 local government200 n102
n121 military allies5167
St. Wandrille, monastery of2856 military demography20910
St. Zeno, monastery of, Verona364, 388 military organisation199209
Salian kings, Romezge of507 n118 military strategy196 n88, 4023, 4378,
Salic lands, holders of3467 519
Sallust105 oath of faithfulness to
Salt trade5923 Charlemagne6234, 642
Salzburg, cathedral church at145 Old Saxons199
Salzungen, royal villa423 Pippin Is tributes567
Samoussy189, 17980, 418 political organisation199209
Saracens3 protection for Fulda missionaries5234
Saragossa113 recognition of Frankish rule566
Charlemagnes retreat from95 slave trading514
Muslim leader of629 societal weakness567
siege of60 technological aid to516
Sarcina, Leo of Ravennas control of390 treaty with Charlemagne2412, 5612
Sardinia376 Scandinavians, links with regnum
Satraps199206, 394, 5789 Francorum571
Saul200 n101 Scarae, of Carolingian army41315, 430,
Sava river370 436, 532, 5423, 548, 614, 622, 641, 643
Saws, stone-cutting335 Schaan, stronghold at477
Saxon (language), use by Carolingian Schanfigg479
missionaries533 Scharnitz, monastery at145
Saxon Poet427, 436, 439, 451 n91, 452 Schlossbuck475
Saxon territory Schlotheim, fortified royal center at586
administrative districts of576 n41 Schningen, Carolingian forces in589
borders of229 n195 Schools, for aristocrats345
Carolingian administration of6434 Scipio Africanus, Roman commander102
Carolingian fortifications in6445 at New Carthage351
Carolingian intelligence on644 Scorched earth, military tactic515, 551,
Carolingian mapping of599 566
Carolingian military objective634 Scotland, Carolingian trade with114
Frankish settlements in571 Seax, short sword206
geography20911 Secrecy, and military planning618
integration into regnum Francorum58, Secundus of Trent494
89, 562, 566630 Slestat, Charlemagnes court at474, 480
mapping of47782, 599 Selz, Carlomanss court at14952
718 index
Septimania, expeditionary levies from630 Slavs571, 584, 590, 593

Sergius, primicerius of pope Stephen and Carolingian intelligence
III115, 158, 1615, 175, 180, 192, 2489 gathering594
blinding of176, 269 Charlemagnes influence on81
murder of268 conversion to Christianity146, 591
Servitium regis, component of Carolingian in Saxon territory591
tax system467 Smuggling48
Setbacks, military, recording of395 Soest, missionary base at591
Settlement policies5734 Soissons
Sheep128 Carlomans coronation at114
Shielding forces299, 300 Soissons-vase incident239 n233
Shields543 Soldiers
Ships citizen soldiers1657
Dromon4712 foot soldiers62, 131, 225, 2846
Liburnian galley47071 and intelligence gathering582, 644
as mode of transport46872 and military planning31
and river transport558 profesional6, 130, 169, 2245, 315
speed of46971 regular166
Viking472 relationships with missionaries58990
Shovels, iron335 soldier-farmers166
Shrines, pagan, destruction of62021 soldier-urbanites166
Sidonius Appolinaris80 n306 Song of Roland91, 1012
Siege encampments, Charlemagnes at Sorbian March584, 631, 645
Pavia32841 Sorde, religious house at129
Siege machines295 Sori, and the Donation of
and military planning31 Charlemagne377
Siege tactics172 n102, 173, 2335, 295, Spades, for ditch-digging335
3124, 3245, 3289, 3423, 355, 3978, Spain119
486, 4901, 497, 543, 648 and Charlemagnes regnum81
at Pavia332, 348353 Christians in629
Siege towers168, 342 Muslim629
Siege trains314 Umayyad governor of126, 136
Sigfried, rex Danorum627 Spatha, long sword206
Sigiburg, see Syburg Spears131, 2067, 233
Signal fires529, 532, 544 in siege defense353
Signalling544, 547 Speyer600
Silver54, 184 magazines at552
as booty313 population size67 n258
smelting of545 Ravenna Geographers itinerary
Silver mines54 through474
Silversmiths1845 Roman road system at474
Sinigaglia, Lombard capture of264, 270 Spies61
Sirmione, defensive walls at389 n57 Saxon2289
Sirmione, Island fortress on Lake Spoleto, Duchy of264, 275 n88
Garda3889, 482, 504 and Carolingian military logistics346
Sisak370 and the Donation of Charlemagne377
Skidrioburg, Saxon fortifications at211 duke of457, 639
Skirmishing301 military levy from379
Slav March645 Squirs (renamed Le Role), religious house
Slaves58 n219, 59, 11213, 132, 135, 194, 514, at129
528, 608, 625 Stabilius, duke of Treviso36970, 484, 500,
and intelligence gathering596 502
Slavic lands109, 112 opposition to Charlemagne466
Christian conquest of111 Starvation, as siege tactic3423
index719
Stassfurt, salt production at592 long2067, 225

Stavoren612 manufacture of617
Stein-am-Rhein, Ravenna Geographers short2067
itinerary through475 Sworn associations42
Stephen II, pope155, 174, 262, 359 n175, Syburg
376, 384, 461, 633 Carolingian capture of4326, 641
Stephen III, pope11415, 117, 137 n133, 140 Carolingian commander at540
n3, 141, 150, 1537, 1612, 169 n94, 1746, Carolingian garrison at546
187, 191, 247, 266, 269, 636 Carolingian relief of54351
Stone, in military fortifications956, 134 Carolingian scarae at5412, 548
Stones, use as weapons3545 church at453
Strasbourg600 fortress at209, 433
Ravenna Geographers itinerary Saxon castra at539
through475 Saxon forces at642
Strategy, aristocratic training in35 Saxon garrison at434
Strela pass479 siege of53843
Strick475 topography434
Sturm, abbot of Fulda Vorburg at436
administration of Saxon territory2445 Sythen
and Charlemagne111, 14850, 159, Carolingian fortifications at555, 645
1826, 195, 225 n183, 422, 424, 564 and Carolingian military logistics550
and Carolingian military logistics224 Carolingian siege of648
6, 521 Saxon fortress at209
and Desiderius635
Eresburg commander453 n99, 610 Tabernae22
exile of144 n12, 151 Tacitus186, 370, 6023, 614
Fulda gap region commander564, 590, accounts of Roman military
622, 652 operations360
and Fulda monastery5328, 6423 Agricola99
and intelligence gathering537 Annales186
military abilities of1834 Tactics, military35, 7780, 2912, 294
military strategy of537 Tagliamento, river492
preaching to Saxons454 Tarbes, fortress city127
as Saxon military target5223 Tarratros (augers)335
and the tripartite pact86 Tassilo, duke of Bavaria
Sdergau region61415 acta of1445
Lebuins journey in407 and Autchar143, 147
Suetonius (Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus), and Bavarian church145
Roman historian32, 100, 574 Carolingian policy43031
accounts of Roman military conquest of Carinthia329
operations360 and Charlemagne32, 39, 151
biographies of92 desertion from Pippins army143, 151
Life of Augustus99, 560, 624 n36
Twelve Caesars99 and Desiderius140, 1423, 164 n77, 167
Sulayman62930 n88
Supplicatio, ceremony of559 diplomatic activity with Pope
Supplies, military3323 Hadrian250
Supply routes, defence of301 intelligence provision to Saxons3689
Supply trains228, 68 n262 Lombard alliance144
Surveying338, 590 marriage of144
Susa289, 301, 322 and the papacy141, 144, 146, 250, 255
Carolingian army at291, 301 and Pippin109, 143
Carolingian fortress at281, 291, 300 political objectives329
Swords206 Slav initiatives146
720 index
Taunus mountains221, 228 immunity from1478

Taxes18 n61, 4548, 578, 113, 571 on trade4749
and coinage55 Tools
dispensations from48 construction tools118
land taxes45 and military logistics3356, 339
on trade479 Topographical information, Charlemagnes
see also annua dona access to598
Telli, hand-launched missile weapons291 Torre, river492
Tentoria, siege shelters311 n4 Tortona
Terror, as Saxon military objective51315 grain depot at489
Tertry, battle of, (687)2, 60 Lombard expeditionary levies in331
Teutoburg238 Torture, and Carolingian intelligence
Theodicius, duke of Spoleto251, 252 n17 gathering5946
Theodoric the Great, Ostrogothic Totila, assault on Rome (546)1734
king3234, 327, 361, 487 Toulouse, fortress city127, 130
fortification of Verona36061 mint at129
palace of363 Roman road at120
Theodosius, bishop of Tivoli272 Roman urban circuit walls at134 n122
Theophylactus, missus of Leo of Touraine52
Ravenna390 Tours, population size67 n258
Theudbaldus, count426 Towers167, 322, 340, 342, 364
Theudicius, duke of Spoleto3089, 320 at Pavia348
Theudo, son of duke Tassilo of Bavaria250 at Verona3634
Thor, great oak dedicated to399 Trackways, wooden580
Three field system14 Tractoria, overland communication
Threngau423 system212, 177, 191 n69, 227, 288, 496,
Thuringer Wald, Thuringian Road at586 508
Thuringia Trade routes554
Carolingian expeditionary levies Trade
from535 Adriatic489
Carolingian troop mobilization in agriculture15
from430 in Gaul119
frontier if183 and governmental income47
population size535 growth in16
revolt in3940 in salt5923
Saxon raids in194 Saxon197 n92
Thuringian Road5846, 592, 601 trans-alpine490
Tiberius606 Transport, military2845, 2878
Tilleda and logistics68
fort at5845 riverine68 n262, 71, 118, 2278, 2234,
Germar Mark at5845 2878
Tilpinus, Archbishop of Rheims1812, 187, Trebuchet515 n14, 516
191 Trent4934
Timber dukes of494
in catapult construction51718, 53940 grain depot at489
in defensive fortifications134, 340, 531 Lombard forces at360
and military logistics351 Treviso48790
Tincino, river, and Carolingian military Agilufs siege of488
logistics344 Alboins siege of488
Tivoli, Lombard military force at272 Carolingian devastation of500
Toll collectors120 Charlemagnes administration of502
Toll stations48, 120 defenses of487
Tolls45, 113, 419, 572 economy of48990
and coinage55 grain depot at489
index721
Lombard troops from299 Valenciennes, Charlemagnes court at178

population of489 Valentinian III, emperor165
Stabilius at484, 487 Valerius Maximus105
strategic importance487, 495 Vallation235, 295, 31314, 3278
surrender of500, 642 at Bourges334
Via Postumia at494 at Pavia33033, 337, 34041
Tributa (tributes)56 see also contra-vallation
Tributes45 n162, 569, 11112 Valleius Paterculus105
Trier Vandals, sacking of Rome173
Constantine the Greats great hall Vanguards301
at557 Varro, Liber logisticorici80
population size67 n258 Varus, Roman governor575, 583, 606
Trinoda necessitas, Anglo Saxon law22 Teutoburg disaster (A.D.9)216
n74 Vassals7, 125
Tripartite alliance15864, 172, 1746, Vassi50, 125, 162, 650
1778, 180, 182, 1923, 213, 2469, 25160, Vassi dominici8, 23, 434, 51, 57 n213, 109,
265, 266, 2689, 271, 273, 276, 635 125, 284
Trivium35 Vecht, Fossa Drusiana at605
Truce devices452 Vecht canal597, 6056, 61113
Trumpets, in military communication445 Vechten
Tuetoburg211 Roman base at99100, 243, 306, 434,
Tunno, Duke of Ivrea251, 252 n17, 298 544, 545 n120, 605
Turin298 on Roman route from the Rhineland to
and Carolingian military logistics347 the Elbe600
military significance317 Vegetius (Publius Flavius Vegetius
walls of317 Renatus)35
Turrets338 De re Militari35, 61, 105, 223, 334, 3368,
Tuscia, levy of171, 271 n75 600
Tutinsode, fortified royal center at586 description of defensive works3378
Two field system14 on siege ladders34950
Two front war411, 428 Veii, siege of3289
Tyrol, duke Tassilos control of146 Velleius Paterculus574, 604, 606
Historia Libri Duo69 n264, 604
Uithuizen Wadden, coastal mud flats612 Venetiae, province of, and the Donation of
Ulfari, duke of Treviso488 Charlemagne377
Unstrut Venetian lagoon, Byzantine control of466
ford of5845 Venice389, 466 n138, 489
Thuringian Road at586 Byzantine military base at330
Urbino, Lombard capture of264, 270 and Carolingian military logistics495
Utensilia, construction tools118 and the Donation of Charlemagne377
Utrecht Verberie, Charlemagnes court at419
Carolingian missionary operations Vercelli, fortress city298
at406 Verona96, 251, 299, 316, 356, 389, 4812
diocese of622 Aios holdings in499
fortress city600 bishop of387
monastic school at619 Carolingian intelligence on362
Roman fort at605 Charlemagnes campaign
route to Deventer617 against35668
and slave trade514 citadel at363
Constantine the Greats siege of35860
Val dEntremont297 fortifications at360
Val di Susa296 Lombard troops from299
Carolingian Army at307 population of358
Val-de-Isre301 n166 road links358
722 index
siege of60, 36068, 648 Waldipert, anti-pope267

surrender of366 Waldo, abbot of St. Denis42 n151
Via Claudia Augusta at479 Wallhausen
walls at357, 3634 Germar Mark at5846
Verruca, siege of (590)494 stronghold at5846
Vetera, (Carolingian Xanten), on Roman Walls, defensive121 n57, 1678, 291 n137,
route from the Rhineland to the 3223, 531
Elbe602 at Annapes531
Via Amarina, Roman road169, 264 at Braburg397
Via Claudia Augusta367 n215, 47980, 496 Danewerke205
Via Emilia347, 388 defense of3535
Via Flamania169 n96, 264 earthen3378, 340
Via Francorum3056 at Eresburg2334
Via Fulvia356 in Friuli490
Via Gallica364 at Fronsac121
Via Postumia494 at Fulda52931
Via Salaria345 height measurment of34950
Vicarii43, 418, 422, 425, 650 at Hersfeld455
Vicecomites43 at Karlburg5634
Vicenza manning of16970
Aios holdings in499 at Merseburg587
Carolingian devastation of499 at Pavia322, 327, 331, 333, 348, 373
Charlemagnes administration of502 at Rome16970
defenses of485 at Sirmione389
economic importance4846 stone95 n361
surrender of499, 642 storming of34853
troop strength at486 at Syburg433
Via Postumia at494 at Verona357, 3634
Vienne, Carolingian army at290 at Vicenza485 n39, 486
Vikings82 at Toulouse134 n122
Great Army133 at Turin317
military forces of756, 77 n293 Waltunc, Carantanian duke250
Wessex raids132, 133 War
Villa organization, bipartite, establishment defensive204
in Saxon territory571 just war242
Villae5052, 650 offensive204
in military logistics335, 336 on rushing war202, 2045, 222, 232, 438
Virgils Cathedral, (cathedral church of two front war411, 428
Salzburg)145 Warendorf61517
Viscomites418, 422, 425 Warin, count188
Visigoths94 Warnechar, missus of Pippin I174
attack on Rome173 Warnefrid, aristocrat from Friuli503
naval forces of80 n306 Water resources97, 183, 239, 240 n235, 244
Vita Hadriani26873, 276, 278, 307, 391 Water transport550, 552, 6067
Vita Libuini antiqua2024 Waterways, Saxon577
Viterbo, Desiderius army at272 Wealth, and military service173 n103
Vogels Gebirge228 Weapons, missile233, 291, 294
Vulvinus, count365 Weather, and military campaigns401 n95,
402, 496, 5067
Wacta, watch-service532 Weinberg, Carolingian fortification at556
Wagons85, 227, 332, 549 Weissgau, Saxon Gau394
Waides river526, 529 Carolingian army at452
Waiofar, duke115, 118, 1212, 126, 134, 314, Werra river219, 591
437 Thuringian Road at592
index723
Weser, river203, 210, 216, 219, 222, 232 Wool, trade in128
n204, 2357, 24043, 3956, 402, 413, Worms
432, 4378, 44043, 446, 591, 593, 6025, Carolingian army at217, 22024, 230,
614, 636, 641 231 n199, 51011, 551
Wesergebirge446, 452 Charlemagnes court at152, 408
Carolingian forces in589 Charlemagnes journey to (771)177, 180
Wessex itinerary from600
Burghal Hidage1323 as mustering center195
population of133 Pippin Is assembly at223 n172
Viking raids in132 population size67 n258
Westergo, Frisian region394, 612 Ravenna Geographers itinerary
Westphalia210, 240 from474
Carolingian army field operations Roman road system at474
in439 royal palatium at511
Wetter, river, Roman military base on601 Wounded soldiers, treatment of314
Wetterau region, Roman defenses in601 Writing, importance at Carolingian
Widukind, Westphalian magnate and court597 n118
rebel6258 Wrssing, Liudgers paternal
military forces of210 grandfather619
Wiedenbrcke, river Ems at617 Wupper, river211
Wiesbaden, Roman military base at601 Wrzburg
Wigbert, abbot of Fritzlar399 bishop of563, 591
relics of399, 423 n166 bishopric at569
Vita of399 Carolingian advance base at601
Wiggerus, count of Utrecht611 demographic expansion in5267
Wilichar, archbishop of Sens188, 417 population of568
Willehad, Anglo-Saxon missionary621
Willibald, biographer of Boniface533, 590, Xanten
608 Carolingian army at552, 554
Willibrord, bishop of Utrecht406 as commercial center554
misionary work of572 on Roman route from the Rhineland to
Wilp, chapel at406 the Elbe600, 602
Windleite, upland region585
Wine Ybbsfeld, battle at (788)385 n45
production1267 Yjssel River, Saxon attacks on406
trade of1278 York, Liudgers visit to620
Winter, military campaigns in411
Witiza, see Benedict of Aniane123 Zacharias, pope569, 633
Women on rebaptism of pagans525 n48
murder of512 Zernetz, Carolingian army at496
as slaves608 Zernez479

Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne&#39;s Early Campaigns (768-777)

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Charlemagnes Early Campaigns (768777)

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hw

A Diplomatic and Military Analysis

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bachrach, Bernard S., 1939-

Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1.Two Kings: Charlemagne and Carloman108

2.Italy in Flux: Opportunities and Problems139

3.The Saxon War: Phase One177

4.The Unwanted War246

5.The Siege of Pavia310

6.The Fall of Pavia and Its Aftermath374

7.The Saxon War: Phase Two427

8.The Friuli Diversion473

9.The End of the Saxon War510

10.Integration of the Saxon Territory566

The citation of classical sources follows the system employed by the

AP Bernard S. Bachrach, Armies and Politics in the Early

SRG Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum

Annales Alamannici, MGH, SS, vol. I; and Annales

Ado of Vienne Brevium Chronicon, PL, 123.

CCt  Constitutum Constantini, ed. Horst Fuhrmann, MGH,

Paul, Hist., Paulus Diaconus, Historia Langobardorum, MGH,

Traditionally, military histories are larded with numerous maps depicting,

In the short century from 687 to 768, Charlemagnes great grandfather

adroit diplomacy, and, when necessary, sustained by effective military

victory at Poitiers in 732 was considered by his contemporary, the Venerable

dynastic change was accomplished with the active support of at least

response to a papal request for military support, culminated in a success-

Early Carolingian Military Organization

Those people who possessed multiples of the minimum level of wealth

In addition to acquiring their share of the royal treasure following the

24Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 7577.

fathers kingdom. The regnum Francorum was divided between them

The death of Carloman the Younger in 771 left Charlemagne in a

Demography and Economy

33Very useful, in this context, is Nelson, Literacy, pp. 258296.

of a state are largely reflected in and determined by its organisation for

39Jean-Pierre Devroey, Les mthodes danalyse dmographique des polyptyques du

of economic development was in agriculture and in the production of

Consonant with increases in agricultural production and perhaps in

Helga Breuninger (Frankfurt-am-Main-New York, 1991), 123223. However, much more

A gradual process of climate warming began in northern Gaul during the

54William H. TeBrake, Ecology of Village Settlement in the Dutch Rijnland, Pathways

The emergence during the Late Antique era of an effective episcopal

It cannot be assumed that merely because the regnum Francorum was

Charlemagne inherited numerous administrative assets for the exercise

organized central bureaucracy based in the royal court.61 In addition, the

61The basic work remains Karl Ferdinand Werner, Missus-Marchio-Comes. Entre

At the technical level, Charlemagnes ability to communicate his will rap-

In addition to overseeing the maintenance of the infrastructure that

There is now a consensus that the pessimists arguments are untenable

Charlemagne, p. 6, gradually has begun to espouse a more optimistic assessment which

represented in various capitularies, at assemblies where a consensus fide

92See, for example, Brunner, Oppositionelle Gruppen, pp. 4095.

Adalhards De ordine palatii to Charles the Balds son and successor,

little opportunity during such a gathering in the spring to influence

106Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 202206; and McKitterick, Charlemagne,

more helpful to characterize this process as one of delegating authority

When, however, Charlemagne sought to impose what some modern

numeracy they generally obtained at home and were introduced to the

fundamentally accurate, if not a verbatim account of what Charlemagne had to say. It

the work methods employed by Charlemagne indicate that he would send

Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne's Early Campaigns (768-777)

Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne's Early Campaigns (768-777)

1.Two Kings: Charlemagne and Carloman108

2.Italy in Flux: Opportunities and Problems139

3.The Saxon War: Phase One177

4.The Unwanted War246

5.The Siege of Pavia310

6.The Fall of Pavia and Its Aftermath374

7.The Saxon War: Phase Two427

8.The Friuli Diversion473

9.The End of the Saxon War510

10.Integration of the Saxon Territory566

AP Bernard S. Bachrach, Armies and Politics in the Early

CCt Constitutum Constantini, ed. Horst Fuhrmann, MGH,

Paul, Hist., Paulus Diaconus, Historia Langobardorum, MGH,