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Sentient Performitivities
of Embodiment
LEXINGTON BOOKS
Lanham Boulder New York London
DRAFT
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Names: Hunter, Lynette, editor. | Krimmer, Elisabeth, 1967- editor. | Lichtenfels, Peter, editor.
Title: Sentient performitivities of embodiment : thinking alongside the human / edited by Lynette
Hunter, Elisabeth Krimmer, and Peter Lichtenfels.
Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2016]. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016006408 (print) | LCCN 2016009330 (ebook) | ISBN 9781498527200 (cloth :
alkaline paper) | ISBN 9781498527217 (Electronic)
Subjects: LCSH: Human body in popular culture. | Human body in mass media. | Human body
Social aspects. | Human body (Philosophy)
Classification: LCC HM636 .S625 2016 (print) | LCC HM636 (ebook) | DDC 128/.6dc23 LC
record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016006408
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Contents
1 Weird Embodiment 19
Timothy Morton
2 The Senses and Sciences of Fascia: A Practice as Research
Investigation 35
Joseph Dumit and Kevin OConnor
3 The Petri Dish: Somatic Praxis, Embryology, Becoming in
Marie Chouinards The Rite of Spring 55
Hilary Bryan
4 The Performativity of Performance : Doing Things with
Bodies and What Words Might Do in Relation to That: A
Lecture/Demonstration (Not for the Squeamish) 73
Jess Curtis
5 Enminded Performance : Dancing with a Horse 93
Nita Little
6 JUST LIKE THAT: William Forsythe : Between Movement
and Language 117
Erin Manning and Brian Massumi
7 Her Heart Can Life Mountains by Beating : Form and
Formlessness in Performance Process 143
Sean Feit
8 Transversal Affectivity and the Lobster : : Intimate
Advances of Deleuze and Guattari, Rodrigo Garca and La
Carnicera Teatro, and Jan Lauwers and Needcompany 159
Bryan Reynolds and Guy Zimmerman
9 Kantors DIRECTOR : I Will Be Myself but I Will Be With the
Actors 175
Peter Lichtenfels
10 Where Can Walking Be Taking Me? 195
lvaro Ivn Hernndez Rodrguez
Contents DRAFT
Bibliography 315
About the Contributors 331
DRAFT
ONE
Weird Embodiment
Timothy Morton
[1.0] In this essay, I show that the way we think embodiment needs to be
weird. Weirdness here means that we acknowledge that things (human
bodies, quasars, spoons, slime molds and chalk) are not simply constructs
made of other thingswhether those other things are smaller (atoms),
larger (processes), relational or correlationist (history, economic relations,
the subject). Why?
[1.1] All these theories assume that what constructs the thing in question is
more real than the thing itself. But this position has been untenable for
over two hundred years, that is, since the advent of Humes demolition of
metaphysical causality theories, and Kants underwriting of this demoli-
tion.
[1.2] What we need to assert instead is that there are things like dolphins
and forks, but in a weird waythey are not metaphysically present. They
ripple with something philosophers have often called nothingness. This
gives them a loop form best described by the topology of non-orientable
surfaces such as the Mbius strip.
[1.3] The essay will then walk around a logic square of four possibilities for
thinking embodiment in modernity. The most popular right now in the
humanities is some form of relational view such as Karen Barads or
Whiteheads, a reaction to the stasis and solidity of normative forms of
reductionist scientism. I show why it is better to think bodies as weird:
they are not reducible to their relations, but they are not constantly
present either.
[1.4] Thinking embodiment as weird is congruent with ecological aware-
ness, which is the creeping realization of what has also been going on for
over two hundred yearsnamely the inception of the Anthropocene, the
Timothy Morton DRAFT
human Protagoras: not that man is the measure of all things, but that
measurement is the measure of all things.
[1.16] At Position (2), the solid seeming islands of Position (1) start to melt
and dissolve. So Position (2) mistakenly thinks that melting and dissolv-
ing are more real aspects of things than non-melting and non-dissolving.
In a way, Position (2) just is modernity trying to wash off whatever fac-
toids it imagines lurking in the pre-modern view, in the same way that
you wash your hands maniacally once you have escaped from the shtetl
to New Jerseyyou wash your hands, thus making you susceptible to a
virus you have been coexisting with forever, polio. The attempt to have a
clean body and a clean mind becomes a magnet for more virulent strains
of virus, and viral code. Well return to this theme.
[1.17] Then we have Position (3), which is Non-essentialism minus the meta-
physics of presence. At least here you are refraining from saying anything
at all, since you hold that what comes out of your mouth will end up
being ontotheology. Position (3) is deconstruction, and it has the virtue of
refraining from harm. And of course its my continuing lineage. But it has
the vice of allowing scientism (and other toxic forms of metaphysics) to
continue unchecked, by abstaining from saying anything about reality.
[1.18] Which leaves us with Position (4), which is weird essentialism, or Essen-
tialism minus the metaphysics of presence. Existing means not being con-
stantly present, as in deconstruction, where the process of meaning mak-
ing is subject to diffrance and so on. Yet unlike deconstruction, I can say
that things do exist, yet they exist insofar as they are shot through with
nothingness. In a sense, Position (2) puts the nothingness of modernity in
the wrong placeit believes that nothingness means there are no things
as such, only processes or discourses or History or Geist and so on. Posi-
tion (3) puts nothingness at the core of meaning, which is promising,
since now at any rate I have decided that I cant make a definitive pro-
nouncementI have done a judo move on my modernity tendency to
want to achieve perfect geostationary orbit outside of reality, my satellite
cameras positioned to capture everything. But Position (4) goes further.
Position (4) puts the nothingness at the core of thingstoothbrushes, liz-
ards, smears of protein and bubbles.
[1.19] There are things, says Position (4), but I cant specify in advance what
they are, so they are strange strangers, irreducibly uncanny. Since I cant
put them in advance into a box called life or non-life, for instance, what
appears is a kind of spectral playground, a sort of charnel ground pos-
sibility space in which all kinds of necessarily partial objects float around.
There is no top thing, such as History or God or the subject, and there is
no bottom thing, such as matter, and there is no middle thing, such as
environment or world. Since there are no top, bottom or middle things,
there is no whole of which things are all components. Thus things are
necessarily partial. There is another sense in which they are partial,
which is that things are fragilemore on this in a moment. Position (4) is
Timothy Morton DRAFT
fragile at the ontological level, namely incomplete, in the same way that
in order to be true, a logical system must be capable of making sentences
such as This sentence cannot be proved.
For life to be life, a lifeform must depend on spectral beings that are [1.25]
neither living nor dead, but instead they inhabit a Goth possibility space,
a kind of ontological graveyard in which all kinds of partial object swim
about. This is what happens when you start to think the world without
metaphysics but with essences. It means that there is an irreducible play
element in reality. I define play here along the lines of Bateson: when a
cat play bites you, it is a bite with a strange meaningThis is a bite, and
this is not a bite (see Bateson 177193).
A weird thing is a strange loop, what some of us call an object. Thus [1.26]
it is looked down on by the constructivist spokespeople of anti-art, which
is also an anti-products movementthe dominant mode of high art since
the inception of the Anthropocene. The idea is to create the ultimate anti-
product, because, in the words of one sound artist, I love listening to
noise music because I cant remember any of it. On this view, good art is
a kind of spinach, rather formless and nasty, and good for you. Heavens
no, not the sugary pop objects, not the sparkly things made of beauty and
sadnesskeep them away! Better to make a disgusting thing that turns
everyone off instantly, or write a manifesto about how making things
always ends with a sellout. You can see why people have trouble with
OOO, calling it a version of commodity fetishism, and you can see why
people have trouble with Cixous fur coat. And with the radical nonutil-
ity of Kantian beauty.
Yet the spinach view of art is a resistance to modernity itself, insofar [1.27]
as I am cordoning off in advance what counts as beauty, what counts as
an aesthetic reaction, by educating you in how to feel appropriately dis-
gustedthis education must be authoritarian, and modernity is my deci-
sion that I can transcend what is given to me by authority; and insofar as
the spinach view attempts to produce an infinite distance towards the art
object. This manifold of attitudes allows me to resist the viral prolifera-
tion of commodities and the nihilism of the commodity form. Art and
philosophy are ways of sobering up from the drunkenness of modernity.
Thus the ultimate art object is, as Derrida argues, a splat of vomit, a little
punk pool of disgust (see Derrida 225). Art as disgust maintains a stan-
dard of taste, if only in the negative, which is why it is constantly strug-
gling against beauty, against the seduction of the aura, against determi-
nacy and the constraints of form. It resists the cognitive style of moder-
nity, which just is awareness of a host of beings that are weird, not meta-
physically present, not specifiable in advance. Disgust aesthetics is Posi-
tion (2) in art mode: anti-essentialism plus the metaphysics of presence.
There are no beautiful things as such, only more or less well-disguised
splats of vomit, and my job as an artist or as an art critic or critique
practitioner is to ferret out the vomit, to find the disgusting in the beauti-
DRAFT Weird Embodiment
Since beauty is already a trace of not-me within me, there is nothing [1.31]
stopping the beauty virus from going viral, as it were, and applying to
interactions between all kinds of entities. Between an oak needle and the
grooves in an ancient record or wax cylinder. Between a diamond and the
silver that encases it in a ring. Between algae and fungi, coexisting as
lichen. Between this gravestone and the writing on it. Between mud and
the foot of a dinosaur, and my eyes seeing a JPEG of the footprint of a
dinosaur in some mud. Beauty is the warning light in all these interac-
tions that says, Amplify this and it will destroy you. You run away
from a disgusting thing or you are transfixed by a horrifying thing. But
you let in an ethereal or beautiful thing. You allow yourself to be seduced
by the song of the siren. Unlike musical spinach, a great pop song lives in
your head, an earworm, a literal parasite, a loop of viral code that you
cant help playing and replaying. You have become infected by it, since
you are susceptible to itdont we talk about infectious pop tunes?
Within beauty, not opposed to it, is the sublime, which is the infinite [1.32]
depth of inner space, the fact that a weird thing resembles the Tardis of
the BBC science fiction character Doctor Who: namely, a thing that is
bigger on the inside than it is on the outside. The sublime is the active
ingredient of beauty. It is the vertigo of nothingness, the fact that a thing
just cannot correspond with its appearance, and yet just is this appear-
ance, and not something else. When, for instance, I experience vertigo, I
imagine myself flyingI imagine myself jumping off the height on which
I stand. I realize that my inner space is far scarier than outer space, since I
have the desire to fly, which is basically the desire to cancel myself out.
All lifeforms down to DNA are trying to cancel themselves out, in the [1.33]
same way that Freud writes about single-celled organisms and the death
driveonly even viral code, even DNA (which is just a kluge of viral
code insertions, virions and so on), is trying to unzip itself. The trouble is
it unzips itself in a protein environment that ironically causes the unzip-
ping to make more DNA. The DNA is in a weird loopit is trying to
escape its fate, and in so doing, it reproduces its fate. Because even non-
life just is caught in the very same loop, which we know theoretically
since, as Freud argues, death comes logically before life (Freud 43102).
Life is a rare form of death, as Nietzsche might have put it. Since to exist
is to be inconsistent, according to weird essentialism, an entity is predi-
cated on the possibility of its nonexistence, and indeed it has this nonexis-
tence embedded throughout it like layers of sediment. This is not saying
that all things are subject to entropy. It is saying that entropy exists because
all things are fragile, as a condition of possibility for their existence. And
why is that? Because a thing is a physical system that is also a semiotic
system, without a convenient dotted line separating the two. Because a
thing is a strange loop. Because a thing is riven between essence and
appearance, even unto itself.
DRAFT Weird Embodiment
[1.40] Now we are in a position to explore how this might relate to a specific
kind of performance, namely the performance of contemplative forms of
yoga. To begin this exploration, we need to investigate two different
Timothy Morton DRAFT
types of nothing. First, there is absolutely nothing at all, which with Paul
Tillich I shall call oukontic nothing. This is the kind of nothing you find
in Spinoza: there is substance, and not even nothing besides substance. On
the other hand, there is what Tillich calls meontic nothing, or what we
often call nothingness (Tillich 188). Meontic nothing is disturbing be-
cause it is palpableit is not absolutely nothing at all. Imagine the uni-
verse according to Spinoza, in which there is absolutely nothing apart
from substance, or the Deleuzian realm in which there is no lack: there is
not even nothing in such a world. On the other hand, a world in which
there is nothingness is a world in which I can detect that things are not as
they seem. And the trouble with this is precisely what Lacan says about
pretense: What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you dont know
whether its pretense or not (Lacan, Le seminaire, 48). Raindrops are rain-
droppy, not gumdroppy. Yet I find myself unable to determine for sure
what this wet thing is, because I am incapable of directly accessing the
thing in itself.
What this means is that nothingness is strangely physical. It is not [1.41]
physical in the way that metaphysicsand the metaphysics of presence,
in particularspecify: I cannot grasp the raindrop in itself, whereas for
standard Aristotelian ontology, I can do just this. Likewise, in post-Kan-
tian eliminative materialism, I can also do it: I can strip away appearances
and be left with the thing, simply by eliminating appearance. The way
the thing exists, according both to Aristotle and to eliminative material-
ism, is as a presence that constantly subtends the (illusory or accidental)
appearance of a thing. Thus we might see eliminative materialism as a
falling away from Kant, another kind of reaction to him, similar to Heg-
els idealism insofar as it disavows the anxiety of the phenomenon-thing
gap.
Fear of nothingness is fear of a certain physicality, a physicality whose [1.42]
phenomena I cannot predictably demarcate from its reality in advance.
Thus we might hypothesize that this physicality has the quality of given-
nessit is just there, yet not in a way I can grasp conceptually. Rather,
it forms the necessarily disturbing substrate of my phenomenal experi-
ence, disturbing precisely because it is not just stuff, just some kind of
neutral stage set on which I strut and fret my hour. I experience such a
givenness as a distortion of my phenomenal world (Marion 3740).
Something is wrong, out of joint, glimpsed out of the corner of my eye, a
slight flickering. There seems to be some correlation between this idea,
which is housed in phenomenological theology, and the Buddhist Prajna-
paramita Sutras notion of emptiness: Form is emptiness, emptiness is
form. 3 Eliminative materialism and idealisms appear to have little trou-
ble with the first formula (form is emptiness). It is the second one,
emptiness is form, that gives them trouble.
This trouble is ironically also common to the experiential etiology of a [1.43]
Buddhist meditator. As Chgyam Trungpa puts it, form comes back
DRAFT Weird Embodiment
(Trungpa 189). Reductionism and elimination make one feel clever, but
what happens when the meditator drops her fixation on feeling clever?
Or consider the frequently repeated slogan of the Soto Zen master Dgen:
first there are mountains, then there are no mountains, then there are
mountains. Is it not the case that what appropriations of Buddhism
within eliminative psychology ward off is precisely the third statement?
What on earth could it mean?
[1.44] Nothingness is not nothing at all, so it is physical, but not in the sense
of constant presence. Nothingness is disturbing. It is there, in a mind-
independent sense; it is part of what is given. But I cannot see it directly.
There is a weird crack in my world. Perhaps there is only one crackthe
one between subject and non-subject: this is how Kantians (and others
including Heidegger) police the gap, by putting some kind of copyright
control on it. Or perhaps there are as many gaps as there are things, and
relations between things. This is what object-oriented ontology has begun
to think about the phenomenonthing gap.
fill in the stomach, make an air hole direct into the lungs where it
should have been in the first place. The masochist body: it is poorly
understood in terms of pain; it is fundamentally a question of the BwO.
It has its sadist . . . sew it up . . . .
Why such a dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonicized, vitrified, [1.48]
sewn-up bodies, when the BwO is also full of gaiety, ecstasy, and
dance? So why these examples, why must we start there? Emptied
bodies instead full ones. What happened? Were you cautious enough?
Not wisdom, caption. In doses. As a rule immanent to experimentation:
injections of caution. Many have been defeated in this battle. Is it really
so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breath-
ing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your
tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and
legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through
your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full
Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krish-
na, Love, Experimentation. Where psychoanalysis says, Stop, find
your self again, we should say instead, Lets go further still, we
havent found our BwO yet, we havent sufficiently dismantled our
self. (Deleuze and Guattari 150151)
Beyond the self concept there lies this thing, this weird embodiment. [1.49]
Yoga, Krishna, Love, Experimentation: precisely. From this viewpoint,
signification, the sign over the toilet, the look of a statue, the question in
the Kinsey report, is being put into a loop, sewn up back into objectal
status. Is this sewing up of the orifices, this closing of the body in on
itself, not remarkably like the Tantric text, Centering?
4. [W]hen breath is all out (up) and stopped of itself, or all in (down) [1.50]
and stoppedin such universal pause, ones small self vanishes . . .
... [1.51]
12. Closing the seven openings of the head with your hands, a space [1.52]
between your eyes becomes all-inclusive.
... [1.53]
14. Bathe in the centre of sound, as in the continuous sound of a water- [1.54]
fall. Or, by putting fingers in ears, hear the sound of sounds. (Reps
153154)
The sound of sounds is called anahata nada in Sanskrit. It means unstruck [1.55]
sound, a sound pervaded with nothingness, a sound that lies at the basis
of all other sounds. The loop-like recursion of sound of sounds suggests
this weird, transcendental yet physical entity.
NOTES [1.73]
[1n3] 3. I quote from the version of the sutra in twenty-five lines, translated into Tibetan
by Lotsawa bhikshu [monk] Rinchen De with the Indian pandita [scholar] Vimalamitra.
Translated into English by the Nalanda Translation Committee, with reference to sev-
eral Sanskrit editions.
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