Professional Documents
Culture Documents
68896
and entitled Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa
[G.R. No. 169292, April 13 : 2011] M. Guevarra, et al., was raffled to Branch 160, presided by
the respondent RTC Judge.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND
AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil
CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA, Case No. 68896, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole
REPRESENTED BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS. petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the
private respondents.
DECISION
On December 16, 2002, the respondent RTC Judge denied
MENDOZA, J.: petitioners' motion to dismiss and at the same time set Civil
Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference, directing the parties
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the to submit their respective pre-trial briefs.
August 11, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-GR. SP No. 89329, filed by petitioners, Spouses On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a second motion to
Francisco De Guzman, Jr. and Amparo O. De Guzman dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum
(petitioners). In the assailed decision, the CA found no shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the
commission of grave abuse of discretion when the public principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7,
respondent therein, Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Judge Fabros), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, fatally defective and thus dismissible.
Branch 160 (RTC), denied petitioners' second motion to
dismiss, in Civil Case No. 68896, an action for annulment of The private respondents opposed the second motion to
contract and damages. dismiss.
The facts of the case have been succinctly summarized by On February 12, 2004, the respondent RTC Judge issued her
the CA as follows: first assailed order, denying the second motion to dismiss,
disposing thus:
On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and
Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, ostensibly xxx
acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment Inasmuch as the records show that the pending incident is
of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale the second motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the
same is hereby Denied for lack of merit. On August 11, 2005, the CA denied the petition for lack' of
merit. The CA, in its decision, agreed with the RTC that
SO ORDERED. following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the
complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed
On May 25, 2004. the petitioners filed their motion for waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to
reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the dismiss.
motion through her second assailed order dated December
29, 2004, to wit: Not in conformity, the petitioners filed this petition for
review under Rule 45, anchored on this:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
dated February 12, 2004, filed by the defendant Spouses GROUND
Francisco and Amparo De Guzman, through counsel, on
May 25, 2004, and after considering the grounds stated
therein in support of their motion, and finding no cogent THE COURT A QUO DECIDED A QUESTION OF
reason to warrant the reconsideration sought for, the motion SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
is DENIED. LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DISMISS, THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE
SO ORDERED.[2] FACT THAT IT WAS INDUBITABLY SHOWN AND
ESTABLISHED THAT THE ESSENTIAL
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATION OF NON-
via a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC should FORUM SHOPPING PURSUANT TO SECTION 5,
have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was RULE 7 OF THE RULES OF COURT WAS NOT
fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and OBSERVED AND COMPLIED WITH SINCE THE
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the SAME WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PERSONALLY
complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa BY THE PURPORTED PLAINTIFFS THEREIN.
but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the
attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the It is the position of the petitioners that the second motion to
attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to dismiss does not violate the Omnibus Motion Rule under
Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue
court. Thus, according to the petitioners, the denial by the raised in the second motion was a question of jurisdiction.
RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical For said reason, the matter of the defective verification and
and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and certification cannot be considered to have been waived when
should be struck down as null and void. it was not interposed at the first instance. Considering that
the issue is jurisdictional, the RTC should have dismissed the
complaint motu proprio. Fabros. Absent such showing of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the
The Court disagrees with the petitioners. ruling of the CA.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus
order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or
of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion,
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a must raise and include all objections available at the time of
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all
errors of judgment.[3] objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As
inferred from the provision, only the following defenses
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application:
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed another action pending between the same parties for the
in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the
final judgment.[4] statute of limitations or prescription.
Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the defective verification and certification of forum shopping
Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite
"grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by ground of defective verification and certification of forum
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all dismiss.
in contemplation of law.[5]
Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement
In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance with
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In
fact, the court may order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is
not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. [6]
SO ORDERED.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the
Republic of the Philippines Resolution[1] dated December 18, 2008 of the Court of
SUPREME COURT Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611, entitled Maximo
Manila D. Sison v. Fr. Noel Labendia for Himself and in
Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement, Diocese of
Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar. The CA Resolution denied
THIRD DIVISION petitioner Office of the Ombudsmans Omnibus Motion for
Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration of the CAs June 26, 2008 Decision.[2]
OFFICE OF THE G.R. No. 185954
OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner, Present:
The Facts
CORONA, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar
VELASCO, JR., Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese
NACHURA, of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint
MAXIMO D. PERALTA, and addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo,
SISON, MENDOZA, JJ. accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public
Respondent. officials[3] of the Province of Samar, including respondent
Promulgated: Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered
February 16, 2010 into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison
x------------------------------------------------------------------------ was the Provincial Budget Officer.
-----------------x
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit
DECISION investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal
and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit
VELASCO, JR., J.: (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases
totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding
The Case procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared
by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines,
electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
Supplies and Property
The Special Audit Team, which was created under Management in Local
LAO Office Order No. 2003-059 dated July 7, 2003, Governments (RRSPMLG).
summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and Moreover, the purchases were
observations, to wit: charged against the calamity
fund, despite absence of any
1. Rules and regulations pertaining to declaration from the President
procurement of supplies and materials that Samar was under a state of
were consciously and continually calamity, in violation of Sec.
violated as disclosed in the verification 324(d) of R.A. 7160.
of selected purchases of the Province.
Below were the findings and 2. Inconsistencies in the dates of
observations: supporting documents relating to the
purchases discussed in finding No. 1
a. Purchases of various items, were so glaring that they raised doubts
totaling at least PhP 29.34 on the validity of the transactions per se;
million and allegedly procured
through public bidding, were 3. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves
found highly irregular for lack for calamity as funding source of
of proper bidding procedures emergency purchases was not legally
and documentation; established, there being no declaration
b. At least PhP 28.165 million from the Office of the President that
worth of purchases through Samar was under a state of calamity, as
repeat orders were made by the required under Sec. 324(d) of R.A.
Province without observing the 7160;
pertinent law, rules and
regulations governing this mode 4. Splitting of requisitions and purchase
of procurement; and orders was resorted to in violation of
c. Emergency purchases of COA Circular No. 76-41 dated July 30,
medicines and assorted goods 1976;
totaling PhP 14.67 million were
found not complying with the 5. There was overpricing in the purchase
requirements set forth under the of rice, medicines, electric fans and
Rules and Regulations on cement in the amount of PhP
580,000.00, PhP 322,760.00, PhP 7. The necessity and veracity of the
341,040.00, and PhP 3.6 million, distribution of t-shirts/caps, medicines,
respectively. An overpayment was also assorted goods and cement purchased by
committed in the payments of cement in the Province of Samar could not be
the amount of PhP 96,364.09; established due to rampant
inconsistencies in dates, quantities, as
6. Other observations gathered corollary well as the signatures of the alleged
to the purchases made are the following: recipients in the Requisition and Issue
Slip; and,
a. Purchase Orders were not
duly accomplished to include a 8. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance
complete description of the to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS)
items to be purchased, the totaling at least PhP 5.4 million in 2002
delivery date and the terms of and PhP 2.78 million as of April 2003
payment, in violation of the were granted to various applicant-
provisions of Section 74 and recipients without subjecting them to the
other corollary provisions of guidelines set forth by the Department
RRSPMLG. Some were even of Social Welfare and Development
acknowledged by suppliers; (DSWD).[4] x x x
b. At least 36 vouchers/claims
were not supported with an
official receipt, in violation of On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman,
the provisions of Section 4 of through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed
PD 1445 that all disbursements with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial
must be supported with officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The
complete documentation; and latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and
c. Advanced deliveries of countervailing evidence against the complaint.
medicines and assorted goods
were made on some purchases In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the
even before the purchase orders accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his
were prepared and before the innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is
public biddings were conducted. limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation
for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has
been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in
any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued SERVICE, and shall carry with it the cancellation of
by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. government service.
Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary Accordingly, Governor Milagrosa T.
evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his Tan and Executive Director Presentacion R.
signature and that he was neither factually connected nor Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government
directly implicated in the complaint. Finance, Department of Finance, are
respectfully directed to implement this
On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper Order upon receipt hereof and to forthwith
to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had inform the Office of compliance herewith.
not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use
of public funds by the Province of Samar. 2. The administrative complaint against
respondents MILAGROSA T. TAN, FE ORTEGA
On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman TAN ARCALES, SUSANO DIMAKILING
rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local SALURIO, BARTOLOME P. FIGUEROA,
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave ANTONIO DE LEON BOLASTIG, III,
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best ROSENAIDA A. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R.
interest of the service and dismissing him from service. The CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re-
dispositive portion of the Decision reads: election in May 2004;
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1- Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a
95, provides that the petition for review shall state the full motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
names of the parties to the case without impleading the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant
court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents. case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on
[20]
Thus, the only parties in such an appeal are the appellant July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was promulgated
as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this on June 26, 2008.
case, the administrative agency that rendered the judgment
appealed from, is not a party in the said appeal. In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of
the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.[22] That case, however, is not
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not applicable here, since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
have the legal interest to intervene. As the CA held correctly: motion for intervention during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA.
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman
was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court
provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified
petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a
copy on the court or agency a quo.[23] Clearly, the Office of
the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a
motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not
now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is
expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive
onlooker.[24]
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION On appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated 31 May 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said
decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the
MAY D. G.R. No. 178221 Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros
AONUEVO,ALEXANDER Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and
BLEE Present: their siblings[4] to intervene in the estate proceedings of the
DESANTIS and JOHN late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.[5] The decretal portion of the
DESANTIS NERI, CORONA, C.J., decision of the appellate court reads:
Petitioners, Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE ACCORDINGLY, the petition for
CASTRO,* certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed
PERALTA,** Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26,
ABAD,*** and 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec.
-versus- PEREZ, JJ. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent
injunction is hereby issued enjoining
respondents [petitioners], their agents and
INTESTATE ESTATE OF anyone acting for and in their behalves, from
RODOLFO G. enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.[6]
JALANDONI, represented Promulgated:
by BERNARDINO G. The antecedents are:
JALANDONI as Special December 1, 2010
Administrator, Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20
Respondent. December 1966.[7] He died without issue.[8]
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; [17] and On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing
the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
c.) Their respective proof of births.[18] proceedings.[25] The intestate court was convinced that the
evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the
It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the
that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings
that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her on her behalf.[26]
lawful representatives.
The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous
represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [27] It ventured on
the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals
regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court
have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
from the social condemnation of having a child out of settlement proceedings.
wedlock.[28]
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the
The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was following arguments:
denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January
2006.[29] Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. under a writ of certiorari.[35] In nullifying the intestate courts
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of
petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. [30] whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
[36]
Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon
In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.
[37]
it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have
disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.
[31]
The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of
Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have
facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or
parents.[32] Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John capriciously in issuing its assailed orders. [38] Grave abuse of
Desantis should have been taken as established. discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the
fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2)
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo. [39]
their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that
the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of
by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there
the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to
being bigamous.[33] From that premise, Isabel cannot be inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that
considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners there was none.[40] A proper evaluation of the evidence at
and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a
any interest in the estate of Rodolfo. previous marriage with John Desantis.[41]
Hence, the instant appeal.[34] To begin with, the respondent was not able to
produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel
and John Desantis.[42] The conspicuous absence of such allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position proceeding, to intervene therein.[46]
that no such marriage ever took place.
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe
Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [43] In assessing jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess
the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an
should have taken note of a typical practice among unwed exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may
Filipino couples who, in order to save face and not to be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
embarrass their families, concoct the illusion of marriage
and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within
[44]
the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it
examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from
Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence
John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have
Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos
Rodolfo is bigamous. estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable
requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-
We are not impressed. assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and
their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate
First Argument court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at
best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely We now proceed to the second argument of the
abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of petitioners.
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels
status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit Second Argument
discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand
of sound judicial procedure that only a person The second argument of the petitioners is also without
with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that
intervene.[45] Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient
evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their The petitioners did no better than to explain away
siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful
Rodolfos estate. statements made only in order to save face.[53] They urge this
Court to take note of a typical practice among unwed
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and
existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That,
Desantis was adequately established. This holds true the Court cannot countenance.
notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between
Isabel and John Desantis exists on record. The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
While a marriage certificate is considered the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. [47] Jurisprudence a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners
evidence other than the marriage certificate.[48] Hence, even would themselves argue that the document on which they
a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
evidence of the marriage between his parents. [49] statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly
precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed,
between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it previously married to John Desantis.Consequently, in the
contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved
John Desantis were married and (b) that Sylvia is by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable
their legitimate child.[50] In clear and categorical language, conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage therefore, void ab initio.
between Isabel and John Desantis.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to
Pursuant to existing laws,[51] the foregoing entries are present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest
true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the
evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings
attested.[52] In the case at bench, the petitioners and their cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
siblings offered no such rebuttal.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed
SUPREME COURT before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an
Manila Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring
125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo, Rizal
FIRST DIVISION (subject property), which was docketed as Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098.5 On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a
G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013 Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as
follows:
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs. It has been established by the evidence adduced by Landicho
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly
CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the spouses
INC., Respondents. Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes, Ignacio Santos and
Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome,
DECISION Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and
Justina Ramos, all of whom in January 1960, executed
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of Landicho, x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x
Court assails the Decision1 dated May 26, 2008 and which superseded the conditional sale. Gavino Espiritu, one
Resolution2 dated September 17, 2008 of the Court of of the vendors, fifty-five years old, farmer, resident of Barrio
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, testified that he and his co-
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land since
jurisdiction. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set 1930 and that the possession of Landicho, together with her
aside the Orders dated April 10, 20073 and November 22, predecessors in interest, has been open, peaceful, continuous
200t of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San and adverse against the whole world in the concept of an
Mateo, Rizal, in Land Registration (Reg.) Case No. N-5098 owner. It has also been established that the parcel of land is
(LRC Rec. No. N-27619). within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I.C. Project
No. 26 of San Mateo, Rizal, x x x; that the parcel of land is
The Facts are as follows.
classified as "montaoso" with an assessed value Teodorico Landicho, Filipino, resident of 74-A South 19th
of P12,560.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7081, x x x, taxes due to St., Quezon City, to the parcel of land under consideration
which for the current year had been paid, x x x; and that the and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal
same is not mortgaged or affected by any encumbrance. circumstances aforementioned.
The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but The opposition of the Director of Lands is hereby dismissed.
presented the report of investigation of Land Investigator
Pedro R. Feliciano dated August 23, 1965, x x x which stated Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the order
substantially that during the investigation and ocular for the issuance of the decree issue. 8
inspection it has been ascertained that no public land
application is involved and that no reservation is affected Upon finality of its Decision dated November 16, 1965, the
thereby, and therefore, he believed that the opposition CFI issued an Order9 on December 22, 1965 directing the
already filed can be withdrawn; x x x, 1st Indorsement dated Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
August 24, 1965 of the District Land Officer, District No. 7, "to comply with Section 21 of Act No. 2347"10 on the
Bureau of Lands, to the Director of Lands, recommending issuance of a decree and original certificate of title (OCT).
that, in view of said report of investigation, the opposition be
withdrawn; and x x x, office memorandum of the Chief, Eventually, on July 11, 1966, Jose D. Santos (Santos),
Records Division, Bureau of Land, addressed to the Chief, Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal, issued
Legal Division, dated September 23, 1965, to the effect that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16768111 in
according to the records, plan Psu-201023 is not covered by Landichos name covering the subject property. Notably,
any kind of public land application or patent. ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT
for the subject property; and although TCT No. 167681
It is therefore clear from the evidence on record that the stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no
applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48, other detail regarding the decree and the original registration
of C.A. No. 141, as amended.7 of the subject property was filled out.
In the end, the CFI decreed: The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and
as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled, new TCTs
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby confirms the title of the were accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the
applicant, Purita Landicho, of legal age, married to subject property could be traced from Landicho to Blue
Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired TCT No. On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of
344936 in its own name on November 10, 1971; then to Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of
Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No. 425582, herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two
November 5, 1973; and finally, to herein respondent years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI),
TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975.12 Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an
Omnibus Motion before the RTC, Branch 75, of San Mateo,
Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged
(ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case No. 12044, entitled A. therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg.
was still pending before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landichos title over the
as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez
property, which was a portion of a bigger tract of land specifically stated that no decree of registration had been
measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of
dated February 20, 1956, in the name of said corporation. the Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT
This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the had been ever issued by the ROD in Landichos name. As
name of Meerkamp Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant to Landichossuccessor-in-interest to the subject property,
Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on Rodriguez prayed that:
November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens (as regards Civil Case No. 12044) on a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the Clerk of
TCT No. 344936 of BCPI. Subsequently, based on the ruling Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City be
of this Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of commanded to transmit to the Honorable Court the
Appeals,14 ADRDI was also able to have its notice of complete records and expediente of LRC No. x x x
adverse claim over the subject property annotated on TCT N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619);
Nos. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI, respectively.
ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to b. After hearing, the Honorable Court give due
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was course to the instant motions and issue an Order as
issued on March 25, 1983. follows:
i. Directing the Administrator of the Land On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a
Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case
of Registration, in accordance with the tenor No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that
of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 x it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial
x x and the Order dated December 22, 1965 legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject
x x x, in the name of the petitioner property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed
[Rodriguez]; out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No.
482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious.
ii. Thereafter, ordering the Register of Deeds PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in
for Marikina City, through the Administrator his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and
of the Land Registration Administration as subsisting, there being no direct action or final court decree
having direct supervisory authority there- for its cancellation. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion constituted
over, to issue the a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not
sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI
Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case
Description as duly confirmed in the said Decision and No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests
Order x x x in the name of the herein petitioner [Rodriguez]. over the subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in-
Intervention; and to deny Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for
PETITIONER further prays for such other measures of relief utter lack of merit.
as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. 15
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion
In the course of the proceedings concerning the in an Order dated April 10, 2007, reasoning as follows:
aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself
submitted as his Exhibit "GG" TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to
but alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, whether this Court may take cognizance of the instant case
the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and, subsequently, rule
commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. upon the Omnibus Motion of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse
Case No. N-5098 set on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to of more than forty (40) years after the finality of the
bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02- Decision of November 16, 1965.
0229; and to testify in connection therewith.
Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because, as earlier stated, however, issue, as prayed for, a writ of execution directing
the proceedings in this Court is merely a continuation of the the issuance of a decree of registration and an original
land registration proceedings commenced in the CFI Pasig. certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
More importantly, with the creation of this Court under the
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases Finally, during the proceedings in this case, this Court was
involving properties within its territorial jurisdiction, made aware of the existence of claimants to the subject
specifically in San Mateo, Rizal, were transferred to this property. However, this Court cannot, at this time and in this
Court (Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). proceedings, rule on the legality or illegality of these claims
of ownership. It is best that these claims be ventilated in
Consequently, there is no legal impediment for this Court to appropriate proceedings specifically sought to for this
reiterate the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and the purpose.16 (Underscoring deleted.)
Order dated December 22, 1966 because the Rules on
execution of Judgment pertaining to civil cases are not The RTC decreed thus:
applicable to this kind of proceedings. A final and executory
judgment in a land registration case, being merely WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated
declaratory in nature, does not prescribe. (Sta. Ana vs. December 22, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Menla, 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Branch 6, is hereby REITERATED. The Land Registration
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316; vda. De Barroga vs. Albano, 157 Authority is directed to issue a decree of registration while
SCRA 131; Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 159) the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise
directed to issue an original certificate of title of the subject
Secondly, a more important issue was put to forewhether property, both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita
this Court may issue a writ of execution directing the Land Landicho, of legal age, married to Teodorico Landicho,
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of Filipino and a resident of 74-A South 19th St., Quezon City,
registration over the subject property and the Register of after compliance with issuance requirements and
Deeds of the Province of Rizal to issue an original certificate procedures.17
of title in the name of [Rodriguez].
PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation of the aforequoted Order of the RTC. The RTC resolved both the
CFI Pasig proceedings, this Court can only reiterate the Motion for Leave to Intervene with the attached Answer-in-
directives in the Order dated December 22, 196[5]. It cannot, Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration of PCCAI in
another Order dated November 22, 2007. The trial court issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to Landicho for the
held: subject property in 1966, following the Order dated July 7,
1966 of then LRC Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas
This Court after receiving evidence that a Decision was (Noblejas), who took cognizance of the fact that the subject
rendered in favor of the applicants spouses Landicho as property, as part of a bigger parcel of land, was already
owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that registered under OCT No. 301 in the name of Meerkamp
no title was issued pursuant to the said Decision which has Co., pursuant to Decree No. 1480 under GLRO Record No.
become final and executory even after an Order to that effect 2429 issued in 1906. LRC Commissioner Noblejas
was issued, merely reiterated the said Order for the additionally stated in his Order that:
implementation of the Decision dated November 16, 1966,
signed by the Hon. Andres Reyes as Judge. In other words, The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue
Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has hereof is deemed to have been derived from Transfer
become final and executory. The issue in the instant Petition Certificate of Title No. N-1. (Under Decree No. 1480 dated
is the issuance of a decree of registration and nothing more is November 22, 1906) which should be deemed cancelled with
being tried. respect to the said property and that the issuance of the same
has been effected without the presentation of the owners
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For Leave duplicate of subsisting certificate of title. 19 (Emphasis
To Intervene and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the deleted.)
PCCAI are both DENIED.18
At around the same time, PCCAI filed a Petition for
The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals,
April 10, 2007, filed a Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing the Orders
informing the trial court that it cannot comply with said dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC for
Order since there were already two existing titles covering having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction
the subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
back to OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the
482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landichos TCT No. ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of execution for a
167681); and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued
Landichos name would only further aggravate the problem that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired
of double titling. The LRA also explained that the ROD
which renders the execution of the final and executory The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the
decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial court intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was
should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. PCCAI proper given the circumstances:
likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land registration court,
did not have the jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of Information
ownership over the subject property. PCCAI lastly Technology of the Philippines vs. Comelec, G.R. 159139,
maintained that it was an indispensable party in Land Reg. August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to
Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by wit:
the RTC to intervene during the hearing of Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated "The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of longer be modified, except only to correct clerical errors or
the CFI. mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or if supervening
events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008, decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. In the
found merit in the Petition of PCCAI. The appellate court interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed
gave great weight and credence to the Manifestation dated exceptions to this rule. A person who has a legal interest in
February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the double titling and the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
conflicting claims over the subject property. The Court of parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
Appeals held that: adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof,
The Land Registration Authority, being the repository of may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
land registration documents and the administrative agency action."
with the necessary expertise concerning land registration
matters, We cannot but agree with the above-quoted We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention
Manifestation. Moreover, from the above facts admitted by when the decision of the case was already final and
the parties and the LRA, it cannot be denied that there are executory and during the execution stage of the case.
conflicting claims on the ownership of the property which However, the supervening event which is the issuance of a
cannot be passed upon by the lower court as a land decree of registration which was already implemented and
registration court for lack of jurisdiction. 20 enforced upon the order of the Administrator of the LRC
way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No.
167861 in the name of Purita Landicho instead of an OCT Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court
makes the said intervention proper and well-taken. through the present Petition, arguing that:
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are REVERSED AND THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [Rodriguez, RTC Presiding Judge AN ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND
Josephine ZarateFernandez, the LRA Administrator, and IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN
Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and desist from RESOLVED.
implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a
proper case before an appropriate court where the issue of II
ownership of the subject land can be put to rest. 22
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED GRAVE
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
Decision but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE [PCCAI] HAD
Resolution dated September 17, 2008. LEGAL STANDING TO PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE
OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS BY "REVERSED AND SET ASIDE" the Orders dated April 10,
WAY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC in Land Reg. Case
THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR TO No. N-5098. The cease and desist order of the appellate court
COMPLY WITH THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 16, in the second line of the same dispositive portion is therefore
1965. a superfluity. Obviously, by reversing and setting aside the
foregoing Orders, there is nothing more to implement. The
A phrase "pending the outcome of a proper case before an
appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject
THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE land can be put to rest,"24 does not mean that the very same
IN LRC NO. N-5098. Orders which were reversed and set aside by the Court of
Appeals could later on be revived or reinstated; rather it
B. means that the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be
litigated and granted in an appropriate proceeding by a court
THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN with proper jurisdiction.
GOOD FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS
DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE. To clarify matters, it must be stressed that the issue brought
before the Court of Appeals did not involve the question of
III the ownership. The appellate court only concerned itself with
the proper execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision in
[RODRIGUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRECTIVE Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 but, due to the intricacy of the
AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO matter, was compelled to take notice of the controversy
INSURE THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS ARE between Rodriguez and PCCAI, both of whom trace back
PROPERLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED.23 their titles to Landicho. In view of these conflicting claims,
Rodriguez now avers that because ROD Santos issued TCT
The instant Petition has no merit. No. 167681 for the subject property in Landichos name, the
November 16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
At the outset, the Court finds unmeritorious Rodriguezs was not validly implemented since no OCT was
claim that the Court of Appeals rendered an open-ended issued.25 Corollary to this, Rodriguez posits that PCCAI is
judgment. In the dispositive portion of its Decision dated not a buyer in good faith of the subject property and that the
May 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals clearly and categorically
latters TCT No. 482970 is spurious. PCCAI, on the other The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
hand, insists that the issuance of TCT No. 167681 to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once
Landicho, from which its own TCT No. 482970 may be a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
traced back, was a valid execution of the said CFI decision. necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on
the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 filed land. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
before the RTC, explained that a TCT was issued to ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong
Landicho because the subject property, as part of a bigger presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and
parcel of land, was already covered by Decree No. 1480 and that they are valid.26 In this case, PCCAI is the registered
OCT No. 301 dated November 22, 1906 in the name of owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970, which
Meerkamp Co. In other words, Landichos TCT No. 167681 could be traced back to TCT No. 16781 issued to Landicho.
is a derivative of Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 of As between PCCAI and Rodriguez, the former is better
Meerkamp Co. which were cancelled to the extent of the entitled to the protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI can
subject property. rely on its TCT No. 482970 until the same has been annulled
and/or cancelled.
Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil
Case No. 12044 in the RTC, Branch 167, Pasig City. Not Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
only is PCCAI questioning the right of Rodriguez to the known as the Property Registration Decree, explicitly
issuance of an OCT pursuant to the November 16, 1965 provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to
Decision and December 22, 1965 Order of the CFI in Land collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
Reg. Case No. N-5098, it is also defending the validity of except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
TCT No. 482970 (which is a derivative of TCT No. 167681
issued to Landicho) against Araneta who holds TCT No. In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the
70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co.s OCT No. Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church in the
301). In view of the foregoing, issuing an OCT covering the United States of America,27 the Court declared that a Torrens
subject property to Rodriguez would give rise to a third title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its
certificate of title over the same property. Such act would validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted
only cause more confusion and complication, rather than the for that purpose. A collateral attack is made when, in another
preservation, of the Torrens system of registration.
action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is title be annulled or canceled. The proper court in an
assailed as an incident in said action. appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues
involving the alleged fatal defects in Landichos TCT No.
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for 167681 and/or its derivative TCTs, including TCT No.
registration of the subject property instituted by Landicho 482970 of PCCAI; the legal effects of Landichos sale of the
before the CFI, which was granted by the CFI in its Decision subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-interest of
dated November 16, 1965. Rodriguez, asserting that he was PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good
Landichos lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus faith or bad faith of PCCAI, as well as Rodriguez, in
purchasing the subject property. The resolution of these
Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 issues will ultimately be determinative of who between
seeking the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject
in his name for the subject property pursuant to the said CFI property.
judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of TCT
No. 482970 of PCCAI for the same property, but he simply Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according
brushed aside said certificate of title for allegedly being weight and credence to the Manifestation dated February 4,
spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No. 482970 2008 of the LRA.
be declared void and/or cancelled; and even if he did, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and
registration case. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. protecting the Torrens system of land titling and
Case No. N-5098, under the circumstances, is a collateral registration.28 In particular, it is tasked with the following
attack on said certificate, which is proscribed under Section functions:
48 of the Property Registration Decree.
(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final
If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT judgments of the courts in land registration
issued in his (or even in Landichos name) for the subject proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars
property, he should have directly challenged the validity of of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding
the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the very same certificates of title;
property in an action specifically instituted for such purpose
(i.e., petition for annulment and/or cancellation of title, (2) Be the central repository of records relative to
petition for quieting of title) and pray the said certificate of original registration of lands titled under the Torrens
system, including subdivision and consolidation not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing itself
plans of titled lands; and because it was merely following the recommendation of the
LRA, which was then acting as an agent of the court.
(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings and to the In another case, Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration
other agencies of the government in the Authority,32 the Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus
implementation of the land reform program.29 compelling the LRA to issue a decree of registration as
ordered by a land registration court. The Court took into
The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is account the LRA report that the parcels of land were already
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the registered and held:
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision
of the court and with the data found in the record. They have That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs
the decree, these officials ought to seek clarification from the reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose,
court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration registration.33
proceedings."30
The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation dated
31
In Ramos v. Rodriguez, the LRA filed a motion for February 4, 2008 to inform the RTC that the subject property
reconsideration of the decision and order of the land is already covered by two TCTs, both "uncancelled and
registration court respectively granting registration of a extant[;]" and for this reason, the LRA cannot comply with
parcel of land and directing the issuance of a decree of the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, directing the issuance
registration for the same. According to the LRA, there was of a decree of registration and an OCT for the same property
already an existing certificate of title for the property. The in Landichos name, as it would "further aggravate the
land registration court granted the motion for reconsideration already existing problem of double titling." In filing said
of the LRA and set aside its earlier decision and order. On Manifestation, the LRA was only faithfully pursuing its
appeal, the Court declared that the land registration court did mandate to protect the Torrens system and performing its
function of extending assistance to the RTC as regards Land property. The issuance of another certificate of title to
Reg. Case No. N-5098. Contrary to Rodriguezs assertion, Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud
the Court of Appeals did not abdicate its jurisdiction when it on its TCT No. 482970.
granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of PCCAI
largely based on the Manifestation of the LRA, since the Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to
LRA filed such a Manifestation as an officer of the court. intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in
several cases, viz:
Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, pertinent provisions of which read: This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an petition for review of the judgment has already been
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or where the assailed order has already become final and
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this
or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once
separate proceeding. and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for
may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress
attached to the motion and served on the original parties. again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court
The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not
482970 in the name of PCCAI.1wphi1 As the registered to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject administration of justice.34 (Citations omitted.)
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders
property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the
16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the
on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the
the same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.
subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996.
Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Costs against petitioner.
Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the
intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice SO ORDERED.
the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the original party
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings
in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in
which he prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965
Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case
only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground
that the subject property is already registered in its name
under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landichos
TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was
reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the
most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to
prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this reason,
the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
ALFONSO JARDENIL and ANUNCIACION
JOVER, LEVITA LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY
HER HUSBAND ANTONIO BERLIZO), JOEL
LLERA, FEBE LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY
HER HUSBAND LUCIANO LIM), SALVACION
N. VDA. DE LLERA, HOSPICIO PEDRINA,
RUFO CALVEZ, and MONSERRAT VILLABA,
[1]
respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On May 28, 1992, the trial court issued another Order, It must also be noted that until and unless there is a
directing the transmittal of the records to the Court of definitive ruling, and this can only be achieved in a final
Appeals.[19] judgment, on the issue of rightful possession and ownership
of the property in question, there can be no satisfactory
On February 2, 1993, petitioners filed a petition solution to the case.
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application
for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set Section 1 of Rule 65 (Rules of Court) governing the special
aside the Order dated July 23, 1992, of the Regional Trial civil action of certiorari presupposes that there is no appeal
Court cancelling the lis pendens notations in the TCT, and its nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Decision dated October 15, 1991 setting aside its original course of law.
decision dated May 30, 1988, for having been issued without
jurisdiction. Petitioners prayed that the trial court be In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is available which,
compelled to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 7687 and we believe, would be more speedy and adequate, and
Civil Case No. 7723 to the Court of Appeals. After hearing demonstrably congruent with law and justice under the
on March 17, 1993, the case was submitted for decision. [20] circumstances.
In its Decision, dated February 17, 1994, the Court of Evidence has been submitted, after the hearing of the
Appeals dismissed the petition and ordered the judge- application for preliminary injunction, that a judge has been
designate to desist from further proceeding with Civil Cases designated to substitute for the respondent Judge who had
No. 7687 and No. 7723, and to elevate the records for been separated from the service. Hence, this Courts order is
consideration on appeal. Said the appellate court: directed to said judge-designate.
It is our considered opinion that justice would be better WHEREFORE, the judge-designate in Civil Cases Nos.
served if we allow the regular appeal, which had been timely 7687 and 7723 is hereby ordered to desist from further
filed, to proceed in due course instead of annulling the proceeding with said cases. Instead, he is hereby directed to
various proceedings taken in the court below. elevate the record thereof to this Court for consideration on
appeal.
Petition DISMISSED. there were reasons for maintaining said notice
of lis pendens.
SO ORDERED.[21]
(4) The execution pending appeal in 1991 was
The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the itself invalid.
petition was denied. Hence, this petition, asserting that:
Considering that the issues of ownership and possession
The order of July 23, 1992 (Annex C), insofar as it are best left for determination by the Court of Appeals,
cancelled the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated petitioners in essence aver that the appellate court erred in
by the petitioners, is null and void because it was issued dismissing the petition for certiorari insofar as it refused to
without jurisdiction, and in violation of due process and pass on (1) the impropriety and invalidity of the trial courts
fundamental rules of procedure.[22] cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and (2) the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter granted the
In its support petitioners argue that: motion for execution of its second decision dated October
15, 1991, pending appeal, which was the basis of the
(1) The cancellation of said notice of lis pendens is cancellation of the cited notice of lis pendens.
a patent nullity because no motion for the
cancellation of the notice (Entry No. 178073) On the first point, petitioners contend that in
was filed. promulgating its assailed decision, and denying the
corrective writ of certiorari against the RTC, the Court of
(2) Assuming that a motion was filed, by then, the Appeals refused to recognize that, at the very least, the
RTC had already lost jurisdiction to grant the cancellation by the RTC of the notice of lis
same since the appeal by petitioners from the pendens, particularly Entry No. 178073, upon a mere ex
first and even the second decision had been parte motion is already grave abuse of discretion, and even
perfected. graver abuse since Entry No. 178073 was not even subject of
the motion at all. Petitioners stress that respondent Ciocon
(3) Even assuming that the motion had been filed prayed for cancellation only of certain entries appearing on
and the RTC still had jurisdiction, there was no the TCT but not Entry No. 178073. Petitioners point out that
showing of the necessity for the cancellation of at the time Ciocon asked for cancellation of the other entries,
said notice of lis pendens. On the contrary, there was no Entry No. 178073 yet. This entry was made
more than a month after Ciocon filed his motion for We note, at the outset, that the trial courts determination
cancellation of certain entries. [23] Petitioners contend that of the basis for cancellation of said notice is precisely the
without a motion for cancellation of Entry No. 178073, no bone of contention in the present appeal. While the trial
hearing on it could be conducted. Without notice and court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens,
hearing, there was manifest denial of petitioners right to due such power is exercised under express provisions of law.
[24]
process. This infirmity in the ex parte cancellation resulted A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole
in the hasty use by Gargar, the new registered owner of Lot world that a particular real property is in litigation. Such
435, of the property as collateral for a P2,000,000.00 loan, announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity,
manifestly prejudicing petitioners. the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated
Petitioners assert that in their motion for and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
reconsideration of the petition, they conceded that the issues subsequent alienation.[25] Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules
of rightful possession and ownership be resolved in the of Court,[26] now Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
appeal rather than risk more delay. But they resolutely ask Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled
for the nullification of the order cancelling the cited notice only after proper showing that the purpose of its annotation
of lis pendens and pray for re-annotation thereof. is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
In their opposition and comment to the petition, private annotated. We have scrutinized the records but found no
respondents claim, with respect to the cited notice of lis showing that the annotation was caused by petitioners
pendens, that the order cancelling the annotation of the merely to molest private respondents, nor that it was not
notice was within the discretion of the RTC and that there needed to protect petitioners rights. The peculiar and
was no abuse of discretion on its part because the RTC could exceptional circumstances of the case, as in the rendering of
determine on its own if a notice was for the purpose of two conflicting decisions by the same judge, indubitably
molesting the adverse party or was not necessary to protect manifest that the annotation was not merely to molest the
the rights of the party who caused its annotation. They other party but was needed to protect petitioners interest
contend that since the determination of the basis for from any hasty transfer of the property to another, making
cancellation of the notice is factual, the Supreme Court is recovery of the property extremely complicated. This is
already bound by such determination by the RTC. exactly what happened in this case when the notice of lis
pendens was cancelled.
Further, the trial courts inherent power to cancel a caused the annotation so that he may be heard to object to
notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that the
circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is
imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the not merely to molest the other party.[28] As the records of this
litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other case reflect, private respondent Ciocons motion dated March
party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; 17, 1992, to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not
where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation include a request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular,
was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the and it certainly could not have been included since the entry
plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of the
who caused such a notation. In such instances, said notice is motion, on April 20, 1992. However, Judge Jocsons order of
deemed ipso facto cancelled.[27] These exceptional cancellation included Entry No. 178073.[29]
circumstances are not present in this case. It will be noted
that although the case took long to resolve, it was not due to Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled
petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of upon the mere filing of a bond by the party on whose title the
the lot in the first decision and it was private respondents notice is annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotation
who filed a motion that the case be decided anew, despite a which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power
timely notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore, of the court and to prevent the defeat of the judgment by
it was the Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if private
the lost testimonies, which the trial court erroneously took as respondents are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the
a remand of the case, resulting in a second decision which amount, in substitution of said notice. [30] As it happened in
was also timely appealed. The records mentioned no such this case, Ciocon sold the property to Gargar who
order to remand by the Court of Appeals. The cancellation of encumbered the property as security for a loan. We are,
the lis pendensnotations should not have been ordered since therefore, constrained to conclude that, contrary to private
there had been no final judgment yet, the decisions having respondents stand, the Court could not be bound by the trial
been timely appealed. courts determination of the bases of the cancellation of the
cited notice. Further, we find the trial courts order
More significantly, a notice of lis pendens cannot be injudicious and erroneous.
ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less without
any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who
We now resolve the question of jurisdiction. The divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case to resolve
records show that the notices of appeal from the first pending incidents; and Roxas vs. Dy,[34] that the cancellation
decision of the trial court were filed within the reglementary of a notice of lis pendens, being a mere incident to an action,
period and were duly approved.[31] At such time the appeals may be ordered at any given time by the court having
were perfected. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that jurisdiction over it. The operative phrase, however, is that
after perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction the cancellation be ordered by a court having jurisdiction
to amend a decision appealed from, and also to issue orders over it. Such is not the case here for the RTC already lost its
for execution pending appeal.The perfection of an appeal jurisdiction upon the perfection of the appeal from its first
divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case and the trial decision as early as 1988.
court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual
functions. Fundamental is the doctrine that jurisdiction is The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in
fixed by law. No amount of rationalization therefore, even a this case, Entry No. 178073, should be set aside for three
declaration that a new decision is being made in the best reasons. First, it was granted ex parte. Petitioners were
interest of justice, can confer on the trial court the deprived of their right to be heard on notice.Second, there
jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired, was no showing that the annotation of the notice was for the
waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it was not
omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by necessary to protect the rights of those who sought the
acquiescence of the court.[32] annotation. And third, at the time of the order of cancellation
of the notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.
It must also be borne in mind that the order of
cancellation of notation of lis pendens was based on the ex Lastly, we need not delve on the appellate courts
parte approval of the motion for execution pending appeal of dismissal of the petition for certiorari. It is mooted by
the trial courts second decision. This order is fatally flawed, petitioners acceptance, although reluctantly, of the appellate
for being the result of a hearing ex parte, hence without courts judgment that the issues of rightful possession and
notice to the adverse party and thereby violative of due ownership of the property be resolved in the appeal.
process.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
The Court is not unaware of Asmala vs. Comelec, Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
[33]
holding that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not
(1) The Order dated July 23, 1992 of the Regional JULIETA G.R. No. 183616
Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47, in PANOLINO,
Civil Cases No. 7687 and No. 7723 insofar as it Petitioner, Present:
directed the cancellation of the notice of lis
CARPIO
pendens, Entry No. 178073 on TCT No. T- MORALES, J.,Chairperson,
165298, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. versus BRION,
BERSAMIN,
(2) The Register of Deeds of the City of Bacolod is ABAD,* and
directed to RE-ANNOTATE the notice of lis VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
pendens, Entry No. 178073 on TCT No. T- JOSEPHINE L.
165298. TAJALA, Promulgated:
Respondent.[1] June 29, 2010
x-----------------------------------------
(3) The judge-designate in Civil Cases No. 7687 ---------x
and No. 7723 is ordered to elevate the records
of said cases to the Court of Appeals for
consideration on appeal. DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
(4) The Court of Appeals upon receipt of the
The Department of Environment and Natural
complete records is directed to immediately
Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director Jim O.
proceed with the appeal for the determination of Sampulna (RD Sampulna), by Decision[2] of June 19, 2007,
the rightful ownership and possession of the lot (1) denied for lack merit the application[3] of Julieta Panolino
in dispute. (petitioner), which was opposed by herein respondent
Josephine L. Tajala, for a free patent over a parcel of land
Costs against private respondents. located in Kinayao, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat, (2)
directed petitioner to vacate the contested property and
SO ORDERED. remove at her expense whatever improvements she may
have introduced thereon, and (3) advised respondent to file
THIRD DIVISION her free patent application over the contested property within
sixty days.[4]
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June
27, 2007, of which she filed a motion for reconsideration (b) If a motion for
on July 11, 2007. Her motion was denied by reconsideration of the
[5]
Order of September 6, decision/order of the Regional
2007, copy of which shereceived on September 12, 2007. Office is filed and such motion for
reconsideration is denied, the
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of movant shall have the right
Appeal[6] before the Office of RD Sampulna, stating that she to perfect his appeal during the re
was appealing the decision and order to the Office of the mainder ofthe period for appeal, r
DENR Secretary. By Order[7]of October 16, 2007, RD eckoned from receipt of the resolu
Sampulna denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was tion of denial. If the decision
filed beyond the reglementary period. The RD explained that is reversed on reconsideration, the
petitioner should have filed her appeal on September 13, aggrieved party shall have fifteen
2007as she had only one day left of the 15-day reglementary (15) days from receipt of the
period for the purpose, pursuant to DENR Administrative resolution of reversal within which
Order No. 87, Series of 1990,[8] the pertinent portions of to perfect his appeal.
which provide:
(c) The Regional office shall, upon
SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals. perfection of the appeal, transmit the
records of the case to the Office of
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law or the Secretary with each page
executive order, appeals from the numbered consecutively and
decisions/orders of the DENR initialed by the custodian of the
Regional Offices shall be perfected records.
within fifteen (15) days after receipt
of a copy of the decision/order xxxx
complained of by the party
adversely affected, by filing with the SECTION 6. Applicability of the
Regional Office which adjudicated Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall
the case a notice of appeal, serving apply when not inconsistent with the
copies thereof upon the prevailing provisions hereof. (emphasis and
party and the Office of the underscoring supplied)
Secretary, and paying the required
fees.
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the To standardize the appeal periods
2005 case of Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
[9]
petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration of RD fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order that she still had a fresh Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of fifteen days from her receipt on September 12, period of 15 days within which to file the
2007 of copy of the September 6, 2007 Order denying her notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision of Court,[13] counted from receipt of the order
the RD or until September 27, 2007. Her motion was denied dismissing a motion for a new trial or
by Order[10] of November 28, 2007. motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before Henceforth, this fresh period
the Court of Appeals which, by Resolution[11] of January 25, rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
2008, dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
exhaust administrative remedies, she having bypassed the to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of the petitions for review from the Regional
President before resorting to judicial action. Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals;
her petition for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. By and Rule 45 governing appeals
Resolution of June 25, 2008, the appellate court, holding that by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
the issue raised is clearly a question of fact,[12] denied new rule aims to regiment or make the
petitioners motion. Hence, the present petition for review on appeal period uniform, to be counted from
certiorari. receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether (whether full or partial) or any final order or
the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes applies to resolution.
petitioners case, i.e., that he had a fresh period of 15 days to
appeal RD Sampulnas October 16, 2007 Order to the DENR x x x. This pronouncement is not
Secretary, counted from her notice on September 12, 2007 of inconsistent with Rule 41,
[14]
the RDs Order of September 6, 2007 denying her motion for Section 3 of the Rules which states that
reconsideration of the decision. the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order
The fresh period rule in Neypes declares: appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It receipt of notice of judgment x x x or from
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense receipt of notice of final order appealed
in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the from x x x.
use of or in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within To recapitulate, a party litigant may
15 days from notice of judgment or within either file his notice of appeal within 15
15 days from notice of the final order, which days from receipt of the Regional Trial
we already determined to refer to the x x x Courts decision or file it within 15 days
order denying the motion for a new trial or from receipt of the order (the final order)
reconsideration. denying his motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
Neither does this new rule run day period may be availed of only if either
counter to the spirit motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
of Section 39 of BP 129[15] which becomes final and executory after the lapse
shortened the appeal period from 30 days of the original appeal period provided
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of in Rule 41, Section 3.[16] (emphasis and
cases. The original period of appeal x x x underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a
party opts to file a motion for The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court is one of law because it can be resolved by merely
court which rendered the assailed decision is determining what the law is under the undisputed facts.
[17]
given another opportunity to review the case The appellate courts ruling that such issue raises a
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify question of fact which entails an examination of the
any error of judgment. While we aim to probative value of the evidence presented by the parties [18] is
resolve cases with dispatch and to have thus erroneous.
judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver Instead, however, of remanding this case to the
justice fairly. Court of Appeals for it to resolve the legal issue of whether
the fresh period rule in Neypes is applicable to petitioners
In this case, the new period of 15 case, the Court opts to resolve it to obviate further delay.
days eradicates the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be countedfrom
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the
decision in Neypes, the fresh period rule shall apply
to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175507 October 8, 2014
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ramon Ching denied these allegationsand insisted that when
Ching with his common-law wife, Lucina Santos.10 She, Antonio Ching died, the Ching family association, headed by
however, disputed this. She maintains that even ifRamon Vicente Cheng, unduly influenced him to give Mercedes
Chings birth certificate indicates that he was Antonio Igne and her children financial aid considering that they
Chings illegitimate child, she and Antonio Ching merely served Antonio Ching for years. It was for this reason that an
adopted him and treated him like their own.11 agreement and waiver in consideration of 22.5 million was
made. He also alleged that hewas summoned by the family
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate
be Antonio Chings illegitimate children with his housemaid, declaring him to be Antonio Chings sole heir.22
Mercedes Igne.12 While Ramon Ching disputed this,13 both
Mercedes and Lucina have not.14 After a year of investigating Antonio Chings death, the
police found Ramon Ching to be its primary
Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill suspect.23Information24 was filed against him, and a warrant
sometime in 1996, he entrusted her with the distribution of of arrest25 was issued.
his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him.
She alleged that she handed all the property titles and On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and
business documents to Ramon Ching for Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a complaint for declaration
safekeeping.15 Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional
illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return all Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case
the titles to the properties and business documents. 16 No. 98-91046 (the first case).26
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave Regional Trial Court of Manila.33 When Branch 20 was made
of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po aware of the first case, it issued an order transferring the case
Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary to Branch 6, considering that the case before it involved
stockholder.The amended complaint was for "Annulment of substantially the same parties and causes of action. 34
Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case,
Preliminary Injunction."27 Sometime after, Lucina Santos praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. 35
filed a motion for intervention and was allowed to
intervene.28 On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting
the motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties,
Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The
jurisdiction of the subject matter.29 dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice. 36
On November 13, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.30 Upon motion of dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal
the Chengs counsel, however, the Chengs and Lucina should have been with prejudice under the "two dismissal
Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file the appropriate rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
pleading. They did not do so.31 Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first
case.37
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra- During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for
Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Waiver, Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement, Deed of
Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer
Properties.32This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02- for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon
103319 (the second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 02-105251(the third case) and was eventually temporary restraining order (the second certiorari case) with
raffled to Branch 6.38 the Court of Appeals.43
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing On March 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the
Properties filed their comment/opposition to the application decision44 in the first certiorari case dismissing the petition.
for temporary restraining order in the third case. They also The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, litis Properties reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was
pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals
state a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the
filed by both parties.39 dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of the
defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the
On July 30, 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus instance of the plaintiffs.45
order40 resolving both the motion for reconsideration in the
second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 46 Ramon
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the Ching and Po Wing Properties filed this present petition for
motion to dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the second review47 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the
filing of the third case.41 On October 8, 2004, while their Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the
motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending, dismissal of the second case was with prejudice since the
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated
certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals, as a dismissal on the merits.48 They also argue that the
assailing the order dated November 22,2002 and the portion second case should be dismissed on the ground of res
of the omnibus order dated July 30, 2004, which upheldthe judicata since there was a previous final judgment of the first
dismissal of the second case.42 case involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.49
On December 28, 2004, the trial court issued an order
denying the motion for reconsideration in the third case. The Lucina Santos was able to file a comment50 on the petition
denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to within the period required.51 The Chengs, however, did not
file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application comply.52 Upon the issuance by this court of a show cause
for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a order on September 24, 2007,53 they eventually filed a
comment with substantially the same allegations and For this courts resolution are the following issues:
arguments as that of Lucina Santos.54
I. Whether the trial courts dismissal of the second
In their comment, respondents allege that when the trial case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case,
court granted the motion to dismiss, Ramon Chings counsel asper the "two-dismissal rule"; and
was notified in open court that the dismissal was without
prejudice. They argue that the trial courts order became final II. Whether respondents committed forum shopping
and executory whenhe failed to file his motion for when they filed the third case while the motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. 55 reconsideration of the second case was still pending.
Respondents argue that the petition for review should be The petition is denied.
dismissed on the ground of forum shopping and litis
pendencia since Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties are The "two-dismissal rule" vis--vis
seeking relief simultaneously in two forums by filing the two
petitions for certiorari, which involved the same omnibus the Rules of Civil Procedure
order by the trial court.56 They also argue that the "two-
dismissal rule" and res judicata did not apply since (1) the Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997
failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal, and (2) they Rules of Civil Procedure. The pertinent provisions state:
only moved for dismissal once in the second case. 57
RULE 17
58
In their reply, petitioners argue that they did not commit DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
forum shopping since the actions they commenced against
respondents stemmed from the complaints filed against them SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint
in the trial courts.59 They reiterate that their petition for may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
review is only about the second case; it just so happened that dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
the assailed omnibus order resolved both the second and motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being
third cases.60 filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
Upon the filing of the parties respective memoranda, 61 the without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
case was submitted for decision.62 adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by
or including the same claim. the court. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case beforeany
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems donethrough notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for declared by the court.
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the The second section of the rule contemplates a situation
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he before the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is
the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the
dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A court.
class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court. The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of
the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or unless otherwise declared by the court.
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or which covers motions to dismiss.63
in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
In Insular Veneer, Inc. v. Hon. Plan,64 Consolidated Logging
and Lumber Mills filed a complaint against Insular Veneer to
recover some logs the former had delivered to the latter. It This court stated that:
also filed ex partea motion for issuance of a restraining
order. The complaint and motion were filed in a trial court in In resolving that issue, we are confronted with the
Isabela.65 unarguable fact that Consolidated Logging on its volition
dismissed its action for damages and injunction in the
The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining Isabela court and refiled substantially the same action in the
order as a writ of preliminary injunction. When Consolidated Manila court. Then, when the Manila court dismissed its
Logging recovered the logs, it filed a notice of dismissal action for failure to prosecute, it went hack [sic] to the
under Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Isabela court and revived its old action by means of an
Procedure.66 amended complaint.
While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending, Consolidated Logging would liketo forget the Manila case,
Consolidated Logging filed the same complaint against consign it to oblivion as if it were a bad dream, and
Insular Veneer, this time in a trial court in Manila. It did not prosecute its amended complaint in the Isabela court as if
mention any previous action pending in the Isabela court. 67 nothing had transpired in the Manila court. We hold that it
cannot elude the effects of its conduct in junking the Isabela
The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to case and in giving that case a reincarnation in the Manila
the nonappearance of Consolidated Loggings counsel court.
during pre-trial. Consolidated Logging subsequently
returned to the Isabela court to revive the same complaint. Consolidated Logging [sic] filed a new case in Manila at its
The Isabela court apparently treated the filing of the own risk. Its lawyer at his peril failed toappear at the pre-
amended complaint as a withdrawal of its notice of trial.70
dismissal.68
This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in
Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to the Isabela court was barred by the prior dismissal of the
dismiss, arguing that the dismissal by the Manila court Manila court, stating that:
constituted res judicataover the case. The Isabela court,
presided over by Judge Plan, denied the motion to dismiss. The provision in section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
The dismissal was the subject of the petition for certiorari that an action may be dismissed because "there is another
and mandamus with this court.69 action pending between the same parties for the same cause"
presupposes that two similar actions are simultaneously (4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff
pending in two different Courts of First Instance. Lis was consented to by the defendant on the ground
pendensas a ground for a motion to dismiss has the same that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the
requisites as the plea of res judicata. former.72
On the other hand, when a pleading is amended, the original The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid
pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to vexatious litigation."73 When a complaint is dismissed a
perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief
for trial on the amended pleading only. So, when on the same claim.
Consolidated Logging filed its amended complaint dated
March 16, 1970 in Civil Case No. 2158, the prior dismissal The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in
order dated January 5, 1970 in the Manila case could he [sic] view of the "two-dismissal rule"
interposed in the Isabela court to support the defense of res
judicata.71 Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It
was later amended to include not only new defendants but
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a
without prejudice except when it is the second time that the special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed
plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to by the defendants onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction.
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following The trial court granted that motion to dismiss, stating that:
requisites must be present:
A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by Complaint dated February 10, 1999, filed by Plaintiff Joseph
a competent court; Cheng, show that additional causes of action were
incorporated i.e. extra-judicial settlement of the intestate
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same estate of Antonio Ching and receivership, subject matters,
claim; which should be threshed out in a special proceedings case.
This is a clear departure from the main cause of action in the
(3) Both notices for dismissal werefiled by the original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of
plaintiff; and certificate of titles with damages. And the rules of procedure
which govern special proceedings case are different and The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the
distinct from the rules of procedure applicable in an ordinary motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. When it allowed
civil action. Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days
tofile an appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a
In view of the afore-going, the court finds the Motion to request made bythe plaintiffs counsel that had no bearing on
Dismiss filed by Atty. Maria Lina Nieva S. Casals to be the dismissal of the case.
meritorious and the Court is left with no alternative but to
dismiss as it hereby dismisses the Amended Complaint. Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss
the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not contemplate a
However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias, counsel situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction.
for the plaintiffs, he is given a period of fifteen (15) days Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs
from today, within which to file an appropriate pleading, default, the trial courts instruction to file the appropriate
copy furnished to all the parties concerned. pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to
file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss
.... the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands.
SO ORDERED.74 The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the
defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Procedure, which states:
Obias failed to file the appropriate pleading within fifteen
(15) days, he violated the order of the court. This, they SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before
argue, made the original dismissal an adjudication upon the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they following grounds:
argue that when respondents filed the second case and then
caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with ....
prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two
dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim. (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
Unfortunately, petitioners theory is erroneous. of the claim;
.... When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs
namely, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, Mercedes Igne and
Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the Lucina Santos appeared without their counsels. That they
same action or claim subject to certain exceptions. verbally affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss, as
shown by their signatures over their respective names
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were reflected thereat. Similarly, none of the defendants appeared,
merely refiling the same claim that had been previously except the counsel for defendant, Ramon Chang [sic], who
dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they manifested that they have not yet filed their Answer as there
moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the
be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance. latter has not yet been served with summons.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was Under the circumstances, and further considering that the
requested by respondents before the service of any defendants herein have not yet filed their Answers nor any
responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this pleading, the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic]
instance is a matter of right that is not subject to the trial cause the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2,
courts discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure without
Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and prejudice. Thereby, and as prayed for, this case is hereby
Development Corporation:76 ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the SO ORDERED.78 (Emphasis supplied)
motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule
17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if When respondents filed the third case on substantially the
the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, same claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the
the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the
dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a instance of the defendants. While it is true that there were
matter of right, regardless of ground.77 (Emphasis supplied) two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not
necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
November 22, 2002 dismissing the case, without prejudice. circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
The order states:
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this However, while the dismissal of the second case was without
case. prejudice, respondents act of filing the third case while
petitioners motion for reconsideration was still pending
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of constituted forum shopping.
Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading
in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section The rule against forum shopping and the "twin-dismissal
3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second rule"
case is still considered as one without prejudice. In Gomez v.
Alcantara:79 In Yap v. Chua:81
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of
to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated supposition that one or the other court would make a
differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by
failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable
and the only exception is when the order of dismissal opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts,
without prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied) abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
and congest court dockets. What iscritical is the vexation
In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It is different courts to rule on the same or related causes and
only when the trial courts order either is silent on the matter, grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the
or states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being
adjudication on the merits. renderedby the different fora upon the same issues. Willful
and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is
a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to
shopping, the most important factor toask is whether the wait until the final disposition of the second case before
elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second
judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain another; case was without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim,
otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity haste to file the third case, however, they unfortunately
of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs transgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are
sought.82 (Emphasis supplied) the rules on litis pendentiaand res judicata.
There is no question that there was an identity of parties, This multiplicity of suits is the veryevil sought to be avoided
rights, and reliefs in the second and third cases. While it may by the rule on forum shopping. In Dy v. Mandy
be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case Commodities Co., Inc.,86 the rule is that:
when the third case was filed, it failed to take into account
that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is
and, thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before
of the second case was the subject of the first certiorari case this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a
and this present petition for review, it can be reasonably lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive
concluded that the second case, to this day, remains pending. measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration
of justice.87 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, when respondents filed the third case, they engaged
in forum shopping. Any judgment by this court on the The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez,
propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably Jr.88 In Buan, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with
affect the disposition of the third case. this court while another petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction was pending before the Regional Trial
This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different Court of Manila involving the same parties and based on the
petitions for certiorari before the appellate court. The same set of facts. This court, in dismissing both actions,
omnibus order dated July 30, 2004 denied two pending stated:
motions by petitioners: (1) the motion for reconsideration in
the second case and (2) the motion to dismiss in the third Indeed, the petitioners in both actions . . . have incurred not
case. Since petitioners are barred from filing a second only the sanction of dismissal oftheir case before this Court
motion for reconsideration of the second case, the first in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also
certiorari case was filed before the appellate court and is the punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that
now the subject of this review. The denial of petitioners in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well.
motion for reconsideration in the third case, however, could Quite recently, upon substantially identical factual premises,
still be the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. That the Court en banchad occasion to condemn and penalize the
act of litigants of filing the same suit in different courts, It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original
aptly described as "forum shopping[.]"89 controversy between the parties has long beenmired in
numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be more
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and
dismissing all pending actions on the same claim filed in any disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it
court. Accordingly, the grant of this petition would would not serve the ends of substantial justice. Courts of
inevitably result in the summary dismissal of the third case. justice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their
Any action, therefore, which originates from the third case merits, rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities:
pending with any court would be barred by res judicata. [C]ases should be determined on the merits, after all parties
have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural
examination must first be made on the purpose of the imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
rule.1wphi1 Parties resort to forum shopping when they file served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
several actions of the same claim in different forums in the expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules,
courts as it "trifle[s] with the orderly administration of resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
justice."90 promote substantial justice, must be avoided.In fact, Section
6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules [on Civil Procedure] shall be
In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
final and executory upon the failure of respondentscounsel ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct every action and proceeding.92 (Emphasis supplied)
pleading the second time around but eventually sought its
dismissal as they"[suspected] that their counsel is not amply The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it
protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost can be shown that (1) the original case has been dismissed
three (3) years."91 The filing of the third case, therefore, was upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons; (2)
not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration; and
butonly to get the case moving, in an attempt to protect their (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of
rights. substantial justice for the fresh new case to proceed.
The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has
since been dismissed and is now the subject of a petition for
certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better
cause of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted
by a counsel they are more comfortable with. Substantial
justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim
to the labyrinth in the procedures that their travails led them.
It is for this reason that we deny the petition. WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 6 is ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-
105251 with due and deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue
5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon herein petitioners the corresponding individual transfer
City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the certificate of titles upon proper application made thereof.
exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio; SO ORDERED.
On May 17, 1989, the defaulted title owners of Vilma On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by
Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the
decision[4] dated November 15, 1989. The appellate court trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus
ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondents because of defective service of WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
summons by publication. Petitioners motion for PARTIALLY GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on
reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they January 19, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows:
filed this petition for certiorari.
(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the
On January 19, 2001, we rendered a Decision denying Partial Decision of the court a quo;
the petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of and
Appeals. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
(2) affirming the Decision of the Court of
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 in
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is all other respects.
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.[7]
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention The Solicitor General summarized the interest of the
filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where Republic in Lot No. 3 (originally covered by OCT No. 333),
trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x as follows:
the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are Proclamation No. 1826 reserving for national government
obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed center site a parcel of land situated in the Constitution Hill,
under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Quezon City, Metro Manila, containing an area of four
Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure]. million for hundred forty thousand FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX SQUARE METERS. In a certification [Annex
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules F, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Registration Authority,
therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole it attested to the fact that the National Government Center
purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the described in Proclamation No. 1826 is within the area
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose covered by GLRO Record No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to Record No. 5975 as plotted in our Municipal Index Sheet
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of (MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B and 3339-D.
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does In a letter [Annex B-2, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and
not constitute the thing itself which courts are always Urban Development Coordinating Council certified that
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to Government Center Housing Project (NGCHP) and the
an end. NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, the
following government buildings, offices and complexes are
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this situated:
Court allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, 1) House of Representatives;
2) Civil Service Commission (CSC); Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to
protect public interest as well as government properties
3) Department of Social Works and Development located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The
(DSWD); Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law can
4) Sandiganbayan; certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed
5) Commission on Audit (COA); out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended
as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the
6) Department of Public Works and Highways State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
(DPWH) Depot; properties.[14]
7) Polytechnic University of the Philippines After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find
(PUP) Commonwealth Campus; that our November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision
8) TESDA Skills Training Center; pertaining to Lot No. 3, overlooked certain aspects which, if
not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable confusion
9) Several Public Elementary and High Schools, and prejudice. The reinstated portions of the decision states:
Health Centers and Barangay Halls.
4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true
It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs
Alternative for Social Empowerment land Acquisition subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
Development Program (PHASE-LADP), has already City, covering the area in excess of said actual area, with the
awarded 3,975 TCTs to its beneficiaries. This program exception of those belonging to non-defaulted respondents,
comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117 as null and void ab initio;
hectares intended for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National Governments 5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the NGCHP, the all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in
remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to be awarded to qualified excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the
beneficiaries.[13]
exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted Regarding the issue of nullity of OCT No. 333,
respondents;[15]
We find that the then Land Registration Court had the power,
We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which authority and jurisdiction to issue it. It was issued after trial,
portions are in excess of the 4,574 square meter area of OCT or presumptively in a fair and square trial with all the
No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non- requisites of the law (The Phil. British Co., Inc. vs. de los
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial Angeles, 63 SCRA 52).
courts decision state the metes and bounds that would serve
as basis in implementing the dispositive portion The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known in local history
thereof. Verily, this flaw goes into the very identity of the as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in its sections 13 to 18,
disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null and void mentions three (3) classes of land, to wit, public land or
for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional public domain, mineral lands, and timber land. (Ramos vs.
mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175). Early decisions as regards
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts classification of public lands, such as Mapa vs. Insular
and the law on which it is based. [16] Hence, the November 20, Government, 10 Phil 175, Ramos vs. Director of
2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial Lands, supra, and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
courts Partial Decision should be modified. Islands, 40 Phil. 10, which were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
and existing title is likewise meritorious. In Republic v. or prior to the passage of Act No. 2874, had impliedly ruled
Tofemi Realty Corporation (Tofemi),[17] an action for that there was no legal provision vesting in the chief
Cancellation of Titles & Reversion of TCT No. 55747 and Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
TCT No. 55748, the validity of OCT No. 333 from which classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
said transfer certificates of title originated, has already been agricultural; so that the courts then were free to make
settled. In dismissing the petition of the Republic, it was held corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
therein that OCT No. 333 is a valid title duly issued by the invested with implicit power in so doing, depending upon
Land Registration Court. The Republic did not appeal the preponderance of the evidence. In Mapa vs. Insular
therefrom and the decision became final and Government, supra, Feb. 10, 1908, the Court of Land
executory. Pertinent portion of which states Registration granted the application for registration after
finding that it was neither timber nor mineral and came 76 and 81 which originally formed parts of Parcel C of Plan
within the definition of Agricultural land under Act 926. The Psu-32606 approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Attorney General appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the on October 21, 1924. (Emphasis supplied)[18]
appealed judgment. In G.L.R.O. No. 1037, the application
for registration was granted and consequently the issuance of Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
a title was decreed in favor of the applicant because the Land decisions and disturb not what is settled. It is a salutary and
Registration Court found that the land applied for is necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
agricultural susceptible of private appropriation (Ramos vs. principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
Director of Lands, supra; Ankron vs. Government of the adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in
Philippine Islands, supra). We repeat by way of emphasis, which the facts sued upon are substantially the same. [19] It is
the record does not reveal that the Government has always beyond cavil, therefore, that since the court had already ruled
considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the on the validity OCT No. 333, said issue must be laid to rest
issuance of OCT 333. To declare the land now as forest land and must no longer be relitigated in the present case.
on the authority of LC Map 639 of Rizal approved on March
11, 1937 only, would deprive defendants of their registered With respect, however, to the area covered by OCT No.
property without due process of law. It was pronounced in 333, the principle of stare decisis is not applicable because
Ramos vs. Director of lands, supra: the decision of the Court of Appeals did not indicate the
boundaries of the lot covered by OCT No. 333. While it was
x x x Upon the other hand, the presumption should be, in held therein that the area of OCT No. 333 is 52,949,735
lieu of contrary evidence, that land is agricultural in square meters, the metes and bounds of the land covered by
nature. One very good reason is that it is good for the OCT No. 333 was not specified. We cannot adopt the
Philippine Islands to have a large public domain come under findings as to the area of OCT No. 333 for it might cause
private ownership.Such is the natural attitude of the deprivation of property of adjacent land owners without due
sagacious citizen. process of law.
OCT No. 333 being legal and valid; ergo, TCTs Nos. So, also, the Court cannot nullify the entire Partial
55747 and 55748, being derived from the said mother title, Decision of the court a quo. The defaulted defendants whose
are also legal and valid. These TCTs were in turn derived properties are located in Lot No. 1 did not question the
from TCTs Nos. 45832 and 45833, covering Lots Nos. 65, decision of the trial court. Neither was it shown in the
Petition-In-Intervention that the OSG is an indispensable null and void, without prejudice to the original action being
party to Lot No. 1. re-filed in the proper court.
In their Motion for Clarification and Manifestation, In the meantime, the World War II Veterans Legionaries
respondents seek the clarification of paragraph 1 of the trial of the Philippines (WW II) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
courts Partial Decision declaring petitioners as owners of, with prior leave of court. It alleges that the Court of Appeals
among others, Lot No. 2 where respondents properties are decision dated November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No.
located. Paragraph 1, provides: 17596, which is the subject of the instant petition for review,
ran counter to the June 22, 1989 decision of the same court
1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221, which merely amended the first
hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, paragraph of the Partial Decision of the trial court in Civil
Rodolfo F. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as Case No. Q-35672. The latter decision of the appellate court
absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 90245 on April 8,
& 3 hereof by virtue of extraordinary prescription, with the 1990.
exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer
certificate of title belonging to non-defaulted respondents. [20] We find no conflict between the two decisions of the
Court of Appeals. It is true that both decisions affected the
In view of the annulment of the trial courts Partial portion of the Partial Decision of the trial court which
Decision with respect to Lot No. 2 originally covered by declared petitioners, who are individual members of the WW
OCT No. 614, all portions of the decision pertaining to Lot II, as absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3. However, the
No. 2, including that in paragraph 1 declaring petitioners as decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17221 merely granted WW IIs
absolute owners in fee simple of Lot No. 2, is declared prayer that it be substituted for its individual members, who
void. Likewise, the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and were declared the owners of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the
5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo concerning Partial Decision. Aside from this, the decision in CA-G.R.
Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it SP No. 17221 had nothing to do with the merits of the
affects Lot No. 3, also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil case. As such, it did not contradict the Court of Appeals
Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof, a decision of November 15, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596
judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned which set aside the Partial Decision of the trial court.
judgment or final order or resolution and render the same
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the As clarified above, paragraph 1 of the dispositive
Petition-In-Intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is portion of the decision of the court a quo is void insofar as it
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on declares petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot
November 20, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows: The Decision Nos. 2 and 3.
dated March 21, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-35762, is annulled The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War
insofar as it concerns Lot No. 2, originally covered by OCT Veterans Legionaries of the Philippines is DENIED for lack
No. 614 and Lot No. 3 originally covered by OCT No. of merit.
333. The November 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 is affirmed in all other SO ORDERED.
respects.