IMET

in
Latin America
Captain Gary L. Arnold, US Air Force

The [M In fernatiomd Military Education and Tminiag (1.MET)

Program has had and continues to have a positice in ftueace
throughout the tcorld byproriding technical trainiag aadpersoaai
con tact amoag m ilitarg professionals. Perh ups IIOILAere is this
program and its role of iatlaencing uttitudes and dcrelopment o
more importaszt than in the turbu[ent region of Lotin Antcricn.
,\.
 Tis education forms the common
mind:
Just as the twig r-sbent the trees
inclined.
MoralEssays
AlexanderPope
AILY, complex developments in Cen-
D tral America are brought to the at-
tention of the US public.The news media
tslk of US support for various Contra orga-
nizat ions in Nicaragua and for the gover-
nmentin El Salvador. News stories empha-
size Cuban and Soviet support for the San
din@a government of Nicaragua and the
associated arms, training and logistical sup-
port for insurgents in El Salvador, Guate-
mala and Honduras.
Meanwhile, the perceptions the US public
has of these societies is largely based on
stereot~ical images of banana republics
plagued with frequent and violent revolu-
tions, Misleading repotting by instant ex-
perts, whose actual expertise in the area is
supertkia], at best, tends to magnify and re-
inforce these images. Thus, despite sensa-
tional news reporting, the US public re-
mains generally ignorant of the historic,
economic and cultural backgrounds of Cen-
tral American countries.
According to some scholars, the percep-
tion of Latin America as a particularly vio-
lent area is a misconception. During this
century Latin America has been one of the
most harmonious regions in the world. Oc-
casional disputes have marred peaceful re-
lations, and the cur ent cmflict in Central
America has taken thousands of lives, dis-
rupted societies and threatens to empt in
further turmoil. Yet, compared to conflicts
, in other regions, Latin America has enjoyed
relative peace. While some attribute this
harmonious tendency to the common lin-
guistic, cultural and historical back-
~ounds, the inherent diversky there tends
to negate the apparent commonality.
MILITARY REVIEW . Febru.sty 1987
Probably the only thing the various Lat-
in-American nations really have in common
is the United States. Despite the fact that
the United States has Iost considerable in-
fluence in Latin America during the last 20
years, it still remains the preponderant
hemispheric power. How the United States
exerts-or chooses not to exert-that power
still has considerable impact. One signifi-
cant aspect of the relationship between the
United States and Central America is the
effects of US military training. A better rm-
derstanding of this relationship may lead to
a greater appreciation of the US role in in-
fluencing Central American tiairs.
Security Assistance
As the United States rose to a position of
world power, it recognized the need to
strengthen ties to one of its nearest and per-
haps most important spheres of intluencc+
Central America and the Caribbean Basin.
This included the need to maintain and
strengthen military-to-military ties throug-
houtLatin America.
President William Howard Taft estab-
lished the first of these ties on 11 May 1912,
signing a joint resolution of Congress per-
mitting a US Army off]cer to serve as an in-
structor and inspector of coastal artillery for
Chile. Later, upon the request of the host
governments, Congress authorized the
president to send other military advisers to
Latin America. Under the auspices of this
initial legislation, the United States sent 32
military missions to Latin America between
1920 and 1938.3
The reason for this relatively modest yet
growing interest wea to gain intluence com-
mensurate with increased US world status
and to counter the presence of European
training missions in Latin America. In
1938, Congress authorized each Latin-
31
 New training courses for
Latin:American students in the US
Canal Zone military schools reflected
this emphasis on infernal security.
The US Army School of the Americas
(USARSA), then located at Fort Gulick,
Punama, changed its curriculum from
primarily hemispheric defense to pro-
tection against internal threats. . . .
American nation to send one cadet to each
US service academy. That same year, the
United States offkially estabhshed mili-
tary missions throughout Latin Amervca
and began offering professional Instruction
32
at less than cost. This emphasis on military
train>ng remains the primary motivation of
the International kl Illtary Education and
Training (IMET) Program.
Naturally, Central American republics
participated In these early programs. Horr-
duras, under Tiburcio Carias, took signifi-
cant steps m military modernization. The
Honduran air corps, founded m 1922, was
one of the pr]mary beneficiaries of these ear-
ly upgrade efforts. US Involvement included
the installation of Colonel William C.
Brooks as the first commandant of the Es-
cuela de Auuzczon Mduar in 1934. By 1942,
Honduras had 22 airplanes manned by pi-
lots trained exclusively under US tutelage.
US control over the aviation school was
Febmaty 1987. M(LITARY REVIEW
maintained until the appointment of the
first Honduran commandant in 1947. The
development of an early professional rela-
tionship was not limited to aeronautical
training-it also included the founding of
offker and noncommissioned otllcer (NCO)
military academies. Ii 1952, these were
consolidated to form the Francieco MorarAn
Military Academy.$
Before looking at recent US efforts to pro-
mote a professional Central American mili-
tary structure, the Security Assistance Pro-
gram (SAP) and the function of fMET must
be examined. The SAP includes four types of
assistance
e Foreign milita~ sales (FMS) credits.
~ Granting military aid.
e Economic support funds,
@ IMET funds.e
In 1976, Congress voted to phase out the
Military Assistance Program (MAP). One of
its major functions was training foreign roil.
itary personnel. IMET was created to con-
tinue with these training programs.
IMET is strictly a grant program, but the
majority of US training is currently under
the FMS program. Yet, even in its reduced
form, IMET contributes to US security as
only a grant program can. Studies show that
positive benefits to the United States just]fy
grant training to countries which could not
otherwise afford this training.
Both legislation regulating SAPs and spe-
cific security assistance policies evolve in
identifiable trends. For example, the goal of
promoting military professionalism in the
Central American region to increase region-
al stability began at the end of World War 11
and included the publication of the Latin-
Amerlcan editions of Mi[ifa~ Reuiew.
The ouerall goai of U.S. defense and for-
eign policy since World War II has been to
foster a stable, peacefid world conducive to
national security, economzc prosperity, and
mdiutdual freedom.
M]litary assistance during the 1950s cen-
MILITARY REVIEW . Februaw 1987
IMET is strictly a grant
progmm, but the majorzty of US
training is currently umikr the FMS
program. Yet, even in its reduced form,
IMETcontributes to US securitg as
onlg a grant progrnm can.
tered on improving Latin-American mili-
tary capabilities to aid in the defense of the
hemisphere from external attack.
This emphasis took a rapid shifi in 1959
after Fidel Castros dramatic rise to power
in Cuba. After Cuban alliance with the So-
viets, it quickly became evident that the
greatest threat to stability in the region wee
not an external attack but an internal
threat from Cuban-supported inaurgencies
and wars of national liiieration. Almost
overnight, the concept of hemispheric se-
curity became archaic. As a resulti
. m 1961, the Kennedy administration
decided to sh@ the basis ofits militnrypolzqy
in Latzn America from hemi.splwric defense
to internal securzty. agatnst Castro-Corn -
mun~t subversion, terrorism and guerrilla
warfare.
New training courses for Lat]n-American
students m the US Canal Zone military
schools reflected this emphasis on internal
security. The US Army School of the Ameri-
cas (USARSA), then located at Fort Gulick,
Panama, changed its curricuhun from pri-
marily hemispheric defense to protection
against internal threats, including counter-
insurgency and CIVICaction programs. By
1969, approximately 70 percent of the
course hours in the curriculum related to
counterinsurgency training the remainder
dealt with technical training.
IMET program objectives may change
from region to regon, but the universal ob-
jectives are to:
~ Create skills needed for the effective
. 33
 The cfmltenge to the durability
of successful IMETprograms comes
tlom seveml sources. There is an
inherent dificulty in training personnel
with different cultuml and linguistic
backgmnuuk. Crdtum[shock atifects
bath students and instructor, and the
problem is compounded in typical US
training environments in which one
class may have students from
diverse cultural backgrounds.
operation and maintenance of US equip-
ment,
e Assist the foreign country in develop-
ing expertise and sysiems needed for the ef-
fective management ofits defense establish-
ment.
e Foster development by the foreign
34
country of its own indigenous training capa-
bility.
Q Promote US mlhtary rapport with the
armed forces of the foreign country.
CIPromote a better understanding of the
United States, including its people, political
system and other institutions.
Department of Defense guidance encour-
ages the pursuit of all objectives simultane-
ously but with emphasis shifting from oper-
ations and maintenance toward manage-
ment and, finally, military-to-military rap-
port. The ultimate, ideal goal is that the en-
tire program be limited solely tQthe mainte-
nance of an amiable milita~-to-mili taryre-
Iationship. Further guidance includes an
emphasis on training individuals who are
likely to hold key positions in the future and
encouraging military professionalism and
better resource management.g
Dedicated military and civilian trainers
February 19e7 . MILITARY REVIEW
 IMET

%3=sively strive to reach these ambitious
goals but, naturally, not all efforts are met
with total success. Part of the reason lies in
the innate difficulties of any training pro-
gram. Another more serious difficulty mmea
from hostile efforts to subvert training pro-
grams and hence block the successftd fultill-
ment of IMET training objectives.
eta were slashed drastically in recent yeara,
yet the objectives remain constant.
The last challenge comes irr the form of
the growing Soviet challenge to the United
States. Currently,the Soviet Union and ita
hemispheric proxy, Cuba, constitute a com-
plex military threat tQ the region. Thie
threat includes support fdr guerrilla groups

tgw-~~ 1~~~ Cumulative

TOtaki
iFiilE~E}g:&dJ~yres IMET Students Trained

Worldwide $1,921.7 491,721

Latin America $187.4 (1O percent of total) 81,246 (16 percent of total)

Central America $38.4 (2 percent of total) 17,625 (3 pereent of total)

lhlET-[ntemailOnal Mldary Educaon and Tramng

Source Fore!gn MrlrmIYSalesand M,l,f.v AssistanceFacts, Annual Report,DefenseSeemty AWsta.C9 Agencv,Washmglon.D.C,

1978,w 2s.23. No!e thal dollar amountsand Peme.tc9e. are roundedOH

Figure 1

that exploit indigenous unrest, support for

The Challenge
The challenge to the durabihty ofsuccess-
ful IMET programs comes from several
scurces. There is an inherent diftkulty in
training personnel with d] fferent cultural
and linguistic backgrounds. Cultural shock
affects both students and instructors, and
the problem is compounded in typical US
training environments in which one class
may have students from diverse cuitural
backgrounds. This is one reason why the
USARSA, now at Fort Benning, Georgia,
enjoys such remarkable success. Instruction
is conducted in Spanish, and classes are
composed of students with relatively simi-
lar cultural backgrounds.
Another challenge is the classlc military
challenge to do more with less. Small budg-
Marxist re~mes and increasing Soviet and
Cuban conventional warfare capabilities in,
the region. These efforts b supplant US in-
fluence and foment Marxist revolutions
have seriously challenged Central Ameri-
can mditasy capabilities and US security
interests during a period when training pro-
grams significantly declined.
IMET is one method used to counter this
growing tin eat. However, IMET produces
limited immediate benefits (primarily in-
creased technical slulls), while its greatest
return is the long-range maintenance and
enhancement of a climate of good will arid
access to influential frienda. Hence, it otlen
takes years to seethe fulfillment of the more
positive benefits of training programs. De-
spite ita significance, IMET claims only a
very small portion of total military assist-
ance worldwide as illustrated in Figure 1.

MILITARY REVIEW . Februaiy 1987 35

 Examining three key natioue further il-
lustrates the relatively small amounts of
IMET expenditures earamrked for Central
American nations. For Fiscal Year 1984, to-
tal military assistance to El Salvador, Gua-
temala and Hondurae was $137.55 million.
Of this, IMET comprised $2.55 million or
only 1.5 percent of the totnl.
There ere periodic shifts in security as-
sistance policies and legislation that impact
on training progmms. One shitl was the rise
of human rights as an instrument of for-
eign policy. This resulted in arms sales re-
FY 1976
El Salvador 230
Guatemala 134
FY-meal
Year
lMEr-lntemalw@ M htwy Ed.ca[lon andTran,.g
Sours C.rtCsS Moms, TheU.,(6W S@tes C.nbbe.n
Etwpr,se Irmttie (or P.b!,c Pol,cy
Oonshrps, Armncan
striations (and an associated traimng de-
cline] baaed on perceived human rights vie.
latlons by selected countries. During this
era, US training facilities witnessed a con-
siderable decline in the number of Central
American students. Naturally, this re-
sulted in a considerable decrexae in expo-
sure to US doctrine, values and technical ed.
ucation. From 1971 to 1975, more than
10,000 Cunbbean Bas]n military persorinel
received UStrainingbut, from 1976to 1980,
that figure declined ta Just over 6,000. Dur-
ing that period, all five Central American
nations had declmmg enrollments in US
mditary training facilities. Figure 2 shows
two excnrples.
MeanwhiIe, the Soviets and Cubans m-
increased training opportunities for Latin
36
Americans. A US government study in-
dicates that the Soviet Union and its War-
saw Pact allles dramatically increaeed the
amount of government-sponsored scholar-
ships available to Latin-American stu-
dents, and Cuba provided thousands more
through its Isle of Youth education complex.
From 1972 through 1982, Soviet bloc schol-
arships @creased from approximately 3,000
to 9,000.
Meanwhile, US government scholarships
declined from more than 4,OOO to 2,000.
While these figures exclude nongovemmen-
FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 FY 1980
47 0 0 126
127 0 0 0
I
Basin M,,,taw Comx?caon A Perwect!ve on Reg,ona Md,tay-to.hf,l,law Rela.
Research. Washington D C 1983 w 19-20
Figure 2
tal students studying In the Umted States,
and while student education abroad does
not necessarily equate to military training
abroad, the Irnphcations are clear. The Sovi-
ets and Cubans are rushing to fill the gap by
providing government scholarships in an ef-
fort to shape the po{ltical attitudes of Cen-
tral American students.
This effort is particularly interesting m
light of the relatively powetiul role student
organizations have played m shaping Cen-
tral American history in this century. There
are ominous Implications for the remainder
of tbe century concerning an increasing
Marxist orientation of politically powerful
Central American students.
Despite these severe challengee-the dif-
ficulties of training students with diverse
February } 987 . MILITARY PIEVIEW
cultural backgrounds, severe finding short-
ages aud an increasingly greater attempt by
the Soviets to gain influenc~the IMET
Program remains strong in Central Arrreri-
ca. One critic even concedes, The fact is
that MAP training is the least expensive
and most effective way to influence Latin
American sokiiers.z

Search for Influence

The maintenance of a predominant US

m]litary influence in the re~on is ]rnphc]t
to the concept of a Soviet and Cuban chal-
lenge to that influence. Access to influential
friends may he one of the greatest Iong-
range benefits of IMET. But what do the
terms influence and access mean?
Access s the capability to communicate
uxth the relevant powergroups, and perhaps
even those out of power. Securzty CLSSLStcZnCe
prouldes, arnongotherthings, thepresenee in
another country to communicate. Influence
u the ability ofa patron state to affect the for.
etgn and domes tzcpolicy behavior ofa recipi-
ent country to further the interests of the pa-
tron.]
Communicate is a key word. As in any ef-
fective communication process, both parties
send and receive signals. We not only have
access and intluence with Central American
mi Iitaries, they also have considerable ac-
cess and influence with us. Thm is a very
strong factor in gaining approval of US fOr-
eign policy goals m the region. Hence, the
relationship affects the forelga policies of
both the hdst country and the Umted States,
and it ultimately affects the ~ntire region.
There is no inherent guarantee that
merely having access and influence with
Central American officials will always
result in the ability to control events favor-
able to the national interests of the United
States. Nicaragua fumlshes a recent exam-
. . . the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies dramatically
increased the amount ofgovernment-
sponsored scholarships available to
Latin-American students, and Cuba
provided thousands more through its
Isle of Youth education comp[ex. From
1972 through 1982, Soviet bloc scholar-
ships increased from approximately
3,000 to 9,000. Meanwhile, US govern-
ment scholarships declined horn
more than 4,000 to 2,000.
ple of failure. Nicara~a demonstrates the
potential for U.S. security assistance policy
h both succeed in the short term and fail in
the long term. =This does not mesa that US
security assistance alone was sutlicient to
maintain the Somoza dynasty in power or
led to the current US-Sandinista tensions
since other more critical factors were in-
volved.
 However, the Nicaraguan example em-
phasizes that simply hating access end in-
fluence does not guarantee favorable for-
eign policy decisions by host countries. It al-
se illustrates the need tu separate pucely
military considerations from broader for-
eign policy considerations. Therefore, US gov-
Despife the lark of guaranteed
success in using US influence to achieve
national foreign policy goat%, total
abrma%nment of security assistance
woutd only decrease access and hence
tower the chances to successfully
influence the real power in most
Central Amen-can nations
the militarg elites.
Maintaining ties with the
kws-than-perkect elite, while trying to
improve theirprofessiona[ skills and ap-
preciation for basic freedoms, is a pre-
ferredoption to total abandonment.
emment planners must blend SAPS with
appropriate amounts of economic assistance
to conquer basic social and economic prob-
lems.
Meanwhile, Latin-American govern-
ments must maintain basic freedoms to fos-
ter democratic political evolut]on. The
maintenance of those freedoms often re-
quiresa capable, professional military. Yet,
some rutMess dictators hat: historically
used the military as an instrument of op-
pression.
There is an obvious need to improve the
Central American militaries professional
skills, tolerance of democratic political evo-
lution and better management of scarce re-
sources-all of which are Objectives of the
IMET program. Central American nations
desperately need these programs to attain a
38
truly free status.
Despite the lack ofgusrsnteed success in
using US intluence to achieve national fOr-
eign policy goals, total abandonment of se-
curit y assi sance would only decrease access
and hence lower the chances to successfully
influence the real power in most Central
American nations-the military elite. W1tb-
out the capability to communicate effective-
ly with the Central American elite, there is
little chance to have any real influence iq
their affairs.
Doing nothzng increases the likelihood
that leadership elites In the area would be re-
placed wtth those aligned with the Cubans
and Soviets. They would probably transform
governments into totahtaruzn structures.w
Maintaining ties with tbe less-than-per-
fect elite, while trying to improve their pro-
fessional skills and appreciation for basic
freedoms, is a preferred option to total aban-
donment.
Such a position is open ta criticism. Secu-
rity assistance critics commonly claim that
US SAPS lead to the wsstefhl allocation of
scarce economic funds, encourage military
intervention m pohtlcs and foster repres-
sive regimes that are mutually harmful to
the host nations citizenry and to the US in-
terest in human rights.
Yet, security assistance, In general, and
IMET, specifically, encourage a more judi-
cious management cf resources and profes-
sionalization, mclud]ng respect for institL
tions and human rights. A detaded analysis
of the relationship between US SAPS and
the frequency ofcoups in Latin America be-
tween 1950 and 1969 Indicates that military
assistance did not cause military coups.
Rather.
the major causal f~tors are bound up
zn the comple.rlties of Latin American socusl
and poltttcal traditions. Likewise, the asse...
tzon that mdzta7y assistance encourages un -
necessary armed forces has little ualidity?
No one can seriously doubt that IMET has
February 1987. MILITARY REVIEW
 No one can senoasly doubt that ZMEThos a tremendous impact in
fostering [ong-lasting relationships between US militargpersonnel and their
Latin-Ameriean counterparts. Latin-American otilcera andNCOs participating
in training programs form realistic impressions of the United States,
its militarg equipment and its instructors.

a tremendous impact in fostering long-last-

ing relationships between US military per-
sonnel and their Latin-American counter-
parts. Latin-American otficers and N(2OS
participating in training programs form re-
alistic impressions of the United States, its
mil}tary equipment and its instructors. In
analyzing the imphcations of SAPs, a study
concluded:
the program probably makes its most
important contribution in directtng U.S.
training to foreign officers who occupy pOsi-
tzons of mfiuence and importance m their
countrzes and their armed foxes.=
hlany of these future leaders develop per-
ceptions while attending technical and pro-
fessional schools in the United States.
Planting tie Seeds
Since the 1940s, five different schools .
have operated in the former Canal Zone: the
Inter-American Geodetic Survey Carto-
graphic School, the Inter-American Naval
Telecommunications Network, the US .Na-
vys Small Craft Instruction and Tecbical
Team, USARSA end the US Air Forces In-
ter-American Air Force Academy (L4AFA).
The first three were relatively small in fac-
ulty and students and in their relative share
of IMET funds. Regardless, they signit7-
cantly increased the technical capabilities
of Latin-American military forces. Both

MILITARY REVIEW Februaw 1987 39

USARSA and IAAFA have a considerably
larger liet of graduates and hence a larger
impact on fostering better relations with
military personneLzG
Before USARSA moved to Fort Benning,
Georgia, in 1984, approximately 29,000 stu-
Communicate is a key word.
As in any effective communication
process, both parties send and receive
signals. We not only have access and
influence with Central American
militaries, they atso have considerable
access aad influence with as. This
is a very strong fmtor in gaining
approval of US foreign policy goals
in the region.
dents graduated from the school when it was
located in the Canal Zone. Records indicate
that USARSA graduates Include three pres-
idents, two ambassadors, 23 m]nisters and
national directors, and 18 chiefs and assist-
ant chiefs of staff. More than 78 graduates
eventually occupied significantly influen-
tial pvsitions in their respective countries.
Meanwhile, the IAAFA located at Al-
brook Air Force Base, Panama, has gradu-
ated more than 20,000 students since 1943.
Ir@-rnation on some of its otlcer graduates
indicates that, in addition to one countrys
president, influential graduates of L4AFA
include
. four armed forces ch[efs of staff, CICVC?l
ambassadors and attaehds, elgh t dtrectors of
civil aeronautics and cruilian CCWPS,nme dt
rectors of milita~ schads, and th lrty-tll rec
du-ectors of natzonalprogrom staffs.a
Besides the obvious accomplishments of
obtaining access and maintaining intluence
with dozens of prominent Latin-Amencan
leaders, L4AFA aIso provides unique tech-
nical skills. The school offers more than 60
40
technical and professional courses, includ-
ingjet engine repair, avionics maintenance
and tactical air operations. Instruction on
the repair of equipment not in the US Air
Force inventory but used by many Latin-
American air forces is included. Bilingual
instructors conduct classes in the students
native language, and many IAAFA gradu-
ates become instructors when they return
home.=
Although IMET funding does not specifi-
cally provide for cross-cultural training, the
environment encourages cross-cultural un-
derstanding. An IAAFA off]cer commented
Well hate stuahts lzvzng, working, and
playing together, from countnes that have
had conflicts as recently as 1981. By getting
to know each other we hope zt helps diffuse
potentialproblems.d
Three bases of influence have been listed
military, economic and cultural. Indirect
US military influence in the form of mili-
tary training programs has resulted in:
respect for the producers of the equip-
ment, acceptance of U.S [deas and doctrines,
and probably friendships u~ith A merlcans
andposltlw feel!ngs for this COuRt~.l
Military schoals are excellent examples of
how we influence future leaders in both mil-
itary and cultural realms. Latlrr-American
oflcers associated wnh US technology and
Ideology through IMET-sponsored schools
tend toward moderation rather than extre-
mism m their m] Iitary and political roles.
IhlETtraining cancontr]bute to a more tol-
erant attitude toward, if hOt receptnuty to,
democratic values.3
A Brazilian instructor at IAAFA com-
mented:
In our countrzes, the milztary also has
a pohtlca[ and social role. That w why the
mzsslon of IAAFA is so Important. Its
more than technical traimng. The message
IAAFA sends m a message ofdemocracy and
freedom. IAAFA can plant and grow the
seeds of a democratic and Christian society.=
February 1987 MILITARY REVIEW
 IMH

While some of the US miiitarypersonnels

legal requirements and attitudinal desires . . . the [IMET] environment
ta separate professional and political inter- encourages cross-cultural under-
ests rub off on Latin-American military stu- standing . . . . Wefl have students
dents, this is not going to change the reali- fiving, working, and playing together,
ties of hundreds of years of cultural heri- from countries that have had coatlkte
tage. Yet, evidence indicates that exposure as recently as 1981. By getting to know
to US ideas tends to produce leaders who each other we hope it helps diffuse
will exercise moderation. Therefore, it is in potential problems.
the best national interest of the United
States to continue maintaining access to
and influence with future leaders through- the desired harvest, but failure to plant the
out Latin Americaparticularly in the tur- crop would result in famine. So must we con-
bulent Central American region. tinue to plant and grow the seeda of a demo-
A farmers plantings do not always yield cratic and Christian society. %

NOTES
! HowxdJ WIwds WI .nd Reau?ofl 7he CmtraJ Ameflc8 fmbrn 1. c..,. s WO.S, m. umzedmaw canob=w am. M,hmv @m6c-
:; ;mn~4 Lnte!am,. lfl%[te W P.bI<c P.\,cy Res-aarch, Wash, n@., w. A P.rspecb. e.. Rwond $.fJ+90+o-M,7,tw R=?Jat4r@Ps
Eteruns. I-MM, for Pubic Polz? Resaamh, WssJIIrqtm D C .7 W-I P9
2 D.w,d F Ro.fela and L.!g R :mwat, Canllm and Cc0PW8uo. ?5 lbd. w%14
Amng Lab. amen-. Sates Beyond Cuba Lab. tie.ca 7am* Cnarge m W.*,ngrcm,. %c.*, 14~c?er19S394
of!. ,=tire sdfia W Lug, R E,a.d,, Crane R-, & C4 !4 Y 1974 D ,7 IJCm$, op t, wlls-m
185 1S m, So net Cuban tineclmm m CUM &mn.a md the Cmbbesn,
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Captmn I&q L Arnold,US ArForm, s chzef.

Tmmmg Bmnch, US Aw Force Southern Am Dt -
ulston (Tactccal A m Command), Houard Aw
Force Base, Panama He recewed a BA from the
U.werslty of Musoun and an MA fmm Tulmw
Unmers@. He has preowusly seined as ths chuf,
Opemtrons Intelligence Branch, 24th Composite
WUIS, HowwtiAuForcw Ba.w, and w deputy dkr-
tar, i.aIu -American A/$ars Brunch, US Au FORX
SF+Cml OPmtwns Scluwl, HurlburtFdd, Fior&

MILITARY REVIEW . Februav 1987

41