DUE PROCESS

G.R. No. 180146 December 18, 2008

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, petitioner,

vs.
POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, POLICE OFFICE and ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL LEGAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE, respondents.

Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.17 Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips
down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing
administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due
process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.18

G.R. No. 151095 August 31, 2004

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.

Anent the issue of violation of respondent's right to due process, the appellate court stressed that it
is not enough that the twin requisites of notice and hearing be present. It is important that the
tribunal hearing the case must be unbiased; indeed, if the government official or employee under
investigation is not afforded the opportunity to present his case before a fair, independent, and
impartial tribunal, the hearing would be futile. Considering that the composition of the fact-finding
Committee is in question, the appellate court concluded that it cannot properly be said that there was
a fair and impartial hearing of the petitioner's case.

G.R. No. 194061 April 20, 2015

EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA and DIGNA MATALANG
COCHING, Respondents.

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process. 31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor, 32
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings,
this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained. 33

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair
trial and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due
process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of
procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the
gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure
should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013

RAY PETER O. VIVO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Respondent.

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings,
this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
15

equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of
16

Appeals elaborates on the well-established meaning of due process in administrative proceedings

17

in this wise:

x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 18

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

G.R. No. 139658 June 21, 2005
PO3 WILLIAM M. MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD and THE DISTRICT
DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.

The importance of a motion for reconsideration cannot be overemphasized. We have held that such
motion is a "plain," "speedy," and "adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.5 The filing of a motion for reconsideration will give the court the opportunity to either (a)
correct the error/s imputed to it or (b) clarify and strengthened its ruling on the issue and hopefully
convince the movant of his wrong position. In either case, the controversy ends right there, thus
preventing unnecessary and premature resort to appellate proceedings. 6Consequently, we cannot
countenance petitioners disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining
speedy, inexpensive, and orderly judicial proceedings.

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, G.R. No. 184129

Petitioner,

- versus

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

EDUARDO F. TUASON, LOCAL
WATER UTILITIES
ADMINISTRATION (LWUA),
represented by its new
Administrator Orlando C.
Hondrade,
Respondents.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a

task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.
[68]
In this regard, the Court finds Parungao, as HRMO, guilty of simple neglect of
duty. Given her duties under the CSC Accreditation Program, she should have been
aware of the reportorial requirements, and of the fact that it is the CSC which has
authority over appointments, and not the DBM. Had she given the proper attention
to her responsibility as HRMO, the first set of appointment papers would never
have been issued, thereby avoiding the present predicament altogether.

When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or

herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and
diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge
of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention which
careful persons use in the management of their affairs. [69] Parungao failed to
exercise such prudence, caution and attention.

Simple neglect of duty is classified under the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as a less grave offense punishable by
suspension without pay for one month and one day to six months. Finding no
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty of six months, and
considering her demonstrated good faith, the Court finds the imposition of
suspension without pay for one month and one day as justified.

G.R. No. 180917 April 23, 2010

ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARAA, Petitioners,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON,
SALVADOR ADUL, and AGNES FABIAN, Respondents,

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in

favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act
negligently, their infraction becomes intentional.35 There can hardly be conspiracy to commit
negligence.36

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.37 In the present case, petitioners fell
short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in
ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their
imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior.

Compare with gross neglect of duty (vide Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA
8). In Civil Service Commission v. Rabang, (G.R. No. 167763, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 540, 547), gross neglect
of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,with a conscious
indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. In Report on the Alleged Spurious Bailbonds and
Release Orders Issued by the RTC, Br. 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. 04-6-332-RTC, April 5, 2006, 486 SCRA
500, 518, the Court ruled that [n]eglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected
of him. Gross neglect, on the other hand, is such neglect from the gravity of the case, or the frequency of instances,
becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. The term does not necessarily
include willful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing.

A.M. No. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008

KENNETH HAO, complainant,
vs.
ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, respondent.

His acts constitute gross negligence.

As we have previously ruled:

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far
as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.33 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Gross neglect, on the other hand, is such neglect from the gravity of the case, or the
frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten the public welfare. The term does not necessarily include willful neglect or
intentional official wrongdoing.34 (Emphasis supplied.)

Good faith on the part of Andres, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate would
be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court tasked
therefor, it behooves him to make due compliance. He is expected to live up to the exacting
standards of his office and his conduct must at all times be characterized by rectitude and
forthrightness, and so above suspicion and mistrust as well.35Thus, an act of gross neglect resulting
in loss of properties in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged by the parties to a suit or the
citizenry in our judicial process. Those responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the
disciplinary power of this Court.

In the instant case, the penalty for the more serious offense which is dismissal should be imposed
on Andres. However, following Sections 5342 and 54,43 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, we have to consider that Andres is a first-time offender; hence, a lighter
penalty than dismissal from the service would suffice. Consequently, instead of imposing the penalty
of dismissal, the penalty of suspension from office for one (1) year without pay is proper for gross
neglect of duty, and another six (6) months should be added for the aggravating circumstance of
grave abuse of authority (oppression).

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Abe C. Andres, Sheriff IV, RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, GUILTY of
gross neglect of duty and grave abuse of authority (oppression) and is SUSPENDED for one (1)
year and six (6) months without pay. He is also hereby WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Republic Act No. 6975 December 13, 1990

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP

Section 51. Powers of Local Government Officials Over the PNP Units or Forces. Governors
and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their respective territorial
jurisdiction. As such, the local executives shall discharge the following functions:

(a) Provincial Governor (1) Power to Choose the Provincial Director. The provincial
governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3) eligible recommended by
the PNP regional director.

(2) Overseeing the Provincial Public Safety Plan Implementation. The governor, as
chairman of the provincial peace and order council, shall oversee the implementation
of the provincial public safety plan, which is prepared taking into consideration the
integrated community safety plans, as provided under paragraph (b) (2) of this
section.

(b) City and Municipal Mayors (1) Operational Supervision and Control. The city and
municipal mayors shall exercise operational supervision and control over PNP units in their
respective jurisdiction except during the thirty (30) day period immediately preceding and the
thirty (30) days following any national, local and barangay elections. During the said period,
the local police forces shall be under the supervision and control of the Commission on
Elections.

The term "operational supervision and control" shall mean the power to direct,
superintend, oversee and inspect the police units and forces.

It shall include the power to employ and deploy units or elements of the PNP, through
the station commander, to ensure public safety and effective maintenance of peace
and order within the locality. For this purpose, the term "employ" and "deploy" shall
mean as follows:

"Employ" refers to utilization of units or elements of the PNP for purposes of

protection of lives and properties, enforcement of laws, maintenance of peace and
order, prevention of crimes, arrest of criminal offenders and bringing the offenders to
justice, and ensuring public safety, particularly in the suppression of disorders, riots,
lawless violence, rebellious seditious conspiracy, insurgency, subversion or other
related activities.

"Deploy" shall mean the orderly organized physical movement of elements or units of
the PNP within the province, city or municipality for purposes of employment as
herein defined.

(2) Integrated Community Safety Plans. The municipal/city mayor shall, in

coordination with the local peace and order council of which he is the chairman
pursuant to Executive Order No. 309, as amended, develop and establish an
integrated area/community public safety plan embracing priorities of action and
program thrusts for implementation by the local PNP stations.

It shall, likewise, be the duty of the city or municipal mayor to sponsor periodic
seminars for members of the PNP assigned or detailed in his city or municipality in
order to update them regarding local ordinances and legislations.
 (3) Administrative Disciplinary Powers. In the areas of discipline, city and municipal
mayors shall have the powers to impose, after due notice and summary hearings,
disciplinary penalties for minor offenses committed by members of the PNP assigned
to their respective jurisdictions, as provided in Section 41 of this Act.

(4) Other Powers. In addition to the aforementioned powers, city and municipal
mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in their respective
jurisdictions:

(i) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles
recommended by the provincial police director, preferably from the same
province, city or municipality.

(ii) Authority to recommend the transfer, reassignment or detail of PNP

members outside of their respective city or town residences; and

(iii) Authority to recommend, from a list of eligibles previously screened by the

peace and order council, the appointment of new members of the PNP to be
assigned to their respective cities or municipalities without which no such
appointment shall be attested.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 226 February 17, 1995

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY" IN ALL

GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PARTICULARLY AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND IN THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

WHEREAS, strict and effective management and control of an organization by the supervisor is
critical in ensuring responsive delivery of services by the government, especially in police matters;

WHEREAS, a supervisor/commander is duty-bound and, as such, is expected to closely monitor,

supervise, direct, coordinate, and control the overall activities of his subordinates within his area of
jurisdiction, and can be held administratively accountable for neglect of duty in taking appropriate
action to discipline his men;

WHEREAS, in order to ensure a more effective, sustained, and successful campaign against erring
government personnel, it is imperative that the doctrine of "command responsibility" be
institutionalized and strictly applied in all government offices and at all levels of command in the PNP
and other law enforcement agencies.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Neglect of Duty Under the Doctrine of "Command Responsibility". - Any government official
or supervisor, or officer of the Philippine National Police or that of any other law enforcement agency
shall be held accountable for "Neglect of Duty" under the doctrine of "command responsibility" if he
has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after
its commission.

Sec. 2. Presumption of Knowledge. - A government official or supervisor, or PNP commander, is

presumed to have knowledge of the commission of irregularities or criminal offenses in any of the
following circumstances:

a. When the irregularities or illegal acts are widespread within his area of jurisdiction;

b. When the irregularities or illegal acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area
of responsibility; or

c. When members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

Sec. 3. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) in
coordination with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations of this Executive Order
within thirty (30) days after the issuance thereof.

Sec. 4. Administrative Liability. - Any violation of this Executive Order by any government official,
supervisor, officer of the PNP and that of any law enforcement agency shall be held administratively
accountable for violation of existing laws, rules and regulations.

Sec. 5. Effectivity. - This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. lawphi1.net

Done in the City of Manila this 17th day of February, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and
ninety-five.

SEC. 2. Classification of Offenses. For purposes of determining

jurisdiction and applying the appropriate penalty, administrative
offenses are classified into light, less grave, and grave offenses.
A. LIGHT OFFENSES:

1) Simple Neglect of Duty Shall include but not (be) limited to

the following:
a) fail to supervise, inspect and control subordinates directly
under his command as to their punctuality, attendance,
prescribed attire, proper use and maintenance of equipment,
preparation and submission of reports, efficient performance of
their duties and responsibilities, and the observance of good
order, conduct, behavior and discipline;
Sec. 5. Guidelines in the Application of Penalties. The imposition
of the penalty shall be made in accordance with the manner
herein below provided:
a) Like penalties shall be imposed for like offenses and only one
penalty shall be imposed for each case. Each case means one
administrative case which may involve one or more charges or
counts;

b) The minimum penalty shall be imposed where only one

mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present;

c) The medium period of the penalty shall be imposed where no

mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present.