RUPA vs CA

Facts: On March 26, 1981, herein petitioner Gerardo Rupa filed an action for redemption with damages
against Magin Salipot before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Branch IV,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, claiming that he was the agricultural share tenant for more than 20 years of a parcel
of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim; that since he assumed tenancy
over the questioned property, he was the one watching, taking care of and cleaning the coconut
plantation; he also gathers coconuts every three months and processes them into copra which he shares
with the Lim spouses under a 50-50% sharing basis; that aside from being a share tenant, he is also the
overseer of four parcels of coconut land situated in the sitios of Minuswang and Comunal, Armenia, Uson,
Masbate also owned by the Lim spouses; that the Lim spouses, however, sold the property to herein
respondent Magin Salipot without any prior written or verbal notice to the petitioner in the sum of
P5,000.00 sometime in January 1981

On February 16, 1981, petitioner came to know about the sale of the property to the respondent when he
was informed in writing by the former landowner, and wanting to buy the property for himself, petitioner
sought the assistance of the local office of Agrarian Reform at Masbate, Masbate, but no agreement was
reached; that the petitioner manifesting his willingness to redeem the questioned property in the same
amount of P5,000.00 bought by respondent, deposited the amount with the trial court (Annex B,
Petition). Petitioner, thus, prayed for judgment authorizing his right of redemption over the property
including his shares of the harvest, damages and expenses arising herein.

Magin Salipot filed his answer denying petitioners allegation of tenancy over the questioned property and
claimed that petitioner was hired every now and then to oversee the copra-making of the laborers of
spouses Lim, with remuneration based on the weight of copra produced

In his affirmative and special defenses, respondent claimed that he bought the registered parcel of land
from the spouses Lim who in turn bought the same from the original registered owner Diego Prieto, who
was issued OCT-1853, and since both deeds of sale, one executed by Diego Prieto in favor of the Lim
spouses and the second, by the Lim spouses to herein respondent, have not yet been registered or
legally conveyed to respondent, the action for redemption filed by the petitioner against respondent is pre-
mature; that petitioner had never been a tenant of spouses Lim over the land in question; that the right of
redemption had already been lost by laches or non-use

Regional Trial Court of Masbate (which had taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations pursuant to BP
129) rendered a decision dated July 17, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that RUPA was not
a tenant of the subject property, thus, not entitled to exercise the right of redemption over the same.

SALIPOT manifested that he was adopting the memorandum filed with the court a quo, while no
memorandum was received from RUPA. 5 The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA -
Plaintiff RUPA, during the proceedings in the Criminal Case, admitted that he was the overseer and the
administrator of five (5) parcels of land, one of which is this land in question, owned by the Lim spouses in
Armenia, Uson Masbate.

The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, may be given in evidence against him
(Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). At the time the plaintiff-appellant admitted that he was the
administrator of Vicente Lim, he had already instituted the action for redemption with damages against
Magin Salipot, wherein he alleged that he was the share-tenant of the Lim spouses. Knowing fully well
that his right of legal redemption is based on his status as share-tenant, he still admitted, six months later,
in Crim. Case 532-U, that he was the administrator of five (5) parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses
in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. His admission, which is clearly adverse to his own interest, constitutes an
admission receivable against him

Aside from his own admission that he was the administrator of the Lim spouses, there is no clear and
positive proof that Gerardo Rupa performed the duties of a tenant in personally tilling and cultivating the
land which he allegedly tenanted.

Prosecution witnesses Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted that they were the hired laborers
of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the land in question (Under R.A. 1199, a share tenant must personally till the
land, possibly with the aid of the immediate farm household). The aforenamed witnesses may not have
been aware of the implication in admitting that they were the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa.

As to Gerardo Rupas claim of tenancy, Republic Act 1199, which governs the relations between
landholders and tenants of coconut lands, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by
another with the latters consent for purposes of production and sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system (Sec. 5[a], RA 1199). A person who does not work or till the land is not a
tenant

HELD: We do not agree with the contentions of private respondent SALIPOT. The CA committed
reversible error in relying mainly on statements made in a decision in another case, and, secondarily on
the certificate of the Municipal Treasurer as basis for establishing the status of petitioner as share-tenant
in the subject land.

A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, both the trial court, and the appellate court
overlooked and disregarded the overwhelming evidence in favor of RUPA and instead relied mainly on the
statements made in the decision in another case.

A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is
necessary that:

1 The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2 The subject is agricultural land;

3 The purpose is agricultural production;

4 There is consent;

5 There is personal cultivation; and

 6 There is sharing of harvests.

Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, RUPA could avail of the benefits afforded by
RA 3844,11 as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads:

SEC. 12. Lessees right of redemption.In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must he
redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right
of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale,
and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with
the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the
land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to
the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with sec. 11, RA 3844, as amended; c) only the
area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the right of redemption must be
exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of
the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed.12

However, as aforesaid, the CA failed to take into account the other material evidence on record to arrive
at its finding that RUPA was not a tenant-farmer.

The decision dated March 11, 1985 relied upon by the CA stemmed from Criminal Case No. 532-U for
Malicious Mischief which was instituted upon a complaint filed by RUPA against one Mariano Luzong who
happens to be the son-in-law of SALIPOT. According to RUPA, Mariano Luzong destroyed the banana
and cassava plants in his farm in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. It was stated in the decision that RUPA
claimed that he is the administrator of the five parcels of land owned by Patrocinio Lim in Armenia, Uson,
Masbate;13 and that the prosecution witnesses, Pablito Arnilla, and Antonieta Bongasan, the alleged
eyewitnesses to the destruction of the banana plants and cassava plants admitted being hired laborers of
Gerardo Rupa in tilling the latters farm.

It is believed that the statements in the said decision are not sufficient basis to overcome the rights of
RUPA as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes and upheld by this Court. The essence of
agricultural tenancy lies in the establishment of owner-cultivatorship and the economic fam-ily-size farm
as the basis of Philippine agriculture, and as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development.1

The above statements in the Criminal case should not have been relied upon by the CA to conclusively
disprove the tenancy relationship.

Said statement was apparently made to prove RUPAs standing to file the complaint and to prove how he
could have witnessed the destruction made by said person. Second, in claiming that he was administrator
of the property, RUPA, a farmer of limited education must have used the word administratorin a loose
sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. As
aptly pointed out by counsel for RUPA during the trial, with no objection from the counsel of SALIPOT,
under common usage in the locality, the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy.
Third, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the inherent incompatibilitybetween being a
tenant-farmer and an administrator or overseer. According to RUPA, he was tenant of one parcel of land
belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other four parcels of land owned by the
said spouses. SALIPOT and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed RUPA to be an overseer and a
copra agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have been receiving a fixed salary. As tenant under our
legal definition, he may have been sharing the harvests with the landowner. This may well lead a person
to find an incompatibility between the two. However, one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land,
supervising the laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for ones services, and at the same time, act
as tenant farmer in another landholding.

Fourth, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were hired laborersshould not have been
given significant weight by the CA. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a person cannot be prejudiced
by the declaration, act or omission of another, except as provided by the Rules of Court in cases of
admission by a co-partner, agent, conspirator and privies. The said witnesses do not come under any of
these exceptions.1

As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that RUPA was a copra buyer
from May 19, 1978 to October 10, 1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule out RUPAs claim that
he was tenant-farmer since 1962. RUPA has satisfactorily explained that pursuing two or three lines of
work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come far and in between, and the tenant can
always engage in the business of copra-buying in the interim. 18 Moreover, the dates indicated therein
cover only a short period of time as against RUPAs claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment
sometime in 1981.

We are therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the records do not
establish RUPAS status as an agricultural tenant.

Conejero vs CA

Facts: Paz Torres and Enrique Torres were co-owners pro indiviso of a lot and building in Cebu City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 197-A1230 (T-3827), that both had inherited from their
deceased parents. As of September 15, 1949, Enrique Torres sold his half interest to the Raffian
spouses for P13,000, with right to repurchase within one year. Subsequent advances by the vendees a
retro increased their claims against Enrique Torres, and finally, on April 3, 1951 (six months after the
expiration of the right to repurchase), said Enrique executed a deed of absolute sale of the same half
interest in the property in favor of the Raffians for P28,000. This deed of absolute sale (Exhibit 3-A)
had not been brought to the attention of Enriques sister and co-owner, Paz Torres de Conejero, nor of her
husband, until August 19, 1952, when Enrique Torres showed his brother-in-law, Enrique Conejero1, a
copy of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) of his share of the property in favor of the Raffians.
Conejero forthwith went to the buyers, offering to redeem his brother-in-laws share, which offer he latter
raised to P29,000.00 and afterwards to P34,000.

Conejeros filed, on October 4, 1952, a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to be
declared entitled to redeem the half interest of Enrique Torres; to which the Raffians made answer,
claiming absolute title to the property in dispute and pleading that plaintiffs lost their right of redemption
because they failed to exercise it within the statutory period.

The court of first instance found the deed of sale to be an equitable mortgage, and declared the plaintiffs
Conejero entitled to redeem Enriques half interest for P34,000. Upon appeal by the defendants, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the court of first instance, found that the deed in favor of the Raffians
was a true sale

The pertinent provision of the law reads:

The right of legal re-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners (Art. 1623).

We will concede that the evidence does not sufficiently show that a written notice was in fact given to the
appellees; but this point is not decisive for the reason that ultimately, according to appellees, themselves,
they came to know of the sale on August 19, 1952, on which date they immediately made an offer to
redeem the property. Appellees argue that their offer to redeem the property on the first day they came to
know of the sale on August 19, 1952, and subsequently on September 7 and 8, 1952, has preserved their
right of legal redemption as the 30-day period provided for by law had not lapsed.

Petitioner now appeals averring that no written notice of the sale to the Raffinans having been given by
Enrique Torres to his sister and co-owner, Paz T. de Conejero, the latters right to exercise legal
redemption has not expired, in fact, it has not even started to run; and (b) that in legal redemption no
tender of the redemption price is required, mere demand to allow redemption being sufficient to preserve
the redemptioners right.

Issue: was there a valid and effective offer to redeem?

Held: The law grants unto the co-owner of a property the right of redemption. But in so granting that
right, the law intended

In legal preemption or redemption under the Civil Code of the Philippines, written notice of the sale to all
possible redemptioner is indispensable. Mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by
the redemptioner, is not sufficient.

Article 1623 of the Civil Code does not prescribe any particular form of notice, or distinctive method
for notifying the redemptioner. So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof, the 30-day period for redemption starts running. In the case at bar, the redemptioner
admit that their coowner-vendor gave them a copy of the deed of sale of his undivided share in favor of
respondent spouses. The furnishing of this copy was equivalent to the giving of written notice required by
law; it came from the vendor and made available in writing the details or finality of the sale. As a
necessary consequence, the 30-day period for the legal redemption began to run from the date of receipt
of said deed of sale.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that they did not, for they failed to make a valid tender of the price
of the sale paid by the Raffians within the period fixed by law. Conejero merely offered a check for
P10,000, which was not even legal tender and which the Raffians rejected, in lieu of the price of P28,000
recited by the deed of sale. The factual finding of the Court of Appeals to this effect is final and
conclusive. Nor were the vendees obligated to accept Conejeros promise to pay the balance by means of
a loan to be obtained in future from a bank.

Bona fide redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase
price, and this was not done. There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by
installments from a redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the 30-day
redemption period, when the purpose of the law in fixing a short and definite term is clearly to avoid
prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold (Cf. Torrijos vs. Crisologo, et
al., G.R. No. L-1773, Sept. 29, 1962).

The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court
because it is only by such means that the buyer can become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. But while consignation is not always necessary because legal redemption is
not made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central vs. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253),
a valid tender is indispensable. Of course, consignation would remove all controversy as to the
redemptioners ability to pay at the proper time.

The right of redemption pertaining to a co-owner should be exercised by means of a valid payment or
tender of the redemption price within the thirty-day period. The buyer of the co-owners share cannot be
compelled to accept payment of the redemption price in installments. The diligence of the co-owner in
asserting willingness to redeem is immaterial. Timeliness and completeness of payment or tender are the
things that matter.

Petitioner says that under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a valid tender of the
redemption (or repurchase) price is not required, citing several cases, however, the SC ruled that a
judicial demand, by action filed within the redemption period and accompanied by consignation in Court of
the redemption price, can take the place of a personal tender to the vendee of the redemption money
under the Civil Code of 1889, because the nine-day redemption period allowed thereunder was so short
as to render it impractical that in every case the redemptioner should be required to seek out and offer the
redemption price personally to the buyer.

MACARAEG vs CA

Facts: On June 7, 1961 Macaraeg filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations (Second
Regional District, sala II, Guimba, Nueva Ecija) praying, inter alia, that (1) an interlocutory order be issued
to restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos (the respondents below), from ejecting him from his landholding
pending resolution of his petition; and (2) after due trial, he be maintained as the lawful tenant in the
disputed landholding.

Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of Teodoro cultivating a farmholding situated in the
municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and that he
has worked said land "as a tenant for the last seven years"; that on March 2, 1961 he received a letter
from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the aforesaid landholding will be given to another tenant , on
the pretext that he (Macaraeg) "is contracting be a tenant of another in said landholding"; that forthwith,
Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land; that subsequently, Niegos repeatedly
forbade him from working on said riceland; that in order to avoid trouble, he refrained from forcibly
entering the landholding, but with the advent of the planting season, it became imperative that the
agrarian court order his reinstatement and restrain Teodoro and Niegos from committing further acts of
dispossession.

Teodoro categorically denied that Macaraeg was his tenant, claiming that "ever since he became the
owner of around 39 hectares of riceland in Kalisitan, Talugtug, N. Ecija, he had always leased all of it
under civil lease and he had never given any portion of it under tenancy." He further alleged that after the
expiration of his lease contract with Macaraeg in January, 1961, his wife twice notified Macaraeg to renew
his contract for the then incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter "verbally told Mrs. Teodoro that
he was no longer interested to work on the land and he was giving it up as he had left the place already."
Teodoro also claims that it was only after Macaraeg had abandoned the farmland that he decided to lease
it to Niegos.

On his part, Niegos seasonably answered, disclaming any knowledge that Macaraeg is the tenant of
Teodoro, and averring that he entered the landholding in good faith clothed with the proper authority from
the other respondent (Teodoro) and with the consent and confirmity of the petitioner (Macaraeg) who
allowed him to work on the same"; and that Macaraeg "has no more interests in the cultivation of the
landholding as could be gleaned from his actuations, like the failure to clean the land during the months of
March and April, and his failure to prepare his seed bed in the month of May which is the period for
broadcasting seedling in the community".

when the hearing of the present controversy was nearing completion in the respondent agrarian court but
before the case was submitted for decision, Macaraeg filed a "supplemental petition", claiming damages
as a a result of his dispossession

Both Teodoro and Niegos interposed their respective answers, identically asserting that the same was
filed out of time and that the failure of Macaraeg to claim earlier his alleged damages amounted to a fatal
neglect which could no longer be cured at that very late stage of the proceedings. Nonetheless, hearing
on the said petition was disclosed that as "a result of his (Macaraeg's) ejectment, he became destitute"
since he had no "income except from those derived from transplanting and reaping wherein he earned the
amount of P30.00". It was further proved that "for the aqricultural year 1961-62, Jose Niegos realized a
gross harvest of 110 cavans out of which he paid his rental to Fidel Teodoro in the amount of 42 cavans
and 23 kilos."
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner Felix Macaraeg and against respondents Fidel Teodoro
and Jose Niegos

The pertinent provisions of the disputed "Contract of Lease" between Teodoro and Macaraeg read as
follows:

That the LESSOR is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land situated at Talugtug, Nueva
Ecija, containing an area of THIRTY NINE (39) HECTARES, more or less;

That for and in consideration of the rental of Nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one
agricultural year, the LESSOR hereby lets and leases and the LESSEE hereby accepts an
undivided portion 4 Hectares of the abovementioned property under the following terms and
conditions:

1. That this contract of lease shall only be for the agricultural year 1960-61;

2. That the LESSEE shall give a guaranty to answer for the payment of the lease consideration of
this contract;

3. That the rental of 38.7 cavans of palay per hectare shall be paid unto the LESSOR not later
than January, 1961;

4. That the corresponding rental must be brought to the Poblacion of Muoz, Nueva Ecija, to be
deposited to any bonded Warehouse at the expense of the LESSEE and in the name of the
LESSOR;

5. That the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE;

6. That the LESSOR shall pay for the real property taxes corresponding to the property leased;

7. That violation of any of the terms of this contract shall be sufficient ground to terminate the
same with damages against the guilty party;

8. That the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only;

9. That in case of default on the part of the LESSEE to pay the lease consideration when the
same becomes due and payable and the collection for the same reaches the court, the LESSEE
hereby binds himself to pay the cost of the suit including reasonable attorney's fees. (Emphasis
supplied)

I. Teodoro contends that the language and tenor of the aforesaid contract clearly manifest the intention of
the parties to enter into an ordinary civil lease contract, not a leasehold tenancy agreement as alleged by
Macaraeg and sustained by the agrarian court.

HELD: The foregoing stance assumed by Teodoro is patently untenable, in the face of the principal
features and stipulations of the contract in controversy and the pertinent provisions of existing law on
leasehold tenancy. It bears emphasis that the title, label or rubric given to a contract cannot be used to
camouflage the real import of an agreement as evinced by its main provisions. Moreover, it is basic that a
contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties. 1
As correctly expressed by the respondent court, "viewed from the four corners of Exhibit A, we have no
doubt that the leasehold tenancy contract entered into between petitioner (Macaraeg) and Fidel Teodoro
is a pure and simple leasehold tenancy contract as the term is understood under our tenancy laws."

Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household, undertaken to cultivate a piece of agricultural
land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm
household, belonging to a legally possessed by another in consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produced or in both.

Furthermore, section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a landlord-lessor as

Any person, natural or judicial, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of
agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said property for purposes of agricultural
production and for a price certain of ascertainable either in amount of money or produced;

while a tenant-lessee is defined as

any person who, with the consent of the former (landlord-lessor), tills, cultivates or operates said
land, susceptible of cultivation by one individual, personally or with the aid of labor available from
among his own immediate farm household.

Gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the following could be synthesized as the principal elements of a
lease-hold tenancy contract or relation:

1. The object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or rented for
the purpose of agricultural production;

2. The size of the landholding must be such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a
single person with assistance from the members of his immediate farm household;

3. The tenant-lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely or with
the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and

4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land, leases
the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in a amount of money
or produce.

Reverting to the controverted "Contract of Lease", we are of the consensus that it indubitably contains the
forgoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.

The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More
specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only".

From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE", it can
reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which
he did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the
landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a
fixed annual rental." (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not
personally cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg
availed of outside assistance in the cultivation of the said riceland.

Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession thereof to
Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold
tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce 9 cavans
per hectare is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually
enter into a leasehold tenancy relation.

Teodoro further argues, however, that the aforesaid "Contract of Lease" cannot possibly be construed as
establishing a leasehold tenancy relation because the parties themselves ignored and repudiated the very
essence of tenancy security of tenure when they stipulated that "this agreement shall only be for the
agricultural year 1960-61".

This argument is unacceptable. The mere fact that the parties fixed and limited the duration of their lease
contract to only one agricultural year, does not remove the relationship which they created from the
purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the general import of their agreement which irreversibly leads
to and clearly justifies tenancy coverage. It is fundamental that the tenant-lessee's security of tenure
subsists notwithstanding the termination of the contract which initially established the tenancy relation . In
the language of the law, the "expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties ... does not of
itself extinguish the relationship". 3 This is a "practical consequence of the distinction between the tenancy
contract which is fixed by the parties, and the tenancy relationship which is maintained and governed by
law". 4 Furthermore, section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that

Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the period of future surrender of the
land, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of
tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landholder except for any of
the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before and the
dispossession is authorized bye the court." (Emphasis supplied)

The abovecited provision does not permit the parties to stipulate at what future time the tenant shall leave
or surrender the land

We now come to the second assignment of error. Teodoro posits that granting the establishment of a
leasehold tenancy relation between him and Macaraeg by virtue of the aforesaid "Contract of Lease", the
agrarian court nevertheless erred in not finding Macaraeg guilty of abandonment, an act which terminates
the tenancy relation and justifies the ejectment of the tenant.

"The word 'abandon', in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. In the
case at bar, Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold possession on the condition that a certain
Claus be taken as his successor. Hence, his act did not constitute desertion of his leasehold as it was a
mere intended surrender of the same. And as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent court,
it is "only through the actual surrender of the land that tenancy relation terminates; no amount of intention
to surrender severs the relationship".

Talavera vs CA
Facts: an action for recovery of possession was instituted by the private respondent against
the petitioners over a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 21,081 square meters located at
Brgy. Sto. Domingo 11, Sitio Tambo, Capas, Tarlac.

The complaint alleged, among others, that respondent Laxamana had been a bonafide tenant of the
aforesaid parcel of land since 1958 until the petitioners took possession thereof sometime in 1984; that
respondent Laxamana had been in continuous possession and cultivation of the said landholding since
1958 but the petitioners, for unknown reasons and without the knowledge of respondent Laxamana,
planted palay thereon in 1984 through force and intimidation after plowing and harrowing were done by
respondent Laxamana; and that due to the petitioners' illegal actions, respondent Laxamana suffered
damages in the amount of P500.00 and the price equivalent to sixty-five (65) cavans of palay per
agricultural year from the time of his dispossession until his reinstatement as tenant over the landholding
in question.

In their answer, the petitioners counter-alleged, among others, that their tenancy relationship with
respondent Laxamana was terminated pursuant to a document captioned "Casunduan" executed on
March 30, 1973 whereby the latter sold his rights and interests over the agricultural landholding under
litigation for a consideration of P1,000.00; that respondent Laxamana was not actually a tenant of the
petitioners and whatever tenancy rights the former had exercised over the landholding in question were
voluntarily surrendered by him upon the execution of the aforesaid document; that respondent Laxamana
had only himself to blame for the litigation expenses resulting from his baseless and patently frivolous
complaint; and that respondent Laxamana was no longer entitled to the amount equivalent to 65 cavans
of palay per agricultural year as claimed since he was no longer a tenant of the petitioners.

After trial, the private respondent obtained a favorable judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's holding that the Casunduan even if assumed to be valid did not constitute "voluntary surrender" as
contemplated by law, hence, respondent Laxamana ought to be reinstated as tenant of the petitioners'
landholding.

The petitioners bolster their claim that respondent Laxamana is no longer their tenant over the
landholding in question by invoking the rule on parol evidence with respect to the probative value of the
"Casunduan" executed by respondent Laxamana on March 30, 1973. They further argue that the
execution of the "Casunduan" clearly showed the intention of respondent Laxamana to surrender
whatever rights he had as tenant over the said landholding.

Issue: whether or not by virtue of the "Casunduan" dated March 30, 1973, respondent Laxamana as
tenant is deemed to have surrendered voluntarily the subject landholding to its owners the petitioners.

Held: status. The Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended)
specifically enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations. Section 8 of
the said Code provides:

Extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation. The agricultural leasehold relation

established under this Code shall be extinguished by:

(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the

agricultural lessor;
 (2) Voluntary surrender of the land holding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or

(3) Absence of the persons under Section rune to succeed to the lessee,
in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.

The petitioners invoke voluntary surrender under Paragraph 2 of Section 8 as the reason for the end of
the tenancy relationship.

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require any court
authorization considering that it involves the tenant's own volition. (see Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87
SCRA 263 [1978]). To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated
by law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to
surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Otherwise,
the right of a tenant to security of tenure becomes an illusory one.

Standing by itself, the March 30, 1973 Casunduan indicates, as contended by the petitioners, a voluntary
relinquishment of tenancy rights. It states that on his own initiative, Jose Laxamana went to the Talaveras
and requested that he be allowed to sell his "puesto cung asican" or "the plot I am farming" to the couple.
A subscribing witness, Ermela Lumanlan testified on the voluntary sale of tenancy rights for P1,000.00,
her signing as a witness at the bottom of the contract, and Laxamana's signing the document.

The argument of the private respondent that under Section 28 of the Agrarian Reform Code, a voluntary
surrender to be valid must be "due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family" is double-
edged. There appears no question that Laxamana needed money to pay for the expenses incident to the
illness of his wife which led to her death. The money was to his advantage.

Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must
be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the States policy of achieving a dignified existence for the
small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices (Sec. 2 [2], Code of Agrarian
Reforms). We, therefore, rule that except for compelling reasons clearly proved the determination that a
person is a tenant-farmer, a factual conclusion made by the trial court on the basis of evidence directly
available to it, will not be reversed on appeal and will be binding on us. Laxaman wins

Tan vs Pollescas

Facts: Petitioners Norma Tan, Jeanette Tan, Julieta Tan, Rommel 3 Tan and Enrique Tan, Jr. (Tan ) are
co-owners of a coconut farmland (Land) located at Labo, Ozamis City with an area of 25,780 square
meters.4

Esteban Pollescas (Esteban) was the original tenant of the Land. Upon Estebans death in 1991, his
son Enrique Pollescas (Enrique) succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique
Tan (Tan).

However, respondent Reynalda Pollescas (Reynalda), Estebans surviving second spouse, demanded
that Tan recognize her as Estebans successor. Tan did not accede. Thus, Reynalda filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Ozamis City (DARAB-Ozamis) a complaint for
Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and damages.
 the DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the Land. The DARAB-Ozamis
apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the customary sharing system
which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant. 7

On the following harvest dates, 11 and 19 of June, 9 September, 6 and 13 of December 1993,
Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting to P3,656.70. The Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to pay such amount.8 However, Reynalda ignored the demand.

Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against Reynalda with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Ozamis City, Branch 2. 9 The trial court found Reynalda guilty of estafa. Subsequently, for
Reynaldas continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the DARAB, Misamis
Occidental (DARAB-Misamis Occidental) an ejectment case

DARAB-Misamis Occidental13 ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs

Reynalda appealed to the DARAB, Diliman, Quezon City (DARAB). The DARAB reversed the decision
of the DARAB-Misamis Occidental,

the Court of Appeals cited Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.16 where this Court held that x x x mere
failure of a tenant to pay the landholders share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the
former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay x x x.

The Court of Appeals held that Reynaldas failure to deliver the full amount of the Tan Heirs share
could not be considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive the Tan Heirs of their share. The Court
of Appeals held that Reynalda honestly believed that she was entitled to a share of the harvests in 1992-
1993 while the case for Annulment of Compromise Agreement was pending before the DARAB-Ozamis.
Reynalda also believed that she could effect a set-off for her 1992-1993 share from the 1994 share of the
Tan Heirs.

The Court of Appeals further declared that the rental must be legal to consider non-payment of such
as a ground for ejectment.

x x x for a tenants failure to pay rental to come within the intendment of the law as a ground for
ejectment, it is imperative that the rental must be legal. What the law contemplates is the deliberate failure
of the tenant to pay the legal rental, not the failure to pay an illegal rental. A stipulation in a leasehold
contract requiring a lessee to pay an amount in excess of the amount allowed by law is considered
contrary to law, morals or public policy. Such contract is null and void as to the excess.

Held: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code 21 abolished and outlawed share
tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.22 On 10 September 1971, Republic Act No.
6389 (RA 6389) amending RA 3844 (RA 3844 as amended) declared share tenancy relationships as
contrary to public policy.23 RA 6389 did not entirely repeal Republic Act No. 1199 24 and RA 3844 even if
RA 6389 substantially modified them. 25Subsequently, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA 6657) took effect on 15 June 1988. RA 6657 only expressly repealed
Section 35 of RA 3844 as amended.26Thus, RA 6657 is the prevailing law in this case. The harvests in
dispute are for the years 1992-1993 or after the effectivity of RA 6657.

In the instant case, the Tan Heirs seek Reynaldas ejectment from the Land on the ground of non-
payment of lease rental.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid
ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first
of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of
lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.

Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended 29 mandates that not x x x more than 25% of the average normal
harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded
Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount
prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for
non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.

Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged
to pay such lease rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment of such unlawful
lease rental. The courts will not enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There was no
validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.

Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix
the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. 30 Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda
cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined.

Hidalgo vs Hidalgo

Facts: Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale
on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents,
the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in
Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, described in the decisions under review.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876square meter parcel of land, together with two
other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales, as tenants
thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account
the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-
vendees1 in their favor.

In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and
petitioners- petitionersspouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondentsvendees in their
favor.

As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties stipulated on the facts in both cases,
petitionerstenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice
of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by
respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondentvendor
were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of
their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required
by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.2 The actions for redemption were timely filed on March 26, 1965
by petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale, prescribed by
section 12 of the said Code.

Issue: whether or not plaintiffs, as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working from the purchasers thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who
was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the
affidavit required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale , In other
words, is the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 applicable
to share tenants?

The Lower court says that The right of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code is
available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions: "(S)ec. 12
of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter I of said Act under the heading 'Agricultural
Leasehold System,' roads as follows:

" 'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption.In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each
shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the.extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The
right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale,
and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.'

"The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this Jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844). A share tenant is
altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-
extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22 to 41, inclusive, and Secs, 42 to 48, inclusive, of Republic Act No,
1199: see also Secs; 4 to 38, inclusive, of Republic Act Act No. 3844).

"It is our considered view that the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is
applicable- to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said provision of law clearly,
definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody- else. In enacting
the Agricultural Land -Reform Code, Congress was fully aware of the existence of share tenancy and in
fact provided for the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system.

Held: The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy as proclaimed in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly-outlaws agricultural share tenancy as
"contrary to public policy." section 2 of the Code expressly declares it to be the policy of the State to
"establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture
and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; x x x
and to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
strength in our democratic society."

It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to state the premise after the Land Reform Code had
already been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction
are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the premise is that' based on
the transitory provision in the first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that existing share tenancy
contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their express abolition,
until whichever of the following events occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the
National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area;
or (b) the shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or (c) the share tenant sooner
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.

The Land Reform Code forges by operation of law the farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he
cultivates under section 11 of the Code as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person
without his knowledge, under section 12 of the Code. This is an essential and indispensable mandate of
the Code to implement the State's policy of establishing ownership-cultivatorship and to achieve a
dignified and self-reliant existence for the small farmers that would make them a pillar of strength of our
Republic. Aside from expropriation by the Land Authority of private agricultural land for resale in economic
family-size farm units "to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers," the .purchase by farmers of
the lands cultivated by them, when the owner decides to sell the samethrough the rights of preemption
and redemptionare the only means prescribed by the Code to achieve the declared policy of the State.

Where the true intent of the law is clear such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

ln Basbas v. Entena, the farmer's right of redemption was not granted because he had yet no funds
to redeem the property and had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet operating
in the locality. In the case at bar, the farmer's possession of funds and compliance with the requirements
of redemption are not questioned,

Guerrero vs CA
Facts: plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take
care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at
Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to
put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed.

In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn
dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually comes
every three months, he was also made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-
hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat
into copra in defendants copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds
from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by
the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office
of the President in Malacaang, Manila.

. This led to an execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed,
among others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and that
their relationship will be guided by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philip-pines.

Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the
plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the
Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the
processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage
where plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business.
Hence, this case for reinstatement with damages.

Held: The law defines agricultural tenancy as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor
of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in
money, or in both

With petitioner reference to this case, share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to
be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited
to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute
or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment

On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844
declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy,
the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower courts
committed grave error in upholding the respondents status as share tenant in the petitioners
landholding. The petitioners arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in
agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform
Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership
of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of
tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.

It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same
have been substantially modified by the latter. However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law,
the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere
general principle. Among the established exceptions are when vested rights are affected and obligations
of contract are impaired

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is admitted
that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in question and
planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only after the same
were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the
land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of
growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of
the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice,
the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the
ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered
by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising
coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or
smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all
phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere
farm laborer.

Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is
their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a tercio basis that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in
favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of tenancy
relations per se, the sharing of harvests, taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown
to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant.
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondents right as share tenant do not end
with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and
stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens x x x active participants in
nation-building, agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards
the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land
reform. It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented.
The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences
of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented,
the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains.
The petitioners arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for
setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.

Quismundo v CA 207 SCRA 609

Facts: It appears that on February 19,1988, private respondents Daway et. Al, as tenants of
petitioner Quismundo, filed a complaint with the trial court praying that their relationship be
changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to Republic Act No. 3844, their
request therefor having been denied by Quismundo.

Private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order authorizing the
supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 1987
1988 sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law
that should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115 and not Republic
Act No. 3844. The petition was denied.

Quismundo filed an MR of the denial order, invoking the lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the case under the authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
specifically Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657. The MR was likewise denied.

The CA also denied Quismundos petition and upheld the jurisdiction of the court below,
ruling that: The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold tenancy is governed by
RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and RA 6657 divesting the
trial court of jurisdiction over the case. We see no inconsistency between RA 3844 and E.O.
No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the cause of action of the
private respondent.

Quismundo contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar considering that
the exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested in
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by Exceutive Order No. 229, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6657.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case at bar

Held: No. Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation
No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision of said
executive order reads as follows:

SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of
 agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).

The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena
duces tecum and writs to enforce its order or decisions.

The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial
Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal.

The above quoted provision should be deemed to have repealed11 Section 12 (a) and (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844,
the courts of agrarian relations had original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except
those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission and questions involving
rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions,
Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial
courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229 which took effect on August 29,
1987,, the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian
reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private
respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft of authority to act on the same, The
allegation of private respondents that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and
not on February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of either
date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of
Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of private respondents since it is in a better
position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter.

De Tangub v CA 191 SCRA 885

Facts: Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao
del Norte an agrarian case for damages by reason of their unlawful dispossession as
tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil.

Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank,
it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land
involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the
bank as the highest bidder

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that by virtue of Executive Order No. 22, Executive
No. 129-A, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to
the Department of Agrarian Reform.

The CA likewise dismissed the petition ruling , agrarian cases no longer fall under the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication
Board.

Rufina Vda. de Tangub, contends the RTC and the CAs order of dismissal are patently illegal
and unconstitutional because they deprive a poor tenant access to courts and directly
violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar

Held: No. Section 17 of of Executive Order No. 229 states:

1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with quasi-judicial powers to

determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and

2) granted it jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian

reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and
the Department of Agriculture, as well as powers to punish for contempt and to
issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.

Executive order No. 129-A conferred jurisdiction to the DAR for:

(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and

(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural

lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,

Clearly, these intention of these orders and laws was evidently to transfer original
jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform. The rules included the creation of the
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the
Department, and the allocation to it of state:

x x original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law,
and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive
Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.

Also, Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 made this clear and reads as follows:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR].

The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over
agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, confers special jurisdiction on Special
Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court forL
1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and

2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x [the] Act.

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No.
1094. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land,
not involving the special jurisdiction of said Trial Court.

Ualat v Ramos 265 SCRA 345

Facts: Ignorance of the law on the part of a judge is not only most ignominous, it is also
prejudicial to litigants and the administration of justice as a whole.

These are two (2) administrative cases filed by complainants Quirino Sabio and Modesto
Ualat against respondent Judge Jose O. Ramos of the MTC of Echague, Isabela, for
"knowingly rendering unjust judgment, ignorance of the law and serious misconduct"
relative to his taking cognizance of an action which according to complainants is an agrarian
dispute and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.

Quirino Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land consisting of 4.7
hectares owned by Leonardo Coma while Ualat alleges that he is Sabio's caretaker. Sabio
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for
Recovery of Possession against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant
Sabio. The landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with Judge
Ramos sala.

The DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as
the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed. However,
respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the landowner ordering the complainants,
among others, to vacate the property.

Sabio contends, notwithstanding the knowledge of the (DAR) resolution, and the fact that
the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his "power
and authority," took cognizance of the case because of personal interest and motive. They
claim that during the pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother,
cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of the case.

Complainant Ualat, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his residential house
which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and argued that as mere
caretaker, he could not be held "jointly and severally" liable to pay the obligations of Sabio.

In denying the charges, respondent Judge alleged that he was without knowledge or
information about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of the DAR resolution
because nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor were these
brought out during the proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented, he ruled
that the relationship between the landowner and herein complainants is that of "civil lease."

Respondent judge denied that he had any personal interest in the agricultural land subject
matter of the case, arguing that he did not have a hand in the "civil lease" contract entered
into by his son and the landowner and that if he had prior knowledge of it, he could have
dissuaded his son from entering into the lease contract to avoid any suspicions.

The Executive Judge investigated the matter and held that Sabio and Ualat did not allege
anything about the DAR case, hence the Judge was not aware of the DAR case when he
rendered the decision. He further stated that jjurisdiction is determined by based on the
allegation of the complaint, not the answer. In this case, there is no allegation of the
complaint that the case is one of agrarian dispute. The Executive Judge recommends the
dismissal of the case against Judge Ramos.

The Court administrator disagreed with the Executive judges recommendation reasoning
that "the mere fact that Judge Ramos lacks prior knowledge or notice of the previous case
before the Department of Agrarian Reform does not entirely absolved (sic) him of any
administrative liability.

Further, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1038, entitled "Strengthening the security of
tenure of tenant-tillers in non-rice/corn producing private agricultural lands," which took
effect October 21, 1976, reads as follows:

"SECTION 2.No judge of the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first instance, city
or municipal courts, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any
ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn, unless certified by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge
or other officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any such case is filed, the case shall
first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative
in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as his authorized
representative in the locality finds that the case is a proper case taking cognizance of
an ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn unless the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform certifies that the case is one proper for such tribunal to hear and
decide.

Issue: Whether or not the MTC Judge was ignorant in taking cognizance of the case at bar

Held: Yes. We agree with the Court Administrator.

The Investigating Judge may have been technically correct in averring that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall
so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute or controversy.

However, this is an administrative case where the issue is not whether a motion to dismiss
the complaint could prosper. The issue is whether respondent judge properly comported
himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before him.

As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil
case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves
and the landowner. Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent judge, complainants
were even represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient
to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our
agrarian laws.

At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving
agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. Knowledge of
existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an
ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to
the DAR for preliminary determination of the real nature of the parties' relationship, as
required by law.
His failure to refer the case to the DAR upon receipt of the answer of complainants, despite
the clear mandate of the two agrarian laws aforementioned, can in no wise be justified by
respondent Judge. What is even more embarrassing is his seeming lack of awareness of the
Civil Code provision making a sub-lessee merely subsidiarily liable for unpaid rentals, to the
extent of the rentals due from him under the sub-lease, at the time of the lessor's
extrajudicial demand.

It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as
well as with the latest decisions of this Court. One cannot seek refuge in having a mere
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one 7. certainly not judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD
QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.

Heirs of Santos v CA 327 SCRA 293

Facts: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which
was levied on execution by the MTC. In accordance with said levy on execution, the land was
sold at a public aucution with Herman Rey Santos, represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia
Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan after private
respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the
reglementary period.

Garcia filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing him from gathering the mango fruits lest
they over-mature and become useless.

The DARAB allowed the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds
thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board.

Meanwhile, Pantaleon Antonio filed a motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that he
is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear
fruits this season.

Garcia then filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption
with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy
Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

Thereafter, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonios motion for
intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue raised.

Later, Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw Intervenors deposited
share. The motion was granted and intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw
P87,300.00 out of P174,600.00 harvest proceeds. Corollarily, the DARAB recognized
Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land. The CA
affirmed the decisions made by the DARAB.

Petitioner Santos contends that the CA erred in ruling that the PARAD has jurisdiction over
the ancillary matters raised by intervenor despite the fact that the PARAD itself has admitted
involvement of question of ownership between the original parties and has indefinitely
suspended the main case pending the outcome of the issue of ownership; and in affirming
the order allowing the release of 50% of the proceeds of the sale of the harvested fruits in
favor of intervenor without due process.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD has jurisdiction over the matters raised by the intervenor
Pantaleon Antonio.

Held: No. Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.The Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.

Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for
the ownership of the subject property.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit that:

1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
4) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Petitioners Santos and private respondent Garcia have no tenurial, leasehold, or any
agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit
of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition for
injunction in the first place.

Also, the issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an
incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main
case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy
between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can
stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to
order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that
an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership.
Corpin v Vivar 333 SCRA 540

Facts: Petitioner Corpin is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang,
Guiguinto, Bulacan Private respondent Vivar is in possession of said parcel of land.

Corpin filed with the MTC Bulacan a complaint for ejectment against Vivar. The latter refused
to vacate the said lot, claiming that he is a tenant of petitioner. In his Answer with Motion to
Dismiss, Vivar averred that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since it
involved a landlord-tenant relationship. Hence, the same should have been filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform instead.

However, since the Answer was filed out of time, the MTC issued an Order ordering private
respondent to vacate the land.

Aggrieved, private respondent appealed the aforementioned decision to the Regional Trial
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. He submitted several documents to support his claim that he is
a tenant such as Pagtitibay, affidavits, and Sinumpang Salaysays, stating that Corpin
acknowledged him as tenant; Patunays and certifications stating that he deposited proceeds
from the sale of mangoes harvested from the lot.

The RTC reversed the judgment dismissed Corpins complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Corpin appealed to the CA. He asserts that the RTC erred in finding that a landlord-tenant
relationship exists between him and private respondent because, among others, the RTC
considered the memorandum and the documents attached thereto submitted by private
respondent even though these were not presented before the municipal trial court. The CA
dismissed the petition and upheld the RTC finding that the municipal trial court erred in
disregarding the Answer filed by Vivar even though the same was belatedly filed because
said pleading raised the issue of the municipal trial courts jurisdiction, an issue which must
be resolved by said court despite the late filing of private respondents Answer

Issue: Whether or not the MTC should not have disregarded Vivars answer but should have
proceeded to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case.

Held: It was error for the MTC to disregard the answer of respondent on the sole premise that
it was belatedly filed. The answer raised the issue of jurisdiction which the court could not
just gloss over because, if, after hearing, it turned out that it really did not have jurisdiction
over the case because it involved an agrarian dispute, then its decision excluding and
ejecting respondent from the premises would have been a complete nullity.

Despite this, we do not find the documents submitted by the parties as sufficient to have
enabled the Regional Trial Court to thoroughly resolve the issue of whether or not the
municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Regional
Trial Court should not have considered the documents submitted in rendering its Decision
since said documents were only presented before it on appeal, and were not previously filed
with the municipal trial court in the original case.

Considering the foregoing, there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may
present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial courts jurisdiction
over the case.

Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts finding that there exists a landlord-tenant
relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents
attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not
presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.

The records of the instant case are hereby remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan for hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.

DAR v Cuenca 439 SCRA 15

Facts: Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.

Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent
a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described
landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, (CARP). The NOTICE OF COVERAGE
also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the
subject land.

Cuenca filed with the RTC, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the
Philippines for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of
E.O. No. 405. He alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer
with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced
and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992, as provided in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); that Executive Order No. 405 amends, modifies
and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional.

MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.

The respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to
cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage. The DAR thereafter filed before
the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

It is the submission the DAR assailed the order as is in direct defiance of Republic Act 6657,
particularly Section 55 and 68 thereof, which read:

SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS.No court in the

Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case,
dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with the application,
implementation, or enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on
agrarian reform.

SECTION 68. IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM COURTS INTERFERENCE.No

injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court
against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in the implementation of their program.

DAR also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely agrarian
in character over which the court a has no jurisdiction and authority to issue the assailed
injunction order.5
CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case stressing that the
issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405,. Consonant with that authority, the RTC had the
power to issue writs.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case, hence allowed to issue the writ
of injunction.

Held: According to the DAR, the issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a
matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of
the CARP. On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails mainly
the constitutionality of EO 405. He contends that since the Complaint raises a purely legal
issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

We do not agree.

There are two basic rules that have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these
cases. First, jurisdiction is conferred by law. And second, the nature of the action and the
issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.

Courts of Agrarian Relations (CARs) were organized under RA 126711 for the enforcement
of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands
under any system of cultivation. The jurisdiction of these courts was spelled out in Section
7 of the said law as follows:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court.The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters,
controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which
determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where
one of the parties works the land, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance over employer and farm employee or labor under Republic Act Numbered six
hundred two and over landlord and tenant involving violations of the Usury Law (Act No.
2655, as amended) and of inflicting the penalties provided therefor.

All the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then Courts of First
Instance12 (now the RTCs) were granted to the CARs.

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 946 thereafter reorganized the CARs, streamlined their
operations, and expanded their jurisdiction as follows:

Sec. 12. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter.The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission; x x
x;

b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees,
Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the
agrarian reform program; Provided, however, That matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree
No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall
be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Then came Executive Order No. 229.17 Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall exercise
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of
Agriculture.

In Quismundo v. CA,18 this provision was deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 946, which vested the then Courts of Agrarian Relations with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program.

In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence of the DAR had
further been clarified by RA 6657 thus:

Also, Section 50 of RA 6657 reads as follows:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR].

Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657 confers special jurisdiction on Special
Agrarian Courts, which are actually RTCs designated as such by the Supreme Court.22
Under Section 57 of the same law, these Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the following matters:

1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and

2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x x [the] Act.

A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs
prayed for refernot to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged
unconstitutionality of EO 405but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage.
Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage.

6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the [respondent] is contrary to law

and, therefore, violates [respondents] constitutional right not to be deprived of his property
without due process of law. The coverage of [respondents] landholding under CARP is NO
longer with authority of law. If at all, the implementation of CARP in the landholding of
[respondent] should have commenced and [been] completed between June 1988 to June
1992 as provided for in CARL, to wit: x x x;

7. Moreover, the placing of [respondents] landholding under CARP as of 21 September

1999 is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as mandated and required by
law pursuant to R.A. 7905 x x x;

9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR, and not x x x Land Bank,
which is authorized to preliminarily determine the value of the lands as compensation
therefor, thusx x x;
 12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with intendment and purpose of
acquiring [respondents] aforementioned land is a gross violation of law (PD 399 dated 28
February 1974 which is still effective up to now) inasmuch as [respondents] land is
traversed by and a road frontage as admitted by the DARs technician and defendant
FORTUNADO (MARO) x x x;

13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of which is hereto attached
as annex D forming part hereof, [respondents] land is above eighteen percent (18%) slope
and therefore, automatically exempted and excluded from the operation of Rep. Act 6657, x
x x.25 (Italics supplied)

In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 by

merely making these two allegations:

10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then President Corazon
Aquino) is unconstitutional for it plainly amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL. On 14 June
1990, then President Corazon Aquino had no longer law-making powers as the Philippine
Congress was by then already organized, existing and operational pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. A copy of the said Executive Order is hereto attached as Annex B forming part
hereof.

11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said Executive Order No.
405 unconstitutional and all valuations made, and to be made, by the defendant Land Bank
pursuant thereto are null and void and without force and effect. Indispensably and
ineludibly, all related rules, regulations, orders and other issuances issued or promulgated
pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405 are also null and void ab initio and without force
and effect.26

We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court
was not the issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor
proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of
determining just compensation.

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent
in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of doubt, the
jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, even if the question[s]
involved [are] also judicial in character,30 as in this case.

Second Issue: Preliminary Injunction

Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the
RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity.

Magno v Francisco 616 SCRA 540

Facts: Petitioner Magno is the owner of a 5.3 hectare lot which is a portion of an agricultural
land situated in Brgy. San Fernando, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Magnos lot is part of the 13
parcels of land registered in the name of petitioners mother, Talens. Talens landholding
totals 61 hectares, more or less.

Magno acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale but the sale was only registered on 1986. At
the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land.
Magno entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel Lazaro wherein
Lazaro was to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season, and 20 cavans
during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand, was required to pay
a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season and 25 cavans during the cropping
season.

Respondents believed that they have fully paid the price of the lot under the Barangay
Committee on Land Productions (BCLP) valuation.

Magno filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and collection of lease
rentals against respondents.

Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint invoking the following arguments:

1.The leasehold contracts are without force and effect since the lot was under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. PD 27. The sale
executed by Talens was merely designed to exclude the land from OLT coverage.

PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the case for lack of merit.

The PARAD stated that Emancipation Patents were issued to respondents. Then, MARO
Rogelio C. Palomo found out that the lot is covered by the OLT program and the DAR-Central
Office had not received any petition for OLT exemption. The PARAD noted that in the final
land valuation conference, a thorough computation of the paid lease rentals was conducted.
The PARAD believed that respondents are no longer liable to pay the lease rentals because
respondents are now considered owners of their respective landholdings

The PARAD took note of the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Talens, where
she conveyed her land to different persons including petitioner for P1 and other valuable
considerations, was suspicious in nature. The PARAD believed that the sale made by Talens
was a device to circumvent PD 27 in order to exclude her land from OLT coverage.

On appeal, the DARAB rendered a Decision setting aside the PARAD decision finding and
declaring the Deed of Absolute sale binding upon respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina
vda. De Lazaro; Declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold respectively entered into
by and between the said parties still subsisting and in full force and effect; Ordering
respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro to pay severally their lease
rentals in arrears.

The DARAB ruled that respondents as petitioners tenants had knowledge of the Deed of
Sale and had recognized petitioner as the new owner and paid rentals to him. Since all the
requirements have been met and satisfied, the sale between petitioner and Talens is binding
upon respondents. The DARAB ruled that respondents are still tenant-lessees of petitioner
and shall be entitled to security of tenure and obligated to comply with their duty to pay the
lease rentals in accordance with the terms and conditions of their leasehold contract.

CA set aside the DARAB decision and reinstated the PARAD decision. The CA stated that the
EPs are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The CA
ruled that petitioner has not presented any evidence showing that the issuance of the EPs
was tainted with defects and irregularities; hence, they are entitled to full faith and credit.

The CA held that the matter of OLT coverage of petitioners lot has been settled. The CA also
upheld the PARADs ruling that respondents have fully paid the value of the lot.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD had authority to declare the lot under OLT coverage?
Held: No. The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and
appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.

Agrarian dispute as defined in Section 3(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 665751 refers to any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

SECTION3.Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.

The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the
administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent
rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances.

It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy relationship,

such that the complaint for collection of back rentals and ejectment is classified as an
agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.
However, in view of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot
and respondents emphasized that the lot is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to
ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program. Since the classification and
identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian
Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue.

Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the
lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that
it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB
suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative
determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and petitioners right of
retention should be introduced in the proper forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a
better position to resolve these issues being the agency lodged with such authority since it
has the necessary expertise on the matter.

We sustain the DARABs ruling declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold entered into
by petitioner and respondents still subsisting and in full force and effect. We modify the
DARABs ruling ordering respondents to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears covering
the period from the regular season of April 1991 until the final determination on the OLT
coverage of the lot.

Wherefore, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84467. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATION the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board dated 8 January 2004 in DARAB Case No.
2404 (Reg. Case No. 2332 NE93) without prejudice to the rights of the parties to seek
recourse from the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the
issues they have raised.