PRADHAN MANTRI The Road to

GRAM SADAK YOJANA Unlocking Rural

Demand

IN JHARKHAND
Karn Satyarthi (C14)
Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 2
1. The political Economy of Rural Roads ............................................................................................. 2
2. Profile of the state 3
3. Analysis..7
4. Conclusion.16
5. References.16

1|Page
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana: The Road to Unlocking Rural
Demand in Jharkhand
Abstract

In the following term paper we analyse the rural road connectivity in the eastern Indian state of
Jharkhand. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section deals with the political economy
of rural roads, it uses the discipline of public finance and public choice to assess the need for the
government in providing rural connectivity. The second section deals briefly with rural connectivity
specific aspects of the state of Jharkhand. The information presented in this section will be further
used in section three to analyse some problems related to the working of Pradhan Mantri Gram
Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) in Jharkhand, probe into their causes and suggest solutions to mitigate some
of them. The technique used to identify problems with the working of PMGSY has been mostly
empirical in nature. Data available on the Online Monitoring and Management System (OMMS) has
been extensively used, random sampling using excel Rand() function has been used once to make a
list of roads listed under both new construction and upgradation. The central argument in this paper
is that rural roads are essentially public goods with chances of market failure due to information
asymmetry between the principal (Ministry of Rural Development) and agents (District level Program
Implementation Units and State level agencies). These market failures manifest themselves as
weaknesses of PMGSY. We also try and propose some solutions that can be used to plug some of
these gaps e.g. Elinor Ostroms idea of community leadership for norm based management of
commons can be applicable to the state. The solutions have been categorised as being demand side
or supply side.

1. The Political Economy of Rural Roads

The government has control over limited resources hence it always faces a trade-off between a
range of heads on which to utilise limited resources. Our aim in this section is to analyse why a
government must devote a significant share of the limited resources that it commands over the
construction and maintenance of rural roads.

1.1. Are rural roads a public good?

The essential characteristics of a public good are two. First a public good must be non excludable i.e.
no one can be excluded from enjoying its benefits, second a public good must be non rivalrous i.e. its
use by one does not reduce its benefits to others. A road can be excludable or can acquire the
characters of a club good if it is a toll road or collects any other type of user charges. The fact
however, is that a majority of rural roads in India cannot employ the user charges model for
maintenance or cost recovery because of low volume of traffici. It is safe therefore to assume that a
majority of rural roads in India (and by corollary in my state of Jharkhand) are non excludable. Some
element of excludability can also be introduced due to sociological factors like people of certain
castes not being allowed to use certain roads; however for our purposes in this term paper we will
exclude market failures like these (or rather assume that it is the governments job to mend such
problems as briskly as possible).

2|Page
A road stretch can become rivalrous under two circumstances, first if the volume of traffic is such
that any marginal increase in the number of vehicles causes an efficiency decline, second if the road
use by one vehicle causes a decline in its quality over a period of time so that the use by someone in
the represent makes the road worse off for someone using it in the future. The first condition does
not apply to rural roads in India as of now because of conditions cited earlier. The second condition
can be avoided by continuous maintenance, the depreciation over time also stretches for a time
horizon of about a decade hence a well constructed rural road is for all practical purposes a public
good in the economic sense.

The investment required for constructing a network of rural roads in India and the state of
Jharkhand is so huge that rural roads acquire the qualities of a natural monopolyii. Traditional
economic theoryiii tells us that the private sector is not best placed to deliver a public good with
tendencies of a natural monopoly and the economic logic for the state to step in the construction of
rural roads rests at that.

Imperfect information between principals and agents also pose huge problems for PMGSY. This is
especially visible in the maintenance activities of rural roads. Poor quality indicates that there is
mechanism effective enough to check this moral hazard.

1.2. Unlocking rural consumption

Other than the public good argument there are many utilitarian arguments too that make it
necessary for rural roads to be considered as sine qua non for unlocking rural consumption. Some of
them are (Bell, 2012):

Benefits to cultivators, agriculture and allied activities

A fillip to employment generation
Encouragement to village based industries
Impact on social indicators like Infant Mortality Rate, reduced mortality and morbidity
Improved school attendance
Improved quality of life and decline in poverty
Market integration effects

The National Transport Development Policy Committee report is of the opinion that rural roads are
the entry points to effective poverty alleviation. The International Food Policy research Institute
(IFPRI) estimates that for every crore invested into rural roads 16500 people are lifted above the
poverty line.

2. Profile of the state

Factsheet

Indicators Value for Jharkhand

Area 79714 sq. km.
Population 3.29 crore
Population Density 414 persons per sq. km.
Percentage ST population (% of total) 26.21%
Percentage SC population (% of total) 12.08%

3|Page
 Number of Households 62.5 lakhs
Sex ratio (females per thousand males) 948
Forest Cover 32.48%
Source: Jharkhand Social Sector Statistics

Habitation profile

The state profile in terms of rural road connectivity can be seen in the table below. In all about
eleven percent of all habitations with a population of more than 250 people remain unconnected.
The district wise distribution of unconnected habitations is as follows.

Name of the District Total Number of Habitations connected Habitations

Habitations unconnected
Sahebganj 1482 1323 159
Koderma 769 656 113
Latehar 941 820 121
Gahrwa 1665 1568 97
Ramgarh 566 555 11
East Singhbhum 2405 2197 208
Lohardaga 536 473 63
Godda 1432 1302 130
Simdega 1965 1489 476
Gumla 2931 2267 664
Bokaro 1763 1654 109
Palamau 2140 1853 287
Hazaribagh 1911 1667 244
Giridih 3030 2654 376
Pakur 1141 1131 10
Deoghar 2388 2261 127
Dhanbad 1237 1232 5
Dumka 1532 1531 1
Chatra 2554 1986 568
Jamtara 1235 1139 96
West Singhbhum 4099 3697 402
Khunti 2382 2033 349
Saraikela Kharsawa 1199 1157 42
Ranchi 2040 1992 48
District wise distribution of unconnected habitations, source: omms.nic.in

One of the distinguishing features of the state is that 18 of the 24 districts are Left wing Extremism
affected. Eight out of these 18 have been recently categorised by the home ministry as being
severely affected by Naxalism. The following graphic makes it clear that districts like Latehar,
Lohardaga and Khunti which are very badly affected by Naxalism are also ones faring badly on
habitation coverage indicators.

4|Page
 Districts of Jharkhand colour coded according to the percentage of rural habitations that remain unconnected, source: omms.nic.in

Evidence shows that there is a weak positive correlation between the percentage of unconnected
habitations in a district and rural poverty. While correlation does not imply causation the available
evidence from states does support our central idea that rural roads contribute to a decrease in rural
poverty.

120.00%

100.00%

80.00%

60.00%

40.00%
Habitation Coverage
20.00% Rural Poverty
0.00%
Lohardaga
Pakur

Dumka
Deoghar

Giridih
Gumla

Palamau

Gahrwa
Koderma

Ranchi
East Singhbhum

West Singhbhum

Godda

Hazaribagh
Sahebganj

Chatra

Bokaro

Dhanbad

The correlation coefficient for rural poverty and percentage of unconnected habitations for Jharkhand is 0 .22. Rest of India shows a similar
trend.

5|Page
Source: Planning Commission Working Group on Rural Roads, October 2011.iv

Districts can also be colour coded according to percentage of unsatisfactory works.

6|Page
It is interesting to note that a particular belt of districts in the western part of Jharkhand like
Lohardaga, Latehar, Gumla and Simdega have both poor habitation coverage as well as poor quality
of works. Incidentally they are also very badly affected by Left Wing Extremist Violence.

3. Analysis
3.1. What ails Jharkhands rural roads? Some indicators.

The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) was conceptualised to provide all weather
connectivity to all rural habitation on a priority basis. The schemes is usually considered to be a
success story because of high value of assets created and better utilisation of funds compared to
some other Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). However if we look closely at data that is publically
available we find that there are severe gaps in PMGSYs performance in my home state of
Jharkhand. Some of the problems identified are as follows:

3.1.1. Cyclicality in commitment:

It is observed that the State Rural Roads Development Agency invariably over commits by
sanctioning a huge number of projects, however there is a mismatch between overall projects
sanctioned and budgetry allocation at the national level. Therefore every other year is spent using
current year allocation for past project completion. This cyclicality in commitment where
overcommitment is followed by almost no new projects is amply clear by the graph below.

Number of Sanctioned Proposals

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600 Number of Sanctioned
Proposals
400
200
0
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18

3.1.2. Percentage of overall target achieved

The OMMS data reveals that only about 65.56% of overall target for the state has been achieved as
of April 2017. What is unfortunate is that this target was to be achieved by 2007 when PMGSY was
first announced.

District wise completion of targets can be found on the following table.

7|Page
 Sr.No. District Name % Physical
Progress Overall

1 Bokaro 68.51
2 Chatra 71.62
3 Deoghar 79.85
4 Dhanbad 84.63
5 Dumka 85.83
6 East Singhbhum 69.83

7 Garhwa 66.76
8 Giridih 78.92
9 Godda 70.76
10 Gumla 37.31
11 Hazaribagh 66.04

12 Jamtara 82.52
13 Khunti 59.74
14 Koderma 73.04
15 Latehar 57.84
16 Lohardaga 34.46

17 Pakur 82.49
18 Palamau 72.68
19 Ramgarh 68.58
20 Ranchi 67.93
21 Sahebganj 56.88

22 Saraikela Kharsawan 55.38

23 Simdega 45.82
24 West Singhbhum 53.17

Total 65.56

3.1.3. Quality

PMGSY follows a three staged monitoring mechanism. The first stage is inspection at the district
level, the second stage is inspection by the State Quality Monitors and the third is inspection by the

8|Page
National Quality Monitors. Joint inspections are also conducted. The following table presents a
snapshot of the National Quality Monitors grading abstracts for the period 2000-2017.

District Percentage Percentage Percentage

unsatisfactory unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
(Completed (Ongoing (Maintenance
Projects) Projects) Projects)

Bokaro 28.57% 20.75% 40.00%

Ranchi 0.00% 9.57% 10.00%
Khunti 0.00% 12.50% 18.75%
Dumka 20.00% 14.77% 21.43%
Palamau 25.00% 22.22% 20.00%
Godda 0.00% 24.14% 43.75%
Lohardaga 11.11% 35.00% 28.57%

Ramgarh 0.00% 25.93% 58.82%

Giridih 0.00% 19.61% 28.57%
West 0.00% 14.29% 22.22%
Singhbhum

Simdega 15.38% 29.51% 33.33%

Latehar 0.00% 42.11% 35.71%
Chatra 0.00% 13.40% 50.00%
East 25.00% 28.40% 47.06%
Singhbhum

Koderma 0.00% 36.36% 57.14%

Hazaribagh 0.00% 20.00% 33.33%

Saraikela 0.00% 6.67% 37.50%

Kharsawan

Gumla 0.00% 28.95% 25.00%

Sahebganj 100.00% 18.18% 90.91%

Dhanbad 100.00% 6.67% 33.33%

Pakur 0.00% 17.95% 30.00%
Jamtara 0.00% 12.90% 30.00%
Deoghar 40.00% 16.67% 16.67%
Garhwa 33.33% 38.10% 40.00%

9|Page
 Jharkhand 12.20% 20.40% 36.71%
Source: http://omms.nic.in/
Calculations are my own

It is notable that almost 40% of all maintenance projects have been found to be unsatisfactory,
similarly 20% of the ongoing works and over 12% of all completed projects have been found
unsatisfactory.

The Pavement Condition Index (PCI) is another index that measures the quality of roads in an
objective manner. In the following table I have used the weighted mean formula to calculate the PCI
values for all rural roads in Jharkhand. It is unfortunate that Chatra is the only district with a PCI
value of more than 2. The average PCI value of less than 2 indicates that the roads are in very bad
Sr.No. District Number 1 2 3 4 5 Cumulative
of PCI
Roads
1 Bokaro 522 10 491.25 1,239.23 573.95 0 1.513545
2 Chatra 58 22.175 157.225 61.75 108.65 265.77 2.590367
3 Deoghar 299 194.25 127.45 219.3 502.35 114.25 1.593923
4 Dhanbad 264 283.395 318.045 178.345 148.025 33.75 1.151967
5 Dumka 254 134.1 213.5 213.518 159.3 163.4 1.504617
6 East 116 103.445 101.365 144.531 92.662 24.523 1.321503
Singhbhum
7 Garhwa 457 0 303.31 971.66 532.5 344.5 1.713337
8 Giridih 484 376.55 636.2 721.8 220.5 120 1.276198
9 Godda 359 877.36 260.7 167.06 114.8 29.75 0.865288
10 Gumla 454 450.652 1,054.45 411.43 120.568 230.3 1.197673
11 Hazaribagh 562 652.72 525.35 499.86 342.24 195.43 1.252282
12 Jamtara 282 169.86 285.5 125.058 360.43 155 1.522782
13 Khunti 415 500.95 544.51 434.685 215.85 44 1.142942
14 Koderma 49 85.35 59.27 9.75 14 40.5 1.176904
15 Latehar 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA
16 Lohardaga 190 425.4 349.225 113.35 28.45 72.5 0.980964
17 Pakur 256 307.3 145.65 152.25 384.08 42.5 1.361142
18 Palamau 187 456.75 109 130.9 31.85 0 0.820075
19 Ramgarh 179 126.75 366.15 222.575 37.25 0 1.113139
20 Ranchi 574 463.3 746.8 792.85 321.05 33 1.227121
21 Sahebganj 206 178.65 172.435 97.6 109.46 292.065 1.596361
22 Saraikela 388 13.5 699.99 807 26 1 1.274154
Kharsawan
23 Simdega 260 233.265 457.21 181.615 211.02 130.2 1.313601
24 West 561 675.31 636.96 1,020.20 504.4 333.4 1.371244
Singhbhum
shape.

Source: omms.nic.in, calculations are mine

A PCI of below 2 indicates very poor quality of the paved surface

3.1.4. Per kilometre Cost of Rural Roads in Jharkhand

10 | P a g e
The per kilometre cost of rural roads in Jharkhand is yet another indicator that suggests that the
state can do much better when it comes to efficiency. In the following table I have calculated the
weighted average of per kilometre cost adjusted for inflation for all states in of India.

State Upgradation New

Construction
Jammu And 91.46 54.76
Kashmir

Arunachal 62.32 61.59

Pradesh

Tripura 55.75 62.96

West Bengal 50.19 43.94

Meghalaya 42.2 48.28

Bihar 35.63 52.04

Assam 27.71 55.63
Haryana 33.82 45.95
Odisha 36.08 40.02
Kerala 50.81 23.69
Jharkhand 39.6 33.75

Uttarakhand 29.37 40.27

Manipur 33.57 33.29

Sikkim 5.18 55.96
Punjab 43.43 16.97
Madhya 26.75 29.75
Pradesh
Chhattisgarh 26.57 29.46

Mizoram 10.93 44.21

Maharashtra 23.67 31.35

Andhra 19.73 33.72

Pradesh
Himachal 23.97 29.05
Pradesh
Uttar 30.61 22.12
Pradesh
Gujarat 23.82 24.88

11 | P a g e
 Tamilnadu 30.02 17.08

Telangana 18.76 24.81

Rajasthan 21.8 21.24

Nagaland 18.19 20.82

Karnataka 20.4 15.1

Goa 7.47 18.22

Source: omms.nic.in
Calculations are my own

It is notable that states like Kerala and Gujarat despite having much higher wages deliver rural roads
at lower costs. The average costs for upgradation and new construction are among the highest for
Jharkhand.

3.2. Possible explanations for the Indicators

3.2.1. Discrepancies in the District Rural Roads Plans

The Comptroller and Auditor Generals (CAG) report on the performance of the Pradhan Mantri
Gram Sadak Yojana published in 2016 cites various deficiencies in the District Rural Roads Plan for
districts in Jharkhand. Some of them are:

The Core Network (CNW) and the DRRP were drawn up considering villages instead of
habitations as the basic unit. This can lead to exclusion of already marginalised social units
like Tolas.
Some basic information like population and proposed connectivity were missing from some
DRRPs
The approval of the District panchayat was missing in a few cases
Some unconnected habitations were shown as connected
Many projects stop short of providing full all weather connectivity to habitations
There are many habitations that have more than one connectivity
3.2.2. Pending clearances and delays in payments

Jharkhand with 27% delay in payments was the third worst after Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura
when it came to slow financial completion of works. Year wise pendency of financial completion of
projects can be seen in the following graph.

12 | P a g e
 Pending Financial Completion of Physically
Completed Works
120%
100%
80%
60%
40% Pending Financial Completion of
20% Physically Completed Works
0%

Jharkhand also ranked very badly on approval to existing proposals. It was among the three worst
performing states when it came to approval at the State Technical agency or the Ministry of Rural
Development level. The following graph gives a breakup of the projects pending approval at the two
levels.

120%
100%
80%
60%
Pendency at bothe STA and
40%
MoRD level
20%
Pendency of proposals at the
0%
MoRD

30%

25%

20%

15% proposals pending clearance at

the MoRD level
10%
Prposals pending clearance at the
5% STA and MoRD leve;
0%

13 | P a g e
Moreover more than 114 projects were facing delays of up to 42 months because of problems
relating to paucity of land, absence of forest clearances and the Naxal threat.

3.2.3. Same roads find a place on both the Comprehensive New Construction Priority List
(CNCPL) and the Comprehensive Upgradation Priority List (CUPL)

A random survey of 100 blocks in Jharkhand throws up the following result:

District: Bokaro
Block: Bermo
Road number L063, Hirak Road DVC colony Baid karo to DVC new colony Baidh karo is listed under
both CNCPL and CUPL

District: Dumka
Block: Jama
Road number L088, LAXMIPUR TO KARHIA is listed under both CNCPL and CUPL

District: Simdega
Block: Bano
Road number T03, PWD Road to Ganmer via Kewgutu Hurda is listed under both CNCPL and CUPL

District: Simdega
Block: Bano
Road number T04, Bano PWD Road to Ganmerpath Via Pabura Nimtur Bintuka pangur Tonia is
listed under both CNCPL and CUPL

District: Simdega
Block: Bano
Road number L31, Bano Nimtur Pangur Path to Sahubern via Dumaria is listed under both CNCPL
and CUPL

This is a serious problem and needs urgent rectification.

3.2.4. Poor Utilisation and absorption of maintenance funds

One of the afflictions ailing rural roads in Jharkhand is poor maintenance. This becomes amply clear
when we have a look at the district wise Pavement Condition Index of roads in Jharkhand.
Maintenance of already constructed roads therefore plays a major role in consolidating the benefits
of rural connectivity. Maintenance however remains Jharkhands Achilles heel. According to the
figures released by the National Rural Roads Authority out of the Rs. 179 crores released by MoRD
for maintenance, the Jharkhand government could utilise only Rs. 12.14 crore, this amounts to a
meagre 9% utilisation of maintenance funds.

3.2.5. Insufficient monitoring at the district level

The CAGs report found out that the District Programme Implementation Units (DPIUs) had not set
up mobile testing laboratories at work sites. The machinery and equipment used for first tier
monitoring at the district level were found to be absent. Records related to inspection were not well

14 | P a g e
maintained. Reinspection based on Action taken Reports of first inspection was also not done in all
31 projects culled out by the CAG.

3.2.6. Competition (or lack thereof)

The following table seems to strengthen our belief in the classical economic theory of perfect
competition. Although our sample size is small, it indicates that a large number of active contractors
per kilometre of road constructed actually lower the per kilometre cost of the roads. States like
Bihar, Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir and Tripura have highest road length to contractor ratio and
they have some of the highest per kilometre cost for rural roads. Similarly states lie Kerala, Andhra
Pradesh and Haryana have some of the lowest Road Length by Contractor ratio and also some of the
lowest per kilometre costs. Gujarat seems to be the only exception and this can be explained by
economies of scale however further research is required and we must be cautious in drawing
conclusions without sufficient evidence.

State Number of Active Total Road Length Average Road

Contractors Constructed in KM Length
(approx.)
Andhra Pradesh (including 980 4900 5
Telangana)
Kerala 266 634 2
Jharkhand 918 12000 13
Bihar 3222 36000 11
Maharashtra 936 3500 4
Gujarat 220 5200 24
Haryana 111 2 0
Jammu and Kashmir 499 5046 10
Karnataka 816 591 1
Tripura 458 2981 7
Source: omms.nic.in, calculations are my own

3.2.7. Process related flaws

The CAG also found a few process related infirmities in its random sample of six districts viz.
Deoghar, Garhwa, Hazaribag, Jamtara, Simdega and West Singhbhum. Some of them were:

Awards of contracts to contractors that were ineligible for work

Change in bidding criteria and non-adherence to the Standard Bidding Document (SBD)
Some works were not finalised within the validity period
A few cases were found where works were awarded without following the tendering process

3.3. Some possible solutions to the problems plaguing PMGSY in Jharkhand

3.3.1. Use of Technology: Supply as well as demand side measure
The state government can initiate a programme for GIS based mapping of all rural roads in
Jharkhand. The Roads Information System thus created will go a long way in rectifying the
errors that the current DRRPs are prone to. This will also improve the functioning of the
OMMAS, make research more accessible and monitoring easier. The cost of the GIS

15 | P a g e
 database can be offset by the efficiency gains we make in better utilisation and creation of
even more assets.
New cost effective technologies must be encouraged
Construction can also be based on locally available material and industrial waste, eg Flya Ash
can serves as a cost effective raw material for a mining dominant state like Jharkhand.
Mobile application like Meri Sadak is a welcome improvement, efforts should be made to
further publicise such avenues for feedback.
Best practices for eProcurement must be strictly followed
3.3.2. Rectification of process flow related problems: Supply side measure
The Ministry of Rural Development must make indicative allotment to states after matching
it with annual proposals and budgetary allocation for the year
The first tier monitoring must be taken more seriously. Officials at the DPIU level must be
made directly responsible for any failure in monitoring at this level. This will align the
incentive structure with performance.
Full utilisation of maintenance funds by state governments must be ensured.
State government must ensure competition in the tendering process.
Ground trothing of the CUPL and CNCPL must be done and the discrepancies must be
weeded out.
3.3.3. Incorporate social audits: Demand side measure

PMGSY envisages a very strong role for the local governments. District Panchayat has a role in the
finalization of the CUPL and the CNCPL lists as well as the DRRP. PMGSY also lays special emphasis on
the preferences of local Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies. However a
mechanism for social audit is completely absent in Jharkhand. Since a rural road is something that
can easily be inspected, a Social Audit mechanism can help improve accountability at the lowest
levels of Programme Implementation. Social audits have thus far proven to be one of the most
effective solutions to the problem of imperfect information between the principal and the agent.
The economist Elinor Ostrom has shown through her extensive work on indigenous communities
that norm based management of commons is possible. Jharkhands tribal communities have strong
traditions of community leadership and a norm based mechanism can be evolved for the
management of rural roads as well.

3.3.4. Government of Indias recent announcement: Supply side measure

The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) recently approved a "Road Connectivity Project
for Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Affected Areas". This scheme will cover rural roads in 44 of the worst
affected districts in the country. Eight districts from Jharkhand also find their name on this list. Such
specific solution can be tried for other parts of the country too. However for any such solution to
succeed we must not prescribe one size fits all solutions and allow considerable scope for innovation
at the lowest levels. Convergence of schemes like MPLAD and MGNREGA would also go a long way in
creating enhanced benefits.

4. Conclusion

This paper is a limited attempt to understand the failings of PMGSY in the state of Jharkhand. In my
view our main concern should be the elimination of information asymmetry to repent agency loss.

16 | P a g e
While traditional methods like third party audits may not be cost effective indigenous solutions like
social audit can be immensely helpful. Steps like provision of real time data online are moves in the
right direction but the powerful potential of technology can be leveraged even more to create an
ecosystem where delivery becomes the norm. Our current focus in provisioning for infrastructure is
focused completely of supply side measures, we must realise that instruments like social audits
provide strong demand side incentives towards the success of projects. The state of Jharkhand faces
some unique challenges due to high forest cover and tribal population. However tribal communities
also have very strong tradition of community leadership which can be used for effective monitoring
of rural roads.

5. References
1. Wales, J. and Wild, L. (2012). The Political Economy of Roads. UK Department of
International Development (DFID).
2. Accountability Initiative (2017). Budget Brief; Volume9, Issue 7. Centre for Policy Research.
3. Report of the National Transport Development Policy Committee.
4. Impact of Rural Roads on Poverty reduction. Asian Development Bank (2002).
5. The Report of the Working Group on Rural Roads for the Eleventh Five Year Plan.
6. The Report of the Working Group on Rural Roads for the Twelfth Five Year Plan.
7. Bell, C. (2012). Estimating the Social Profitability of Indias Rural Roads Program: A Bumpy
Ride. University of Heidelberg
8. Mohapatra, J. and Chandrasekhar, B. (2007). Rural Roads. India Infrastructure Report.
9. Pateriya, I. (2016). Rural Roads. Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.
10. Samanta, P. (2015). Development of Rural Road Infrastructure in India. Pacific Business
Review International
11. Mankiw, N. (2014). Principles of Economics. Cengage Learning Products.
12. Maintenance of Rural Roads: A Policy framework. International Labour Organisation in
2014
13. Aggarwal, S. (2017). Do Rural Roads Create Pathways out of Poverty? Evidence from India.
Indian School of Business
14. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on the Performance Audit of
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (2016).
15. An assessment of distribution of PMGSY project benefits in three states by gender and
ascribed social groups, a world bank report.
16. Impact Assessment Study of Improved Rural Road Maintenance System under PMGSY.
Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India
17. Jharkhand: Social Sector Statistics 2014. Department of Planning and Development,
Government of Jharkhand.

i
http://pmgsy.nic.in/GMMR_2014.pdf
ii
Budget brief by accountability initiative
iii
Mankiw page 302
iv
http://www.iesd.org.in/jjsd/Journal%20pdf/2013-V-1&2%20ramesh%20sharan.pdf

17 | P a g e