PHILIPPINEJURISPRUDENCEFULLTEXT

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
G.R.No.L21064June30,1970
J.M.TUASON&CO.,INC.vs.LANDTENUREADMINISTRATION,ETAL.

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L21064June30,1970

J.M.TUASON&CO.,INC.,petitionerappellee,
vs.
THELANDTENUREADMINISTRATION,THESOLICITORGENERALandTHEAUDITORGENERAL,respondentsappellants.

Araneta,MendozaandPapaforpetitionerappellee.

Besa,AguilarandGancia,OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralFelixV.Makasiar,AssistantSolicitorGeneralFrine'C.Zaballero,Solicitor
RosalioA.deLeonandSpecialAttorneyMagnoB.Pabloforrespondentsappellants.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO,J.:

FromourdecisionofFebruary18,1970,reversingthejudgmentofthelowercourtholdingthatRepublicActNo.2616asamendedis
unconstitutional,printedmotionforreconsiderationwasfiledbypetitionerappelleeonMarch31,1970reiteratingitsargumentsastoits
allegedinvalidityforbeingviolativeofthedueprocessandequalprotectionguarantees.OnMay27,1970,adetailedoppositiontosuch
a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q. Antonio, on behalf of respondentsappellants.
Thencamearejoinderofpetitioner,onJune15,1970,tothepleadingoftheSolicitorGeneral.Themotionforreconsiderationisthus
ripe for determination. With due recognition of the vigor and earnestness with which petitioner argued its motion, based on what it
consideredtobeourapplicabledecisions,theCourtcannotgrantthesame.Ourdecisionstands.

1.ItwasaunanimousCourtthatcouldnotlocateaconstitutionalinfirmityvitiatingRepublicActNo.2616directingtheexpropriationof
theTatalonEstateinQuezonCity.Therearepointsofdifferencesinthethreewrittenopinions,butthereisnoneastothechallenged
legislative act being invulnerable on the grounds therein asserted to justify its sought for nullification. While, to repeat, petitioner
legislative
apparentlyremainsunconvinced,standingfastonthecontentionstowhichitwouldseektoimpartgreaterplausibility,stilltheintentof
theframersoftheConstitutionalConvention,asshownnotonlybythespecificprovisionsallowingtheexpropriationoflandedestates,
butalsobythesocialjusticeprovisionasreflectedinourdecisions,savepossiblyRepublicvs.Baylosis,1precludeafavorableaction
ontheimpassionedpleaofpetitionerforareconsiderationofourdecision.Atanyrate,petitionerappelleecantakecomfortin
the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, with which four other members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, are in
agreement, to enable it to raise questions, the answers to which, if its view would be sustained, would certainly afford
sufficientprotectiontowhatitbelievestobeanunconstitutionalinfringementonitspropertyrights.
2. It may not be amiss to make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616
prohibiting a suit for ejectment proceedings or the continuance of one already commenced even in the absence of expropriation
proceedings,isunconstitutional,asheldinCuaticov.CourtofAppeals.2Greateremphasislikewiseshouldbelaidonourholding
thatwhileaninaccuracyapparentonthefaceofthechallengedstatuteastotheownershipoftheTatalonEstatedoesnot
sufficetocallforitsinvalidity,stilltoeraseevenafancifuldoubtonthematter,thestatementthereinfoundinSection1ofthe
Actthatinadditiontopetitionerappellee,GregorioAraneta&Co.,Inc.andFlorencioDeudor,etal.areincluded,cannotbe
understoodasconferringonanyjuridicalornaturalpersons,clearlynotentitledthereto,dominicalrightsoversuchpropertyin
question.
3. In the aforesaid decision of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to the amendatory Act, Republic Act No. 3453 to
Section 4 as it originally was worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the amendment consisting of the following: "Upon approval of this
amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon
Estate,andnoejectmentproceedingsalreadycommencedshallbecontinued,andsuchlotoranyportionthereofshallnotbesoldby
theownersofsaidestatetoanypersonotherthanthepresentoccupantwithouttheconsentofthelattergiveninapublicinstrument."3
The question before the, Court, according, to the opinion penned by Justice Bautista Angelo, was: "Are the provisions
embodiedintheamendatoryActwhichprescribethatuponapprovalofsaidActnoejectmentproceedingsshallbeinstituted
orprosecutedagainstanyoccupantofanylotintheTatalonEstate,orthatnoejectmentproceedingsalreadycommenced
shallbecontinued,constitutionalandvalidsuchthatitmaybesaidthattheCourtofAppealsabuseditsdiscretionindenying
thepetitionsforsuspensionfiledbypetitioners.?"4
Then came this portion of the opinion: "This is not the first time that this Court has been called upon to pass upon the validity of a
provisionwhichplacesalandownerinthesituationoflosinghisdominicalrightsoverthepropertywithoutdueprocessorcompensation.
WerefertotheprovisionsofRepublicAct2616beforetheywereamendedbyRepublicActNo.3453.Notethat,asoriginallyprovided,
RepublicActNo.2616prohibitedtheinstitutionofanejectmentproceedingagainstanyoccupantofanylotintheTatalonEstateorthe
continuance of one that has already been commenced after the expropriation proceedings shall have been initiated and during the
pendencyofthesame.Onthesurfacethisprovisionwouldappeartobevalidifthesameiscarriedoutinthelightoftheprovisionsof
our Constitution relative to cases of eminent domain, for in that case the rights of the owner of the property to be expropriated are
protected.Butthenanattemptcametocircumventthatprovisioninanefforttosafeguardorprotecttheinterestofsomeoccupantsof
theland,whichreachedthisCourtforadjudication,aswhensomeoccupantsattemptedtoblocktheirejectmentuponthepleathatthe
government would soon start expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds were appropriated to provide compensation to the
ownerandevenifitwasnotinapositiontotakepossessionoftheestate,andsotheownercontestedtheattemptinvokingitsrights
undertheConstitution.AndthisCourtupheldthecontentionoftheownerbydeclaringtheattemptunconstitutional."5

Theconclusionthatinevitablywascalledforiswordedthus:"Itis,therefore,imperativethatwedeclare,aswenowdo,thatSection4of
Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one that has already been
commenced,evenintheabsenceofexpropriationproceedingsoffendsourConstitutionand,hence,isunenforceable."6

What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our decision sought to be reconsidered but perhaps not given the
importancewhich,intheopinionofpetitionerappellee,itwasentitledto.Nothinginourdecisioncanbetakentodetractinanywise
fromthebindingforceandeffectoftheCuaticorulingwhichdeclaredunconstitutionalSection4ofRepublicActNo.3453.

4.WelikewiseruledthatthemistakeimputedtoCongressinapparentlyrecognizingtherightsofownershipinentitiesorindividualsnot
possessedofthesamecouldnotinvalidatethechallengedstatute.Inthesameway,itcannotbemadethebasisfornonexistentrights
ofownershiptothepropertyinquestion.Itisinthatsensethat,asnotedinourdecision,nofearneedbeentertainedthattherebythe
petitionerappelleewouldbeadverselyaffected.Thegovernmentcertainlywouldnotpaytoapartyotherthantheownertheclaimfor
justcompensationwhich,undertheConstitution,itisrequiredtomeet.Neither,thencananypartywhoisnotinthatsituationhaveany
standingwhatsoever.Thismuchisbeyonddispute.Torepeat,theapprehensionentertainedbypetitionerappellee,perhapsindicativeof
it,excessofcaution,iswithoutlegalfoundation.

WHEREFORE,themotionforthereconsiderationofourdecisionofFebruary18,1970,filedbypetitionerappellee,isdenied.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Castro,TeehankeeandBarredo,JJ.,concur.

#Footnotes

196Phil.461.(1955).

2L2014142,Oct.31,1962,6SCRA595.

3Ibid.,pp.597598.

4Ibid.p,598.

5Ibid.,p.599.

6Ibid.,p.601.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation