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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework
of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain
fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.
2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. In case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitutionshould be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz,
Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING
PROVISIONS. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it
is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details
may be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING IN ANOTHER.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of
the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTING.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL RESOURCES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST POLICY PROVISION,
APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A STATE ACTION, SUBJECT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a " public function", (2) when the
government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3)
when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of
its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE AND
GOVERNMENT. When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY. In the instant case,
where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be imply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS BEFORE
ACCEPTANCE OF BID. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate,
petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to
compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE CORRESPONDING
DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures
but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. While it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or
set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.
PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION, CONSTRUED. A study of the 1935 Constitution,
where the concept of "national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only
the natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the
material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers
did not stop with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved
only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the
exclusive benefits of their national patrimony. Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila
Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it
and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of
many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel
is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and
benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of
many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO SALES OF SHARE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL.
"Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or
tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of
things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal
the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional
preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all. While government agencies, including the courts should
re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores,
yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and
heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves creditably, such as in
the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital
stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people
to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION GIVING PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTORY. The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos" is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an
enabling law or a set of rules.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE COUNTRY; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED
THEREIN. The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its cultural heritage.
A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; SALE OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, AN ACT OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. The
act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which derives its authority from the State, in
selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; DOES NOT
REFER TO ALLOWING QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO MATCH FOREIGN BID. On the pivotal issue of the degree of
"preference to qualified Filipinos" I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of
Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the
qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of
dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the
competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; FILIPINO
BIDDERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION. I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional
mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong
Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a
qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given
by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation. Under the rules on public bidding of the Government
Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be
given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," so that if petitioner bid for more shares, it would be
preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only
in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine
corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price per share"
before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this
case by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING
THEREOF; SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. Section 10, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" which ordain "The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy,
effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19), Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of
the highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings. The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect
the history and spirit of the Malolos Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitutionand the 1973 Constitution. I subscribe to the
view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages and
practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a
people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic
events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not
be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our
people. The Filipino should be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:


1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE SELF-EXECUTING. A Constitution
provides the guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law
and government. As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further legislative action.
Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not
self-executing. Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future
legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused
with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT MERELY ANNOUNCES A POLICY AND EMPOWERS
THE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS TO CARRY THE POLICY INTO EFFECT. Contrariwise, case law lays down the
rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.
3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT SELF-EXECUTING. The first paragraph directs
Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the country to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent of whose
capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will encourage the formation and
operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire
State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national economy and
patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-
set priorities. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for
Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the
formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS UNDER PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF
SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12, SELF-EXECUTING. The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are
directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the
exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and
privileges covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement
is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY. The second issue is whether
the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony.
The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning.
According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage
of our race. By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony.
6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. The third issue is whether the constitutional
command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government. The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently. They are to be used
to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational
expenses of the GSIS. Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of
the employees. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by Congress and
granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and
the Commission on Audit. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out
in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the
Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED IN ALL LEGISLATIONS AND ALL STATE
ACTIONS. The constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to Congress
alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include
applicable rules and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their rule-making
power.
8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; STATE NOT PROHIBITED FROM
GRANTING RIGHTS TO FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. In the absence of qualified
Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will
promote the weal of the nation.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In
that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred. It is with deep regret
that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission
must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not justify the
claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be
awarded the block of shares . . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It deserves the
award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the
higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our sympathies may be with petitioner but
the court has no power to extend the latitude and longitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. We are duty-
bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but
we must uphold the grant for as long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a
denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE WINNING BID OF FOREIGN
FIRM FROM BEING AWARE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO RESPECT. I
submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and
regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the
winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot be allowed to
obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on the
essence of bidding.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; LOSING
FILIPINO NOT GIVEN RIGHT TO EQUAL THE HIGHEST FOREIGN BID. The majority contends the Constitution should
be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to
equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant
of rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The
majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a
losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the
majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a
ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines! Aside from being
prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term
Filipino interests. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put
the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being unfair to the foreigner. In short, the Constitutionmandates a
victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly
posted the highest score.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid
to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual
"strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified
by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came
to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division.
The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people . To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the
said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which
only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine
zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under thepatrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and
distinct from the Philippines as a State. lexlib
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition
giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise
its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition
for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature
to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions ofthe constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote
from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording
of "PREFERENCE" is given to "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To
qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT.
What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO.
No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over
aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws
or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done . For
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (italics supplied by respondents).
MR RODRIGO.
It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes. 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be
left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of
the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks
of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-
building, 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to
constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions
indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The
very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources
but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center
of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Governmentit plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two
(2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing
host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d'etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least
60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question.
Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE.
The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly
owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD.
At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE.
Is that the intention?
MR MONSOD.
Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-
percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE.
I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals
and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD.
We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO.
Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO.
The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities
fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. FOZ.
Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO.
"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."
MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is
also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.
MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still
be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ.
Thank you. 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy.
That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and
rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further
clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43
"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions.
...
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make
a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly
does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are
incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
"qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole
inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it
has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-
executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision
by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the
discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even
before Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When
the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of
applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court,
for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51%
of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent
GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the
State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written
in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is
a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those
which violate the Constitutionlose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself
is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of astronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision
of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic
law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner
was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the
bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group
is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but
with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used
as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian
of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and
diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice
Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress
and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division
against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal
system can be a major obstacle to doing business here."
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts
of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its
bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or
implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk
that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of
the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary,
objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and
nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free
society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty
residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare
of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional
provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a policy. It cannot
override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for
the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking
about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation.
We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to
cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this
sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that
has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51 cda
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark
this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino
psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a
nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a
qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a non-Filipino? How
much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how
much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and
well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. SO
ORDERED.
||| (Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, [February 3, 1997], 335 PHIL 82-154)]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PASIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents
JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented
by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This
right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State
shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT
BAR. all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This
Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case. 'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684
[1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second
place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S.
502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-
147 [1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59
SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept
of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit,
the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according
to the disposition of the judiciary." In Daza vs. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187
SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."

4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation
of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios,
79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs.vda. de Yulo, 16
SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991];
Madrona vs.Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court explicitly states that
petitioners have thelocus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether
now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such a beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A BALANCE AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY"; INTERPRETATION. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of
particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or
open-pit mining; kainginor slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Sections 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). As a matter of logic,
by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted,
the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. Justice Feliciano suggestion is
simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal
right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;
STANDARDS. the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutorypolicy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have
been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a
broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners
can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualifications. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare
and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course
of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's')
to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors' generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in thePhilippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth' and 'make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).' (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.' (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to
the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During
its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing,
to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a
class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitutionexplicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development and conservation of our natural
resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) andP.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts
to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to
implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a rightvis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless,
be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
" 'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'
"
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases ofrenewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the
holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995.]

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA , EMILIO


C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, REFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN,
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P.
ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Jovito R. Salonga, Fernando Santiago and Emilio C . Capulong, Jr., for the petitioners.
Renato L. Cayetano, Eleazar Reyes for private respondent PGMC.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN A CASE IS BEFORE A
COURT A SECOND TIME AFTER A RULING BY AN APPELLATE COURT. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to
bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact
that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation. The doctrine applies only when a case is before
a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINITION. "Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
3. ID.; ID.; "LAW OF THE CASE" DIFFERENTIATED FROM RES JUDICATA. As this Court explained in another case,
"The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in
refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusiveness of the first judgment is not
dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not universally, not final. It relates entirely to questions of law,
and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93
SCRA 503, 521 [1979])
4. ID.; ID.; "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE WILL NOT APPLY WHERE THE PARTIES ARE THE SAME BUT THE
CASES ARE DIFFERENT. It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before
in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but
the cases are not.
5. ID.; ID.; RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT OR PRECLUSION OF ISSUES; DOCTRINE CONSTRUED.
Nor is inquiry into petitioners' right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment."
According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit cannot again be
drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. ( Pealosa v. Tuason,
22 Phil. 303, 313 [1912]; Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108 Phil. 582 [1960])
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO ISSUES OF LAW. It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222 [1979]; BATOR MELTZER,
MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 [3rd Ed., 1988])
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. This exception to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in Restatement of
the Law 2d, on Judgments, as follows: Sec. 28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the
parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: . . . (2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims
that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO QUESTION THE EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT (ELA), A LEGAL QUESTION. The question whether petitioners have standing to question the Equipment
Lease Agreement or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid
in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence
the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993
Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.
9. ID.; ID.; RULE ON STANDING AND REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST, DIFFERENTIATED. The difference between the rule
on standing and real party-in-interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because
of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is
the real party-in-interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 328 [1985]) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
(Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]) On the other hand, the question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he
is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" ( Salonga v.
Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil 125, 131 [1951])
10. ID.; ID.; REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS ARE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. In
actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or
are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and
can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it
(Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]), or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have
been illegally excluded from it. (See De la Lara Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-
13460, Nov. 28, [1958])
11. ID.; ID.. ID.; PARTIES WITH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST; "PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST,"
CONSTRUED. These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase 'present substantial interest' more concretely is meant such
interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is
sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him." (1
MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 154-155 [1979])
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES WITHOUT PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT,
NOT ENTITLED TO BRING SUIT FOR ANNULMENT; CASE AT BAR. But petitioners do not have such present
substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right to intervene will not leave
without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before
the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. The Constitution requires that the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as
protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including government-owned or controlled
corporations." (Art. XI, 12) In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
(Rule 66, Sec. 2 [a] [d] For reasons set for, we hold that petitioner have no cause against respondents and therefore their
petition should be dismissed.
13. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT, A LEASE CONTRACT. The
features of the old Contract of Lease have been removed in the present ELA. While the rent is still expressed in terms of
percentage (it is now 4.3% of the gross receipts from the sale of tickets) in the ELA, the PGMC is now guaranteed a
minimum rent of P35,000.00 a year per terminal in commercial operation. (Par. 2) The PGMC is thus assured of payment of
the rental. The PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system is completely in its hands. This feature of
the new contract negates any doubt that it is anything but a lease agreement. In this case the rental has to be expressed in
terms of percentage of the revenue of the PCSO because rentals are treated in the charter of the agency ( R.A. No. 1169,
Sec. 6[C]) as "operating expenses" and the allotment for "operating expenses" is a percentage of the net receipts. We hold
that the ELA is a lease contract and that it contains none of the features of the former contract which were considered
"badges of a joint venture agreement" To further find fault with the new contract would be to cavil and expose the opposition
to the contract to be actually an opposition to lottery under any and all circumstances. But "[t]he morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." ( Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]. Cf. Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, Jan. 27, 1995) In the case of
lottery, there is no dispute that, to enable the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to raise funds for charity, Congress
authorized the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to hold or conduct lotteries under certain conditions.

14. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; WILL GENERALLY NOT INTERFERE WITH MATTERS OF BUSINESS JUDGMENT.
Petitioners reply that to obviate the possibility that the rental would not exceed 15% of the net receipts what the respondents
should have done was not to agree on a minimum fixed rental of P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. This is a
matter of business judgment which, in the absence of a clear and convincing showing that it was made in grave abuse of
discretion of the PCSO, this Court is not inclined to review.
15. ID.; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; GOVERNMENT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN TAKING
CONTRACTS; CASE AT BAR. By virtue of the provision on upgrading of equipment, petitioners claim, the parties can
change their entire agreement and thereby, by "clever means and devices," enable the PGMC to "actually operate, manage,
control and supervise the conduct and holding of the on-line lottery system," considering that as found in the first decision,
"the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery." The claim is
speculative. It is just as possible to speculate that after sometime operating the lottery system the PCSO will be able to
accumulate enough capital to enable it to buy its own equipment and gain expertise. As for expertise, after three months of
operation of the on-line lottery, there appears to be no complaint that the PCSO is relying on others, outside its own
personnel, to run the system. In any case as in the construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts the
government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power to the
government holds true also in cases involving the validity of contracts made by it.
16. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; LEASE CONTRACTS, DEFINED. A contract of lease, as this is
defined in Civil law, may call for some form of collaboration or association between the parties since lease is a "consensual,
bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which one person binds himself to grant temporarily the use of a thing or the
rendering of some service to another who undertakes to pay some rent, compensation or price." (5 PADILLA, CIVIL CODE
611 [6TH Ed 1974]).
17. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (RA 1169); NOT PROHIBITED FROM
HOLDING OR CONDUCTING LOTTERY "IN COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION OR JOINT VENTURE" WITH ANOTHER
PARTY; PROHIBITION REFERS TO INVESTMENT IN BUSINESS ENGAGED IN LOTTERIES AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.
The charter of the PCSO does not absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery "in collaboration, association or
joint venture" with another party. What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business engaged in sweepstakes
races, lotteries and similar activities, and it is prohibited from doing so whether in "collaboration, association or joint venture"
with others or "by itself." The reason for this is that these are competing activities and the PCSO should not invest in the
business of a competitor. When parsed, it will be seen that 1 grants the PCSO authority to do any of the following: (1)
to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities; and/or (2) to invest whether "by itself or in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company entity" in any "health and welfare-related
investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit oriented," except "the activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A)," i.e., sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities. The PCSO is prohibited from investing
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" because, as already stated, these are competing activities. The subject
matter of 1(B) is the authority of the PCSO to invest in certain projects for profit in order to enable it to expand its health
medical assistance and charitable grants. The exception in the law refers to investment in businesses engaged in
sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities. The limitation applies not only when the investment is undertaken by the
PCSO "in collaboration, association or joint venture" but also when made by the PCSO alone, "by itself." The prohibition can
not apply to the holding of a lottery by the PCSO itself. Otherwise, what it is authorize to do in par. (A) would be negated by
what is prohibited by par. (B). To harmonize pars. (A) and (B), the latter must be read as referring to the authority of the
PCSO to invest in the business of others. Put in another way, the prohibition in 1(B) is not so much against the PCSO
entering into any collaboration, association or joint venture with others as against the PCSO investing in the business of
another franchise holder which would directly compete with PCSO's own charity sweepstakes races, lotteries or similar
activities. The prohibition applies whether the PCSO makes the investment alone or with others.
18. ID.; ID.; MAY ENTER INTO EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT WITHOUT PUBLIC BIDDING. Finally the question is
whether the ELA is subject to public bidding. In justifying the award of the contract to the PGMC without public bidding, the
PCSO invokes E.O. No. 301.E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in Secs. 6
and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned
buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No.
301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase
and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.
PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY TO APPLY THE LAW IRRESPECTIVE OF PERSONAL CONVICTION OF
MEMBER. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President,
(unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's personal conviction that gambling
should be totally prohibited by law.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; LEASE, DEFINED. A lease is a contract whereby one of the parties
binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain and for a period which may be definite or
indefinite (Article 1643, Civil Code).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LESSOR OF EQUIPMENT, FREE TO DEMAND AMOUNT OF RENTALS. It would appear from the above
legal provision that the ELA is truly a straight contract of lease. That the parties to the ELA have stipulated on flexible rentals
does not render it less of a lease contract and more of a joint venture. Surely, the PGMC as owner of the leased equipment
is free to demand the amount of rentals it deems commensurate for the use thereof and, as long as PCSO agrees to the
amount of such rentals, as justifying an adequate net return to it, then the contract is valid and binding between the parties
thereto. This is the essence of freedom to enter into contracts.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT (ELA), A
STRAIGHT LEASE EQUIPMENT. Petitioners have not cited any law which prevents such stipulations to be included in
contracts of lease or which changes the nature of such agreement from a lease to some other juridical relation. In fact, such
stipulations are common in leases of real estate for commercial purposes. A ruling that would prevent PCSO from entering
into such lease agreement for the operation by PCSO of the lottery would defeat the intent of the law to raise, from such
lotto operations, funds for charitable institutions and government civic projects, because an outright purchase by PCSO of
the lottery equipment appears next to impossible or at least not feasible costwise considering the capital equipment
involved. In enacting the law creating the PCSO, Congress, to be sure, did not intend to make it impossible for PCSO to
attain its given purposes. A rigid interpretation of the restriction on "association, collaboration, and joint venture" will result in
such impossibility. Neither can petitioners' argument that certain provisions in the ELA will ensure PGMC's continued
participation and interest in the lottery operations provide enough grounds for granting the petition in this case. Such
arguments are based on speculations devoid of any material or concrete factual basis. In sum, the ELA constitutes, in my
view, a straight lease agreement of equipment between PCSO and PGMC. Such an agreement is, as far as PCSO's charter
is concerned, validly and lawfully entered into.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SHOULD NOT PREEMPT JUDGMENT OF COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) ON
MATTERS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION; ISSUE ON NECESSITY OF PUBLIC BIDDING IN ELA, WITHIN COA'S
JURISDICTION. On the allegation of lack of public bidding on the ELA, the Commission on Audit (COA) has yet to
resolve a case where the issue of the validity of the ELA due to lack of public bidding has been squarely raised. This matter
surfaced during the hearing of the present case. Needless to say, the Court should not preempt the determination and
judgment of the COA on matters which are within its primary jurisdiction under the Constitution.
6. POLITICAL LAW; ISSUE AS TO WHETHER ELA IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, A
POLITICAL QUESTION. As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the government, it should be
stressed that the matter involves, basically, a policy-determination by the executive branch which this Court should not
ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the time honored doctrine of separation of powers.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; PROHIBITION AGAINST HOLDING OR


CONDUCTING LOTTERY IN COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION OR JOINT VENTURE WITH ANOTHER PARTY; VIEW
EXPRESSED BY THE INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR WHO CRAFTED QUESTIONED PROVISION SHOULD AT LEAST BE
ENTITLED TO A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS. I turn first to the novel argument made in the majority
opinion that the charter of PCSO does not "prohibit [] it from holding or conducting lottery in collaboration, association or
joint venture with another party." That opinion argues that "what [PCSO] is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business
engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities" which are "competing activities and the PCSO should not
invest in the business of a competitor." In so doing, my learned brother Mendoza, J . purports to controvert and overturn the
reading that the majority of this Court, through Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., in the first Kilosbayan case gave to the relevant
provisions of the PCSO charter. It so happens that the critical language in the relevant PCSO charter provision that is,
the "except" clause in Section 1 (B) of the PCSO charter as amended by B.P. Blg. 42 was crafted by the then
Assemblyman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. during the deliberations in the Interim Batasan Pambansa on the bill that became B.P.
Blg. 42. It is impliedly contended by the majority that the intent of an individual legislator should not be regarded as
conclusive as to the "collect" interpretation of the provision of a statute. This is true enough, as a general proposition, for it is
the intent of the legislative body as manifested in the language used by the legislature that must be examined and applied
by this Court. However, it seems to me that the view expressed by an individual legislator who eventually comes to sit in this
Court as to the meaning to be given to words crafted by himself should, at the very least, be regarded as entitled to a strong
presumption of correctness. Put a little differently, I respectfully submit that in a situation such as that presented in this case,
a strong presumption arises that the interpretation given by Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. and approved and adopted by the
majority of the Court in the first Kilosbayan case faithfully reflected the intent of the legislative body as a whole.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT CLEARLY DISCERNIBLE IN WORDS USED BY LEGISLATURE. Fortunately, in the present
case, it is not necessary to take the word of Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. as to what the intent of the legislative body was in
respect of Section 1 (B) of the present PCSO charter. For that intent is clearly discernible in the very words used by the
legislative body itself. Examining the actual text of Section 1 (B), it will be noted that what PCSO has been authorized to do
is not simply "to invest whether by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture ' in any health and welfare-
related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented . . ." Rather, the PCSO has been
authorized "to engage in health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-
oriented.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. The "except" clause in Section 1 (B), is not designed as a non-competition provision, nor
as a measure intended to prevent PCSO from putting its money in enterprises competing with PCSO. What the law seeks
thereby to avoid, rather, isthe PCSO sharing or franchising out its exclusive authority to hold and conduct sweepstakes
races, lotteries and similar activities by collaborating or associating or entering into joint ventures with other persons or
entities not government-owned and legislatively chartered like the PCSO is. The prohibition against PCSO sharing its
authority with others is designed, among other things, to prevent diversion to other uses of revenue streams that should go
solely to the charitable and welfare-related purposes specified in PCSO's charter. It will be seen that without the "except"
clause inserted at the initiative of former Assemblyman Davide, Jr., Section 1(B) would be so comprehensively worded as to
permit PCSO precisely to share its exclusive right to hold and conduct sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like. It is this
"except" clause which prevents such sharing or lending or farming out the PCSO "franchise" "by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A) . . ." This "except" clause thus operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause
which refers back to Section 1 (A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1
(A). The textual location, in other words, of the "except" clause offers no support for the new-found and entirely original
interpretation offered in the majority opinion.
4. ID.; ID.; EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT (ELA); PUBLIC BIDDING, A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE; CASE AT BAR.
I consider next the question of whether the "Equipment Lease Agreement" (ELA) is subject to public bidding. PCSO
refers to Executive Order No. 301 dated 26 July 1987 in seeking to justify the award of the ELA to the PGMC without public
bidding. In accepting the contentions of PCSO, the majority opinion relies basically on two (2) propositions. The first of these
is that Executive Order No. 301, Section 1 refers to contracts of purchase and sale [only]. The second proposition offered is
that the use of the term "supplies" "cannot be limited so as to exclude 'materials' and 'equipment' without defeating the
purpose for which these exceptions are made." The first proposition finds no basis in the actual language used in the
operative paragraph of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 301 setting out the general rule ". . . no contract for public services
or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities
shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following situations: . . . It is worthy of
special note that the above opening paragraph does not even use the words "purchase and sale" or "buy and sell";
the actual term used is "furnishing . . . equipment to the government." The term "furnishing" can scarcely be limited
to sales to the government but must instead be held to embraced any contract which provides the government with either
title to or use of equipment. A contrary view can only result in serious emasculation of Executive Order No. 301. It is
common place knowledge that equipment leases (especially "financial leases" involving expensive capital equipment) are
often substitutes for or equivalents of purchase and sale contracts, given the multifarious credit and tax constraints
operating in the market place. Thus the above first proposition fails to take into account actual commercial practice already
reflected in our present commercial and tax law. The second proposition similarly requires one who must interpret and apply
the provisions of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 310 to disregard the actual language used in that Order. For Executive
Order No. 301 uses done (3) distinguishable terms "supplies," "materials" and "equipment." These terms are not always
used simultaneously in Executive Order No. 301. In some places, only "supplies" is used; in other places, only "materials" is
employed; and in still other places, the term "equipment" is used alongside with, but separately from, both of the other two
(2) terms. To say that "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" are merely synonymous or fungible would appear too casual a
treatment of the actual language of Executive Order No. 301. The fundamental difficulty with the above two (2) propositions
is this: that public bidding is precisely the standard and best way of ensuring that a contract by which the government seeks
to provide itself with supplies or materials or equipment is in fact the most advantageous to government. It is true enough
that public bidding may be inconvenient and time consuming; but it is still the only method of procurement so far invented by
man by which the government could reasonably expect to keep relatively honest those who would contract with it. This is
the basic reason why competition through public bidding is the general rule and not the exception.
5. ID.; ID.; JOINT VENTURE NOT CONVERTED INTO AN ORDINARY EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT BY SIMPLE
REARRANGEMENT OF WORDS AND PARAGRAPHS. I would address finally the question of whether or not the original
contract between PCSO and PGMC which the Court in the first Kilosbayan case found to be a joint venture, has been so
substantially changed as to have been effectively converted from a joint venture arrangement to an ordinary equipment
lease agreement. The majority of the Court have concluded that the ELA has been effectively "purged" of the characteristics
of a joint venture arrangement and that it should now be regarded as lawful under the provisions of the revised PCSO
charter. It is suggested, with respect that the burden of showing that the elements found by the Court in the
first Kilosbayan case to constitute the prohibited "collaboration, association or joint venture" have truly (and not simply
ostensibly) been expunged from the relationship between PCSO and PGMC rests, not on Kilosbayan nor on this Court, but
rather on PCSO and PGMC. It is respectfully submitted further that that burden has not been adequately discharged in the
present case by the simple re-arrangement of words and paragraphs of the old contract considering that the reality of the re-
arrangement is controverted by the commercial terms of the new contract.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENTAL IS NOT EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF A FIXED AND ABSOLUTE FIGURE. I begin with the natare
and form of the rental provisions of the ELA. The rental payable by PCSO as lessee of equipment and other assets owned
by PGMC as lessor, is fixed at a specified percentage, 4.3% of the gross revenues accruing to PCSO out of or in connection
with the operation of such equipment and assets. The rental payable is not, in other words, expressed in terms of a fixed
and absolute figure, although a floor amount per leased terminal is set. Instead, the actual total amount of the rental rises
and falls from month to month as the revenues grow or shrink in volume. I respectfully suggest that thereby the lessor or the
facilities leased has acquired a legal interest either in the business of the lessee PCSO that is conducted through the
operation of such facilities and equipment, or at least in the income stream of PCSO originating from such operation. In the
commercial world, a rental provision cast in terms of a fixed participation in the gross revenues of the lessee, signals
substantial economic interest in the business of such lessee. Such a provision cannot be regarded as compatible with an
"ordinary" equipment rental agreement. On the other hand, it is of the very substance of a commercial joint venture and of
economic collaboration or association. The assertion that the 4.3% rental rate is "well within the maximum of 15% net
receipt fixed by law" is entirely meaningless insofar as explaining the structure of the rental provision and the
reasonableness thereof is concerned. In the second place, it is child's play for an accountant to convert absolute figures
representing operating expenses [actual or budgeted] into a percentage of "net receipts [actual or expected]"; there is
nothing in Section 6 (C) of the PCSO charter that either requires or justifies the adoption of the rental provision found both in
the old contract and in the ELA giving PGMC a fixed share in gross revenues. The explanation offered by the Solicitor
General is unfortunately merely contrived; its acceptance depends on lack of familiarity with elementary accounting
concepts.

7. ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATE RECOURSE TO THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO VENTILATE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON
ITS REVISED CHARTER. The PCSO appears sincerely convinced that the legal restrictions placed upon its operations
by the actual text of Section 1 (B) of its revised charter prevent it from realizing the kinds and volume of revenues that it
needs for charitable and health and welfare-oriented programs. In this situation, the appropriate recourse is not to make
light of nor to conjure away those legal restrictions but rather to go to the legislative authority and there ask for further
amendment of its charter. In that same forum, the petitioners may in turn ventilate their own concerns and deeply felt
convictions.
REGALADO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE; PURPOSE. Even in American law, the "law of the
case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
decided and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final determination of the rights
of the parties. That is the actual and basic role that it was conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale
for the doctrines of res judicataand conclusiveness of judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY ARISE FROM AN ORIGINAL HOLDING OF A HIGHER COURT ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. The
"law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on a writ of certiorari, and is binding not only in
subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties.
Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official
discretion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law
of the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally could not be the court of origin from which the
postulated second appeal should be taken.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WITH SAME BINDING EFFECT WITH THAT OF AN APPEALED CASE. What I wish to underscore is
that where, as in the instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed down in an original
action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it would have had if promulgated in a case on appeal.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CONCEPT THEREOF IN PUBLIC INTEREST CASES SHOULD DIFFER FROM PRIVATE
INTEREST LITIGATIONS. It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its
purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest based on his possession of a
cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede that the concept of a cause of
action in public interest cases should not be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.
5. ID.; ID.; REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST; NO DEFINED RULE FOR ITS DETERMINATION. There is no clearly defined
rule by which one may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found any concise definition of
the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of each separate case, and one may be a party in
interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF REMEDIAL MEASURE, AVAILABLE TO PERSONS NOT REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN
QUESTIONING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. If the majority would have its way in this case, there would be no
available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or
capacity to sue. The legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a suggestion submitted in the majority
opinion. The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners are not the real parties,
hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the
Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should
this Court now sustain the assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it
is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria
persona or ex relatione, not only because one has to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but
because he is himself the counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the
legalities in the case but also the realities of life.
7. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; CHANGE OF MEMBERSHIP OF MEMBERS OF COURT, NOT GROUND TO REEXAMINE
RULING. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two members of the Court, it is time to
reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible
basis is the change of membership and known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court,
it may not sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated
by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a
time limit for the resolution thereof, stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the
unkind criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.
8. ID.; ID.; "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE; ISSUE ON RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILE AND MAINTAIN ACTION
QUESTIONING LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, FORECLOSED BY COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FIRST
LOTTO CASE. I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action whether the
objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the
first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle, I see
no reason why that particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF SOME OBJECTIONABLE TERMS OF CONTRACT DOES NOT
EXTINGUISH IDENTITY OF SUBJECT MATTER IN BOTH CASES. It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar,
there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and has long become final and executory. There is, to
be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first action is different from that in the instant case, since the
former was the original contract and the latter is the supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered
distinction. The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which nevertheless continues to
operate under the same basis, with on the same property, for the same purpose, and through the samecontracting parties
does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject matter in both cases. This would be to exalt form over substance.
Furthermore, respondents themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just
some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The contrary assumption now being
floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the
rules on the finality of judgments.
10. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; ALL ISSUES FINALLY ADJUDGED SHALL BE CONCLUSIVE
BETWEEN PARTIES ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. Even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the
expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or delict, that would merely constitute at
most a difference in the causes of action in the former and the present cases. Under Section 49(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, we would still have a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment.
Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the case now
before us and that definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the
right to sue respondents on the contracts concerned.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SUDDEN REVERSAL OF RULING PUTS TO JEOPARDY THE FAITH AND
CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CERTAINTY AND STABILITY OF THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS COURT.
I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter referred to
as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the
Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to
question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of
the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the
lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to endless
litigations for reexamination of such pronouncements and weakens this Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from
lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; CANNOT HOLD AND CONDUCT CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES RACES, LOTTERIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION OR
JOINT VENTURE WITH ANY OTHER PARTY. In the first lotto case, this Court also emphatically ruled that the language
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, is indisputably clear that with respect to this [PCSO's] franchise
or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise
it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the
phrase "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, " charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EITHER THE LAW OF THE CASE OR RES JUDICATA, THE
PCSO AND PGMC ARE BOUND BY THE RULING IN THE FIRST LOTTO CASE ON THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE
PETITIONERS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE IN PARAGRAPH B, SECTION 1 OF R.A. 1169, AS
AMENDED FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR ITS RECONSIDERATION. The PCSO and the PGMC never challenged our
application or interpretation of the exception clause and our definitions of the terms collaboration, association, and joint
venture. On the contrary, they unconditionally accepted the same by not asking for reconsideration of our decision in the
first lotto case. Under the principle of either the law of the case or res judicata the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the
ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause
in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest
under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
which provides: "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines."
4. ID.; ID.; LAW OF CASE; CONSTRUED. The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end
litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to
criticisms on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE APPLIES WHERE THE SECOND CASE IS BUT A SEQUEL TO AND CONTINUATION OF THE
FIRST LOTTO CASE. It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inapplicable because that doctrine applies
only when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court. While indeed the statement
may be correct, it disregards the fact that this case is nothing but a sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and purposes,
a continuation of the first lotto case. By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the
PCSO submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced the instant petition also
in the said case. Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in the said case because the decision
therein had become final does not detract from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new
chapter in the raging controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the other, on
the operation of the on-line lottery system.
6. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR WHERE THE CONTRACT IN
QUESTION IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM OR UNRELATED TO THE FIRST NULLIFIED CONTRACT. Equally
unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment on the ground that the
question of standing is a legal question, as this case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of locus
standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent
case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the conduct or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration,
association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity. And, the contract in question is not different
from or unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it is nothing but a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even
candid enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO
was of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was sufficient.
7. ID.; ID.; PRECLUSION OF ISSUES OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; DOES NOT APPLY TO CASE AT BAR WHERE
ISSUE INVOLVED IS ONE OF LAW. Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States that preclusion of issues or
collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved, is misplaced.
For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue
of law. For another, these cases involve the same and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract
between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system. The majority opinion likewise failed to
consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Restatement of Law, 2d
Judgments S. 28), the second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis may lead
the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare decisis is an effective
bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment.
8. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS; CONSTRUED; ABANDONMENT THEREOF NOT WARRANTED IN CASE AT
BAR. The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established
by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded
on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. This is
explicitly fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."
Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons which I do not find in this case
otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
public's confidence in the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.
9. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; ASPECTS. The doctrine of res judicata has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as
well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments; that controversies once
decided on their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of
facts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only puts an end to
strife, but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to individual rights and
gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.
11. ID.; ID.; RULE ON REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST SUBORDINATE TO DOCTRINE OF LOCUS STANDI. In public law
the rule of real party-in-interest is subordinated to the doctrine of locus standi. The majority opinion declares that the real
issue in this case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This
proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring strict
compliance with the rule on real-party-in-interest in ordinary civil action, thereby effectively subordinating to that rule the
doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a party to that proposition. First. Friendenthal, et al., whose book is cited in
the majority opinion in its discussion of the rule on real party in interest and the doctrine of locus standi, admit that there is a
difference between the two, between the two, and that the former is not strictly applicable in public law cases. Second. The
attempt to use the real-party-in-interest rule is to resurrect the abandoned restrictive application of locus standi, This Court,
speaking through the constitutionalist nonpareil, Justice and later Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, has already declared
in Tan vs. Macapagal that as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not
it should be entertained. Third. Such attempt directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of the judicial authority of this Court
in an original action and there had been many in the past to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Only a
very limited few may qualify, under the real-party-in-interest rule, to bring actions to question acts or contracts tainted with
such vice. Where, because of fear of reprisal, undue pressure, or even connivance with the parties benefited by the
contracts or transactions, the so-called real-party-in-interest chooses not to sue, the patently unconstitutional and illegal
contracts or transactions will be placed beyond the scrutiny of this Court, to the irreparable damage of the Government, and
prejudice to public interest and the general welfare.

12. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS; LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT; AUTHOR THEREOF, BEST AUTHORITY ON
INTENTION OR RATIONALE OF AMENDMENT. Before I take up the defined issues, I find it necessary to meet squarely
the majority opinion's interpretation of paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. This is, of course, on the
assumption that this Court may now disregard the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. I
respectfully submit that the best authority on the intention or rationale of a legislative amendment is its author. Fortunately, I
happened to be the author of the exception clause in said provision. The language of that clause is very short and simple,
and the elaboration given therefor, as earlier shown, is equally short and simple. The sponsor of the measure, then
Assemblyman, now Congressman, Ronaldo Zamora did not even ask for an explanation or clarification; he readily accepted
the amendment. Nobody from the floor interpellated me for an explanation or clarification. I regret then to say that neither
the letter nor the spirit of the exception clause in paragraph B supports the interpretation proposed in the majority opinion.
The reason given in the majority opinion for the alleged prohibition from investing in "activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A)" (i.e., the holding or conducting of charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities) is that
"these are competing activities." In that aspect alone, the majority opinion has clearly misconstrued the exception clause.
The prohibition is not direct against such activities, since they are in fact the franchised primary activities of the PCSO. What
is prohibited is the conduct or holding thereof "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign." In the first lotto case, this Court explained the principal reasons for such
prohibition. If the purpose of the prohibition in the exception clause is indeed to prevent competition, it would be with more
reason that no other person, natural or juridical, should be allowed to share on the PCSO's franchise to hold and conduct
lotteries. In short, the argument in the majority opinion sustains the rationale of the prohibition.
13. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO); EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT
(ELA), A JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT; DELETION OF PROVISIONS WHICH HOWEVER DID NOT AFFECT THE
INDIVISIBILITY OF COMMUNITY OF INTEREST ON THE ON-LINE LOTTERY SYSTEM DOES NOT TRANSFORM
CONTRACT TO ONE OF LEASE. I am not persuaded. To my mind, the parties only performed a surgery on the nullified
contract by merely deleting therefrom provisions which this Court had considered in the first lotto case to be badges of a
joint venture contract and by engrafting some modifications on rental, which include an option to purchase. The PGMC and
the PCSO conveniently forgot that per this Court's findings in the first lotto case, they had an indivisible community of
interest in conception, birth, and growth of the on-line lottery and that each is wed to the other for better or for worse. The
surgery affected only the post-natal activities of the union, but not the indivisibility of their community of interest at
conception and at the birth of the on-line lottery system. Put differently, it only separated one from the other from bed and
board but did not dissolve the bonds of such indivisibility or community of interest. This was confirmed by respondent
Morato when he candidly confessed in his letter to the COA Chairman that: [I]t is apparent that the lease of the needed
equipment through negotiations is the most advantageous to the Government since so many studies, plans and procedures
had already been worked out with PGMC since October 1993 as a result of the previous bidding (Sec. 1. e, Executive Order
No. 301 [1987]).
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RENTAL CLAUSE. Even on the face of the new ELA, the elements of the proscribed joint venture or,
at the very least, collaboration or association, can be detected, albeit they are hidden behind the skirt of the following: (a)
the Rental Clause; (b) the upgrading provision under the Repair Services Clause; and (c) the details of what are embraced
in the term Lottery Equipment and Accessories subject of the contract, which are found in Annex "A" of the ELA. The Rental
Clause provides for a flexible rate based on a percentage of the gross amount of ticket sales, payable bi-weekly, with an
annual minimum rental fixed at P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation, any shortfall of which shall be paid out of
the proceeds of the current ticket sales. This is an unusually novel arrangement which insures and guarantees the PGMC
full participation in the gross proceeds of ticket sales even if, ultimately, a draw could mean losses to the PCSO. The rental
clause is, indeed, a subtle scheme to unconditionally guaranty PGMC's share in the profits.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UPGRADING CLAUSE. It should be stressed here that in the old contract the upgrading clause is
underfacilities, which include among other things all capital equipment, computers, terminals, and softwares. Under the
upgrading provision, new equipment may be used; the number of terminals may be increased; and new terms and
conditions, including rates of "rentals" and the purchase price in case of exercise of the option to buy, may be agreed upon.
This makes the ELA not just a sweetheart contract, but one which will preserve the parties' indivisible union and community
of interest, thereby giving further credence to this Court's observation in the first lotto case that each is wed to the other for
better or for worse.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EQUIPMENT. It may be observed that the term facilities in the old contract included all capital
equipment but excluded "technology, intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and systems." As this Court found in
the first lotto case, there was a separate provision on the PGMC's obligations (1) to train PCSO and other local personnel
and (2) to effect the transfer of technology and other expertise. Clearly, the inclusion of "technology, intellectual property
rights, knowhow, processes and systems" in the term Equipment was a ploy to hide, again, the continuing indispensable
collaboration of the PGMC in the conduct of the on-line lottery business.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC BIDDING, A PREREQUISITE. Even assuming that the subject ELA is not a joint venture
contract, still it must be nullified for having been entered into without public bidding and for being grossly disadvantageous
to the Government. The opening paragraph of E.O. No. 298, series of 1940, of President Manuel L. Quezon, entitled
"Prohibiting the Automatic Renewal of Contracts, Requiring Public Bidding Before Entering Into New Contracts, Providing
Exceptions Therefor," states that . . . contracts for public services or for furnishing of supplies, materials, and equipment to
the Government be submitted to public bidding. This was restated inE.O. No. 301 of President Corazon C. Aquino, entitled
"Decentralizing Actions on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records Disposals, " whose Section 1
reads in part that . . . no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or
any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any
of the following situations. It is clear that Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 301 refer to contracts forpublic services,
or furnishing supplies, materials, and equipment to the government. In no uncertain terms, the Executive Order itself
distinguishes the terms supplies, materials, and equipment from each other, i.e., it did not intend to consider them as
synonymous terms. If such were the intention, there would have been no need to enumerate them separately and to limit
subparagraphs (a), (b), and (e) to supplies; subparagraph (c) to materials, and subparagraph (f) to all three (supplies,
materials and equipment). The specific mention of supplies in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (e) was clearly intended to
exclude therefrom materials and equipment, and the specific mention of materials in subparagraph (c) was likewise
intended to exclude supplies and equipment. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Elsewise stated, the Executive Order
leaves no room for a construction that confuses supplies with materials orequipment or either of the last two with the first or
with each other. Besides, subparagraph (e) of Section 1 unequivocally refers to a contract of purchase of supplies. The ELA
in question is not a contract of purchase of supplies. The parties themselves proclaim to the whole world and solemnly
represent to this Court that it is a contract of lease of equipment. They titled it, in bold big letters, "EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT," and devote the first clause thereof to EQUIPMENT. Accordingly, since the ELA is not a contract of purchase
of supplies, we are unable to understand why the DOJ applied Section 1(e) of E.O. No. 301 to exempt the ELA from the
public-bidding requirement.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY COA RULES AND REGULATION FOR PREVENTION OF IRREGULAR,
UNNECESSARY, EXCESSIVE AND EXTRAVAGANT EXPENDITURES. The submission of the petitioners that the ELA
violates paragraph 4.3 of the COA Rules and Regulations for the Prevention of Irregular, Unnecessary, Excessive, and
Extravagant Expenditures is not persuasive. The said paragraph covers Lease Purchase contracts. The ELA in question
hardly qualifies as a lease purchase contract because there is no perfected agreement to purchase (sale) but only an option
on the part of PCSO to purchase the equipment for P25 million. It is, in fact, an option which is not supported by a separate
and distinct consideration, hence, not really binding upon the PGMC.
19. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; OPTIONAL CONTRACT, CONSTRUED. An optional contract is a
privilege existing in one person, for which he had paid a consideration, which gives him the right to buy certain specified
property from another person, if he chooses, at any time within the agreed period, at a fixed price. Said contract is separate
and distinct contract from the contract which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. The second
paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[a]n accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise supported by a consideration distinct from
the price."

20. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO); EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT
(ELA); CONTRACT GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE PCSO. A comparison between the nullified contract and
the assailed ELA to prove that the latter is grossly disadvantageous to the PCSO is not at all hampered by any perceived
difficulty. For all the representations, duties, obligations, and responsibilities, as well as the automatic loss of its ownership
over the facilities without any further consideration in favor of the PCSO after the expiration of only eight years, the PGMC
gets only a so-called rental of 4.9% of gross receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld,
which may, however, be drastically reduced, or in extreme cases, totally obliterated because the PGMC bears "all risks if the
revenue from ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money." Under the assailed ELA,
however, the PGMC is entitled to receive a flexible rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross ticket sale (or only 0.6% lower than
it was entitled to under the old contract) for the use of its on-line lottery system equipment (as distinguished from facilities in
the old contract), which does not anymore include the nationwide telecommunications network, without any assumption of
business risks and the obligations (1) to keep the facilities in safe condition and if necessary, to upgrade, replace, and
improve them from time to time as technology develops, and bear all expenses relating thereto; (2) to undertake advertising
and promotions campaign; (3) to bear all taxes, amusements, or other charges imposed on the activities covered by the
contract; (4) to pay the premiums for third party or comprehensive insurance on the facilities: (5) to pay all expenses for
water, light, fuel, lubricants, electric power, gas, and other utilities used and necessary for the operation of the facilities; and
to pay the salaries and related costs of skilled and qualified personnel for administrative and technical operations and
maintenance crew. The PGMC is also given thereunder a special privilege of receiving P25 million as purchase price for the
equipment at the expiration of eight years should the PCSO exercise its option to purchase. Unlike in the old contract where
nothing may at all be due the PGMC of the event that the ticket sales, computed on an annual basis, are insufficient to pay
the entire prize money, under the new ELA the PCSO is under obligation to pay rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross
receipts from ticket sales, the aggregate amount of which per year should not be less than the minimum annual rental of
P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. Any shortfall shall be paid out of the proceeds of the then current ticket
sales after payment of prizes and agents' commissions but prior to any other payments, allocations, or disbursements. The
grossness of the disadvantage to the PCSO is all too obvious, and why the PCSO accepted such unreasonable,
unconscionable, and inequitable terms and conditions confounds as.
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JUDICIAL POWER, DEFINED. "Judicial power," is such authority and duty of courts of
justice "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. I take it that the provision of Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution has not been
intended to unduly mutate, let alone to disregard, the long established rules on locus standi. Neither has it been meant, I
most respectfully submit, to do away with the principle of separation of powers and its essential incident such as by, in
effect, conferring omnipotence on, or allowing an intrusion by, the courts in respect to purely political decisions, the exercise
of which is explicitly vested elsewhere, and subordinate to that of their own the will of either the Legislative Department of
the Executive Department both co-equal, independent and coordinate branches, along with the Judiciary, in our system
of government. Again, if it were otherwise, there indeed would be truth to the charge, in the words of some constitutionalist,
that "judicial tyranny" has been institutionalized by the 1987 Constitution, an apprehension which should, I submit, rather be
held far from truth and reality.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, RULE THEREON NOT DISREGARDED BY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF
JUDICIAL POWER. I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto
Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994). Back to the core of the petition, however, the
matter of the legal standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears to me, both under substantive
law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R.
No. 118910, and I regret my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart from the view I have expressed on
it in G.R. No. 113375.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the
Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into
negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this
Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision." cdasia
On January 25, 1995 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased
on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount
of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental
computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the
event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay
the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. No. 1169, Sec. 6 [B])
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery
equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3) cdtai
In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of,
or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8)
Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25
million.
A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior
case. cdt
On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially
the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Petitioners argue:
1. THE AMENDED ELA IS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS BASICALLY OR SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
AS OR SIMILAR TO THE OLD LEASE CONTRACT AS REPRESENTED AND ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS PGMC AND PCSO.
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE AMENDED ELA IS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE OLD
LEASES CONTRACT, THE AMENDED ELA IS NEVERTHELESS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
INCONSISTENT WITH AND VIOLATIVE OF PCSO'S CHARTER AND THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT OF MAY 5, 1995. aisadc
3. THE AMENDED EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE LAW ON PUBLIC BIDDING OF CONTRACTS FOR FURNISHING SUPPLIES, MATERIALS AND
EQUIPMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY E.O. NO. 301DATED 26 JULY 1987 AND E.O.
NO. 298 DATED 12 AUGUST 1940 AS AMENDED, AS WELL AS THE "RULES AND REGULATIONS
FOR THE PREVENTION OF IRREGULAR, UNNECESSARY, EXCESSIVE OR EXTRAVAGANT (IUEE)
EXPENDITURE PROMULGATED UNDER COMMISSION ON AUDIT CIRCULAR NO. 85-55-A DATED
SEPTEMBER 8, 1985, CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS AWARDED AND EXECUTED WITHOUT THE
PUBLIC BIDDING REQUIRED UNDER SAID LAWS AND COA RULES AND REGULATIONS, IT HAS
NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND IT IS NOT MOST
ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
4. THE ELA IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2 (2), ARTICLE IX-D OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN
RELATION TO THE COA CIRCULAR NO. 85-55-A.
The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners' standing to bring suit. They
maintain (1) that the ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture in the Contract of Lease
nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the
exception provided in E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the
government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for the lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its
own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this
suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum. cdta
For the reason set forth below, we hold that petitioners have no cause against respondents and therefore their
petition should be dismissed.
I. PETITIONERS' STANDING
The Kilosbayan, Inc. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors,
priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are
also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen.
Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Taada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members of the Congress suing as such and as
"taxpayer and concerned citizens."

Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the
contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the
enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their
standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case" and
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened. cdasia
Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case", nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a
barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit.
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may
itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who, in questioning the
validity of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar.
(Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept . 22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that
members of Congress have standing to question the validity of presidential veto on the ground that, if true, the illegality
of the veto would impair their prerogatives as members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not grounded on the
impairment of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have standing to question the validity of any law or official
action. (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994])
There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing. The voting on petitioners' standing in the
previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners'
right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In
addition, there have been changes in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the
appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the
maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing. cdta
Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think
this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation:
The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. Thus in People v.
Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999 (1958), it was stated:
"'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the
case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)
"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding
appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or
issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or re-adjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) cdasia
"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite determination, the
court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those
arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance
with its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the
appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal . . . .
"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of the case whether that
decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5
C.J.S. 1276-77)
"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the
case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the
court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87)" cdtai
As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate
court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res
judicata in that the conclusiveness of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally,
if not universally, not final. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 [1979])
It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the
ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.
Nor is inquiry into petitioners' right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment." 1 According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
(Pealosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 [1960]) cdt
It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to
issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L.
Ed. 2d 210, 222 [1979]; BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed.
898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the
money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this
determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of
assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not
conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on collateral
estoppel, it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respectswith that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are
separate, even though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in
the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with but, in a form
separable from, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make
an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in Restatement of the Law 2d, on
Judgments, as follows:
Sec. 28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the
parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:cdasia
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a
new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; . . .
Illustration:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain B's defense of
sovereign immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings the second action against B for
an unrelated tortious injury occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive
on the question whether the defense immunity is available to B. Note: The doctrine of stare decisis may
lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity. See Sec. 29, Comment i.
The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment Lease Agreement or ELA is a
legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is
essentially different from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the
determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993
Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.

Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking,
not even the issue in this case, since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties-in-interest" within the meaning
of Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest."
The difference between the rule on standing and real party-in-interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating
to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party-in-interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
(FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985]) aisadc
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." ( Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7
L. Ed. 2d 633 (1962))
Accordingly, in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to
a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held:
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere
in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly
and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing
the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of. cdta
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not
in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for
petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under the Rule 3,
Sec. 2.
It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government
corporation. There is, however, no allegation that the public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one
and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
(Valmonte v. PCSO, supra; BugnayConst.and Dev. Corp. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989])
On the other hand, the question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125, 131
[1951]) cdasia
Petitioners invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (Sec.
5)
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Sec. 12) cdtai
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. (Sec. 13)
The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development. (Sec. 17)
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7) cdt
These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of contract law. More specifically, the
question is whether petitioners have legal right which has been violated.
In action for annulment of contracts such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are
bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did no intervene in it ( Ibaez v.
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]), or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally
excluded from it. (See De la Lara Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-13460, Nov. 28,
1958)
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest . . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest' more concretely is meant such interest
of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient,
or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment by him." (1 MORAN, COMMENTS
ON THE RULES OF COURT 154-155 (1979) ) Thus, in Gonzales v. Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963) petitioner's right to
question the validity of a government contract for the importation of rice was sustained because he was a rice planter with
substantial production, who had a right under the law to sell to the government. cdasia
But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to
them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts.
Question as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can
be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. The Constitution requires that
the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including
government-owned or controlled corporations." (Art. XI , Sec. 12) In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an
action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its
corporate charter or misused its franchise. (Rule 66, Sec. 2 (a) (d))
We now turn to the merits of petitioners' claim constituting their cause of action.
II. THE EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT
This Court ruled in the previous case that the Contract of Leases, which the PCSO had entered into two with
the PGMC on December 17, 1993 for the operation of an on-line lottery system, was actually a joint venture agreement
or, at the very least, a contract involving "collaboration or association" with another party and for that reason, was void.
The Court noted the following features of the contract: cdt
(1) The PCSO had neither funds nor expertise to operate the on-line lottery system so that it would be
dependent on the PGMC for the operation of the lottery system.
(2) The PGMC would exclusively bear all costs and expenses for printing tickets, payment of salaries and
wages of personnel, advertising and promotion and other expenses for the operation of the lottery system. Mention was
made of the provision, which the Court considered "unusual in a lessor-lessee relationship but inherent in a joint
venture," for the payment of the rental not at a fixed amount but at a certain percentage (4.9%) of the gross receipts
from the sale of tickets, and the possibility that "nothing may be due demandable at all because the PGMC binds itself
to 'bear all risks if the revenue from the ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize
money.'" (232 SCRA at 147)
(3) It was only after the term of the contract that PCSO personnel would be ready to operate the lottery system
themselves because it would take the entire eight-year term of the contract for the technology transfer to be completed.
In the view of the Court, this meant that for the duration of the contract, the PGMC would actually be the operator of the
lottery system, and not simply the lessor of equipment. aisadc
The Court considered the Contract of Lease to be actually a joint venture agreement. From another angle, it
said that the arrangement, especially the provision that all the risks were for the account of the PGMC, was in effect a
lease by the PCSO of its franchise to the PGMC.

These features of the old Contract of Lease have been removed in the present ELA. While the rent is still
expressed in terms of percentage (it is now 4.3% of the gross receipts from the sale of the tickets) in the ELA, the
PGMC is now guaranteed a minimum rent of P35,000.00 a year per terminal in commercial operation. (Par. 2) The
PGMC is thus assured of payment of the rental. Thus par. 2 of the ELA provides:
2. RENTAL
During the effectivity of this Agreement and the term of this lease as provided in paragraph 3 hereof,
LESSEE shall pay rental to LESSOR equivalent to FOUR POINT THREE PERCENT (4.3%) of
the gross amount of ticket sales from all the LESSEE's on-line lottery operations in the Territory,
which rental shall be computed and payable bi-weekly net of withholding taxes on income, if any:
provided that, in no case shall the annual aggregate rentals per year during the term of the
leases be less than the annual minimum fixed rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in
commercial operation per annum, provided, further that the annual minimum fixed rental shall be
reduced pro-rata for the number of days during the year that a terminal is not in commercial
operation due to repairs or breakdown. In the event the aggregate bi-weekly rentals in any year
falls short of the annual minimum fixed rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in
commercial operation, the LESSEE shall pay such shortfall from out of the proceeds of the then
current ticket sales from LESSEE's on-line lottery in the Territory (after payment first of prizes and
agents' commissions but prior to any other payments, allocations or disbursements) until said
shortfall shall have been fully settled, but without prejudice to the payment to LESSOR of the
then current bi-weekly rentals in accordance with the provisions of the first sentence of this
paragraph 2.
The PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system is completely in its hands. This feature of the new
contract negates any doubt that it is anything but a lease agreement.
It is contended that the rental of 4.3% is substantially the same as the 4.9% in the old contract because the reduction is
negligible especially now that the PCSO assumes all business risks and risk of loss of, or damage to, equipment. Petitioners
allege that: aisadc
PGMC's annual minimum rental is P35,000.00 per terminal or a total of P70,000,000.00 per annum
considering that there are 2,000 terminals per the amended ELA. In order to meet the amount, based on
the 4.3% rental arrangement without shortfall, the gross ticket sales must amount to at least
P1,627,906,977.00. Multiplying this amount by 4.9 % we get the 4.9% rental fee fixed under the old lease
contract and the product is P79,767,442 .00. Deducting from this amount the sum of P70,000,000.00
representing the annual minimum rental under the amended ELA, we get the figure of P9,767,442 which
is equivalent to the .06% difference between the rental under the old lease contract and under the
amended ELA.
This amount of P9,767,442.00 cannot possibly cover the costs, expenses and obligations shouldered by
PGMC under the old leases contract but which are now to be borne by the PCSO under the new ELA, not
to mention the additional P25 million that the PCSO has to pay the PGMC if the former exercises its
option to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease period under the amended ELA.
(Petition, p. 37) cdt
To be sure there is nothing unusual in fixing the rental as a certain percentage of the gross receipts. The lease
of space in commercial buildings, for example, involves the payment of a certain percentage of the receipts in rental.
Under the Civil Code (Art. 1643) the only requirement is that the rental be a "price certain." Petitioners do not claim here
that the rental is not "price certain," simply because it is expressed as a certain percentage of the total gross amount of
ticket sales.
Indeed it is not alone the fact that in the old contract the rental was expressed in terms of percentage of the net
proceeds from the sale of tickets which was held to be characteristics of a joint venture agreement. It was the fact that,
in the prior case, the PGMC assumed, in addition, all risks of loss from the operation of the lottery, with the distinct
possibility that nothing might be due it. In the view of the Court possibility belied claims that the PGMC had no
participation in the lottery other than being merely the lessor of equipment.
In the new contract the rental is also expressed in terms of percentage of the gross proceeds from ticket sales
because the allocation of the receipts under the charter of the PCSO is also expressed in percentage, to wit: 55% is set
aside for prizes; 30% for contribution to charity; and 15% for operating expenses and capital expenditure. (R.A. No.
1169, Sec. 6) As the Solicitor General points out in his Comment filed in behalf of the PCSO: aisadc
In the PCSO charter, operating cost are reflected as a percentage of the net receipts (which is defined as
gross receipts less ticket printing costs which shall not exceed 2% and the 1% granted to the
Commission on Higher Education under Republic Act No. 7722). The mandate of the law is that the
operating costs, which include payments for any leased equipment, cannot exceed 15% of net receipts,
or 14.55% of gross receipts. The following conclusions are therefore evident:
a. The 4.3% rental rate for the equipment is well within the maximum of 15% net receipts fixed by
law;
b. To obviate any violation of the law, it is best to express large operating costs for budgetary
purposes as a percentage of either gross or net receipts, specifically since the amount of
gross receipts can only be estimated.
c. Large fixed sums of money for major operating costs, such as fixed rental for equipment, can
very well exceed the maximum percentages fixed by law, specifically if actual gross
receipts are lower than estimates for budgetary purposes.
d. The problem of budgeting based on estimates is even more difficult when new projects are
involved, as is the case in the on-line lottery.
(PCSO's Comment, pp. 18-20) cdt
Petitioners reply that to obviate the possibility that the rental would not exceed 15% of the net receipts what the
respondents should have done was not to agree on a minimum fixed rental of P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial
operation . This is a matter of business judgment which, in the absence of a clear and convincing showing that it was
made in grave abuse of discretion of the PCSO, this Court is not inclined to review. In this case the rental has to be
expressed in terms of percentage of the revenue of the PCSO because rental are treated in the charter of the agency
(R.A. No. 1169, Sec. 6 (C)) as "operating expenses" and the allotment for "operating expenses" is a percentage of the
net receipts.
The ELA also provides:
8. REPAIR SERVICES aisadc
LESSEE shall bear the costs of maintenance and necessary repairs, except those repairs to correct
defective workmanship or replace defective materials used in the manufacture of Equipment
discovered after delivery of the Equipment, in which the case LESSOR shall bear the costs of
such repairs and, if necessary, the replacements. The LESSEE may at any time during the term
of the lease, request the LESSOR to upgrade the equipment and/or increase the number of
terminals, in which case the LESSEE and LESSOR shall agree on an arrangement mutually
satisfactory to both of them, upon such terms as may be mutually agreed upon.
By virtue of this provision on upgrading of equipment, petitioners claim, the parties can change their entire agreement and
thereby, by "clever means and devices," enable the PGMC to "actually operate, manage, control and supervise the conduct
and holding of the on-line lottery," considering that as found in the first decision, "the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor
the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery."
The claim is speculative. It is just as possible to speculate that after sometime operating the lottery system the PCSO will be
able to accumulate enough capital to enable it to buy its own equipment and gain expertise. As for expertise, after three
months of operation of the on-line lottery, there appears to be no complaint that the PCSO is relying on others, outside its
own personnel, to run the system. In any case as in the construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts
the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power to the
government holds true also in cases involving the validity of contacts made by it. cdta
Finally, because the term "Equipment" is defined in the ELA as including "technology, intellectual property
rights, know-how processes and systems," it is claimed that these items could only be transferred to the PCSO by the
PGMC training PCSO personnel and this was found in the first case to be a badge of a joint venture.
Like the argument based on the upgrading of equipment, we think this contention is also based on speculation
rather than on fact or experience. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO
and its personnel in prohibited or collaboration with the PGMC within the contemplation of the law.
A contract of lease, as this is defined in Civil law, may call for some form of collaboration or association
between the parties since lease is a "consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which one person
binds himself to grant temporarily the use of a thing or the rendering of some service to another who undertakes to pay
some rent, compensation or price." (5 PADILLA, CIVIL CODE 611 (6TH ED. 1974)). The lessor of a commercial
building, it may be assumed, would be interested in the success of its tenants. But it is untenable to contend that this is
what the charter of the PCSO contemplates in prohibiting it from entering into "collaboration or association" with any
party. It may be added that even if the PCSO purchases its own equipment, it still needs the assistance of the PGMC in
the initial phase or operation. cdt

We hold that the ELA is a lease contract and that it contains none of the features of the former contract which were
considered "badges of a joint venture agreement." To further find fault with the new contract would be to cavil and expose
the opposition to the contract to be actually an opposition to lottery under any and all circumstances. But "[t]he morality of
gambling is not a justifiable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se . . . . It is left to Congress to deal with activity as it sees fit."
(Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994). Cf . Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, Jan. 27, 1995)
In the case of lottery, there is no dispute that, to enable the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to raise funds for charity,
Congress authorized the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to hold or conduct lotteries under certain
conditions.
We therefore now consider whether under the charter of the PCSO any contract for the operation of an on-line lottery
system, which involves any form of collaboration or association, is prohibited.
III. THE INTERPRETATION of SEC. 1 OF R.A. 1169
In G.R. No. 113375 it was held that the PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would involve it in
any form of "collaboration, association or joint venture" for the holding of sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities. This interpretation must be reexamined especially in determining whether petitioners have a cause of action.
We hold that the charter of the PCSO doe not absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery "in collaborating,
association or joint venture" with another party. What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business engaged
in sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities, and it is prohibited from doing so whether in "collaboration, association
or joint venture" with others or "by itself." The reason for that is that these are competing activities and the PCSO should not
invest in the business of a competitor.
It will be helpful to quote the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42: cdta
Sec. 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for
funds for heath programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as
such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four
Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency
and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated
by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in heath and welfare-related
investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign,
except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for
permanent and continuing sources for health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical
assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with
the private sector in the areas where the investments are adequate as may be determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority. aisadc
When parsed, it will be seen that Sec. 1 grants the PCSO authority to do any of the following: (1) to hold or conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities; and/or (2) to invest whether "by itself or in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity" in any "health and welfare-related investments, programs,
projects and activities which may be profit oriented," except "the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," i.e.,
sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities. The PCSO is prohibited from investing in "activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A)" because, as already stated, these are competing activities.
The subject of Sec. 1 (B) is the authority of the PCSO to invest in certain projects for the profit in order to enable it to
expand its health programs, medical assistance and charitable grants. The exception in the law refers to investments in
businesses engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities. The limitation applies not only when the
investments is undertaken by the PCSO "in collaboration, association or joint venture" but also when made by the PCSO
alone, "by itself." The prohibition can not apply to the holding of a lottery by the PCSO itself. Otherwise when it is authorized
to do in par. (A) would be negated by what is prohibited by par. (B).
To harmonize pars. (A) and (B), the latter must be read as referring to the authority of the PCSO to invest in the
business of others. Put in another way, the prohibition in Sec. 1 (B) is not so much against the PCSO entering into any
collaboration, association or joint venture with others as against the PCSO investing in the business of another
franchise holder which would directly compete with PCSO's own charity sweepstakes races, lotteries or similar
activities. The prohibition applies whether the PCSO makes the investment alone or with others. cdt
The contrary construction given to Sec. 1 in the previous decision is based on remarks made by then
Assemblyman, now Mr. Justice, Davide during the deliberations on what later became B.P. Blg. 42, amending R.A. No.
1169. It appears, however, that the remark were made in connection with a proposal to give the PCSO the authority "to
engage in any and all investments." It was to provide exception with regard to the type of investments which the PCSO
is authorized to make that the Davide amendment was adopted. It is reasonable to suppose that the members of the
Batasan Pambansa, in approving the amendment, understood it as referring to the exception to par (B) of Sec. 1 giving
the PCSO the power to make investments. Had it been their intention to prohibit the PCSO from entering into any
collaboration, association or joint venture with others even in instances when the sweepstakes races, lotteries or similar
activities are operated by it ("itself"), they would have made the amendment not in par. (B), but in par. (A), of Sec. 1, as
the logical place for the amendment.
The following excerpt 2 from the record of the discussion on Parliamentary Bill No. 622, which became B.P. Blg.
422, bears out this conclusion:
MR. ZAMORA.
On the same page, starting from line 18 until line 23, delete the entire paragraph from "b. to engage in
any and all investments. . . ." until the words "charitable grants" on line 23 and in lieu thereof
insert the following: cdasia
SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE MINISTER OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, TO ENGAGE
IN HEALTH-ORIENTED INVESTMENTS, PROGRAMS, PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH
MAY BE PROFIT-ORIENTED, BY ITSELF OR IN A COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION, OR
JOINT VENTURE WITH ANY PERSON, ASSOCIATION, COMPANY OR ENTITY, WHETHER
DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING FOR PERMANENT AND
CONTINUING SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR HEALTH PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE
EXPANSION OF EXISTING ONES AND/OR CHARITABLE GRANTS.
I move for approval of the amendment, Mr. Speaker.
MR. DAVIDE.
Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
The gentleman from Cebu is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
May I introduce an amendment to the committee amendment? The amendment would be to insert after
"foreign" in the amendment just read the following: EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITY IN LETTER (A)
ABOVE. aisadc
When it is a joint venture or in collaboration with any other entity such collaboration or joint
venture must not include activity letter (a) which is the holding and conducting of sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar acts.
MR. ZAMORA.
We accept the amendment, Mr. Speaker.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Mr. Speaker. cdtai
THE SPEAKER.
Is there any objection to the amendment? (Silence) The amendment, as amended, is approved.
MR. ZAMORA.
Continuing the line, Mr. Speaker, after "charitable grants" change the period (.) into a semi-colon (;) and
add the following proviso: PROVIDED, THAT SUCH INVESTMENTS, PROGRAMS, PROJECTS
AND ACTIVITIES SHALL NOT COMPETE WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AREAS WHERE
THE PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ARE ADEQUATE.
May I read the whole paragraph, Mr. speaker.
MR. DAVIDE.
May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to leave the
determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment is to add after
"adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a matter of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in
these areas, provided that the determination of whether the private sector's activity is already
adequate must be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
MR. ZAMORA.
Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. aisadc
THE SPEAKER.
May the sponsor now read the entire paragraph?
MR. ZAMORA.
May I read the paragraph, Mr. Speaker.
"Subject to the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-oriented
investment programs, projects, and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign, EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH (a)
for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs,
including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services and/or charitable
grants: PROVIDED THAT SUCH INVESTMENTS, HEALTH PROGRAMS, PROJECTS AND
ACTIVITIES SHALL NOT COMPETE WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AREAS WHERE THE
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ARE ADEQUATE AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY."

THE SPEAKER.
Is there any objection to the amendment? aisadc
MR. PELAEZ.
Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
The Gentleman from Misamis Oriental is recognized.
MR. PELAEZ.
Mr. Speaker, may I suggest that in that proviso, we remove "health programs, projects and activities,"
because the proviso refers only to investments activities "provided that such investments will
not compete with the private sector in areas where the investments are adequate . . ." aisadc
MR. ZAMORA.
It is accepted, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
Is there any objection?
MR. PELAEZ.
Mr. Speaker, may I propose an improvement to the amendment of the Gentlemen from Cebu, just for
style, I would suggest the insertion of the word PRECEDING before the word "paragraph." The
phrase will read "the PRECEDING paragraph." aisadc
MR. ZAMORA.
It is accepted, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
Very well. Is there any objection to the committee amendment, as amended? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the amendment is approved.
The construction given to Sec. 1 in the previous decision is insupportable in light of both the text of Sec. 1 and the
deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa which enacted the amendatory law. aisadc
IV. REQUIREMENT OF PUBLIC BIDDING
Finally the question is whether the ELA is subject to public bidding. In justifying the award of the contract to the
PGMC without public bidding, the PCSO invokes E.O. No. 301, which states in pertinent part:
Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of the law, decree, executive order or other
issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies,
materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be
renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following situations. cdasia
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may be involve the loss of,
or danger to, life and/or property:
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have sub-
dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government; cdtai
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were
exorbitant or non-conforming to specifications:
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the need supplies through negotiated purchase is
most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head
concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government. cdt
Petitioners point out that while the general rule requiring public bidding covers "contract[s] for public services or for
furnishingsupplies, materials and equipment" to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities, the
exceptions in pars. (a), (b), (d), (e), and (f) refer to contracts for the furnishing of supplies only, while par. (c) refers to the
furnishing of materials, only. They argue that as the general rule covers the furnishing of "supplies, materials and
equipment," the reference in the exceptions to the furnishing of "supplies" must be understood as excluding the furnishing of
any of the other items, i.e. "materials" and "equipment."
E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to
contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in Secs. 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease
of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and
these provisions do not require public bidding. These provisions state:
Sec. 6. Guidelines for Lease Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other
issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), with
respect to the leasing of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-
owned buildings or space for private use, shall formulate uniform standards or guidelines for determining
the reasonableness of the terms of lease contracts and of rental rates involved. aisadc
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned
buildings or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use,
shall have authority to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates
thereof, and to enter in such leases contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject
to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the
DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized representative in accordance with
existing rules and regulations.
It thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought
of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a
contract of purchase and sale.
Even assuming that Sec. 1 of E.O. 301 applies to lease contracts, the reference to "supplies" in the exceptions can not
strictly construed to exclude the furnishing of "materials" and "equipment" without defeating the purpose for which these
exceptions are made. For example, par. (a) excepts from the requirement of public bidding the furnishing of "supplies" which
are "urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property." Should rescue
operations during a calamity, such as an earthquake, require the use of heavy equipment, either by purchase or lease, no
one can insist that there should first be a public bidding before the equipment may be purchased or leased because the
heavy equipment is not a "supply" and Sec. 1 (a) is limited to the furnishing of "supplies" that are urgently needed. cdta
Petitioners contend that in any event the contract in question is not the "most advantageous to the government." Whether
the making of the present ELA meets this condition is not to be judged by a comparison, line by line, of its provisions with
those of the old contract which this Court found to be in reality a joint venture agreement. In some respects the old contracts
would be more favorable to the government because the PGMC assumed many of the risks and burdens incident to the
operation of the on-line lottery system, while under the ELA it is freed from these burdens. That is because the old contract
was a joint venture agreement. The ELA, on the other hand, is a lease contract, with the PCSO, as lessee, bearing solely
the risks and burdens of operating the on-line lottery system.
It is paradoxical that in their effort to show that the ELA is a joint venture agreement and not a lease contract,
petitioners point to contractual provisions whereby the PGMC assumed risk and losses which might conceivably be
incurred in the operation of the lottery system, but to show that the present lease agreement is not the most
advantageous arrangement that can be obtained, the very absence of these features of the old contract which made it a
joint venture agreement, is criticized.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the present lease
contract is "[more] advantageous to the government." The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the
most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could
have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the
PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the
government. cdasia

For the foregoing reasons, we hold:
(1) that petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make them real parties in interest within
the meaning of Rule 3, Sec. 2;
(2) that a determination of the petitioners' right to bring this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision in the prior case
between the parties; cdtai
(3) that the Equipment Lease Agreement of January 25, 1995 is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not
contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under Sec. 1 (A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a
contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party,
so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement in question did not have to be submitted to the public bidding as a condition for its
validity. aisadc
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare the Equipment Lease
Agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. invalid is
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, [July 17, 1995], 316 PHIL 652-791)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA


MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents, 1 JAIME N. SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003.]

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-


ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003.]

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS


LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-
in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003.]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE


PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,
FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,
MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,
AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO
DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON,
JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,
PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLFO PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO
IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO
ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,
RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003.]

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003.]

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003.]

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON


MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO,
KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD
WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003.]

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003.]

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY
HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003.]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,


THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003.]

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003.]

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-
ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE
THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003.]

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003.]


NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003.]

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF


REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,respondents.

[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.


DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003.]

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH


THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.]

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,


PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC.],
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIDENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

SYNOPSIS
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other
Associate Justices of the Court for violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The
House Committee on Justice subsequently dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First District, Tarlac and Felix William B.
Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another verified impeachment complaint with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and
personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various infrastructure projects and
acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment. Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House of Representatives. The
complaint was set to be transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action.
Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the bar, members of the House of Representatives
and private individuals, asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners contended that the filing of second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
The Supreme Court held that the second impeachment complaint filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was
unconstitutional or barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners, as taxpayers, had sufficient
standing to file the petitions to prevent disbursement of public funds amounting to millions of pesos for an illegal act. The
petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication because there was an actual controversy involving rights that are legally
demandable. Whether the issues present a political question, the Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly
political questions are beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to resolve with definitiveness the
issues of constitutionality. It is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions to exercise the power of judicial review as the
guardian of the Constitution.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; INCLUDES THE DUTY TO CURB GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
BY "ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF GOVERNMENT." This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on
the judicial branch of the government in Section l, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. . . As pointed out by Justice
Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and
"to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of
the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.". . In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
". . . judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them." To him,"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or
instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation." To ensure the potency of the power of judicial
review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government." the afore-quoted Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitutionengraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this court.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITIES CONFERRING UPON THE LEGISLATURE THE
DETERMINATION OF ALL ISSUES PERTAINING TO IMPEACHMENT TO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW ARE OF DUBIOUS APPLICATION WITHIN OUR JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. Respondents' and
intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the AmericanConstitution and American authorities cannot be credited to
support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI,
Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings. Said American
jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitutioncan trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths
of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of amicius curiae Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical
cord."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT AND THAT OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINE AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS. The
major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and
the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3). (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.
4.ID.; ID.; POWER EXCLUSIVELY VESTED IN THE JUDICIARY; CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO RULE ON THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. The futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
5.ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL POWER IS NOT ONLY A POWER BUT ALSO A DUTY; ONLY "TRULY POLITICAL QUESTIONS" ARE
BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW. From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article
VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that respect for the doctrine of separation of powers
must be maintained. On the other hand. by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.
6.ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT OVER JUSTICIABLE ISSUES IS NOT AN OPTION; COURT IS DUTY
BOUND TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONS IN CASE AT BAR. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable
issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."Otherwise, this Court
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority
thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. On the
occasion when this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it had acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally
fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, toi be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptation lurking in [his] office."
7.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT POWER; ONE-YEAR BAN PROHIBITING THE
INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5) OF
THE CONSTITUTION; MEANING OF TIE TERM "INITIATE"; CASE AT BAR. From the records of the Constitutional
Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action on said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO MAKE AND INTERPRET ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT IS NOT
ABSOLUTE; IMPEACHMENT RULES MUST EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption
that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3(8) of Article XI
provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; NOT FORECLOSED BY THE ISSUE OF
"POLITICAL QUESTION" ON AN ASSAILED ACT OF A BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WHERE DISCRETION HAS NOT, IN
FACT BEEN VESTED, YET ASSUMED AND EXERCISED. The Court should not consider the issue of "political question"
as foreclosing judicial review on an assailed act of a branch of government in instances where discretion has not, in fact,
been vested, yet assumed and exercised. Where, upon the other hand, such discretion is given, the "political question
doctrine" may be ignored only if the Court sees such review as necessary to void an action committed with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the constitutional grant of the power of judicial
review vested by the Philippine Constitution on the Supreme Court is rather clear and positive, certainly and textually
broader and more potent than where it has been borrowed.
2.ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, EXPANDED; VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATES ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INQUIRY; SUPREME COURT AS THE ULTIMATE ARBITER ON, AND THE
ADJUDGED SENTINEL OF THE CONSTITUTION. The1987 Constitution has, in good measure, "narrowed the reach of
the `political question doctrine' by expanding the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not grave
abuse of discretion has attended an act of any branch or instrumentality of government. When constitutional limits or
proscriptions are expressed, discretion is effectively withheld. Thus, issues pertaining to who are impeachable officers, the
number of votes necessary to impeach and the prohibition against initiation of impeachment proceeding twice against the
same official in a single year, provided for in Sections 2, 3, and 4, and 5 of Article XI of the Constitution, verily are subject to
judicial inquiry, and any violation or disregard of these explicit Constitutional mandates can be struck down by the Court in
the exercise of judicial power. In so doing, the Court does not thereby arrogate unto itself, let alone assume superiority over,
nor undue interference into the domain of, a co-equal branch of government, but merely fulfills its constitutional duty to
uphold the supremacy of theConstitution. The judiciary may be the weakest among the three branches of government but it
concededly and rightly occupies the post of being the ultimate arbiter on, and the adjudged sentinel of, the Constitution.
3.ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; ONE-YEAR BAN PROHIBITING THE INITIATION
OF A SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5) OF
THE CONSTITUTION; MEANING OF THE TERM, "INITIATE"; CASE AT BAR. I would second the view that the term
"initiate" should be construed as the physical act of filing the complaint, coupled with an action by the House taking
cognizance of it, i.e., referring the complaint to the proper Committee. Evidently, the House of Representatives had taken
cognizance of the first complaint and acted on it 1) The complaint was filed on 02 June 2003 by former President Joseph
Estrada along with the resolutions of endorsement signed by three members of the House of Representatives; 2) on 01
August 2003, the Speaker of the House directed the chairman of the House Committee on Rules, to include in the Order of
Business the complaint; 3) on 13 October 2003, the House Committee on Justice included the complaint in its Order of
Business and ruled that the complaint was sufficient in form; and 4) on 22 October 2003, the House Committee on Justice
dismissed the complaint for impeachment against the eight justices, including Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., of the
Supreme Court, for being insufficient in substance. The following day, on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed by two members of the House of Representatives, accompanied by an endorsement signed by at least
one-third of its membership, against the Chief Justice.
PANGANIBAN, J. separate concurring opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; HAS THE DUTY TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY
INCIDENT OF THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING VIOLATES ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION; CASE AT BAR.
The constitution imposes on the Supreme court the duty to rule on unconstitutional acts of "any" branch or instrumentality
of government. Such duty is plenary, extensive and admits of no exceptions. While the Court is not authorized to pass upon
the wisdom of an impeachment, it is nonetheless obligated to determine whether any incident of the impeachment
proceedings violates any constitutional prohibition, condition or limitation imposed on its exercise. Thus, normally, the Court
may not inquire into how and why the house initiates an impeachment complaint. But if in initiating one, it violates a
constitutional prohibition, condition or limitation on the exercise thereof, then the Court as the protector and interpreter of
the Constitution is duty-bound to intervene and "to settle" the issue. . . In the present cases, the main issue is whether, in
initiating the second Impeachment Complaint, the House of Representatives violated Article XI, Section 3(5), which provides
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
The interpretation of this constitutional prohibition or condition as it applies to the second Impeachment Complaint clearly
involves the "legality, not the wisdom" of the acts of the House of Representatives. Thus, the Court must "settle it."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., separate concurring opinion:
1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; COURT SHOULD DO ITS DUTY TO
INTERPRET THE LAW EVEN IF THERE IS A DANGER OF EXPOSING THE COURT'S INABILITY IN GIVING EFFICACY
TO ITS JUDGMENT. Confronted with an issue involving constitutional infringement, should this Court shackle its hands
under the principle of judicial self restraint? The polarized opinions of the amici curiae is that by asserting its power of
judicial review, this Court can maintain the supremacy of the Constitution but at the same time invites a disastrous
confrontation with the House of Representatives. A question repeated almost to satiety is what if the House holds its
ground and refuses to respect the Decision of this Court? It is argued that there will be a Constitutional crisis. Nonetheless,
despite such impending scenario, I believe this Court should do its duty mandated by the Constitution, seeing to it that it
acts within the bounds of its authority. The 1987 Constitution speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but
also of duty. As the last guardian of the Constitution, the Court's duty is to uphold and defend it at all times and for all
persons. It is a duty this Court cannot abdicate. It is a mandatory and inescapable obligation made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by the oath of each member of this Court. Judicial reluctance on the face of a clear constitutional
transgression may bring about the death of the rule of law in this country. Yes, there is indeed a danger of exposing the
Court's inability in giving efficacy to its judgment. But is it not the way in our present system of government? The Legislature
enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. It is not for the Court to withhold its judgment just
because it would be a futile exercise of authority. It should do its duty to interpret the law.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; SUPREME COURT HAS POWER TO DECLARE HOUSE RULES OR
ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF FORBIDDEN BY THE CONSTITUTION. While the power to initiate all cases of
impeachment is regarded as a matter of "exclusive" concern only of the House of Representatives, over which the other
departments may not exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the separation of powers established by the fundamental law, it does
not follow that the House of Representatives may not overstep its own powers defined and limited by the Constitution.
Indeed, it cannot, under the guise of implementing its Rules, transgress theConstitution, for when it does, its act immediately
ceases to be a mere internal concern. Surely, by imposing limitations on specific powers of the House of Representatives, a
fortiori, the Constitution has prescribed a diminution of its "exclusive power." I am sure that the honorable Members of the
House who took part in the promulgation and adoption of its internal rules on impeachment did not intend to disregard or
disobey the clear mandate of the Constitution the law of the people. And I confidently believe that they recognize, as fully
as this Court does, that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, equally binding upon every branch or department of
the government and upon every citizen, high or low. It need not be stressed that under our present form of government, the
executive, legislative and judicial departments are coequal and co-important. But it does not follow that this Court, whose
Constitutional primary duty is to interpret the supreme law of the land, has not the power to declare the House Rules
unconstitutional. Of course, this Court will not attempt to require the House of Representatives to adopt a particular action,
but it is authorized and empowered to pronounce an action null and void if found to be contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT CASES; PETITIONERS, AS TAXPAYERS, HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION
VALIDITY OF THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Indeed, the present suits
involve matters of first impression and of immense importance to the public considering that, as previously stated, this is the
first time a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is being subjected to an impeachment proceeding which, according to
petitioners, is prohibited by the Constitution. Obviously, if such proceeding is not prevented and nullified, public funds
amounting to millions of pesos will be disbursed for an illegal act. Undoubtedly, this is a grave national concern involving
paramount public interest. The petitions are properly instituted to avert such a situation.
CORONA, J., separate opinion:
1.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT; PURPOSE; INTENDED TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OF
LAST RESORT. Impeachment has been described as sui generis and an "exceptional method of removing exceptional
public officials (that must be) exercised by the Congress with exceptional caution." Thus, it is directed only at an exclusive
list of officials, providing for complex procedures, exclusive grounds and every stringent limitations. The implied
constitutional caveat on impeachment is that Congress should use that awesome power only for protecting the welfare of
the state and the people, and not merely the personal interests of a few. There exists no doubt in my mind that the framers
of the Constitution intended impeachment to be an instrument of last resort, a draconian measure to be exercised only
when there are no other alternatives available. It was never meant to be a bargaining chip, much less a weapon for political
leverage. Unsubstantiated allegations, mere suspicions of wrongdoing and other less than serious grounds, needless to
state, preclude its invocation or exercise.
2.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; SUPREME COURT HAS THE DUTY TO
DECIDE PENDING PETITIONS TO MAINTAIN THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION IN CASE AT BAR. The
Court has the obligation to decide on the issues before us to preserve the hierarchy of laws and to maintain the supremacy
of the rule of the Constitution over the rule of men, . . .The Court should not evade its duty to decide the pending petitions
because of its sworn responsibility as the guardian of the Constitution. To refuse cognizance of the present petitions merely
because they indirectly concern the Chief Justice of this Court is to skirt the duty of dispensing fair and impartial justice.
Furthermore, refusing to assume jurisdiction under these circumstances will run afoul of the great traditions of our
democratic way of life and the very reason why this Court exists in the first place.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION EXPANDED. Under the new definition of
judicial power embodied in Article VIII, Section 1, courts of justice have not only the authority but also the duty to "settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" and "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." The Court can therefore, in certain situations provided in the Constitution itself, inquire
into the acts of Congress and the President, though with great hesitation and prudence owing to mutual respect and comity.
Among these situations, in so far as the pending petitions are concerned, are (1) issues involving constitutionality and (2)
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government. These
are the strongest reasons for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the pending cases before us.
CALLEJO, SR., J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; IMPEACHMENT CASES; SUPREME COURT HAS
THE DUTY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE CONSTITUTION. Under Section 1, Article VIII of theConstitution, "judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. The judicial power of the Court includes the power to settle controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the branch or instrumentality of the
Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court held that with the new provision in the Constitution, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The constitution is the supreme law on all
governmental agencies, including the House of Representatives and the Senate. Under Section 4(2), Article VIII of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality, application and
operation of government rules and regulations, including the constitutionality, application and operation of rules of the House
of Representatives, as well as the Senate. It is competent and proper for the Court to consider whether the proceedings in
Congress are in conformity with the Constitution and the law because living under the Constitution, no branch or department
of the government is supreme; and it is the duty of the judiciary to determine cases regularly brought before them, whether
the powers of any branch of the government and even those of the legislative enactment of laws and rules have been
exercised in conformity with the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void. Under Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. The House of
Representatives may have the sole power to initiate impeachment cases, and the Senate the sole power to try and decide
the said cases, but the exercise of such powers must be in conformity with and not in derogation of the Constitution.
AZCUNA, J., separate opinion:
1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; PETITIONERS, AS TAXPAYERS, HAVE LOCUS
STANDI TO QUESTION VALIDITY OF THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE CHIEF JUSTICE;
JUSTICIABILITY OF PETITIONS IN CASE AT BAR. There can be no serious challenge as to petitioners' locus standi.
Eight are Members of the House of Representatives, with direct interest in the integrity of its proceedings. Furthermore,
petitioners as taxpayers have sufficient standing, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue at hand. It goes
beyond the fate of Chief Justice Davide, as it shakes the very foundations of our system of government and poses a
question as to our survival as a democratic polity. There is, moreover, an actual controversy involving rights that are legally
demandable, thereby leaving no doubt as to the justiciability of the petitions.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT CASES; SUPREME COURT HAS THE DUTY TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE
PROCEEDINGS THEREIN CONFORM WITH THE CONSTITUTION. Unlike the Constitutions of other countries, that of
the Philippines, our Constitution, has opted textually to commit the sole power and the exclusive power to this and to that
Department or branch of government, but in doing so it has further provided specific procedures and equally textually
identifiable limits to the exercise of those powers. Thus, the filing of the complaint for impeachment is provided for in detail
as to who may file and as to what shall be done to the complaint after it is filed, the referral to the proper Committee, its
hearing, its voting, its report to the House, and the action of the House thereon, and the timeframes for every step
(Subsection 2). Similarly, the required number of votes to affirm or override a favorable or contrary resolution is stated
(Subsection 3). So, also, what is needed for a complaint or resolution of impeachment to constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, so that trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed, is specifically laid down, i.e., a verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House (Subsection 4). It is my view that when
the Constitution not only gives or allocates the power to one Department or branch of government, be it solely or
exclusively, but also, at the same time, or together with the grant or allocation, specifically provides certain limits to its
exercise, then this Court, belonging to the Department called upon under the Constitution to interpret its provisions, has the
jurisdiction to do so. And, in fact, this jurisdiction of the Court is not so much a power as a duty, as clearly set forth in Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
3.ID.; LEGISLATION DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT; ONE-YEAR BAN PROHIBITING THE INITIATION THEREOF
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION 3(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION; MEANING OF THE
TERM "INITIATE." It is also contended that the provision of Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) refers to impeachment proceedings in
the Senate, not in the House of Representatives. This is premised on the wording of Article XI, Sec. 3 (1) which states that
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment." Thus, it is argued,
cases of impeachment are initiated only by the filing thereof by the House of Representatives with the Senate, so that
impeachment proceedings are those that follow said filing. This interpretation does violence to the carefully allocated
division of power found in Article XI, Sec. 3. Precisely, the first part of the power is lodged with the House, that of initiating
impeachment, so that a respondent hailed by the House before the Senate is a fact and in law already impeached. What the
House initiates in the Senate is an impeachment CASE, not PROCEEDINGS. The proceedings for impeachment preceded
that and took placeexclusively in the House (in fact, non-members of the House cannot initiate it and there is a need for a
House member to endorse the complaint). And what takes place in the Senate is the trial and the decision. For this reason,
Subsections (1) to (5) of Article XI, Section 3 apply to the House whereas Subsections (6) and (7) apply to the Senate, and
Subsection (8) applies to both, or to "Congress." There is therefore a sequence or order in these subsections, and the
contrary view disregards the same.
TINGA, J., separate opinion:
1.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT, NATURE OF. On the question of whether it is
proper for this Court to decide the petitions, it would be useless for us to pretend that the official being impeached is not a
member of this Court, much less the primus inter pares. Simplistic notions of rectitude will cause a furor over the decision of
this Court, even if it is the right decision. Yet we must decide this case because the Constitution dictates that we do so. The
most fatal charge that can be levied against this Court is that it did not obey the Constitution. The Supreme Court cannot
afford, as it did in the Javellana case, to abdicate its duty and refuse to address a constitutional violation of a co-equal
branch of government just because it feared the political repercussions. And it is comforting that this Court need not rest
merely on rhetoric in deciding that it is proper for it to decide the petitions, despite the fact that the fate of the Chief Justice
rests in the balance. Jurisprudence is replete with instances when this Court was called upon to exercise judicial duty,
notwithstanding the fact that the application of the same could benefit one or all members of the Court. Nevertheless, this
does not mean that the second impeachment complaint is forever barred; only that it should be dismissed without prejudice
to its re-filing after one year from the filing of the first impeachment complaint. Indeed, this Court cannot deprive the House
of the exclusive power of impeachment lodged in the House by the Constitution. In taking cognizance of this case, the Court
does not do so out of empathy or loyalty for one of our Brethren. Nor does it do so out of enmity or loathing toward the
Members of a co-equal branch, whom I still call and regard as my Brethren. The Court, in assuming jurisdiction over this
case, to repeat, does so only out of duty, a duty reposed no less by the fundamental law.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SENATE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO PASS UPON THE HOUSE RULES ON IMPEACHMENT. Despite
suggestions to the contrary, I maintain that the Senate does not have the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
House Rules of Impeachmentviolate the Constitution. As I earlier stated, impeachment is not an inherent legislative function,
although it is traditionally conferred on the legislature. It requires the mandate of a constitutional provision before the
legislature can assume impeachment functions. The grant of power should be explicit in the Constitution. It cannot be
readily carved out of the shade of a presumed penumbra. In this case, there is a looming prospect that an invalid
impeachment complaint emanating from an unconstitutional set of House rules would be presented to the Senate for action.
The proper recourse would be to dismiss the complaint on constitutional grounds. Yet, from the Constitutional and practical
perspectives, only this Court may grant that relief. The Senate cannot be expected to declare void theArticles of
Impeachment, as well as the offending Rules of the House based on which the House completed the impeachment process.
The Senate cannot look beyond the Articles of Impeachment. Under the Constitution, the Senate's mandate is solely to try
and decide the impeachment complaint. While the Senate acts as an impeachment court for the purpose of trying and
deciding impeachment cases, such "transformation" does not vest unto the Senate any of the powers inherent in the
Judiciary, because impeachment powers are not residual with the Senate. Whatever powers the Senate may acquire as an
impeachment court are limited to what theConstitution provides, if any, and they cannot extend to judicial-like review of the
acts of co-equal components of government, including those of the House. Pursuing the concept of the Senate as an
impeachment court, its jurisdiction, like that of the regular courts,' has to be conferred by law and it cannot be presumed.
This is the principle that binds and guides all courts of the land, and it should likewise govern the impeachment court, limited
as its functions may be. There must be an express grant of authority in theConstitution empowering the Senate to pass
upon the House Rules on Impeachment.
3.ID.; ID.; INTER-CHAMBER COURTESY; ANY ATTEMPT OF THE SENATE TO INVALIDATE THE HOUSE RULES OF
IMPEACHMENT IS OBNOXIOUS TO INTER-CHAMBER COURTESY. Ought to be recognized too is the tradition of
comity observed by members of Congress commonly referred to as "inter-chamber courtesy." It is simply the mutual
deference accorded by the chambers of Congress to each other. Thus, "the opinion of each House should be independent
and not influenced by the proceedings of the other." While inter-chamber courtesy is not a principle which has attained the
level of a statutory command, it enjoys a high degree of obeisance among the members of the legislature, ensuring as it
does the smooth flow of the legislative process. It is my belief that any attempt on the part of the Senate to invalidate the
House Rules of Impeachment is obnoxious to inter-chamber courtesy. If the Senate were to render these
House Rules unconstitutional, it would set an unfortunate precedent that might engender a wrong-headed assertion that
one chamber of Congress may invalidate the rules and regulations promulgated by the other chamber. Verily, the duty to
pass upon the validity of the House Rules of Impeachment is imposed by the Constitution not upon the Senate but upon this
Court.
4.ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; SUPREME COURT HAS THE DUTY TO ADDRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF IT WOULD REDOUND TO THE
BENEFIT OF ONE, SOME OR EVEN ALL MEMBERS OF THE COURT. On the question of whether it is proper for this
Court to decide the petitions, it would be useless for us to pretend that the official being impeached is not a member of this
Court, much less the primus inter pares. Simplistic notions of rectitude will cause a furor over the decision of this Court,
even if it is the right decision. Yet we must decide this case because the Constitution dictates that we do so. The most fatal
charge that can be levied against this Court is that it did not obey the Constitution. The Supreme Court cannot afford, as it
did in the Javellana case, to abdicate its duty and refuse to address a constitutional violation of a co-equal branch of
government just because it feared the political repercussions. And it is comforting that this Court need not rest merely on
rhetoric in deciding that it is proper for it to decide the petitions, despite the fact that the fate of the Chief Justice rests in the
balance. Jurisprudence is replete with instances when this Court responded to the call of judicial duty, notwithstanding the
fact that the performance of the duty would ultimately redound to the benefit of one, some or even all members of the Court.
. . Indeed, this Court cannot deprive the House of the exclusive power of impeachment lodged in the House by
the Constitution. In taking cognizance of this case, the Court does not do so out of empathy or loyalty for one of our
Brethren. Nor does it do so out of enmity or loathing toward the Members of a coequal branch, whom I still call and regard
as my Brethren. The Court, in assuming jurisdiction over this case, to repeat, does so only out of duty, a duty reposed no
less by the fundamental law.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.POLITICAL LAW; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; HISTORIOGRAPHY OF OUR IMPEACHMENT PROVISIONS
SHOW INHERENT NATURE OF IMPEACHMENT AS POLITICAL. The historiography of our impeachment provisions will
show that they were liberally lifted from the USConstitution. Following an originalist interpretation, there is much to
commend to the thought that they are political in nature and character. The political character of impeachment hardly
changed in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, among the grounds of impeachment are "other high crimes or
betrayal of public trust." They hardly have any judicially ascertainable content. The power of impeachment is textually
committed to Congress, a political branch of government. The right to accuse is exclusively given to the House of
Representatives. The right to try and decide is given solely to the Senate and not to the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice
has a limited part in the process . . . to preside but without the right to vote when the President is under impeachment.
Likewise, the President cannot exercise his pardoning power in cases of impeachment. All these provisions confirm the
inherent nature of impeachment as political.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; REENGINEERED CONCEPT OF OUR IMPEACHMENT IS NOW A COMMIXTURE OF POLITICAL AND
JUDICIAL COMPONENTS; RIGHT OF CHIEF JUSTICE AGAINST THE INITIATION OF A SECOND IMPEACHMENT
WITHIN ONE YEAR IS A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE. Be that as it may, the purity of the political nature of impeachment has
been lost. Some legal scholars characterize impeachment proceedings as akin to criminal proceedings. Thus, they point to
some of the grounds of impeachment like treason, bribery, graft and corruption as well defined criminal offenses. They
stress that the impeached official undergoes trial in the Senate sitting as an impeachment court. If found guilty, the
impeached official suffers a penalty "which shall not be further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines." I therefore respectfully submit that there is now a commixture of political and
judicial components in our reengineered concept of impeachment. It is for this reason and more that impeachment
proceedings A classified assui generis. To be sure, our impeachment proceedings are indigenous, a kind of its own. They
have been shaped by our distinct political experience especially in the last fifty years. EDSA People Power I resulted in the
radical rearrangement of the powers of government in the 1987 Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; INITIATION THEREOF AND ITS DECISION ARE INITIALLY BEST LEFT TO CONGRESS; COORDINACY
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS DEMAND DEFERMENT OF
COURT'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS; CASE AT BAR. I most respectfully submit, that the 1987
Constitution adopted neither judicial restraint nor judicial activism as a political philosophy to the exclusion of each other .
The expanded definition of judicial power gives the Court enough elbow room to be more activist in dealing with political
questions but did not necessarily junk restraint in resolving them. Political questions are not undifferentiated questions. They
are of different variety. The antagonism between judicial restraint and judicial activism is avoided by the coordinacy theory of
constitutional interpretation. This coordinacy theory gives room for judicial restraint without allowing the judiciary to abdicate
its constitutionally mandated duty to interpret the constitution. Coordinacy theory rests on the premise that within the
constitutional system, each branch of government has an independent obligation to interpret the Constitution. This
obligation is rooted on the system of separation of powers. The oath to "support this Constitution" which
the constitution mandates judges, legislators and executives to take proves this independent obligation. Thus, the
coordinacy theory accommodates judicial restraint because it recognizes that the President and Congress also have an
obligation to interpret the constitution. In fine, the Court, under the coordinacy theory, considers the preceding constitutional
judgments made by other branches of government. By no means however, does it signify complete judicial deference.
Coordinacy means courts listen to the voice of the President and Congress but their voice does not silence the judiciary.
The doctrine in Marbury v. Madison that courts are not bound by the constitutional interpretation of other branches of
government still rings true. As well stated, "the coordinacy thesis is quite compatible with a judicial deference that
accommodates the views of other branches, while not amounting to an abdication of judicial review." With due respect, I
cannot take the extreme position of judicial restraint that always defers on the one hand, or judicial activism that never
defers on the other. I prefer to take the contextual approach of the coordinacy theory which considers the constitution's
allocation of decision-making authority, theconstitution's judgments as to the relative risks of action and inaction by each
branch of government, and the fears and aspirations embodies in the different provisions of the constitution. The contextual
approach better attends to the specific character of particular constitutional provisions and calibrates deference or restraint
accordingly on a case to case basis. In doing so, it allows the legislature adequate leeway to carry out their constitutional
duties while at the same time ensuring that any abuse does not undermine important constitutional principles. . . Their
correct calibration will compel the conclusion that this Court should defer the exercise of its ultimate jurisdiction over the
petitions at bar out of prudence and respect to the initial exercise by the legislature of its jurisdiction over impeachment
proceedings.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; SUPREME
COURT HAS THE DUTY TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACTS OF CONGRESS. I also concur with
the ponente that the Court has the power of judicial review: This power of the Court has been expanded by
the Constitution not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of an branch or instrumentality of government. The court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to
undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues is shown to have attended the contested act. The Court
checks the exercise of power of the other branches of government through judicial review. It is the final arbiter of the
disputes involving the proper allocation and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution. When the Supreme
Court reviews the Constitutionality of the acts of Congress, it does not thereby assert its superiority over a co-equal branch
of government. It merely asserts its solemn and sacred obligation under the Constitution and affirms constitutional
supremacy. Indeed, in the resolution of the principal issue in these petitions, a distinction has to be drawn between the
power of the members of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment proceedings, on the one hand, and the
manner in which they have exercised that power. While it is clear that the House has the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, and the Senate has the sole power to try and decide these cases, the Court, upon a proper finding that
either chamber committed, grave abuse of discretion or violated any constitutional provision, may invoke its corrective
power of judicial review.
2.ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; ONE-YEAR BAN PROHIBITING THE INITIATION
OF IMPEACHMENT CASE AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION;
MEANING OF THE TERM "INITIATE. The meaning of the word "initiate" in relation to impeachment is at the center of
much debate. The confusion as to the meaning of this term was aggravated by the amendment of the House of
Representatives' Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The first set of Rules adopted on May 31, 1988,
specifically Rule V, Section 14 and Rule 11, Section 2 thereof, provides that impeachment shall be initiated when a verified
complaint for impeachment is filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, or when a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House. This provision was later amended on November 28, 2001: Rule V, Section 16 of the
amendatory Rules states that impeachment proceedings under any of the three methods above-stated are deemed initiated
on the day that the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official is sufficient
in substance or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance. The adoption of the 2001 Rules, at least insofar as initiation of
impeachment proceedings is concerned, unduly expanded the power of the House by restricting the constitutional time-bar
only to complaints that have been "approved" by the House Committee on Justice. As stated above, the one-year bar is a
limitation set by the Constitution which Congress cannot overstep. Indeed, the Records of the Constitutional Commission
clearly show that, as defined in Article XI, Section 3 (5), impeachment proceedings begin not on the floor of the House but
with the filing of the complaint by any member of the House of any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof. This is the plain sense in which the word "Initiate" must be understood, i.e., to begin or commence the action.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; HOW COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT IS "FILED"; CASE AT BAR. Moreover, the second impeachment
complaint was filed by only two complainants, namely Representatives Gilberto G. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella. The rest of the members of the House whose names appear on the attachments thereto merely signed
endorsements to the Complaint. Article XI, Section 3 (3) of the Constitution is explicit: In case the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (Emphasis provided.) The mere endorsement of
the members of the House, albeit embodied in a verified resolution, did not suffice for it did not constitute filing of the
impeachment complaint, as this term is plainly understood. In order that the verified complaint may be said to have been
filed by at least 1/3 of the Members, all of them must be named as complainants therein. All of them must sign the main
complaint. This was not done in the case of the assailed second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. The
complaint was not filed by at least one-third of the Members of the House, and therefore did not constitute the Article of
Impeachment. I am constrained to disagree with the majority decision to discard the above issue for being unnecessary for
the determination of the instant cases. On the contrary, the foregoing defect in the complaint is a vital issue in the
determination of whether or not the House should transmit the complaint to the Senate, and if it does, whether the Senate
should entertain it. The Constitution is clear that the complaint for impeachment shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
without need of referral to the Committee on Justice, when the complaint is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House. Being the exception to the general procedure outlined in theConstitution, its formal requisites must be strictly
construed.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNING OF IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT DONE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS IN CASE AT BAR. The
impeachment complaint suffers from yet another serious flaw. As one of the amici curiae, former Senate President Jovito
Salonga, pointed out, the signing of the impeachment complaint by the purported 1/3 of the Congressmen was done without
due process. The Chief Justice, against whom the complaint was brought, was not served notice of the proceedings against
him. No rule is better established under the due process clause of the constitution, than that which requires notice and
opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights. Indeed, when the Constitution says that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, it means that every person shall be afforded
the essential element of notice in any proceeding. Any act committed in violation of due process may be declared null and
void.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
Notwithstanding the constitutional and procedural defects in the impeachment complaint, I dissent from the majority when it
decided to resolve the issues at this premature stage. I submit that the process of impeachment should first be allowed to
run its course. The power of this Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable questions should come into play only when the
procedure as outlined in the Constitution has been exhausted. The complaint should be referred back to the House
Committee on Justice, where its constitutionality may be threshed out. Thereafter, if the Committee so decides, the
complaint will have to be deliberated by the House on plenary session, preparatory to its possible transmittal to the Senate.
The questions on the sufficiency of the complaint in form may again be brought to the Senate by way of proper motion, and
the Senate may deny the motion or dismiss the complaint depending on the merits of the grounds raised. After the Senate
shall have acted in due course, its disposition of the case may be elevated to this Court pursuant to its judicial power of
review. . . The Court should recognize the extent and practical limitations of its judicial prerogatives, and identify those areas
where it should carefully tread instead of rush in and act accordingly. Considering that power of impeachment was intended
to be the legislature's lone check on the judiciary, exercising our power of judicial review over impeachment would place the
final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is
meant to regulate. In fact, judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review is
counter-intuitive because it eviscerates the improper constitutional check to the judiciary. A becoming sense of propriety and
justice dictates that judicial self-restraint should be exercised; that the impeachment power should remain at all times and
under all circumstances with the legislature, where theConstitution has placed it. The common-law principle of judicial
restraint serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may
appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship
among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary
which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions
whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis
of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the
public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-
equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination
among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve
a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est
suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. cEDIAa
SECTION 3.(1)The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2)A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3)A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4)In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6)The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7)Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8)The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions
between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE IIRULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENTBAR AGAINST INITIATION
OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of InitiatingSection 16. Impeachment Proceedings


Impeachment. ImpeachmentDeemed Initiated. In cases where a
shall be initiated only by a verifiedMember of the House files a verified
complaint for impeachment filed bycomplaint of impeachment or a citizen
any Member of the House offiles a verified complaint that is endorsed
Representatives or by any citizen uponby a Member of the House through a
a resolution of endorsement by anyresolution of endorsement against an
Member thereof or by a verifiedimpeachable officer, impeachment
complaint or resolution of impeachmentproceedings against such official are
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of alldeemed initiated on the day the
the Members of the House.Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint
and/or resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a


resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-
third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing of such

verified complaint or resolution of


impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. NoSection 17. Bar Against Initiation Of


impeachment proceedings shall beImpeachment Proceedings. Within a
initiated against the same official moreperiod of one (1) year from the date
than once within the period of oneimpeachment proceedings are deemed
(1) year.initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
italics supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of theConstitution which reads: HSTCcD
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," 9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary
General of the House 12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. 13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al., most of which petitions contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress," 14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November
28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of theConstitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case
are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon
from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the
use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring
petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG 15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation, 16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. ESCTaA
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that,
as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice,
and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance
of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate,
its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner
Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state
what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. CTAIHc
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction
which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran 17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and
the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with
the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has
a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their
duties in accordance with theConstitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment
complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents
Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers
of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they
have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional
issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined
from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in
accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and
audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1)
the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House
of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas, et al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed
before this Court, 18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to
the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001
House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought
similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for
a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to
the Senate. TEHDIA
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General,
to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae. 20 In addition, this Court
called on petitioners and respondents to maintain thestatus quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its
co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene ( Ex Abudante
Cautela) 21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)
include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation
stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as
of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to
constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not,
and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal
of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also
filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295,
and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an
Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what
issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a)locus standi of petitioners;
b)ripeness (prematurity; mootness);
c)political question/justiciability;
d)House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e)Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment; aTADCE
f)constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution; and
g)judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined
them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed
in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus,
Justice Laurel discoursed:
. . . In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof .
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth
in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels , for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment,
and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of
our Constitution. IAETDc
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? TheConstitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. 24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all
courts 25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by
its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison 27 that the power of judicial review was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land,
the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only
which shall be made in pursuance of theconstitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by noted political law
professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7.Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or theConstitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of
checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it
serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government . It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. . . . And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
theConstitution. 32 (Emphasis and italics supplied) THaAEC
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, ". . . judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments
of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in
that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in
the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner
Roberto Concepcion:
xxx xxx xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality
of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question.
And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved . It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question. 35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 36 this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning . We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 38 in
this wise: SHTaID
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
. . . The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization
of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of theConstitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers. 41 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon, 42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
. . . [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of
our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function
to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give
us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof . 46 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of
judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia, et al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. 47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases 48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senates power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings. 49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review,
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally
the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States. 50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the
powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is
the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily
confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment
proceedings. TEcAHI
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are
no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC , 52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the
umbilical cord." DHacTC
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that
while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
but also a duty, and it wasgiven an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of
the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the
principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing
full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, 57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez 58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon, 59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the
impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for
writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power
of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
Thus, inSantiago v. Guingona, Jr., 60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, 61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, 62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.Mitra, 63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
InDaza v. Singson, 64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission
on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, 65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution. ATHCDa
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by
theConstitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
. . . Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. 69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the
Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded
standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and
transcendental importance, 71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the
other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest
is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons,
cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc.v. Morato 75 to clarify what is meant
by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus:
"It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." DTAcIa
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class
suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met
have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.
He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. 79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public. 80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court
opted to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the
Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an associationhas legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true,
does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in
the suit, 88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court. 89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this
Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty.
Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public. 91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the
matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et al.
in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no
objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted their Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in
G.R. No.160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been
complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310
are of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention
with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene
were granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a
point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason,
and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as
earlier stated, allowed to argue. IEcDCa
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. COMELEC, 93 to
wit:
. . . While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. 94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest
as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal, 95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the matter
is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed
with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan
v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being
the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself,
cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution 97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed
with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Taada v. Cuenco, 98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its
stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of
the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases, however, despite the
seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark case of Javellana
v. Executive Secretary 102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court
shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases
during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify
this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the
purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. . . . And so, with the bodys indulgence, I
will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality
of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question .
And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved . It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain.
I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration
had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not
publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those
who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that
upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of
them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they
finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for
about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of
some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of
the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word
famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he
would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to
be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded
were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite
because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice
delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in
force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the
case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring
that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void . The main
defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified
the draft of theConstitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did
they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum
and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
. . . The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following
questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential
system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others .Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for
thought on the subject of the judiciary. 103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial
power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question
as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.Therefore, the court has the duty to
decide.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to
the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction . . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power . But the Gentleman
will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the
pale of judicial power. 104(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do
away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that respect for the doctrine of separation of
powers must be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of
cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, 105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. 106 . . .
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases." 108(Emphasis and italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, 109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. 110 . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear
standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr 111 attempts to provide some:
. . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or theimpossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 112 (emphasis supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of
one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining
whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If
there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly
acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I.Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II.Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of
the Constitution.
III.Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund
is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
IV.Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V.Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other
high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of
public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their
clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 115 this Court held:
. . . It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. 116 [Emphasis and italics supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 117 where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 ofRepublic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself . 118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the
related canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is applied." 119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment
complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and
jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a
violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary. 121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule
of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be
broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this
Court inBengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and
filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provision
of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that
the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House."
With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella . . . 124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be"filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been
calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise
asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional
issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis
mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors
in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt
this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts
of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the
instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a
result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment
court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial
review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not
assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this
argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred." 126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of
the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiaeFather Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which
may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule
upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public
has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas
v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. 131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on
the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the
Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not
have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators elect, six of
whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the
wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in
such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice
of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of
the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto, 132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. Itaffects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba, 134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of
judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA 135 as follows:
1.The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never
was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer
to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2.The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' .
. . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3.The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'
4.The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has
found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5.The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the
denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . .
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought
to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth
on behalf of all its citizens.
6.The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.
7.When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1.that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2.that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3.that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4.that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5.that the parties are not in estoppel
6.that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1.actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2.the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement
3.the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4.the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to
avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing
and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress
to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence
and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
. . . Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until
the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the
Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either
to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved
the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would
behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social
upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit: 141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which
they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs. 142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term
"initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body,
which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because
filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of theConstitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not
have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually
became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiaeaffirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which
he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the
first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a complexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not
say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated. The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time
after actual initiation. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions
on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some
time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information
of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint .And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House
of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section
3 (3), from lines 17 to 18,we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will
now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned,really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary
the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and italics supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability
of Public Officers. 144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase " to initiate impeachment proceedings"
as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint , and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution." 145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1).The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx xxx xxx
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-
third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the
Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and
an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House
of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of
one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the
Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary . . . to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not
initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in
the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary
words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section
3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," this is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases"
with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners,
it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1)
if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiaebrief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an
aid in the interpretation of Sec. 3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino 147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal
opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during
this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real
meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness. 148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this
Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief
Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on
the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption
that Congress hasabsolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3.(1). . .
(2)A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3)A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4)In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun, 149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules
and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of
the Commission on Appointments, 150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting
Justice Brandeis in United States v.Smith, 151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia, 152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that
while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained . It is only within these
limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that
in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable . Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at
bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues
before the Court. It is in Ballinwhere the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3.On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting,
and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the
validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly,
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. TheConstitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e.,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test:
(1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers. 154
xxx xxx xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of
our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis- -vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government. 155
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly,
the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by
the people. 156
xxx xxx xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis- -vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, thenew Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations
by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it
must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision
as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners. 157 (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmea v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation
of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US 158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not
decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S.
Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds
nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a
constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of
the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our
individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of
course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly
a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society from the business,
retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the
official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national
life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through
what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court
from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court
found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a
regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether
the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues
out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the
executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered
our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect one of their brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial
power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unafraid by
whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of
any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from
the suits at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a
case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men
before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle
of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its
application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he
gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case
against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a
solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this
Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each
other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. SO ORDERED.
||| (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310,
160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160362, 160370, 160376, 160392, 160397, 160403, 160405, [November 10, 2003], 460
PHIL 830-1126)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.]

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; IT IS WELL
WITHIN THE POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO INQUIRE WHETHER INDEED THE SENATE
OR ITS OFFICIALS COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS AND PREROGATIVES. In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of
whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They
claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader.
They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondent. Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this
Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE NO PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OR EVEN THE RULES OF THE SENATE
HAS BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, DISREGARDED OR OVERLOOKED, GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO SENATE OFFICIALS FOR ACTS DONE WITHIN THEIR COMPETENCE AND
AUTHORITY. We hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. Under these
circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment"
or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws
or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. CSEHIa
3. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; WHILE THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE MUST BE ELECTED BY A NUMBER CONSTITUTING MORE THAN ONE HALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS
THEREOF, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT THE MEMBERS WHO WILL NOT VOTE FOR HIM SHALL IPSO
FACTO CONSTITUTE THE "MINORITY," WHO COULD THEREBY ELECT THE MINORITY LEADER. The term
"majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect,
while the Constitutionmandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISION PRESCRIBED WHICH OF THE MANY MINORITY
GROUPS OR THE INDEPENDENTS OR A COMBINATION THEREOF HAS THE RIGHT TO SELECT THE MINORITY
LEADER. Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the group,
party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority,
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribed which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the
right to select the minority leader.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL THAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS IS THAT "EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER
OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY"; THE METHOD OF CHOOSING SUCH OTHER OFFICERS IS MERELY A
DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION;
SUCH METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE COURT. While the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is the "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. The Rules of Senate do not provide for the positions of majority
and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT WILL NEITHER BE A TYRANT NOR A WIMP; RATHER, IT WILL REMAIN
STEADFAST AND JUDICIOUS IN UPHOLDING THE RULE AND MAJESTY OF THE LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL RESPECT
AND A BECOMING REGARD FOR THE SOVEREIGN ACTS OF A CO-EQUAL BRANCH PREVENTS THIS COURT FROM
PRYING INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE. Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide
for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for
the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justified the
Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court
from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law. To accede, then, to the interpretation of
petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fall. DIESaC
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO; USURPATION OF OFFICE; THE PERSON SUING
MUST SHOW THAT HE OR SHE HAS A CLEAR RIGHT TO THE OFFICE; IN CASE AT BAR, PETITIONERS PRESENT
NO SUFFICIENT PROOF OF A CLEAR AND INDUBITABLE FRANCHISE TO THE OFFICE OF THE SENATE MINORITY
LEADER. Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of
title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general
or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another. The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully
holding or exercising such office. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to
the office of the Senate minority leader.

MENDOZA, J.: concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part:


POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; COURTS HAVE NO
POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND BUSINESS OF A HOUSE OF CONGRESS EXCEPT
AS THE QUESTION AFFECTS THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES OR A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION IS
INVOLVED. The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the minority in the Senate entitled
to elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the
government and is thus addressed solely to that august body. Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization
and business of a house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a specific constitutional
limitation is involved. For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the discipline of
members of the legislature and the application and interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house. For indeed, these
matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J.: separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; WHATEVER
DIFFERENCES THE PARTIES MAY HAVE AGAINST EACH OTHER MUST BE SETTLED IN THEIR OWN TURF AND THE
COURT, CONSCIOUS AS IT IS OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY-DELINEATED POWERS, WILL NOT TAKE A STEP TO
OVERSTEP THE SAME. Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a Senate "office" and
does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the
same ground as I previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of the Senate. There is to me
no constitutional breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed
by petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not find support in the text
thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority vote
required for the election of a Senate President and a speaker of the House of Representatives speaks only of such number
or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing, each of the two
Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority
Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As pointed out by my
esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under
paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary, still "the method of choosing who will be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate,
whatever differences the parties may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court, conscious as
it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous move to overstep the same. ITADaE
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws of even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law. LLphil
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader
of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor general "to file
COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents
and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated
September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave
due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September
29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide petitions
for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a
filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the
Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first
regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as
follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian
Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the
Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members
are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President
was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the
question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate
met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the
main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no
constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the
lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16(1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of who is the lawful
Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court
cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is
involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has
the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an interpretation or
application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances"
impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative
practice to support the petitioner's theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various important cases involving
this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions
involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of
Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts
that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like
the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions
as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
"Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly
explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be
expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an
effective settlement are pinned." 15
". . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
refuse to decide them." 16
". . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered." 17
In Taada v. Cuenco, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those questions
which, underthe Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a
political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to
and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon
v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda 23 that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension (of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon
all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary. 24
"The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not
political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political
questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the presidential system of
government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3)
categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or filed of action assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or
decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
"Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality of validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form
of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by
our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle
it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a
'duty, rather than a power,' to determine whether another branch of the government has 'kept within
constitutional limits."
Unlike or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza
v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the
leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in
the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in
nature," since it involve "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's
concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such
action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion.
Earlier in Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a decision of
the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications
of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 3 1 The Court may inquire into a decision or
resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion." 32

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the
certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was
properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached
in the passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation
of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal procedures of the
House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
"It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court things the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. . . In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body."
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try to hew
closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been
observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is
the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid
allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction
of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse
their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or
the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election
of the Senate President "by majority vote of all its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of
"majority" and "minority", as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted
constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships
comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert,
Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President.
Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to
the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one
half of allthe senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the "minority,"
in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of
these terms. cdtai
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in petitioner's
Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E.
Estrada 38 . During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the
minority. 39 This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to
which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority". Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction
with the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy
to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party
system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination
thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
"Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
"SEC. 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro
Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
"These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.
RULE II
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
"SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there
be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections
shall be by viva voce or by resolution."
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders . Neither is there an open
clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof . At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 47

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during
their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being . Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding
the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while
the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative
department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the
judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, said in part: 51
". . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
"Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
"This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question."
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and,
second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one without color of title or
who is not entitled by law thereto 53. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment 54. The action may be brought by the solicitor general
or a public prosecutor 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the
Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested.
Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's
assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility." 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader,
he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at
least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution,
the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, [November 18, 1998], 359 PHIL 276-315)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973.]

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-36164. March 31, 1973.]

VIDAL TAN, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, ALEJANDRO ROCES, MANUEL CRUDO, ANTONIO U.


MIRANDA, EMILIO DE PERALTA and LORENZO M. TAADA, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY
OF LAND REFORM, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE
BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
REORGANIZATION, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE,respondents.

[G.R. No. L-36165. March 31, 1973.]

GERARDO ROXAS, AMBROSIO PADILLA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, SALVADOR H. LAUREL, RAMON


V. MITRA, JR. and EVA ESTRADA-KALAW, petitioners, vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary; JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense;
General ROMEO ESPINO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the philippines;
CONSTANCIO E. CASTAEDA, in his capacity as Secretary of General Services; Senator GIL J.
PUYAT, in his capacity as President of the Senate; and Senator JOSE ROY, in his capacity as
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-36236. March 31, 1973.]

EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, [personally and in his capacity President of the National Press Club of
the Philippines],petitioner, vs, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER & THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondent.

[G.R. No. L-36283. March 31, 1973.]

NAPOLEON V. DILAG, ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., LEONARDO ASODISEN, JR., and RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, petitioners,vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
HONORABLE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE HONORABLE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Josue Javellana.


Lorenzo M. Taada & Associates for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.
Taada, Salonga, Ordoez, Rodrigo, Sanidad Roxas Gonzales and Arroyo for petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al.
Joker P. Arroyo and Rogelio B. Padilla for petitioner Eddie Monteclaro.
Raul M. Gonzales & Associates for petitioners Napoleon V. Dilag, et al.
Arturo M. Tolentino for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Solicitor Vicente V . Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno for other respondents.

RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, J p:

The above entitled five (5) cases are a sequel of cases G.R. Nos. L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-
35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965 and L-35979, decided on January 22, 1973, to which We will hereafter
refer collectively plebiscite cases.

Background of the Plebiscite Cases


The factual setting thereof is set forth in the decision rendered, from which We quote:
"On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended
by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented
by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election
of delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the, 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 73, 'submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor,' as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
"Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G.R. No. L-35925,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin
said 'respondents or their agents from implementingPresidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until
further orders of the Court,' upon the grounds, inter alia that said Presidential Decree 'has no force and
effect as law because the calling . . . of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the
same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in
Congress . . .,' and 'there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for
January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being sufficient time
to inform the people of the contents thereof.'
"Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad against the
Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35929); on December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al.,
against the Commission on Elections, Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General
(Case G.R. L-35940), by Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of
the Philippines (Case G.R. No L-35941), and by Sedfrey A. Ordoez, et al. against the National Treasurer
and the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35942); on December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al.,
against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the
Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35948), and by Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino against the
Commission on Elections (Case G R No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by Jacinto Jimenez against
the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on
Elections, the Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-
35965), and on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the Commission on Elections, the
Secretary of Education, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).
"In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required to file their
answers 'not later than 12:00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16, 1972.' Said cases were, also, set
for hearing and partly heard on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued on
December 19, 1972. By agreement of the parties, the aforementioned last case G.R. No. L-35979
was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, on that
date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases were given a short period of time within which 'to
submit their notes on the points they desire to stress.' Said notes were filed on different dates, between
December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973.
"Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for ratification or rejection
of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing 'that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973
be postponed until further notice.' Said General Order No. 20, moreover, 'suspended in the meantime' the
'order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes
of free and open debate on the proposedConstitution.'
"In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed
it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22,
1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have
the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the
Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an 'urgent motion,'
praying that said case be decided 'as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.' It
was alleged in said motion, inter alia.
'6.That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 86 organizing the
so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin Today, January 1,
1973];
'7.That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose
"[1]The New Society;
"[2]Reforms instituted under Martial Law;
"[3]The holding of a plebiscite on proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative
new dates given following postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are
February 19 and March 5);
"[4]The opening of the regular session on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.]
'8.That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to be asked to the
Citizens Assemblies:

"[1]Do you approve of the New Society?


"[2]Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
"[3]Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
"[4]How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?" [Bulletin
Today, January 5, 1973].
'9.That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take place during the period
from January 10 to January 15, 1973;
'10.That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that one more question would be added to the four (4)
questions previously announced, and that the forms of the questions would be as follows:
"[1]Do you like the New Society?
"[2]Do you like the reforms under martial law?
"[3]Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
"[4]Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
"[5]Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?"
[Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; additional question italics.]
'11.That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be submitted to the so
called Assemblies:
"[1]Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to
decide issues of national interests?
"[2]Do you approve of the New Constitution?
"[3]Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
"[4]Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution?
"[5]If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?
"[6]Do you want martial law to continue?" [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973; italics
supplied.]
'12.That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional questions quoted above will
be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof;
'13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page which we marked as Annex "A-1", and which
reads:
"COMMENTS ON
QUESTION No. 1
In order to broaden the base of citizen participation in government.
QUESTION No. 2
But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be convened at
all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the
New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the
Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the Constitution, then the new Constitution should be
deemed ratified.
QUESTION No. 4
We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so many
debates and so much expenses.
QUESTION No. 5
Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough for
stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to return.
QUESTION No. 6
We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can accomplish
all his reform programs and establish normalcy in the country. If all other measures fail, we
want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government along the lines of the
newConstitution without the ad interim Assembly."
'Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3," which reads:
"QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the plebiscite on the
New Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the
new Constitution should be deemed ratified."
This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities.
'14.That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7, 1973, the President
announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed Constitution was being withdrawn and
that the proclamation of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder would thenceforth
strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973];
'15.That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added in the last list of
questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely:
"Do you approve of the New Constitution?"
in relation to the question following it:
"Do you still want a plebiscite to becalled to ratify the new Constitution?"
would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which the question of the
validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now pending;
'16.That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative answer to the two
questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable Court and the entire nation will be
confronted with a fait accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and undemocratic
manner;
'17.That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people approving the
proposed Constitution;
'18.That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court could, to all intents and
purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of such
supposed expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be announced
that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has been ratified;
'19.That, in such a situation, the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is likelihood of confusion
if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will not know which Constitution is in force.
'20.That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will immediately decide
and announce its decision on the present petition;
'21.That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on the
proposed Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to See. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73,
the opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer that the proposed plebiscite be prohibited has now
collapsed and that a free plebiscite can no longer be held.'
"At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a 'manifestation' filed by the petitioners in L-
35949, 'Gerardo Roxas, et al, v. Commission on Elections, et al.,' and L-35942, 'Sedfrey Ordoez, et al. v.
The National Treasurer, et al.'
"The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said 'urgent motion' and 'manifestation,' 'not later that
Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.' Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed a 'supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order
and inclusion of additional respondents,' praying
'. . . that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission
on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose
Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the
National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned
such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other
officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained
when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and
January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent
Motion.'
"In support of this prayer, it was alleged
'3.That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that this
Honorable Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents, particularly respondent
Commission on Elections as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado
Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega;
and their deputies, subordinates and/or substitutes, from collecting certifying, announcing and
reporting to the President the supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly
obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period between January 10 and
January 15, 1973, particularly on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion;
'4.That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void
particularly insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a supposed consensus for
the ratification of the proposed Constitution because:
[a]The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the
proposed constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are
elections at which only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote,
whereas, the so called Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15
years of age and older, regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed
in the Election Code;
[b]Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments
contemplated in Article XV ofthe Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of
choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of action, but votes
in the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by raising hands;
[c]The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and honest
elections, and such provisions are a minimum requirement for elections or
plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no
similar provisions to guide and regulate proceedings of the so called Citizens'
Assemblies;
[d]It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more than a
handful of the so called Citizens' Assemblies have been actually formed, because
the mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a day or so before
the day they were supposed to begin functioning

'Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors had been


meeting with barrio captains and community leaders since last Monday
[January 8, 1973] to thresh out the mechanics in the formation of the
Citizens' Assemblies and the topics for discussion.' [Bulletin Today,
January 10, 1973].
'It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the
beginning of the year [Daily Express, January 1, 1973], and considering the lack of experience of
the local organizers of said assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for
organization, it is too much to believe that such assemblies could be organized at such a short
notice.
'5.That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the
additional officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion could not be completed because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12,
1973, the submission of the proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was not made
known to the public until January 11, 1973. But be that as it may, the said additional officials and
agencies may be properly included in the petition at bar because:
[a]The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the annulment
not only of Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any similar decree,
proclamation, order or instruction."
so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the
proposed Constitution to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is properly in issue in
this case, and those who enforce, implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86,
and the instructions incidental thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition;
[b]In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining not only the respondents named in the petition but also their
"agents" from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any
other similar decree, order, instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of
a plebiscite on January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino
people for their ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or
proposed Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on November
30, 1972"; and finally,
[c]Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and equitable.
[p. 39, Petition].
'Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies
mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully he reached by the
processes of this Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that the
Commission on Elections has under our laws the power, among others, of:
"(a)Direct and immediate supervision and control over national, provincial,
city, municipal and municipal district officials required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the enforcement of the
provisions of this Code . . ." [Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3].
'6.That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on
Elections, together with the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this
Supplemental Urgent Motion are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or
announcing to the President the results of the alleged voting of the so-called Citizens'
Assemblies, irreparable damage will be caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino
people, the cause of freedom and democracy, and the petitioners herein because:
[a]After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof shall have been announced, a conflict will arise between those
who maintain that the 1935 Constitution is still in force, on the one hand, and
those who will maintain that it has been superseded by the proposed Constitution,
on the other, thereby creating confusion, if not chaos;
[b]Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack
because the advocates of the theory that the proposed Constitution has been
ratified by reason of the announcement of the results of the proceedings of the so-
called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that, General Order No. 3, which shall also
be deemed ratified pursuant to the Transitory Provisions of the
proposed Constitution, has placed Presidential Decree Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the
reach and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.'
"On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in
said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file 'file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday,
January 16, 1973,' and setting the motion for hearing 'on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.' While the case
was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of
this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering
to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-
35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there
present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed
said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No.
1102 which is of the following tenor:
'BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
'PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
'ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
'WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one
Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
'WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in
districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31,
1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six
months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list
of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
'WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the
base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the
citizenry to express their views on important national issues;
'WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens
Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the NewConstitution? Do you still want a plebiscite
to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
'WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one
(14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the
proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would
still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred
ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for
a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a
vote in a plebiscite;
'WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent
of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution,
the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should
already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;
'NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the
Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby
come into effect.
'IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
'Done in the City of Manila, this 17 th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
'President of the Philippines
'By the President:
'ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
'Executive Secretary'
"Such is the background of the cases submitted for Our determination. After admitting some of the
allegations made in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations thereof, respondents therein
alleged in their answer thereto, by way of affirmative defenses: 1) that the 'questions raised' in said
petition 'are political in character'; 2) that 'the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had plenary
authority to propose not only amendments but a Constitution which would supersede the
present Constitution' as that 'the President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for this
purpose are valid'; 4) that 'there is not an improper submission' and there can be a plebiscite
under Martial Law'; and 5) that the 'argument that the Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete,
makes an unconstitutional delegation of power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial
Law and purports to exercise judicial power' is 'not relevant and . . . without merit.' Identical defenses
were set up in the other cases under consideration.
"Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of that date, the
Members of the Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned cases and, after extensive
discussions on the merits thereof, have deemed it best that each Member write his own views thereon
and that thereafter the Chief Justice should state the result or the votes thus cast on the points in issue.
Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court are set forth in the opinions attached hereto,
except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Members have preferred to merely concur in
the opinion of one of our colleagues."

Then the writer of said decision expressed his own opinion on the issues involved therein, after which he recapitulated the
views of the Members of the Court, as follows:
"1.There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73.
"2.On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and
myself, or six (6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and
academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.
"3.On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to
incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justices Fernando,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention.
"4.Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority
to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view.
"5.On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the
proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned Justice
Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnance between the election contemplated under Art. XV of
the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were
they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that issue
involves questions of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not
necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated.
"6.On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
"a.Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and myself
are of the opinion that the question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised
before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
"b.Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the purported
ratification of the Proposed Constitution . . . based on the referendum among Citizens'
Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution,' but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, 'considering all other related
relevant circumstances, . . . the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be
recognized as legitimately in force.'
"c.Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no
force and effect whatsoever.
"d.Justice Antonio feels 'that the Court is not competent to act' on the issue whether the
Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, 'in the absence of any judicially
discoverable and manageable standards,' since the issue 'poses a question of fact.'
"7.On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their
respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee, and the writer similarly voted, except as regards
Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time
within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case
No. L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther
and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration."
Accordingly, the Court acting in conformity with the position taken by six (6) of its members, 1 with three (3) members
dissenting, 2with respect to G.R. No. L-35948, only, and another member 3 dissenting, as regards all of the cases
dismissed the same, without special pronouncement as to costs.
The Present Cases
Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents, from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution' referring to that of
1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a
class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24,
1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the
President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including,"
and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create
the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution . . ."; "that the President is
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Similar actions were filed, on January 23, 1973, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta, Alejandro Roces, Manuel Crudo, Antonio
U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M. Taada against the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Finance Justice,
Land Reform, and National Defense, the Auditor General, Budget Commissioner, the Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Reorganization, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Commission on Elections and the Commissioner of
Civil Service 4 ; on February 3, 1973, by Eddie Monteclaro, personally and as President of the National Press Club of the
Philippines, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Public Information, the Auditor General, Budget Commissioner
and the National Treasurer 5 ; and on February 12, 1973, by Napoleon V. Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., Leonardo
Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M. Gonzales, 6 against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Budget
Commissioner and the Auditor General.
Likewise, on January 23, 1973, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito R. Salonga, Salvador H. Laurel, 7 Ramon V. Mitra,
Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as "duly elected Senator and Minority Floor Leader of the Senate," and the others as
"duly elected members" thereof, filed Case G.R. No. L-36165, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Secretary of General Services, the President and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate. In their petition as amended on January 26, 1973 petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et
al. allege, inter alia, that the term of office of three (3) of the aforementioned petitioners 8 would expire en December 31,
1975, and that of the others 9 on December 31, 1977; that pursuant to our1935 Constitution, "which is still in force,"
Congress of the Philippines "must convene for its 8th Session on Monday, January 22, 1973, at 10:00 A.M., which is the
regular customary hour of its opening session"; that "on said day, from 10:00 A.M. up to the afternoon," said petitioner
"along with their other colleagues, were unlawfully prevent from using the Senate Session Hall, the same having be closed
by the authorities in physical possession and control of the Legislative Building'; that "(a)t about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. of the said
day, the premises of the entire Legislative Building were ordered cleared by the same authorities, and no one was allowed
to enter and have access to said premises"; that "(r)espondent Senate President Gil J. Puyat and, in his absence,
respondent President Pro Tempore Jose Roy were asked by petitioning Senators to perform their duties under the law and
the Rules of the Senate, but unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from doing so"; that the petitioners "are ready and
willing to perform their duties as duly elected members of the Senate of the Philippines," but respondents Secretary of
National Defense, Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff, "through their agents and representatives, are preventing
petitioners from performing their duties as duly elected Senators of the Philippines"; that "the Senate premises in the
Congress of the Philippines Building . . . are occupied by and are under the physical control of the elements of military
organizations under the direction of said respondents"; that, as per "official reports, the Department of General Services . . .
is now the civilian agent in custody of the premises of the Legislative Building"; that respondents "have unlawfully excluded
and prevented, and continue to so exclude and prevent" the petitioners from the performance of their sworn duties, invoking
the alleged approval of the 1972 (1973) Constitution of the Philippines by action of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies on
January 10, 1973 to January 15, 197 ', as stated in and by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 signed and issued by the
President of the Philippines"; that "the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as instrumentalities for the ratification of
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and palpably unconstitutional; that respondents
Senate President and Senate President Pro Tempore "have unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from and/or
unlawfully neglected and continue to neglect the performance of their duties and functions as such officers under the law
and the Rules of the Senate" quoted in the petition; that because of events supervening the institution of the plebiscite
cases, to which reference has been made in the preceding pages" the Supreme Court dismissed said cases on January 22,
1973, by a majority vote, upon the ground that the petitions therein had become moot and academic; that the alleged
ratification of the 1972 (1973) Constitution "is illegal, unconstitutional and void and . . . can not have superseded and
revoked the 1935 Constitution," for the reasons specified in the petition as amended; that, by acting as they did, the
respondents and their "agents, representatives and subordinates . . . have excluded the petitioners from an office to which"
they "are lawfully entitled"; that "respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy have unlawfully refrained from convening the
Senate for its 8th session, assuming general jurisdiction over the Session Hall and the premises of the Senate and . . .
continue such inaction up to this time and . . . a writ of mandamus is warranted in order to compel them to comply with the
duties and functions specifically enjoined by law"; and that "against the above mentioned unlawful acts of the respondents,
the petitioners have no appeal nor other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except by invoking the
equitable remedies of mandamus and prohibition with the provisional remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction."

Premised upon the foregoing allegations, said petitioners prayed that, "pending hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued ordering the respondents Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the . . . Secretary of General Services, as well as all their agents,
representatives and subordinates to vacate the premises of the Senate of the Philippines and to deliver physical possession
of the same to the President of the Senate or his authorized representative"; and that "after hearing, judgment be rendered
declaring null and void Proclamation No. 1102 . . . and any order, decree, or proclamation having the same import and
objective, issuing the writs of prohibition and mandamus, as prayed for against the above-mentioned respondents, and
making the writ of injunction permanent; and that a writ of mandamus be issued against the respondents Gil J. Puyat and
Jose Roy directing them to comply with their duties and functions as President and President Pro Tempore, respectively, of
the Senate of the Philippines, as provided by law and the Rules of the Senate."
Required to comment on the above-mentioned petitions and/or amended petitions, respondents filed, with the leave of
Court first had and obtained, a consolidated comment on said petitions and/or amended petitions, a consolidated comment
on said petitions and/or amended petitions, alleging that the same ought to have been dismissed outright; controverting
petitioners' allegations concerning the alleged lack or impairment of the freedom of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to
approve the proposed Constitution, its alleged lack of authority to incorporate certain contested provisions thereof, the
alleged lack of authority of the President to create and establish Citizens' Assemblies "for the purpose of submitting to them
the matter of ratification of the new Constitution," the alleged "improper or inadequate submission of the proposed
constitution," the "procedure for ratification adopted . . . through the Citizens Assemblies"; and maintaining that: 1) "(t)he
Court is without jurisdiction to act on these petitions"; 2) the questions raised therein are "political in character and therefore
non-justiciable"; 3) "there was substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was
properly submitted to the people in a free, orderly and honest election"; 5) " Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of
the election, is conclusive upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
not exclusive of other modes of amendment."
Respondents Puyat and Roy, in said Case G.R. No. L-36165, filed their separate comment therein, alleging that "(t)he
subject matter" of said case "is a highly political question which, under the circumstances, this . . . Court would not be in a
position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the opinions expressed by three members of this Court in its decision in
the plebiscite cases, in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further proceedings in this case may only be
an academic exercise in futility."
On February 5, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents in L 36236 to comment on the petition therein not
later than Saturday, February 10, 1973, and setting the case for hearing on February 12, 1973, at 9:30 a.m. By resolution
dated February 7, 1973, this Court resolved to consider the comments of the respondents in cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-
36161, L-36165, as motions to dismiss the petitions therein, and to set said cases for hearing on the same date and time as
L-36236. On that date, the parties in G.R. No. L-36283 10 agreed that the same be, likewise, heard, as it was, in fact, heard
jointly with the aforementioned cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165 and L 36236. The hearing, which began on
February 12, shortly after 9:30 a.m., was continued not only that after but, also, on February 13, 14, 15 and 16, morning and
afternoon, after which the parties were granted up to February 24, 1973, noon, within which to submit their notes arguments
and additional arguments, as well as the documents required of them or whose presentation was reserved by them. The
same resolution granted the parties until March 1, 1973, to reply to the notes filed by their respective opponents. Counsel
for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165 filed their aforementioned notes on February 24, 1973, on which date
the Solicitor General sought an extension of time up to March 3, 1973, within which to file his notes, which was granted, with
the understanding that said notes shall include his reply to the notes already filed by the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164
and L-36165. Counsel for the petitioners, likewise, moved and were granted an extension of time, to expire on March 10,
1973, within which to file, as they did, their notes in reply to those submitted by the Solicitor General on March 3, 1973. On
March 21, 1973, petitioners in l-36165 filed a "Manifestation and Supplemental Rejoinder," whereas the Office of the
Solicitor General submitted in all these cases a "Rejoinder to Petitioners' Replies."
After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and serve a copy
thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon.
Such individual opinions are appended hereto.
Accordingly, the writer will first express his personal opinion on the issues before the Court. After the exposition of his
aforesaid opinion, the writer will make, concurrently with his colleagues in the Court, a resume of summary of the votes cast
by them in these cases.
Writer's Personal Opinion
I
Alleged academic futility of further proceedings in G.R. No. L-36165.
This defense or theory, set up by counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy in G.R. No. L-36165, and, also, by the
Solicitor General, is predicated upon the fact that, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, Mr. Justice Barredo expressed the
view that the 1935 Constitution had "pro tanto passed into history" and "been legitimately supplanted by the
Constitution now in force by virtue ofProclamation No. 1102 . . . "; that Mr. Justice Antonio did not feel "that this Court is
competent to act" in said cases "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards" and because "the
access to relevant information is insufficient to assure the correct determination of the issue," apart from the circumstance
that "the new constitution has been promulgate and great interests have already arisen under it" and that the political organ
of the Government has recognized its provisions; whereas, Mr. Justice Esguerra had postulated that "(w)ithout any
competent evidence . . . about the circumstances attending the holding" of the referendum or plebiscite" thru the Citizens'
Assemblies, he "cannot say that it was not lawfully held" and that, accordingly, he assumed "that what the proclamation (No.
1102) says on its face is true and until overcome by satisfactory evidence" he could not "subscribe to the claim that such
plebiscite was not held accordingly"; and that he accepted "as a fait accompli that the Constitution adopted (by the 1971
Constitutional Convention) on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified."
Counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy goes on to say that, under these circumstances, "it seems remote or
improbable that the necessary eight (8) votes under the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten (10) votes required by the
1972 (1973) Constitution, can be obtained for the relief sought in the Amended Petition" in G.R. No. L-36165.
I am unable to share this view. To begin with, Mr. Justice Barredo announced publicly, in open court, during the hearing of
these cases, that he was and is willing to be convinced that his aforementioned opinion in the plebiscite cases should be
reconsidered and changed. In effect, he thus declared that he had an open mind in connection with the cases at bar, and
that in deciding the same he would not necessarily adhere to said opinion if the petitioners herein succeeded in convincing
him that their view should be sustained.
Secondly, counsel for the aforesaid respondents had apparently assumed that, under the 1935 Constitution, eigth (8) votes
are necessary to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No. 1102. I do not believe that this assumption is borne out by
any provision of said Constitution. Section 10 of Article VIII thereof reads:
"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two
thirds of all the members of the Court."
Pursuant to this section, the concurrence of two thirds of all the Members of the Supreme Court is required only to declare a
"treaty or law" unconstitutional. Construing said provision, in a resolution dated September 16, 1949, then Chief Justice
Moran, voicing theunanimous view of the Members of this Court, postulated:
". . . There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to
nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the
previous drafts of section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution, 'execution order' and 'regulation' were
included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the
Court. But 'executive order' and 'regulation' were later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six members of this Court
is enough to nullify them." 11
The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (eight [8] votes) requirement, indeed, was made to
apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the participation of the two other departments of the government
the Executive and the Legislative is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules, regulations and executive
orders. Indeed, a law(statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval or veto of the President, whose disapproval
cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all members of each House of Congress. 12 A treaty is
entered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate, 13 which is not required in the case of rules, regulations
or executive orders which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to nullify the same, a lesser number of votes is
necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to invalidate a law or treaty.
Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the President, the dictum applies with
equal force to executive proclamations, like said Proclamation No. 1102, inasmuch as the authority to issue the same is
governed by section 63 of theRevised Administrative Code, which provides:
"Administrative acts and commands of the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines touching the
organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the districts,
divisions, parts, or ports of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines and all acts and commands governing the
general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be
made effective in executive orders.
"Executive orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or orders are to have or cease to
(have) effect and any information concerning matters of public moment determined by law, resolution, or
executive orders, may be promulgated in an executive proclamation, with all the force of an executive
order." 14
In fact, while executive orders embody administrative acts or commands of the President, executive proclamations are
mainly informative and declaratory in character, and so does counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy maintain in
G.R. No. L-36165. 15As consequence, an executive proclamation has no more than "the force of an executive order," so
that, for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the same number of
votes needed to invalidate an executive order, rule of regulation namely, six (6) votes would suffice.
As regards the applicability of the provisions of the proposed new Constitution, approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, in the determination of the question whether or not it is now in force, it is obvious that such question depends
upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional Convention was called and approved the proposed Constitution.
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be settled by applying the
provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification, or the old Constitution. 16
II
Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature of a political, and, hence, non-justiciable
question?
The Solicitor General maintains in his comment the affirmative view and this is his main defense. In support thereof, he
alleges that "petitioners would have this Court declare as invalid the New Constitution of the Republic" from which he
claims "this Court now derives its authority"; that "nearly 15 million of our body politic from the age of 15 years have
mandated this Constitution to be the NewConstitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in reliance on it caution
against interposition of the power of judicial review"; that "In the case of the New Constitution, the government has been
recognized in accordance with the New Constitution"; that "the country's foreign relations are now being conducted in
accordance with the new charter"; that "foreign governments have taken note of it"; that the "plebiscite cases" are "not
precedents for holding questions regarding proposal and ratification justiciable"; and that "to abstain from judgment on the
ultimate issue of constitutionality is not to abdicate duty."
At the outset, it is obvious to me that We are not being asked to "declare" the new Constitution invalid. What petitioners
dispute is the theory that it has been validly ratified by the people, especially that they have done so in accordance with
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners maintain that the conclusion by the Chief Executive in the dispositive
portion of Proclamation No. 1102 is not borne out by the whereases preceding the same, as the predicates from which said
conclusion was drawn; that the plebiscite or "election" required in said Article XV has not been held; that the Chief Executive
has not authority, under the 1935 Constitution, to dispense with said election or plebiscite; that the proceedings before the
Citizens' Assemblies did not constitution and may not be considered as such plebiscite; that the facts of record abundantly
show that the aforementioned Assemblies could not have been held throughout the Philippines from January 10 to January
15, 1973; and that, in any event, the proceedings in said Assemblies are null and void as an alleged ratification of the new
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, not only because of the circumstances under which said
Assemblies had been created and held, but, also, because persons disqualified to vote under Article V of the
Constitution were allowed to participate therein, because the provisions of our Election Code were not observed in said
Assemblies, because the same were not held under the supervision of the Commission on Elections, in violations of section
2 of Article X of the 1935 Constitution, and because the existence of Martial Law and General Order No. 20, withdrawing or
suspending the limited freedom to discuss the merits and demerits of said proposed Constitution, impaired the people's
freedom in voting thereon, particularly, a viva voce, as it was done in many instances, as well as their ability to have a
reasonable knowledge of the contents of the document on which they were allegedly called upon to express their views.
Referring now more specifically to the issue on whether the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is a political question
or not, I do not hesitate to state that the answer must be in the negative. Indeed, such is the position taken by this
Court, 17 in an endless line of decisions, too long to leave any room for possible doubt that said issue is inherently and
essentially justiciable. Such, also, has been the consistent position of the courts of the United States of America, whose
decisions have a persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, our constitutional system in the 1935 Constitution being patterned
after that of the United States. Besides, no plausible reason has, to my mind, been advanced to warrant a departure from
said position, consistently with the form of government established under said Constitution.
Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, 18 We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question
whetherPresidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the
proposed newConstitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of
a political nature; and Weunanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity, We overruled
the respondents' contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, 19 questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus on
August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelona v. Baker 20 and Montenegro v.
Castaeda, 21 insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly abandoned and refused to apply. For
the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 22 the political-
question theory adopted in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 23 Hence, respondents herein urge Us to reconsider the action thus
taken by the Court and to revert to and follow the views expressed in Barcelon v. Baker and Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 24
The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support of the political-
question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and
found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence, Our decision in the
aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis, which gained added weight by its
virtual reiteration in the plebiscite cases.
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and
simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of
powers characteristic of the Presidential system of government the functions of which are classified or divided, by
reason of their nature, into three (8) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the
legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying
and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is
supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of
action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts
performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions
arewithin the area allocated thereto by the Constitution. 25
This principle of separation of powers under the Presidential system goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law with some powers to forestall, restrain or arrest
a possible or actual misuse or abuse of powers by the other departments. Hence, the appointing power of the Executive, his
pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call the Legislature or Congress to special sessions and even to prescribe
or limit the object or objects of legislation that may be taken up in such sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an agency or
arm thereof such as the Commission on Appointments; may approve or disapprove some appointments made by the
President, It, also, has the power of appropriation, to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,"
as well as that of impeachment. Upon the other hand, under the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the "Supreme
Court and . . . such inferior courts as may be established by law," may settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable
controversies between private individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or conflicts between a private individual or entity, on
the one hand, and an officer or branch of the government, on the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service,
when the latter officer or branch is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so,
when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such
power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of
justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon another branch of the service to
the exclusion of the others. Hence, inTaada v. Cuenco, 26 this Court quoted with approval from In re McConaughy, 27 the
following:

"'At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and
not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board
would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a
fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney
General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx xxx
"'. . . What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a
matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity , or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary
power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, N.W. 724, 15 L.R.A. 561; In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155;
32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L.R.A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16 C .C.A. 516, 30 L.R.A. 90; Fletcher vs.
Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the
people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political
questions, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long
as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot
be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws
have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government
must act according to law and subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard
thereof must subject him to that restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the
agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that the people act through courts, as well as through
the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary
is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law
places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and
America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not of men" words
which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document.' (Italics
supplied.)"
and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped, understandable to the laymen,
We added that ". . . the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy" in matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. "In other words, in the language
of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, it justiciable or non-political, the crux of
the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or
limitations particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential
form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates.
As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, 28 it was held that
courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within
constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides
how it may be amended as it is in our 1935 Constitution "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." 29 In fact, this very Court speaking through Justice
Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost
leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, thejudicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the government. 30
The Solicitor General has invoked Luther v. Borden 31 in support of his stand that the issue under consideration is non-
justiciable in nature. Neither the factual background of that case nor the action taken therein by the Federal Supreme Court
has any similarity with or bearing on the cases under consideration.
Luther v. Borden was an action for trespass filed by Luther with the Circuit Court of the United States against Borden and
others for having forcibly entered into Luther's house, in Rhode Island, sometime in 1842. The defendants who were in the
military service of said former colony of England, alleged in their defense that they had acted in obedience to the commands
of a superior officer, because Luther and others were engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and
the state had been placed by competent authority under Martial Law. Such authority was the charter government of Rhode
Island at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for unlike other states which adopted a new Constitution upon
secession from England Rhode Island retained its form of government under a British Charter, making only such
alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to its subsequent condition as an independent state. It
was under this form of government when Rhode Island joined other American states in the Declaration of Independence
and, by subsequently ratifying the Constitution of the United States, became a member of the Union. In 1843, it adopted a
new Constitution.
Prior thereto, however, many citizens had become dissatisfied with the charter government. Memorials addressed by them
to the Legislature having failed to bring about the desired effect, meetings were held and associations formed by those
who belonged to this segment of the population which eventually resulted in a convention called for the drafting of a
new Constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. The convention was not authorized by any law
of the existing government. The delegates to such convention framed a new Constitution which was submitted to the
people. Upon the return of the votes cast by them, the convention declared that said Constitution had been adopted and
ratified by a majority of the people and became the paramount law and Constitution of Rhode Island.
The charter government, which was supported by a large number of citizens of the state, contested, however, the validity of
said proceedings. This notwithstanding, one Thomas W. Dorr, who had been elected governor under the new Constitution of
the rebels, prepared to assert authority by force of arms, and many citizens assembled to support him. Thereupon, the
charter government passed an Act declaring the state under Martial Law and adopted measures to repel the threatened
attack and subdue the rebels. This was the state of affairs when the defendants, who were in the military service of the
charter government and were to arrest Luther, for engaging in the support of the rebel government which was never able
to exercise any authority in the state broke into his house.
Meanwhile, the charter government had taken measures to call its own convention to revise the existing form of
government. Eventually, a new constitution was drafted by a convention held under the authority of the charter government,
and thereafter was adopted and ratified by the people. "(T)he times and places at which the votes were to be persons who
were to be given, the receive and return them qualifications of the voters having all been previously authorized and
provided for by law passed by the charter government," the latter formally surrendered all of its power to the new
government, established under its authority, in May 1843, which had been in operation uninterruptedly since then.
About a year before, or in May 1842, Dorr, at the head of a military force, had made an unsuccessful attempt to take
possession of the state arsenal in Providence, but he was repulsed, and, after an "assemblage of some hundreds of armed
men under his command at Chepatchet in the June following which dispersed upon approach of the troops of the old
government, no further effort was made to establish" his government. ". . . until the Constitution of 1843" adopted under
the auspices of the charter government "went into operation, the charter government continued to asset its authority and
exercise its powers and to enforce obedience throughout the state . . ."

Having offered to introduce evidence to prove that the constitution of the rebels had been ratified by the majority of the
people, which the Circuit Court rejected, apart from rendering judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff took the case for
review to the Federal Supreme Court which affirmed the action of the Circuit Court, stating:
"It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of State decisions, that the trial of
Thomas W. Dorr took place after the constitution of 1843 when into operation. The judges who decided
that the case held their authority under that constitution; and it is admitted on all hands that it was
adopted by the people of the State, and is the lawful and established government. It is the decision,
therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the constitution and laws of Rhode
Island is not questioned by either party to this controversy, although the government under which it acted
was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government.
"The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question
relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State; and the well settled rule in this court is, that
the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which
concern merely the constitution and laws of the State.
"Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of United States which tried this case have departed from this
rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode Island? Undoubtedly the courts
of the United States have certain powers under the Constitution and laws of the United States which do
not government has been lawfully established, which the courts of State disown and repudiate, is not one
of them. Upon such a question the courts of the United States are bound to follow the decisions of the
State tribunals, and must therefore regard the charter government as the lawful and established
government during the time of this contest." 32
It is thus apparent that the context within which the case of Luther v. Borden was decided is basically and fundamentally
different from that of the cases at bar. To begin with, the case did not involve a federal question, but one purely municipal in
nature. Hence, the Federal Supreme Court was "bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals" of Rhode Island
upholding the constitution adopted under the authority of the charter government. Whatever else was said in that case
constitutes, therefore, an obiter dictum. Besides, no decision analogous to that rendered by the State Court of Rhode Island
exists in the cases at bar. Secondly, the states of the Union have a measure of internal sovereignty upon which the Federal
Government may not encroach, whereas ours is a unitary form of government, under which our local governments derive
their authority from the national government. Again, unlike our 1935 Constitution, the charter or organic law of Rhode Island
contained no provision on the manner, procedure or conditions for its amendment.
Then, too, the case of Luther v. Borden hinged more on the question of recognition of government, than on recognition
of constitution, and there is a fundamental difference between these two (2) types of recognition, the first being generally
conceded to be a political question, whereas the nature of the latter depends upon a number of factors, one of them being
whether the new Constitution in force at the time of the purported ratification of the former, which
is essentially a justiciable question. There was, in Luther v. Borden, a conflict between two (2) rival governments,
antagonistic to each other, which is absent in the present cases. Here, the Government established under the 1935
Constitution is the very same government whose Executive Department has urged the adoption of the new or revised
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and now alleges that it has been ratified by the people.
In short, the views expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849, on matters other than
those referring to its power to review decisions of a state court concerning the constitution and government of that state, not
the Federal Constitutionor Government, are manifestly neither controlling, nor even persuasive in the present cases, having
as the Federal Supreme Court admitted no authority whatsoever to pass upon such matters or to review decisions of
said state court thereon. In fact, referring to that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had the following to say:
"Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, is always cited by those who assert that the courts have no
power to determine questions of a political character. It is interesting historically, but it has not the
slightest application to the case at bar. When carefully analyzed, it appears that it merely determines that
the federal courts will accept as final and controlling a decision of the highest court of a state upon a
question of the construction of the Constitution of the state . . ." 33
Baker v. Carr, 34 cited by respondents, involved an action to annul a Tennessee statute apportioning the seats in the
General Assembly among the counties of the State, upon the theory that the legislation violated the equal protection clause.
A district court dismissed the case upon the ground, among others, that the issue was a political one, but, after a
painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and held
that said issue was justiciable and non-political, inasmuch as: ". . . (d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution . . ."
Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack, 35 the same Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Warren, reversed a decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York affirming that of a Federal District Court, dismissing Powell's action for a declaratory
judgment declaring thereunder that he whose qualifications were uncontested had been unlawfully excluded from the
90th Congress of the U.S. Said dismissal was predicated upon the ground, inter alia, that the issue was political, but the
Federal Supreme Court held that it was clearly a justiciable one.
The Supreme Court of Minnessota undertook a careful review of American jurisprudence on the matter. Owing to the lucidity
of its appraisal thereof, We append the same to this opinion as Annex A thereof.
After an exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded:
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial question. There
can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the
Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine the question; and even then many
of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law . . . " 36
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its
amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature,
and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to decide such question.
The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit'"
because it allegedly involves a political question "a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority.'" 37
III
Has the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified conformably to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution?
Petitioners in L-36142 maintain the negative view, upon the ground: 1) that the President "is without authority to create the
Citizens' Assemblies" through which, respondents maintain, the proposed new Constitution has been ratified; 2) that said
Assemblies "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution"; 3) that the President "is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and 4),that "the election held (in the Citizens' Assemblies) to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Apart from substantially reiterating these grounds support of said negative view, the petitioners in L-36164 contend: 1) that
the President "has no power to call a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection" of the proposed Constitution or "to
appropriate funds for the holding of said plebiscite"; 2) that the proposed new or revised Constitution "is vague and
incomplete," as well as "contains provisions which are beyond the powers of the 1971 Convention to enact," thereby
rendering it "unfit for . . . submission to the people;" 3) that "(t)he period of time between November 30, 1972 when the 1972
draft was approved and January 11-15, 1973," when the Citizens' Assemblies supposedly ratified said draft, "was too short,
worse still, there was practically no time for the Citizens' Assemblies to discuss the merits of the Constitution which the
majority of them have not read and which they never knew would be submitted to them for ratification until they were asked
the question 'do you approve of the New Constitution?' during the said days of the voting"; and that "(t)here was
altogether no freedom of discussion and no opportunity to concentrate on the matter submitted to them when the 1972 draft
was supposedly submitted to the Citizens' Assemblies for ratification."

Petitioner in L-36236 added, as arguments in support of the negative view, that: 1) "(w)ith a government-controlled press,
there can never be a fair and proper submission of the proposed Constitution to the people"; and 2) Proclamation No.
1102 is null and void "(i)nasmuch as the ratification process" prescribed "in the 1935 Constitution was not followed."
Besides adopting substantially some of the grounds relied upon by the petitioners in the above mentioned cases, the
petitioners in L-36283 argue that "(t)he creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as the vehicle for the ratification of the
Constitution was a deception upon the people since the President announced the postponement of the January 15, 1973
plebiscite to either February 19 or March 5, 1973."38
The reasons adduced by the petitioners in L-36165 in favor of the negative view have already been set forth earlier in this
opinion. Hence, it is unnecessary to reproduce them here. So it is, with respect to the positions taken in L-36165 by counsel
for therein respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy although more will be said later about them and by the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the other respondents in that case and the respondents in the other cases.
1.What is the procedure prescribed by the 1935 Constitution for its amendment?
Under section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential, namely:
1.That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention called for that purpose, "by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately," but "in joint
session assembled";
2.That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election"; and
3.That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election.
Compliance with the first requirement is virtually conceded, although the petitioners in L-36164 question the authority of the
1971 Constitutional Convention to incorporate certain provisions into the draft of the new or revised Constitution The main
issue in these five (5) cases hinges, therefore, on whether or not the last two (2) requirements have been complied with.
2.Has the contested draft of the new or revised Constitution been "submitted to the people for their ratification" conformably
to Art. XV of the Constitution?
In this connection, other provisions of the 1935 Constitution concerning "elections" must, also, be taken into account,
namely, section 1 of Art. V and Art. X of said Constitution. The former reads:
"Section 1.Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a
plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not
less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively
on the question."
Sections 1 and 2 of Art. X of the Constitution ordain in part:
"Section 1.There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed . . .
"xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 2.The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to theconduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its
deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings
the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
"xxx xxx xxx" 39
a.Who may vote in a plebiscite under Art. V of the Constitution?
Petitioners maintain that section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution is a limitation upon the exercise of the right of suffrage. They
claim that no other persons than "citizen of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of
age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the
municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election," may exercise the right of suffrage
in the Philippines. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that said provision merely guarantees the right of
suffrage to persons possessing the aforementioned qualifications and none of the disqualifications, prescribed by law, and
that said right may be vested by competent authorities in persons lackingsome or all of the aforementioned qualifications,
and possessing some of the aforesaid disqualifications. In support of this view, he invokes the permissive nature of the
language "(s)uffrage may be exercised" used in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, and the provisions of the
Revised Barrio Charter, Republic Act No. 3590, particularly sections 4 and 6 thereof, providing that citizens of the
Philippines "eighteen years of age or over," who are registered in the list of barrio assembly members, shall
be members thereof and may participate as such in the plebiscites prescribed in said Act.
I cannot accept the Solicitor General's theory. Art. V of the Constitution declares who may exercise the right of suffrage, so
that those lacking the qualifications therein prescribed may not exercise such right. This view is borne out by the records of
the Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution. Indeed, section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution was
largely based on the report of the committee on suffrage of the Convention that drafted said Constitution, which report was,
in turn, "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines . . ." 40 Said committee had recommended:
1) "That the right of suffrage should be exercised only by male citizens of the Philippines." 2) "That it should be limited to
those who could read and write." 3) "That the duty to vote should be made obligatory." It appears that the first
recommendation was discussed extensively in the Convention, and that, by way of compromise, it was eventually agreed to
include, in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, the second sentence thereof imposing upon the National Assembly,
established by the original Constitution instead of the bicameral Congress subsequently created by amendment of said
Constitution the duty to "extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite to be held for that purpose within two
years after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary
qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question." 41
The third recommendation on "compulsory" voting was, also, debated upon rather extensively, after which it was rejected by
the Convention. 42 This accounts, in my opinion, for the permissive language used in the first sentence of said Art. V.
Despite some debates on the age qualification amendments having been proposed to reduce the same to 18 or 20,
which were rejected, and the residence qualification, as well as the disqualifications to the exercise of the right of suffrage
the second recommendation limiting the right of suffrage who could "read and write" was in the language of Dr. Jose
M. Aruego, one of the Delegates to said Convention "readily approved in the Convention without any dissenting vote,"
although there was some debate on whether the Fundamental Law should specify the language or dialect that the voter
could read and write, which was decided in the negative. 43
What is relevant to the issue before Us is the fact that the constitutional provision under consideration was meant to be and
is a grantor conferment of a right to persons possessing the qualifications and none of the disqualifications therein
mentioned, which in turn, constitute a limitation of or restriction to said right, and cannot, accordingly, be dispensed with,
except by constitutional amendment. Obviously, every such constitutional grant or conferment of a right is necessarily a
negation of the authority of Congress or of any other branch of the Government to deny said right to the subject of the grant
and, in this sense only, may the same partake of the nature of a guarantee. But, this does not imply not even remotely,
that the Fundamental Law allows Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the committee on suffrage responsible for the adoption of section 1 of Art. V of the
Constitutionwas "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines." Our first Election Law was Act
1582, passed on January 9, 1907, which was partly amended by Acts 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768, and incorporated into
the Administrative Code of 1916 Act 2657 as chapter 20 thereof, and then in the Administrative Code of 1971 Act
2711 as chapter 18 thereof, which, in turn, was amended by Act 3387, approved on December 3, 1927. Sections 431 and
432 of said Code of 1917, prescribing, respectively, the qualifications for and disqualifications from voting, are quoted
below. 44 In all of these legislative acts, the provisions concerning the qualifications of voters partook of the nature of
a grant or recognition of the right of suffrage, and. hence, of a denial thereof to those who lacked the requisite qualifications
and possessed any of the statutory disqualifications. In short, the history of section 1, Art. V ofthe Constitution, shows
beyond doubt that the same conferred not guaranteed the authority to exercise the right of suffrage to persons having
the qualifications prescribed therein and none of the disqualifications to be specified in ordinary laws and, by necessary
implication, denied such right to those lacking any of said qualifications or having any of the aforementioned
disqualifications.

This view is further bolstered by the fact that the 1971 Constitutional Convention sought the submission to a plebiscite of a
"partial amendment" to said section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution, by reducing the voting age from twenty-one (21)
years to eighteen (18) years, which, however, did not materialize on account of the decision of this Court in Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections, 45 granting the writs of prohibition and injunction therein applied for, upon the ground that,
under the Constitution, all of the amendments adopted by the Convention should be submitted in "an election" or a single
election, not separately or in several or distinct elections, and that the proposed amendment sought to be submitted to a
plebiscite was not even a complete but a "partial amendment" of said section 1, which could be amended further, after its
ratification had the same taken place, so that the aforementioned partial amendment was, for legal purposes, no more than
a provisional or temporary amendment. Said partial amendment was predicated upon the generally accepted contemporary
construction that, under the 1935 Constitution, persons below twenty-one (21) years of age could not exercise the right of
suffrage, without a previous amendment of the Constitution.
Upon the other hand, the question, whether 18-year-old members of barrio assemblies may vote in barrio as plebiscites is,
to say the least, a debatable one. Indeed, there seems to be a conflict between the last paragraph of said section 6 of Rep.
Act No. 3590, 46pursuant to which the "majority vote of all the barrio assembly members" (which include all barrio residents
18 years of age or over, duly registered in the list of barrio assembly members) is necessary for the approval, in an
assembly plebiscite, of "any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax ordinances," whereas, according to the
paragraph preceding the penultimate one of said section, 47 "(a)ll duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to
vote" who, pursuant to section 10 of the same Act, must be citizens "of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age or over,
able to read and write," and residents of the barrio "during the six months immediately preceding the election, duly
registered in the list of voters" and "not otherwise disqualified . . ." just like the provisions of the present and past election
codes of the Philippines and Art. V of the 1935 Constitution "may vote in the plebiscite."
I believe, however, that the apparent conflict should be resolved in favor of the 21-year-old members of the assembly, not
only because this interpretation is in accord with Art. V of the Constitution, but, also, because provisions of a Constitution
particularly of a written and rigid one, like ours are generally accorded a mandatory status unless the intention to the
contrary is manifest, which is not so as regards said Art. V for otherwise they would not have been considered sufficiently
important to be included in the Fundamental Law of the land. 48 Besides, it would be illogical, if not absurd, to believe
that Republic Act No. 3590 requires, for the most importantmeasures for which it demands in addition to the favorable
action of the barrio council the approval of the barrio assemblythrough a plebiscite, lesser qualifications than those
prescribed in dealing with ordinary measures for which such plebiscite need notbe held.
It is similarly inconceivable that those who drafted the 1935 Constitution intended section 1 of Art. V thereof to apply only to
elections of public officers, not to plebiscites for the ratification of amendments to the Fundamental Law or a revision
thereof, or of an entirely new Constitution, and to permit the legislature to require lesser qualifications for such ratification,
notwithstanding the fact that the subject thereof is much more important if not fundamental, such as the basic changes
introduced in the draft of the revisedConstitution adopted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which are intended to be in
force permanently, or, at least, for many decades, and to affect the way of life of the nation and, accordingly demands
greater experience and maturity on the part of the electorate than that required for the election of public officers, 49 whose
average term ranges from 2 to 6 years.
It is admitted that persons 15 years of age or over, but below 21 years, regardless of whether or not they possessed the
other qualifications laid down in both the Constitution and the present Election Code, 50 and of whether or not they are
disqualified under the provisions of said Constitution and Code, 51 or those of Republic Act No. 3590, 52 have participated
and voted in the Citizens' Assemblies that have allegedly ratified the new or revised Constitution drafted by the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
In fact, according to the latest official data, the total number of registered voters 21 years of age or over in the entire
Philippines, available in January 1973, was less than 12 million. Yet, Proclamation No. 1102 states that 14,976,561
"members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against . . .
743,869 who voted for its rejection," whereas, on the question whether or not the people still wanted a plebiscite to be called
to ratify the new Constitution, ". . . 14,298,814 answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite." In other words, it is conceded that the
number of people who allegedly voted at the Citizens' Assemblies for exceeded the number of registered voters under
the Election Code in force in January 1973.
It is thus clear that the proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies and We have more to say on this point in
subsequent pages were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in section 1 of Art. V
of the Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those
less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens'
Assemblies must be considered null and void. 53
It has been held that "(t)he power to reject an entire poll . . . should be exercised . . . in a case where it is impossible to
ascertain with reasonable certainty the true vote," as where "it is impossible to separate the legal votes from the illegal or
spurious . . ." 54
In Usman v. Commission on Elections, et al., 55 We held:
"Several circumstances, defying exact description and dependent mainly on the factual milieu of the
particular controversy, have the effect of destroying the integrity and authenticity of disputed election
returns and of avoiding their prima facie value and character. If satisfactorily proven, although in a
summary proceeding, such circumstances as alleged by the affected or interested parties, stamp the
election returns with the indelible mark of falsity and irregularity, and, consequently, of unreliability, and
justify their exclusion from the canvass."
Then, too, the 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment to the Fundamental Law
to be "valid" as part thereof, and the term "votes cast" has a well-settled meaning.
"The term 'votes cast' . . . was held in Smith v. Renville County Commissioners, 65 N.W. 956, 64 Minn.
16, to have been used as an equivalent of 'ballots cast.'" 56
"The word 'cast' is defined as 'to deposit formally or officially.'" 57
"It seems to us that a vote is cast when a ballot is deposited indicating a 'choice.' . . . The word 'cast'
means 'deposit (a ballot) formally or officially . . .'
". . . In simple words, we would define a 'vote cast' as the exercise on a ballot of the choice of the voter
on the measure proposed." 58
In short, said Art. XV envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by raising hands
by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we
had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government andsecrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,
when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. And the 1935 Constitution has been so consistently interpreted
in all plebiscites for the ratification or rejection of proposed amendments thereto, from 1935 to 1967. Hence, the viva
voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio.
b.How should the plebiscite be held? (COMELEC supervision indispensable; essential requisites)
Just as essential as compliance with said Art. V of the 1935 Constitution is that of Art. X thereof, particularly its sections 1
and 2. Indeed, section 1 provides that "(t)here shall be an independent Commission on Elections . . ." The point to be
stressed here is the term "independent." Indeed, why was the term used?
In the absence of said constitutional provision as to the independence of the Commission, would it have been dependent
upon either Congress or the Judiciary? The answer must be in the negative, because the functions of the Commission
"enforcement and administration" of election laws are neither legislative nor judicial in nature, and, hence, beyond the
field allocated to either Congress or courts of justice. Said functions are by their nature essentially executive, for which
reason, the Commission would be under the "control" of the President, pursuant to section 10, paragraph (1) of Art. VII
of the Constitution, if Art. X thereof did not explicitly declare that it (the Commission) is an "independent" body. In other
words, in amending the original 1935 Constitution, by inserting therein said Art. X, on the Commission on Elections, the
purpose was to make said Commission independent principally of the Chief Executive.

And the reason therefor is, also, obvious. Prior to the creation of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional organ,
election laws in the Philippines were enforced by the then Department of the Interior, through its Executive Bureau, one of
the offices under the supervision and control of said Department. The same like other departments of the Executive
Branch of the Government was, in turn, under the control of the Chief Executive, before the adoption of the 1935
Constitution, and had been until the abolition of said Department, sometime ago under the control of the President of
the Philippines, since the effectivity of said Fundamental Law. Under the provisions thereof, the Executive could so use his
power of control over the Department of the Interior and its Executive Bureau as to place the minority party at such a great,
if not decisive, disadvantage, as to deprive it, in effect, of the opportunity to defeat the political party in power, and, hence, to
enable the same to perpetuate itself therein. To forestall this possibility, the original 1935 Constitution was amended by the
establishment of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional body independent primarily of the President of the
Philippines.
The independence of the Commission was sought to be strengthened by the long term of office of its members nine (9)
years, except those first appointed 59 the longest under the Constitution, second only to that of the Auditor General 60 ;
by providing that they may not be removed from office except by impeachment, placing them, in this respect, on the same
plane as the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General; that they may not be
reappointed; that their salaries "shall be neither increased nor diminished during their term of office"; that the decisions of
the Commission "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" only 61 ; that "(n)o pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence for the violation of any election law may be granted without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission" 62 ; and that its chairman and members "shall not, during their continuance in office, engage in the practice of
any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise which in anyway
may be affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract
with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof." 63 Thus, the framers of the amendment to the
original Constitution of 1935 endeavored to do everything possible to protect and insure the independence of each member
of the Commission.
With respect to the functions thereof as a body, section 2 of said Art. X ordains that "(t)he Commission on Elections shall
have exclusivecharge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," apart from such
other "functions which may be conferred upon it by law." It further provides that the Commission "shall decide, save those
involving the right to vote, alladministrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials." And, to forestall
possible conflicts or frictions between the Commission, on the one hand, and the other offices or agencies of the executive
department, on the other, said section 2 postulates that "(a)ll law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and
honest elections." Not satisfied with this, it declares, in effect, that "(t)he decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission"
shall not be subject to review, except by the Supreme Court.
In accordance with the letter and spirit of said Art. X of the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 6388, otherwise known as Election
Code of 1971, implements the constitutional powers of the Commission on Elections and grants additional powers thereto,
some of which are enumerated in sections 5 and 6 of said Act, quoted below. 64 Moreover, said Act contains, inter alia,
detailed provisions regulating contributions and other (corrupt) practices; the establishment of election precincts; the
designation and arrangement of polling places, including voting booths, to protect the secrecy of the ballot; the formation of
lists of voters, the identification and registration of voters, the proceedings therefor, as well as for the inclusion in, or
exclusion or cancellation from said list and the publication thereof; the establishment of municipal, provincial and national
files of registered voters; the composition and appointment of boards of election inspectors; the particulars of the official
ballots to be used and the precautions to be taken to insure the authenticity thereof; the procedure for the casting of votes;
the counting of votes by boards of inspectors; the rules for the appreciation of ballots and the preparation and disposition of
election returns; the constitution and operation of municipal, provincial and national boards of canvassers; the
representation of political parties and/or their candidates in each election precinct; the proclamation of the results, including,
in the case of election of public officers, election contests; and the jurisdiction of courts of justice in cases of violations of the
provisions of said Election Code and penalties for such violations.
Few laws may be found with such a meticulous and elaborate set of provisions aimed at "insuring free, orderly, and honest
elections," as envisaged in section 2 of Art. X of the Constitution. Yet, none of the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions was followed by the so-called Barangays or Citizens' Assemblies. And no reasons have been given, or
even sought to be given therefor. In many, if not most, instances, the elections were held a viva voce, thus depriving the
electorate of the right to vote secretly one of the most fundamental and critical features of our election laws from time
immemorial particularly at a time when the same was of utmost importance, owing to the existence of Martial Law.
In Glenn v. Gnau, 65 involving the casting of many votes, openly, without complying with the requirements of the law
pertinent thereto, it was held that the "election officers" involved "cannot be too strongly condemned" therefor and that if
they 'could legally dispense with such requirement xxx they could with equal propriety dispense with all of them, including
the one that the vote shall be by secret ballot, or even by ballot at all . . ."
Moreover, upon the formal presentation to the Executive of the proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, or on December 1, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 73 (on the validity of which was contested in the plebiscite
cases, as well as in the 1972 habeas corpus case 66 We need not, in the cases at bar, express any opinion) was issued,
calling a plebiscite, to be held on January 15, 1973, at which the proposed Constitution would be submitted to the people for
ratification or rejection; directing the publication of said proposed Constitution; and declaring, inter alia, that "(t)he provisions
of the Election Code of 1971, insofar as they are not inconsistent" with said decree excepting those "regarding rights and
obligations of political parties and candidates" "shall apply to the conduct of the plebiscite." Indeed, section 2 of
said Election Code of 1971 provides that "(a)ll elections of public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites shall be
conducted in the manner provided by this Code." General Order No. 20, dated January 7, 1973, postponing, until further
notice, "the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973," said nothing about the procedure to be followed in the
plebiscite to take place at such notice, and no other order or decree has been brought to Our attention, expressly or
impliedly repealing the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 73, insofar as said procedure is concerned.
Upon the other hand, said General Order No. 20 expressly suspended "the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 73 insofar as they allow free public discussion of the proposed Constitution . . . temporarily suspending the effects
of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution . . ." This specific mention
of the portions of the decrees or orders or instructions suspended by General Order No. 20 necessarily implies that all other
portions of said decrees, orders or instructions and, hence, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 73 outlining the
procedure to be followed in the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution remained in force,
assuming that said Decree is valid.
It is claimed that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 86-A the text of which is quoted below 67 the Executive
declared, inter alia, that the collective views expressed in the Citizens' Assemblies "shall be considered in the formulation of
national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific decision"; that such
Citizens' Assemblies "shall consider vital national issues . . . like the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution . . .
and others in the future, which shall serve as guide orbasis for action or decision by the national government"; and that the
Citizens' Assemblies "shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on important national issues, including
those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit the results thereof to the Department of Local Governments and
Community Development immediately thereafter, . . ." As in Presidential Decree No. 86, this Decree No. 86-A does not and
cannot exclude the exercise of the constitutional supervisory power of the Commission on elections or its participation in the
proceedings in said Assemblies, if the same had been intended to constitute the "election" or plebiscite required in Art. V of
the 1935 Constitution. The provision of Presidential Decree No. 86-A directing the immediate submission of the result
thereof to the Department of Local Governments and Community Development is not necessarily inconsistent with, and
must be subordinate to the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to exercise its "exclusive" authority over the
"enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," if the proceedings in the Assemblies would
partake of the nature of an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution.

We are told that Presidential Decree No. 86 was further amended by Presidential Decree No. 86-B, dated January 7, 1973,
ordering "that important national issues shall from time to time be referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for
resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 86-A dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum shall
include the matter of ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" and that "(t)he
Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the implementation of this
order." As in the case of Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, the foregoing directives do not necessarily exclude the
exercise of the powers vested by the 1935 Constitution in the Commission on Elections, even if the Executive had the
authority to repeal Art. X of our Fundamental Law which he does not possess. Copy of Presidential Decree No. 86-B is
appended hereto as Annex B hereof.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the Commission on
Elections, and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree
No. 73. What is more, they were held under the supervision of the very officers and agencies of the Executive Department
sought to be excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935 Constitution. Worse still, said officers and agencies of the Executive
Department, who had been publicly urged and ostensibly promised to work for the ratification of the proposed revised
Constitution would be favored thereby, owing to the practically indefinite extension of their respective terms of office in
consequence of section 9 of the Transitory Provisions, found in Art. XVII of the proposed Constitution, without any elections
therefor. And the procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of
the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Art. X of the
Constitution which can hardly be sanctioned. And, since the provisions of this article form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will, the
aforementioned violation thereof renders null and void the contested proceedings or alleged plebiscite in the Citizens'
Assemblies, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. ". . . (a)ll the authorities agree that the legal definition of an election, as well as that which is usually and
ordinarily understood by the term, is a choosing or a selection by those having a right to participate (in the selection) of
those who shall fill the offices, or of the adoption or rejection of any public measures affecting the territory involved. 15 Cyc.
279; Lewis v. Boynton, 25 Colo. 486, 55 Pac. 732; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216,
47 N.W. 1091, 11 L.R.A. 354; State v. Hirsh, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N.E. 1062, 9 L.R.A. 170; Bouvier's Law Dictionary." 68
IV
Has the proposed Constitution aforementioned
been approved by a majority of the people in
the Citizen's Assemblies allegedly held
throughout the Philippines?
Respondents maintain the affirmative, relying upon Proclamation No. 1102, the validity of which is precisely being contested
by petitioners herein. Respondents claim that said proclamation is "conclusive" upon this Court, or is, at least, entitled to full
faith and credence, as an enrolled bill; that the proposed Constitution has been, in fact, ratified, approved or adopted by the
"overwhelming" majority of the people; that Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution has thus been "substantially" complied with; and
that the Court should refrain from passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, not only because such question is
political in nature, but, also, because should the Court invalidate the proclamation, the former would, in effect, veto the
action of the people in whom sovereignty resides and from whom its powers are derived.
The major flaw in this process of rationalization is that it assumes, as a fact, the very premise on which it is predicated, and
which, moreover, is contested by the petitioners. As the Supreme Court of Minnessota has aptly put it
". . . every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject
to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it
must be remembered that the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law
places upon all official action. . . ."
Accordingly, the issue boils down to whether or not the Executive acted within the limits of his authority when he certified
inProclamation No. 1102 "that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect."
In this connection, it is not claimed that the Chief Executive had personal knowledge of the data he certified in said
proclamation. Moreover, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution was precisely inserted to place beyond the Executive the power to
supervise or even exerciseany authority whatsoever over "all laws relative to the conduct of elections," and, hence, whether
the elections are for the choice or selection of public officers or for the ratification or rejection of any proposed amendment,
or revision of the Fundamental Law, since the proceedings for the latter are, also, referred to in said Art. XV as "elections."
The Solicitor General stated, in his argument before this Court, that he had been informed that there was in each
municipality a municipal association of presidents of the citizens' assemblies for each barrio of the municipality; that the
president of each such municipal association formed part of a provincial or city association of presidents of such municipal
associations; that the president of each one of these provincial or city associations in turn formed part of a National
Association or Federation of Presidents of such Provincial or City Associations; and that one Francisco Cruz from Pasig,
Rizal, as President of said National Association or Federation, reported to the President of the Philippines, in the morning of
January 17, 1973, the total result of the voting in the citizens' assemblies all over the country from January 10 to January
15, 1973. The Solicitor General further intimated that the said municipal associations had reported the results of the citizens'
assemblies in their respective municipalities to the corresponding Provincial Association, which, in turn, transmitted the
results of the voting in the province to the Department of Local Governments and Community Development, which tabulated
the results of the voting in the citizens' assemblies throughout the Philippines and then turned them over to Mr. Francisco
Cruz, as President or acting President of the National Association or Federation, whereupon Mr. Cruz, acting in a
ceremonial capacity, reported said results (tabulated by the Department of Local Governments and Community
Development) to the Chief Executive, who, accordingly, issued Proclamation No. 1102.
The record shows, however, that Mr. Cruz was not even a member of any barrio council since 1972, 80 that he could not
possibly have been a member on January 17, 1973, of a municipal association of presidents of barrio or ward citizens'
assemblies, much less of a Provincial, City or National Association or Federation of Presidents of any such provincial or city
associations.
Secondly, at the conclusion of the hearing of these cases on February 16, 1973, and in the resolution of this Court of the
same date, the Solicitor General was asked to submit, together with his notes on his oral argument, a true copy of the
aforementioned report of Mr. Cruz to the President and of the "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or
circular, if any, creating or directing or authorizing the creation, establishment or organization" of said municipal, provincial
and national associations, but neither a copy of said alleged report to the President, nor a copy of any said "(p)roclamation,
decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular," has been submitted to this Court. In the absence of said report,
"(p)roclamation, decree, instruction," etc., Proclamation No. 1102 is devoid of anyfactual and legal foundation. Hence, the
conclusion is set forth in the dispositive portion of said Proclamation No. 1102, to the effect that the proposed new or
revised Constitution had been ratified by the majority of the votes cast by the people, cannot possibly have any legal effect
or value.
The theory that said proclamation is "conclusive" upon the Court is clearly untenable. If it were, acts of the Executive and
those of Congress could not possibly be annulled or invalidated by courts of justice. Yet, such is not the case. In fact, even a
resolution of Congress declaring that a given person has been elected President or Vice-President of the Philippines as
provided in the Constitution69 is not conclusive upon the courts. It is no more than prima facie evidence of what is attested
to by said resolution. 70 If assailed directly in appropriate proceedings, such as an election protest, if and when authorized
by law, as it is in the Philippines, the Court may receive evidence and declare, in accordance therewith, who was duly
elected to the office involved. 71 If prior to the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, no such protest could be filed,
it was not because the resolution of Congress declaring those had been elected President or Vice-President
was conclusive upon courts of justice, but because there was no law permitting the filing of such protest and declaring what
court or body would hear and decide the same. So, too, a declaration to the effect that a given amendment to the
Constitution or revised or new Constitution has been ratified by a majority of the votes cast therefor, may be duly assailed in
court and be the object of judicial inquiry, in direct proceedings therefor such as the cases at bar and the issue raised
therein may and should be decided in accordance with the evidence presented.

The case of In re McConaughy 72 is squarely in point. "As the Constitution stood from the organization of the state" of
Minnesota "all taxes were required to be raised under the system known as the 'general property tax.' Dissatisfaction with
the results of this method and the development of more scientific and satisfactory methods of raising venue induced the
Legislature to submit to the people an amendment to the Constitution which provided merely that taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects. This proposed amendment was submitted at the general election held in November, 1906,
and in due time it was certified by the state canvassing board and proclaimed by the Governor as having been legally
adopted. Acting upon the assumption that the amendment had become a part of the Constitution, the Legislature enacted
statutes providing for a State Tax Commission and a mortgage registry tax, and the latter statute, upon the same theory,
was held constitutional" by said Court. "The district court found that the amendment had not in fact been adopted, and on
this appeal" the Supreme Court was "required to determine the correctness of that conclusion."
Referring to the effect of the certification of the State Board of Canvassers created by the Legislature and of
the proclamation made by the Governor based thereon, the Court held: "It will be noted that this board does no more than
tabulate the reports received from the various county boards and add up and certify the results. State v. Mason, 45 Wash.
234, 88 Pac. 126, 9 L.R.A. (U.S.) 1221. It is settled law that the decisions of election officers, and canvassing boards
are not conclusive and that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares that the decisions of the
board shall be final" and there is no such law in the cases at bar. ". . . The correctness of the conclusion of the state
board rests upon the correctness of the returns made by the county boards and it is inconceivable that it was intended that
this statement of result should be final and conclusive regardless of the actual facts. The proclamation of the Governor
adds nothing in the way of conclusiveness to the legal effect of the action of the canvassing board. Its purpose is to formally
notify the people of the state of the result of the voting as found by the canvassing board. James on Const.Conv. (4th Ed.)
sec. 523."
In Bott v. Wartz, 73 the Court reviewed the statement of results of the election made by the canvassing board, in order that
the true results could be judicially determined. And so did the court in Rice v. Palmer. 74
Inasmuch as Art. X of the 1935 Constitution places under the "exclusive" charge of the Commission on Elections, "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive, and there is
not even a certification by the Commission in support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon
in Proclamation No. 1102 apart from the fact that on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President of the alleged result of
the citizen's assemblies all over the Philippines it follows necessarily that, from a constitutional and legal
viewpoint, Proclamation No. 1102 is not even prima facie evidence of the alleged ratification of the proposed Constitution.
Referring particularly to the cases before Us, it will be noted that, as pointed out in the discussion of the preceding topic, the
new or revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not ratified in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, it has not even been ratified in accordance with said proposed Constitution, the
minimum age requirement therein for the exercise of the right of suffrage being eighteen (18) years, apart from the fact that
Art. VI of the proposed Constitution requires "secret" voting, which was not observed in many, if not most, Citizens'
Assemblies. Besides, both the 1935 Constitution and the proposed Constitution require a "majority of the votes cast" in an
election or plebiscite called for the ratification of an amendment or revision of the first Constitution or the effectivity of the
proposed Constitution, and the phrase "votes cast" has been construed to mean "votes made in writing," not orally, as it was
in many Citizens' Assemblies. 75
Even counsel for Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, as respondents in L-36165, asserts openly that Art. XV of the Constitution has
not been complied with, and since the alleged substantial compliance with the requirements thereof partakes of the nature
of a defense set up by the other respondents in these cases, the burden of proving such defense which, if true, should be
within their peculiar knowledge is clearly on such respondents. Accordingly, if despite the extensive notes and documents
submitted by the parties herein, the members of the Court do not know or are not prepared to say whether or not the
majority of the people or of those who took part in the Citizens' Assemblies have assented to the proposed Constitution, the
logical step would be to give due course to these cases, require the respondents to file their answers, and the plaintiffs their
reply, and, thereafter, to receive the pertinent evidence and then proceed to the determination of the issues raised thereby.
Otherwise, we would be placing upon the petitioners the burden of disproving a defense set up by the respondents, who
have not so far established the truth of such defense.
Even more important, and decisive, than the foregoing is the circumstance that there is ample reason to believe that many,
if not most, of the people did not know that the Citizens' Assemblies were, at the time they were held, plebiscites for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. Hence, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, We said, inter alia:
"Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing 'that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15,
1973, he postponed until further notice.' Said General Order No. 20, moreover, 'suspended in the
meantime' the 'order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposedConstitution.'
"In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed
it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22,
1973,and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have
the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the
Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases."
And, apparently, the parties in said cases entertained the same belief, for, on December 23, 1972 four (4) days after the
last hearing of said cases 76 the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite scheduled by Presidential
Decree No. 73 to be held on January 15, 1973, after consultation with the Commission on Elections and the leaders of
Congress, owing to doubts on the sufficiency of the time available to translate the proposed Constitution into some local
dialects and to comply with some pre-electoral requirements, as well as to afford the people a reasonable opportunity to be
posted on the contents and implications of said transcendental document. On January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20 was
issued formally, postponing said plebiscite "until further notice." How can said postponement be reconciled with the theory
that the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies scheduled to be held from January 10, to January 15, 1973, were
"plebiscites," in effect, accelerated, according to the theory of the Solicitor General, for the ratification of the proposed
Constitution? If said Assemblies were meant to be the plebiscites or elections envisaged in Art. XV of the Constitution, what,
then, was the "plebiscite" postponed by General Order No. 20? Under these circumstances, it was only reasonable for the
people who attended such assemblies to believe that the same were not an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or
adoption of said proposed Constitution.
And, this belief is further bolstered up by the questions propounded in the Citizens' Assemblies, namely:
"[1]Do you like the New Society?
"[2]Do you like the reforms under martial law?
"[3]Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
"[4]Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
"[5]Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government? [Bulletin Today,
January 10, 1973; additional question italics.]
"[6]Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of
national interests?
"[7]Do you approve of the new Constitution?
"[8]Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
"[9]Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935
Constitution?

"[10]If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?
"[11]Do you want martial law to continue?" [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973]
To begin with, questions nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 are not proper in a plebiscite for the ratification of a
proposed Constitution or of a proposed amendment thereto. Secondly, neither is the language of question No. 7 "Do you
approve of the new Constitution?" One approves "of" the act of another, which does not need such approval for the
effectivity of said act, which the first person, however, finds to be good, wise or satisfactory. The approval of the majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite is, however, essential for an amendment to the Constitution to be valid as part thereof. Thirdly,
if the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies constituted a plebiscite, question No. 8 would have been unnecessary and
improper, regardless of whether question No. 7 were answered affirmatively or negatively. If the majority of the answers to
question No. 7 were in the affirmative, the Constitution would have become effective and no other plebiscite could be held
thereafter in connection therewith, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were, also, in the affirmative. If the
majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the negative, neither may another plebiscite be held, even if the majority of
the answers to question No. 8 were in the affirmative. In either case, not more than one plebiscite could be held for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. In short, the insertion of said two (2) questions apart from the other
questions adverted to above indicates strongly that the proceedings therein did not partake of the nature of a plebiscite
or election for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution.
Indeed, I can not, in good conscience, declare that the proposed Constitution has been approved or adopted by the people
in the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines, when it is, to my mind, a matter of judicial knowledge that there have
been no such citizens' assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. In
a letter of Governor Efren B. Pascual of Bataan, dated January 15, 1973, to the Chief Executive, the former reported:
". . . This report includes a resume (sic) of the activities we undertook in effecting the referendum on the
eleven questions you wanted our people consulted on and the Summary of Results thereof for each
municipality and for the whole province.
"xxx xxx xxx
". . . Our initial plans and preparations, however, dealt only on the original five questions. Consequently,
when we received an instruction on January 10 to change the questions, we urgently suspended all
scheduled Citizens' Assembly meetings on that day and called all Mayors, Chiefs of Offices and other
government officials to another conference to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and materials
to be used.
"On January 11, . . . another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions
among those to be discussed and asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we
again had to make modifications in our instructions to all those managing and supervising the holding of
the Citizens' Assembly meetings throughout the province . . . Aside from the coordinators we had from
the Office of the Governor, the splendid cooperation and support extended by almost all government
officials and employees in the province, particularly of the Department of Education, PC and PACD
personnel, provided us with enough hands to trouble shoot and implement sudden changes in the
instructions anytime and anywhere needed . . .
". . . As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and readiness to
accept this new method of government to people consultation in shaping up government policies."
Thus, as late as January 10, 1973, the Bataan officials had to suspend "all scheduled Citizens' Assembly meetings . . ." and
call all available officials ". . . to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and materials to be used . . ." Then, "on January
11 . . . another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions among those to be discussed and
asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we again had to make modifications in our instructions to
all those managing and supervising the holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings throughout the province . . . As to our
people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and readiness to accept the new method of
government to people consultation in shaping upgovernment policies."
This communication manifestly shows: 1) that, as late as January 11, 1973, the Bataan officials had still to discuss not
put into operation means and ways to carry out the changing instructions from the top on how to organize the citizens'
assemblies, what to do therein and even what questions or topics to propound or touch in said assemblies; 2) that the
assemblies would involve no more than consultations or dialogues between people and government not decisions to be
made by the people; and 3) that said consultations were aimed only at "shaping up government policies" and, hence, could
not, and did not, partake of the nature of a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment of a new or
revised Constitution for the latter does not entail the formulation of a policy of the Government, but the making of a decision
by the people on the new way of life, as a nation, they wish to have, once the proposed Constitution shall have been
ratified.
If this was the situation in Bataan one of the provinces nearest to Manila as late as January 11, 1973, one can easily
imagine the predicament of the local officials and people in the remote barrios in northern and southern Luzon, in the Bicol
region, in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. In fact, several members of the Court, including those of their immediate
families and their household, although duly registered voters in the area of Greater Manila, were not even notified that
citizens' assemblies would be held in the places where their respective residences were located. In the Prohibition and
Amendment case, 77 attention was called to the "duty cast upon the court of taking judicial cognizance of anything affecting
the existence and validity of any law or portion of the Constitution . . ." In line with its own pronouncement in another case,
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States stressed, in Baker v. Carr, 78 that "a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to
an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared."
In the light of the foregoing, I cannot see how the question under consideration can be answered or resolved otherwise than
in the negative.
V
Have the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution?
It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has been run, since January 17, 1973, under the
Constitutiondrafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political department of the Government has recognized
said revised Constitution; that our foreign relations are being conducted under such new or revised Constitution; that the
Legislative Department has recognized the same, and that the people, in general, have, by their acts or omissions,
indicated their conformity thereto.
As regards the so called political organs of the Government, I gather that respondents refer mainly to the offices under the
Executive Department. In a sense, the latter performs some functions which, from a constitutional viewpoint, are political in
nature, such as in recognizing a new state or government, in accepting diplomatic representatives accredited to our
Government, and even in devising administrative means and ways to better carry into effect Acts of Congress which define
the goals or objectives thereof, but are either imprecise or silent on the particular measures to be resorted to in order to
achieve the said goals or delegate the power to do so, expressly or impliedly, to the Executive. This, notwithstanding, the
political organ of a government that purports to be republican is essentially the Congress or Legislative Department.
Whatever may be the functions allocated to the Executive Department specially under a written, rigid Constitution, with a
republican system of Government like ours the role of that Department is inherently, basically and
fundamentally executive in nature to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," in the language of our 1935
Constitution. 79
Consequently, I am not prepared to concede that the acts of the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line
withProclamation No. 1102, connote a recognition thereof or an acquiescence thereto. Whether they recognized the
proposed Constitutionor acquiesce thereto or not is something that cannot legally, much less necessarily or even normally,
be deduced from their acts in accordance therewith, because they are bound to obey and act in conformity with the orders
of the President, under whose "control" they are, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. They have absolutely no other
choice, specially in view of Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under Martial Law. Besides, by virtue of the very
decrees, orders and instructions issued by the President thereafter, he had assumed all powers of Government although
some question his authority to do so and, consequently, there is hardly anything he has done since the issuance
of Proclamation No. 1102, on January 17, 1973 declaring that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of the people that he could not do under the authority he
claimed to have under Martial Law, since September 21, 1972, except the power of supervision over inferior courts and its
personnel, which said proposed Constitution would place under the Supreme Court, and which the President has not
ostensibly exercised, except as to some minor routine matters, which the Department of Justice has continued to handle,
this Court having preferred to maintain the status quo in connection therewith pending final determination of these cases, in
which the effectivity of the aforementioned Constitution is disputed.

Then, again, a given department of the Government cannot generally be said to have "recognized" its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Accordingly, when a subordinate officer or office of
the Government complies with the commands of a superior officer or office, under whose supervision and control he or it is,
the former merely obeysthe latter. Strictly speaking, and from a legal and constitutional viewpoint, there is no act of
recognition involved therein. Indeed, the lower officer or office, if he or it acted otherwise, would just be guilty of
insubordination.
Thus, for instance, the case of Taylor v. Commonwealth 80 cited by respondents herein in support of the theory of the
people's acquiescence involved a constitution ordained in 1902 and "proclaimed by a convention duly called by a direct
vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the work of that Convention has
been recognized, accepted and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the State" by
1.The "Governor of the State in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby";
2.The "Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by
the Convention . . .";
3.The "individual oaths of its members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a year, in legislating under it
and putting its provisions into operation . . .";
4.The "judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support it and by enforcing its provisions . . . "; and
5.The "people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by registering as voters under it to
the extent of thousands throughout the State, and by voting, under its provisions, at a general election for their
representatives in the Congress of the United States."
Note that the New Constitution of Virginia, drafted by a convention whose members were elected directly by the people,
was notsubmitted to the people for ratification or rejection thereof. But, it was recognized, not by the convention itself, but
by other sectors of the Government, namely, the Governor; the Legislature not merely by individual acts of its members,
but by formal joint resolutionof its two (2) chambers; by the judiciary; and by the people, in the various ways specified
above. What is more, there was no martial law.In the present cases, none of the foregoing acts of acquiescence was
present. Worse still, there is martial law, the strict enforcement of which was announced shortly before the alleged citizens'
assemblies. To top it all, in the Taylor case, the effectivity of the contested amendment was not contested judicially until
about one (1) year after the amendment had been put into operation in all branches of the Government, and complied with
by the people who participated in the elections held pursuant to the provisions of the new Constitution. In the cases under
consideration, the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, was impugned
as early as December 7, 1972, or five (5) weeks before the scheduled plebiscite, whereas the validity ofProclamation No.
1102 declaring on January 17, 1973, that the proposed Constitution had been ratified despite General Order No. 20,
issued on January 7, 1972, formally and officially suspending the plebiscite until further notice was impugned as early as
January 20, 1973, when L-36142 was filed, or three (3) daysafter the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102.
It is further alleged that a majority of the members of our House of Representatives and Senate have acquiesced in the new
or revisedConstitution, by filing written statements opting to serve in the Ad Interim Assembly established in the Transitory
Provisions of saidConstitution. Individual acts of recognition by members of our legislature, as well as of other collegiate
bodies under the government, are invalid as acts of said legislature or bodies, unless its members have performed said acts
in session duly assembled, or unless the law provides otherwise, and there is no such law in the Philippines. This is a well-
established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers, and no plausible reason has been adduced to
warrant departure therefrom. 81
Indeed, if the members of Congress were generally agreeable to the proposed Constitution, why did it become necessary to
padlock its premises to prevent its meeting in session on January 22, 1973, and thereafter as provided in the 1935
Constitution? It is true that, theoretically, the members of Congress, if bent on discharging their functions under said
Constitution, could have met in any other place, the building in which they perform their duties being immaterial to the
legality of their official acts. The force of this argument is, however, offset or dissipated by the fact that, on or about
December 27, 1972, immediately after a conference between the Executive, on the one hand, and members of Congress,
on the other, some of whom expressed the wish to meet in session on January 22, 1973, as provided in the 1935
Constitution, a Daily Express columnist (Primitivo Mijares) attributed to Presidential Assistant Guillermo de Vega a
statement to the effect that "'certain members of the Senate appear to be missing the point in issue' when they
reportedly insisted on taking up first the question of convening Congress." The Daily Express of that date, 82 likewise,
headlined, on its front page, a "Senatorial Plot Against 'Martial Law Government' Disclosed." Then, in its issue of December
29, 1972, the same paper imputed to the Executive an appeal "to diverse groups involved in a conspiracy to undermine" his
powers "under martial law to desist from provoking a constitutional crisis . . . which may result in the exercise by me of
authority I have not exercised."
No matter how good the intention behind these statements may have been, the idea implied therein was too clear
and ominous for any member of Congress who thought of organizing, holding or taking part in a session of Congress, not to
get the impression that he could hardly do so without inviting or risking the application of Martial Law to him. Under these
conditions, I do not feel justified in holding that the failure of the members of Congress to meet since January 22, 1973, was
due to their recognition, acquiescence in or conformity with the provisions of the aforementioned Constitution, or its alleged
ratification.
For the same reasons, especially because of Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law,
neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a
number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects
issued subsequently thereto amounts, constitutes or attests to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation
No. 1102. In the words of the Chief Executive, "martial law connotes power of the gun, meant coercion by the military,
and compulsion and intimidation." 83 The failure to use the gun against those who comply with the orders of the party
wielding the weapon does not detract from the intimidation thatMartial Law necessarily connotes. It may reflect the good,
reasonable and wholesome attitude of the person who has the gun, either pointed at others, without pulling the trigger, or
merely kept in its holster, but not without warning that he may or would use it if he deemed it necessary. Still, the intimidation
is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence. This is specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and large, unfamiliar with the parliamentary
system, the new form of government introduced in the proposed Constitution, with the particularity that it is not even
identical to that existing in England and other parts of the world, and that even experienced lawyers and social
scientists find it difficult to grasp the full implications of some provisions incorporated therein.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and attested to by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, concerning legislative measures approved by the two Houses of Congress. The argument of the Solicitor
General is, roughly, this: If the enrolled bill is entitled to full faith and credence and, to this extent, it is conclusive upon the
President and the judicial branch of the Government, why shouldProclamation No. 1102 merit less consideration than in
enrolled bill?
Before answering this question, I would like to ask the following: If, instead of being certified by the aforementioned officers
of Congress, the so-called enrolled bill were certified by, say, the President of the Association of Sugar Planters and/or
Millers of the Philippines, and the measure in question were a proposed legislation concerning Sugar Plantations and Mills
sponsored by said Association, which even prepared the draft of said legislation, as well as lobbied actually for its approval,
for which reason the officers of the Association, particularly, its aforementioned president whose honesty and integrity are
unquestionable were present at the deliberations in Congress when the same approved the proposed legislation, would
the enrolled bill rule apply thereto? Surely, the answer would have to be in the negative. Why? Simply, because said
Association President has absolutely no official authority to perform in connection therewith, and, hence, his certification is,
legally, as good as non-existent.

Similarly, a certification, if any, of the Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development
about the tabulated results of the voting in the Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held all over the Philippines and the records
do not show that any such certification, either to the President of the Philippines or to the President of the Federation or
National Association of presidents of Provincial Associations of presidents of municipal associations of presidents of barrio
or ward assemblies of citizens would not, legally and constitutionally, be worth the paper on which it is written. Why?
Because said Department Secretary is not the officer designated by law to superintend plebiscites or elections held for the
ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment or revision ofthe Constitution and, hence, to tabulate the results thereof.
Worse still, it is the officer or department which, according to Article X of the 1935 Constitution, should not and must not be
allowed to participate in said plebiscite if plebiscite there was.
After citing approvingly its ruling in United States v. Sandoval, 84 the Highest Court of the United States declared that courts
"will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power." 85
I cannot honestly say, therefore, that the people have impliedly or expressly indicated their conformity to the
proposed Constitution.
VI
Are the Parties entitled to any relief?
Before attempting to answer this question, a few words must be said about the procedure followed in these five (5) cases. In
this connection, it should be noted that the Court has not as yet decided whether or not to give due course to the petitions
herein or to require the respondents to answer thereto. Instead, it has required the respondents to comment on the
respective petitions with three (3) members of the Court voting to dismiss them outright and then considered the
comments thus submitted by the respondents as motions to dismiss, as well as set the same for hearing. This was due to
the transcendental nature of the main issue raised, the necessity of deciding the same with utmost dispatch, and the main
defense set up by respondents herein, namely, the alleged political nature of said issue, placing the same, according to
respondents, beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry and determination. If this defense was sustained, the cases could readily
be dismissed; but, owing to the importance of the questions involved, a reasoned resolution was demanded by public
interest. At the same time, respondents had cautioned against a judicial inquiry into the merits of the issues posed on
account of the magnitude of the evil consequences, it was claimed, which would result from a decision thereon, if adverse to
the Government.
As a matter of fact, some of those issues had been raised in the plebiscite cases, which were dismissed as moot and
academic, owing to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 subsequently to the filing of said cases, although before the
rendition of judgment therein. Still one of the members of the Court (Justice Zaldivar) was of the opinion that the
aforementioned issues should be settled in said cases, and he, accordingly, filed an opinion passing upon the merits
thereof. On the other hand, three (3) members of the Court Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra filed separate
opinions favorable to the respondents in the plebiscite cases, Justice Barredo holding "that the 1935 Constitution has pro
tanto passed into history and has been legitimately supplanted by the Constitution in force by virtue of Proclamation
1102." 86 When the petitions at bar were filed, the same three (3) members of the Court, consequently, voted for the
dismissal of said petitions. The majority of the members of the Court did not share, however, either view, believing that the
main question that arose before the rendition of said judgment had not been sufficiently discussed and argued as the nature
and importance thereof demanded.
The parties in the cases at bar were accordingly given every possible opportunity to do so and to elucidate on and discuss
said question. Thus, apart from hearing the parties in oral argument for five (5) consecutive days morning and afternoon,
or a total of exactly 26 hours and 31 minutes their respective counsel filed extensive notes on their oral arguments, as
well as on such additional arguments as they wished to submit, and reply notes or memoranda, in addition to rejoinders
thereto, aside from a sizeable number of documents in support of their respective contentions, or as required by the Court.
The arguments, oral and written, submitted have been so extensive and exhaustive, and the documents filed in support
thereof so numerous and bulky, that, for all intents and purposes, the situation is as if disregarding forms the petitions
had been given due course and the cases had been submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Court believe that they should express their views on the aforementioned
issues as if the same were being decided on the merits, and they have done so in their individual opinions attached hereto.
Hence, the resume of the votes east and the tenor of the resolution, in the last pages hereof, despite the fact that technically
the Court has not, as yet, formally given due course to the petitions herein.
And, now, here are my views on the reliefs sought by the parties.
In L-36165, it is clear that we should not issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, as
President and President Pro Tempore respectively of the Senate, it being settled in our jurisdiction, based upon the theory of
separation of powers, that the judiciary will not issue such writ to the head of a co-equal department, like the
aforementioned officers of the Senate.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondents in said case, as well as in eases L-36142, L-36164, L-36236
and L-36283, my vote is that the petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing
that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, or
substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or a majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in
force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission
of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and
XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of theRevised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases overlooks what they might consider to be the demands of "judicial
statesmanship," whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. I am aware of this possibility, if not probability; but "judicial
statesmanship," though consistent with Rule of Law, cannot prevail over the latter. Among consistent ends or consistent
values, there always is a hierarchy, a rule of priority.
We must realize that the New Society has many achievements which would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish under the old dispensation. But, in and for the judiciary, statesmanship should not prevail over the Rule of Law.
Indeed, the primacy of the law or of the Rule of Law and faithful adherence thereto are basic, fundamental and essential
parts of statesmanship itself.
Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution
As earlier stated, after the submittal by the members of the Court of their individual opinions and/or concurrences as
appended hereto, the writer will now make, with the concurrence of his colleagues, a resume or summary of the votes cast
by each of them.
It should be stated that by virtue of the various approaches and views expressed during the deliberations, it was agreed to
synthesize the basic issues at bar in broad general terms in five questions for purposes of taking the votes. It was further
agreed of course that each member of the Court would expound in his individual opinion and/or concurrence his own
approach to the stated issues and deal with them and state (or not) his opinion thereon singly or jointly and with such
priority, qualifications and modifications as he may deem proper, as well as discuss thereon other related issues which he
may consider vital and relevant to the cases at bar.
The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following:
1.Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?
2.Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict,
compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3.Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
4.Are petitioners entitled to relief? and
5.Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their respective
opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:
1.On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable
and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in
their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed that there
has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep its hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in the negative,
the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution has been
complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political
and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2.On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for
ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters." 87
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article,
the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed,
falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge
that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that,
in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the
belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which
is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has
been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in
effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
3.On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority
vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already
accepted the1973 Constitution." 88
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has
even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitutionunder Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted or
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the
mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free
expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." 89
4.On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justices Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view
that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases
to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and
unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents'
motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5.On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is
in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no
vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.
||| (Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, L-36283 (Resolution), [March 31,
1973], 151-A PHIL 35-427)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,


MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who
may be appointed vice representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C . Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; DEFINED. The accepted meaning of "political question" is that "where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or
both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where
the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused
to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL; DEFINES "JUDICIAL
POWER." Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
3. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT UNDER
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Section 17 reechoes Section 11,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal
which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTISAN. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal
as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the
Senate and House of Representatives: "The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members. "The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the
election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained in the legislature." "The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to
supervise and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. "The Electoral
Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while
composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. "The
Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciarywhen and while
acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139.)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO REMOVE A MEMBER FROM THE HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of ourConstitution,would, however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he
cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such
interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a
mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power. The expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the
House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND "BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE" NOT VALID GROUND FOR
TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP THEREIN. As judges, the members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERS THEREIN ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE; REMOVAL MUST BE FOR A VALID CAUSE. The
resolution of the House of Representatives expelling Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members
of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership
in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House
of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the
records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party,
his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF "SEPARATION OF POWERS"; EXPLAINED. A fundamental principle in our
constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among three (3) great departments: legislative,
executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one
deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not
only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its
functions fully and adequately without the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to
say, one department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular functions." The
completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in
one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in
them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and
duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever.
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE POWER TO APPOINT OR DESIGNATE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE
POWER TO REMOVE SAID MEMBER. The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to
be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of
the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the
political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected, no matter how politically motivated it
might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom orexpediency.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR ACTION OF
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TAKEN IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER COMMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO IT BY THE
CONSTITUTION; CASE AT BAR. The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution. It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them
within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, are exclusively of legislative concern. To hold
otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. Even assuming that the act of the House of
Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the
electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the House of
Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE. I believe that the question, can the
Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? is a political question and a question in which
the Court can not intervene. It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house.
This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.
DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J p:

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the
House? LLphil
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated
to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome
as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a
political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question"
doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that "where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their
sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is
beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or
Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.).
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a
showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority
is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished,
necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the
Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action
when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is
"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice
according to law. . . . It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for
the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes
Difference 3,300 votes

On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom
are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member


Associate Justice
Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member


Associate Justice
Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Benguet
LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Palawan
LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member


Congressman 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija
LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Davao del Sur
LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member


Congressman
4th Dist., Batangas
LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member


Congressman
2nd Dist., Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP).
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was
submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At
that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a re appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts,
thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner
of the contest. LLpr
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his "Chief," Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc
"consistent with truth and justice and self-respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the
HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's revelation
stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority
in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case
No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman
Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution
No. 03-91, had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del
Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from
the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it "especially in matters where party
membership is a prerequisite." 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March
13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
"13 March 1991
"Honorable Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
"Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
"I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives
during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of
the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP
communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
"Thank you.
"For the Secretary-General
"(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
"Officer-in-charge
Operations Department"
(p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this "distressing development" and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
"By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral
protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is
sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73777-78, promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to
its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.
"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor
of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots,
the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
"Congressman Camasura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pined case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leadership of his
party.
"Under the above circumstances, an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to
continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its integrity and credibility as a
constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent
member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it.
"In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead
for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by
the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the
party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component
in the Tribunal.
"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving
members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
"We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with
their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal
deliberations.
"There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991.Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.
"But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the
Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
"Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
"xxx xxx xxx".
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling
the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
"In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda
(HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's
vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the
Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
"The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that
this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from
membership in the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a
member of the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention." (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved
to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that: LibLex
". . . in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of
these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases
before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon
assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the
independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz, and
Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of
non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which
performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and
c) to NOTE the new that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but
only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to
the said Tribunal in the first instance.
"Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty
will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave."
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who
may be appointed Vice Representative Juanito G. Camasura Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, "to withdraw the nomination
and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place
of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition
within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of
Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanito G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said
Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority
that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has
the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate
is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party
affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation
would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of
the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House
of Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against
him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to
implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET, that withdrew and
rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with
the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable
party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the
Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief
of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one
of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET, several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an
election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the
majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main
political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggravations in the Legislature.
The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each
House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (1935 Constitution of the Philippines.).
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it was impossible for any political party to control the
voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa. LLpr
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
theexclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
"The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
"The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained in the legislature."
"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special
tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of
the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own
employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
"The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx.
"The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges
on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
"My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal,
either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I
will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by
mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?.
"MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
"MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
"MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
"MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are
not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
"MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know
again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the
present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are
independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has
no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
"MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of
government.
"MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
"Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
"MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice
that the wordings say: `The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal.' It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the
tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
"MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
"MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
"MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
"MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion Commissioner Concepcion that there
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera,Senate Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from
all political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such
detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
"MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent." (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22,
1986, Emphasis ours.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution,would, however,
be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the
tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court
and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not
a valid cause for
termination of membership
in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on
the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman
Camasura violates his
right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. LLjur
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of
the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was
replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that
those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to
remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on
Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design
to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty"
after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion
of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated,
and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal.
That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote
and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge
that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and
discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty
under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring
opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not
for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc
of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March
13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he
prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay
incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED,
effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent
Marciano A. Pineda. SO ORDERED.
||| (Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, [September 26, 1991], 278 PHIL 784-817)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.


Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. The separation of powers is a fundamental


principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere.
2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments
is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a
certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL
BOUNDARIES. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing
of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY
CLEAR IMPLICATION. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which
is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY". The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what
is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY
OF LEGISLATION. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY; SUCCESS
MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. But much as we might postulate on the
internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of
James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of
this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation
rooms and court chambers.
8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution
adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall
have no power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is
true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123, Title IX, Constitution
of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.
9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. The nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional
system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the ElectoralCommission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO


THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. The original provision regarding
this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that the assembly shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this
provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature over the particular
cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete". (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. The transfer of the power of determining the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. As
early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court
of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22];
Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth
of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In
Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be
resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of
March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak
Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43) all provide
for an Electoral Commission.
12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. The creation of
an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number
of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for
such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members
elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the
four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE
HISTORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE
PEOPLE. The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY
THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN INDEPENDENT AND
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION
ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THAN TO
ANY OTHER. The Electoral Commissionis a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a
power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of
the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature.
16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS COMPLETE
AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. The grant of power to
the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the Legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power
claimed for the National Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
theElectoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to
thecommission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be
created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of
the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part
of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.

17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED
ALSO IN THE ELECTORALCOMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. The creation of
the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. The possibility of
abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. If
any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible
abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as it has given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with same zeal
and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of
these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of
human institutions. From the fact that theElectoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its
legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. The Commonwealth Government
was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25, of that year,
and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The
protest by the herein respondent against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the
filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of
the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting
the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or
tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that
it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS AGAINST THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests has been
filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation
of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of
the Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone
by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to
entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1,
par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. Under the practice prevailing when the
Jones Law was still in force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election
of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No.
3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest the election
of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already
expired, each House passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election
no protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests
against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has
expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the
exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix,
as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members.
And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

DECISION

LAUREL, J p:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National
Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
"[No. 8]
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES
NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935."
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the
passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este
dia."
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of
the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January
23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to hem for decision and to matters involving
their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not
availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under sections 1
and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon
the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commissioninterposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day
for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in
adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members
of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive
the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set
by its own rules;
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi- judicial functions, created by the Constitution
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person"
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,
setting forth following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing Law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-
judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means
of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its
members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to
deprive theElectoral Commission of jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decisions are final and unappeallable;
(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance
appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the
Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed
for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be
reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and
leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass
upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the
other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority
of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other
than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power
of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment,
and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the
less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be
ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the last and
ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election
of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December
9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has
the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December
9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of
the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when the
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in
their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall
have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is
true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution
of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our
case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict
of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this
court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to theElectoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution
of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able
counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes herein. The
senior Justice in the Commissionshall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore,
that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and
the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down
the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . .." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916
(sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House
of the Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of
power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs.
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.).
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to
the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub- committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of
a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear protests not only against the election of members of the
legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required,
as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officers. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six
members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designated by the
majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a
member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention
on September 24, 1934, subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either House and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted,
as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of
votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice."
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the
Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to
create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as
an Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power
with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on
October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
"(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over
by one of said justices."
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to
strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly
shall be the sole and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four
lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: 'The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ..' I should like to ask from the gentleman from
Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose election is not contested shall
also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that
is why the word 'judge' is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election
of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to
be determined.
"Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those who election is not contested?.
"Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the
assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that be has
been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
"Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize
his pay.
"Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims-in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the
same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest.
The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person
tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. For example, in a case when
the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the
man who has been elected is in question.
"However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give
to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns
and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
"Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
"Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
"Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from
Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate
from the first part of the section which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
"Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase 'the elections, returns and qualifications.' This phrase 'and contested
elections' was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
"Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the election of the members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
"Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield? .
"THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

"Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.


"Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
"Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-
thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
"Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualification of the members.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the
eligibility of its members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
"Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though
that question has not been raised.
"Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge."
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por
varios Delegados al efecto to que la primera clausula del draft que dice: 'The election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly' parece que da a la
Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambin la eleccion de los miembros que no han
sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tiene razon en ese
sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: 'All cases contesting the
election', de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en
que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomit de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Qu dice el Comit?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cre Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a
los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Cremos que si el tribunal o la Comision esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus mritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunfo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo."
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National
Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to
accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
"(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commissionshall be its chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly."
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating
to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the election", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a
mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a
vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the
House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of
March 14, 1936:
"153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing
committee appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of
privileges and elections, whose function was to hear and investigate all questions of this description
which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the
house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee, they heard the parties
and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion
thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house.
The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was
adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a
committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is
called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named
was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and
vote if they pleased.
"154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770,
controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for example, in 1741,
Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an
adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election, cases, as
conducted under this system, that 'Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly
prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to
adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the
public welfare.' Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house
to bring in a bill, 'to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament.' In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing
practice in the following terms: 'Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are
an earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not
bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is
well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in
a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and
take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine
with the strictest impartiality.'

"155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill
which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares,
that it 'was one of the noblest works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman.' It is probable, that the magnitude of the
evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to
the information of a judgment, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day,
and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North,
Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of
the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system
was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most
important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons."
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench
of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt
and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo.
5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were
originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in
the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper
House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The
Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art.
10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the
purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2,
1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to
the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate
provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19,
chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special ElectoralCommission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be
selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in
this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme
Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany,
1913]-Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical
interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of
other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision
(section 4) creating the Electoral Commissionunder Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But
it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R.
A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of thecommission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not
only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and wherever
the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically
an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as
we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of theElectoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule
of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol.
I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the ElectoralCommission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of
mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession
of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an ElectoralCommission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and
must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not
intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same
zealand honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations
of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the ElectoralCommission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of
equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, was approved
by that body on December 3, 11935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when theElectoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the ElectoralCommission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body has actually been organized. As a
matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly
attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six
members of the National Assembly constituting theElectoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members
of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be
that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases
had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and
deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution.
This result was not and could not have been contemplated,and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice
of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing
of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers in sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the
time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2,
secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the
claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of
the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to
enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a
writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c.
125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative
Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed
the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time
fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving
the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was
interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested
(Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, pp.
1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892,
893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have
been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe
regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the
National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against
the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through
the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict
and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments
of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the herein petitioner Jose A.Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within
the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
||| (Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, [July 15, 1936], 63 PHIL 139-187)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,


MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who
may be appointed vice representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C . Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; DEFINED. The accepted meaning of "political question" is that "where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or
both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where
the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused
to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL; DEFINES "JUDICIAL
POWER." Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
3. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT UNDER
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Section 17 reechoes Section 11,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal
which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTISAN. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal
as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the
Senate and House of Representatives: "The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission
was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members. "The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the
election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained in the legislature." "The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to
supervise and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. "The Electoral
Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while
composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. "The
Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciarywhen and while
acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139.)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO REMOVE A MEMBER FROM THE HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of ourConstitution,would, however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he
cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such
interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a
mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power. The expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the
House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND "BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE" NOT VALID GROUND FOR
TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP THEREIN. As judges, the members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERS THEREIN ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE; REMOVAL MUST BE FOR A VALID CAUSE. The
resolution of the House of Representatives expelling Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members
of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership
in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House
of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the
records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party,
his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF "SEPARATION OF POWERS"; EXPLAINED. A fundamental principle in our
constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed among three (3) great departments: legislative,
executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one
deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not
only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its
functions fully and adequately without the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to
say, one department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular functions." The
completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in
one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in
them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and
duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever.
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE POWER TO APPOINT OR DESIGNATE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE
POWER TO REMOVE SAID MEMBER. The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to
be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of
the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the
political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected, no matter how politically motivated it
might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom orexpediency.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR ACTION OF
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TAKEN IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER COMMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO IT BY THE
CONSTITUTION; CASE AT BAR. The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution. It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them
within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, are exclusively of legislative concern. To hold
otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. Even assuming that the act of the House of
Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the
electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the House of
Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE. I believe that the question, can the
Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? is a political question and a question in which
the Court can not intervene. It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house.
This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J p:

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the
House? LLphil
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated
to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome
as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a
political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question"
doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that "where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their
sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is
beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or
Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.).
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a
showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority
is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished,
necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the
Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action
when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is
"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice
according to law. . . . It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for
the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes
Difference 3,300 votes

On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom
are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member


Associate Justice
Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member


Associate Justice
Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Benguet
LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Palawan
LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member


Congressman 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija
LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member


Congressman
1st Dist., Davao del Sur
LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member


Congressman
4th Dist., Batangas
LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member


Congressman
2nd Dist., Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP).

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was
submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At
that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a re appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts,
thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner
of the contest. LLpr
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his "Chief," Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc
"consistent with truth and justice and self-respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the
HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's revelation
stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority
in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case
No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman
Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution
No. 03-91, had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del
Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from
the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it "especially in matters where party
membership is a prerequisite." 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March
13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
"13 March 1991
"Honorable Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
"Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
"I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives
during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of
the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP
communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
"Thank you.
"For the Secretary-General
"(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
"Officer-in-charge
Operations Department"
(p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this "distressing development" and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
"By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral
protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is
sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73777-78, promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to
its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.
"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor
of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots,
the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
"Congressman Camasura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pined case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leadership of his
party.
"Under the above circumstances, an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to
continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its integrity and credibility as a
constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent
member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it.
"In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead
for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by
the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the
party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component
in the Tribunal.
"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving
members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
"We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with
their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal
deliberations.
"There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991.Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.
"But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the
Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
"Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
"xxx xxx xxx".
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling
the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
"In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda
(HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's
vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the
Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
"The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that
this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from
membership in the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a
member of the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention." (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved
to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that: LibLex
". . . in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of
these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases
before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon
assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the
independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz, and
Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of
non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which
performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and
c) to NOTE the new that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but
only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to
the said Tribunal in the first instance.
"Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty
will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave."
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who
may be appointed Vice Representative Juanito G. Camasura Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, "to withdraw the nomination
and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place
of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition
within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of
Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanito G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said
Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority
that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has
the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate
is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party
affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation
would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of
the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House
of Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against
him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to
implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET, that withdrew and
rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with
the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable
party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the
Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief
of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one
of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET, several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an
election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the
majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main
political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggravations in the Legislature.
The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each
House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (1935 Constitution of the Philippines.).
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it was impossible for any political party to control the
voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa. LLpr
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
theexclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
"The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
"The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained in the legislature."
"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special
tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of
the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own
employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
"The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx.
"The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges
on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
"My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal,
either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I
will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by
mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?.
"MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
"MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
"MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
"MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are
not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
"MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know
again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the
present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are
independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has
no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
"MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of
government.
"MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
"Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
"MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice
that the wordings say: `The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal.' It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the
tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
"MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
"MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
"MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
"MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion Commissioner Concepcion that there
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera,Senate Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from
all political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such
detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
"MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent." (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22,
1986, Emphasis ours.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution,would, however,
be a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the
tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court
and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not
a valid cause for
termination of membership
in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
"disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on
the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman
Camasura violates his
right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. LLjur
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of
the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was
replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that
those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to
remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on
Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design
to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty"
after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion
of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated,
and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal.
That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote
and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge
that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and
discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty
under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring
opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not
for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc
of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March
13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he
prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay
incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED,
effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent
Marciano A. Pineda. SO ORDERED.
||| (Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, [September 26, 1991], 278 PHIL 784-817)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.]

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL,


MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY
SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P.
LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA
PACIFIC CONSORTIUM,respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:

There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; 1 or (2)
when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 2 In the present case, the
Commission on Elections approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the subject Contract not only in clear violation of
law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. For the automation of the
counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, Comelec awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium"
an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with
"Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a company that joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.
Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing
mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even
if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity
of elections, especially the following three items:
They failed to achieve the accuracy rating criteria of 99.9995 percent set-up by the Comelec itself
They were not able to detect previously downloaded results at various canvassing or consolidation
levels and to prevent these from being inputted again
They were unable to print the statutorily required audit trails of the count/canvass at different levels
without any loss of data
Because of the foregoing violations of law and the glaring grave abuse of discretion committed by Comelec, the Court has
no choice but to exercise its solemn "constitutional duty" 3 to void the assailed Resolution and the subject Contract. The
illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the Commission have not only desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have
also cast serious doubts upon the poll body's ability and capacity to conduct automated elections. Truly, the pith and soul of
democracy credible, orderly, and peaceful elections has been put in jeopardy by the illegal and gravely abusive acts of
Comelec.
The Case
Before us is a Petition 4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), which awarded "Phase II of the Modernization Project of the Commission to Mega
Pacific Consortium (MPC);" (2) to enjoin the implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into by
Comelec "either with Mega Pacific Consortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI);" and (3) to compel Comelec to
conduct a re-bidding of the project.
The Facts
The following facts are not disputed. They were culled from official documents, the parties' pleadings, as well as from
admissions during the Oral Argument on October 7, 2003.
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, 5 which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration
of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 6 authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
Initially intending to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, Comelec in its Resolution
No. 2985 dated February 9, 1998 7 eventually decided against full national implementation and limited the automation to
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some
automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu. 8
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done
manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It
resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III Electronic
Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5
billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid," which we quote as follows:
"INVITATION TO APPLY FOR ELIGIBILITY AND TO BID
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act Nos. 8189 and
8436, invites interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors to apply for eligibility and to bid for the
procurement by purchase, lease, lease with option to purchase, or otherwise, supplies, equipment,
materials and services needed for a comprehensive Automated Election System, consisting of three (3)
phases: (a) registration/verification of voters, (b) automated counting and consolidation of votes, and (c)
electronic transmission of election results, with an approved budget of TWO BILLION FIVE HUNDRED
MILLION (Php2,500,000,000) Pesos. EICDSA
Only bids from the following entities shall be entertained:
a. Duly licensed Filipino citizens/proprietorships;
b. Partnerships duly organized under the laws of the Philippines and of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the interest belongs to citizens of the Philippines;
c. Corporations duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, and of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock belongs to citizens of the Philippines;
d. Manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture, i.e., a
group of two (2) or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be
jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular contract, provided that Filipino
ownership thereof shall be at least sixty percent (60%); and
e. Cooperatives duly registered with the Cooperatives Development Authority.
Bid documents for the three (3) phases may be obtained starting 10 February 2003, during office hours
from the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Secretariat/Office of Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
7th Floor, Palacio del Governador, Intramuros, Manila, upon payment at the Cash Division, Commission
on Elections, in cash or cashier's check, payable to the Commission on Elections, of a non-refundable
amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php15,000.00) for each phase. For this purpose, interested
offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors have the option to participate in any or all of the three (3) phases of
the comprehensive Automated Election System.
A Pre-Bid Conference is scheduled on 13 February 2003, at 9:00 a.m. at the Session Hall, Commission
on Elections, Postigo Street, Intramuros, Manila. Should there be questions on the bid documents,
bidders are required to submit their queries in writing to the BAC Secretariat prior to the scheduled Pre-
Bid Conference.
Deadline for submission to the BAC of applications for eligibility and bid envelopes for the supply of the
comprehensive Automated Election System shall be at the Session Hall, Commission on Elections,
Postigo Street, Intramuros, Manila on 28 February 2003 at 9:00 a.m.
The COMELEC reserves the right to review the qualifications of the bidders after the bidding and before
the contract is executed. Should such review uncover any misrepresentation made in the eligibility
statements, or any changes in the situation of the bidder to materially downgrade the substance of such
statements, the COMELEC shall disqualify the bidder upon due notice without any obligation whatsoever
for any expenses or losses that may be incurred by it in the preparation of its bid." 9
On February 11, 2003, Comelec issued Resolution No. 5929 clarifying certain eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule
of activities for the project bidding, as follows:
"1.) Open to Filipino and foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do business and is actually
doing business in the Philippines, subject to Sec. 43 of RA 9184 (An Act providing in the
Modernization Standardization and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government
and for other purposes etc.)
2.) Track Record:
a) For counting machines should have been used in at least one (1) political exercise with no
less than Twenty Million Voters;
b) For verification of voters the reference site of an existing data base installation using
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) with at least Twenty Million.
3.) Ten percent (10%) equity requirement shall be based on the total project cost; and

4.) Performance bond shall be twenty percent (20%) of the bid offer.
RESOLVED moreover, that:
1) A. Due to the decision that the eligibility requirements and the rest of the Bid documents shall be
released at the same time, and the memorandum of Comm. Resurreccion Z. Borra dated
February 7, 2003, the documents to be released on Friday, February 14, 2003 at 2:00 o'clock
p.m. shall be the eligibility criteria, Terms of Reference (TOR) and other pertinent documents;
B. Pre-Bid conference shall be on February 18, 2003; and
C. Deadline for the submission and receipt of the Bids shall be on March 5, 2003.
2) The aforementioned documents will be available at the following offices:
a) Voters Validation: Office of Comm. Javier
b) Automated Counting Machines: Office of Comm. Borra
c) Electronic Transmission: Office of Comm. Tancangco" 10
On February 17, 2003, the poll body released the Request for Proposal (RFP) to procure the election automation machines.
The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of Comelec convened a pre-bid conference on February 18, 2003 and gave
prospective bidders until March 10, 2003 to submit their respective bids.
Among others, the RFP provided that bids from manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint
venture may be entertained, provided that the Philippine ownership thereof shall be at least 60 percent. Joint venture is
defined in the RFP as "a group of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and
severally responsible or liable for a particular contract." 11
Basically, the public bidding was to be conducted under a two-envelope/two stage system. The bidder's first envelope or the
Eligibility Envelope should establish the bidder's eligibility to bid and its qualifications to perform the acts if accepted. On the
other hand, the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. The RFP outlines the bidding procedures as follows:
"25. Determination of Eligibility of Prospective Bidders
"25.1 The eligibility envelopes of prospective Bidders shall be opened first to determine their eligibility. In
case any of the requirements specified in Clause 20 is missing from the first bid envelope, the BAC shall
declare said prospective Bidder as ineligible to bid. Bid envelopes of ineligible Bidders shall be
immediately returned unopened.
"25.2 The eligibility of prospective Bidders shall be determined using simple 'pass/fail' criteria and shall
be determined as either eligible or ineligible. If the prospective Bidder is rated 'passed' for all the legal,
technical and financial requirements, he shall be considered eligible. If the prospective Bidder is rated
'failed' in any of the requirements, he shall be considered ineligible.
"26. Bid Examination/Evaluation
"26.1 The BAC will examine the Bids to determine whether they are complete, whether any
computational errors have been made, whether required securities have been furnished, whether the
documents have been properly signed, and whether the Bids are generally in order.
"26.2 The BAC shall check the submitted documents of each Bidder against the required documents
enumerated under Clause 20, to ascertain if they are all present in the Second bid envelope (Technical
Envelope). In case one (1) or more of the required documents is missing, the BAC shall rate the Bid
concerned as 'failed' and immediately return to the Bidder its Third bid envelope (Financial Envelope)
unopened. Otherwise, the BAC shall rate the first bid envelope as 'passed'.
"26.3 The BAC shall immediately open the Financial Envelopes of the Bidders whose Technical
Envelopes were passed or rated on or above the passing score. Only Bids that are determined to contain
all the bid requirements for both components shall be rated 'passed' and shall immediately be considered
for evaluation and comparison.
"26.4 In the opening and examination of the Financial Envelope, the BAC shall announce and tabulate
the Total Bid Price as calculated. Arithmetical errors will be rectified on the following basis: If there is a
discrepancy between words and figures, the amount in words will prevail. If there is a discrepancy
between the unit price and the total price that is obtained by multiplying the unit price and the quantity,
the unit price shall prevail and the total price shall be corrected accordingly. If there is a discrepancy
between the Total Bid Price and the sum of the total prices, the sum of the total prices prevail and the
Total Bid Price shall be corrected accordingly. HcSaAD
"26.5 Financial Proposals which do not clearly state the Total Bid Price shall be rejected. Also, Total Bid
Price as calculated that exceeds the approved budget for the contract shall also be rejected.
27. Comparison of Bids
"27.1 The bid price shall be deemed to embrace all costs, charges and fees associated with carrying out
all the elements of the proposed Contract, including but not limited to, license fees, freight charges and
taxes.
"27.2 The BAC shall establish the calculated prices of all Bids rated 'passed' and rank the same in
ascending order.
xxx xxx xxx
"29. Postqualification
"29.1 The BAC will determine to its satisfaction whether the Bidder selected as having submitted the
lowest calculated bid is qualified to satisfactorily perform the Contract.
"29.2 The determination will take into account the Bidder's financial, technical and production
capabilities/resources. It will be based upon an examination of the documentary evidence of the Bidder's
qualification submitted by the Bidder as well as such other information as the BAC deems necessary and
appropriate.
"29.3 A bid determined as not substantially responsive will be rejected by the BAC and may not
subsequently be made responsive by the Bidder by correction of the non-conformity.
"29.4 The BAC may waive any informality or non-conformity or irregularity in a bid which does not
constitute a material deviation, provided such waiver does not prejudice or affect the relative ranking of
any Bidder.
"29.5 Should the BAC find that the Bidder complies with the legal, financial and technical requirements, it
shall make an affirmative determination which shall be a prerequisite for award of the Contract to the
Bidder. Otherwise, it will make a negative determination which will result in rejection of the Bidder's bid, in
which event the BAC will proceed to the next lowest calculated bid to make a similar determination of that
Bidder's capabilities to perform satisfactorily." 12
Out of the 57 bidders, 13 the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For
technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC's Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST).
In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a
number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003,
promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and the award
of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter 14 to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as
technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-
bidding.
In a letter-reply dated June 6, 2003, 15 the Comelec chairman speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive
assistant rejected the protest and declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny."
Hence, the present Petition. 16
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. The COMELEC awarded and contracted with a non-eligible entity; . . .
"2. Private respondents failed to pass the Technical Test as required in the RFP. Notwithstanding, such
failure was ignored. In effect, the COMELEC changed the rules after the bidding in effect
changing the nature of the contract bidded upon.
"3. Petitioners have locus standi.
"4. Instant Petition is not premature. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified." 17
In the main, the substantive issue is whether the Commission on Elections, the agency vested with the exclusive
constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative
functions, it awarded to MPC the contract for the second phase of the comprehensive Automated Election System.
Before discussing the validity of the award to MPC, however, we deem it proper to first pass upon the procedural issues: the
legal standing of petitioners and the alleged prematurity of the Petition.
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Procedural Issue:
Locus Standi of Petitioners
Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi, inasmuch as they are not challenging the validity or
constitutionality of RA 8436. Moreover, petitioners supposedly admitted during the Oral Argument that no law had been
violated by the award of the Contract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no actual and material interest in the Contract and,
hence, do not stand to be injured or prejudiced on account of the award.
On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens respond
that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed
bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of
the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably
affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for
automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws
governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

We agree with petitioners. Our nation's political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of
the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern
and imbued with public interest"; 18 in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" 19 and "transcendental
importance." 20 This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." 21 Petitioners' legal standing should
therefore be recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public
funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." 24 In the instant case,
individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the
Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract
and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners
possess locus standi.
Second Procedural Issue:
Alleged Prematurity Due to Non-Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies
Respondents claim that petitioners acted prematurely, since they had not first utilized the protest mechanism available to
them underRA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, for the settlement of disputes pertaining to procurement
contracts.
Section 55 of RA 9184 states that protests against decisions of the Bidding and Awards Committee in all stages of
procurement may be lodged with the head of the procuring entity by filing a verified position paper and paying a protest
fee. Section 57 of the same law mandates that in no case shall any such protest stay or delay the bidding process, but it
must first be resolved before any award is made.
On the other hand, Section 58 provides that court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated by the
statute shall have been completed. Cases filed in violation of this process are to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Regional trial courts shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the procuring entity, and court actions shall be
instituted pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. cECTaD
Respondents assert that throughout the bidding process, petitioners never questioned the BAC Report finding MPC eligible
to bid and recommending the award of the Contract to it (MPC). According to respondents, the Report should have been
appealed to the Comelecen banc, pursuant to the aforementioned sections of RA 9184. In the absence of such appeal, the
determination and recommendation of the BAC had become final.
The Court is not persuaded.
Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074 dated April 15, 2003, awarding the project to
Respondent MPC even before the BAC managed to issue its written report and recommendation on April 21, 2003. Thus,
how could petitioners have appealed the BAC's recommendation or report to the head of the procuring entity (the chairman
of Comelec), when the Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even before petitioners
learned of the BAC recommendation?
It is claimed 25 by Comelec that during its April 15, 2003 session, it received and approved the verbal report and
recommendation of the BAC for the award of the Contract to MPC, and that the BAC subsequently re-affirmed its verbal
report and recommendation by submitting it in writing on April 21, 2003. Respondents insist that the law does not require
that the BAC Report be in writing before Comelec can act thereon; therefore, there is allegedly nothing irregular about the
Report as well as the en banc Resolution.
However, it is obvious that petitioners could have appealed the BAC's report and recommendation to the head of the
procuring entity (the Comelec chair) only upon their discovery thereof, which at the very earliest would have been on April
21, 2003, when the BAC actually put its report in writing and finally released it. Even then, what would have been the use of
protesting/appealing the report to the Comelec chair, when by that time the Commission en banc (including the chairman
himself) had already approved the BAC Report and awarded the Contract to MPC?
And even assuming arguendo that petitioners had somehow gotten wind of the verbal BAC report on April 15, 2003
(immediately after the en banc session), at that point the Commission en banc had already given its approval to the BAC
Report along with the award to MPC. To put it bluntly, the Comelec en banc itself made it legally impossible for petitioners to
avail themselves of the administrative remedy that the Commission is so impiously harping on . There is no doubt that they
had not been accorded the opportunity to avail themselves of the process provided under Section 55 of RA 9184, according
to which a protest against a decision of the BAC may be filed with the head of the procuring entity. Nemo tenetur ad
impossible, 26 to borrow private respondents' favorite Latin excuse. 27
Some Observations on the BAC Report to the Comelec
We shall return to this issue of alleged prematurity shortly, but at this interstice, we would just want to put forward a few
observations regarding the BAC Report and the Comelec en banc's approval thereof.
First, Comelec contends that there was nothing unusual about the fact that the Report submitted by the BAC came only
after the former had already awarded the Contract, because the latter had been asked to render its report and
recommendation orally during the Commission's en banc session on April 15, 2003. Accordingly, Comelec supposedly acted
upon such oral recommendation and approved the award to MPC on the same day, following which the recommendation
was subsequently reduced into writing on April 21, 2003. While not entirely outside the realm of the possible, this interesting
and unique spiel does not speak well of the process that Comelec supposedly went through in making a critical decision
with respect to a multi-billion-peso contract.
We can imagine that anyone else standing in the shoes of the Honorable Commissioners would have been extremely
conscious of the overarching need for utter transparency. They would have scrupulously avoided the slightest hint of
impropriety, preferring to maintain an exacting regularity in the performance of their duties, instead of trying to break a
speed record in the award of multi-billion-peso contracts. After all, between April 15 and April 21 were a mere six (6) days.
Could Comelec not have waited out six more days for the written report of the BAC, instead of rushing pell-mell into the
arms of MPC? Certainly, respondents never cared to explain the nature of the Commission's dire need to act immediately
without awaiting the formal, written BAC Report.
In short, the Court finds it difficult to reconcile the uncommon dispatch with which Comelec acted to approve the multi-
billion-peso deal, with its claim of having been impelled by only the purest and most noble of motives.
At any rate, as will be discussed later on, several other factors combine to lend negative credence to Comelec's tale.
Second, without necessarily ascribing any premature malice or premeditation on the part of the Comelec officials involved, it
should nevertheless be conceded that this cart-before-the-horse maneuver (awarding of the Contract ahead of the BAC's
written report) would definitely serve as a clever and effective way of averting and frustrating any impending protest under
Section 55.
Having made the foregoing observations, we now go back to the question of exhausting administrative remedies.
Respondents may not have realized it, but the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29,
2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to
award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation
of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol.
Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it
hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.
And even without that May 29, 2003 letter-protest, the Court still holds that petitioners need not exhaust administrative
remedies in the light of Paat v. Court of Appeals. 29 Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." 30

The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself
made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable."
In any event, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the unconventional rendition of the BAC Report and the precipitate
awarding of the Contract by the Comelec en banc plus the fact that it was racing to have its Contract with MPC
implemented in time for the elections in May 2004 (barely four months away) have combined to bring about the urgent
need for judicial intervention, thus prompting this Court to dispense with the procedural exhaustion of administrative
remedies in this case.
Main Substantive Issue:
Validity of the Award to MPC
We come now to the meat of the controversy. Petitioners contend that the award is invalid, since Comelec gravely abused
its discretion when it did the following:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility
requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC
of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of
the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for
Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to
pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated
counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to
focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their
effect on the present controversy
A.
Failure to Establish the Identity, Existence and Eligibility
of the Alleged Consortium as a Bidder
On the question of the identity and the existence of the real bidder, respondents insist that, contrary to petitioners'
allegations, the bidder was not Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI), which was incorporated only on February 27, 2003, or
11 days prior to the bidding itself. Rather, the bidder was Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC), of which MPEI was but a part. As
proof thereof, they point to the March 7, 2003 letter of intent to bid, signed by the president of MPEI allegedly for and on
behalf of MPC. They also call attention to the official receipt issued to MPC, acknowledging payment for the bidding
documents, as proof that it was the "consortium" that participated in the bidding process.
We do not agree. The March 7, 2003 letter, signed by only one signatory "Willy U. Yu, President, Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc., (Lead Company/Proponent) For: Mega Pacific Consortium" and without any further proof, does not by
itself prove the existence of the consortium. It does not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by
the other members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more important, to
commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings. The letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated.
Neither does an official receipt issued to MPC, acknowledging payment for the bidding documents, constitute proof that it
was the purported consortium that participated in the bidding. Such receipts are issued by cashiers without any legally
sufficient inquiry as to the real identity or existence of the supposed payor.
To assure itself properly of the due existence (as well as eligibility and qualification) of the putative consortium, Comelec's
BAC should have examined the bidding documents submitted on behalf of MPC. They would have easily discovered the
following fatal flaws.
Two-Envelope, Two-Stage System
As stated earlier in our factual presentation, the public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for
Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first
envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the
contract if its bid was accepted, while thesecond envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business registrations, licenses
and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary evidence to
establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial
documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity.
In the case of a consortium or joint venture desirous of participating in the bidding, it goes without saying that the Eligibility
Envelope would necessarily have to include a copy of the joint venture agreement, the consortium agreement or
memorandum of agreement or a business plan or some other instrument of similar import establishing the due
existence, composition and scope of such aggrupation. Otherwise, how would Comelec know who it was dealing with, and
whether these parties are qualified and capable of delivering the products and services being offered for bidding? 32
In the instant case, no such instrument was submitted to Comelec during the bidding process. This fact can be conclusively
ascertained by scrutinizing the two-inch thick "Eligibility Requirements" file submitted by Comelec last October 9, 2003, in
partial compliance with this Court's instructions given during the Oral Argument. This file purports to replicate the eligibility
documents originally submitted to Comelec by MPEI allegedly on behalf of MPC, in connection with the bidding conducted
in March 2003. Included in the file are the incorporation papers and financial statements of the members of the supposed
consortium and certain certificates, licenses and permits issued to them.
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement,
or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.
The only logical conclusion is that no such agreement was ever submitted to the Comelec for its consideration, as part of
the bidding process.
It thus follows that, prior the award of the Contract, there was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a
consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT. 33 Neither
was there anything to indicate the exact relationships between and among these firms; their diverse roles, undertakings and
prestations, if any, relative to the prosecution of the project, the extent of their respective investments (if any) in the
supposed consortium or in the project; and the precise nature and extent of their respective liabilities with respect to the
contract being offered for bidding. And apart from the self-serving letter of March 7, 2003, there was not even any indication
that MPEI was the lead company duly authorized to act on behalf of the others.
So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged
consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory
and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest.
Notwithstanding such deficiencies, Comelec still deemed the "consortium" eligible to participate in the bidding, proceeded to
open its Second Envelope, and eventually awarded the bid to it, even though per the Comelec's own RFP the BAC
should have declared the MPC ineligible to bid and returned the Second (Bid) Envelope unopened.
Inasmuch as Comelec should not have considered MPEI et al. as comprising a consortium or joint venture, it should not
have allowed them to avail themselves of the provision in Section 5.4 (b) (i) of the IRR for RA 6957 (the Build-Operate-
Transfer Law), as amended byRA 7718. This provision states in part that a joint venture/consortium proponent shall be
evaluated based on the individual or collective experience of the member-firms of the joint venture or consortium and of the
contractor(s) that it has engaged for the project. Parenthetically, respondents have uniformly argued that the said IRR of RA
6957, as amended, have suppletory application to the instant case.
Hence, had the proponent MPEI been evaluated based solely on its own experience, financial and operational track record
or lack thereof, it would surely not have qualified and would have been immediately considered ineligible to bid, as
respondents readily admit.
At any rate, it is clear that Comelec gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily failing to observe its own rules, policies and
guidelines with respect to the bidding process, thereby negating a fair, honest and competitive bidding.
Commissioners Not Aware of Consortium
In this regard, the Court is beguiled by the statements of Commissioner Florentino Tuason Jr., given in open court during the
Oral Argument last October 7, 2003. The good commissioner affirmed that he was aware, of his own personal knowledge,
that there had indeed been a written agreement among the "consortium" members, 34 although it was an internal matter
among them, 35 and of the fact that it would be presented by counsel for private respondent. 36
However, under questioning by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, Commissioner Tuason in effect
admitted that, while he was the commissioner-in-charge of Comelec's Legal Department, he had never seen, even up to
that late date, the agreement he spoke of. 37 Under further questioning, he was likewise unable to provide any information
regarding the amounts invested into the project by several members of the claimed consortium. 38 A short while later, he
admitted that the Commission had not taken a look at the agreement (if any). 39
He tried to justify his position by claiming that he was not a member of the BAC. Neither was he the commissioner-in-charge
of the Phase II Modernization project (the automated election system); but that, in any case, the BAC and the Phase II
Modernization Project Team did look into the aspect of the composition of the consortium.
It seems to the Court, though, that even if the BAC or the Phase II Team had taken charge of evaluating the eligibility,
qualifications and credentials of the consortium-bidder, still, in all probability, the former would have referred the task to
Commissioner Tuason, head of Comelec's Legal Department. That task was the appreciation and evaluation of the legal
effects and consequences of the terms, conditions, stipulations and covenants contained in any joint venture agreement,
consortium agreement or a similar document assuming of course that any of these was available at the time. The fact
that Commissioner Tuason was barely aware of the situation bespeaks the complete absence of such document, or the
utter failure or neglect of the Comelec to examine it assuming it was available at all at the time the award was made
on April 15, 2003. TIaDHE
In any event, the Court notes for the record that Commissioner Tuason basically contradicted his statements in open court
about there being one written agreement among all the consortium members, when he subsequently referred 40 to the four
(4) Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) executed by them. 41
At this juncture, one might ask: What, then, if there are four MOAs instead of one or none at all? Isn't it enough that there
are these corporations coming together to carry out the automation project? Isn't it true, as respondent aver, that nowhere in
the RFP issued by Comelec is it required that the members of the joint venture execute a single written agreement to prove
the existence of a joint venture. Indeed, the intention to be jointly and severally liable may be evidenced not only by a single
joint venture agreement, but also by supplementary documents executed by the parties signifying such intention. What then
is the big deal?
The problem is not that there are four agreements instead of only one. The problem is that Comelec never bothered to
check. It never based its decision on documents or other proof that would concretely establish the existence of the claimed
consortium or joint venture or agglomeration. It relied merely on the self-serving representation in an uncorroborated letter
signed by only one individual, claiming that his company represented a "consortium" of several different corporations. It
concluded forthwith that a consortium indeed existed, composed of such and such members, and thereafter declared that
the entity was eligible to bid.
True, copies of financial statements and incorporation papers of the alleged "consortium" members were submitted. But
these papers did not establish the existence of a consortium, as they could have been provided by the companies
concerned for purposes other than to prove that they were part of a consortium or joint venture. For instance, the papers
may have been intended to show that those companies were each qualified to be a sub-contractor (and nothing more) in a
major project. Those documents did not by themselves support the assumption that a consortium or joint venture existed
among the companies.
In brief, despite the absence of competent proof as to the existence and eligibility of the alleged consortium (MPC), its
capacity to deliver on the Contract, and the members' joint and several liability therefor, Comelec
nevertheless assumed that such consortium existed and was eligible. It then went ahead and considered the bid of MPC, to
which the Contract was eventually awarded, in gross violation of the former's own bidding rules and procedures contained in
its RFP. Therein lies Comelec's grave abuse of discretion.
Sufficiency of the Four Agreements
Instead of one multilateral agreement executed by, and effective and binding on, all the five "consortium members" as
earlier claimed by Commissioner Tuason in open court it turns out that what was actually executed were four
(4) separate and distinct bilateral Agreements. 42 Obviously, Comelec was furnished copies of these Agreements
only after the bidding process had been terminated, as these were not included in the Eligibility Documents. These
Agreements are as follows:
A Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and SK C&C
A Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and WeSolv
A "Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and Election.com Ltd.
A "Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and ePLDT
In sum, each of the four different and separate bilateral Agreements is valid and binding only between MPEI and the other
contracting party, leaving the other "consortium" members total strangers thereto. Under this setup, MPEI
dealt separately with each of the "members," and the latter (WeSolv, SK C&C, Election.com, and ePLDT) in turn had
nothing to do with one another, each dealing only with MPEI.
Respondents assert that these four Agreements were sufficient for the purpose of enabling the corporations to still qualify
(even at that late stage) as a consortium or joint venture, since the first two Agreements had allegedly set forth the joint and
several undertakings among the parties, whereas the latter two clarified the parties' respective roles with regard to the
Project, with MPEI being the independent contractor and Election.com and ePLDT the subcontractors.
Additionally, the use of the phrase "particular contract" in the Comelec's Request for Proposal (RFP), in connection with the
joint and several liabilities of companies in a joint venture, is taken by them to mean that all the members of the joint venture
need not be solidarily liable for the entire project or joint venture, because it is sufficient that the lead company and the
member in charge of a particular contract or aspect of the joint venture agree to be solidarily liable.
At this point, it must be stressed most vigorously that the submission of the four bilateral Agreements to Comelec after the
end of the bidding process did nothing to eliminate the grave abuse of discretion it had already committed on April 15, 2003.
Deficiencies Have Not Been "Cured"
In any event, it is also claimed that the automation Contract awarded by Comelec incorporates all documents executed by
the "consortium" members, even if these documents are not referred to therein. The basis of this assertion appears to be
the passages from Section 1.4 of the Contract, which is reproduced as follows:
"All Contract Documents shall form part of the Contract even if they or any one of them is not referred to
or mentioned in the Contract as forming a part thereof. Each of the Contract Documents shall be mutually
complementary and explanatory of each other such that what is noted in one although not shown in the
other shall be considered contained in all, and what is required by any one shall be as binding as if
required by all, unless one item is a correction of the other.
"The intent of the Contract Documents is the proper, satisfactory and timely execution and completion of
the Project, in accordance with the Contract Documents. Consequently, all items necessary for the proper
and timely execution and completion of the Project shall be deemed included in the Contract."
Thus, it is argued that whatever perceived deficiencies there were in the supplementary contracts those entered into by
MPEI and the other members of the "consortium" as regards their joint and several undertakings have been cured. Better
still, such deficiencies have supposedly been prevented from arising as a result of the above-quoted provisions, from which
it can be immediately established that each of the members of MPC assumes the same joint and several liability as the
other members.
The foregoing argument is unpersuasive. First, the contract being referred to, entitled "The Automated Counting and
Canvassing Project Contract," is between Comelec and MPEI, not the alleged consortium, MPC. To repeat, it is MPEI not
MPC that is a party to the Contract. Nowhere in that Contract is there any mention of a consortium or joint venture, of
members thereof, much less of joint and several liability. Supposedly executed sometime in May 2003, 43 the Contract
bears a notarization date of June 30, 2003, and contains the signature of Willy U. Yu signing as president of MPEI (not for
and on behalf of MPC), along with that of the Comelec chair. It provides in Section 3.2 that MPEI (not MPC) is to supply the
Equipment and perform the Services under the Contract, in accordance with the appendices thereof; nothing whatsoever is
said about any consortium or joint venture or partnership.
Second, the portions of Section 1.4 of the Contract reproduced above do not have the effect of curing (much less
preventing) deficiencies in the bilateral agreements entered into by MPEI with the other members of the "consortium," with
respect to their joint and several liabilities. The term "Contract Documents," as used in the quoted passages of Section 1.4,
has a well-defined meaning and actually refers only to the following documents:
The Contract itself along with its appendices
The Request for Proposal (also known as "Terms of Reference") issued by the Comelec, including the
Tender Inquiries and Bid Bulletins

The Tender Proposal submitted by MPEI


In other words, the term "Contract Documents" cannot be understood as referring to or including the MOAs and the Teaming
Agreements entered into by MPEI with SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. This much is very clear and admits of
no debate. The attempt to use the provisions of Section 1.4 to shore up the MOAs and the Teaming Agreements is simply
unwarranted.
Third and last, we fail to see how respondents can arrive at the conclusion that, from the above-quoted provisions, it can be
immediately established that each of the members of MPC assumes the same joint and several liability as the other
members. Earlier, respondents claimed exactly the opposite that the two MOAs (between MPEI and SK C&C, and
between MPEI and WeSolv) had set forth the joint and several undertakings among the parties; whereas the two Teaming
Agreements clarified the parties' respective roles with regard to the Project, with MPEI being the independent contractor
and Election.com and ePLDT the subcontractors.
Obviously, given the differences in their relationships, their respective liabilities cannot be the same. Precisely, the very clear
terms and stipulations contained in the MOAs and the Teaming Agreements entered into by MPEI with SK C&C, WeSolv,
Election.com and ePLDT negate the idea that these "members" are on a par with one another and are, as such,
assuming the same joint and several liability.IHTASa
Moreover, respondents have earlier seized upon the use of the term "particular contract" in the Comelec's Request for
Proposal (RFP), in order to argue that all the members of the joint venture did not need to be solidarily liable for the entire
project or joint venture. It was sufficient that the lead company and the member in charge of a particular contract or aspect
of the joint venture would agree to be solidarily liable. The glaring lack of consistency leaves us at a loss. Are respondents
trying to establish the same joint and solidary liability among all the "members" or not?
Enforcement of Liabilities Problematic
Next, it is also maintained that the automation Contract between Comelec and the MPEI confirms the solidary undertaking
of the lead company and the consortium member concerned for each particular Contract, inasmuch as the position of MPEI
and anyone else performing the services contemplated under the Contract is described therein as that of an independent
contractor.
The Court does not see, however, how this conclusion was arrived at. In the first place, the contractual provision being
relied upon by respondents is Article 14, "Independent Contractors," which states: "Nothing contained herein shall be
construed as establishing or creating between the COMELEC and MEGA the relationship of employee and employer or
principal and agent, it being understood that the position of MEGA and of anyone performing the Services contemplated
under this Contract, is that of an independent contractor."
Obviously, the intent behind the provision was simply to avoid the creation of an employer-employee or a principal-agent
relationship and the complications that it would produce. Hence, the Article states that the role or position of MPEI, or
anyone else performing on its behalf, is that of an independent contractor. It is obvious to the Court that respondents
are stretching matters too far when they claim that, because of this provision, the Contract in effect confirms the solidary
undertaking of the lead company and the consortium member concerned for the particular phase of the project. This
assertion is an absolute non sequitur.
Enforcement of Liabilities Under the Civil Code Not Possible
In any event, it is claimed that Comelec may still enforce the liability of the "consortium" members under the Civil
Code provisions onpartnership, reasoning that MPEI et al. represented themselves as partners and members of MPC for
purposes of bidding for the Project. They are, therefore, liable to the Comelec to the extent that the latter relied upon such
representation. Their liability as partners is solidary with respect to everything chargeable to the partnership under certain
conditions.
The Court has two points to make with respect to this argument. First, it must be recalled that SK C&C, WeSolv,
Election.com and ePLDTnever represented themselves as partners and members of MPC, whether for purposes of bidding
or for something else. It was MPEIalone that represented them to be members of a "consortium" it supposedly headed.
Thus, its acts may not necessarily be held against the other "members."
Second, this argument of the OSG in its Memorandum 44 might possibly apply in the absence of a joint venture agreement
or some other writing that discloses the relationship of the "members" with one another. But precisely, this case does not
deal with a situation in which there is nothing in writing to serve as reference, leaving Comelec to rely on mere
representations and therefore justifying a falling back on the rules on partnership. For, again, the terms and stipulations of
the MOAs entered into by MPEI with SK C&C and WeSolv, as well as the Teaming Agreements of MPEI with Election.com
and ePLDT (copies of which have been furnished the Comelec) are very clear with respect to the extent and the limitations
of the firms' respective liabilities.
In the case of WeSolv and SK C&C, their MOAs state that their liabilities, while joint and several with MPEI, are limited only
to the particular areas of work wherein their services are engaged or their products utilized . As for Election.com and ePLDT,
their separate "Teaming Agreements" specifically ascribe to them the role of subcontractor vis-a-vis MPEI as contractor and,
based on the terms of their particular agreements, neither Election.com nor ePLDT is, with MPEI, jointly and severally liable
to Comelec. 45 It follows then that in the instant case, there is no justification for anyone, much less Comelec, to resort to
the rules on partnership and partners' liabilities.
Eligibility of a Consortium Based on the Collective Qualifications of Its Members
Respondents declare that, for purposes of assessing the eligibility of the bidder, the members of MPC should be evaluated
on a collective basis. Therefore, they contend, the failure of MPEI to submit financial statements (on account of its recent
incorporation) should not by itself disqualify MPC, since the other members of the "consortium" could meet the criteria set
out in the RFP.
Thus, according to respondents, the collective nature of the undertaking of the members of MPC, their contribution of assets
and sharing of risks, and the community of their interest in the performance of the Contract lead to these reasonable
conclusions: (1) that their collective qualifications should be the basis for evaluating their eligibility; (2) that the sheer
enormity of the project renders it improbable to expect any single entity to be able to comply with all the eligibility
requirements and undertake the project by itself; and (3) that, as argued by the OSG, the RFP allows bids from
manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that have formed themselves into a joint venture, in recognition of the virtual
impossibility of a single entity's ability to respond to the Invitation to Bid.
Additionally, argues the Comelec, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 6957 (the Build-Operate-Transfer Law) as
amended byRA 7718 would be applicable, as proponents of BOT projects usually form joint ventures or consortiums. Under
the IRR, a joint venture/consortium proponent shall be evaluated based on the individual or the collective experience of the
member-firms of the joint venture/consortium and of the contractors the proponent has engaged for the project.
Unfortunately, this argument seems to assume that the "collective" nature of the undertaking of the members of MPC, their
contribution of assets and sharing of risks, and the "community" of their interest in the performance of the Contract entitle
MPC to be treated as a joint venture or consortium; and to be evaluated accordingly on the basis of the members' collective
qualifications when, in fact, the evidence before the Court suggest otherwise.
This Court in Kilosbayan v. Guingona 46 defined joint venture as "an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally, all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of interest
in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith, and [a] duty, which
may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses."
Going back to the instant case, it should be recalled that the automation Contract with Comelec was not executed by the
"consortium" MPC or by MPEI for and on behalf of MPC but by MPEI, period. The said Contract contains no mention
whatsoever of any consortium or members thereof. This fact alone seems to contradict all the suppositions about a joint
undertaking that would normally apply to a joint venture or consortium: that it is a commercial enterprise involving a
community of interest, a sharing of risks, profits and losses, and so on.
Now let us consider the four bilateral Agreements, starting with the Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and WeSolv
Open Computing, Inc., dated March 5, 2003. The body of the MOA consists of just seven (7) short paragraphs that would
easily fit in one page! It reads as follows:
"1. The parties agree to cooperate in successfully implementing the Project in the substance and form as
may be most beneficial to both parties and other subcontractors involved in the Project.
"2. Mega Pacific shall be responsible for any contract negotiations and signing with the COMELEC and,
subject to the latter's approval, agrees to give WeSolv an opportunity to be present at meetings with the
COMELEC concerning WeSolv's portion of the Project.
"3. WeSolv shall be jointly and severally liable with Mega Pacific only for the particular products and/or
services supplied by the former for the Project.

"4. Each party shall bear its own costs and expenses relative to this agreement unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties.
"5. The parties undertake to do all acts and such other things incidental to, necessary or desirable or the
attainment of the objectives and purposes of this Agreement.
"6. In the event that the parties fail to agree on the terms and conditions of the supply of the products and
services including but not limited to the scope of the products and services to be supplied and payment
terms, WeSolv shall cease to be bound by its obligations stated in the aforementioned paragraphs.
"7. Any dispute arising from this Agreement shall be settled amicably by the parties whenever possible.
Should the parties be unable to do so, the parties hereby agree to settle their dispute through arbitration
in accordance with the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)
Even shorter is the Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and SK C&C Co. Ltd., dated March 9, 2003, the body of
which consists of only six (6) paragraphs, which we quote: IDCHTE
"1. All parties agree to cooperate in achieving the Consortium's objective of successfully implementing
the Project in the substance and form as may be most beneficial to the Consortium members and in
accordance with the demand of the RFP.
"2. Mega Pacific shall have full powers and authority to represent the Consortium with the Comelec, and
to enter and sign, for and in behalf of its members any and all agreement/s which may be required in the
implementation of the Project.
"3. Each of the individual members of the Consortium shall be jointly and severally liable with the Lead
Firm for the particular products and/or services supplied by such individual member for the project, in
accordance with their respective undertaking or sphere of responsibility.
"4. Each party shall bear its own costs and expenses relative to this agreement unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties.
"5. The parties undertake to do all acts and such other things incidental to, necessary or desirable for the
attainment of the objectives and purposes of this Agreement.
"6. Any dispute arising from this Agreement shall be settled amicably by the parties whenever possible.
Should the parties be unable to do so, the parties hereby agree to settle their dispute through arbitration
in accordance with the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that the two Agreements quoted above are very similar in wording. Neither of them contains any specifics or
details as to the exact nature and scope of the parties' respective undertakings, performances and deliverables under the
Agreement with respect to the automation project. Likewise, the two Agreements are quite bereft of pesos-and-centavos
data as to the amount of investments each party contributes, its respective share in the revenues and/or profit from the
Contract with Comelec, and so forth all of which are normal for agreements of this nature. Yet, according to public and
private respondents, the participation of MPEI, WeSolv and SK C&C comprises fully 90 percent of the entire undertaking
with respect to the election automation project, which is worth about P1.3 billion.
As for Election.com and ePLDT, the separate "Teaming Agreements" they entered into with MPEI for the remaining 10
percent of the entire project undertaking are ironically much longer and more detailed than the MOAs discussed earlier.
Although specifically ascribing to them the role of subcontractor vis-a-vis MPEI as contractor, these Agreements are,
however, completely devoid of any pricing data or payment terms. Even the appended Schedules supposedly containing
prices of goods and services are shorn of any price data. Again, as mentioned earlier, based on the terms of their particular
Agreements, neither Election.com nor ePLDT with MPEI is jointly and severally liable to Comelec.
It is difficult to imagine how these bare Agreements especially the first two could be implemented in practice; and how
a dispute between the parties or a claim by Comelec against them, for instance, could be resolved without lengthy and
debilitating litigations. Absent any clear-cut statement as to the exact nature and scope of the parties' respective
undertakings, commitments, deliverables and covenants, one party or another can easily dodge its obligation and deny or
contest its liability under the Agreement; or claim that it is the other party that should have delivered but failed to.
Likewise, in the absence of definite indicators as to the amount of investments to be contributed by each party,
disbursements for expenses, the parties' respective shares in the profits and the like, it seems to the Court that this situation
could readily give rise to all kinds of misunderstandings and disagreements over money matters.
Under such a scenario, it will be extremely difficult for Comelec to enforce the supposed joint and several liabilities of the
members of the "consortium." The Court is not even mentioning the possibility of a situation arising from a failure of WeSolv
and MPEI to agree on the scope, the terms and the conditions for the supply of the products and services under the
Agreement. In that situation, by virtue of paragraph 6 of its MOA, WeSolv would perforce cease to be bound by its
obligations including its joint and solidary liability with MPEI under the MOA and could forthwith disengage from the
project. Effectively, WeSolv could at any time unilaterally exit from its MOA with MPEI by simply failing to agree. Where
would that outcome leave MPEI and Comelec?
To the Court, this strange and beguiling arrangement of MPEI with the other companies does not qualify them to be treated
as a consortium or joint venture, at least of the type that government agencies like the Comelec should be dealing with. With
more reason is it unable to agree to the proposal to evaluate the members of MPC on a collective basis.
In any event, the MPC members claim to be a joint venture/consortium; and respondents have consistently been arguing
that the IRR for RA 6957, as amended, should be applied to the instant case in order to allow a collective evaluation of
consortium members. Surprisingly, considering these facts, respondents have not deemed it necessary for MPC members
to comply with Section 5.4 (a) (iii) of the IRR for RA 6957 as amended.
According to the aforementioned provision, if the project proponent is a joint venture or consortium, the members or
participants thereof are required to submit a sworn statement that, if awarded the contract, they shall bind themselves to be
jointly, severally and solidarily liable for the project proponent's obligations thereunder . This provision was supposed to
mirror Section 5 of RA 6957, as amended, which states: "In all cases, a consortium that participates in a bid must present
proof that the members of the consortium have bound themselves jointly and severally to assume responsibility for any
project. The withdrawal of any member of the consortium prior to the implementation of the project could be a ground for
the cancellation of the contract."
The Court has certainly not seen any joint and several undertaking by the MPC members that even approximates the tenor
of that which is described above. We fail to see why respondents should invoke the IRR if it is for their benefit, but refuse to
comply with it otherwise.
B.
DOST Technical Tests Flunked by the Automated Counting Machines
Let us now move to the second subtopic, which deals with the substantive issue: the ACM's failure to pass the tests of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
After respondent "consortium" and the other bidder, TIM, had submitted their respective bids on March 10, 2003, the
Comelec's BAC through its Technical Working Group (TWG) and the DOST evaluated their technical proposals.
Requirements that were highly technical in nature and that required the use of certain equipment in the evaluation process
were referred to the DOST for testing. The Department reported thus:
TEST RESULTS MATRIX 47
[Technical Evaluation of Automated Counting Machine]
KEY REQUIREMENTS MEGA-PACIFIC TOTAL INFORMATION
[QUESTIONS] CONSORTIUM MANAGEMENT
YES NO YES NO
1. Does the machine have
an accuracy rating of at
least 99.995 percent?
At COLD
environmental
conditions
At NORMAL
environmental
conditions
At HARSH
environmental
conditions
2. Accurately records and
reports the date and time
of the start and end of
counting of ballots per
precinct?
3. Prints election returns
without any loss of date
during generation of
such reports?
4. Uninterruptible back-up
power system, that will
engage immediately to
allow operation of at
least 10 minutes after
outage, power surge or
abnormal electrical
occurrences?
5. Machine reads two-
sided ballots in one Note: This
pass? particular
requirement
needs further
verification
6. Machine can detect
previously counted
ballots and prevent
previously counted
ballots from being
counted more than
once?
7. Stores results of counted
votes by precinct in Note: This
external (removable) particular
storage device? requirement
needs further
verification
8. Data stored in external
media is encrypted? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
9. Physical key or similar
device allows, limits, or
restricts operation of the
machine?
10. CPU speed is at least
400mHz? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
11. Port to allow use of
dot-matrix printers?
12. Generates printouts of
the election returns in a
format specified by the
COMELEC?
Generates printouts
In format specified by
COMELEC
13. Prints election returns
without any loss of data
during generation of
such report?
14. Generates an audit trail
of the counting
machine, both hard copy
and soft copy?

Hard copy
Soft copy
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
15. Does the
City/Municipal Note: This
Canvassing System particular
consolidate results from requirement
all precincts within it needs further
using the encrypted soft verification
copy of the data
generated by the
counting machine and
stored on the removable
data storage device?
16. Does the
City/Municipal Note: This Note: This
Canvassing System particular particular
consolidate results from requirement requirement
all precincts within it needs further needs further
using the encrypted soft verification verification
copy of the data
generated by the
counting machine and
transmitted through an
electronic transmission
media?
17. Does the system output
a Zero City/Municipal Note: This
Canvass Report, which particular
is printed on election requirement
day prior to the conduct needs further
of the actual canvass verification
operation, that shows
that all totals for all the
votes for all the
candidates and other
information, are indeed
zero or null?
18. Does the system
consolidate results from Note: This
all precincts in the particular
city/municipality using requirement
the data storage device needs further
coming from the verification
counting machine?
19. Is the machine 100%
accurate? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
20. Is the Program able to
detect previously Note: This
downloaded precinct particular
results and prevent these requirement
from being inputted needs further
again into the System? verification
21. The System is able to
print the specified
reports and the audit
trail without any loss of
data during generation
of the above-mentioned
reports?
Prints specified reports
Audit Trail
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
22. Can the result of the
city/municipal Note: This
consolidation be stored particular
in a data storage device? requirement
needs further
verification
23. Does the system
consolidate results from Note: This
all precincts in the particular
provincial/district/ requirement
national using the data needs further
storage device from verification
different levels of
consolidation?
24. Is the system 100%
accurate? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
25. Is the Program able to
detect previously Note: This
downloaded precinct particular
results and prevent these requirement
from being inputted needs further
again into the System? verification
26. The System is able to
print the specified
reports and the audit
trail without any loss of
data during generation
of the abovementioned
reports?
Prints specified reports
Audit Trail
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
27. Can the results of the
provincial/district/ Note: This
national consolidation particular
be stored in a data requirement
storage device? needs further
verification
According to respondents, it was only after the TWG and the DOST had conducted their separate tests and submitted their
respective reports that the BAC, on the basis of these reports formulated its comments/recommendations on the bids of the
consortium and TIM.HaTSDA
The BAC, in its Report dated April 21, 2003, recommended that the Phase II project involving the acquisition of automated
counting machines be awarded to MPEI. It said:
"After incisive analysis of the technical reports of the DOST and the Technical Working Group for Phase II
Automated Counting Machine, the BAC considers adaptability to advances in modern technology to
ensure an effective and efficient method, as well as the security and integrity of the system.
"The results of the evaluation conducted by the TWG and that of the DOST (14 April 2003 report), would
show the apparent advantage of Mega-Pacific over the other competitor, TIM.
"The BAC further noted that both Mega-Pacific and TIM obtained some 'failed marks' in the technical
evaluation. In general, the 'failed marks' of Total Information Management as enumerated above affect
the counting machine itself which are material in nature, constituting non-compliance to the RFP. On the
other hand, the 'failed marks' of Mega-Pacific are mere formalities on certain documentary requirements
which the BAC may waive as clearly indicated in the Invitation to Bid.
"In the DOST test, TIM obtained 12 failed marks and mostly attributed to the counting machine itself as
stated earlier. These are requirements of the RFP and therefore the BAC cannot disregard the same.
"Mega-Pacific failed in 8 items however these are mostly on the software which can be corrected by
reprogramming the software and therefore can be readily corrected.
"The BAC verbally inquired from DOST on the status of the retest of the counting machines of the TIM
and was informed that the report will be forthcoming after the holy week. The BAC was informed that the
retest is on a different parameters they're being two different machines being tested. One purposely to
test if previously read ballots will be read again and the other for the other features such as two sided
ballots.
"The said machine and the software therefore may not be considered the same machine and program as
submitted in the Technical proposal and therefore may be considered an enhancement of the original
proposal.
"Advance information relayed to the BAC as of 1:40 PM of 15 April 2003 by Executive Director Ronaldo T.
Viloria of DOST is that the result of the test in the two counting machines of TIM contains substantial
errors that may lead to the failure of these machines based on the specific items of the RFP that DOST
has to certify.
OPENING OF FINANCIAL BIDS
"The BAC on 15 April 2003, after notifying the concerned bidders opened the financial bids in their
presence and the results were as follows:
Mega-Pacific:
Option 1 Outright purchase: Bid Price if Php1,248,949,088.00
Option 2 Lease option:
70% Down payment of cost of hardware or Php642,755,757.07
Remainder payable over 50 months or a total of Php642,755,757.07
Discount rate of 15% p.a. or 1.2532% per month.
Total Number of Automated Counting Machine 1,769 ACMs (Nationwide)
TIM:
Total Bid Price Php1,297,860,560.00
Total Number of Automated Counting Machine 2,272 ACMs (Mindanao and NCR only)
"Premises considered, it appears that the bid of Mega Pacific is the lowest calculated responsive bid, and
therefore, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) recommends that the Phase II project re Automated
Counting Machine be awarded to Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc." 48
The BAC, however, also stated on page 4 of its Report: "Based on the 14 April 2003 report (Table 6) of the DOST, it appears
that both Mega-Pacific and TIM (Total Information Management Corporation) failed to meet some of the requirements.
Below is a comparative presentation of the requirements wherein Mega-Pacific or TIM or both of them failed : . . .." What
followed was a list of "key requirements," referring to technical requirements, and an indication of which of the two bidders
had failed to meet them.
Failure to Meet the Required Accuracy Rating
The first of the key requirements was that the counting machines were to have an accuracy rating of at least 99.9995
percent. The BAC Report indicates that both Mega Pacific and TIM failed to meet this standard.
The key requirement of accuracy rating happens to be part and parcel of the Comelec's Request for Proposal (RFP). The
RFP, on page 26, even states that the ballot counting machines and ballot counting software " must have an accuracy rating
of 99.9995% (not merely 99.995%) or better as certified by a reliable independent testing agency."
When questioned on this matter during the Oral Argument, Commissioner Borra tried to wash his hands by claiming that the
required accuracy rating of 99.9995 percent had been set by a private sector group in tandem with Comelec. He added that
the Commission had merely adopted the accuracy rating as part of the group's recommended bid requirements, which it
had not bothered to amend even after being advised by DOST that such standard was unachievable. This excuse, however,
does not in any way lessen Comelec's responsibility to adhere to its own published bidding rules, as well as to see to it that
the consortium indeed meets the accuracy standard. Whichever accuracy rating is the right standard whether 99.995 or
99.9995 percent the fact remains that the machines of the so-called "consortium" failed to even reach the lesser of the
two. On this basis alone, it ought to have been disqualified and its bid rejected outright.
At this point, the Court stresses that the essence of public bidding is violated by the practice of requiring very high standards
or unrealistic specifications that cannot be met like the 99.9995 percent accuracy rating in this case only to water them
down afterthe bid has been award. Such scheme, which discourages the entry of prospective bona fide bidders, is in fact a
sure indication of fraud in the bidding, designed to eliminate fair competition. Certainly, if no bidder meets the mandatory
requirements, standards or specifications, then no award should be made and a failed bidding declared.
Failure of Software to Detect Previously Downloaded Data
Furthermore, on page 6 of the BAC Report, it appears that the "consortium" as well as TIM failed to meet another key
requirement for the counting machine's software program to be able to detect previously downloaded precinct results
and to prevent these from being entered again into the counting machine. This same deficiency on the part of both bidders
reappears on page 7 of the BAC Report, as a result of the recurrence of their failure to meet the said key requirement.

That the ability to detect previously downloaded data at different canvassing or consolidation levels is deemed of utmost
importance can be seen from the fact that it is repeated three times in the RFP. On page 30 thereof, we find the requirement
that the city/municipalcanvassing system software must be able to detect previously downloaded precinct results and
prevent these from being "inputted" again into the system. Again, on page 32 of the RFP, we read that
the provincial/district canvassing system software must be able to detect previously downloaded city/municipal results and
prevent these from being "inputted" again into the system. And once more, on page 35 of the RFP, we find the requirement
that the national canvassing system software must be able to detect previously downloaded provincial/district results and
prevent these from being "inputted" again into the system.
Once again, though, Comelec chose to ignore this crucial deficiency, which should have been a cause for the gravest
concern. Come May 2004, unscrupulous persons may take advantage of and exploit such deficiency by repeatedly
downloading and feeding into the computers results favorable to a particular candidate or candidates. We are thus
confronted with the grim prospect of election fraud on a massive scale by means of just a few key strokes. The marvels and
woes of the electronic age!
Inability to Print the Audit Trail
But that grim prospect is not all. The BAC Report, on pages 6 and 7, indicate that the ACMs of both bidders were unable to
print the audit trail without any loss of data. In the case of MPC, the audit trail system was "not yet incorporated" into its
ACMs.
This particular deficiency is significant, not only to this bidding but to the cause of free and credible elections. The purpose
of requiring audit trails is to enable Comelec to trace and verify the identities of the ACM operators responsible for data entry
and downloading, as well as the times when the various data were downloaded into the canvassing system, in order to
forestall fraud and to identify the perpetrators. CTIDcA
Thus, the RFP on page 27 states that the ballot counting machines and ballot counting software must print an audit trail of
all machine operations for documentation and verification purposes. Furthermore, the audit trail must be stored on the
internal storage device and be available on demand for future printing and verifying. On pages 3031, the RFP also requires
that the city/municipal canvassing system software be able to print an audit trail of the canvassing operations, including
therein such data as the date and time the canvassing program was started, the log-in of the authorized users (the identity
of the machine operators), the date and time the canvass data were downloaded into the canvassing system, and so on and
so forth. On page 33 of the RFP, we find the same audit trail requirement with respect to the provincial/district canvassing
system software; and again on pages 3536 thereof, the same audit trail requirement with respect to
the national canvassing system software.
That this requirement for printing audit trails is not to be lightly brushed aside by the BAC or Comelec itself as a mere
formality or technicality can be readily gleaned from the provisions of Section 7 of RA 8436, which authorizes the
Commission to use an automated system for elections.
The said provision which respondents have quoted several times, provides that ACMs are to possess certain features
divided into two classes: those that the statute itself considers mandatory and other features or capabilities that the law
deems optional. Among those considered mandatory are "provisions for audit trails"! Section 7 reads as follows: " The
System shall contain the following features: (a) use of appropriate ballots; (b) stand-alone machine which can count votes
and an automated system which can consolidate the results immediately; (c) with provisions for audit trails; (d) minimum
human intervention; and (e) adequate safeguard/security measures." (Italics and emphases supplied.)
In brief, respondents cannot deny that the provision requiring audit trails is indeed mandatory, considering the wording of
Section 7 ofRA 8436. Neither can Respondent Comelec deny that it has relied on the BAC Report, which indicates that the
machines or the software was deficient in that respect. And yet, the Commission simply disregarded this shortcoming and
awarded the Contract to private respondent, thereby violating the very law it was supposed to implement.
C.
Inadequacy of Post Facto Remedial Measures
Respondents argue that the deficiencies relating to the detection of previously downloaded data, as well as provisions for
audit trails, are mere shortcomings or minor deficiencies in software or programming, which can be rectified. Perhaps
Comelec simply relied upon the BAC Report, which states on page 8 thereof that " Mega Pacific failed in 8 items[;] however
these are mostly on the software which can be corrected by re-programming . . . and therefore can be readily corrected."
The undersigned ponente's questions, some of which were addressed to Commissioner Borra during the Oral Argument,
remain unanswered to this day. First of all, who made the determination that the eight "fail" marks of Mega Pacific were on
account of the software was it DOST or TWG? How can we be sure these failures were not the results of machine
defects? How was it determined that the software could actually be re-programmed and thereby rectified? Did a qualified
technical expert read and analyze the source code 49 for the programs and conclude that these could be saved and
remedied? (Such determination cannot be done by any other means save by the examination and analysis of the source
code.)
Who was this qualified technical expert? When did he carry out the study? Did he prepare a written report on his findings?
Or did the Comelec just make a wild guess? It does not follow that all defects in software programs can be rectified, and the
programs saved. In the information technology sector, it is common knowledge that there are many badly written programs,
with significant programming errors written into them; hence it does not make economic sense to try to correct the
programs; instead, programmers simply abandon them and just start from scratch. There's no telling if any of these
programs is unrectifiable, unless a qualified programmer reads the source code.
And if indeed a qualified expert reviewed the source code, did he also determine how much work would be needed to rectify
the programs? And how much time and money would be spent for that effort? Who would carry out the work? After the
rectification process, who would ascertain and how would it be ascertained that the programs have indeed been properly
rectified, and that they would work properly thereafter? And of course, the most important question to ask: could the
rectification be done in time for the elections in 2004?
Clearly, none of the respondents bothered to think the matter through. Comelec simply took the word of the BAC as gospel
truth, without even bothering to inquire from DOST whether it was true that the deficiencies noted could possibly be
remedied by re-programming the software. Apparently, Comelec did not care about the software, but focused only on
purchasing the machines.
What really adds to the Court's dismay is the admission made by Commissioner Borra during the Oral Argument that the
software currently being used by Comelec was merely the "demo" version, inasmuch as the final version that would actually
be used in the elections was still being developed and had not yet been finalized.
It is not clear when the final version of the software would be ready for testing and deployment. It seems to the Court that
Comelec is just keeping its fingers crossed and hoping the final product would work. Is there a "Plan B" in case it does not?
Who knows? But all these software programs are part and parcel of the bidding and the Contract awarded to the
Consortium. Why is it that the machines are already being brought in and paid for, when there is as yet no way of knowing if
the final version of the software would be able to run them properly, as well as canvass and consolidate the results in the
manner required?
The counting machines, as well as the canvassing system, will never work properly without the correct software programs.
There is an old adage that is still valid to this day: "Garbage in, garbage out." No matter how powerful, advanced and
sophisticated the computers and the servers are, if the software being utilized is defective or has been compromised, the
results will be no better than garbage. And to think that what is at stake here is the 2004 national elections the very basis
of our democratic life.
Correction of Defects?
To their Memorandum, public respondents proudly appended 19 Certifications issued by DOST declaring that some 285
counting machines had been tested and had passed the acceptance testing conducted by the Department on October 8
18, 2003. Among those tested were some machines that had failed previous tests, but had undergone adjustments and thus
passed re-testing.
Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the condition,
performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.
Apart from that fact, the remedial efforts of respondents were, not surprisingly, apparently focused again on the machines
the hardware. Nothing was said or done about the software the deficiencies as to detection and prevention of
downloading and entering previously downloaded data, as well as the capability to print an audit trail. No matter how many
times the machines were tested and re-tested, if nothing was done about the programming defects and deficiencies, the
same danger of massive electoral fraud remains. As anyone who has a modicum of knowledge of computers would say,
"That's elementary!"

And only last December 5, 2003, an Inq7.net news report quoted the Comelec chair as saying that the new automated poll
system would be used nationwide in May 2004, even as the software for the system remained unfinished. It also reported
that a certain Titus Manuel of the Philippine Computer Society, which was helping Comelec test the hardware and
software, said that the software for the counting still had to be submitted on December 15, while the software for the
canvassing was due in early January.
Even as Comelec continues making payments for the ACMs, we keep asking ourselves: who is going to ensure that the
software would be tested and would work properly?
At any rate, the re-testing of the machines and/or the 100 percent testing of all machines (testing of every single unit) would
not serve to eradicate the grave abuse of discretion already committed by Comelec when it awarded the Contract on April
15, 2003, despite the obvious and admitted flaws in the bidding process, the failure of the "winning bidder" to qualify, and
the inability of the ACMs and the intended software to meet the bid requirements and rules.
Comelec's Latest "Assurances" Are Unpersuasive
Even the latest pleadings filed by Comelec do not serve to allay our apprehensions. They merely affirm and compound the
serious violations of law and gravely abusive acts it has committed. Let us examine them.
The Resolution issued by this Court on December 9, 2003 required respondents to inform it as to the number of ACMs
delivered and paid for, as well as the total payment made to date for the purchase thereof. They were likewise instructed to
submit a certification from the DOST attesting to the number of ACMs tested, the number found to be defective; and
"whether the reprogrammed software has been tested and found to have complied with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 8436." 50
In its "Partial Compliance and Manifestation" dated December 29, 2003, Comelec informed the Court that 1,991 ACMs had
already been delivered to the Commission as of that date. It further certified that it had already paid the supplier the sum of
P849,167,697.41, which corresponded to 1,973 ACM units that had passed the acceptance testing procedures conducted
by the MIRDC-DOST 51 and which had therefore been accepted by the poll body. ICTcDA
In the same submission, for the very first time, Comelec also disclosed to the Court the following:
"The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM
hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the
following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."
Purchase of the First Type of Software Without Evaluation
In other words, the first type of software was to be developed solely for the purpose of enabling the evaluation of the
bidder's technical bid. Comelec explained thus: "In addition to the presentation of the ACM hardware, the bidders were
required to develop a 'base' software program that will enable the ACM to function properly. Since the software program
utilized during the evaluation of bids is not the actual software program to be employed on election day, there being two (2)
other types of software program that will still have to be developed and thoroughly tested prior to actual election day use,
defects in the 'base' software that can be readily corrected by reprogramming are considered minor in nature, and may
therefore be waived."
In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder
partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a
sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day. Keeping in mind that the
Contract involves the acquisition of not just the ACMs or the hardware, but also the software that would run them, it is now
even clearer that the Contract was awarded without Comelec having seen, much less evaluated, the final product the
software that would finally be utilized come election day. (Not even the "near-final" product, for that matter).
What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the Contract was still to be
created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form? And that is
not all!
No Explanation for Lapses in the Second Type of Software
The second phase, allegedly involving the second type of software, is simply denominated "Testing and Acceptance
Procedures." As best as we can construe, Comelec is claiming that this second type of software is also to be developed and
delivered by the supplier in connection with the "testing and acceptance" phase of the acquisition process. The previous
pleadings, though including the DOST reports submitted to this Court have not heretofore mentioned any statement,
allegation or representation to the effect that a particular set of software was to be developed and/or delivered by the
supplier in connection with the testing and acceptance of delivered ACMs.
What the records do show is that the imported ACMs were subjected to the testing and acceptance process conducted by
the DOST. Since the initial batch delivered included a high percentage of machines that had failed the tests, Comelec asked
the DOST to conduct a 100 percent testing; that is, to test every single one of the ACMs delivered. Among the machines
tested on October 8 to 18, 2003, were some units that had failed previous tests but had subsequently been re-tested and
had passed. To repeat, however, until now, there has never been any mention of a second set or type of software pertaining
to the testing and acceptance process.
In any event, apart from making that misplaced and uncorroborated claim, Comelec in the same submission also professes
(in response to the concerns expressed by this Court) that the reprogrammed software has been tested and found to have
complied with the requirements of RA 8436. It reasoned thus: "Since the software program is an inherent element in the
automated counting system, the certification issued by the MIRDC-DOST that one thousand nine hundred seventy-three
(1,973) units passed the acceptance test procedures is an official recognition by the MIRDC-DOST that the software
component of the automated election system, which has been reprogrammed to comply with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8436 as prescribed in the Ad Hoc Technical Evaluation Committee's ACM Testing and Acceptance Manual, has passed
the MIRDC-DOST tests."
The facts do not support this sweeping statement of Comelec. A scrutiny of the MIRDC-DOST letter dated December 15,
2003, 52 which it relied upon, does not justify its grand conclusion. For clarity's sake, we quote in full the letter-certification,
as follows:
"15 December 2003
"HON. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA
Commissioner-in-Charge
Phase II, Modernization Project
Commission on Elections
Intramuros, Manila
Attention: Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr.
Project Director
"Dear Commissioner Borra:
"We are pleased to submit 11 DOST Test Certifications representing 11 lots and covering 158 units of
automated counting machines (ACMs) that we have tested from 0212 December 2003.
"To date, we have tested all the 1,991 units of ACMs, broken down as follow: (sic)
1st batch 30 units 4th batch 438 units
2nd batch 288 units 5th batch 438 units
3rd batch 414 units 6th batch 383 units
"It should be noted that a total of 18 units have failed the test. Out of these 18 units, only one (1) unit has
failed the retest.
"Thank you and we hope you will find everything in order.
"Very truly yours,
"ROLANDO T. VILORIA, CESO III
Executive Director cum
Chairman, DOST-Technical Evaluation Committee"
Even a cursory glance at the foregoing letter shows that it is completely bereft of anything that would remotely support
Comelec's contention that the "software component of the automated election system . . . has been reprogrammed to
comply with" RA 8436, and "has passed the MIRDC-DOST tests." There is no mention at all of any software
reprogramming. If the MIRDC-DOST had indeed undertaken the supposed reprogramming and the process turned out to be
successful, that agency would have proudly trumpeted its singular achievement.
How Comelec came to believe that such reprogramming had been undertaken is unclear. In any event, the Commission is
not forthright and candid with the factual details. If reprogramming has been done, who performed it and when? What
exactly did the process involve? How can we be assured that it was properly performed? Since the facts attendant to the
alleged reprogramming are still shrouded in mystery, the Court cannot give any weight to Comelec's bare allegations.
The fact that a total of 1,973 of the machines has ultimately passed the MIRDC-DOST tests does not by itself serve as an
endorsement of the soundness of the software program, much less as a proof that it has been reprogrammed. In the first
place, nothing on record shows that the tests and re-tests conducted on the machines were intended to address the serious
deficiencies noted earlier. As a matter of fact, the MIRDC-DOST letter does not even indicate what kinds of tests or re-tests
were conducted, their exact nature and scope, and the specific objectives thereof. 53 The absence of relevant supporting
documents, combined with the utter vagueness of the letter, certainly fails to inspire belief or to justify the expansive
confidence displayed by Comelec. In any event, it goes without saying that remedial measures such as the alleged
reprogramming cannot in any way mitigate the grave abuse of discretion already committed as early as April 15, 2003.
Rationale of Public Bidding Negated by the Third Type of Software
Respondent Comelec tries to assuage this Court's anxiety in these words: " The reprogrammed software that has already
passed the requirements of Republic Act No. 8436 during the MIRDC-DOST testing and acceptance procedures will require
further customization since the following additional elements, among other things, will have to be considered before the final
software can be used on election day: 1. Final Certified List of Candidates . . . 2. Project of Precincts . . . 3. Official Ballot
Design and Security Features . . . 4. Encryption, digital certificates and digital signatures . . . The certified list of candidates
for national elective positions will be finalized on or before 23 January 2004 while the final list of projects of precincts will be
prepared also on the same date. Once all the above elements are incorporated in the software program, the Test
Certification Group created by the Ad Hoc Technical Evaluation Committee will conduct meticulous testing of the final
software before the same can be used on election day. In addition to the testing to be conducted by said Test Certification
Group, the Comelec will conduct mock elections in selected areas nationwide not only for purposes of public information but
also to further test the final election day program. Public respondent Comelec, therefore, requests that it be given up to 16
February 2004 to comply with this requirement."

The foregoing passage shows the imprudent approach adopted by Comelec in the bidding and acquisition process. The
Commission says that before the software can be utilized on election day, it will require "customization" through addition of
data like the list of candidates, project of precincts, and so on. And inasmuch as such data will become available only in
January 2004 anyway, there is therefore no perceived need on Comelec's part to rush the supplier into producing the final
(or near-final) version of the software before that time. In any case, Comelec argues that the software needed for the
electoral exercise can be continuously developed, tested, adjusted and perfected, practically all the way up to election day,
at the same time that the Commission is undertaking all the other distinct and diverse activities pertinent to the elections.
Given such a frame of mind, it is no wonder that Comelec paid little attention to the counting and canvassing software
during the entire bidding process, which took place in FebruaryMarch 2003. Granted that the software was defective, could
not detect and prevent the re-use of previously downloaded data or produce the audit trail aside from its other
shortcomings nevertheless, all those deficiencies could still be corrected down the road. At any rate, the software used
for bidding purposes would not be the same one that will be used on election day, so why pay any attention to its defects?
Or to the Comelec's own bidding rules for that matter? HcTIDC
Clearly, such jumbled ratiocinations completely negate the rationale underlying the bidding process mandated by law.
At the very outset, the Court has explained that Comelec flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings (1) by
allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding
the Contract to MPC/MPEI. Now, with the latest explanation given by Comelec, it is clear that the Commission further
desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to change and alter the subject of the Contract (the
software), in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding.
This stance is contrary to settled jurisprudence requiring the strict application of pertinent rules, regulations and guidelines
for public bidding for the purpose of placing each bidder, actual or potential, on the same footing. The essence of public
bidding is, after all, an opportunity for fair competition, and a fair basis for the precise comparison of bids. In common
parlance, public bidding aims to "level the playing field." That means each bidder must bid under the same conditions; and
be subject to the same guidelines, requirements and limitations, so that the best offer or lowest bid may be determined, all
other things being equal.
Thus, it is contrary to the very concept of public bidding to permit a variance between the conditions under which bids are
invited and those under which proposals are submitted and approved; or, as in this case, the conditions under which the bid
is won and those under which the awarded Contract will be complied with. The substantive amendment of the contract
bidded out, without any public bidding after the bidding process had been concluded is violative of the public policy on
public biddings, as well as the spirit and intent of RA 8436. The whole point in going through the public bidding exercise was
completely lost. The very rationale of public bidding was totally subverted by the Commission.
From another perspective, the Comelec approach also fails to make sense. Granted that, before election day, the software
would still have to be customized to each precinct, municipality, city, district, and so on, there still was nothing at all to
prevent Comelec from requiring prospective suppliers/bidders to produce, at the very start of the bidding process, the "next-
to-final" versions of the software (the best software the suppliers had) pre-tested and ready to be customized to the final
list of candidates and project of precincts, among others, and ready to be deployed thereafter. The satisfaction of such
requirement would probably have provided far better bases for evaluation and selection, as between suppliers, than the so-
called demo software.
Respondents contend that the bidding suppliers' counting machines were previously used in at least one political exercise
with no less than 20 million voters. If so, it stands to reason that the software used in that past electoral exercise would
probably still be available and, in all likelihood, could have been adopted for use in this instance. Paying for machines and
software of that category (already tried and proven in actual elections and ready to be adopted for use) would definitely
make more sense than paying the same hundreds of millions of pesos for demo software and empty promises of usable
programs in the future.
But there is still another gut-level reason why the approach taken by Comelec is reprehensible. It rides on the perilous
assumption that nothing would go wrong; and that, come election day, the Commission and the supplier would have
developed, adjusted and "re-programmed" the software to the point where the automated system could function as
envisioned. But what if such optimistic projection does not materialize? What if, despite all their herculean efforts, the
software now being hurriedly developed and tested for the automated system performs dismally and inaccurately or, worse,
is hacked and/or manipulated? 54 What then will we do with all the machines and defective software already paid for in the
amount of P849 million of our tax money? Even more important, what will happen to our country in case of failure of the
automation?
The Court cannot grant the plea of Comelec that it be given until February 16, 2004 to be able to submit a "certification
relative to the additional elements of the software that will be customized," because for us to do so would unnecessarily
delay the resolution of this case and would just give the poll body an unwarranted excuse to postpone the 2004 elections.
On the other hand, because such certification will not cure the gravely abusive actions complained of by petitioners, it will be
utterly useless.
Is this Court being overly pessimistic and perhaps even engaging in speculation? Hardly. Rather, the Court holds that
Comelec should not have gambled on the unrealistic optimism that the supplier's software development efforts would turn
out well. The Commission should have adopted a much more prudent and judicious approach to ensure the delivery of tried
and tested software, and readied alternative courses of action in case of failure. Considering that the nation's future is at
stake here, it should have done no less.
Epilogue
Once again, the Court finds itself at the crossroads of our nation's history. At stake in this controversy is not just the
business of a computer supplier, or a questionable proclamation by Comelec of one or more public officials. Neither is it
about whether this country should switch from the manual to the automated system of counting and canvassing votes. At its
core is the ability and capacity of the Commission on Elections to perform properly, legally and prudently its legal mandate
to implement the transition from manual to automated elections.
Unfortunately, Comelec has failed to measure up to this historic task. As stated at the start of this Decision, Comelec has
not merely gravely abused its discretion in awarding the Contract for the automation of the counting and canvassing of the
ballots. It has also put at grave risk the holding of credible and peaceful elections by shoddily accepting electronic hardware
and software that admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements. Inadequate as they are, the remedies it
proffers post facto do not cure the grave abuse of discretion it already committed (1) on April 15, 2003, when it illegally
made the award; and (2) "sometime" in May 2003 when it executed the Contract for the purchase of defective machines and
non-existent software from a non-eligible bidder.
For these reasons, the Court finds it totally unacceptable and unconscionable to place its imprimatur on this void and illegal
transaction that seriously endangers the breakdown of our electoral system. For this Court to cop-out and to close its eyes
to these illegal transactions, while convenient, would be to abandon its constitutional duty of safeguarding public interest.
As a necessary consequence of such nullity and illegality, the purchase of the machines and all appurtenances thereto
including the still-to-be-produced (or in Comelec's words, to be "reprogrammed") software, as well as all the payments
made therefor, have no basis whatsoever in law. The public funds expended pursuant to the void Resolution and Contract
must therefore be recovered from the payees and/or from the persons who made possible the illegal disbursements, without
prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them.
Furthermore, Comelec and its officials concerned must bear full responsibility for the failed bidding and award, and held
accountable for the electoral mess wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in the performance of their functions. The
State, of course, is not bound by the mistakes and illegalities of its agents and servants.
True, our country needs to transcend our slow, manual and archaic electoral process. But before it can do so, it must first
have a diligent and competent electoral agency that can properly and prudently implement a well-conceived automated
election system.
At bottom, before the country can hope to have a speedy and fraud-free automated election, it must first be able to procure
the proper computerized hardware and software legally, based on a transparent and valid system of public bidding. As in
any democratic system, the ultimate goal of automating elections must be achieved by a legal, valid and above-
board process of acquiring the necessary tools and skills therefor. Though the Philippines needs an automated electoral
process, it cannot accept just any system shoved into its bosom through improper and illegal methods. As the saying goes,
the end never justifies the means. Penumbral contracting will not produce enlightened results.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074
awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the
subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to
refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman which shall determine the criminal liability, if any, of
the public officials (and conspiring private individuals, if any) involved in the subject Resolution and Contract. Let the Office
of the Solicitor General also take measures to protect the government and vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the
illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the void Resolution and Contract.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, [January 13, 2004],
464 PHIL 173-324)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011.]

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY
C. ROQUE, JR.,AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL
BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE
PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE
OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY
ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO,
JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS,
JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA
ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, petitioners,vs.HON.
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE,
JR.,IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9522 1 (RA 9522) adjusting the country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories. EScAID
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. 3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
"territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round
of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for
nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical
errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change
was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes
the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline
for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. 8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened
one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers
or . . . legislators," 9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely:
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary
treaties, 12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy,
and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument
of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference
either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's framework of regime of islands to determine the
maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition's
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners' alleged lack of locus
standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country's security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines' claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners' assertion that what
Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners' prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs
of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to
declare RA 9522unconstitutional. SHEIDC
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the
petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 15 nor misuse of public funds, 16 occasioned by the
passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners' locus standi as citizens with
constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national
significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the
requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the
offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18
Respondents' submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles
to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of
constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of
the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional


RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country's
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the
pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded
in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters,
beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United
States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters
extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners' theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. 23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III
on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: TaEIcS
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelfshall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago." 24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522's Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines' Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework to draw the baselines,
and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area. 27 Petitioners add that the KIG's (and Scarborough Shoal's) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines
results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen. 28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of
maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis- -vis the Philippines' obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length
of baselines). Under RA 3046, as underRA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners' argument
branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines' claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are
relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines' total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29
Extent of maritime
Extent of maritime area
area using RA 9522,
using RA 3046, as amended,
taking into account
taking into account the
UNCLOS III (in
Treaty of Paris' delimitation
square nautical
(in square nautical miles)
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic 166,858 171,435
waters

Territorial
274,136 32,106
Sea
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210
======= =======
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends
way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are
overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime
boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. 30

Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA
9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines'
continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS): aTEACS
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that
"the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of
baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize
the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we
might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such
baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So
sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal,
hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim
them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa
itaas,that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of
its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some
technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06
nautical miles ....This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS
III],which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except
that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that
length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to
Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying
reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress'
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "'Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121" 36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
"regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners' argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines' claim over Sabah in
North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing
the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitution's
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38 ACcISa
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward
of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to
their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters,including the sea lanes, or the
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air
space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining
unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their
constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and conditions
for their exercise. 42Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures
from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage 45 does not place them in lesser footing vis- -vis continental coastal States which are subject,
in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic
States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to theirterritorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States' archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. 46 Separate islands generate their own maritime
zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States' territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) 48must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative
guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights . . . ." 49 Article II
provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory
provisions of the Constitution. AlthoughOposa v. Factoran 50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 2) 51 and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7), 52 are not violated by RA 9522. cDAISC
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be
bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space
the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal
States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea
before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines' Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522. 54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners' reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first,it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the country's case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones
and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime
zones, consistent with the Constitutionand our national interest.
WHEREFORE,we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, [August 16, 2011], 671 PHIL 243-294)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.]


MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J p:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," 1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone either by those who enjoy it or
by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the
land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen,
and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich
heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural- born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based
the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented
several documentary exhibits 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed
in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the
affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of
the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a
Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files
of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no
available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley,
and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, would include G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. 'Fernando Poe, Jr.'),
and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G.R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course or to cancel FPJ's
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the
COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78.Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly and honest elections"
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified
petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 2 in an action
for certiorariunder Rule 65 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of, by this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the
land.

In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634


Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate
any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare,
in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under
the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be
deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge
the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise
"Rule 12.Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of thePresident or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13.How Initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition
for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14.Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections, et al.," and G.R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described
the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 6 Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons
who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 7 The concept grew to include one who would both
govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and
large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal
liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the
right to participate in the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. 11 The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship. 12
The Local Setting from Spanish Time to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago.
Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point
to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands
except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. 14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 15 however,
three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands, 17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to
the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its
Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by
special laws. 19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
"(a)Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b)Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c)Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d)Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy." 20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was
forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of
international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force,
would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. 21 Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be
determined by its Congress
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or
of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record,
within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States. LibLex
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred
to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines
". . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." 23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899. 24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which
period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period. 25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein." 26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The
word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made
mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the
Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That
the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not
a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitutionbrought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
"(2)Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution,had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
"(5)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted
in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as
equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitutioncrafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3)Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
"(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her
act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that
aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3)Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
"(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." 27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 had
been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor 30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ
was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of
San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the
father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that
1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5.At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was
submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the
admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in
relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou
on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
"(d)When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly,
and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense
of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of
from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his
death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office
would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother])
or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate
son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of
birth, a will, or a public document. 32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry
Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state
or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the
certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. 33 In Mendoza vs. Mella, 34 the Court ruled
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether
or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may
be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes
the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F.
Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the
only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, 35 this Court
defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private
individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for
purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a
public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by
the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173.The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both the
parties.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Art. 175.Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256.This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. De SyQuia vs. Court of Appeals, 36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article
278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition
of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity
of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment of recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and
personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code,such provisions must be taken in the context or private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among member of a family, and those which exist
among members of a society for the protection of private interests." 37
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, . . . the laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or
nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property,
the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree
it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code,stating that
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad"
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly,
citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights
and family relations. 40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents
and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law 41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish
family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from
and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word 'pedigree' includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the
pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question,
(d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20
before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the facts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with
FPJ, i.e., living together with Bessie Kelly and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family
"I, Ruby Kelly Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A.,
after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
"1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelly Poe.
"2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as 'Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ'.
"4.Ronald Allan Poe 'FPJ' was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"xxx xxx xxx
"7.Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe Sr., by my sister that
same year.
"8.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
"10.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan
Poe.
"xxx xxx xxx
"18.I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural
born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelly Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactory establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioner's Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness


Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelly, Allan F.
Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelly
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than
respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ
was born on 20 August 1939 to Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on
16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, basing his stand on the
ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, 43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon 44 and Serra vs. Republic. 45
On the above score, the disqualification made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the procurement of the
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine
under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I
therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivio. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue
was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there.
The stepson did not have blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was
about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935
Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan. 46 This is more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the
illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court
said obiterthat even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because
Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely necessary for the case. . . . It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter
dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it
would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make
an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make
an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a
Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionality allowable distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat. 47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests
on real differences. . . . But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
". . . What is the relevance of legitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there
be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that
his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own?
To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean
Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the
child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the
child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions,the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there are
clearly none provided.
In Sum
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G.R. No. 161824, filed
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national
elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2)The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both
having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter's capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-
presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3)In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died
in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled inRomualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 48 must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS


1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
want of jurisdiction.
2.G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission
on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 161634, 161824, [March 3, 2004], 468 PHIL 421-755)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-
appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.


Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Sol. Gen. Frine C . Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V . Bernardo for respondent-
appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G) THEREOF, NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO
LEGITIMATELY BECOMES FILIPINO. Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into
the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if
they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces
the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in
the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very
nature and express provisions, theImmigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS,
THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT PREVAILS. A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and
if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it
should receive the former construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will,
if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions
construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a
construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction
which will result in absurd consequences.
4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT. So a construction should, if
possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the
judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the
court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION, EXPLAINED. The
avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a
judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only
those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for
citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases,
the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal
proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the
Philippines.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED NOT DISQUALIFIED
BY LAW. We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED. Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15.
If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceeding, inorder to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision,
include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also
those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PURPOSE. The leading idea or purpose of Section
15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are
related, the effect is for said person to become ipso factocitizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not
mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily
become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do notipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship
commences.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT HERSELF BE NATURALIZED. The legislature
could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of
fact necessary to establish her citizenship as afactum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The
word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman
"had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.
12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. Regarding
the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigrationconducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates
its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO FILIPINO MUST PROVE
QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the
positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as
the disqualifications under Section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, L-21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under Section 4 would not necessarily qualify
under Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other words, by giving to Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under Section 3 could result in
admitting to citizenship woman that Section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American
interpretation of the words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered hinding in this jurisdiction.

DECISION

BARREDO, J p:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy
Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al.vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and
the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner
of Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond,
upon her failure to do so.'
"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was
heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:
'On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits '1,' '1-a,' and '2'). She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. Onthe date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit '4'). On January
25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one
and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.'
"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant
petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order of this Court, dated
March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
'First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
"'Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what
it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized' incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien
to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
"'3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as
a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by
virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified,
does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because,
having been admitted as a temporary visitor only onMarch 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks
at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No.
2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
'Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law,
it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Philippines."
'Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines,
after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff
only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident
that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.
'Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
"'5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period
of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised." (Chung Tiao Bing,
et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par.,
Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the decided cases of
the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-
paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940which reads:
" 'An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph
is added by Republic Act 503).'" (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940).
'And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws
relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien
immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner ofImmigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner ofImmigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-
R, Dec 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of
discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.'
"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in
broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either language."
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this
appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the government's brief, that "in the
hearing . . . , it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized
by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of
petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE 'WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE
LAWFULLY NATURALIZED' (OF SECTION 15,REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY
IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE
OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS
AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT
POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO
CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN
THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT
OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO
CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST
OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER
OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION
WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN
YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER
BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG
IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN
REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU
YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19,
1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of
objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and
thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing
from the Philippines as she had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16,
1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter
Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee
Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)"
It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised
in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I.
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments
of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems evident that the Solicitor General's pose that
an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he
voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the
proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We
note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were
the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her
marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure
from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers
of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act."
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens
or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the
Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may
neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:
". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary
visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go backon his representation and stay permanently,
without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of 'change' or 'correction', for
the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to
enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the
meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came,
contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-
evident."
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who
has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply
thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right
has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag
been conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is
indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they
have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its
seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
". . . (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage,
she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be
affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled
or the be deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative.'" (At. pp. 462-463) In
other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions,
theImmigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II.
Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's
marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect
of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in
the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring
her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay,
et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706, 713, 1 for it was only
in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over
the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a
Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization
Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still
pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been
reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial
construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese
nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to
guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said
marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of
her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do
so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower
court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her
bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion,
our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
"The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or,
at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14,
1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok
Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision
appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that
'in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit
is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the
Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife,
unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized.' As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice
(O.p. No. 52, series of 1950), * this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
'(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the . . . Philippines are at war, during the period of
such war;
'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.'
"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall
under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure
to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no
breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to
citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.
"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the
parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may 'be lawfully naturalized,' and
this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and
justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said
issue." (At pp. 462-464.).
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the
following propositions:
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized
under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by
the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry
need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnoted several opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the
following:
"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473),
provided that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.' A similar provision in
the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings,
but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7
Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized', should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the
race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that
any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not
having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband." (Op. No.
176, v. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the
citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily
James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"The phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', as contained in the above provision, means that
the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948,
No. 95, s. 1941: Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura
does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino
mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule
that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec.
of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must
necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No.
52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days
later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated
the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was
forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of deportation. Later, on December 20,
1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a
Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the
deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the
petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

"Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra,
p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the
wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must
show, in addition, that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the
decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not
disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan,
upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to
interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable
for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport."
(Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil.
521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied]
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to
prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any
judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this
country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it
can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they
need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such
qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative
of which held:
"At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show
that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with
other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for
naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops.
Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated
May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law,
held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
'herself may he lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under
Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a
Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups ? The Commissioner of Immigration does
not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for
'overstaying' is pending against the petitioner.
"We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are
expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become
naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius)" (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition." (Op. No. 38, B. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated
May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised
Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15
excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats
the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship." (Op. 57, s. 1958
of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely:
No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28, s. 1950, 'this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134,
B. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by
this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
"Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines
(25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present
her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated (Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoingorder, on 1 April 1955 the
Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was
anorder issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail
bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory
reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman, (section 15,
Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in
the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government." (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955,
Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las
Pias, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had
penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
"The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman
from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and
conditions of; the undertaking in the bond failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her
authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the
Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice were committed before the
marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possesses the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization. ** There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization."
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before
Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law
to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to
Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly
adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that
"(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', should
be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized." (Op. Na. 79, s.
1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be
said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification
should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963,
penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok
Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since
it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no
more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is
deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' so that the fact of marriage to a citizen,
by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G.
356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the
qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already
pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In La
San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: 10 San Tuang, a
Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961.
She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date at her permit, and when she was
refused to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by
marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo
San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal
dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession
of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for
the Court, reasoning out thus:
"It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid
down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it
was only necessary that the woman 'should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized
by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the
wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen.' (In
explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: 'If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of
her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed
all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of
the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to
find.')
"In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of
African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest
of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
"Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No.
3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it
provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:
'Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
'Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
'Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act,
in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
'The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being
not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each
of the following qualifications:
'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years,
except as provided in the next following section;
'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
Period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are living;
'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and
'Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his
intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority,
state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.'
"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women
married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1)
natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other
Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the
qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.
"But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17,
1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for
naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to
remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasian} and
against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity
with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in
question. The result is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must be understood in
the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in
Leonard v. Grant.
"The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor
General points out, the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
"There is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must
now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen
of the Philippines, because the law treats 'qualifications' and 'disqualifications' in separate sections. And
then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be
understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did
not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons
in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that
the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race
of persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization the assumption being always that she is not
otherwise disqualified.

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien
woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this
case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any
way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same
being self-serving."
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow
Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the
decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
"In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November
30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held
that the fact that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen
of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that
petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was
favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would
become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay."
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera
reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a
Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice
Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and
obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a
reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's
husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year, Choy
King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa
before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961.On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner
of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos,
and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew
the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not on]y reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San
Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon
readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner
of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization,
had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold
eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy
King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking
into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an
alien woman who is widowed during the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may
be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530,
show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization
Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 1 1 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling
in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is
settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law,Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at
the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary
oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently
becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken
line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer
to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for
decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even
before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not
necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the
Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice
Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because they wanted to leave the point
now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at
length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici
curiae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful
manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of
the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves
as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous
recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts.
Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who
took no part in Ga Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all,
the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not
categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides,
some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later
cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the
Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said
provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per
adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that
of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found
only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the
Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious
reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the
Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or
orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:


"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight."
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision
as follows:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:
"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein."
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon
the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which
were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always
followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien
upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had
become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus:
"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings.
The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce
the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were
added to the above Section 13:
"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of
Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
'SEC. 13 (a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine
Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
'SEC. 13 (b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the
age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the
Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
'SEC. 13 (c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine
Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.' "
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became
its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13(a) abovequoted was re-
enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to
Philippines. And it could not have beenon any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and
everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman
who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she
becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 ofCommonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications
were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession
of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to
become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United
States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who
were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section
providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against
Asiatics, "the only logical deduction . . . is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and
"there is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood
as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be quoted:
"The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of
a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may he deemed a
Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775,
Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to
the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in
the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2
of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No.
3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization
Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not
citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American
Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In
other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the
naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to
the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien
women marrying American citizens.
"This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised
Naturalization Law(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been
eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to
presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision that to be deemed a Philippine citizen
upon marriage the alien wife must be one 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' the reference is no
longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to
the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' would be meaningless
surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
"The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line
with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege
granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the
basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

"Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed,
that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen."
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
"On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the
Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13. t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the
principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.)
"While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the
present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess
the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ('a' to
'h') subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage,
both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law
demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
"At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be
regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et
al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
'The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship
upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.'
"Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the
requirement of section 15 ofCommonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married
to a citizen should be one who 'might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from
the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27,
1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965;
Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if
all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result
might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualifies only
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,'
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a
competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship
'must be of good moral character.'
"Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain
selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain 'herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as
long as she is not 'opposed to organized government,' nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas.' Et sic de
caeteris.
"The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of
disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the
case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
"As to the argument that the phrase 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' was derived from the U.S.
Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to
it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November
30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965."
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot but reveal
certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements
for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of
Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did
away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippines citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein."
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the
persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the
inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable
limitations flowing from our status as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of
Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by
an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March
23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already
been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the
exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act
2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law.
The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation.
In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of
the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision
was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of
which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words
used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but
more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization laws of
the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to
organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States."
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if
they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to
Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens
throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6,
1882 not being among those expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted,
subdivision (c) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced
back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem
that the nationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927
by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization
law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason, why the construction adopted in the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond
dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States as it stood before it repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all courts of the
United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in
the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the
provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United
States and all administrative authorities charged with the implementation of the naturalization andimmigration laws of that
country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295
U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938];
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained
in United Stats of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523,
decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as
follows: 'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'
"Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10
Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided 'that any woman, who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States,
shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen.'
"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap.
66, . . . 16, 1844, which provided that 'any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born
subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the
rights and privileges of a natural born subject.'
"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed.
Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being 'An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married
Women,' in 2, provides 'that any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of
this Act, . . . shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . .'
"Section 6 of the act also provides 'that . . . 1994 of the Revised Statutes . . . are repealed.'
"Section 6 also provides that 'such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either
of such sections, . . .' meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to
the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case,
therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
"In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this
provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: 'The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person,"
and not an alien enemy.'
"This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which
might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as
to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the
exclusion or deportation of aliens.
"In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855,
declaring that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.' He held that 'upon the authorities, and
the reason, if not the necessity, of the case,' the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an
alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and
who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should
appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her
to naturalization.
"In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v.
Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a
naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage
she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the
provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: 'There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed.
283.' The alien 'belonged to the class of persons' who might be lawfully naturalized.
"In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States
from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took
her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under
a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American
citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was
entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: 'The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of
her husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil.'
"In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, had before it the
application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was
held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization
would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined
whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect
of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he expressed his opinion that the
husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become
lawfully naturalized. 'Her own capacity (to become naturalized),' the court stated, 'is a prerequisite to her
attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her.'
Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing
more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with
all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed, 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that
an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey,
and then came to the United States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she had
not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed,
in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have
been lawfully naturalized, and we said: 'Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be
correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under
our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators.'
"We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent
with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction
between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place
before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such
an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a
judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances that
existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being
carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the
ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease,
we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of
the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an
American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an
alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies
only to aliens, and not to citizens.

"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to
deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien
and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to
the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her
deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry.
One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the
United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to
believe that a marriage under such circumstances 'is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the
facts shown.' He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override
theimmigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien
not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law
from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied
wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that
where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to
a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage
was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A.
666, 219 Fed. 1022.
"It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the
Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act
of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the period required by the
naturalization laws was not necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married
a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her
husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered
by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a
native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way
of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242,
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for
the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the
same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United
States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was
lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her
marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home
in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her good
intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being advance that by her
marriage she had become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney
General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the
words, 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27
Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in
enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, co as to provide, in 19, 'that the marriage to an American citizen
of a female of the sexually immoral classes . . . shall not invest such female with United States citizenship
if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts
which make her liable to deportation under this act.'
"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
"(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation
through the device of marrying an American citizen.
"(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of
the excluded classes, either before or after her detention should not confer upon her American
citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19
would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class."
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the, subject and We have found no warrant for the
proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Status was meant
solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would
seem to give such impression. The case of Kelly v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of
these decisions 19 simply held:
"As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the
United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress
provide. The terms 'married' or 'who shall be married,' do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when the
ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who
under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship
existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that
fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The
construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens,
would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in
our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any
application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction
suggested.
"The terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,' only limit the application of the
law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the
person applying for its benefits should be 'a free white person,' and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th,
1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
"A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40
N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions"
Note that while the court did say that "the terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, . . . required
that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a 'free white person' (but also) . . . not an alien enemy." This is
simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of
enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof
anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there
was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien-enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the
fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in
addition to race. This is important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice
Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the application of the law
to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then
existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent,
not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in
force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the inference that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it. follows that in place of the said eliminated
section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity
to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools,
etc., thereby implying that, in effect, said Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927.
Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently
justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already examined above of the mentioned provisions
has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that
Section 15 an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval
of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that
in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which
was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the
qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered,
and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual
scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
"The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra,
'shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen,' while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person ison that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word 'deemed' is the equivalent of 'considered' or 'judged'; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of any person or thing,
must, in law, he considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be 'deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed."
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our
legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such
statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different
connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the
contrary conclusion appear to be based oninaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the
framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act
2927 co-existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the
phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so called
racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the
elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were
embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be
taken into account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said
Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended
to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated,
Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By
that time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed
expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American
citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than
those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already
demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor
of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our
lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its
settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization, and it
appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American law on the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature,
already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make
one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to
maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said
phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans
had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the
phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American
courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for
Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature
borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators
even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a
nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous American posture
because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of
a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to
indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so-called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the
same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More
accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were
the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section
2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to
those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone
will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title
8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing
with approval the opinions of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements
were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their
elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such
elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become
disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448),
notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the
phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification
under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could
not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one
group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather
than decreasing the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such
elimination could have converted qualifications into disqualifications, specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated,
in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be
lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our
law onthe matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the
United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v.
Republic, supra:
"Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove 'qualifications
"There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the
law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an
alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
"1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law
is that the applicant 'must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years.' If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means
that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband.
If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a
foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this
could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having
acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her
petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an
indefinite period of time.
"2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he 'must own real
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.' Considering the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the
citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a
lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578,
Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-
20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not
have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the
wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil
Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be
remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?
"3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization 'must have enrolled his minor
children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen.' If an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her
period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of
this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized
educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic,
L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87
Phil. 668 [950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953;Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575,
Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not
exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
"4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 'shall
be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman.' It
is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five
years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten years.
"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage
to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems
more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to
an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It
will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were
treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature
enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is
enlightening:
'It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the
husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the
alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil
Code being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States. Accordingly, the stand taken by the Attorney-General prior to the enactment of Act
No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former
citizens of this country.' (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928).
'To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 5448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a)
to Act No. 2997 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands.' (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours)
"If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way
as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege
granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to
the manifested object of the statute, must be rejected.
'A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest
object, it should receive the former construction.' (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 333, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134
[1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]).
'. . . A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if
possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance
with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.'
'So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency
in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in
futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should
adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to
have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements
of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right . . .' (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632)."
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15
with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to
suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically impossible
in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for
naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their
possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship
may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the
construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but
surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension
of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following
observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

"We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy
of 'selective admission' more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a
judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy
of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here achoice between accepting or
rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is
conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the
individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the
statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of
the Philippines, 'irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino
ideals, customs, and traditions.' A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove
the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income,
or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is
required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a
fact.
"A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains
and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending
the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also 'Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary.' UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et
seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has
placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the
family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220,
Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code).
Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest
between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See
De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of
husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of
the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: 'The status of the wife follows that of the
husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile.' And the
presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the
regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
"It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from
that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor
that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we
submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers
from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of theRevised Naturalization Law." (Motion for
Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the
American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be
construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize
the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the
world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the
writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own
concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as
source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law
now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when
the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from
the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to
any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral
character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this
Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous
persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala
fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision
should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it
arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the
need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino.
If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty,
the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent
lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization
proceedings, provided she could sustain her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand
now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a
naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As
already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for
its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for
the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
"We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent
court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.

"3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a 'petition for
citizenship'. This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were
made to act forth therein. and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and,
in fact, declared petitioner 'a citizen of the Philippines.'"
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is
not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization,
apparently from declaration of intention to oath-taking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a
Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the
national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period
of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, make her children
study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her
husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two
credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is rendered in her favor,
after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will
she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly; she can become a Filipino citizen only by
judicial declaration.
Such being the import of, the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the
provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of
an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought
that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it
behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any
relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that contained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us
is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made
by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse
effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to enforce.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known for
their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly
evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision
therein thus:
"The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case that an alien
woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can
acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised
Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions 'certifying or declaring' such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are 'null and void' has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the
present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N.
Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are
affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including
Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members
of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all
exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately
or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to
citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business
activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married
women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges
exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct
for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the administration of that
law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and far-
reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and re-
examination."
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No L-20819,
Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
"The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases although referring to
situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar may have
contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced
the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.
"Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was
required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state 'how many cases there are, like the one at bar,
in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January
28, 1950' (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) 'to May 29, 1957' (when the Ong
Son Cui was decided) 'and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965' (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).
"After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter,
the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of
certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957."
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application
of its construction of the law made in a previous decision 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice
and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under
reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and other that followed them have at the
most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to
re-examine the said rulings and clarify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
"Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children . Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
consider citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at
the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippines citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be
a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of minority, he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary
oath of allegiance."
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act
473, as a whole is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the of the status of citizenship upon
qualified aliens. After having out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards
against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have
been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines
but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the
Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also "deemed citizens" of this country provided
that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all
such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens,
unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country
where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, failing within the
conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippines citizenship
directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p.
192 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the
same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the
vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole
process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling
in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section
deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to
confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Taada
& Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.] ) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign
religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions
applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized.
The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature has done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respected authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: " A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with
respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso factonaturalized, if
she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law
498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua ,supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from which
our law has been copies, 28a the American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words
'and taken' are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA
8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenziev. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed.
297.)
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of
an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that , in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction
among the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who
married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage
itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made
of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be
reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the
uniform construction of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the
effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to
judicial naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippines Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928
which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preferences to
adopts the latter law and its settled constitution rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1992.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has
evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their
automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization
proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has
enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the
1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this Court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the
view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies
during the proceeding do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits
of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides:
"SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings.
The decision rendered in the case shall, so far same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life
of the petitioner."
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383 this Court held:
"Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the
widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the
original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those
of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or
after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.
"There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16
contemplates the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the
simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the
petitioner.' This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the
deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it effected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to
do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow
prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. IN the case at bar, petitioner
Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed,
not on behalf of the deceased, but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of
his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a
citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.' (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision
granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow
could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9
minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the P)etition of Lee Pa to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp.
8-11). The reference for Chua case is, therefore, premature."
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see
no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:
"It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the
Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe
the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power
of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898];
see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippine citizens ed.]). The constitutional itself
recognizes as Philippines citizens 'Those who are naturalized in accordance with law' (Section 1[5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those
who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those
who acquire citizenship by 'derivative naturalization' or by operation of law, as. for example, the
'naturalization' of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit supra, at 152 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]: 1 Paras, Civil code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 3).
"The phrase 'shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines found in Section 14 of the Revised
Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in
the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994) , American courts have uniformly taken it to
mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209] and
Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398] ).
'The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen, " in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat.
1091 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 910 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen", while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a
competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person
is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or
"taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged
or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed" an American to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual
mode thereby prescribed.' (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.] ; italics ours).
"That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization provision. In its entirely, Section 15 reads:
(See supra)
The phrases 'shall be deemed,' shall be considered,' and 'shall automatically become,' as used in the
above provision , are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to
confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of
their relationship, by blood affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the
fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs related, the effect is for said
persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. 'Ipso facto' as here used does not mean that all
alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily
become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become
citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however,
is that in respect of those persons numerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines
is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it
also determines the points of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the
Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs
with the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the time when child became a citizen does not depend
upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25
years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be
'considered' a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time.
Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after
her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status
became in question), that she is one who 'might herself be lawfully naturalized.' It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she 'might herself be
lawfully naturalized.'
"The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law , the
legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless
and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized' is not a condition precedent to the
vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word 'might,'
as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman 'had (the) power' to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6
DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her
marriage, she became a citizen.
"(This Court has held) that 'an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized' (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under
this view, the acquisition' of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications
for citizenship, that is, she is not a lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the
proviso does not mean that she must first prove that deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen.
Even the 'uniform' decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien
wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions
ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed
to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957], the case was
remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by
marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government, 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' for the
purpose of 'proving her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen' (at 464). In Cua v. Board,
101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by
marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: 'No such evidence appearing on record, the claim
of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable.'
(at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives
'might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized' did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth
and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives
failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.
"In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred
should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would
be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually
establish his claim to citizenship. *** His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his
claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might
herself be a lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a
person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself
be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto
upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

"It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it
cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said
that on account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned
in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case,
the presumption of law should be what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905] : Hilado v.
Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955] ). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made is
true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738 A. 369, 111 ME. 321)."
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is there for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such is no proof that the
citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case
may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate
proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into
the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official
findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant
public records may be kept in order the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of
Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties.
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition."
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less
difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor
of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but
as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby
reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal J ., reserves his separate concurring opinion.
Fernando, J ., concurs except as the interpretation accorded some American decisions as to which he is not fully
persuaded.
APPENDIX
The following review of all naturalization statutes of the United States from 1790 to 1970 ravel: (1) that aside from race,
various other disqualifications have also been provided for in the said statutes from time to time, although it was only in
1906 that the familiar and usual grounds of disqualification, like not being anarchists, polygamists, etc. were incorporated
therein, and (2) that qualifications of applicants for naturalization also varied from time to time.
A DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26, 1790, only a "free white person" could be naturalized, provided he was not
"proscribed" by any state, unless it be with the consent of such state. (Chap. V. 1 Stat. 103)
2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same provisions was added the disqualification of those "legally convicted of having
joined the army of Great Britain, during the late war." (Chap. XX, 1 Stat. 414).
3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereto provided:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or of
any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject, 'he shall have declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at
the time of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the court having
jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States fourteen years, at least, and within
the state or territory where, or for which such court is at the time held five years, at least, besides
conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, any thing therein
to the contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limelights,
and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand
seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of this actand any alien who
shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to
the provisions of the act, entitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the
act heretofore passed on that subject,' may, within four years after having made the declaration
aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making
proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United
States: And provided also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or
state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to
become a citizen of the United States."
There is here no mention of "white persons." (Chap. LIV, 1 Stat. 566).
4. In the Act of April 14, 1802, mentioned in Kelly v. Owen, supra, reference was made again to "free white persons," and
the same enemy alien and "state-proscribed" disqualifications in the former statutes were carried over. (Chap. XXVIII, 2
Stat. 153.)
5. The Act of March 26, 1804 provided in its Section 1 thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, who was residing within the limits and under the
jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the eighteenth day of June, one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-eight, and the fourteenth day of April one thousand eight hundred and two, and who
has continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States,
without a compliance with the first condition specified in the first section of the act, entitled 'An act to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject.' "
In its Section 2, this Act already provided that:
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who shall have complied with the first condition
specified in ,the first section of the said original act, and who shall have pursued the directions prescribed
in the second section of the said act, may die, before he is actually naturalized, the widow and the
children of such alien shall be considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to rights
and privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law." (CHAP. XLVII, 2 Stat. 292)
6. In the Act of July 30, 1813, the disqualification of enemy aliens was removed as follows:
"CHAP. XXXVI. An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore passed on the subject of an
uniform rule of naturalization. (a)
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That persons resident within the United States, or the territories thereof, on the eighteenth
day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve, who had before that day made
declaration according to law, of their intention to become citizens of the United States, or who by the
existing laws of the United States, were on that day entitled to become citizens, without making such
declaration, may be admitted to become citizens thereof, notwithstanding they shall be alien enemies at
the times and in the manner prescribed by the laws heretofore passed on that subject: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall be taken or construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and
removal, agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual naturalization of such
alien." (Chap. XXXVI, 3 Stat. 53)

7. Neither the Act of March 22, 1816 nor those of May 26, 1824 and May 24, 1828 made any change in the above
requirements. (Chap. XXXII, 3 Stat. 258; Chap. CLXX-XVI, 4 Stat. 69; and Chap. CXVI, 4 Stat. 310).
8. Then the Act of February 10, 1855, important because it gave alien wives of citizens ,the status of citizens, was enacted
providing:
"CHAP. LXXI. An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States
born out of the Limits thereof.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall
be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided,
however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the
United States.
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall loyal be deemed and taken
to be a citizen." (Chap. LXXI, 10 Stat. 604.)
9. The Act of July 14, 1870 mainly provided only for penalties for certain acts related to naturalization, as punished thereby,
but added in its Section 7 "that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to African
descent." (Chap. CCLIV, 16 Stat. 254.)
10. The Act of February 1, 1876 contained no relevant amendment. (Chap. 5, 19 Stat. 2.)
11. When the statutes of the United States were revised on June 22, 1874, the naturalization law of the country was
embodied in Sections 2165-2174 of saddle Revised Statutes. This contained no racial disqualification. In fact, it
reenacted ;Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 as its Section 1994 thereof, thus:
"SEC. 1994. Any person who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." (18 Stat. 351.)
12. The Act of May 6, 1882 provided expressly that no State court or court of the United State shall admit Chinese to
citizenship. (Chap. 126, Sec. 14, 22 Stat. , 61.)
13. The Act of August 9, 1888 extended the benefits of American citizenship to Indian woman married to Americans thus:
"CHAP. 818. An Act in relation to marriage between white men and Indian women.
"Be it enacted, That no white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians, who may hereafter
marry, an Indian woman, member of any Indian tribe in the United States, or any of its Territories except
the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory, shall by such marriage hereafter acquire any right to any
tribal property, privilege, or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled.
"SEC. 2. That every Indian woman, member of any such tribe of Indians, who may hereafter be married
to any citizen of the United States, is hereby declared to become by such marriage a citizen of the United
States, with all the right, privileges, and immunities of any such citizen, being a married woman:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall impair or in any way affect the right or title of such
married woman to any tribal property or any interest therein.
"SEC. 2. That whenever the marriage of any white man with any Indian woman, a member of any such
tribe of Indians, is required or offered to be proved in any judicial ,proceeding, evidence of the admission
of such fact by the party against whom the proceeding is had, or evidence of general repute, or of
cohabitation as married persons, or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact
may be inferred, shall be competent. (Aug. 9, 1888) " [25 Stat. 392, Suppl. 1.]
14. The Act of April 19, 1900 extended American citizenship to all citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 as
well as the laws of the United States to said Republic, including, of course, those on naturalization. (Chap. 339, Sec. 4, 31
Stat. 141.)
15. On June 29, 1906. "An Act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide a uniform rule for the
naturalization of aliens throughout the United States" was approved. No reference was made therein to "free white
persons''; it merely provided in its Section 7 that:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieve in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to
organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States." (36
Stat. 598)
Incidentally, the 6th paragraph of its Section 4 provided:
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies
before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat. 598)
16. By the Act of March 2, 1907, alien women who acquired American citizenship by marriage retained said citizenship, if
she continued to reside in the United States and did not renounce it, or, if she resided outside of the United States by
registering with the U.S. Consul of her place of residence. (CHAP. 2534, Sec. 4, 34 Stat. 1229.)
17. Since United States legislation treats naturalization and citizenship per se separately, Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes remained untouched. In the Act of February 24, 1911 it was provided:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That when any alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States,
becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry
under the land laws of the United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other
provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat.
929.)
18. The Act of August 11, 1916 merely validated entries filed in certain countries. (CHAP. 316, 39 Stat. 926.)
19. In the Act of May 9, 1918, the U.S. Congress amended the naturalization laws to make possible the admission of
Filipino navy servicemen, and understandably, because of the war then, it provided:
"Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the
United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less
than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge
with recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United
States, . . . ." (40 Stat. 542.)
20. On September 22, 1922, "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and citizenship of married women" was appareled
repeating Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and otherwise adopting a different attitude as regards the citizenship and
naturalization of married women thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate cleaned House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That the right of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United States
shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because she is a married woman.
"Sec. 2. That any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, or any
woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of this Act, shall not become a citizen of the
United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be
naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws, with
the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of
residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition.
"Sec. 3. That a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by
reason of her marriage after the passage of this Act, unless she makes a formal renunciation of her
citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens; Provided, That any woman
citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States. If at
the termination of the marital status she is a citizen of the United States she shall retain her citizenship
regardless of her residence. If during the continuance of the marital status she resides continuously for
two years in a foreign State of which her husband is a citizen or subject, or for five years continuously
outside the United States, she shall thereafter be subject to the same presumption as is a naturalized
citizen of the United States under the second paragraph of section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act in
reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad," approved March 2 1907. Nothing
herein shall be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of Revised Statutes 1999 or of section 2 of
the Expatriation Act of 1907 with reference to expatriation.
"Sec. 4. That a woman who, before the passage of this Act, has lost her United States citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided by section 2 of
this Act: Provided, That no certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the
continuance of the marital status she; shall have resided within the United States. After her naturalization
she shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after the passage of this
Act.

"Sec. 5. That no woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the
continuance of the marital status.
"Sec. 6. That section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 are
repealed. Such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections
nor restore citizenship lost under section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907.
"Sec. 7. That section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1901 is repealed. Such repeal shall not restore
citizenship lost under such section nor terminate citizenship resumed under such section. A woman who
has resumed under such section citizenship lost by marriage shall, upon the passage of this Act, have for
all purposes the same citizenship status as immediately preceding her marriage." (Chap. 411, 42 Stat.
10211022.)
21. When "The Code of the Laws of to United States of America of a General and Permanent Character in
Force on December 7, 1925" was approved, the provisions, corresponding to the disqualifications for naturalization and the
citizenship and naturalization of women embodied therein were:
"367. Naturalization of woman; sex or marriage not a bar. The right of any woman to become a
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because
she is a married woman. ( Sept. 22, 1922, c.411, 1, 42 Stat. 1021.)
"368. Same; women marrying citizens or persons becoming naturalized; procedure. Any woman who
marries a citizen of the United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose husband is
naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or
naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance
with the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of
residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition. (Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 2, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"369. Same; women who have lost citizenship by Marrying aliens eligible to citizenship; procedure. A
woman, who, before September 22, 1922, has lost her United States citizenship by reason for her
marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided in the preceding section. No
certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital
status she shall have resided within the United Stators. After her naturalization she shall have the same
citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after September 22, 1922. (Swept. 22, 1922, c. 411,
4, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"370. Same; Women married to persons ineligible to citizenship. No woman whose husband is not
eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital status. (Swept. 22, 1922,
c. 411, 5, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"371. Same, wife of alien declaring becoming insane before naturalization; minor children. When any
alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane before he
is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the
United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other provisions of the
naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (Feb. 24, 1911, c. 151, 36
Stat. 929.)" (Chap. 9, 44 Stat. 156, 158.)
which, of course, must be read together with the provisions on inadmissibility of Chinese, anarchists, polygamists, non-
English speaking persons, etc. in Sections 363-365 of the same Code.
22. The Act of May 26, 1926 extended naturalization privileges to alien veterans of World War I, thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate anal House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That (a) as used in this Act, the term "alien veteran" means an individual, a member of the
military or naval forces of the United States at any time after April 5, 1917, and before November 12,
1918, who is now an alien not ineligible to citizenship; but does not include (1) any individual at anytime
during such period or thereafter separated from such forces under other than honorable conditions, (2)
any conscientious objector who performed no military duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform, or (3)
any alien at any time during such period or thereafter discharged from the military or naval
forces on account of his alienage.
(b) Terms defined in the Immigration Act of 1924 shall, when used in this Act, have the meaning assigned
to such terms in that Act.
"Sec. 2. An alien veteran shall for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924 be considered as a non-
quota immigrant, but shall be subject to all the other provisions of that Act and of the immigration laws,
except that
(a) He shall not be subject to the head tax imposed by section 2 of the Immigration Act of 1917;
(b) He shall not be required to pay any fee under section 2 or section 7 of the Immigration Act of 1924;
(c) If otherwise admissible, he shall not be excluded under section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917,
unless excluded under the provisions of that section relating to
(1) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, except tuberculosis in
any form;
(2) Polygamy;
(3) Prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons;
(4) Contract laborers;
(5) Persons previously deported;
(6) Persons convicted of crime.
"Sec. 3. The unmarried child under eighteen years of age, the wife, or the husband, of an alien veteran
shall, for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924, be considered as a non quota immigrant when
accompanying or following within six months to join him, but shall be subject to all other provisions of that
Act and of the immigration laws.
'Sec. 4. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to any alien unless the immigration visa is
issued to him before the expiration of one year after the enactment of this Act." (Chap. 398, 44 Stat. 654-
655.)
23. The Act of June 21, 1930 authorized repatriation of certain veterans of World War I. (Chap. 559, 46 Stat. 791.)
24. On March 3, 1931, the Act of September 22, 1922 as amended as follows:
"Sec. 4.(a) Section 3 of the Act entitled "An Act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married
women," approved September 22, 1922, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
'Sec. 3.(a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by
reason of her marriage after this section, as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal
renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens.
'(b) Any woman who before this section, as amended takes effect, has lost her United States citizenship
by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship may, if
she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative act, be naturalized in the manner prescribed in
section 4 of this Act, as amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be
denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race.
'(c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under section 4 of this Act, as amended, if her United
States citizenship originated solely by a reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States or by
reason of the acquisition of United States citizenship by her husband.'
"(b) Section 5 of such Act of September 22, 1922, is repealed." (Chap. 442, 46 Stat. 1511-1512.)
25. The Act of May 25, 1932 contained the following somewhat pertinent provisions:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That
(a) an alien veteran, as defined in section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1926 (ch. 398, 44 Stat. 654; title 8, sec.
241, U.S. C. Supp. 1), if residing in the United States, be entitled at any time within two years after the
enactment of this Act to naturalization upon the same terms, conditions, and exemptions which would
have been accorded to such alien if he had petitioned before the armistice of the World War, except that
(1) such alien shall be required to prove that immediately preceding the date of this petition he has
resided continuously within the United States for at least two years, in pursuance of a legal admission for
permanent residence, and that during all such period he has behaved as a person of good moral
character; (2) if such admission was subsequent to March 3, 1924, such alien shall file with his petition a
certificate of arrival issued by the Commissioner of Naturalization; (3) final action shall not be had upon
the petition until at least ninety days have elapsed after filing of such petition; and (4) such alien shall be
required to appear and file his petition in person, and to take the prescribed oath of allegiance in open
court. Such residence and good moral character shall be proved either by the affidavits of two credible
witnesses who are citizens of the United States, or by depositions by two such witnesses made before a
naturalization examiner, for each place of residence.
"(b) All petitions for citizenship made outside the United States in accordance with the seventh
subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, upon which
naturalization has not been heretofore granted, are hereby declared to be invalid for all purposes.
"Sec. 2. (a) The seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended,
is amended by striking out 'the National Guard or Naval Militia of any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, or the State Militia in Federal Service.'

"(b) This section shall not be applied in the case of any individual whose petition for naturalization has
been filed before the enactment of this Act.
"Sec. 3. The last proviso in the first paragraph of the seventh subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June
29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu
thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that this proviso shall not apply in the case of
service on American-owned vessels by an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence.'
"Sec. 4. Section 32 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subdivisions:
'(c) If the name of any naturalized citizen has, subsequent to naturalization, been changed by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction, or by marriage, the citizen may, upon the payment to the commissioner of
a fee of $10, make application (accompanied by two photographs of the applicant) for a new certificate of
citizenship in the new name of such citizen. If the commissioner finds the name of the applicant to have
been changed as claimed he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate with one of such photographs
of the applicant affixed thereto.
'(d) The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized to make and issue, without fee, certifications of any
part of the naturalization records of any court, or of any certificate of citizenship, for use in complying with
any statute, State or Federal, or in any judicial proceeding. Any such certification shall be admitted in
evidence equally with the original from which such certification was made in any case in which the
original thereof might be admissible as evidence. No such certification shall be made by any clerk of
court except upon order of the court.'
"Sec. 5. So much of subdivision (a) of section 33 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, as read
'Upon obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of Labor showing the date, place, and manner of arrival in
the United States,' is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 6. Section 4 of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other
purposes,' approved March 2, 1929, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that no such certificate shall be required if
the entry was on or before June 29, 1906.'
"Sec. 7. Despite the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 1 of the Act entitled 'An Act making it a felony
with penalty for certain aliens to enter the United States of America under certain conditions in violation of
law,' approved March 4, 1929, as amended, an alien, if otherwise admissible, shall not be excluded from
admission to the United States under the provisions of such subdivision after the expiration of one year
after the date of deportation if, prior to his reembarkation at a place outside of the United States, or prior
to his application in foreign contiguous territory for admission to the United States, the Secretary of Labor,
in his discretion, shall have granted such alien permission to reapply for admission.
"Sec. 8. The compilation of the statistics to show races nationalities, and other information, authorized
and directed to be prepared by the Commissioner of Naturalization, shall be completed and published at
the same time, as near as practicable, as the Publication of the statistics of the 1930 census except that
reports covering the census of 1910 shall be completed and submitted not later than January 31, 1933,
and reports covering the census of 1920 not later than December 31, 1938. Such statistics shall show the
records of registry made under the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization
laws, and for other purposes,' approved March 2, 1929. Payment for the equipment used in preparing
such compilation shall be made from appropriations for miscellaneous expenses of the Bureau of
Naturalization.
"Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, is authorized
to provide quarters without payment of rent, in the building occupied by the Naturalization Service in New
York City, for a photographic studio operated by welfare organizations without profit and solely for the
benefit of aliens seeking naturalization. Such studio shall be under the supervision of the Commissioner
of Naturalization.
"Sec. 10. The tenth subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906 (ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 598), as
amended by the Act of May 9, 1918 (ch. 69, 40, 40 Stat. 545; U.S.C., title 8 sec. 377), is hereby amended
to read as follows:
'Tenth. That any person not an alien enemy, who resided uninterruptedly within the United States during
the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on that date otherwise qualified to become
a citizen of the United States, except that he had not made a declaration of intention required by law and
who during or prior to that time, because of misinformation regarding his citizenship status erroneously
exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States in good faith, may file the
petition for naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary declaration of intention
required of other aliens, and upon satisfactory proof to the court that he has so acted may be admitted as
a citizen of the United States upon complying in all respects with the other requirements of the
naturalization law.' (Chap. 203, 47 Stat. 165-167.)
26. By June 27, 1952, the right of a person to be naturalized could no longer be denied by reason of race or sex or because
such person was married, although various disqualifications were still maintained, such as lack understanding, capacity to
read and write English, or of the principles of the constitution and form of government of the United States, being opposed
to organized government of law, favoring totalitarian forms of government, deserters from the armed forces, etc. (Secs.
1422 to 1426, USCA 8-9, 1953; See also Secs. 1421 et seq., USCA 8, 1970.)
B QUALIFICATIONS
Apart from the above disqualifications, the statutes referred tea contained express requirements as to qualifications as
follows:
(1) The Act of 1790 required residence, good moral character and adherence to the principles of the United States
Constitution.
(2) That of 1795 required a declaration of intention. residence, adherence to the U.S. Constitution, good moral character
and no title of nobility.
(3) That of 1798 referred only declaration of intention and residence.
(4) That of 1802 required residence, renunciation of allegiance to former government, adherence to U.S. Constitution, good
moral character and declaration of intention.
(5) That of 1804 was practically I the same as that of 1802.
(6) So also were those of 1813, 1816 and 1824.
(7) That of 1828 mentioned only residence and declaration of intention.
(8) Those of 1855, 1870 and 1888 amended the law in other respects.
(9) That of 1906 contained the following provisions:
"SEC. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner
and not otherwise:
"First. He A hall declare on oath before the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or
his authorized deputy, in the district in which such alien resides, two years at least prior to his admission,
and after he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen
of the united States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the
alien may be at the time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth, the name, age,
occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival,
the, name of the vessel, if any, in which he came to the United states, and the present place of residence
in the United States of said alien: Provided, however, That no alien who, in conformity with the law in
force at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States
shall be required to renew such declaration.
"Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven years after he has made such declaration of
intention he shall make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such applicant shall state his full name, his place of
residence (by street and number, if possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and place of his
birth; the place from which he emigrated, and the date and place of his arrival in the United States, and, if
he entered through a port, the name of the vessel on which he arrived; the time when and the place and
name of the court where he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; if he is
married he shall state the name of his wife and, if possible, the country of her nativity and her place of
residence at the time of filing his petition; and if he has children, the name, date, and place of birth and
place of residence of each child living at the time of his petition: Provided, That if he has filed his
declaration before the passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign the petition in his own
handwriting.
"The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized government, or a
member of or affiliated with any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in or opposed to
organized government, a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy, and that it is his intention to
become a citizen of the United States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty of which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a citizen or subject, and that it
is his intention to reside permanently within the United States, and whether or not he has been denied
admission a, a citizen of the United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial, the court
or courts in which such decision was rendered, and that the cause for such denial has since been cured
or removed, and every fact material to his naturalization ailed required to be proved upon the final
hearing of his application.
"The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses, who are citizens of
the United States, and who shall state in their affidavits that they have personally known the applicant to
be a resident of the United States for a period of at least five years continuously, and of the State,
Territory, or district in which the application is made for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding the date of the filing of his petition, and that they each have personal knowledge that the
petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be
admitted as a citizen of the United States.
"At the time of filing of his petition there shall be filed with the clerk of the court a certificate from the
Department of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives in the United States after the passage of this
Act, stating the date, place and manner of his arrival in the United States, and the declaration of intention
of such petitioner, which certificate and declaration shall be attached to and made a part of said petition.
"Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court that he will support the
Constitution of the United States, and he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and
bear true faith and allegiance to the same.
"Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that
immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States
five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least,
and that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. In
addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States,
as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be
required, and the name, ,place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set forth in the
record.
"Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has borne any hereditary title, or has been
of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the
above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his
application is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the court.
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies
before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (34 stat. 596-98.)
10. Those of 1911 and 1916 contained amendments as to other matters.
11. That of 1918 provided for different qualifications for Filipinos, Porto Ricans, etc. for naturalization in addition to service in
the U.S. Navy or Philippine Constabulary.
12. Those of years after 1922 when Section 1994 was repealed would have no material bearing in this case.
Amen.
||| (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, [October 4, 1971], 148-B PHIL 773-877)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]


CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO
LOPEZ, respondents.

Ifurung & Marquinez for petitioner.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by
petitioner against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental. EHTCAa
Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, because: she is
a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in
her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship.
Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual
citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual
allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support
and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS; APPLYING FOR AN ALIEN


CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND HOLDING A FOREIGN PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. In order
that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention that the application
of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put
to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELECand in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.In the case
of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC,it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was
holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere
fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. EDATSI
2. ID.; ID.; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; AS A DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE REFERS TO
CITIZENS WITH DUAL ALLEGIANCE; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic
Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, . . . In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act,
and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. . . Thus, the fact that the
private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY REMOVES ANY DISQUALIFICATION AS A
DUAL CITIZEN; CASE AT BAR. It was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when
the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992.
And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; PRINCIPLE THEREOF GENERALLY DOES NOT APPLY IN
CASES OF CITIZENSHIP; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is
concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in
the case of Burca vs. Republic,an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order
that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's
citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao,the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings
on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really
binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. TCaEAD

DECISION

PURISIMA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336,
dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served
as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected
governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr.,in a petition for quo
warranto,docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed
the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent
was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father ...and consequently,
prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis,the perorations of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding. ETIDaH
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence
substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance
and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". 1

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her
opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First
Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating
substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-
336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC's First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as
follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the
merits trying it de novo,the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely
restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and
matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such
Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no
convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this
Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED." 2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the
COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore,
qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle
of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore,
there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly
qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted
facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national
and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; SCEDaT
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR);and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence,
private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration
forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC's finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992
before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February
11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically
restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private
respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent
has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner
concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under
consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 that:
"...Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata,hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. ..."
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902
defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4. ...all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto; shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight. (italics supplied) HSIADc
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein. (italics supplied)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent's father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on
January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.
By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo's daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis,which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the1973 4 and 1987 5 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli,then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless
renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent's application for an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR),on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to
her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign county upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; SEHTIc
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC 6 and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC. 7
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he
is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was
not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC,it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997,
only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her
claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. 8 As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one's citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano,were mere acts
of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent
had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. ISHCcT
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitioner's claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is
disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx xxx xxx
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government
Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. 9 Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting
laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification
must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
". . . the phrase 'dual citizenship' in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, . . . 20 must be
understood as referring to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. 10 The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen. 11 This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration,
which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992.
And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same;
citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. 12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in
cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, 13 an exception to this general rule
was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings
on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really
binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. 14 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.
However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. ATHCac
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Valles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137000, [August 9, 2000], 392 PHIL 327-342)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL


and TEODORO C. CRUZ,respondents.
DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." 1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines:Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided,finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate
nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino
citizen . . . .
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen
on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630. 3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition, for quo warranto and declaring respondent
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. SDEHCc
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not
validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated
since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution,natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
underCommonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications 12 and none of the disqualifications 13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion
of the armed forces; 19 (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time; 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and (5) political and
economic necessity. 23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, 24 we held:
. . . . Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Emphasis in the
original.] 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined
in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2)
he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-
born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, 28 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
the latter. 30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office
of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no such showing of grave
abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part. Chairman of the HRET which rendered the decision under review.
Vitug, J.,took no part. A member of the HRET which rendered the appealed judgment.
Mendoza, J., took no part, being ponente of decision under review.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Pardo, J., concurs on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., also joins concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., hereby certifies that J. Santiago joins with the majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
Gutierrez, J., Please see dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely
abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible
to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was,
therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act
to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance
with Section 2 2 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine Corps from November
1985 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military
service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4) 3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship. HAEDCT
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to regain his
Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting
Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States," 4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered
the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-
born citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery
of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his
citizenship" may "reacquire" it by "taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International
Law. 5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain conditions." 6 Webster
buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country
of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; . . . ." 7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of
citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz became a
non-natural-born citizen would not be consistent with the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New," because it is not the same as that with which he has
previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant . . . ." 9 Accordingly, the
same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

2. Not Being Naturalized,


Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized.
Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized citizens. 10 While CA 63 provides
that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through
such procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized). 11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in
order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 12 a natural-born
citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as
follows:
"SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one
must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's
Philippine citizenship. 13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above.
Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent
being clearly and concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire
their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon
his repatriation in 1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion
on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born
Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is
limited to determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its
perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its
own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the two chambers of Congress "shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." 16 In several
cases, 17 this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if
they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgments are beyond judicial interference, unless
rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.: 19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct
an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common
definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse
of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation
made in good faith and grounded on reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely
acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation
of the Constitution or the law or any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the
latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law. 20 Even
assuming that we disagree with the conclusions of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse. 21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications
of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt,
Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the
sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken.
They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives.
The votes that Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined
(66,182). 23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule
otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. 24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. 25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all
times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. 26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's
choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. 27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a
winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote." 28
5. Current Trend Towards
Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. 29 Protectionist barriers are being
dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the
same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for
citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being
considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital.
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino
community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipinos by blood, by
origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great
economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizen desirous of not simply returning to
the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipinos is
private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted
municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen
by the people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not
grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens have given rise to
some of the most disputatious and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is compounded in this petition
because citizenship is taken up in connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court to deny respondent Teodoro Cruz the right to hold
the Office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not possess the constitutional
requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be
elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and
Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine
Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District
of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he
was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who
lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March
17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR No. B-04628111) and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an
Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the United States
Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.
In the local elections of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a natural-born
Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
on September 14, 1998, claiming that Cruz, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be
natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall
be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the
HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and
declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby
DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to the
President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on
Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio." TDaAHS
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET
in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the, HRET Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the
fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizen on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that did
not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the
time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution 1 provides:
"SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. . . . ."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point and must be
continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born
citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of
all the benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to
comply with the requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born
Filipino.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic
of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in its legal
connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs.
Collector of Customs, 2 the Supreme Court traced the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were
Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens
of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our
first colonial charter or fundamental law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the
Philippine Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a
requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the
passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus
solidoctrine. 4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only
later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended,
and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such
persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition of a natural-born citizen in
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born
and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING
COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum,
Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of
a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in
a Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court
can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for
construction of what the words imply.
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself.
The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of these modes:
(naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either
as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered
natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug 7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice Jose A.R. Melo: 8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming process
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to
make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and
exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be
considered a natural-born citizen under the first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one
should not have to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable
him to reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim
citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the
term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason
of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935
Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that
only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in
Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later adopted by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those 'who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship,' and to those 'who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation there is only room for application. The phrase 'from birth' indicates that
there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without
interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a member of the House of
Representatives must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for higher elective
offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a
candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the Filipinos (even as the
draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guides and governs the
interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 Constitution, 9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable only to the President and Vice
President. 10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly. 11 Only in
1940, 12 when the first Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives. 13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice
of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a lower court. 14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have
become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme
Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members
of the cabinet, must be natural-born citizens. 16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the
members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It
shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizen and citizenship in
general. caIDSH

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less than the Constitution. Indeed,
a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural-born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only
be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored. He can run for public
office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has
reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
||| (Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, [May 7, 2001], 409 PHIL 633-672)
EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


and JOSE ONG, JR.,respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 92202-03. July 30, 1991.]

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF


REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.


Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HOUSE OF


SENATE; SOLE JUDGES OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin vs. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so long as the
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS THEREOF AS A RULE BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE; EXCEPTION; ARBITRARY AND
IMPROVIDENT USE OF POWER RESULTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. In the case of Robles vs. HRET (181
SCRA 780 [1980]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only
"in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading case of Morrero vs. Bocar(66 Phil. 429
[1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no
less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not
decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide (See Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]). It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the
Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance
of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it (See
Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).
4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION UNDER 1987 CONSTITUTION. The Supreme Court under
the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches
and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within bounds of the Constitution (See Article
VIII, Section 1, Constitution). Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the government
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
5. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; HOW CONSTRUED; SPIRIT AND INTENDMENT MUST PREVAIL. In
construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and
injustice (Casela vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail
over the letter thereof (Jarrolt vs. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580). In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuazon vs. LTA (31
SCRA 413 [1970]); "To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution,anyconstitution is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical
formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal . . . ."
6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF 1987 CONSTITUTION; CONSTRUED. Article IV
of the Constitutionprovides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born
Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The
provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. To make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must
also be retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien father were placed in equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the
bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds
of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the amendments were
enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP; APPLIES ONLY TO
THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN FATHER BUT NOT TO ONE WHOSE FATHER HAS BEEN
NATURALIZED WHEN MINOR WAS ONLY NINE (9) YEARS OF AGE. There is no dispute that respondent's mother was
a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected
or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they electcitizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for
the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a
sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was
nine years old.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) APPLIES IN CASE AT BAR. In the
case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement
of the Court, we held: "Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship." The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal
declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

9. ID.; ID.; AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT ACTION. The petitioners argue that the
respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The
Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very
late date just so we can go after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach.
This can not be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for
its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
10. ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE THE GRANT THEREOF AS NULL AND VOID VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
WHERE PERSON INVOLVED HAS BEEN LAID TO REST. To ask the Court to declare that grant of Philippine citizenship
to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid
to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the
HRET: "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise beyond where
his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 17 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN SUB-PARAGRAPH 4 THEREOF IN RELATION TO SECTION 4
OF THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902, APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those
who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: "ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards: . . . (4). Those without such
papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy." The domicile of a natural person is the place of his
habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te became a
permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by
virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899;
it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place where Ong Te set up his business and acquired his
real property. Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain. Although Ong Te
made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of
his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the
Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject
by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an
inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who
has a domicile in a place (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe
that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Under the Constitution, the term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under
the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return (Ong Huan Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]). The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF; OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT NECESSARY. The petitioners'
allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said
place is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner
thereof (as a co-heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents. Even assuming that the
private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. Solidum (61
Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE CHANGE THEREOF; "ANIMUS
REVERTENDI" ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence (Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]). The private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his
studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
15. ID.; ID.; PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION; MORE HUMANE AND LESS TECHNICAL APPROACH TO
CITIZENSHIP PROBLEMS. Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special
privilege which one must forever cherish. However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. Under the
overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons,
who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by
minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to
acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
16. ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; CANDIDATES; PROPERTY OWNERSHIP; NOT A QUALIFICATION. To require
the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required bythe Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified
to run (see Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]).
17. REMEDIAL LAW; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTION; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN LOST; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF
TO BE ADMISSIBLE; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT BAR. The petitioners' sole ground in disputing that respondent was
a natural-born Filipino is that the documents presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best evidence rule. The
petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial
evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body upon which the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated. On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions
to the best evidence rule. It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found. This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo,
Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P. Law Center, in their
respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The execution of the originals was established by Atty.
Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such
execution. The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente,
Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of
sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found (see
Government of P.I. vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918]). Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were
adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION THEREOF; EXPANDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; DECISION OF HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. I believe that,
contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of
the House Electoral Tribunal and to decide the present controversy. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The Constitution, it is true,
constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429), construing Section 4, Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that " . . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly." that: "The judgment rendered
by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such and acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due
process of law' (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off.
Gaz., 23)." And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-
bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The present controversy, involves more than perceived irregularities in
the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional
directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than
a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the
Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated
by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House
of Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal
would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review. Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office
of Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts and earnestly
perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to
consider and decide.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, does not assert supremacy over it in contravention of the time-
honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and
assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with
finality. "It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in
the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of
the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court
in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to
determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically
reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
4. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; NATURAL-BORN; REQUISITE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. The records show that
private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen
(not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under
the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose
fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the
Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private
respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizenby virtue of the Chinese citizenship of
his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the
citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (C.A. 473); DID NOT CONFER STATUS OF
NATURAL-BORN IN CASE AT BAR. While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children
of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically
become Filipino citizens, this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the
operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not
have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
6. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; NATURE THEREOF; PRIVILEGE NOT A RIGHT. "Naturalization is not a right, but a
privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and
which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION; GRANT THEREOF; APPEALABLE; OATH TAKEN BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF
APPEAL; IMPROPER. It is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and
illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and before the expiration of the reglementary
period to perfect any appeal from said order. In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic (159 SCRA 477), this Court held that:
"Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes
the proceedings so taken null and void (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381)."
8. ID.; ID.; NATURAL-BORN; DEFINED AND INTERPRETED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Article IV, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article IV,
Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . .
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority." It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino
citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers
(with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino
mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be
deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made
before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, and to foster equality among them.
9. ID.; ID.; ELECTION THEREOF; MUST BE MADE EXPRESSLY AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 625. It is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with
Commonwealth Act 625, Sections 1 and 2 of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected
expressly, not impliedly.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 1974, [59
SCRA 45]) NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare which held that
Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is
not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before
the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE
AT BAR. The respondent tribunal erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing
for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father
was valid, and that there was no further need for private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically
become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an
election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority. There is no doubt in
my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in 1969 or
within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino
citizen under Sections 2 and 1 (3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

12. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST; QUESTIONING ELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE-ELECT; IN EFFECT A QUO WARRANTO
PROCEEDING; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE-ELECT RESULTS IN NO-CHOICE. Neither of the petitioners may take
the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The
ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal
(176 SCRA 1), is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City. A petition alleging
that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election
protest. It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place.
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election
does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the
electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.
13. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902; REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT
BAR. The "test," following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te, private
respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino
citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen. Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House
Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from
years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a
resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal Exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of
Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as
petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore,
could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face
of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING
EVIDENCE.
14. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE. The decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil
L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of
a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not
have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there
is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there
is no, identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the 1987
Constitution. As held in Lee vs. Commissioners on Immigration (G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561): " . . .
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand."
15. ID; SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION; MUST BE ENFORCED. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have to cease in office by
virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the
legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the
fundamental consideration in case of this nature is the Constitution and onlythe Constitution. It has to be assumed,
therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for
private respondent, they seemed and believed that he was fully eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the
Constitution.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AS SOLE JUDGE OF
ALL CONTEST RELATING TO MEMBERS THEREOF; ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP INCLUDED; BEYOND JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION. The question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the
tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as follows: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." is the best judge of facts and this
Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION THEREOF; REVIEW OF FACTS NOT INCLUDED. In the case
of Aratuc vs.Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing
mistakes and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is
true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the Court, but as the Charter states, our authority is "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." It is not to review facts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" DEFINED. "Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as
whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET, in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET, in
its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). prLL
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supraat p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under
the 1935 Constitution has been described as 'intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
originally remained in the legislature.' (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'. (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted
the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968] The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution." (p. 401).

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-
786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as
will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action. LLjur
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the
bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that
the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite
scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the
Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today
where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its
constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China.
Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in
the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship
with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and
practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina
Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast
his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for naturalization on February 15,
1954. LibLex
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house.
Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang,
Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which
were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central
Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971,
his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. cdll
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly,
voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of
greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections
for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total
votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:.
"SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural born citizens."

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after
February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There
is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Azcuna:
With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under
the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas:
It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution whether the election was done before or after January l7, 1973." (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Trenas:
The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has
more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Citizen as provided in
section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas:
yes."
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Nolledo:
And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the
decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father
Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas:
As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not
only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress . . .
Fr. Bernas:
Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that
provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo:
I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who
was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural born citizen."
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we
were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-
born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens." (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to
give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would
result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
"To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution,any constitution is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the
significance of which is vital not formal . . ." (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were
placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in
two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore,
treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution. Cdpr
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable
and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not
been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case
is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of
age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement
of the Court, we held:
"Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship". (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.
The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small
boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for
taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs
and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The
mass of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of
this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of
his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering
a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons. LLjur
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is
a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was
only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that
had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this
very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction,
an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA
52 [1970]).
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the
principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend
himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity
by his demise and obviously he could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter
to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine
whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his
natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant
only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the
present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first
formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The
same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the
Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of
the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the
respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET
decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and
then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
"ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy ." (Emphasis
supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig
v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of
residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election
Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7,1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established m 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th
century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil
Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in
China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his
domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. LibLex
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other
logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that the documents presented to prove it were not in compliance with the
best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary
evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the
plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P. Law Center, in their
respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17,
1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo,
and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty;
it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v.
Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former
member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the
protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the
hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was
presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong.
He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr.
The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a
natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private
respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET,
by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress.
Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only
after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line
between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood
as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election'. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mrs. Rosario Braid:
The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
'resident' has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes:
Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid:
Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes:
But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence."
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no
matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized
by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]) cdphil
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary
to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET, sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their
house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family,
two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18, 1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a
resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co-
heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los
Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish
his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified
to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our
history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This
racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few,
the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own
President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese
than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever
cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by
influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process
were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and
meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical
approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the house of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar. SO ORDERED.
||| (Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 92202-03, [July 30, 1991], 276 PHIL 758-830)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183133. July 26, 2010.]


3:30 P.M.

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR.,and


VALERIANO CABILING MA, petitioners,vs.COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ,
JR.,ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE
DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Board of Commissioners (Bureau of Immigration),and MAT G.
CATRAL, respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age
of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered
foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission
negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as
Filipinos.
The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein petitioners.
The Facts
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi
Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, 1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. 2
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the
1935 Philippine Constitutionin the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. 3
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent
their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor
understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have
not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines. 4 aIAEcD
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration
(ACRs). 5
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1 (4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on
15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance
before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. 7 In
1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of
which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005. 8
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing
the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship
that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. 9 On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the
registration requirement.
Individual certifications 10 all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer,
Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct
No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the
mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of
suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in BarangayWashington, Surigao City. 11
Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953 12 and
1959, 13 respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the documents
showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986.
However, no other supporting documents appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she
subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that will
provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro. ECSaAc
The Complaint
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit 14 of a certain Mat G. Catral
(Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr.
Catral, however, did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint
against them was politically motivated because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National
and Local Elections. 15
On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of
Sections 37 (a) (7) 16and 45 (e) 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended. The Charge Sheet 18 docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in
part:
That Respondents ...,all Chinese nationals, failed and continuously failed to present any valid document
to show their respective status in the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce documents to show their
election of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the
country.
That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade the
requirements of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of
Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment
dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37 (a) (7)
and 45 (e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001,
respectively. 19
The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No.
625, which was approved on 7 June 1941, they were governed by the following rules and regulations:
1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of Philippine citizenship embodied in a
statement sworn before any officer authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry; 20 and Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration [BI]) Circular
dated 12 April 1954, 21 detailing the procedural requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship. caSEAH
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956 22 of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the cancellation
of their alien certificate of registration with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;
3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985,
requiring that the records of the proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final
determination and review. 23
As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of
Immigration 24requires that ACR, E-series, be issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing
and issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950. 25 According to public respondents, any
foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented
aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the Alien Registration Act of
1950, as amended. 26
Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election
proceedings, public respondents concluded that Felix, Jr.,Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann
are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 27
Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to support their claim that they are
Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these
reasons, public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 28
The dispositive portion 29 of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:
1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
Felix Ma, Jr., BalgameloMa, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma,
Taiwanese [Chinese], under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation to BI M.O.
Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively;
2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma,
Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section
37(a);
3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr.,Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann
Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the Immigration Blacklist;and DAEICc
4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma,
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)
(15). (Emphasis supplied.)
In its Resolution 30 of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February
2005. They were convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13 (g). 31 However,
they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his children. 32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr.,and Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They
sought the nullification of the issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2 February 2005,
ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their
names in the Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8
April 2005, denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition 33 after finding that the petitioners "failed to
comply with the exacting standards of the law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the
Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals." 34
On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution 35 denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 20
September 2007.
To reiterate, a person's continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, his being a registered voter
or an elected public official cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector
is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. The constitutional mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine
citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 36 HCaDIS
Our Ruling
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) ...;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship. 37
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article
IV, of the Constitutionshall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and
of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
In Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 38 we determined the meaning of the
period of election described by phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." Our references were the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice. 39 We pronounced:
. . . [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. 40 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the
age of majority. 41 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the elections should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 42 However, we held in Cue[n]co vs.
Secretary of Justice, 43 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to
elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. STHAID
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite.
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority.
It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority. 44
We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 45 a case in which we adopted the findings of the appellate
court that the father of the petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the
reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that "the belated submission to the local
civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance . . . was defective because the affidavit of election was
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained." 46
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The
acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three
years upon reaching the age of majority.
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements
upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost
and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re: Florencio
Mallare, 47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 48 and Re: Application for Admission to the
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching. 49
In Mallare, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. 50 The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein
petitioners' cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would
be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen, 51 and that Esteban was born in
1929 52 prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. 53 CDHacE
In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in the
Philippines. 54Again, such circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners', was not appreciated because it was
ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law
itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him 55 as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to his father. 56
In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his
case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered
no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship. 57
In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners' argument of good faith and "informal election" unacceptable
and held:
Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D.
Ching, [which was decided on 1 October 1999],is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that the Supreme
Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down inIn Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that "the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. 58
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place
of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, the election of citizenship has in fact
been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently,
and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
For what purpose is registration?
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals, 59 we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of
the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a
list." 60 In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In
strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently
the right of ownership and other real rights. 61 Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose
of notification.62 CTSHDI
Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge thereof. Thus,
"[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to
others." 63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into
a valid one between the parties." 64 It lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure
to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that
neither does such failure affect the partnership's juridical personality. 65 An unregistered contract of partnership is valid
as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give
notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their
contract. 66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement
for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. 67
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an analogous
case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.
Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 68
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of
election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the
fact that citizenship has been claimed.
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. 69 Thus, has it been admitted
through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact
of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the
designated government agency. HIAcCD
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It
was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to
any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other
nationality.
Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been
formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching
the age of reason.
Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented by
the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not
properly documented. 70 On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would
be inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among
others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners' election of Philippine citizenship.
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone
by the jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine
citizenship.
The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision on
Philippine citizenship.
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching their age of majority, 71 upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become
Filipinos 72 and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) ....
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 73 HATICc
Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-born citizens
upon election of Philippine citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),Section 1 hereof 74 shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.(Emphasis supplied.)
The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
MR. CONCEPCION. ....
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the option to
choose Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if the father were an
alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages
involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart
provision in the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention upon
reaching the age of majority. I understand that the committee would further liberalize this provision of
the 1935 Constitution. The Committee seemingly proposes to further liberalize the policy of the 1935
Constitution by making those who became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of intention to
choose their mother's citizenship upon reaching the majority age by declaring that such children are
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. 75
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the
1935? 76
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. . . . Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship was a
recognition of the fact that it reflected a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of remedying
that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not penalize the mother of a child
simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what citizenship the child would
prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the
right of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches the age of majority. I think dual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control. But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine government to require that [at] a certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we
should penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention of the
modification made in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution. 77 SacTAC
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen by election, which the Committee
is now planning to consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for Philippine
citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all he had was just an
inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship,
it would appear that his choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the Gentleman's
proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen? 78
FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who lost his status is that the natural-
born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in
Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose. 79
xxx xxx xxx
[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for
Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court ....80
We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the
conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not
result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The
documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although
belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of
Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time. CTEDSI
WHEREFORE,the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April
2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with
respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix CabilingMa, Jr.,and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given
ninety (90) days from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in
its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the
payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance
with the decision of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ma v. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133, [July 26, 2010], 639 PHIL 577-601)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-
appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.


Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Sol. Gen. Frine C . Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V . Bernardo for respondent-
appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G) THEREOF, NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO
LEGITIMATELY BECOMES FILIPINO. Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into
the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if
they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces
the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in
the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very
nature and express provisions, theImmigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS,
THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT PREVAILS. A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and
if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it
should receive the former construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will,
if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions
construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a
construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction
which will result in absurd consequences.
4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT. So a construction should, if
possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the
judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the
court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION, EXPLAINED. The
avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a
judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only
those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for
citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases,
the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal
proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the
Philippines.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED NOT DISQUALIFIED
BY LAW. We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED. Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15.
If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision,
include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also
those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PURPOSE. The leading idea or purpose of Section
15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are
related, the effect is for said person to become ipso factocitizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not
mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily
become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do notipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship
commences.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT HERSELF BE NATURALIZED. The legislature
could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of
fact necessary to establish her citizenship as afactum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The
word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman
"had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand.
12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. Regarding
the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its
order or decision granting or denying the petition.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO FILIPINO MUST PROVE
QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the
positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as
the disqualifications under Section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, L-21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under Section 4 would not necessarily qualify
under Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other words, by giving to Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under Section 3 could result in
admitting to citizenship woman that Section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American
interpretation of the words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered hinding in this jurisdiction.

DECISION

BARREDO, J p:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim
Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of
Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond,
upon her failure to do so.'
"The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was
heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
"The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:
'On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits '1,' '1-a,' and '2'). She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit '4'). On January
25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one
and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.'
"Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant
petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reasons set forth in the Order of this Court, dated
March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
'First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
"'Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what
it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized' incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien
to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
"'3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as
a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by
virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified,
does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because,
having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks
at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No.
2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
'Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law,
it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Philippines."
'Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines,
after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff
only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident
that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.
'Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
"'5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period
of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay
permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised." (Chung Tiao Bing,
et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par.,
Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed, not only by the decided cases of
the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-
paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940which reads:
" 'An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph
is added by Republic Act 503).'" (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940).
'And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws
relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien
immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-
R, Dec 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of
discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.'
"It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in
broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either language."
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this
appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the government's brief, that "in the
hearing . . . , it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized
by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of
petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE 'WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE
LAWFULLY NATURALIZED' (OF SECTION 15,REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY
IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE
OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS
AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT
POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO
CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN
THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT
OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO
CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST
OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID
OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH
WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST
AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A
FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN
REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU
YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19,
1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of
objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and
thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing
from the Philippines as she had promised (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16,
1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
"That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter
Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee
Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)"
It is obvious from the nature of these objections that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised
in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I.
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments
of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seems evident that the Solicitor General's pose that
an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he
voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the
proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We
note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were
the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her
marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure
from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers
of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act."
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens
or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the
Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may
neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 Phil. 785, said:
". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary
visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently,
without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of 'change' or 'correction', for
the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to
enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the
meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came,
contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-
evident."
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who
has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply
thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right
has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag
been conferred upon him. Consider, for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is
indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not they
have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its
seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
". . . (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage,
she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be
affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that 'in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled
or the be deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative.'" (At. pp. 462-463) In
other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions,
theImmigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II.
Precisely, the second objection of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's
marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect
of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in
the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring
her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay,
et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706, 713, 1 for it was only
in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over
the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a
Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization
Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still
pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been
reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial
construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese
nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to
guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said
marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of
her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so,
on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court
sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond
should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
"The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or,
at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14,
1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok
Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision
appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that
'in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen . . . of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit
is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the
Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
"The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife,
unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized.' As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice
(O.p. No. 52, series of 1950), * this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
'(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the . . . Philippines are at war, during the period of
such war;
'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.'
"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall
under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure
to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no
breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to
citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.
"Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the
parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may 'be lawfully naturalized,' and
this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and
justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said
issue." (At pp. 462-464.).
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the
following propositions:
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized
under Section 4 of the law quoted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by
the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualifications enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry
need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnoted several opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the
following:
"Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473),
provided that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.' A similar provision in
the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings,
but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7
Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully
naturalized', should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the
race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
"Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that
any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not
having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband." (Op. No.
176, v. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
"From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the
citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily
James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"The phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', as contained in the above provision, means that
the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948,
No. 95, s. 1941: Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura
does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
"It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino
mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule
that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec.
of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must
necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No.
52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later,
on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the
same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On
December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purposes of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she
married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon
a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation
proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition.
Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

"Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra,
p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the
wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must
show, in addition, that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the
decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not
disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan,
upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to
interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable
for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport."
(Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil.
521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied]
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to
prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any
judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country,
on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be
proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they
need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such
qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative
of which held:
"At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show
that she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with
other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for
naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops.
Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated
May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law,
held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
'herself may he lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under
Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a
Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
"Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups ? The Commissioner of Immigration does
not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for
'overstaying' is pending against the petitioner.
"We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are
expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become
naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius)" (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition." (Op. No. 38, B. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated
May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised
Naturalization Law, held that 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she 'herself may be lawfully naturalized,' and that 'this limitation of Section 15
excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473.' In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats
the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship." (Op. 57, s. 1958
of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
"The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely:
No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28, s. 1950, 'this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134,
B. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by
this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
"Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines
(25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present
her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated (Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955
the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an
order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail
bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory
reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman, (section 15,
Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in
the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government." (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955,
Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las
Pias, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had
penned Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
"The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman
from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and
conditions of; the undertaking in the bond failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her
authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the
Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice were committed before the
marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possesses the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization. ** There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization."
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before
Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law
to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to
Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly
adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that
"(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized', should
be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized." (Op. Na. 79, s.
1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be
said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification
should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963,
penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok
Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since
it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no
more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is
deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' so that the fact of marriage to a citizen,
by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G.
356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the
qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already
pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In La
San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: 10 San Tuang, a
Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961.
She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date at her permit, and when she was
refused to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by
marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo
San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal
dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession
of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for
the Court, reasoning out thus:
"It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid
down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it
was only necessary that the woman 'should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized
by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the
wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen.' (In
explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: 'If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of
her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed
all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of
the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to
find.')
"In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of
African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest
of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
"Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No.
3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it
provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:
'Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
'Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
'Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act,
in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
'The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being
not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each
of the following qualifications:
'First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years,
except as provided in the next following section;
'Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
Period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are living;
'Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and
'Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
'In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his
intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority,
state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.'
"Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant, supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women
married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1)
natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other
Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the
qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.
"But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17,
1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for
naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to
remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasian} and
against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity
with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in
question. The result is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must be understood in
the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in
Leonard v. Grant.
"The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor
General points out, the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
"There is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must
now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen
of the Philippines, because the law treats 'qualifications' and 'disqualifications' in separate sections. And
then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be
understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did
not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in
order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the
phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of
persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization the assumption being always that she is not
otherwise disqualified.

"We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien
woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this
case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any
way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same
being self-serving."
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong V. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow
Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the
decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
"In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November
30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held
that the fact that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen
of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the
disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that
petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was
favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would
become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay."
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera
reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a
Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice
Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and
obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a
reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's
husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year, Choy
King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa
before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and
when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the
issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not on]y reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang
but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon
readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had
submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight
days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy
King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking
into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an
alien woman who is widowed during the pendency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may
be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530,
show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization
Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 1 1 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling
in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is
settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law,Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
"SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent,
shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at
the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary
oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently
becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? If nothing but the unbroken
line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer
to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on
January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy
King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that
the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im
Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro
concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because they wanted to leave the point now under discussion
open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious
relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curiae 13 in the Burca
case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the
legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation
of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and
have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their
status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these
circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in
Ga Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first
laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically
repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points
brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still
bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the
Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said
provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per
adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that
of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found
only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the
Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious
reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the
Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or
orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently:


"SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight."
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision
as follows:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially:
"SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein."
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon
the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which
were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always
followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien
upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had
become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus:
"SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings.
The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce
the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner."
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were
added to the above Section 13:
"SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of
Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
'SEC. 13 (a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine
Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
'SEC. 13 (b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the
age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the
Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
'SEC. 13 (c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine
Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.' "
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became
its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13(a) abovequoted was re-
enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to
Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and
everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman
who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she
becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 ofCommonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications
were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession
of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to
become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United
States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who
were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section
providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against
Asiatics, "the only logical deduction . . . is that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and
"there is simply no support for the view that the phrase 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized' must now be understood
as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be quoted:
"The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of
a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may he deemed a
Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-19977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775,
Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to
the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in
the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2
of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No.
3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization
Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not
citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American
Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In
other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the
naturalization laws of the two countries, and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to
the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien
women marrying American citizens.
"This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised
Naturalization Law(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been
eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to
presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision that to be deemed a Philippine citizen
upon marriage the alien wife must be one 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' the reference is no
longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to
the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' would be meaningless
surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
"The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line
with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege
granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the
basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

"Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed,
that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen."
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
"On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the
Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13. t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the
principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.)
"While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the
present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess
the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ('a' to
'h') subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage,
both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law
demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
"At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be
regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al.
v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
'The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship
upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.'
"Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the
requirement of section 15 ofCommonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married
to a citizen should be one who 'might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from
the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27,
1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965;
Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
"Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if
all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result
might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualifies only
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,'
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a
competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such
person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship
'must be of good moral character.'
"Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain
selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain 'herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as
long as she is not 'opposed to organized government,' nor affiliated to groups 'upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas.' Et sic de
caeteris.
"The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of
disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the
case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
"As to the argument that the phrase 'might herself be lawfully naturalized' was derived from the U.S.
Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to
it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November
30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965."
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot but reveal
certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements
for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of
Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did
away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may become Philippines citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein."
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the
persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the
inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable
limitations flowing from our status as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of
Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority, without which it could not have been done, granted by
an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March
23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already
been quoted earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the
exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act
2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law.
The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation.
In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of
the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision
was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of
which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words
used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but
more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization laws of
the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to
organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States."
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if
they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to
Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens
throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6,
1882 not being among those expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted,
subdivision (c) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced
back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem
that the nationalization in the quoted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927
by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization
law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason, why the construction adopted in the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond
dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States as it stood before it repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly followed in all courts of the
United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in
the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the
provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United
States and all administrative authorities charged with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that
country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295
U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [1935]; Helvering v. Windmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained
in United Stats of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 285 Fed. 523,
decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
"Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as
follows: 'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.'
"Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10
Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided 'that any woman, who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States,
shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen.'
"And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap.
66, . . . 16, 1844, which provided that 'any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born
subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the
rights and privileges of a natural born subject.'
"The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed.
Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being 'An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married
Women,' in 2, provides 'that any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of
this Act, . . . shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage . . .'
"Section 6 of the act also provides 'that . . . 1994 of the Revised Statutes . . . are repealed.'
"Section 6 also provides that 'such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either
of such sections, . . .' meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to
the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case,
therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
"In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this
provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: 'The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person,"
and not an alien enemy.'
"This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which
might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as
to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the
exclusion or deportation of aliens.
"In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855,
declaring that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.' He held that 'upon the authorities, and
the reason, if not the necessity, of the case,' the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an
alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and
who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should
appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her
to naturalization.
"In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v.
Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a
naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage
she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the
provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: 'There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed.
283.' The alien 'belonged to the class of persons' who might be lawfully naturalized.
"In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States
from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took
her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under
a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American
citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was
entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: 'The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of
her husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil.'
"In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, had before it the
application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was
held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization
would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined
whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect
of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he expressed his opinion that the
husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become
lawfully naturalized. 'Her own capacity (to become naturalized),' the court stated, 'is a prerequisite to her
attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her.'
Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing
more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with
all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
"In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed, 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that
an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey,
and then came to the United States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she had
not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed,
in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have
been lawfully naturalized, and we said: 'Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be
correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration
laws, it does not affect these relators.'
"We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent
with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction
between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place
before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after such an
order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a
judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances that
existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being
carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the
ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease,
we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the
order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an
American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an
alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies
only to aliens, and not to citizens.

"In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to
deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien
and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to
the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her
deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry.
One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the
United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to
believe that a marriage under such circumstances 'is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the
facts shown.' He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not
otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from
admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied
wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that
where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to
a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage
was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A.
666, 219 Fed. 1022.
"It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the
Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act
of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for the period required by the
naturalization laws was not necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married
a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her
husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered
by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a
native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way
of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242,
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for
the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the
same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United
States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was
lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her
marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home
in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her good
intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being advance that by her
marriage she had become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney
General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the
words, 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized,' refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27
Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
"Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in
enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, co as to provide, in 19, 'that the marriage to an American citizen
of a female of the sexually immoral classes . . . shall not invest such female with United States citizenship
if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts
which make her liable to deportation under this act.'
"Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
"(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation
through the device of marrying an American citizen.
"(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of
the excluded classes, either before or after her detention should not confer upon her American
citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19
would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class."
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the, subject and We have found no warrant for the
proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Status was meant
solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would
seem to give such impression. The case of Kelly v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of
these decisions 19 simply held:
"As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the
United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress
provide. The terms 'married' or 'who shall be married,' do not refer, in our judgment, to the time when the
ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who
under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship
existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that
fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The
construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens,
would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in
our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any
application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction
suggested.
"The terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,' only limit the application of the
law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the
person applying for its benefits should be 'a free white person,' and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th,
1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
"A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40
N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions"
Note that while the court did say that "the terms, 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, . . . required
that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a 'free white person' (but also) . . . not an alien enemy." This is
simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of
enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof
anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there
was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien-enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the
fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in
addition to race. This is important, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice
Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms 'who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws' only limit the application of the law
to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then
existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent,
not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in
force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the inference that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it. follows that in place of the said eliminated
section, particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity
to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools,
etc., thereby implying that, in effect, said Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927.
Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently
justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already examined above of the mentioned provisions
has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that
Section 15 an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval
of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that
in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which
was taken from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the
qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered,
and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual
scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
"The phrase, 'shall be deemed a citizen,' in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra,
'shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen,' while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word 'deemed' is the equivalent of 'considered' or 'judged'; and,
therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be 'deemed' or 'taken' as true of any person or thing,
must, in law, he considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be 'deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed."
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our
legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such
statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different
connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the
contrary conclusion appear to be based on inaccurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the
framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act
2927 co-existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the
phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so called
racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the
elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were
embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be
taken into account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said
Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended
to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated,
Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By
that time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed
expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American
citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than
those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already
demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor
of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be naturalized judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our
lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its
settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization, and it
appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American law on the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature,
already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make
one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to
maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said
phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans
had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the
phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American
courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for
Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature
borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators
even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these
circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a
nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous American posture
because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of
a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to
indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so-called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the
same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More
accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were
the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section
2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to
those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone
will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title
8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing
with approval the opinions of the Secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements
were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their
elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such
elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become
disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448),
notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the
phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification
under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could
not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one
group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather
than decreasing the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such
elimination could have converted qualifications into disqualifications, specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated,
in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be
lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our
law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the
United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v.
Republic, supra:
"Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove 'qualifications
"There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the
law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications
prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an
alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
"1. One of the qualifications required of an applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law
is that the applicant 'must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years.' If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means
that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband.
If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a
foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this
could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having
acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her
petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an
indefinite period of time.
"2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he 'must own real
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.' Considering the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the
citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a
lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578,
Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-
20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not
have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the
wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil
Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be
remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?
"3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization 'must have enrolled his minor
children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen.' If an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her
period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of
this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized
educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic,
L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87
Phil. 668 [950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575,
Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as applied to her does not
exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
"4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 'shall
be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman.' It
is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five
years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten years.
"Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage
to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems
more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to
an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It
will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were
treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature
enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is
enlightening:
'It is true that under Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the
husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the
alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil
Code being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States. Accordingly, the stand taken by the Attorney-General prior to the enactment of Act
No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former
citizens of this country.' (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928).
'To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 5448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a)
to Act No. 2997 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands.' (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours)
"If Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way
as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege
granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to
the manifested object of the statute, must be rejected.
'A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest
object, it should receive the former construction.' (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 333, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134
[1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]).
'. . . A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if
possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance
with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.'
'So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency
in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in
futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should
adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to
have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements
of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right . . .' (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632)."
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15
with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to
suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult, if not practically impossible
in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for
naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their
possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship
may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the
construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family, the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but
surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension
of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following
observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

"We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy
of 'selective admission' more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a
judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy
of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here achoice between accepting or
rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is
conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the
individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the
statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of
the Philippines, 'irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino
ideals, customs, and traditions.' A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove
the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income,
or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is
required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a
fact.
"A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains
and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending
the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N.
W. 640 [1925]; see also 'Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary.' UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et
seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has
placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the
family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220,
Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code).
Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest
between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See
De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of
husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of
the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: 'The status of the wife follows that of the
husband, . . . and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile.' And the
presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the
regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
"It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from
that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor
that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we
submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers
from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of theRevised Naturalization Law." (Motion for
Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the
American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be
construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize
the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the
world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the
writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own
concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as
source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law
now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when
the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from
the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to
any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral
character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this
Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous
persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala
fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision
should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practices and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it
arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the
need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino.
If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty,
the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent
lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization
proceedings, provided she could sustain her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand
now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a
naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As
already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for
its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for
the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
"We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent
court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.

"3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a 'petition for
citizenship'. This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were
made to act forth therein. and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and,
in fact, declared petitioner 'a citizen of the Philippines.'"
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is
not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization,
apparently from declaration of intention to oath-taking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a
Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the
national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period
of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, make her children
study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her
husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two
credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is rendered in her favor,
after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will
she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly; she can become a Filipino citizen only by
judicial declaration.
Such being the import of, the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the
provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of
an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought
that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it
behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any
relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that contained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us
is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made
by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse
effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to enforce.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known for
their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly
evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision
therein thus:
"The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case that an alien
woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can
acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised
Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions 'certifying or declaring' such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are 'null and void' has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the
present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N.
Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are
affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including
Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members
of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all
exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately
or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to
citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business
activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married
women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges
exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct
for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged with the administration of that
law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and far-
reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and re-
examination."
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No L-20819,
Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
"The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases although referring to
situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar may have
contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced
the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.
"Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was
required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state 'how many cases there are, like the one at bar,
in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January
28, 1950' (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) 'to May 29, 1957' (when the Ong
Son Cui was decided) 'and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965' (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).
"After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter,
the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of
certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957."
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application
of its construction of the law made in a previous decision 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice
and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca is still under
reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and other that followed them have at the
most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to
re-examine the said rulings and clarify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
"Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children . Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
consider citizens thereof.
"A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at
the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippines citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be
a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
"A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of minority, he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary
oath of allegiance."
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act
473, as a whole is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the of the status of citizenship upon
qualified aliens. After having out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards
against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have
been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines
but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the
Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also "deemed citizens" of this country provided
that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all
such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens,
unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country
where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, failing within the
conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippines citizenship
directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p.
192 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the
same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the
vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole
process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling
in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section
deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to
confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Taada
& Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.] ) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign
religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions
applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized.
The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature has done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respected authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: " A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with
respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso factonaturalized, if
she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law
498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua ,supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from which
our law has been copies, 28a the American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words
'and taken' are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States
becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA
8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L
ed. 297.)
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of
an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that , in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction
among the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who
married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage
itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made
of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be
reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the
uniform construction of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the
effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to
judicial naturalization, albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippines Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928
which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preferences to
adopts the latter law and its settled constitution rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1992.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has
evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their
automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization
proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has
enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the
1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
constitutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this Court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the
view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies
during the proceeding do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits
of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides:
"SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die
before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings.
The decision rendered in the case shall, so far same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life
of the petitioner."
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383 this Court held:
"Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the
widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the
original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those
of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or
after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.
"There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16
contemplates the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the
simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the
petitioner.' This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the
deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it effected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to
do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow
prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. IN the case at bar, petitioner
Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed,
not on behalf of the deceased, but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of
his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a
citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that 'any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.' (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision
granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow
could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9
minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the P)etition of Lee Pa to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp.
8-11). The reference for Chua case is, therefore, premature."
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see
no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel:
"It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the
Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe
the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power
of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898];
see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippine citizens ed.]). The constitutional itself
recognizes as Philippines citizens 'Those who are naturalized in accordance with law' (Section 1[5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those
who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those
who acquire citizenship by 'derivative naturalization' or by operation of law, as. for example, the
'naturalization' of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit supra, at 152 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]: 1 Paras, Civil code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 3).
"The phrase 'shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines found in Section 14 of the Revised
Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in
the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994) , American courts have uniformly taken it to
mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 402], July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 209] and
Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398] ).
'The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen, " in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat.
1091 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 910 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen", while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a
competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is
on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or
"taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged
or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed" an American to her being naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual
mode thereby prescribed.' (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.] ; italics ours).
"That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization provision. In its entirely, Section 15 reads:
(See supra)
The phrases 'shall be deemed,' shall be considered,' and 'shall automatically become,' as used in the
above provision , are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to
confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of
their relationship, by blood affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the
fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs related, the effect is for said
persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. 'Ipso facto' as here used does not mean that all
alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily
become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become
citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however,
is that in respect of those persons numerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines
is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it
also determines the points of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the
Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs
with the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the time when child became a citizen does not depend
upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25
years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be
'considered' a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time.
Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after
her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status
became in question), that she is one who 'might herself be lawfully naturalized.' It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she 'might herself be
lawfully naturalized.'
"The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law , the
legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless
and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized' is not a condition precedent to the
vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word 'might,'
as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman 'had (the) power' to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6
DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her
marriage, she became a citizen.
"(This Court has held) that 'an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized' (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under
this view, the acquisition' of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications
for citizenship, that is, she is not a lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the
proviso does not mean that she must first prove that deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen.
Even the 'uniform' decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien
wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions
ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed
to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [1957], the case was
remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by
marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government, 'might herself be lawfully naturalized,' for the
purpose of 'proving her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen' (at 464). In Cua v. Board,
101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by
marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: 'No such evidence appearing on record, the claim
of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable.'
(at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives
'might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized' did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth
and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives
failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.
"In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred
should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would
be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually
establish his claim to citizenship. *** His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his
claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might
herself be a lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a
person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself
be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto
upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

"It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it
cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that on
account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any
legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the
presumption of law should be what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905] : Hilado v. Assad,
51 O.G. 4527 [1955] ). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true.
(Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738 A. 369, 111 ME. 321)."
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is there for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such is no proof that the
citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case
may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate
proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into
the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official
findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant
public records may be kept in order the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of
Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties.
"Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among
other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her
Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition."
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less
difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor
of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but
as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby
reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal J ., reserves his separate concurring opinion.
Fernando, J ., concurs except as the interpretation accorded some American decisions as to which he is not fully
persuaded.
APPENDIX
The following review of all naturalization statutes of the United States from 1790 to 1970 ravel: (1) that aside from race,
various other disqualifications have also been provided for in the said statutes from time to time, although it was only in
1906 that the familiar and usual grounds of disqualification, like not being anarchists, polygamists, etc. were incorporated
therein, and (2) that qualifications of applicants for naturalization also varied from time to time.
A DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26, 1790, only a "free white person" could be naturalized, provided he was not
"proscribed" by any state, unless it be with the consent of such state. (Chap. V. 1 Stat. 103)
2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same provisions was added the disqualification of those "legally convicted of having
joined the army of Great Britain, during the late war." (Chap. XX, 1 Stat. 414).
3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereto provided:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or of
any state, unless in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled 'An Act to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject, 'he shall have declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, five years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at
the time of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the satisfaction of the court having
jurisdiction in the case, that he has resided within the United States fourteen years, at least, and within
the state or territory where, or for which such court is at the time held five years, at least, besides
conforming to the other declarations, renunciations and proofs, by the said act required, any thing therein
to the contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who was residing within the limelights,
and under the jurisdiction of the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand
seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year after the passing of this actand any alien who
shall have made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, in conformity to
the provisions of the act, entitled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the
act heretofore passed on that subject,' may, within four years after having made the declaration
aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making
proof that he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United
States: And provided also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen or subject of any nation or
state with whom the United States shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to
become a citizen of the United States."
There is here no mention of "white persons." (Chap. LIV, 1 Stat. 566).
4. In the Act of April 14, 1802, mentioned in Kelly v. Owen, supra, reference was made again to "free white persons," and
the same enemy alien and "state-proscribed" disqualifications in the former statutes were carried over. (Chap. XXVIII, 2
Stat. 153.)
5. The Act of March 26, 1804 provided in its Section 1 thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, who was residing within the limits and under the
jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the eighteenth day of June, one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-eight, and the fourteenth day of April one thousand eight hundred and two, and who
has continued to reside within the same, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States,
without a compliance with the first condition specified in the first section of the act, entitled 'An act to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on that subject.' "
In its Section 2, this Act already provided that:
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That when any alien who shall have complied with the first condition
specified in ,the first section of the said original act, and who shall have pursued the directions prescribed
in the second section of the said act, may die, before he is actually naturalized, the widow and the
children of such alien shall be considered as citizens of the United States, and shall be entitled to rights
and privileges as such, upon taking the oaths prescribed by law." (CHAP. XLVII, 2 Stat. 292)
6. In the Act of July 30, 1813, the disqualification of enemy aliens was removed as follows:
"CHAP. XXXVI. An Act supplementary to the acts heretofore passed on the subject of an
uniform rule of naturalization. (a)
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That persons resident within the United States, or the territories thereof, on the eighteenth
day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve, who had before that day made
declaration according to law, of their intention to become citizens of the United States, or who by the
existing laws of the United States, were on that day entitled to become citizens, without making such
declaration, may be admitted to become citizens thereof, notwithstanding they shall be alien enemies at
the times and in the manner prescribed by the laws heretofore passed on that subject: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall be taken or construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and
removal, agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual naturalization of such
alien." (Chap. XXXVI, 3 Stat. 53)
7. Neither the Act of March 22, 1816 nor those of May 26, 1824 and May 24, 1828 made any change in the above
requirements. (Chap. XXXII, 3 Stat. 258; Chap. CLXX-XVI, 4 Stat. 69; and Chap. CXVI, 4 Stat. 310).
8. Then the Act of February 10, 1855, important because it gave alien wives of citizens ,the status of citizens, was enacted
providing:
"CHAP. LXXI. An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States
born out of the Limits thereof.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall
be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided,
however, That the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the
United States.
"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall loyal be deemed and taken
to be a citizen." (Chap. LXXI, 10 Stat. 604.)
9. The Act of July 14, 1870 mainly provided only for penalties for certain acts related to naturalization, as punished thereby,
but added in its Section 7 "that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to African
descent." (Chap. CCLIV, 16 Stat. 254.)
10. The Act of February 1, 1876 contained no relevant amendment. (Chap. 5, 19 Stat. 2.)
11. When the statutes of the United States were revised on June 22, 1874, the naturalization law of the country was
embodied in Sections 2165-2174 of saddle Revised Statutes. This contained no racial disqualification. In fact, it
reenacted ;Section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 as its Section 1994 thereof, thus:
"SEC. 1994. Any person who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." (18 Stat. 351.)
12. The Act of May 6, 1882 provided expressly that no State court or court of the United State shall admit Chinese to
citizenship. (Chap. 126, Sec. 14, 22 Stat. , 61.)
13. The Act of August 9, 1888 extended the benefits of American citizenship to Indian woman married to Americans thus:
"CHAP. 818. An Act in relation to marriage between white men and Indian women.
"Be it enacted, That no white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians, who may hereafter
marry, an Indian woman, member of any Indian tribe in the United States, or any of its Territories except
the five civilized tribes in the Indian Territory, shall by such marriage hereafter acquire any right to any
tribal property, privilege, or interest whatever to which any member of such tribe is entitled.
"SEC. 2. That every Indian woman, member of any such tribe of Indians, who may hereafter be married
to any citizen of the United States, is hereby declared to become by such marriage a citizen of the United
States, with all the right, privileges, and immunities of any such citizen, being a married woman:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall impair or in any way affect the right or title of such
married woman to any tribal property or any interest therein.
"SEC. 2. That whenever the marriage of any white man with any Indian woman, a member of any such
tribe of Indians, is required or offered to be proved in any judicial ,proceeding, evidence of the admission
of such fact by the party against whom the proceeding is had, or evidence of general repute, or of
cohabitation as married persons, or any other circumstantial or presumptive evidence from which the fact
may be inferred, shall be competent. (Aug. 9, 1888) " [25 Stat. 392, Suppl. 1.]
14. The Act of April 19, 1900 extended American citizenship to all citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898 as
well as the laws of the United States to said Republic, including, of course, those on naturalization. (Chap. 339, Sec. 4, 31
Stat. 141.)
15. On June 29, 1906. "An Act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide a uniform rule for the
naturalization of aliens throughout the United States" was approved. No reference was made therein to "free white
persons''; it merely provided in its Section 7 that:
"SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieve in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to
organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States." (36
Stat. 598)
Incidentally, the 6th paragraph of its Section 4 provided:
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies
before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat. 598)
16. By the Act of March 2, 1907, alien women who acquired American citizenship by marriage retained said citizenship, if
she continued to reside in the United States and did not renounce it, or, if she resided outside of the United States by
registering with the U.S. Consul of her place of residence. (CHAP. 2534, Sec. 4, 34 Stat. 1229.)
17. Since United States legislation treats naturalization and citizenship per se separately, Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes remained untouched. In the Act of February 24, 1911 it was provided:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That when any alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States,
becomes insane before he is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry
under the land laws of the United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other
provisions of the naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (36 Stat.
929.)
18. The Act of August 11, 1916 merely validated entries filed in certain countries. (CHAP. 316, 39 Stat. 926.)
19. In the Act of May 9, 1918, the U.S. Congress amended the naturalization laws to make possible the admission of
Filipino navy servicemen, and understandably, because of the war then, it provided:
"Seventh. Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the
United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less
than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge
with recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United
States, . . . ." (40 Stat. 542.)
20. On September 22, 1922, "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and citizenship of married women" was appareled
repeating Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and otherwise adopting a different attitude as regards the citizenship and
naturalization of married women thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate cleaned House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That the right of any woman to become a naturalized citizen of the United States
shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because she is a married woman.
"Sec. 2. That any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, or any
woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of this Act, shall not become a citizen of the
United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be
naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws, with
the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of
residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition.
"Sec. 3. That a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by
reason of her marriage after the passage of this Act, unless she makes a formal renunciation of her
citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens; Provided, That any woman
citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall cease to be a citizen of the United States. If at
the termination of the marital status she is a citizen of the United States she shall retain her citizenship
regardless of her residence. If during the continuance of the marital status she resides continuously for
two years in a foreign State of which her husband is a citizen or subject, or for five years continuously
outside the United States, she shall thereafter be subject to the same presumption as is a naturalized
citizen of the United States under the second paragraph of section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act in
reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad," approved March 2 1907. Nothing
herein shall be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of Revised Statutes 1999 or of section 2 of
the Expatriation Act of 1907 with reference to expatriation.
"Sec. 4. That a woman who, before the passage of this Act, has lost her United States citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided by section 2 of
this Act: Provided, That no certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the
continuance of the marital status she; shall have resided within the United States. After her naturalization
she shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after the passage of this
Act.

"Sec. 5. That no woman whose husband is not eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the
continuance of the marital status.
"Sec. 6. That section 1994 of the Revised Statutes and section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 are
repealed. Such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections
nor restore citizenship lost under section 4 of the Expatriation Act of 1907.
"Sec. 7. That section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1901 is repealed. Such repeal shall not restore
citizenship lost under such section nor terminate citizenship resumed under such section. A woman who
has resumed under such section citizenship lost by marriage shall, upon the passage of this Act, have for
all purposes the same citizenship status as immediately preceding her marriage." (Chap. 411, 42 Stat.
10211022.)
21. When "The Code of the Laws of to United States of America of a General and Permanent Character in Force on
December 7, 1925" was approved, the provisions, corresponding to the disqualifications for naturalization and the
citizenship and naturalization of women embodied therein were:
"367. Naturalization of woman; sex or marriage not a bar. The right of any woman to become a
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or because
she is a married woman. ( Sept. 22, 1922, c.411, 1, 42 Stat. 1021.)
"368. Same; women marrying citizens or persons becoming naturalized; procedure. Any woman who
marries a citizen of the United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose husband is
naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or
naturalization; but, if eligible to citizenship, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance
with the following exceptions:
(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;
(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of
residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided
continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition. (Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411, 2, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"369. Same; women who have lost citizenship by Marrying aliens eligible to citizenship; procedure. A
woman, who, before September 22, 1922, has lost her United States citizenship by reason for her
marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship, may be naturalized as provided in the preceding section. No
certificate of arrival shall be required to be filed with her petition if during the continuance of the marital
status she shall have resided within the United Stators. After her naturalization she shall have the same
citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place after September 22, 1922. (Swept. 22, 1922, c. 411,
4, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"370. Same; Women married to persons ineligible to citizenship. No woman whose husband is not
eligible to citizenship shall be naturalized during the continuance of the marital status. (Swept. 22, 1922,
c. 411, 5, 42 Stat. 1022.)
"371. Same, wife of alien declaring becoming insane before naturalization; minor children. When any
alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes insane before he
is actually naturalized, and his wife shall thereafter make a homestead entry under the land laws of the
United States, she and their minor children may, by complying with the other provisions of the
naturalization laws be naturalized without making any declaration of intention. (Feb. 24, 1911, c. 151, 36
Stat. 929.)" (Chap. 9, 44 Stat. 156, 158.)
which, of course, must be read together with the provisions on inadmissibility of Chinese, anarchists, polygamists, non-
English speaking persons, etc. in Sections 363-365 of the same Code.
22. The Act of May 26, 1926 extended naturalization privileges to alien veterans of World War I, thus:
"Be it enacted by the Senate anal House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That (a) as used in this Act, the term "alien veteran" means an individual, a member of the
military or naval forces of the United States at any time after April 5, 1917, and before November 12,
1918, who is now an alien not ineligible to citizenship; but does not include (1) any individual at anytime
during such period or thereafter separated from such forces under other than honorable conditions, (2)
any conscientious objector who performed no military duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform, or (3)
any alien at any time during such period or thereafter discharged from the military or naval forces on
account of his alienage.
(b) Terms defined in the Immigration Act of 1924 shall, when used in this Act, have the meaning assigned
to such terms in that Act.
"Sec. 2. An alien veteran shall for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924 be considered as a non-
quota immigrant, but shall be subject to all the other provisions of that Act and of the immigration laws,
except that
(a) He shall not be subject to the head tax imposed by section 2 of the Immigration Act of 1917;
(b) He shall not be required to pay any fee under section 2 or section 7 of the Immigration Act of 1924;
(c) If otherwise admissible, he shall not be excluded under section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917,
unless excluded under the provisions of that section relating to
(1) Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, except tuberculosis in
any form;
(2) Polygamy;
(3) Prostitutes, procurers, or other like immoral persons;
(4) Contract laborers;
(5) Persons previously deported;
(6) Persons convicted of crime.
"Sec. 3. The unmarried child under eighteen years of age, the wife, or the husband, of an alien veteran
shall, for the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924, be considered as a non quota immigrant when
accompanying or following within six months to join him, but shall be subject to all other provisions of that
Act and of the immigration laws.
'Sec. 4. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall not apply to any alien unless the immigration visa is
issued to him before the expiration of one year after the enactment of this Act." (Chap. 398, 44 Stat. 654-
655.)
23. The Act of June 21, 1930 authorized repatriation of certain veterans of World War I. (Chap. 559, 46 Stat. 791.)
24. On March 3, 1931, the Act of September 22, 1922 as amended as follows:
"Sec. 4.(a) Section 3 of the Act entitled "An Act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married
women," approved September 22, 1922, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
'Sec. 3.(a) A woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States by
reason of her marriage after this section, as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal
renunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturalization of aliens.
'(b) Any woman who before this section, as amended takes effect, has lost her United States citizenship
by residence abroad after marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship may, if
she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative act, be naturalized in the manner prescribed in
section 4 of this Act, as amended. Any woman who was a citizen of the United States at birth shall not be
denied naturalization under section 4 on account of her race.
'(c) No woman shall be entitled to naturalization under section 4 of this Act, as amended, if her United
States citizenship originated solely by a reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States or by
reason of the acquisition of United States citizenship by her husband.'
"(b) Section 5 of such Act of September 22, 1922, is repealed." (Chap. 442, 46 Stat. 1511-1512.)
25. The Act of May 25, 1932 contained the following somewhat pertinent provisions:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That
(a) an alien veteran, as defined in section 1 of the Act of May 26, 1926 (ch. 398, 44 Stat. 654; title 8, sec.
241, U.S. C. Supp. 1), if residing in the United States, be entitled at any time within two years after the
enactment of this Act to naturalization upon the same terms, conditions, and exemptions which would
have been accorded to such alien if he had petitioned before the armistice of the World War, except that
(1) such alien shall be required to prove that immediately preceding the date of this petition he has
resided continuously within the United States for at least two years, in pursuance of a legal admission for
permanent residence, and that during all such period he has behaved as a person of good moral
character; (2) if such admission was subsequent to March 3, 1924, such alien shall file with his petition a
certificate of arrival issued by the Commissioner of Naturalization; (3) final action shall not be had upon
the petition until at least ninety days have elapsed after filing of such petition; and (4) such alien shall be
required to appear and file his petition in person, and to take the prescribed oath of allegiance in open
court. Such residence and good moral character shall be proved either by the affidavits of two credible
witnesses who are citizens of the United States, or by depositions by two such witnesses made before a
naturalization examiner, for each place of residence.
"(b) All petitions for citizenship made outside the United States in accordance with the seventh
subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, upon which
naturalization has not been heretofore granted, are hereby declared to be invalid for all purposes.
"Sec. 2. (a) The seventh subdivision of section 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, as amended,
is amended by striking out 'the National Guard or Naval Militia of any State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, or the State Militia in Federal Service.'

"(b) This section shall not be applied in the case of any individual whose petition for naturalization has
been filed before the enactment of this Act.
"Sec. 3. The last proviso in the first paragraph of the seventh subdivision of section 4 of such Act of June
29, 1906, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu
thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that this proviso shall not apply in the case of service on
American-owned vessels by an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence.'
"Sec. 4. Section 32 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subdivisions:
'(c) If the name of any naturalized citizen has, subsequent to naturalization, been changed by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction, or by marriage, the citizen may, upon the payment to the commissioner of
a fee of $10, make application (accompanied by two photographs of the applicant) for a new certificate of
citizenship in the new name of such citizen. If the commissioner finds the name of the applicant to have
been changed as claimed he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate with one of such photographs
of the applicant affixed thereto.
'(d) The Commissioner of Naturalization is authorized to make and issue, without fee, certifications of any
part of the naturalization records of any court, or of any certificate of citizenship, for use in complying with
any statute, State or Federal, or in any judicial proceeding. Any such certification shall be admitted in
evidence equally with the original from which such certification was made in any case in which the
original thereof might be admissible as evidence. No such certification shall be made by any clerk of
court except upon order of the court.'
"Sec. 5. So much of subdivision (a) of section 33 of such Act of June 29, 1906, as amended, as read
'Upon obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of Labor showing the date, place, and manner of arrival in
the United States,' is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 6. Section 4 of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization laws, and for other
purposes,' approved March 2, 1929, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the following: 'except that no such certificate shall be required if
the entry was on or before June 29, 1906.'
"Sec. 7. Despite the provisions of subdivision (a) of section 1 of the Act entitled 'An Act making it a felony
with penalty for certain aliens to enter the United States of America under certain conditions in violation of
law,' approved March 4, 1929, as amended, an alien, if otherwise admissible, shall not be excluded from
admission to the United States under the provisions of such subdivision after the expiration of one year
after the date of deportation if, prior to his reembarkation at a place outside of the United States, or prior
to his application in foreign contiguous territory for admission to the United States, the Secretary of Labor,
in his discretion, shall have granted such alien permission to reapply for admission.
"Sec. 8. The compilation of the statistics to show races nationalities, and other information, authorized
and directed to be prepared by the Commissioner of Naturalization, shall be completed and published at
the same time, as near as practicable, as the Publication of the statistics of the 1930 census except that
reports covering the census of 1910 shall be completed and submitted not later than January 31, 1933,
and reports covering the census of 1920 not later than December 31, 1938. Such statistics shall show the
records of registry made under the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement the naturalization
laws, and for other purposes,' approved March 2, 1929. Payment for the equipment used in preparing
such compilation shall be made from appropriations for miscellaneous expenses of the Bureau of
Naturalization.
"Sec. 9. The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, is authorized
to provide quarters without payment of rent, in the building occupied by the Naturalization Service in New
York City, for a photographic studio operated by welfare organizations without profit and solely for the
benefit of aliens seeking naturalization. Such studio shall be under the supervision of the Commissioner
of Naturalization.
"Sec. 10. The tenth subdivision of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906 (ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 598), as
amended by the Act of May 9, 1918 (ch. 69, 40, 40 Stat. 545; U.S.C., title 8 sec. 377), is hereby amended
to read as follows:
'Tenth. That any person not an alien enemy, who resided uninterruptedly within the United States during
the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on that date otherwise qualified to become
a citizen of the United States, except that he had not made a declaration of intention required by law and
who during or prior to that time, because of misinformation regarding his citizenship status erroneously
exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States in good faith, may file the
petition for naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary declaration of intention
required of other aliens, and upon satisfactory proof to the court that he has so acted may be admitted as
a citizen of the United States upon complying in all respects with the other requirements of the
naturalization law.' (Chap. 203, 47 Stat. 165-167.)
26. By June 27, 1952, the right of a person to be naturalized could no longer be denied by reason of race or sex or because
such person was married, although various disqualifications were still maintained, such as lack understanding, capacity to
read and write English, or of the principles of the constitution and form of government of the United States, being opposed
to organized government of law, favoring totalitarian forms of government, deserters from the armed forces, etc. (Secs.
1422 to 1426, USCA 8-9, 1953; See also Secs. 1421 et seq., USCA 8, 1970.)
B QUALIFICATIONS
Apart from the above disqualifications, the statutes referred tea contained express requirements as to qualifications as
follows:
(1) The Act of 1790 required residence, good moral character and adherence to the principles of the United States
Constitution.
(2) That of 1795 required a declaration of intention. residence, adherence to the U.S. Constitution, good moral character
and no title of nobility.
(3) That of 1798 referred only declaration of intention and residence.
(4) That of 1802 required residence, renunciation of allegiance to former government, adherence to U.S. Constitution, good
moral character and declaration of intention.
(5) That of 1804 was practically I the same as that of 1802.
(6) So also were those of 1813, 1816 and 1824.
(7) That of 1828 mentioned only residence and declaration of intention.
(8) Those of 1855, 1870 and 1888 amended the law in other respects.
(9) That of 1906 contained the following provisions:
"SEC. 4. That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in the following manner
and not otherwise:
"First. He A hall declare on oath before the clerk of any court authorized by this Act to naturalize aliens, or
his authorized deputy, in the district in which such alien resides, two years at least prior to his admission,
and after he has reached the age of eighteen years, that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen
of the united States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which the
alien may be at the time a citizen or subject. And such declaration shall set forth, the name, age,
occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival,
the, name of the vessel, if any, in which he came to the United states, and the present place of residence
in the United States of said alien: Provided, however, That no alien who, in conformity with the law in
force at the date of his declaration, has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States
shall be required to renew such declaration.
"Second. Not less than two years nor more than seven years after he has made such declaration of
intention he shall make and file, in duplicate, a petition in writing, signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting and duly verified, in which petition such applicant shall state his full name, his place of
residence (by street and number, if possible), his occupation, and, if possible, the date and place of his
birth; the place from which he emigrated, and the date and place of his arrival in the United States, and, if
he entered through a port, the name of the vessel on which he arrived; the time when and the place and
name of the court where he declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States; if he is
married he shall state the name of his wife and, if possible, the country of her nativity and her place of
residence at the time of filing his petition; and if he has children, the name, date, and place of birth and
place of residence of each child living at the time of his petition: Provided, That if he has filed his
declaration before the passage of this Act he shall not be required to sign the petition in his own
handwriting.
"The petition shall set forth that he is not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized government, or a
member of or affiliated with any organization or body of persons teaching disbelief in or opposed to
organized government, a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy, and that it is his intention to
become a citizen of the United States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty of which he at the time of filing of his petition may be a citizen or subject, and that it
is his intention to reside permanently within the United States, and whether or not he has been denied
admission a, a citizen of the United States, and, if denied, the ground or grounds of such denial, the court
or courts in which such decision was rendered, and that the cause for such denial has since been cured
or removed, and every fact material to his naturalization ailed required to be proved upon the final
hearing of his application.

"The petition shall also be verified by the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses, who are citizens of
the United States, and who shall state in their affidavits that they have personally known the applicant to
be a resident of the United States for a period of at least five years continuously, and of the State,
Territory, or district in which the application is made for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding the date of the filing of his petition, and that they each have personal knowledge that the
petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that he is in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be
admitted as a citizen of the United States.
"At the time of filing of his petition there shall be filed with the clerk of the court a certificate from the
Department of Commerce and Labor, if the petitioner arrives in the United States after the passage of this
Act, stating the date, place and manner of his arrival in the United States, and the declaration of intention
of such petitioner, which certificate and declaration shall be attached to and made a part of said petition.
"Third. He shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court that he will support the
Constitution of the United States, and he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name to the prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or subject; that he will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and
bear true faith and allegiance to the same.
"Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that
immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States
five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least,
and that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. In
addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States,
as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be
required, and the name, ,place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set forth in the
record.
"Fifth. In case the alien applying to be admitted to citizenship has borne any hereditary title, or has been
of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, he shall, in addition to the
above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his
application is made, and his renunciation shall be recorded in the court.
"Sixth. When any alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States dies
before he is actually naturalized the widow and minor children of such alien may, by complying with the
other provisions of this Act, be naturalized without making any declaration of intention." (34 stat. 596-98.)
10. Those of 1911 and 1916 contained amendments as to other matters.
11. That of 1918 provided for different qualifications for Filipinos, Porto Ricans, etc. for naturalization in addition to service in
the U.S. Navy or Philippine Constabulary.
12. Those of years after 1922 when Section 1994 was repealed would have no material bearing in this case.
Amen.
||| (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, [October 4, 1971], 148-B PHIL 773-877)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104654. June 6, 1994.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING


JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 105715. June 6, 1994.]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 105735. June 6, 1994.]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.


Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS, JURISDICTIONAL;


CASE AT BAR. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for
himself and to select the requirement which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which
be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was
formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her
Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
therein, are null and void or failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization
Law. Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of
the petition and the order must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least
ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5)
that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such
allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Likewise the petition is not supported by the
affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the
petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing
the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took
his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is
ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this
decision becomes final and executory.
2. ID.; ID.; DECISION THEREON BECOMES FINAL ONLY AFTER THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM PROMULGATION. A
decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor
General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
3. ID.; ID.; DECISION GRANTING NATURALIZATION SHALL BE EXECUTORY AFTER TWO (2) FROM PROMULGATION;
REASON. Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country;
(2) the applicant has dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; PETITION NOT COVERED BY THE TEN (10) DAY
PERIOD FOR APPEAL PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 253 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. In Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent's
title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal
prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
5. POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; QUALIFICATIONS THEREON ARE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS. We
explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
6. ID.; ID.; ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS CAN RUN AND BE ELECTED THERETO. Petitioner's argument, that to unseat
him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that
only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted
for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
7. ID.; ELECTIONS; WHERE THE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DISQUALIFIED,
THE CANDIDATE WHO GARNERED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS NOT ENTITLED TO BE
DECLARED WINNER. Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be
considered stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner.
In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC , 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio
v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

DECISION

QUIASON, J p:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an
alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of the Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in these petitions docketed as G.R. No. 104654, G.R. No.
105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involved the same issues and
parties. LibLex
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the
Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under
the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by
private respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo
to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required
the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24- 26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his
intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy
was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be
moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
The Motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21,
1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted. cdrep
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The
Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3)
Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private
respondent's picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6)
Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque
of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and
Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (9) Certificate of Naturalization
issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of
a natural born Filipino citizen" (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H.
Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with
the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section
5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which
dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union
of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect
of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is
being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner
further prayed that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of
the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner. llcd
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out
of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of
canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental
issue of private respondent's disqualification in the guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent's name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon
was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was an American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is
still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent's proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2)
the deletion of private respondent's name from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the
governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016,
against private respondent. LLphil
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC's immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the
cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in
G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as
candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial court's decision re-admitting private
respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming the decision to
be valid, private respondent's oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was
promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can
be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from
the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondent's
certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio
H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the
petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had
been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter. LLjur
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy
must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA
878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo, p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision
granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a
candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the
said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately
resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused
from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that
the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as
EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private respondent's disqualification because of his American
citizenship. LLjur
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent's citizenship.
In his comment to the State's appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private
respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political
asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He
tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed
that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of
their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without
objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was
jampacked. LLphil
It is private respondent's posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of
his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent
theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the
background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private
respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-
known. Private respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon
for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings
in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly. LLphil

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to
select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes
are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a
Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship
by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the
publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance
therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition
and the order must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least
ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5)
that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral
character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed
to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law. LLphil
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of
the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor
General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision ( Republic v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory
until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the
applicant has dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the country or contrary to government announced policies. prcd
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for
naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in
G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en
banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondent's
proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the
petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for questioning the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. prcd
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed
Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondent's
title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal
prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioner's argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government
Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise
that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired
Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he,
being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC , 176
SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is
not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238
[1912]). prLL
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No.
105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER
the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, 105715, 105735, [June 6, 1994])

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL


and TEODORO C. CRUZ,respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." 1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines:Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided,finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate
nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino
citizen . . . .
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen
on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630. 3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition, for quo warranto and declaring respondent
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. SDEHCc
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not
validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated
since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution,natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
underCommonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications 12 and none of the disqualifications 13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion
of the armed forces; 19 (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time; 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and (5) political and
economic necessity. 23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, 24 we held:
. . . . Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Emphasis in the
original.] 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined
in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2)
he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-
born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, 28 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
the latter. 30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office
of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no such showing of grave
abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part. Chairman of the HRET which rendered the decision under review.
Vitug, J.,took no part. A member of the HRET which rendered the appealed judgment.
Mendoza, J., took no part, being ponente of decision under review.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Pardo, J., concurs on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., also joins concurring opinion of J. Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., hereby certifies that J. Santiago joins with the majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
Gutierrez, J., Please see dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely
abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible
to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was,
therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act
to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance
with Section 2 2 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine Corps from November
1985 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military
service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4) 3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship. HAEDCT
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to regain his
Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting
Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States," 4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered
the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-
born citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery
of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his
citizenship" may "reacquire" it by "taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International
Law. 5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain conditions." 6 Webster
buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country
of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; . . . ." 7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of
citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz became a
non-natural-born citizen would not be consistent with the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New," because it is not the same as that with which he has
previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant . . . ." 9 Accordingly, the
same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

2. Not Being Naturalized,


Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized.
Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized citizens. 10 While CA 63 provides
that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through
such procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized). 11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in
order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 12 a natural-born
citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as
follows:
"SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one
must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's
Philippine citizenship. 13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above.
Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent
being clearly and concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire
their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon
his repatriation in 1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion
on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born
Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is
limited to determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its
perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its
own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the two chambers of Congress "shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members." 16 In several
cases, 17 this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if
they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgments are beyond judicial interference, unless
rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.: 19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct
an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common
definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse
of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation
made in good faith and grounded on reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely
acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation
of the Constitution or the law or any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the
latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law. 20 Even
assuming that we disagree with the conclusions of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse. 21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications
of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt,
Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the
sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken.
They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives.
The votes that Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined
(66,182). 23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule
otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. 24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. 25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all
times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. 26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's
choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. 27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a
winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote." 28
5. Current Trend Towards
Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. 29 Protectionist barriers are being
dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the
same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for
citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being
considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital.
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino
community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipinos by blood, by
origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great
economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizen desirous of not simply returning to
the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipinos is
private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted
municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen
by the people to be their representative in Congress.

I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not
grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens have given rise to
some of the most disputatious and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is compounded in this petition
because citizenship is taken up in connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court to deny respondent Teodoro Cruz the right to hold
the Office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not possess the constitutional
requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be
elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and
Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine
Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District
of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he
was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who
lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March
17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR No. B-04628111) and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an
Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the United States
Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.
In the local elections of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a natural-born
Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
on September 14, 1998, claiming that Cruz, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be
natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall
be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the
HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and
declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby
DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to the
President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on
Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio." TDaAHS
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET
in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the, HRET Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the
fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizen on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that did
not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the
time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution 1 provides:
"SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. . . . ."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point and must be
continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born
citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of
all the benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to
comply with the requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born
Filipino.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic
of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in its legal
connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs.
Collector of Customs, 2 the Supreme Court traced the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were
Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens
of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our
first colonial charter or fundamental law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the
Philippine Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a
requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the
passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus
solidoctrine. 4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only
later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended,
and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such
persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition of a natural-born citizen in
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born
and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING
COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or accepting
commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum,
Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of
a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in
a Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the
sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court
can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for
construction of what the words imply.
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself.
The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms
are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of these modes:
(naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either
as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered
natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug 7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice Jose A.R. Melo: 8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming process
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to
make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and
exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be
considered a natural-born citizen under the first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one
should not have to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable
him to reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim
citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the
term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason
of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935
Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that
only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in
Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later adopted by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those 'who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship,' and to those 'who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation there is only room for application. The phrase 'from birth' indicates that
there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without
interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a member of the House of
Representatives must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for higher elective
offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a
candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the Filipinos (even as the
draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guides and governs the
interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 Constitution, 9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable only to the President and Vice
President. 10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly. 11 Only in
1940, 12 when the first Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives. 13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice
of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a lower court. 14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have
become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme
Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members
of the cabinet, must be natural-born citizens. 16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the
members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It
shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizen and citizenship in
general. caIDSH

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less than the Constitution. Indeed,
a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural-born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only
be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored. He can run for public
office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has
reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
||| (Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, [May 7, 2001], 409 PHIL 633-672)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil for Juan G. Frivaldo.
Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand Laguna, Gavinoo Barlin and Bernardo P. Fernandez for Raul Lee.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; QUALIFICATION REQUIRED FOR ALL ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS. The Local
Government Code of 1991 [Republic Act No. 7160] expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective
local officials, including that of provincial governor. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term
of office to begin. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN
THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective
official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual voting is the
core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
2. ID.; ID.; MANNERS OF REACQUISITION UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
3. ID.; ID.; IMMIGRATION LAW; P.D. 725 CREATED A RIGHT AND REMEDY TO REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
NOT ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO MARRIED ALIENS BEFORE THE 1973
CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT BUT ALSO OF OTHER NATURAL BORN FILIPINO WHO LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy,
thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino
women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law ( C.A. No.
63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and
who could neither be benefited by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women the right to
re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other
hand, said statute also provide a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such
former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
4. ID.; ID.; REPATRIATION; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF ARE LESS TEDIOUS AND CUMBERSOME COMPARED TO
NATURALIZATION. The requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY BE GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. While it is true that the law was
already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself ( P.D. 725)
which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroactive to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in
this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in
a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law . That is,
the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.
6. ID.; ID.; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE DOES NOT SPECIFY WHEN SUCH QUALIFICATION SHALL BE
POSSESSED. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of 'ELECTIVE OFFICIALS', not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term. Section 39, par. (a) (thereof) speaks
of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." The citizenship requirement in the Local Government
Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of
office to which he has been elected.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEAL OF LAW; BY SUBSEQUENT ONES. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones [Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines] and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express
repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not
categorically and/or impliedly state that PD 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact,
she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text.
8. ID.; ID.; BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED; EXCEPTION. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implicationare not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". The memorandum of then
President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive
even under the Transitory Provisions of the1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making
powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to hall the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution"
might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725but left it to the first Congress once created to
deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the
matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention
of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by
Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
9. ID.; THE LAW PRESUMES THAT THE LAW MAKING-BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL. In case
of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail. [Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines)
10. CIVIL LAW; RETROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS OF STATUTES; WHEN EFFECTIVE. It is true that under Art. 4 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are
settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS. According to TOLENTINO, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities,
thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation.
Agpalo, [Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271] on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing
acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . .
(and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e.,
those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

11. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; PROVIDED REMEDY TO QUESTION INELIGIBILITY OF A
CANDIDATE. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate,
the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that
authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the COMELEC an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of
"within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may
be taken cognizance of by the Commission.
12. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY UNDER SECTION 78
IS MERELY DIRECTORY. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.
13. ID.; ELECTIONS; THE RULE IS THE INELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE RECEIVING MAJORITY VOTES DOES NOT
ENTITLE THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE RECEIVING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED
ELECTED. "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office."
14. ID.; ID.; ELECTORAL LAWS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY AND EQUITABLY CONSTRUED TO GIVE FULLEST EFFECT
TO THE MANIFEST WILL OF OUR PEOPLE. This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must
be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held: ". . . (L)aws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections." In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice,
this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is
merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
ourConstitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. The real essence of justice does not emanate from quibbling
over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the
ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical
and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; A STATE DETERMINES ONLY THOSE WHO ARE ITS OWN CITIZENS NOT WHO ARE
THE CITIZENS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international
law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE,
CONSTRUED. The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it
appears as the first in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, Section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law
proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. [The 1987
Constitution added the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.] It is one of the few principles whose truth has
been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal
government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the American
authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino farmers.
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, Section 4 of
Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1,
Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . . " Sections 15 and 16
of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall
strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance
of their duty." And Section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our
people. To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its
metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is
meant to be supreme, the just summi imperu, theabsolute right to govern. Former Dean Vicente Sinco states that an
essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the
nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute in
relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not
derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given time." Citing Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory,
p. 59 (1952 ed.), he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of " a final power of final legal adjustment of
all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but
in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."
2. ID.; ID.; REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY DISTINGUISHED FROM PURE DEMOCRACY. In our Constitution,the
people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains ". . .
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the
people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the
citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate for the people and act on their behalf, serving for a
limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, 'at all times be accountable to the people' they are sworn to serve .The purpose of a
republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves."
3. ID.; ELECTION CASES; THE COURT SHOULD STRIVE TO ALIGN THE WILL OF THE LEGISLATURE WITH THE WILL
OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its
law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people.
For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the
ultimate source of established authority." (Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199) The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion"
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; ELECTION; WHEN THE PRESCRIBED QUALIFICATION
SHALL BE POSSESSED. Justice Davide departs from the view in the ponencia is that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the
case, then it suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved. Section 39
actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are
not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest, the first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of
voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section
unquestionably refers to elective not elected local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS;
under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrases "An elective local
official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the
qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to
mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected
candidate. It is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be
possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at
the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous
nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED
VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply
means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the
exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first
qualification.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVAILABLE REMEDIES ON QUESTIONS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. Quo warranto is not
the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person
filing the certificate of candidacy must state inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means that he has all the
qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the disqualifications as provided by law.
The petitioner under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC rules of procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the
ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."
3. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; STEPS FOR THE REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY REPATRIATION. The steps to reacquire
Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3)
taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the
applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to
retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
4. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; STATELESSNESS, CONSTRUED. Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the
status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having all opportunity to acquired
another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them
protection outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R.
COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995, ed., 290). Under Chapter I, Article 1 of the United
Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by
Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State
under the operation of its law.
5. ID.; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; DOCTRINE OF PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY,
CONSTRUED. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and
refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution is quite
clear on this. And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people. . .
" Thus, the sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body. That sovereign power of the Filipino
people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to
determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would
provide the formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful
governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but
who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now
claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of
Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their
ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of
governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility
of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction
to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated
on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed
a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding
any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy
be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition
with the following disposition: 6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of
the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections.
So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8
dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of
Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his proclamation as
the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en bancdirected "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for
the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of
Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the
Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to
hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT
the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the
highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim
petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest
number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of
Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due
implementation thereof."
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the
prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed
the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755


Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" 15 :
"First The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the
exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue
in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from
running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of
the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the
above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is
reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election." (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by
law", i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification
within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are
intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy
the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to
qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from
when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility
to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that
said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions,
all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the
elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the
other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective
local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to
show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute
(R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to
resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt atnaturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same
opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed
through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the
Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for
co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.).
That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
Hence, he insists that he not Lee should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when
the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered
the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now
discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon
Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of
citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy
which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of
the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members
of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes ofPresidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino
directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility
as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may
be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D.
725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically
by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two
laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment
the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D.
725 but left it to the first Congress once created to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law,
she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her
presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only
upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.

Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting
that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30,
1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed
by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the
said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the
Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing
of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended
solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19,
1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for
repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully
rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and
even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is
not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In
the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his
province prior to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of
the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer
once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any
contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing
there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government
Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R.
104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine
citizens can run and be elected to Public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said
case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held
his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved
at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose
of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent
with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished fromliberal) construction,
it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of
the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official"
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered
as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenshipqualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to
reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter
IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized thatthe Local Government Code requires
an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual
voting is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that
the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized and Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In
fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead- fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a
registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a
voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he
voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995. 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a
remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten
days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be
taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30,
1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the
afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the
highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise
would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some
technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,
42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and ) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb
certain evils . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct
errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against
the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy,
thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino
women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A.
No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status" and who could neither be benefited by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who
marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply
to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to
these women the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist
prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because
prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of
their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes
faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and
thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative
intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or
amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or
from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons,
events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the
legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said
that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if
the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied
although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering
that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983,
and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation
granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority
that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect
and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is
nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there
is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving; retroactivity
to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance
of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D.
725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing
of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo having
already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for
repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were
relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his
being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not
present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under
the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as
of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the
nationality qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or
date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed
settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August
17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is
cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when
he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in
1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not
been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this
Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as
affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or
on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court." 54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying"
Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo
an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of
his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any
public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with
the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for
such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in
its assailed Resolution: 55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no
record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995
elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been
declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines .' This
declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship
is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317
because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case,
an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that
Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective. . .
provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58
Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been
proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA
883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days
following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is
no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of
the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was
alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate
as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the
Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet
become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo
was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which
reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still
be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was
"fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him,
he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Lee should be proclaimed,
since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Laboagain, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon.
This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as
he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he not Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295. Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May
1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be
annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election." (emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc 63 on February
23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections,
thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But
whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute
that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first
Frivaldo case; 64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe
reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered
voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-
citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a
candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a
certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong,
he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our
point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1,
1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even
after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note
that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-
day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78.
Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a
petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of
Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first
Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining
his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his
political status not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only
with the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who
are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not
who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was
stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law,
such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous
elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First,
there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be
true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications
of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of
that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the
latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress
had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have
specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor,
mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among
others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the
provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to
the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section
39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D.
725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law."
We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and
apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of
Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or
repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted
and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right
to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to
give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be
given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he
having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee.
Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon
is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public
office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
". . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted)." 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the
popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to
ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice,
this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for
it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility
is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have
refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings
of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy,
legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this
land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He
took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old
age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice
and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a
citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving
once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which
can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent
Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no
merit.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, 123755, [June 28, 1996], 327 PHIL 521-598)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125793. August 29, 2006.]

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF


IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN, respondents.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J p:

Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when
he wrote that "it is man's basic right for it is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore,
the State sees to it that its reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies
with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino
citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of
Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of
Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized
citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who
holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6 ), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order
No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on
May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987
Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:
1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy,
informed the Bureau that respondent's Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be
summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8
The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San
Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the
Philippines. Mr. Tabasa's passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal
warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United
States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California
Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code,
Section 243.4 (D). 9
The BID ordered petitioner's deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following
summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila,
filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner
Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him,
and that the respondent's Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked. AaSTIH
By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives
apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, '81461' should be '86461'], 30
May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does
not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under
Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie
where the passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due
process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation
is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or
to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in
Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in
1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12
On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show
the cause of petitioner's detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID
presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their
memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. 13 Meanwhile, the Commissioner of
Immigration granted the petitioner's temporary release on bail on a PhP20,000.00 cash bond. 14
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot
be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. 15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasa's petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully
acquired by repatriation his Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an
American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he
lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171
the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that
political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioner's parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.
Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the United
States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a
quo noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of
Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996 more
than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioner's "repatriation"
as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only
reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a
quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no
valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage
to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2)
classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner
provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association
for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or
economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he
lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. TDAcCa
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos.
This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides
to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a
situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine
citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s)
who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil
life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot
apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was
naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now
wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to
political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13,
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for
repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost
his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could
have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent's
and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove
that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the
minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire
Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by
simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization
(SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285)
dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
SECTION 1. Composition. The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the
Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
SECTION 2. Procedure. Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which
shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for
repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence
proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the
qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an
affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was
already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on
August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should
have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitioner now of legal age can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that
his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law.
Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires
a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether
by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to 'political or economic
reasons' is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
Petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on. AcaEDC
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No.
725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups
of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic
necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit
the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by
marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House
Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit:
Ms. Domingo: . . .
From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that
there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.
The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to
be found in the country.Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their
lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those
who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we
have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.
Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but
rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their
families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by
this body. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx


. . . [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who
leave their country. And the two types the economic and political refugees are the ones being
addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through
marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the country because of political
persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to
the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they
find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because they are treated no different from any
other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the
intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have
abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to
one's native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and his father's loss of
Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic
necessity." 27
This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one's native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the
act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why
Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo
illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have
committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that
they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the
SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political
or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987
Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the
power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State
to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa,
fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls
within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation
proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation
by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV
shall merely require the presentation of the alien's valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis
thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the
alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be '86461'], 30 May 1989). The automatic
loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners
may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary
documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an
alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine
visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of
staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. . . . 29
Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who
can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no
legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. TAacCE
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, [August 29, 2006], 531 PHIL 407-428)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

Balase, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but
suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en
banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the
COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal
of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice
mayor of Makati. cdasia

On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in the
disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION, ALLOWED IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS BEEN NO FINAL JUDGMENT
RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation
nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before
the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been
no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at
the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which
the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to
have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If
Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent
to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioner's
interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.

2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance,
on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual
allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas,
one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." By
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.

4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP; CASE
AT BAR. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when
he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the
assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: "By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government." These factual
findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by
Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent
had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private
respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . [T]he Certification
that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands
to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. acCITS

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were
as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by
a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril
and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother.
He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered
an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending even until after the
election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by
private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1,
with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He
acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus
soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father
and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for
vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty-three (103,853)
votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred
ninety-four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty-nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel
Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy-five (54,275) votes. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf.
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position
of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the
parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31,
1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. cdasia

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELECen banc and to
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already
37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7
May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming
that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner
Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in
support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling
denying his motion for intervention:

SECTION 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by
the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention,


the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before
the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for
Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that
there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several
cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one
who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position"
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or anyintervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial
of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided
the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention
but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship
and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION


The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case,
contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinisis born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers'
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the
instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I
reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is
seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem
of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country.
There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently,
the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated
Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and
Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction.
At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a
second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been
worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are
Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic
capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation,
worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE
IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance,
thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the
sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in
a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution
and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to
the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result
of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to
Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a
foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun
Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country,
arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the
most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on
us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any
person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born
citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of
his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are
such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be
an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election.
Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without
any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is
really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the
Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether
such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization
Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELECen banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine
national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was
already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty
over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim
v.Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate
of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,


CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8,
1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without
merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent
reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to
the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21,
1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
vs. COMELEC 18 appliesmutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is notstill a Filipino. . . .
[T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is,
of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that
the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenshipwhen there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support theConstitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that
he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be
taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. cdasia

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179848. November 27, 2008.]

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution 1 dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division 2 disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US)
citizenship. SCcHIE
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December 1989. 3
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles
PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval 4 of petitioner's request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines. 6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor
of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before the COMELEC Provincial
Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under
Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer 9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper 10 dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his
Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. DaTEIc
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution 11 disqualifying the petitioner
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his
US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It
additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign
citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC 12and Mercado v.
Manzano 13 applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner
who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned
Resolution that:
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed,
respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such
disqualification. 14
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as
an effective renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance
to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner
explicitly renounced his US citizenship. 15The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's Motion in a
Resolution 16 dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship" 17 dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of
renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before
the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the
appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who
allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an
identical document entitled "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All
Foreign Citizenship" on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy. 18
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003",
SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE
PUBLIC OFFICE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION
FEES; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD
RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN. 19
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from
running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
his US citizenship.
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for
different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to
reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: DcaCSE
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of
a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No.
9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his
foreign citizenship. SEDaAH
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such
an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I
hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. 20
Hence, Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute apersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of
Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained
to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship: aSCHcA
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think it's very
good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER.
. . I think it's already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER.
Ah. . . but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
No. . .no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
Can I go back to No. 2. What's your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER.
They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano. . .
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER.
To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON.
No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR.
No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only
one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.
To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship. TcEaAS
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially
similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance
is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of
foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more
than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles 21 and Mercado, 22 wherein the filing by a person with
dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now
specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought
under another law, Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual citizenship" vis- -vis the concept of "dual
allegiance". At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000,
respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by
our legislature. 23
Lopez v. Commission on Elections 24 is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same
factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225.
Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number of votes in
the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply
with the requirements of Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship," 25 which he supposedly executed
on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit,
petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his case that he complied with the requirement of making
a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new theory
constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the COMELEC that he complied with the
requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles
PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-
judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. 26 Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly. 27
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. 28 Petitioner should have offered
the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any applicable
provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy
or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the
admission of evidence not formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to
examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. 29 Additionally, the piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. 30 SHCaDA
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document,
"Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" executed
on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said
Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en
banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing, not
to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and
in existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of
evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioner's counsel,
and even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 5 (2) ofRepublic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much
evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioner's excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not
change the outcome of petitioner's case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the
case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded
differently. 31 The only exceptions to the general rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel which
this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a
technicality. 32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner's averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the
presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as
to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the
burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case unless they prejudice the
client and prevent him from properly presenting his case do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such
that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel. 33 aCSHDI
Also belying petitioner's claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner
continuously used his former counsel's theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse
decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law
requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance
on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the former's incongruous allegations that the
latter has been grossly negligent.
Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should
have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of
7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution
issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former
counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel's acts, because,
otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a
piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan's denial of
his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De
Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition
at bar.
Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending
the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioner's behalf. Moreover, petitioner's cause was not
defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A
case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts
and mistakes of their counsel. 36
Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election
requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective
position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement. 37 The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was
qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state. 38 The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. 39 aAcHCT
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the
14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said
municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, [November 27, 2008], 592 PHIL 661-680)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.]

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship. 1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act. TIDaCE
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: DcITaC
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/orTSHEIc
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this
Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either
natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The Constitution,
however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. ASEcHI
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further
claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an
effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and
accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to
the Republic. 3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of
the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would
allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist the retention of
foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are
two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual
allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance
by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now
be a violation of the Constitution. IEAacT
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual
allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it
addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that
the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because
the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and
not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine
government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not
require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual
allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship
and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance
to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes
to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxx xxx xxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest
should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the
bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize
Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. cHCSDa

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he
abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that
foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the
country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the
Philippines but of the other foreign country. 4(Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is
to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual
allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends
that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v.
Manzano, 6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship. 7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt
with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. 10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. cADTSH
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set
the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune
with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. 12 The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
||| (Calilung v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, [May 11, 2007], 551 PHIL 110-119)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-5. September 17, 1945.]


CO CHAM (alias CO CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Marcelino Lontok, for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla, for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon, in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACTS OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT. It is a


legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
2.ID.; KINDS OF "FACTO" GOVERNMENTS. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force
or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the
government of England under the Commonwealth, first the Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second
is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which
was reduced to British possession in the in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with
Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession.
3.ID.; DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF SECOND KIND OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT. The
distinguishing characteristics of the second kind of de facto government, more aptly denominated a government of
paramount force, are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exist it must necessarily be obeyed in
civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly
by military force.
4.ID.; ID.; POWERS AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT OF PARAMOUNT FORCE. The powers and duties
of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Convention of 1907, which is a
revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of Military Authority over Hostile
Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the
hands of the occupants, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and issue, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION, A "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND
KIND. It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on
January 23, 1942 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces,
was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second Kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United
States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to
all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil
government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government
imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws
alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission
was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no
consequence.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF SAME CHARACTER AS PHILIPPINE
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a
sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the belligerent occupants or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the
Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military
authority and government. Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the
sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latest sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a
treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in international law,
recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Convention of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied
territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not
serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of
occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. Even if the Republic of the Philippines had been
established by the free will of the Filipino people who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from
the Islands, had organized an independent government under that name with the support and backing of Japan, such
government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the
parent state of the United States. And, as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by
the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized by the as such by the Supreme Court of the United
States in numerous cases; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Islands
of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by same court in the case of McCleod
vs. United States (229 U. S., 416).
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AFTER REOCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. The
governments of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of
justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-
known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR ANNULLING ALL
"PROCESSES OF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE." The phrase "processes of any other
government" is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines of other governmental agencies established in the Islands
during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, according to the well-known principles of
international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de
facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the
occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other
government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The
only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes
or court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a
statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF COMMONWEALTH TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS IN
ACTIONS PENDING IN COURTS DURING JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION. Although in theory the authority of
the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place,
in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
Following this practice and the precepts of the law of nations, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces
proclaimed on January 3, 1943, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the
territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive
and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall
remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission
was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1943, the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same jurisdiction, in
conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese army in Order No.3 of
February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same
courts were continued with no substantial change in the organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings pending
in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to
reason the same courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p.
526), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.

10.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUITY OF LAW. It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a political nature, "Law
once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by chance of
sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman,
13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There
can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a
primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persist until a change takes
place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to amend; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change." As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends
upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continues in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and
until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in
order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and
not repealing those laws. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be
continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They
are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer
continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts
having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.

DECISION

FERIA, J p:
This is a petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be
ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initialed under the regime of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground
that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower court courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending
in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And
the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the governments established in
the Philippines during Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "Military Administration, under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army." In
said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the
past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administrative organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission"
was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate
coordination of the existing central administrative organs and of judicial courts, based upon what had existed
theretofore, with the approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth
were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the
Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of
February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising
legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administrative organs
and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs . . . "
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was
effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive
Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a
proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
"1.That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme
authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
"2.That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and.
"3.That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control."
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General Douglas
MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under
the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here reestablished as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the
present case may be reduced to the following: (1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)
Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of United
States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control," has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the
said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth, which were the same courts existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation
of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied
and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines was reestablished in
the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
1.It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive,
and judicial department of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not
the governments established in these islands under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino Forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is
that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such government of England under the Commonwealth,
first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war
of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third
is that established as an independent government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the
war of secession. We are not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds
of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are: (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exist it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military force . . .. One example of this sort of government is found in the case of Castine, in
Maine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . .. U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in
the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . ..Fleming vs. Page
( Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possession of territory by lawful and regular governments at war with
the country of which the territory so possessed was part."
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of
Military Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of the legitimate power
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."
According to these precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is
burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of
a de facto government, and he can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make changes in the old as he
may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied
territory, the municipal laws in force which enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the
country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of
assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied are
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of
justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to
take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue
administering justice; and the judges and other judicial officers are kept in their post if they accept the authority of the
belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities
appointed by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists
who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the Presidents of the
United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444):
"The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of
the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not no look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and
limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws of war, as established by the usage of the
world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations . . .. The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror . . .. He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later
embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,
1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by the United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the
military occupant are absolutely and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,
the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things,
until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but
are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and
the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States,
continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American
Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
As to de facto government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of
Thorington vs. Smith,supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de facto government. In
that case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary
governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did not originate in lawful acts of regular war;
but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the
governments of which these are examples . . .."
In the case of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176., 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the
validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for
the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion,
remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be
treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state
of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated,
precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative
Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose or
mode of enforcement to the authority of National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occurred or was
done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be
disregarded or held to be invalidmerely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established
by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States
did not relieve those who were within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the
bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions
in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or
remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were
without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection;' and
"That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called Confederate States should be
respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National
Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order
No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese Forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the
government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
"The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given
by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is
of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and
the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the appellants of such territory or the
rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the
Philippines Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained
the existing administration under the general direction of a French official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, I IV, 25); and in
the same way, the Duke of Wellington, on invading France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of
their functions, apparently without appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.) The Germans, on
the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in
every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars, 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505,
note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government.
As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted,
under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14,
1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of, the Filipino
people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
doctrine in international law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of
the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de
jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty
Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United Statesvs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan
to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or
turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief or at least
the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino people who,
taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese
forces of invasion, had organized and independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan,
such government would had been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the
parent state or the United States. And, as such, it would had been a de facto government similar to that organized by
the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the Supreme Court of the United States
in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williamsvs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and
similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Islands of Cebu during the Spanish-
American war, recognized as de facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mc
Leod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated
the Islands of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the
Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing
the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme
Court held in that case that "such government was of the class of de facto government described in I Moore's
International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
aptly denominated a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of
paramount force . . .'." That is to say, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection
or rebellion against the parent state, rest upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of
an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings
of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
McArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by
an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few
cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to
do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to
the extent that they may take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same
time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a
community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and individuals the evil would be scarcely less,
it would be hard to example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to
the general interest that sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive
government." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each
an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as
conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty, as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p.
615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion,
are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, it confirmed by the
Proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
regulations and proceedings of the governments established in the Philippines during Japanese occupation, for it would
have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2.The second questions hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as
used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944 that is, whether it was the
intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and avoid thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact,
that as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of thede facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of
the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
McArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes in
violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to
governmental processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of
statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may
not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of
the military occupation demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a
commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an
enemy, during the military and before the restoration on the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief
of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than
those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of
the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas
McArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full
respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the
international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section
3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public
interest would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled,
accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminal set aside, and criminals might easily become immune
for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court
records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established
rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public
interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court
ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a
territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the
belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military
occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be
expected that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgments or decisions may afterwards
be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may
escape the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts of justice during the
Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President
of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and
the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive Order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided
"that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during
Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23,
because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which had been duly appealed to said court prior to the
Japanese occupation, but to cases which had theretofore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the
Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals
prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10,
1945 in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which says: "Moreover when it is said
that an occupier's act are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it
must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong
would committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the
matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And
from this quotation the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be
considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of
international law that denies to the restored government the right to exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon
it in its instead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier,
such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent
occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not
judicial processes" precisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to
annul and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts during Japanese occupation. The question to be
determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or
nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes
of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not General
Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations
of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience, constitute or
form the law of nations. Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article
43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question,
imposes upon the occupant the to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which
prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals
of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their court to assert or
enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L. R.
[1915], 1 K. B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and
forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication,
the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting
aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of
these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to
suspending in said courts the rights and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by
the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower
another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States
Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet,
in construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Ochoa vs. Hernandez (230 U. S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international law
and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."
In the case of Raymund vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the
forces of the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a
court of chancery in that State in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts
approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the
powers and duties of military officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its
decision the court said: "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very
large governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question . . .. The clearest language would be
necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so exercised . . ..It was an
arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the
power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise
of military power, where the rights of the citizens are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigencies
requires. (Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.
c., 1 Smith's L. C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was
void."
It is, therefor, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the
judicial acts and proceedings, which are not of political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were
continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and are now good and valid after
the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3.The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Commission and by the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at
the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth Government was restored.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course
as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into
his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunal to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection
says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary
will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice
such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws
and institutions so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 596.) Undoubtedly, this
practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces
proclaimed on January 3, 1945, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the
territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive
and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall
remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission
was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same jurisdiction, in
conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of
February 20, 1942. And October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same
courts were continued with no substantial change in the organization and jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had
been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which have become reestablished and conceived
of as having been in continued existenceupon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principle "a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign
military forces, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired . . .. Such political resurrection is
the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon the removal of the
external force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content."
(Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support of his conclusion that the Court of
First Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of
this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have
provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases
commenced and left pending therein," is "that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but
they had become the laws and the courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption (U. S. vs. Reiter, 27 F.
Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U. S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the
country occupied, if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the
sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is
essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What
the court said was that, if such laws and institution are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive
their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institutions or courts so
continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of occupied territory. The laws and courts of the Philippines,
therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The
provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of the 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the
population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit everything which would
assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the
political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the courts
of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the
name of the legitimate sovereign" (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the
victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to
violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the
name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers
in the name of the French people and government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts
refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers
occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow the use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise.
(Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed., of 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale,
Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same
author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it
must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when
changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is
impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign
by legislative act creates a change."
As court are creatures of statutes and their existence depends upon that of the laws which create and confer
upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of
sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that
said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such
proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even
assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the
so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the court of Japan,
as the said courts and the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein
before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or
transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary
only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines Islands
ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued
and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the
Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in
Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the
Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65
of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution
of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or
order that the courts in the Islands were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the
civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the
Spanish-American war of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the said
provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Courts of First Instance, or Supreme
Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the
City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending therein
within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts are the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and,
therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in
connection with the second question. Said Executive Order provides "(1) that the Court of Appeals, created and
established under Commonwealth Act No. 3, as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all
cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for
final decision. . . .". In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that
existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in
discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up
to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance
during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not
the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to that time of the
Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January
2, 1942, been duly appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings
in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws
of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that
the respondent judge of the court, having refused to act and continue the said proceedings, which the law specifically
enjoins him to do as a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of
jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts
of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing, it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of a mandamus issue, directed to the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
||| (Co Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, [September 17, 1945], 75 PHIL 113-224)

Minute Resolutions

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972,
People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U.
Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that
her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions
and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.


Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS


Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.------------------------------------------
DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge.

The Court further held that:


The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 9959. December 13, 1916.]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, defendant-
appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.


Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CHARITIES; EARTHQUAKE RELIEF FUND. Funds collected as a result of a national subscription for the
relief of those damaged by an earthquake constitute, under article 1 of the Law of June 20, 1849, and article 2 of the
instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public
charitable institution.
2. ID.; SUPERVISION AND CONTROL BY THE GOVERNMENT. The law of June 20, 1849, the royal order
of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date conferred upon the former sovereign authority to
supervise and control certain private or special charities of a temporary nature.
3. ID.; TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY; EFFECT ON THE LAWS. While there is a total abrogation of the
former political relations of the inhabitants of ceded territory, and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political
character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues
in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. Laws conferring upon the Government power to supervise and
control special charities are not in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the United States.
4. ID.; RECOVERY OF TRUST FUNDS LOANED BY FORMER SOVEREIGN; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
The statute of limitations does not run against the right of action of the Philippine Government to recover trust funds
loaned by the former sovereign.
5. ID.; ID.; FACTS. In 1863 the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of those
damages by an earthquake in the Philippine Islands and the money was remitted to the Philippines to be distributed by
a central relief board. Part of the funds contributed were turned over to the board. Part of the funds contributed were
turned over to the "Monte de Piedad" to be held at the disposal of the relief board. Held: That the Philippine
Government is the proper party to maintain an action to recover the funds thus loaned or deposited for the purpose of
carrying out the intention of the contributors.

DECISION

TRENT, J p:

About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the Treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the
Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damages by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June
3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King
of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the
relief board allotted #365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by
order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those
entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, in
accordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $40,299.65, leaving a balance of #365,403.85 for
distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine
Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates:
February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account
of various petitions of the persons and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the
central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2109, effective January
30, 1912, empowering and directing the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad to
recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80,000,
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the
Official Gazette under date of April 7, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular
Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent
in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant
appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:
"1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), given to the Monte
de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of
such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these Islands, within eight days following the day
when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by the
former government.
"2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty
thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad
y Caja de Ahorros.
"3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated
the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national
subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Islands.
"4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine
Legislature on January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional.
"5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this
suit brought by the Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the
reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by the late Spanish Government of
these Islands.
"6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the
Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), gold coin, or the equivalent
thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th,
1912, and the costs of this suit."
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the
home Government in what manner the indemnity might board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake
might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward the
donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which reads:
"Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila. Presidencia.
"Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs
your Excellency, First: That the funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been
exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which
will be expended between to-day and day after establishment, which would be greatly injured were its
operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His
Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the
treasury derived from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of
1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief
board over $100,000, which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your general Government, it
having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. Fifth: That in the
straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to
the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at
the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000,
there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the
Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the failure
of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application
to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a part of the subscription intended to relieve the distress caused
by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand
pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or
banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. This present
crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other
officials who have to take part in the transaction."
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
"GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
"MANILA, February 1, 1883.
"In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all
invested in loans on jewelry and that the small amount remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the
transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance
of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de
Piedad$80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief
of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum should H.
M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds
by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it
will be compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficent an
institution; and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and
considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned
than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has submitted for the determination of
H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the
subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a
donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the
wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to
relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it
liberates needy persons from the pernicious effects of usury; and

"Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution
referred to would be frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its establishment would be
immediately lost and wiped out if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted, since the suspension of its
operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
"Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it
might be said that at the present juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order
because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the later calamities, and because it is
the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and
"Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained,
for the funds in question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H. M. Government does not
approve the recommendation mentioned, this general Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary
powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as
follows:
"First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the
public treasury of these Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the
earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum of $80,000, as its needs may require, in installments of
$20,000.
"Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight
days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this
resolution.
"Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work,
proceed to prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to
may be made and the danger that menaces theMonte de Piedad of having to suspend its operations may
be averted.
"H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.
(Signed) "P. DE RIVERA."
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform
this ministeriowhat is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to
the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the
rights of the claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs
had been established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations
assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay
their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the
proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from
all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury,
such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your general
Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were
expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had
as a result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply
with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this royal order
by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned
over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
"Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines)
Excellency. By Royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who
sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year 1863 shall be paid the
amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules
specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payments to the interested
parties the assets shall be reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time that has
elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the
general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions
and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your
Excellency was pleased to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to
this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is, for compliance with its directions
and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums
paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and
this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the
date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to
return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On
this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with
the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by
the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it
was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that
the assets of the earthquake relief fund should be collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos
loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during
which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to other persons. This Intendencia also
supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from
investing it in beneficent transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds
bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on
interest what the former had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the
promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to return the money on the
ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the
reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that thisIntendencia was acting in the discharge of a
sovereign command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further
ground that the sum of P80,000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake
victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, thus in the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously
interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription
raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no
donation is made to the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it
owes, and that you give this Intendenciapower to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I must
call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and
after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum
which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds."
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the
Philippine Government of the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000;
March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883; $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is
as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from the
general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1,
1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a
loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada
Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada
Mitra and subscription, balance of these two accounts which on this date are united in accordance with an order of
the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine Government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status
of the $80,000 and received the following reply:
"MANILA, March 31, 1902.
"To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.
"SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this
office as to when and for what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty
thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as
well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is called upon to furnish,
I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious, show that on the 15th of February,
1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they
deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and
June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty
thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. (Signed) Emilio Moreta.

"I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those
Pious Institutions.
"Manila, November 19, 1913.
(Sgd.) "EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
"Secretary.
(Sgd.) "O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
"Managing Director."
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the
Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other,
concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial
condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury
of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be
held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the
transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It
did not ask that the $80,000 be given to its as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the
petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance
which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus, should
be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution,"
and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the
transfer of $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not
approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the
$80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid
Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that
Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was
directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the
earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by
your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the
interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intent that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should
include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of
Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte
de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan, for it appears in its books that it received the amount from the
general treasury "as a returnable loan, and without interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January,
1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra
and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedadrecognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902,
that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt
about the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation.
Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:
"The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of
being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was this
duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies;
among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the
Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the
protectors; the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, implicitly renounced this high
office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national
subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands;
and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the
consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose the fulfillment of all these things
involved, in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the
Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very
closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government, though Christian, was not Roman
Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained
a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.
"In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of
the Treaty of Paris, which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of
the contracting parties to subrogate to the American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government
anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. the same
reasons that induced the Spanish government to take over such things would result in great
inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate
one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be
believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like the American.
(U.S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
"It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or
rather, the King of Spain, in this regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and
possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became impossible of fulfillment by the
cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the
contract has been cleared thereof."
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, is untenable for two reasons, (1) because such contention is based
upon the erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2)
because sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has already
been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was
given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose the relief of the earthquake sufferers and for no other
purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish
government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the sufferers. All officials,
including the King lands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in might have belonged to a certain church had
nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The
church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of theMonte
de Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question has been
founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-
general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their
civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the
right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See,
based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
"By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors
were persons in Spain, the trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the certuis que trustent,
were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed
and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being
the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it
certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris
are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the
consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust
under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than
doubtful. It follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who
could claim to be damages by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis
que trustent, and this Government is neither."
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel
say, transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan?
It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this
purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments
were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with
reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time these transactions took place, which are
the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. These
legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34).

The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish
Government and which were remitted to the Philippine government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by
the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1849, and article 2 of the instructions of April
27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the
Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that
Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervisions and control
over the monies thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The relief board had no
power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the
sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of
Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other charitable
purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were
necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above
mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to
defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the
donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds
wee applied to the purposes for which they were contributed. The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His
Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The
Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in
their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will thus be seen that those
governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the
Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or in other words, the present
Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled
principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change.
While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States
and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay
Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States
"all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity
with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not
included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in
our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that
the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations
incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will now inquire what effect this cession had
upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In
Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:
"That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded
region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character,
constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y
Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U.S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law that great body
of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or
changed by the new ruler."
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of
the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their United States, but if they are among "that great body of
municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they
have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and
character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government
the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present
sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the
general supervisions of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of the crown of Spain devolved upon
the United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Church vs. United States
(136 U.S., 1, 57), the court said:
"The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the
prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts the same force and effect."
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 How., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity
case, said:
"When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the
people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so far as they have delegated a
portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment.
The State as a sovereign, is the parens partiae."
Chancelor Kent says:
"In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens partiae, has the right to
enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public
interests, where no other person is entrusted with it." (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the
last quotations, said:
"This prerogative of parens partiae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which
are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction
of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves."
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein
the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the sale
of the estates of infants, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves,
said:
"These remarks in reference to infants, insane persons and persons not known, or not in being,
apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly look
for protection to the sovereign authority, acting asparens partiae. They show that this beneficent function
has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now
resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes
of justice and right, and is as clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
cases whatever."
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that
the Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct
right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the
Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right
but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the following
quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Young & C. C., 417):
"Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust,
it is the privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting,
on behalf on the public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found
effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it." (2 Kent's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on
Trusts, sec. 665; 1 Daniell's Chancery Practice, sec. 13; Perry on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damages by this payment to
the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donor or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently,
the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a
great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are
unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original
sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of
the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions
either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the
Government to against assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the
Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a
measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but
within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness
and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to
maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar
acts of humanity and Christian benevolences in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the court assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little
need be said for the reason that we have just held the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action.
The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it
undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July
1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the
$80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefore, there can be nothing in the
Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the
theory that the city, under its present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic
person, and liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different
corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old debt, said:
"The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city
is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights
of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities."
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined
to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action
had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon articles 1961, 1964 and 1969
and of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed
(a) because the defense off prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of
action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be
interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be
held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance
with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de
Piedad in June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it
was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative,
stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest.Act No. 2109 became
effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or
corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken
as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on
March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount.
(Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May
3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in
U.S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U.S., 120, 125), said:
"It is settled beyond doubt or controversy upon the foundation of the great principle of public
policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by
the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided that the United States,
asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless
Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound." (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666;
U.S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U.S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486;
Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U.S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Chouteau, supra, the court said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That
no laches can be imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common
law, and was founded on the was the maxim of the common law, and was founded on the principle of
public policy, that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officers and servants. The principle is applicable to all governments, which must
necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests and property
of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within
which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly
designated or the mischiefs to be remedies are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As
legislation of a State can only apply to persons and things over which the State has jurisdiction, the
United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.
In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:
"In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statutes of limitations do not as a
general rule run against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise
where the mischiefs to be remedies are of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included,
where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks
to enforce his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a
nominal party."
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and
prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust devolved upon
it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee
for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the
Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it
held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R.
Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not
run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see
also Atty. Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U.C.Q.B., 397].)
These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature
of things, applicable to the Philippine Government.
Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of
the judgment nor do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment
in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
||| (Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, G.R. No. 9959, [December 13, 1916], 35 PHIL 728-753)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009.]


ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner,vs.MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M.
HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 165636. April 29, 2009.]

ELISEO F. SORIANO,petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION


BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL
BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of the
Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA
CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA,
JR.,MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before
the MTRCB,respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR.,J p:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify
and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in
connection with certain utterances he made in his television show, Ang Dating Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m.,petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana
lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito. 1 ...
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), 2 against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner's
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. 3 Forthwith, the MTRCB
sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the
August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. 4 cDAISC
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3 (d) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. 5 The same order
also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing
the case. 6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw 7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, 8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive
suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano
liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his
program, "Ang Dating Daan".
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby
exonerated for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R.
No. 165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED
16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN ...IS NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;
(D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. 10
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ...CONSIDERING THAT:
I
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT
PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CURTAILING THE SAME;
CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND
OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER
2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; SEcADa
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER
THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE
MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E.,DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19
OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT
BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD
FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS
PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR],RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE
MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19
OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT
BENCH 11
G.R. No. 164785
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension,
although its implementability had already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed
September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioner's threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR
provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive
suspension.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory,
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. 12 They
have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. 13 And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. 14
A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority,
albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is
necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the ...production,
...exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether living or dead;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the ...production, copying, distribution,
sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by
the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be ...produced, copied,
reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
xxx xxx xxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the
purposes and objectives of this Act ....(Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority and functions
expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3 (d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to
"supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the . . . exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be . . . exhibited and/or
broadcast by television".
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB's express regulatory and
supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such
mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. 15 And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to
investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the
complaint. 16 ECaTDc
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986.
The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of
the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD
1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER. Any time during the pendency of the case, and in order
to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board
may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive ...suspension of the permit/permits
involved, and/or closure of the ...television network, cable TV station ...provided that the
temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date
of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to
deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among
others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations
as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed
pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB's duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of
whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely
formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3 (c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCB's assailed
action. Petitioner's restrictive reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law,
would give the agency little leeway to operate, stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3 (k) of PD 1986 clearly
intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec. 3 (k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise
such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this
Act . . .." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished
from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by
necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. 17 As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general
grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the
performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 18 Clearly, the power to impose preventive
suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioner's assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is
applicable only to motion pictures and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB's authority extends beyond motion
pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as much. And while the law makes specific reference to
the closure of a television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less punitive measure that can be
undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioner's argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of
lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice,
appeared before that Board for a hearing on private respondents' complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the
order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing, 19 proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB.
Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny time during the pendency of
the case". In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD
1986 20 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. 21
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. 22
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing
to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioner's position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons subject to
legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed". 23 It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. 24 Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not
facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV
programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB's disciplinary action. If the
immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to
answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor
the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts
of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether or
not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech,
adding that words like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5,
Article III of the1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights. TcEaDS
There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner's attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His
claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating
Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept
that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended
to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension
order, being, as insisted, an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an
impermissible prior restraint. The main issue tendered respecting the adverted violation and the arguments holding such
issue dovetails with those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under the assailed September 27, 2004
MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues and arguments shall be jointly
addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three
months on the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3 (c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons
articulated in this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts and
principles underlying the freedom of speech and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come within the
broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. 25 Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence
in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech
protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. 26 Just as
settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat
of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition,
or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. 27 The freedom
of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be regulated to
some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits
of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern. 28 In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to
give immunity for every possible use of language". 29 From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express
one's sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any
sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others". 30
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 31 "there are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech that are harmful, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems". In net effect, some forms of speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that
restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the freedom of speech clause. 32 A speech
would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality". 33 Being of little or no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them, no
imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test, they being
essentially modes of weighing competing values, 34 or, with like effect, determining which of the clashing interests
should be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value
expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or
"fighting words",i.e.,those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and
expression endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioner's statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in
formulating a definition ofobscenity that would apply to all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on
the matter:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it
would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in
determining what is "patently offensive"....What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for
judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge's sound
discretion. 35
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California, 36 a patently offensive utterance would
come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying
contemporary standards. HAaDTE
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an
average adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga ...,masahol ka pa sa putang babae ....Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but
merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they
were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that
they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach
even the eyes and ears of children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly
be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of
petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a
female prostitute",a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal
meaning, missing the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, "ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba", making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating
that Sandoval was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and
ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why
Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of
the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech
as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In
this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner's words, when speaking of the average person
in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average child may not have
the adult's grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may
convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and
its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner's utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the
umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioner's remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules
that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a
medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected
speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern
involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first
impression, it being the first time that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its
regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica
Foundation, 37 a 1978 American landmark case cited inEastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr. 38 and Chavez v.
Gonzales, 39 is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient
appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was made,
irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be categorized as
unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words 40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist
later aired in the afternoon over a radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard
the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son, FCC declared the language used as "patently
offensive" and "indecent" under a prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added, however, that its
declaratory order was issued in a "special factual context",referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when
children were undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject
utterance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to wit:
(1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. The US Court, however,
hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts, albeit it did not expound and identify
a compelling state interest in putting FCC's content-based regulatory action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez 41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that
is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the
expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under
well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression.
Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying
factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw
Katigbak, 42 easily "reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown";second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a
reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general
patronage" rated program. Under Sec. 2 (A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
"[s]uitable for all ages",meaning that the "material for television ...in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain
anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision".The words
petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioner's utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as
unprotected speech. aEcTDI
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, 43 false or misleading
advertisement, 44advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is
not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be
stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court
has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet
another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our
children. As unprotected speech, petitioners utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his
utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty
to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent. 45
Petitioner's invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests,
would not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first
formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject
to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit. 46 Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press
is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and
other crimes involving the overthrow of government. 47 It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should
be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences
on the security and public order of the community. 48 The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this
jurisdiction. 49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a
magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy
of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. 50 As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the
clear and present danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums". 51
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts.
Generally, said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not
clearly undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court,
however, in several cases Ayer Productions v. Capulong 52 and Gonzales v. COMELEC, 53 applied the balancing of
interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his Separate Opinion
that "where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more
generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific
danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation", 54 then the "balancing of interests" test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an
indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. ...We
must, therefore, undertake the "delicate and difficult task ...to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights ....
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual
interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the
basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-interests" test which has found application in more
recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the
individual's freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be judged
in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions",a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in
ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and importance of the
specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the
restriction,i.e.,whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are few; (c)
the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation the reference
here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific
restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public
interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom. 55
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, 56 rests on the theory that it is the court's
function in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression
clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight
shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it
outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests
theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and
expression clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. 57 To
the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow. ASIDTa
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was
slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of
speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to
free speech, the Court rules that the government's interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the
children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner's prayer to continue as
program host of Ang Dating Daanduring the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or
expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be
difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to
recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide
protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on
youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall "extend social
protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster racial,
religious or other forms of discrimination". 58
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of
neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents,
through regulatory mechanisms, protect their children's minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting
experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field
of nation-building. 59 In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character. 60
Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily
accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday
use. As such, the welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens
patriae, 61 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner's utterances in TV
broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who, because of age
or interest capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen's written
message, ["Fuck the Draft"],might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast
could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be
withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture
theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held
in Ginsberg v. New York that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting
"parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the
concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the
young:
...It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television
reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly
the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied
though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of
the young. 62
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow
confines of the case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following
considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently
offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3) the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan program. And in agreeing
with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a
two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan
comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction.
...The [FFC's] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all important. The
concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC].The
content of the program in which the language is used will affect the composition of the audience ....As Mr.
Justice Sutherland wrote a 'nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard'.We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly
indecent if not outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB
of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate
and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or
offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a "pig
in the parlor".Public interest would be served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed from the
"parlor".ADEacC
Ergo, petitioner's offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that,
however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction
or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional
breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast
censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial
effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
(now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV
program. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or
television broadcast.
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows, even
religious programs, was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, the Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that
the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. ...
xxx xxx xxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [ PD 1986] is unconstitutional
for Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs
and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this setup
in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz.:
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in
order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they
please, regardless of its character." 63
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television
programs or parts of either are fit for public consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people",and what "tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition",or "tend to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their government and/or duly constituted authorities",etc. Moreover,
its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court. 64
Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 65 it was held that the power of review and prior
approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit
before they air their television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of speech is subject to that
requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga, government regulations through the MTRCB became "a
necessary evil" with the government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations
explicitly agreed to this regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as
competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each other's signals. In this scheme, station owners and broadcasters in
effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of speech in radio and television programs and
impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint denial of permit or subsequent punishment, like
suspension or cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the
broadcast ofAng Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the
suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and
obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the
imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3 (i) of PD 1986 and the
remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if applicable.
As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent broadcasting does not
constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioner's exercise of his
freedom of speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G" rated TV program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to
regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly
accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.
Neither can petitioner's virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly
treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an
intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible
cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of
the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its proper
context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program; it does not bar
future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should
not be confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB, 66 sustained the power of
the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in
violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986. IcDHaT
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to
regulate and even restrain the prime-time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a "G" rated program is
not acceptable. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting
is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media".The MTRCB, as a regulatory
agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be effective if its punitive actions would be
limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with
which they can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary
action. The suspension of a violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for
those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of petitioner's television program is justified, and does not constitute
prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times, and craft jurisprudence
to reflect these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very law creating the
MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as applied to him, infringes also upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier
adequately explained why petitioner's undue reliance on the religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an
exempting dimension to his licentious utterances in his program. The Court sees no need to address anew the repetitive
arguments on religious freedom. As earlier discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what was
uttered was in no way a religious speech. Parenthetically, petitioner's attempt to characterize his speech as a legitimate
defense of his religion fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing evidently as an afterthought
that this was his method of refuting the alleged distortion of his statements by the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But
on the night he uttered them in his television program, the word simply came out as profane language, without any
warning or guidance for undiscerning ears.
As to petitioner's other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection of the law, suffice
it to state that we have at length debunked similar arguments in G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into
the fact that petitioner was afforded due process when he attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable
to demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB proceedings.
Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not
provide for the range of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that
local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction
has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may
be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. 67
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner's protestation about
undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for
violation of the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule
of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms of the law.
Petitioner's posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that PD
1986 does not prescribe the imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier
indicated, however, the MTRCB, by express and direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and
regulating, granting, denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures,
television programs, and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures, programs, and materials shall be
exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3 (k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB
"to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives
of [the law]". As earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a
meaningless grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to
the offense committed, charged, and proved. As the Court said in Chavez v. National Housing Authority: cDSAEI
...[W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. ...[W]hen the statute does not
specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power
vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
function. 68
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of
TV programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought
to be enforced. And would it not be logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV
program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference, provides that
agency with the power "[to] promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of
this Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives . . . ". And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
Section 1.VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS. Without prejudice to the immediate
filing of the appropriate criminal action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to
Section 13, any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations governing
motion pictures, television programs, and related promotional materials shall be penalized with
suspension or cancellation of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the
imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties. The Board recognizes the existing Table of
Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need
arises. In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be enforced.
(Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of
Sec. 3 (d) and (k).Contrary to what petitioner implies, the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the
law or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to
regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the public.
In Sec. 3 (c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be
applied to determine whether there have been statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television
programs, and publicity materials "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard", and, from there,
determine whether these audio and video materials "are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, [etc.] . . ." and apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide
for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute. 69 The grant of the rule-making power to administrative
agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative
powers. 70 Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law". 71 Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room
in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of
an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently
regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its
decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor
in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the
program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may
prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not suspend television
personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond
what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD
1986 will be considered to be within the decree's penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable
doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought.
Thus, the MTRCB's decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the subsequent order
issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on which
petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts
obtaining call for.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute
permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without
adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We
repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be
greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid.
This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully
scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified,
the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of THREE
(3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant
petition.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are
hereby exonerated for lack of evidence. DIEAHc
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 165636, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 43-193)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.]

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate
and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of
Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as
taxpayers: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION,
CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in
their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization;
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Abelardo T . Domondon for petitioners.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL, SUBJECT TO WAIVER. The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because
this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively, waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any
event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than
the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel.
2.ID.; ID.; PARTIES; LOCUS STANDI; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that
the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of
such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be
met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.
3.ID.; ID.; PETITION SEEKING TO NULLIFY ACT OF SENATE ON GROUND THAT IT CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTION, A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide."
4.ID.; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER; SCOPE. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in
the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality, of the government." The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality, of government including Congress. It is an innovation
in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously, as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
5.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; APPROPRIATE REMEDIES TO
REVIEW ACTS OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials.
6.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; AIDS OR GUIDES IN THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of
principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,
the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
7.ID.; ID.; THOUGH IT MANDATES A BIAS IN FAVOR OF FILIPINO GOODS, SERVICES, LABOR AND ENTERPRISES, IT
RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR BUSINESS EXCHANGE WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. While the
Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
8.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; JOINING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NOT A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." GATT has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived
of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion simply because we disagree
with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only, perform
its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
9.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; POLICY OF "SELF-
RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY" DOES NOT RULE OUT ENTRY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS,
GOODS AND SERVICES. The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not
necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor
"mendicancy in the international community."
10.POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; WORLD TRADE LAW ORGANIZATION/GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE; RELIANCE ON "MOST FAVORED NATIONS", CONSTITUTIONAL. The WTO reliance on "most
favored nation", "national treatment", and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact
they are rules of equality and reciprocity, that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocal", the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers
and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

11.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; QUESTIONS INVOLVING "JUDGMENT CALLS", NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will WTO/GATT succeed in
promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters expand the country's exports and
generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for
which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto
are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
12.POLITICAL LAW; SOVEREIGNTY; SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO BY
THE STATE; CASE AT BAR. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be
performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and
shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action." Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and
multilateral that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of
its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the
Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION; PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE 34 OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS AND
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(TRIPS); DOES NOT INTRUDE ON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES ON
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES. Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 (Process Patents: Burden of
Proof) of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. A WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the
contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the
said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of
evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of
proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product was made by the patented process. Moreover, it should
be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by
the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two
provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our
disposition of the third issue derogation of a legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that
the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustments in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MINISTERIAL DECLARATION AND DECISIONS AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES, NOT SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE. "A final act, sometimes called protocol
de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by
the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a
protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet
"to give effect to those provision of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also
approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their
respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial
service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business."
16.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; RESORT THERETO ON GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AVAILABLE ONLY WHERE THERE IS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW. Procedurally. a writ ofcertiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
17.ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty, enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.
18.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of
two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using
the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's
processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of
the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at
least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike
down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably,
what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that
our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries, has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly
propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as
mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the
words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the
key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." prll
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks
and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-
ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency
problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world
trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a
variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing
access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the
Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World Trade Organization with the signing
of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1 1a 1b 1c
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . ., (the reduction of) costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting . . ., and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession
will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly
through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where
naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization
of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and
resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
"(a)to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b)to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of
the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant toSection 21, Article VII of the Constitution." cdta
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a
resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the
Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal
instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
"ANNEX I
Annex 1A:Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B:General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C:Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual


Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism"
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
"NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15
April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof."
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and
"the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral
parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral
annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two
latter documents as follows:

"The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of
WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on
dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence
and new financial service." cdti
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners'
reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed
their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity,
(1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
"(a)the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b)the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to
the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2)
copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as
possible."
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance
dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral
treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted
their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
"A.Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B.Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading
to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization or of the validity or of the concurrence.
C.Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
D.Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict
and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article
VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is 'vested in the Congress of the Philippines';
E.Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the
exercise of judicial power.
F.Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-
infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G.Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which
included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners
into the following": 10
"1.Whether or not the provisions of the 'Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement' cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2.Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
3.Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4.Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate 'in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization' implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act."
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively
ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether
petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit;
and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence
in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues
thus: cdt
(1)The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction
of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first
issue;
(2)The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively
waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not
cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of
estoppel; and
(3)The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part
of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners.
Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional
issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than
skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1)DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES
THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION?
(2)DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE
SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3)DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR
THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4)DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5)WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, 15 as follows:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature."

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. LibLex
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions
raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision
of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only
exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are
violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO
Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
Constitution, which are worded as follows:
"Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19.The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12.The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive."
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their
memorandum: 19
"a)In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
"Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1.Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. No Member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2.An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
"ANNEX
Illustrative List
1.TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a)the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its
local production; or
(b)that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount
related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. LLjur
2.TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a)the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production
that it exports;
(b)the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production
by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise;
or
(c)the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its
local production." (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis
supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which
are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II,
and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1 (a) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.
177, emphasis supplied).
"b)In the area of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . . (par. 1,
Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
"(c)In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1.In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein,
each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of
all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
2.A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3.Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies
the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared
to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied)."
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos."
The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines
as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations
on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing
and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not
be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that
read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains
sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization. LLphil
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in
the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to
implement them, thus:
"On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
'In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and
to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article,
the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure
with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2)."
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:
"My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
'Section 1.. . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.' (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as 'the right to a balanced and healthy ecology' and 'the right to
health' are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as 'a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction,' the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene." cdasia
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1
and 13 thereof which read:
"Section 1.The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13.The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity."
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1.A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2.A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3.An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference
in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State
to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held
that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision
itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here
is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are
enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council. aisadc
"WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of
the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote.
Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals." 33

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
"The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral
trading system, . . ." (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the
rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in
terms of the amount of tariff reductionand the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT
requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries including the Philippines arerequired to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products
by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays
for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For
developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a
longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-
dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived
of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we
disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It
will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion. cdtai
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the
international community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
"Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities." 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy oflaissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the
other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether
WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters
expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the
Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does
not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent
of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a
diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events.
They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that
a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of
change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
"The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base
and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape,
not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly 'in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,'
where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance.
In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society
it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation." cdtech

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power


The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking
"unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the
Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and
general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . .
but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters . . ." 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such
limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member
of the family of nations. Unquestionably,the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest
of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.44 One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they
also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of
international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign
rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give
the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such
assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for
the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice
held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the
United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding
share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty
of members within their own territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the
Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the
present charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the sovereign power to make
a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor. cda
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and multilateral
that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, as follows:
"(a)Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed,
among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt
from income tax by the Philippines.
(b)Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income.
(c)Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d)Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e)Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs
duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular
equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f)Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs
duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating
oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g)Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the
same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service
agreements.
(h)Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted
Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the
Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i)Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit
and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j)Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without
consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs
duties, taxes and related charges.
(k)Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l)Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes
concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and
its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

"International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law
of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external
obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we
accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss
of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined
substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of
potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller country's market."48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations." casia
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
"Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1.For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to
in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an
identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one
of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the
patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the
patented process:
(a)if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b)if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of
the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2.Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the
alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3.In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account."
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the
contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the
said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of
evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical
product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the
genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
"SEC. 60.Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the
article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design
or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying." (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the
product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made
by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where
either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue derogation of legislative power
will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents
referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the
document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that
the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the
subject of concurrence of the Senate. cdt
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a)to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b)to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories,
namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the
ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to
those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and
furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It
applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill,
elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free
transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and
refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral
parts, 58 as follows:

"Article II
Scope of the WTO
1.The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2.The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred
to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3.The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
"Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted
them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4.The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as
"GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October
1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on
August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day
hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was
submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final
act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to
withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable.
That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for
Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new. . . is he making a new submission
which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding,
it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones
that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to
the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the
World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him
Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I
saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the
Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the
Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to
with the governments of the participants. prcd
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
'By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO
Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view of seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.'
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification
or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade
Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the
Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had
been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the
same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on
this?
SEN. LINA, Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the
abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have
no further comment to make."
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's
constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally,
a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 61Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive
arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of theConstitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and
locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not
in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied
upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations. cdasia
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent
and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion
to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial
or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East
will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the
"free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against
possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not
economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the
crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.


||| (Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, [May 2, 1997], 338 PHIL 546-606)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008.]

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN


and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the
latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183752. October 14, 2008.]

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor


of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA.
ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO,
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity
as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183893. October 14, 2008.]

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his
capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or
SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183951. October 14, 2008.]

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON.


ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his
capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA
JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS,
Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON.
FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS,
HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON.
JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON.
ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by
HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the
Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183962. October 14, 2008.]

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL,
represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.

SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioner-in-intervention.

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioner-
in-intervention.

THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-


AKBAR, petitioner-in-intervention.
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his
capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-
intervention.

RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao
Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.

CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and


RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.

MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.

MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC. (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.

MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-


intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the
facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-
standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly
delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to
the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive
precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I.FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of
their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it
splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of
what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations. 1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. IECcaA
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the
two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace
Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among
others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with
sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. 2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March
2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada
declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. cHDaEI
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the
government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with
deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to
seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. 4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the
parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the
GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. 5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard
to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by
the Parties in their next meeting".
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the
parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of
the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by
Mohagher Iqbal. 6 ISCHET
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the
draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
II.STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument the MOA-AD
which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and
183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain. 7 and the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 183591, forMandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. 9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition. 11 filed
by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise
pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the
Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and
void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public
respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. 13 The Court also required the
Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, 14 to which she
complied. 15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan 16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893,
praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing
the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as respondent. HSDCTA
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, 17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-
Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on
August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter
alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, 20 docketed
as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for
being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners hereinadditionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel
represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention.
Petitioners-in-intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel
Tamano, the City of Isabela 21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. Suharto
Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo
tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers
Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed
their respective Comments-in-Intervention. aIHSEc
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the
petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly
review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the
cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:
1.Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i)insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the
final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii)insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is
considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2.Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3.Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the
MOA vis- -vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4.Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;
5.Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself ACcISa
a)to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b)to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c)to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;
6.Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the
projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7.Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines. 24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their
memoranda on time.
III.OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-
intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an
overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP
and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace
Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of
President Fidel Ramos. TICAcD
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international law instruments the ILO
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration
on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime
of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the
nature of a treaty device".
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was
the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic
laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were
outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the
Islamic world became part of the international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations,
the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to
describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact)
and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and
cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land
of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained
freedom of religion for Muslims. 28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-
sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government the Philippines being the
land of compact and peace agreement that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as
"any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for
a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]". 29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS", and starts with its main
body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.
A.CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as 'Bangsamoros'". It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendantswhether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. 30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro", as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only " Moros" as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. ICTaEH
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland", the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. 32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain. 33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on
ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku
Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the
elements of a nation-state in the modern sense. 34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the
sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically
in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent
principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others. 35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the 'First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations".
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as
Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation", hence, all of them are
usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations". 36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro
people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation departs from the Canadian usage
of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. 37 ADaECI
B.TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. 38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM thus constituting the
following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core
also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. 39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two
categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates,
years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months
following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas", on the other hand, are
to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement the Comprehensive
Compact. 41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its
"internal waters", defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also
have "territorial waters", which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
"Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. 43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint".
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the
BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement. 44 The activities which the
Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of
natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety
measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to
the internal waters of the BJE.
C.RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries
and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however,
are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation
agreements. 46 ACcaET
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is
also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain. 47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel,
mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within
its territorial jurisdiction". This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so
requires", the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both
Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25
in favor of the BJE. 49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their
territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever
restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. 50 STDEcA
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions,
Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land
tenure instrumentsgranted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM. 51
D.GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of
the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms
and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the
third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. 52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as " associative", characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial,
and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon
signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-
derogation of prior agreementsand within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As
will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial
and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. AIaDcH
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal,
Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of
the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties", meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and
not merely of the negotiating panels. 53In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY"
Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed
Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process
in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP
and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the
Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and
barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.
IV.PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A.RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. 55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to
actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial
determination. 58 CEHcSI
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 59 For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. 61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions,
reasoning that:
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative
enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put,
the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon
issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases.
Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly
violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated
steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived
injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere
conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites 63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxx xxx xxx
2.Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxx xxx xxx
d.Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to
conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months
following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in
the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex
constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties
shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the
Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-
AD. caTESD
xxx xxx xxx
GOVERNANCE
xxx xxx xxx
7.The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall
be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively. CASTDI
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes
to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the
stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64(Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre, 65 this Court held:
. . . [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. DEaCSA
xxx xxx xxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws . . . settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication,
even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on
its face. 68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United
States, 69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not
to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the
provision's consequences. 70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by
law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition,
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 73 Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28,
2001. 75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic
approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process . . . be governed by this
Executive Order". 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without
consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed
in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that
"any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework", implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed
in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties
under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus,and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a
branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 77 HSIDTE
B.LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions". 78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary
question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of. 80When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has
an interest in the execution of the laws. 81 EaHcDS
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an
illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. 82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit. 83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office. 84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe
it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the
other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention, . 88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has
exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside,
the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of
the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus
standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion
given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure. 91 ScHADI
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del
Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-
intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the
direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be
included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM
which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as
citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage
of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de
Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at
hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would
be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone,
they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable
transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to
enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a
genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the
requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a
member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and
taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin
Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court
exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues
at hand. ECaAHS
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice
and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated.
Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B.MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by
petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court
ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA". 92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the
GRP Peace Panel. 93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; 97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it
does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot
especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the
violation. 93 SICDAa
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds
cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of
Batangas v. Romulo 100and Manalo v. Calderon 101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening
events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due
to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points", especially given
itsnomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-
reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points", foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect
necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect .
Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-
going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been
rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,101 the manifestation that it will not be signed
as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel notwithstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the
country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject
to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the
Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government
and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. 103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately
constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole".
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled
was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual
relation between two parties the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific
government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing
exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the
controversy. ATcaID
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli
Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such
component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian,
Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated
that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]", mootness will not
set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic
provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an
agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured", it
is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral
Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v.
Reyes 104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness,
"provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of
their issuance". They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be
invoked. DHSEcI
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No.
183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition
as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. 105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction
over most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what
it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the
Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and
the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable
of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of
August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too,
intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V.SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one
relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz.:
1.Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2.Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article
III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7.The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, 108 Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a
right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. SaHTCE
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, 110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.
. . . The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection
for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases." . . . 111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital
issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a
well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no serious challenge.
In fact,respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. 115 In previous cases, the Court found that the
regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the
various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used
to grant loans to public officials, 119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list
nominees, 121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is
of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the
lives of the public at large. ACcHIa
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of
the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has
categorically ruled:
. . . [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction". Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right
to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if
one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in
the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of
Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis and italics
in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry" 123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28.Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. 125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy. 126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials
at all times accountable to the people. 127 DcaCSE
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ.
And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until
after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE.
I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will
have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as
having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress
to implement?
MR. OPLE.
Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner
Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be
provided by law".
MR. DAVIDE.
But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide
for reasonable safeguardson the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE.
Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate
of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law
revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this
policy. 129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress
cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards". The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader 130 right to information on
matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving
public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. SDHAEC
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin
rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID.
Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government
provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the
existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the
government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational
mechanisms.
MR. OPLE.
Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a
message and a feedback, both ways.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also
network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a
matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and
voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be
another OMA in the making. 132 (Emphasis supplied) ScCEIA
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to
respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace
agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there
is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the
people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting
the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by
the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community". 134 Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes " continuing consultations
on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of
people's participation in the peace process". 135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations,
contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation". 136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process". 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and
seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels,
on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives". 138 aTADcH
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave
abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority , and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however,
require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President. 139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of
petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of
E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from
superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument
defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on
both national and local levels.The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the
GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions . 141 It bears emphasis
that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through
dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of
the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution,
without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex
abundante ad cautelam. ESTDcC
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions" 142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed
policy:
Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, 144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only
to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and
projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented . 145 The MOA-AD is
one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, 146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein
by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate
fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an
instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said
Act, 148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is
the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In
proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of
the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the
heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance
suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be
discussed in the following section. TcSHaD
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them. 149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated
under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court,
and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of
its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions
therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that
framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go
beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE,
however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-
AD, namely, the international lawconcept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe
the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. aTCAcI
4.The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall
be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined
powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established
in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government
and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD
by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. cdrep
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence. . . . 150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly
part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a
Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S.,
yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was
confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct
foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources,
trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is
obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards
as relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and
obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of
establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military
personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international
association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated
nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has
been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American
model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence. 152 ACTISE
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former
colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as
a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since
become independent states. 153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover,
the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not
recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution
to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. caTIDE
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SEC. 1.The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SEC. 15.There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, 154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and
a capacity to enter into relations with other states. AEITDH
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region". (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
"autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under
paragraph 2 (c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2 (d) and 2 (e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast
to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and
the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE. ScCIaA
The MOA-AD, moreover, would
not comply with Article X, Section
20 of the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SEC. 20.Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1)Administrative organization;
(2)Creation of sources of revenues;
(3)Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4)Personal, family, and property relations;
(5)Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6)Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7)Educational policies;
(8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment
that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of
said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-
AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation
vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which
states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines . . . ." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary 155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President
has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CIHAED
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement
does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE
and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice,
has generally been a preparation for independence,is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the
Constitution, the MOA-AD is also
inconsistent with prevailing
statutory law, among which are
R.A. No. 9054 156 or the Organic
|Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. 157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro
people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES states:
1.It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and
be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be
respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cHAaCE
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which,
rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao,
clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens
residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a)Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sectors of the national community; and
(b)Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some
or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The
MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure .
By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region".
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions
thereof:
SEC. 52.Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:
xxx xxx xxx
b)Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP
with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the
NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; CSaIAc
c)Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office
upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination
with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and
participation by the members of the communities concerned;
d)Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or
community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which
shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution; ISaCTE
3)Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds,
sacred places and old villages;
4)Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the
ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5)Survey plans and sketch maps;
6)Anthropological data;
7)Genealogical surveys;
8)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks,
ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10)Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e)Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;
f)Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the preliminary census and a
report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g)Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of
the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days.
A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the
NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from
date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting
in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; aCTADI
h)Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a
claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds
for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases
where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain
claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them
in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the section below.
xxx xxx xxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of
not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution states that the
Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land".
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 158 held that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a
detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the
Court in Agustin v. Edu 159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples", understood not merely as the entire
population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to
unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC 160 had
occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international
conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond 'convention' and is considered a general principle of
international law".
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue
of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development". DICSaH
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A
distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii)Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126.The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination a people's pursuit of its political,
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right
to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a
right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under
carefully defined circumstances. . . .
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra,as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis
added) HDAaIS
127.The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support
the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the
conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing
state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise,
namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and
less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right
to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the
same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and
pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and
judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. 163 There, Sweden
presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be
authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the
kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three
jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely
left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
. . . [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national
territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law
does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of
which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of
other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a
portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other
method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively
constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions
therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of
one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a
State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be
contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State", but would also endanger the interests of the
international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it
be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) DHTCaI
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by
international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated
above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands
agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of
Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the
formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the
Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the
capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two
opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively
constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a
portion of its population the option to separate itself a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to
their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as
international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land
(spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as
"indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise
stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler
societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous
peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples", indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law, 165 but they do have rights amounting to what was
discussed above as the right tointernal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the
Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to
autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. TAHCEc
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic,
social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as
equivalent to "internal self-determination". 166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more
particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1.Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture.
2.States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a)Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b)Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories
or resources;
(c)Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or
undermining any of their rights;
(d)Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e)Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination
directed against them.
Article 21
1.Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and
social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training
and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. SHCaDA
2.States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the
rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with
disabilities.
Article 26
1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2.Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as
well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3.States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure
systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. ScCIaA
Article 30
1.Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by
a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples
concerned.
2.States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through
appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using
their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1.Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2.States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources. CEHcSI
3.States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social,
cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and
to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements.
2.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous
peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures,
including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. EScIAa
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying
customary international law a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here the obligations enumerated
therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the
particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in
scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and
internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples
against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the
protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then
surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the
UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it
upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. IDTSEH
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are
qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it
would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone
would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that
the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of
the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: AcSIDE
7.The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD
shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into
force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to
be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the
provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad
enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the
provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already
violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall
be conducted in accordance with . . . the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines". (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing. HDAaIS
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is
invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5 (c), which
states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to
be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions
with rebel groups". These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress
of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with
the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the
components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace", is the
pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec.
4 (a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3 (a), of E.O. No. 125, 167 states: HSEcTC
SEC. 4.The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the
processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They
shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a.PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves
the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects
aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest.
This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional
amendments.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision
of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box", so to
speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political
reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require
new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause", however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked AIcaDC
whether the President herself may
exercise the power delegated to the
GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3,
Sec. 4 (a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace
negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the
reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
discussion of HIEAcC
the extent of the President's power
to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 168 in issue was the
authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion an authority which is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the
Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor.
The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers
of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for
the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. cEITCA
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers
as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. . .
. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely
attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the
nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
. . . [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any
post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years,
conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is
undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to
succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover,
a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political
and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision
of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace
agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate. 170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that
the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking
them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less
than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172 is the framers'
intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the
MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur
Misuari. aTIEcA
MR. ROMULO.
There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if
they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it
is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question
is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?
MR. OPLE.
May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain
definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with
respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no
question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the
fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
policy. 173 (Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters,
been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the
Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve
lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace
negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if
resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. DAaIEc
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be
prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant
to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant
to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people,
call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for constitutional
change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, 174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for
constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the
1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the
interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled
the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional
amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at
present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which
was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent, 175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit
proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the
President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his
proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines
and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the
constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it
follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments
directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power
is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." 176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President in the course of conducting peace
negotiations may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she
may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that
body were assumed as a certainty. TEAaDC
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative
and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted
on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these
recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any
further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine
"people's initiative". The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the
Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC: 177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the 'people's voice'. However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that 'ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms'. The Lambino Group thus admits that their 'people's'
initiative is an 'unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of 'people's voice' or 'sovereign will' in
the present initiative." SEcITC
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits
to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as
an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority
to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to
propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the
Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on
the budget prepared by the President, which for all intents and purposes is a proposal for new legislation coming from
the President. 179
The "suspensive clause" in the
MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite . The most she
could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are
vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework". This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition defined in
civil law as a future anduncertain event but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will be effected, butwhen. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the
paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact".
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
contemplated in the MOA-AD which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears
noting that, TSHcIa
By the time these changes are put in
place, the MOA-AD itself would be
counted among the "prior
agreements" from which there
could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these
"consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down asunconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace
agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a
three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the
Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or
repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region
envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial
difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the
legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions
[on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing
law". cHECAS
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of
the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding
agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community
that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In
addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily
lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed.
An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION: LOM ACCORD AMNESTY 180 (the Lom Accord case) of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between
the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone
Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting
signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of
West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government,
another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was
established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of
Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. AETcSa
Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to
prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign
dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this
argument, ruling that the Lome Accord isnot a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the
parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international
court like it of jurisdiction.
"37.In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume
and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants
seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the
document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their
representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement
of the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. cHITCS
xxx xxx xxx
40.Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of
the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who
are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any
obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
41.In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which
has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state.
The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the
principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is
implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors
assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended,
presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be
implemented as not including certain international crimes.
42.An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law
which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither
rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such
as the Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt
creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting
through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an
international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as
distinguished from municipal, law.A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting
in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the
Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with
possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such
consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the
situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot
be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed
conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed
conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lom
Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. . . ." (Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied) AHSaTI
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties
to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State,
binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have
to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v.
France, 181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). EcIaTA
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific.
France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French
officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to
dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international
community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in
issuing its public statements, viz.:
43.It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and
often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it
should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the
character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any
subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is
required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with
the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was
made.
44.Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain
position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound the intention
is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act .When States make statements by which their
freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. cCSTHA
xxx xxx xxx
51.In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention
effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take
note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements
and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the
security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in
the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from
the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act
must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to
the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an
undertaking possessing legal effect.The Court considers *270 that the President of the
Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to
the international community to which his words were addressed. . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as
a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect
to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise
only in peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina
Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a
statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to
be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina
Faso. CaASIc
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal
implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French
declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40.In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the
factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the
Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at
the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that
Government's unilateral declarations had 'conveyed to the world at large, including the
Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests' (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269,
para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French
Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral
declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated
solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its
conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here,
there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the
binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation
Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since
no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are
no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a
unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being
bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and
international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they
participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact
that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international
organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. HaAIES
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would
not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among
States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already
discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case,
there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest
that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of
a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication
that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering
into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international
community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement
with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to
be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration
under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents'
almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign
Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process. aTIAES
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the
sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in
international law, is known asJus Cogens. 184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping
with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and
academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. EDcICT
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or
another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in
providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II
of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. HcaATE
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public
consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society. AIHECa
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to
consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents
effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for
judicial compliance and public scrutiny.ISCDEA
IN SUM, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will
not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-
AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws
will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that
process. ScaEIT
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that
renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE
and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is
declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION. DTSO ORDERED.
||| (Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, [October 14, 2008], 589 PHIL 387-732)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-49. November 12, 1945.]


WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
William F. Peralta, in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Taada, for respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag, as amicus curiae.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SO-CALLED


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. As the so-called Republic of the
Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), the questions involved in the present
case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government, because the belligerent
occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said
territory (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate
States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of
another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the
usages of nations.
2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND EXCLUSIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had the
power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to
whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with the duty of
applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not
depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of
the creation of the court in question.
3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT. With respect to the
summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of
the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent
occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure,
so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his
army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity
and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not
violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less
objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than
the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in
continental Europe.
4. VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES. It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the
crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of
war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of
occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons
charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and
other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those
provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the
territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by
Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the
belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other
necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did,
and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art LII, sec.
III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial
notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.
5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BY SAID ACT NO. 65 AND ORDINANCE NO. 7
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The crimes penalized by Act No.
65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes against public order,
penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all
political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against
the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION, AFTER
REOCCUPATION OR LIBERATION. The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the
military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (Hall's International Law,
seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part Ii, War, pp. 97, 98; Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh
edition, 1944, p. 245.)
Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:
7. ORDINANCE NO. 7 NULLIFIED BY OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. Ordinance No. 7 issued by President
Laurel, of the "Republic of the Philippines" under the Japanese regime, was nullified by the proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944.
8. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. The October Proclamation was issued by General MacArthur in
keeping with the official statement issued by the President of the United States of October 23, 1943, denying
recognition or sympathy to the collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic."
9. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Ordinance No. 7 is incompatible with the
fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern
nations, and can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and
political atmosphere of the era of darkness.
10. WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE. The provisions of Ordinance no. 7 as to issuance of search
warrants are repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense of right
which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3), of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the
Constitution of the Philippines, search warrants should be issued only by a judge.
11. HABEAS CORPUS Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus,
is violative of one of the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution of the Philippines.
12. SELF-INCRIMINATION The criminal procedure authorized by Ordinance No. 7, in relation with Executive
Order No. 157, is violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
13. REVOLTING PROCEDURE. The procedure provided under Ordinance No. 7 is so revolting, so
nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes real courage to keep one's equanimity when analyzing it. It is
beyond comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure,
which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.
14. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD BE RETAINED JEALOUSY It is
necessary to be careful to retain jealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It was acquired as a
result of protests against all inquisitorial and third degree procedure.
15. THIRD DEGREE PROCEDURES. We must not forget that even during normal times, under the twentieth
century lights, just before the last global war started, in America and in the Philippines, it was heard not rarely
denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had
to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under
consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means.
16. EVERYBODY'S SECURITY JEOPARDIZED. Even with the existence of the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination, there are officers of the law who cannot resist the temptation of using their power to compel,
through third degree methods, innocent of guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow
changes tending to nullify the protection against self- incrimination, and no man, however innocent be may be, shall be
secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.

17. APPEAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ACCUSED. Under the provisions of the Constitution of
the Philippines (Art. VIII, sec. 2), the right of appeal has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights of all
accused in the Philippines.
18. ID., REASONS OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. The drafters of our Constitution, taught
by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable
human weaknesses. To reduce to the minimum the effects of such innate human weakness, they provided n our
fundamental law that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused.
19. INSTRUMENTALITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. The Supreme Court is just one of the
instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. It is one of the means considered necessary to
better serve the supreme interest of the people.
20. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ABRIDGED. The summary procedure in criminal cases under
Ordinance No. 7 abridged the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
21. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VIOLATED. The summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7
violates the constitutional principle that all accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt.
22. THE HAGUE CONVENTION. The Hague Convention of 1899 is flagrantly violated by the enactment of
Ordinance No. 7.
23. INTERNATIONAL LAW. Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the
legitimate government, once restored to his own territory, after expelling the invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not
recognizing or by nullifying any and all acts of the invader.
24. DECISION RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY UNENFORCEABLE. The decision is by which
petitioner was convicted and is being held for life, having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning, and acting
under the authority of a foreign state, the Emperor or the Imperial Government of Japan, is unenforceable.
25. VESTIGES OF A PEOPLE SPIRITUALLY PERVERTED AND DEBASED. The process and judgment
under which petitioner has been convicted is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a
people spiritually perverted and debased. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of
decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country.
26. PERFECTION OF ELEMENTAL HUMAN CONCEPTS. The procedure here in question exhibits either
inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely the high purposes
of a judicial procedure.

DECISION

FERIA, J p:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and
control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No.
9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as
defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the
procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Commission, made
applicable to the trial for violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial
Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of
America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the
fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional
rights"; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code."
The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons
expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff- appellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos,
defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L- 22 (p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner,
should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons
advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said
Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, are tinged
with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate
Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the cases of Texas vs. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States vs. Home
Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott vs. United States (20 Wall., 459).
The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curi. In his memorandum he submits that the
petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court
was created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent
necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional
right; and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III,
section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the
Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are; that the court may interrogate the accused and
witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions
may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the
defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in
case of the death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the
Supreme Court composed of three Justices.
Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present
case, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the
Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines.
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113, 127, ante), recently
decided, this Court, speaking through the Justice who pens this decision, held:
"In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order
No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the
government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
'the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given
by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is
of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and
the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it
concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of
its acts.' (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government
and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence."
And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision, this Court said:
"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government.
As general MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted,
'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October
14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United
States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the
Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
recognized in the law of nations."

As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount
force), as the government established in Castine, Maine, during its occupation by the British forces, and as that of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with that country by the United States Army, the questions involved in the
present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the
belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the
administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases
involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of
the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of
paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity
of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal
jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
In the case of United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by
the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course,
suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a
temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize
and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the
occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws
of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of
war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Vol. II, Sixth
Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342.)
The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of
Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; United
States vs. Home Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 249; Sprott vs.United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the judicial and
legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United
States or of the States, or were inconflict with those constitutions, were null and void, is not applicable to the present
case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate
Government . . . sanctioned no hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal citizens as they had
existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Bruffy, supra); that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble,
and the obligation of allegiance to the state and obedience to her laws and state constitution, subject to the Constitution
of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. White, supra) and that the
Confederate States "in most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of
a new and different national head. The same constitutions, the same laws for the protection of property and personal
rights remained and were administered by the same officers." (Sprott vs. United States, supra). In fine, because in the
case of the Confederate States, the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union continued in
force in those states during the War of Secession; while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was
suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war
with the United States.
The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the
validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure
adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of life
imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on said punitive
sentence of the re- occupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No.
7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is
well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory
finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as
defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose
authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines,
being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a
political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within
its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or
character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in
question.
With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which
resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations
of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not
forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal
liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts." (Hall's International Law, seventh ed., p.
500.) A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case,
and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless, so far as is
necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially
the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure."(Oppenheim's
International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p. 349.)
No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth
Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the
period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its
revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because "a
constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a
retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and cases quoted and cited in the
footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.
The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or
promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for
military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by
the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be
considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of
view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the
semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.
(2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which
imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be
enforced by the occupant consist of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and
social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that any needless displacement of it would
defeat the object which the invader is enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law as
may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. Such
variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to
the invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution
of the war by them, that acts committed to their detriment shall not only lose what jurisdiction the territorial law might
give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress
acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded, so far as it
may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the
regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called
martial law." (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.)

According to Hyde (International Law, Vol. II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe
any fact in relation to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system of law, or to a special agency
entrusted with its administration. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of
military authority, is essentially martial. All law, by whomsoever administered, in an occupied district is martial law; and it
is none the less so when applied by the civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words
"martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine
what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix penalties,
and generally to administer justice through such agencies as are found expedient.
And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new
laws and regulations as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come into being
as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are
necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to
provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its
operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76,77.)
From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said
Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period
of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code,
they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses
demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent
occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its
operations.
They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized
by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the
production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators
are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The
acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called
martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from
reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but
also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that, in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces
could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their
maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the
fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply
upon the produce of this country.
The crime penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to
wit: treason, espionage, inciting to war, violation of neutrality, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's
country, piracy; and the crimes against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were
punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy
and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. While it is true that these offenses,
when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are defined and also penalized by the
territorial law or Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of
the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said
Ordinance No. 7, for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the
belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Islands. They are also considered by some writers
as war crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes the following:
"Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered
to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying
commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer war, the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against
their martial law; Being in possession of arms, ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods;
holding meetings other than those allowed; using seditious language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for
goods; wearing uniforms without due authority; going out of doors between certain hours; injuring military animals or
stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, etc.; hindering those in execution of military
orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with several others, were specified in the Japanese
regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law, War. seven edition, 1944, p. 242.)
It is therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the
admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which
petitioner was convicted.
(3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the
Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which
petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.
In order to resolve this last question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. It is
sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject of several international jurist and our recent decision in the case of Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra.
Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or
created by the belligerent occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . .
Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether they introduce any positive change into the
organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. The execution also of
punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the
state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader." (Hall's International Law, seventh
edition, p. 518.)
Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question,
which is within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to
which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. Like any other
legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to
be debarred from carrying out his will without notice, when required by military necessity and so far as practically
carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment, but always remembering that to punish for breach of a
regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. But the law made by the occupant within his
admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will bind any member of the occupied population as against any other
member of it, and will bind as between them all and their national government, so far as it produces an effect during the
occupation. When the occupation comes to an end and the authority of the national government is restored, either by
the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress can be had for what has been
actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be
released, and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as
well as for enactment. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands."
(Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.)
And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance
No. 7 and Act No. 65, says: "In general, the acts of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law
should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed
the occupant's power (e. g., alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for 'war treason'
and 'war crimes,' to acts of a political character, and to those that operate beyond the period of occupation. When
occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out." (Wheaton's International
Law, supra, p. 245.)

We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid
upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present
case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having
ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all, laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act
and invalidate the punitive sentence rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the
proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military
occupation of the of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the
petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
||| (Peralta v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, [November 12, 1945], 75 PHIL 285-371)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947.]

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Pedro M. Recto and Que Tube C. Makalintal, for petitioner.


First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO


SOVEREIGN; NATURE OF. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to
the occupier.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. The subsistence of the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international
law of our times."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO
GOVERNMENT OF HIS RESIDENCE. The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the
military government established over them, may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives
and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes
to his own government or sovereign.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY
OCCUPATION. Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the
enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the
latter by giving them aid and comfort.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 114 OF REVISED PENAL CODE, APPLICABILITY OF. Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES.
Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier
to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by
the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF
TREASON. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject
to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance
from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the
preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF THEORY OF, ADOPTED. Adoption of the
petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or
states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government
without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in
their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation,
and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders
in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their
own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide.
10. ID., SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE. Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines.
11. ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. The
Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations
imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL. The question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country."
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING
JAPANESE OCCUPATION. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the
change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged
with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government
and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this
Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."

RESOLUTION

"In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1)
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
"(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which of foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the
obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 42g;
Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web.
Works, 526);
"Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to
the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113)
and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the
state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during
the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
by the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II Oppenheim,
6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of
Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended
and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the
basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
"Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United States was suspended in
Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in
1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the
existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of
1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty, or on the old
theory that such occupation transfers the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
'sovereignty' used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because
as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second
case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has
become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied
to the present case;
"Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by Oppenheim and
other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the
enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of
the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not
do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes
to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may
be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant
of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate
government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that if
the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its
laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a
foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to
obey, with certain exceptions, the laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his
original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or
sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
"Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations),
the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens,
are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon,supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate
government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that
the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition,
and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation
to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against
the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason
above stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114
of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
"Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government
and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control
of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the
Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of
Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws
of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in
force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not
in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
"Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and
comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend
the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him;
because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the
military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may
lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
"Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to
disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter
incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their
military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the
whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party i n the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
"(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and
penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made,
upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 , a crime against the Government of
the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section
2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution;'
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not
absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of
the Philippines, which contains the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them' (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United
States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, 'As I
stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status
as a government of other independent nations in fact all the attributes of complete and respected
nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is 'a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.'

"Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that
pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States 'All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States', was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of
the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not do away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves
its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States;
that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in
the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it
is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that 'The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines';
"This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the
petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in
the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and
Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion."

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J ., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace,
there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated
during peace, but there are no traitors until war has started.
As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-
preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon
as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with
national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by
citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case
if the law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.
Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in
support of the proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the
laws of the Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under
the theory, was one of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.
Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his
government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.
"'Allegiance,' as the term is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which
the person is either a citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2
Law. ed., 208.
"'Allegiance' was said by Mr. Justice Story to be 'nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience
of a subject to the sovereign, under whose protection he is.' United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct.,
456, 461; 169 U. S., 649; 42 Law. ed., 890.
"Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him
who enjoys the protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government.
It is that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the
government and the citizen. Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.
"By 'allegiance' is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It
may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or
subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by
some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or
sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance, which is continuous
during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U. S.(16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.
"'Allegiance,' as defined by Blackstone, 'is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King,
in return for that protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is
of two sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being per actual, the latter temporary. Natural
allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth,
for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and
for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due from the subject
upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean
himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born
within the King's allegiance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehavior; but the rights of
aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove.
If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to
the King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides,
that thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other
inconveniences.' Indians w ithin the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance to the government
of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject to its laws. They are born in
allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911." (3 Words and
Phrases, Permanent ed., pp. 226-227.)
"Allegiance. Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or
subject; the duty which is due from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys
the protection of the commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government; the
obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government or to the sovereign
under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of
protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
"Classification. Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance that which arises
by nature and birth; (2) acquired allegiance that arising through some circumstance or act other than
birth, namely, by denotation or naturalization; (3) local allegiance the arising from residence simply
within the country, for however short a time; and (4) legal allegiance that arising from oath, taken
usually at the town or reed, for, by the common law, the oath of allegiance might be tendered to every
one upon attaining the age of twelve years." (3 C. J. S., 'p. 885.)
"Allegiance. The obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R. C. L.,
140." (Ballentine, Law Dictionary, p. 68.)
"'Allegiance,' as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to
his state the obligation of obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political
person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons owing this
allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its government. The persons who operate
this machinery constitute its magistency. The rules of conduct which the state utters or enforces
are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty." (W. W.
Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American
Journal of International Law, p. 915.)
"The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character.
This principle had been aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case
of Luria vs. United States:
"Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of
the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one
being a compensation for the other." (3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p. 6.)
"Allegiance. The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection
which the government affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the
protection received.
"It is a comparatively modern corruption of allegiance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege
(ligius), meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and unqualified
fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.
xxx xxx xxx

"Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary
one; the citizen or subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly
renounces it, whilst the alien domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing
during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United States, 16 Wall. [U. S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 42G." (1 Rouvier's
Law Dictionary, p. 179.)
The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary
insertion in our Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.' (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define
allegiance with the idea that sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people
themselves. Although it is possible that they had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true
sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been
exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was
best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of
persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in opposition to the people themselves. Although
democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies function on the assumption that
sovereignty resides in the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in
the fundamental law of our people.
To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some
plausibility in the proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that
allegiance must also have been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea
cannot have any place under our Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the
basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty
is the very life of our people, and there is no such thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation
between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the personality and existence of our people. Can anyone
imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended existence" of a people? In no time during enemy
occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.
The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.
There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband.
Because some external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions,
and duties, and the wife is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of
suspended loyalty and may she freely share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the
assailant and allowing him to enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as
defense for her adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable.
We have already decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the
Republic is the same as that of the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name
of our Government and the withdrawal by the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the
Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our
constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist. It has been recognized by the United States
of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our Constitution. By such act, President Roosevetl,
as spokeman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle that sovereignty resides in the people that
is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.
The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation f independence on
July 4, 1946. Since the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign
people in the Allied War Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part outstanding and brilliant, it
may be added in the drafting and adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forunner of the
future democratic constitution of the would government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all
mankind, the early realization of which is anxiously desired all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and
disaster of another war.
Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress.
Sometimes it is delegated to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election to the President to
suspend the election in certain districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public
calamity, but it has never been exercised by tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all
laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power, authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any
valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be included among the laws of ther Commonwealth
which, by, his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he claims have been suspended during the
Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to
Washington, had fled to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the
interests of the Japanese imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or
for rebellion or sedition, as the laws punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the
theory.
"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be
required by law to render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That
duty of defense becomes more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How
can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The
framers of the Constitution surely did not entertain even for a moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the
citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be
suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be required to render personal, military or civil service may
claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in distress.
Petitioner advances the theory that protection is the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the
Commonwealth Government having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were
relieved of their allegiance to said government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an
indispensable bond for the existence of society. If that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the
existence of the latter is the result of the social compact mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized
society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are
entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the
need of maintaining the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that the physical forces of attraction should be
kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability or inability of his mind to choose
the most effective measures of personal protection.
After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes lad during and under the Japanese regime,
whether executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null
and void, as we have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs.
Director of Prison (75, Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot
consistently accept petitioner's theory.
If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine
the existence of organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws governing, it,
necessarily we have to conclude that the laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect during the occupation and
the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.
Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To
give way to that paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our
legitimate government was suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring
absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms, loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy,
admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity, understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some foe
feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy
only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings hate, anger, vexation, chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt,
spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political social and ethical ideologies, between our people and the Japanese,
making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from the initial fact that the Japanese
invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness, braggadocio and beastly
brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped,
may appear to be divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political
actions, legal rules, and judicial decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love
the enemy is not natural. As long as human psychology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible
to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?
The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law,
could not have established in our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as
bandits and ruffians, and it is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance even a
temporary one from a decent people.
One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion,
are free to do anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be
the doom of small nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices.
In the imminence of invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller will readily throw away their arms to rally behind
palladium of the invaders.
Two foot he three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since
September 25, 1945, the day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to
try and decide all cases of crime against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2,
1945," (section 2), the legislative and executive have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including
the time of Japanese occupation, all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, punishing treason, had reminded in full effect an should be enforced.
That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said and that no one, at the time the act was
being considered by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the useless of creating a
People's Court to try crimes which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them
have been suspended, is a historical fact of which the Supreme Court may the take judicial notice. This fact shows
universal and unanimous agreement of our people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the
theory of suspended allegiance is just an afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason
cases at any cost.
Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based n generally accepted principles
of international law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to
strong powers but harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we
accept at face value the premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended
sovereignty are based on generally accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue
of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory.
But the theory has the effect of suspending the laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in
nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn
devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the offspring devours its parent.
Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?
There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy determining agency of government, even since the
Pacific war started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended
during enemy occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of
the archipelago were under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere
in the Philippines, the Second National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on
December 16, 1941. When we approved said act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect
during the emergency, and in said act we even went to the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in fore laws
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy," (section 2 ), that "the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary
to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency." (Section 1.) To give more
emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines small otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not meet as
scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then
convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectively the enemy invasion.
Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will
cause a great injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes
involving disloyalty to their country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to re
vindicate themselves. Having been acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history
will indiscriminately classify them with the other accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts
against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma
of having betrayed their own people. They should not be deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of
law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of
test.

HILADO, J ., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation
of the Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the
Islands which constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their
legitimate government and to the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period
there was no change of sovereignty here; but my reasons are different and I proceed, to set them forth:
I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE
(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World
War II, the nations had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing
their conduct with each other and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or in civilian life,
in time of peace or in time of war. During the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had
no realization of the potential excesses of which "men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was,
at least under certain conditions, considered as sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed
nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now
to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact. Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.
But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely
different reasons and from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of
warfare had been so materially changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields
or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and
to their properties, not only in the countries engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized
nations and governments, among them Japan, had to formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-
Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the
United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to President Truman of June 7, 1945:
"International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting
international legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of
governments designed to meet a change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through
decisions reached from time to time in adopting settled principles to new situations.
xxx xxx xxx
"After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the
earlier and sounder doctrines of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was
thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal
and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to those who engaged in such an
enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and
criminal.

"The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the
most significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with
the United States and practically all the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national
policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.
"Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and
comes close to being an act of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry I,. Stimson, as United States Secretary of
State, gave voice to the American concept of its effect. He said, 'war between nations was renounced by
the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegalthroughout practically
the entire world It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to the principle
around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing . . .. By that
very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of
re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.'
"This Pact constitutes only one reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought
international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind that justifiable war is a crime.
"Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments,
which declared that 'a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime.'
"The Eighth Assembly of the league of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the
representatives of forty-eight member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression
constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one
American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that 'war of aggression constitutes
an international crime against the human species.'
xxx xxx xxx
"We therefore propose to charge that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern
international law has abolished the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate
business. Thus may the forces of the law be mobilized on the side of Peace." (U. S. A. An American
Review," published by the United States Office of War Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.)
When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law"
and "the re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by
Grotius, the father of international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war the war of
defense and the war of aggression" to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.
In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that
"international law as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was
not illegal and no crime at law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the
Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a reversal of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into
harmony with the common sense of mankind that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of
the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a
war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a
war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th Pan-American Conference of 1928, which unanimously
adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species: which
enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.
It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid
succession, against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and
more unjustifiable, as admitted on all sides, was its attack; against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and
occupation of certain areas thereof.
Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his
theory of suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all
war was considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the
course of really justifiable war.
Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw
the entire Pacific area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 to the first week of September, 1945,
expressly agreed to outlaw, proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek
the settlement of her disputes with other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that
modification of the then existing rules and principles of international law governing the matter. With that modification, all
the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the
outlawing, proscription and renunciation of military occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus
outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of saying that the rules and principles of international law
therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically abrogated and rendered ineffective in all
future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.
If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an
international crime against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war
cannot possibly, under any principle of natural or positive law, acquire or possess any legitimate power or right growing
out or incident to such occupation. Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain
portions of its territory during the Pacific war, could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense and only in this sense
should we speak here with respect this country and its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's
house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or right within that house with respect either to the person of the
owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the
second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as in case of a military occupant in the course of a
justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be the most monstrous and unpardonable
contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and
at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation of territories they have so barbarously and feloniously
invaded. And let it not be forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and
conducted the so-called war crimes trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a
representative in the international commission currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave
no room for doubt that this government is in entire accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war
started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already
renounced war as an instrument of national policy ( Constitution, Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the
doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the
occupation by Japan of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law
which might be applicable to a military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court
recognize any lawfulness or validity in that occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said
international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese "war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and
peace" committed by them during World War II of which said occupation was but part and parcel? In such
circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the suspension of the allegiance of our
people to their country and government?
(b) But even in the hypothesis and not more than a mere hypothesis that when Japan occupied the City of
Manila and certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended
allegiance would not hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a nation by its citizens is one of those high
privileges of citizenship which the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.
" . . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus
forbidden to take certain measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy.
The restrictions imposed upon him are in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of
some highly important privileges. These concern his allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor
and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and connection with or residence in the
occupied territory.

"The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to
swear allegiance to the hostile power. . . ." (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp 1898-1899.)
". . .Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the
authority of the occupant is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . ." (II
Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-344)
The occupant's lack of authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is
but a corollary of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist
merely in obedience to the laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the
same volume and pages of Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the
occupied territory owe no temporary allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them
to take an oath sometimes called an 'oath of neutrality' willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since,
naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is
applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath of obedience to his laws; and since, according to the
same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience to his laws, which he
can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.
(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when one's country is
unable to afford him its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the
doctrine that precisely when his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from
that loyalty. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its
worthy offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the
irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and
prompting of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible
feelings and prompting of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to speak, nor even to think a whit
contrary to their Love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and say to it that, because
when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence, was disabled from affording them
protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely adhere to
its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their
crime.
II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence,
proclaimed on July 4, 1946. During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution;
after the proclamation of independence that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law.
Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that the government established thereby shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines.' Under this provision the Government of the Philippines immediately prior to
independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter only the name of that government was to be
changed.
Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are
always the plaintiff in all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant
or defendants)." This was already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason.
"The Government of the Philippines" spoke of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the
Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution, which
constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution" of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines before, and the Republic of the Philippines
after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and resides in the people (Article II,
section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people they are the same people who preserve it to this
day. There has never been any change in this respect.
If one committed treason against the people of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally
liable for the crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued
by the Constitution, that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the
Philippines," in the textual words of the Constitution (Articles XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government
which after independence became known as the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the
sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute after independence that they became, politically, fully of
age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his
becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason committed against the Filipino people when they
were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this status? The offended party continues to be
the same only his status has changed.

PARAS, J ., dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is
in full harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law adopted by our Constitution (Article II, section
3) as a part of the law of the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a
political nature or affecting political relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation" (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political
nature or affecting political relations are considered suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is
intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75,
Phil., 876,881.)
The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally
suspend all laws of a political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be
made known to the inhabitants. (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United
States is an essential element in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its
position in our political structure prior to the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the
United States necessarily has a binding force and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction
followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention,
which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.
Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander
in chief of January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the
United States of America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military
Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said
Commander in Chief of February 20, 1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in
the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided
that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in
the explanations to Order No. 3 reminding that "all laws and regulations of the Philippines have been suspended since
Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws and regulations which are not proper to act under the
present situation the Japanese Military Administration," especially those "provided with some political purposes."
The suspension of political laws during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase
outweighs all other aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and
purposes of a military occupant. It is tuns consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the
Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interests of
humanity and the over progressive needs of civilization," and that "in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of international law,
as they result from the usage's established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation
wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by appropriate affirmative action undertakes to
acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard himself as clothed with freedom to
endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political ideology, and to make that
endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to retain the exercise
of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading
power, whose interests and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is
legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary
for the security of his forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country
(United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to
involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country" (Hague
Regulations, article 52); and if, as we have in effect said, by the surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary
allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws, and such only, as it chooses to recognize
and impose, and the belligerent occupant 'is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since
occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the
foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions." (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
75 Phil., 285, 29a), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II,
Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 432.)
He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory
were required to obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in
a reverse order, of Mr. Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following
passage:
"To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to
the Japanese oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet
governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them
in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile
governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions on the one
hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and,
on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan."
The only sensible purpose of the treason law which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial
law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and
necessary for the control of the occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), must be the preservation
of the nation, certainly not its destruction or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond
of the theory that what is suspended is merely the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government or the latter's
authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this
were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the
fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically assert its authority in a territory actually
beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step of prosecuting and punishing
the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in question, we have to
accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It should be
borne in mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that
are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete
with it on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempts interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to
weaken the enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus if
the absent territorial sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the
occupant has ordained obedience to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual
from prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)
As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants
for "war treason" or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory
and the protection of the army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot
obviously be protected by their native sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the
same time be prosecuted and punished for an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of the
territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
In Peralta is. Director of Prisons. 75 Phil., 286, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth
Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent
occupant at regular war with the United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in
the following passage (page 298):
"No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our
Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter
was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor
may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminium, because 'a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless
the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect,' (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note),
especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely."
In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese
military occupation against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code was not then in force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the
reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against
any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive
effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse to enforce the Constitution, more essential to
sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code ni the aforesaid case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons if , as
alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?
The decision in United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and
described in United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States the court of highest human authority on that subject and as the decision was against the United States, and
in favor of the authority of Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence the war out of
which it grew; and while no department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or
disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the
conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision.
That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September,
1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that
while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty, had been introduced into that port
without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place was by treaty restored to the United States,
and after that was done the Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing the
goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would have
been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the
time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced
there; and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound
so to decide. But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner.
Mr. Justice Story, that great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said:
'The single question is whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties
imposed by the revenue laws upon goods imported into the United States. . . . We are all of opinion that the claim for
duties cannot be sustained. . . .. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and
the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who
remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the
British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. From the
nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as
respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subjects to
such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the
United States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had been foreign
territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this
case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of
public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities
cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid
from authority.' Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerent
occupation, is to be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be
stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall
presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so
adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held,
is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods
imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory of its
former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice
should be construed to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has
become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can
have any important significance only when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the
thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate
the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or
be obligatory upon the inhabitant who remained and submitted to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the
majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law, hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the
belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that are to obtain within the occupied area is an
exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete with it on an even plane. Neither may
the doctrine in United States vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without repudiating the actual rule prescribed
and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a political nature and even
require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article
309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of a
territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to the occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the
occupied district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and,
being under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. ( Willoughby,
The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 364.)
The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the
law of treason was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or
subject owes not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance"
to the military occupant may be likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most
unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in
the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules of international law, the laws of political nature of his
own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or neutral power is real, not the kind of
protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army. "It is but reasonable that
States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within
the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that those States should provide system of la-v and of courts, and
in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a
State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges
which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have
such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus
determined, protected." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)
When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in foreign country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other
than one under belligerent occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a
crime "the direct or indirect purpose of which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to
pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3
Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under occupation can no longer be "delivered."
The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military
occupant to legally recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for
treason. This argument is not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the
Hague Regulation (article 52) that allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the
population "in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension
prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude, much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by
the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in the present state of international law should be
corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organization.
It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming
number of Filipinos were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which
leads to the conclusion that if the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not
be any Filipino nation that could have been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the
mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas after the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces,
they would have faced certain annihilation by the Japanese, considering the latter's military strength at the time and
the long period during which they were left militarily unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make
reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.
If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it
was because the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the
resistance movement. If they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the
civilian population in cities and towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary
pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the
Japanese are assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the
outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the
hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at war with each other. Fear for their own safety
may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to interfere with the safety and success of
the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause it to take vengeance in cruel fashion. Again,
even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate success in its major conflict
may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions, proceed to utilize the
inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second
Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few months;
it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in
barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or
by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Clam vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon) 75 Phil.,
371, 373. ) The law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of
the occupant's cause. (Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhered to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a
wrong and low conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the
first place, and no amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are
not so base as to be insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots
who fought and died during the last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by
their inborn love of country, and not by such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people, as a whole, passively
opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of the treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the
democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course,
there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they met and will unavoidably meet the necessary
consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and informers subjected themselves to the
perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the guerrillas and the parties
injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning sovereign; those
who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the municipal
law, and under this group, even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made
answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon
with. We cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of,
or injury to, any Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a
desire to levy war against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the
Japanese occupation the royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to
the guerrillas for acts, otherwise criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way
legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them upon the real traitors.

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience
and cooperation of the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the
Philippines, when the r mere physical presence implied force and pressure and not after the American forces of
liberation had restored the Philippine Government that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of
international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated
herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did
not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers, and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine
history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent and degree, of the peace and order
prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave aid and comfort to the
enemy.
Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective
during the occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of
October 23, 1944, he ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute bolls of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines . . . are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (76 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the
President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of
its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907."
The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to
the hostile power," was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry
the implication that the latter continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States,
a signatory to the Hague Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all
laws of a political nature and even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States
Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article 309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the
inhabitants, no longer receiving the protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being
under the control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is
prohibited is the application of force by the occupant, from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not
altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of
this authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the inhabitants as are necessary for their
survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to know what will save them during
the military occupation than any exile government.
"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of
the judicial process for non judicial ends, and attached cynics who 'see no reason why courts, just like other agencies,
should not be policy weapons. If we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he but
don't hide the deed behind a court. If you are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial;
the world yields no respect for courts that are merely organized to convict.' Mussolini may have got his just desserts, but
nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough
laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some
guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against
Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial appearing in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34,
and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.
If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military
occupation, they were at most borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas errors of the mind
and not of the heart. We advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended
allegiance or sovereignty, but as an affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always
remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their country.
Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the
present Republic of the Philippines has no right to prosecute reason committed against the former sovereignty existing
during the Commonwealth Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has
already held that, upon a change of sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by
the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people,"
but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of
principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subservient to and controlled by the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution under which, in addition to its manly provisions essentially destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is
expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not then been withdrawn. The
framers of the Constitution had to mail said declaration of principle because the document was ultimately intended for
the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the purposes of the
Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we suppose,
will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent county under the Commonwealth Government.
The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law,
but its non-sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty
delegated by the United States whose sovereignty over the Philippines continued to be complete.
"The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. It has already been seen that the exercise of
sovereignty is conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute
the Government. For practical political reasons which can be casually appreciated, it is desirable that the
public policies of a State should be formulated and executed by governmental agencies of its own
creation and which are not subject to the control of other States. There is, however, nothing in a nature of
sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the exercise of certain powers to the
governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may go to any extent in
the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States, those
governmental agencies thus becoming quad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose
sovereignty is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be instrumentalities for the
expression of the will of the State by which they were originally created.
"By this delegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and
the legal hypothesis is that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the
exercise, through organs of its own creation, of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to
colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right of control of so
slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet, so long
as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be
founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother
countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative
autonomy and not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the
so-called Confederate or Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government
the exercise of almost all of their powers of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on
the other hand, a State may, without parting with its sovereignty of lessening its territorial application,
yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of powers as to create of them
bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all States, indeed,
when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of
local self-government be granted to particular districts." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 15.)

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American
Union which, it is alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has
been authoritatively stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers
as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national
sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no
longer contested.
"It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such
autonomous powers as they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the
constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that, even when selecting members for the national legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying
proposed amendments to the federal Constitution, the States act, ad hoc, as agents of the National
Government." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 250.)
"This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-
sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested." (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts
of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)
Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known
as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of
the Philippines and under the Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government
possessed administrative autonomy and exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to
be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the
Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States.
Treason committed against the United States or against its instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which
exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty (id., p. 49), is therefore not treason against the sovereign and independent
Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make the Constitution applicable to the
Republic.
Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands
shall remain operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of
the Philippines, and on section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and
determined under the laws then in force, thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic
of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain
operative under the present regime if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said
penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should
owe allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed
out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the
Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United States. To contend that article 114 must be
deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is deleted, and, as thus modified,
should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an ex post facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of
Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with
restrictions, it is sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in
Cincinnati Soap Co. vs. United States (301 U. S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the
sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case can
only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the
United States.
No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the
United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent
nations in act all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as
having accelerated the date, much less as a formal proclamation of the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the
Tydings McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less also than the President of the United States had to issue the
proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the United States and recognizing Philippine
Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmena who was with him, that proclaimed on October
23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given official participation in
the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth Government,
extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice President of the Philippines.
The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well
as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained,
treason against either is not and cannot be treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines.
||| (Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409 (Resolution), [January 30, 1947], 77 PHIL 856-906)
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL-SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF
QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, P.J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, and INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T . Velarde & Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J p:

The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by
respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final
and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse
of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application
indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent
Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3,
1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino
Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in
the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969,
the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, . . . 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned
Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of
garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution'; the Philippine Veterans Bank
received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 . . . 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches
are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July
3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, . . ." 2 The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12.
Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null
and void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set
forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What
was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the
loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein
expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense
from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule
that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued
in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm
as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the
hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public
policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate
grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969
declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
||| (Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, [November 28, 1973], 153 PHIL 356-362)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-24548. October 27, 1983.]

WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO


RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y.
FELICIANO, respondents-appellees, RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and
ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors.
Camito V. Pefianco, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; WHEN TRIAL COURT CAN PROPERLY DISMISS A
COMPLAINT THEREON DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN WITHOUT A HEARING. In Llanto vs. Ali
Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can
properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into
consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL. Petitioner appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for
reconsideration. This omission means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from
raising this question for the first tune on appeal. "Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
3. ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE; NOT TO BE APPLIED IN A VERY RIGID, TECHNICAL SENSE. Petitioner-appellant
cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its
sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are
made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a
party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced."
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; FAILURE TO APPEAL ORDER OF
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, A FAILURE
TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238
withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering
that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL. This being a special
civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The
Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner-appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is
an appeal to the President of the Philippines. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court
(People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 463), "it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial
redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies available'' (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18,
1969).
6. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; WHEN STATE'S IMMUNITY MAY BE VALIDLY INVOKED. "The
rule establishing State exemption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State
instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it
can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer
nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Politicial Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724 and other
cases cited).
7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; TIMBER LICENSE; CON- STRUED. A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
8. ID.; LICENSE; GRANT THEREOF DOES NOT CREATE IRREVOCABLE RIGHT, NEITHER IS IT PROPERTY OR A
PROPERTY RIGHT. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right nor, does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J., 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
9. POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER; PROPER EXERCISE THEREOF CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY ANY FRANCHISE
OR RIGHT. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The
State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481, Oct. 24, 1970).
10. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF CONTROL; SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES HAS AUTHORITY TO REVOKE, ON VALID GROUNDS, TIMBER LICENSES ISSUED BY DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director
of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate
officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (Sec, 79 [c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers
of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 3, 1981). The power of control of the
Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials
(Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs.
Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent-
appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J p:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil
Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2, rec.), which
dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause
of action, and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI
rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising
7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (p. 99,
CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the
necessary fees and posting the required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p.
29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be
awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of
the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:
"It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for
watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area
as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the
Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted
last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as above stated . . .
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA"
(p. 98, CFI rec.)
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is
made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and We quote:

"Respectfully forwarded to the Honorable, the Executive Secretary, Malacaang, Manila, inviting
particular attention to the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the preceding
indorsement in which this Office fully concurs.
"The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest
conservation and watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion,
they have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve rather than open it for
timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than good to the public interest. To
convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest protection force, would make of it a
'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open
target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the other
hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging
operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient
number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest conservation and watershed protection.
"Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to
determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress,
the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly, was arrived at after much thought
and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed
in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating
bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest
concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds, would
cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.
"In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the
announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area" (p. 13, CFI rec.)
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer,
"respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate
action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI
rec.)
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposals, the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on
December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon who succeeded Secretary
Cesar M. Fortich in office issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
"SUBJECT: . . .
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.
"1. . . .
"2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area
covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses
for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;
"3. This Order shall take effect immediately" (p. 267, CFI rec.)
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing Secretary
Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office, he immediately promulgated on December 19, 1963 General Memorandum
Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum Order No. 46, to
grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said
Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963
"1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and nature of the work of the Department, the
authority delegated to the Director of Forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30,
1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000
hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares
each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of new licenses and renewals of licenses,
including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
"2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars,
memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked" (p. 268, CFI rec.;
italics supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No.
20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry
Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order
of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, O.T.L. No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be
cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws,
rules and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of said order reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No.
20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED
without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
"The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if
there be any, in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further
improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and
Jorge Lao Happick in this case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.)
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied
the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:
"In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of
February 12, 1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including
the proposed Olongapo Watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of
Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment
concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in relation to wise utilization of the forest,
denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas influenced by
the watershed, etc . . ." (pp. 38-39, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.)
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao
Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the
same area, promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to
grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is
paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without
the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed
and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.)
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before the court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil
Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI
rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber
license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his
constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (p. 6, CFI
rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents-
appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April
11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the proceedings in
connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew O.T.L. No.
20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the sum of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by
way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000,00) as attorney's fees and costs. The
respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial
Company, Jorge Lao Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too
opposed the writ.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has
no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all
available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative
and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2)
that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its
consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of
petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in
intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors, and extensive
discussion was held both orally and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the question on
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a
sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing
the petition, stated that "the court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this
question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand,
arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-
appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I.
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:
(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action; and
(2) dismissing the petition [p. 27, rec.]
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of
action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of
action wherein he contended that the three essential elements thereof namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the
correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right are satisfied in
the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint
states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and
the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. He further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on
insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the
motion (pp. 32-33, rec.)
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed, this
case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner-
appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion
supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, all facts which are
well pleaded. However, while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of
which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts
inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol.
1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence
introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of the
allegations in his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine
the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If
there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. (C.C.A. Minn., 1942, 129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was
presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the court could
properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as
the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the
trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by
taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is
hereby quoted:
"Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the
motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
"1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued 'without any hearing on the motion
to dismiss'? Is it void?
"WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on
February 10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, '(r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing.
But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition thereto, we find that the
arguments pro and con on the question of the board's power to abolish petitioner's position minutely
discussed the problem and profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at
length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.
"One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce
evidence in support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause
of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts averred in
the challenged pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully
discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are
reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other
intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., `to avoid surprises upon the opposite party
and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,' has been sufficiently met.
And then, courts do not exalt form over substance" (emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, "even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of action will
be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court
to go beyond disclosure in the complaint" (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's
Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952;
131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-
appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of
the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its
order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand,
arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new
arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation,
and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. "Issues not raised in
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states
no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the
substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973,
p. 157, citing cases)

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the
inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by
forest denudation. LLphil
The are covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI
rec.). It is of public knowledge the watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of
water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization
of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant
abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly
deforested due to uncontrolled timer cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in
paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timer license it is stated:
"The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require"
(Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.)
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on
April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as
follows:
"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, I,
Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and
establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production
purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the Director of
Forestry, . . . the following parcels of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo,
province of Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: . . ." (60 O.G. No. 23,
3198)
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in
question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area
covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect,
recognize and respect the very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily
revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using and
enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity
of his timber license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner-appellant's timber license was signed and released without
authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such
findings: cdphil
"In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was
authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more
than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs.
2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of
the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to
grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that the whole area
should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the whole area of 6,420
hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives an
area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commercial and operable forest
(Exh. 1-Ravago). Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:
" 'Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo,
Zambales was declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there
were received bid proposals from the following persons: . . .
" 'Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be
awarded, as it is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: . . .'
"In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no
more authority to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. 1-Ravago). The authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general memorandum order No.
60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio"
(pp. 479-480, CFI rec.)
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on
which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the
release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have
been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the
licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on
the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in
the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that
if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it
claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said
complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in
acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the
claim of the plaintiff to be the owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-
appellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II.
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-
appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the
area covered by his timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the
respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above
after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the
case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the
plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court
action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is
that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter
(Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.)
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area
from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to
take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs.
Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
"At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the
alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from
the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands
he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
"The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all
thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an
administrative case."

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, thus:
"When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. (Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253; Chiu Yow vs. U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by
law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative
remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely
and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government.
When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to
dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no
more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be
reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and
adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner-appellant's
speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines. prcd
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either
want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" (F.S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April 21, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit
there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and
again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well known principle that before
seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA
944, April 18, 1969).
"Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action
for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be
deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29, 1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the
pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls which it does not within the cases where, in accordance with our
decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law
[Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs.
Osmea, G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs.
Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-
15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
13000, Sept. 25, 1959]" (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).
III.
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit
against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to
be sued (Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution)
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the scope of their
authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle
of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens
against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is
just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at
the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants
near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exemption from
suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In
such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really
affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant"
(SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation System vs.
Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil Phil. vs. Customs Arrastre
Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341,
343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of
the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a
timber license. cdll
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of
its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to
be sued.
IV.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his
timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license
states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that
this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require " (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber
license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract, within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of
Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held that:
"A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may
not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public
interests so require."
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of
police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent
power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct.
24, 1970)
V.
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization
and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while
Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any
forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry
is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Sec. 79[c], Rev.
Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer"
(Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over
bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan
vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144,
147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on
valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of
petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent-appellee (Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid. prLL

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged
right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so
again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national
patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT. SO ORDERED.
||| (Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, [October 27, 1983], 210 PHIL 244-267)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 70853. March 12, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE


APPELLATE COURT,respondents-appellants.

DECISION

YAP, J p:

Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of
respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of
the State. LLpr
The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as follows:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by
virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola
had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced
by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same,
introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the
Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which
the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that
the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true
owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal, valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and
nullify all awards to the settlers. LLphil
The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient
cause of action and prescription.
On August 29, 1970. the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of
701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title in the name of
his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. The court declared the
rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by eighty-six (86) settlers, together with the
barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among other things that intervenors had been in possession of the land in question for
more than twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.
On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors to file their
corresponding pleadings and present their evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well as
the Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff presented additional
evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for hearing for the reception of intervenors' evidence on August 30 and
August 31, 1971.
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the latter did not appear but submitted
a motion for postponement and resetting of the hearing on the next day, August 31, 1971. The trial court denied the motion
for postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence "en ausencia," after which the case would be deemed submitted
for decision. On the following day, August 31, 1971, Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of August 29,
1970. prcd
A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a
motion for execution, dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time through Judge Miguel
Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors' motion for
postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of
Judge Navarro's order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari. Said petition was,
however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163,
which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State
and also on the ground that the existence and or authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the
respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of title, or if
it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches.LexLib
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for
certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge Lising and
remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Hence this petition.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A
suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. 1 It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 2 There is no such showing in the instant
case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on this basis
alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as
alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings." 4
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it established the
reservation "subject to private rights, if any there be." We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of
the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not
be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5 Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an
act of the legislative body. prcd
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission. which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the basis of our
decision in theBegosa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from
suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds. It is contended that the
complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not
being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land
sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to
compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that
he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to
establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.

The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means provided
by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of America, to
record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex parte proceeding conducted in
accordance with prescribed rules. 7 Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the fact that at the
time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his
application. 8 The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to
10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. 9
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a
record of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the
Public Land Act, which is an actionin rem. However, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at
this time. Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact admitted by him and stated in the decision of
the Court a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land in question since even before the outbreak of the
war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession. cdll
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of
the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was
"reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission
of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only
in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the
"informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," 11 whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano
comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701.9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory
information" documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the
complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 70853, [March 12, 1987], 232 PHIL 391-399)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-33112. June 15, 1978.]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court
of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La
Union, respondents.

Conrado E. Medina, Edgardo M. Magtalas & Walfrido Climaco for petitioner.


Felimon A. Aspirin for respondent Agoo Tobacco Planters Association, Inc.
Virgilio C. Abejo for respondent Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration.

SYNOPSIS

Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. A writ of execution, followed
thereafter by a notice of garnishment of funds for the full amount mentioned in the writ, was issued by respondent judge.
Petitioner Philippine National Bank, with whose La Union Branch the funds to be garnished are deposited, objected and
raised the doctrine of non-suablity of the state, alleging that such funds are public in character. Failing to have the order set
aside, petitioner instituted this present action.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Bank could not legally set forth as a bar to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of
non-suability for the reason that respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is a public corporation whose funds
could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Petition dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATION HAS DISTINCT PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN; FUNDS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
MAY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST. The doctrine of non-suability cannot be legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a
notice of garnishment. In National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 118 Phil. 782 (1963), it
was explicitly stated: "That allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and
that, as such the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and
controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has
pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . . . " Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)"
2. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and
is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations. (Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 73 Phil. 374)

DECISION

FERNANDO, Acting C.J p:

The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent Judge
Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, 1 followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 2 deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-
suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. This is not the first time petitioner raised that
issue. It did so before in Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 3 decided only last January. It did not
meet with success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous cases of National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation 4 and Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 5 that funds of public corporations which
can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is
likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, 6 a similar outcome is indicated. This petition must be
dismissed. prLL
It is undisputed that the judgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had reached the stage of
finality. A writ of execution was, therefore, in order. It was accordingly issued on December 17, 1970 7 There was a notice of
garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of execution in the sum of P12,724.66. 8 In view of the objection,
however, by petitioner Philippine National Bank on the above ground, coupled with an inquiry as to whether or not
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds deposited with petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until
January 25, 1971 that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari proceeding was issued by respondent Judge. 9 Its
dispositive portion reads as follows: "Conformably with the foregoing, it is now ordered, in accordance with law, that
sufficient funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration now deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union
Branch, shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the Writ of Execution for one-half of the
amount awarded in the decision of November 16, 1970." 10 Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
As noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National Bank would invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that
under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth
in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 11 If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the
case here. Garnishment would lie. Only last January, as noted in the opening paragraph of this decision, this Court, in a
case brought by the same petitioner precisely invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of public corporations
could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. Accordingly, this petition must fail.
1. The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of this certiorari proceeding, was sought to be justified on the failure of
respondent Judge to set aside the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration. This excerpt from the aforecited decision of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations makes
manifest why such an argument is far from persuasive: "The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in
character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned
entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court
of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion: 'The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as
such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant
to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established
"all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . . . ." Accordingly, it may be sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)' . . . To repeat, the
ruling was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even
if owned or controlled by the government." 12
2. The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the first of its kind. The ruling therein could be inferred
from the judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, decided as far back as
1941. 13 In the language of its ponente, Justice Ozaeta: "On the other hard, it is well-settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of
the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." 14 It is worth mentioning that Justice Ozaeta could
find support for such a pronouncement from the leading American Supreme Court case of United States v. Planters'
Bank, 15 with the opinion coming from the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall. It was handed down more than one hundred
fifty years ago, 1824 to be exact. It is apparent, therefore, that petitioner Bank could not legally set forth as a bar or
impediment to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of non-suability.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs.
||| (Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, [June 15, 1978], 173 PHIL 25-30)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; CONSTRUED. The basic postulate enshrined in the
constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It
is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be
accordingly restricted.
2. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION ON NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not
say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent"; its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The
States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where
the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand,
is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPLIED CONSENT THROUGH CONTRACTS; QUALIFICATION. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. (United States
of America vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed
a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the contract on security services; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services,
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . . ."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MONEY CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE; PROVISIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
327 REQUIRING FILING OF CLAIMS WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE LABOR
CODE. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. (Carabao, Inc. vs. Agricultural Productivity
Commission) We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor
Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis
for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
6. ID.; ID.; CONSENT NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH LIABILITY; REQUISITE FOR LIABILITY TO ATTACH. When the State
gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put,
when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the
State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against
the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

DECISION

VITUG, J p:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-suability of the state. llcd
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro
City Sheriff from enforcing the decision2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on
petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the
guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same
parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90
(or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. LLjur
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991, finding herein petitioner jointly and severally liable with
sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards.
The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final
and executory. cdrep
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e., one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota
Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their
sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the petitioner
with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was
effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal effect. The
petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:


"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:
1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-
00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months,
more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to
source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it;
2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above-stated and to
deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount it has been adjudged to pay jointly and
severally with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration Branch X, Cagayan de
Oro City within the same period for proper disposition;
3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post
sufficient surety andsupersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary
award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court or by the Regional
Trial court of Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or
default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims;
4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on execution within
ten (10) days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In
the meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses incurred by the City Sheriff, if
any, in connection with the execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of
the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in
the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs;
5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments
made in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the
ruling in the Eagle Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the judgment debtors, the
Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct
arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings;
6. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued in Liftedand Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a
period of two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991, conditioned
upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner with in ten (10) days from notice pursuant
to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention is Denied for lack of
merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff in Noted. LLpr
SO ORDERED."
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC
has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," 7 reflects nothing
less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by
Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants
the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10 We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored,
for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater
in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and
the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On
the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule,
relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by
the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18
In United States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in
the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held:
"The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without
its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and
other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes."
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and
similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083,
aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, . . ." Pursuant, however, toCommonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc., vs.
Agricultural Productivity Commission, 20 we ruled:
"(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act
327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit,
subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that 'no execution shall issue upon any
judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions
provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed.' "
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with
respect to money claims against the State. The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the
State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.

When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it.
Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it
can, that the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has
explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents
are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the
decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner. SO ORDERED.
||| (Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104269, [November 11, 1993])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.]

DALE SANDERS, and A.S. MOREAU, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as
Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M.
ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they
did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the
other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the
said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was
private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute
grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result
was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private
respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that
"Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements
that: a) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven,
according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were
under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the
case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly coming
from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The
letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a
complaint for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters
contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in
a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the
doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on the
main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts,
moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order
issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the
properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters
worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The
motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of
some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the
petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that
the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when
they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will
not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and
liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled
principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the
government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to
proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties.
The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional
immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has
since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the court a quo. LLjur
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings
exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial
still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to
unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo
Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued
was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be
sued. It was the reverse situation inSyquia v. Almeda Lopez, 11 where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a
motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name
of the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United
States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed
against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than
proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases, 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the
proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the
doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment,
work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact
a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private
respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing
officer's criticism in effect a direct attack against him that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of
supervision."
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion
of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding
for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate
superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of
NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or
private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking,
being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the
scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming
that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have
to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This
will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. cdrep

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately
liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the
doctrine of state immumity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to
the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends." 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude
would "unduly vex the peace of nations."17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of
our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be
sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him
to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet
member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay
damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax
overpayments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer
impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held
that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even
without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in
forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation
canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party
defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the
United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment
that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of
appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public
officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to
bad faith. 24 This, too, is well-settled. 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept
of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by
our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the
performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper
for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal
administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing
before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect
upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the
basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in 1946. LLjur
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other
countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning
reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the
light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own
concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still so minded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the
laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed.
Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be
sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977, and September 7,
1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining
order of September 26, 1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.SO ORDERED.
||| (Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, [June 10, 1988], 245 PHIL 63-76)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23139. December 17, 1966.]

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE


and BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T . Cuison for defendants-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION. A defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical
person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued.
2. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS OR CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE NOT PERSONS: IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Neither the Bureau of Customs (a fortiori) nor its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely
parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev.
Adm. Code); and the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs Administrative
Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962. It follows that defendants herein cannot be sued under the first two above-mentioned
categories of natural or juridical persons.
3. ARRASTRE SERVICE; NATURE OF ARRASTRE SERVICE. The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in
Section 1213 ofRepublic Act 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957). The statutory provisions authorizing
the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is
deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function.
4. ID.; PERFORMANCE BY NON-CORPORATE GOVERNMENT ENTITY OF PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DOES NOT
MAKE IT SUABLE. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity (Bureau of
Printing, et al., vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et al., G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961).
5. ID.; ARRASTRE FUNCTION OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS ALTHOUGH PROPRIETARY IS NECESSARY INCIDENT TO
ITS GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. Although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident
of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily
render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATURE OF FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS; ARRASTRE SERVICE NECESSARY
INCIDENT TO FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU. The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev.
Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
fines, and penalties (Sec. 602, Republic Act No. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For
practical reasons said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or
ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this
checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. Regardless of the merits of the claim
against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its
present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 327,
which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
8. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of
the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a
necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
9. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY PROVISIONS WAIVING STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, HOW CONSTRUED. Statutory
provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Com, 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785).

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J p:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged
to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein.
The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. cdphil
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus
other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the
law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the
Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of
the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such can be sued by private
individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
"SECTION 1. Who may be parties. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action."
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law
to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They
are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance
(Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set
up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record
on Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot be sued under the first two above-mentioned categories of natural
or juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly
authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary,
not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put defendants under the third category
of "entities authorized by law" to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the
Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre service at
the Port of Manila, which, it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code,
effective June 1, 1957), and it states:
"SECTION 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles. The Bureau of Customs shall
have exclusive supervision and control over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on
the wharves and piers at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized to
acquire, take over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and comfort of passengers and
the handling of baggage, as well as to acquire fire protection equipment for use in the
piers: Provided, That whenever in his judgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles
can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public bidding
and subject to the approval of the department head, contract with any private party for the service of
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale
or lease of government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service."
In Associated Workers Union, et al., vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed
held "that the foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said
arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function."
The issue in said case, however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in
the Government employed in governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the
effect that "employees in the Government . . . shall not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which does not
impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike" which prohibition "shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions of the Government. . . ."

Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not
that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue
on the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower
court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the
inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed responsible for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning
Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in
its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. This is the doctrine recognized in
Bureau of Printing et al., vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January 25, 1961:
"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act
No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is 'charged with the execution of all printing and binding,
including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work
of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive
Secretary, be authorized to undertake. . . .' (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence,
and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing
needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or judicial personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself,
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent much less over its
objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al., vs. Angat
River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957.)"
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec.
81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For
practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or
ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this
checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation. 1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit.
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. liblex
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil., 203,
on which appellant would rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found to have for its prime reason for
existence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:
"Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute
contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and
rentals for the use of any property under its management.
"These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and
be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenue be not its prime objectives but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public . . ."
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its
consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies,
Sec. 96, p. 314; Pettyvs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785.) From the provision
authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said
Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and
as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. cda
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
||| (Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-23139, [December 17, 1966], 125 PHIL 270-
279)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5122. April 30, 1952.]

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE TEODORO SR., as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for petitioner.
Ozaeta, Roxas, Lichauco & Picazo for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE; WHEN MAY BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. "Suits against state agencies with
relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the
nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits
against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by
engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation." (59 C.J., 313.)
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration are, under section 3 of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property,
and to grant concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation
gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management. These provisions
confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration the power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to
transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports
Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION. The National Airports Corporation is abolished
for all purposes; it can not be regarded as still in existence even for the limited object of winding up its affairs. No
trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation thereof and, what is more, there is nothing
to liquidate, as everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. To all legal intents and practical purposes, said corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name.

DECISION

TUASON, J p:

The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports
Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was
created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for
landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to
have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports
Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., in 1951 to recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-
party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons
on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third-party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports
Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third-party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third-party defendant and its predecessor in
interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third-party defendant
would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.".
The Solicitor-General, after answering the third-party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third-party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its
juridical personality," and, second, because the Civil Aeronautics Administration "being an office or agency of the
Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing
and being sued. "Section 7 of Executive Order No. 365 reads:
"All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and
contracts of the National Airports Corporation abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to,
vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction, and
improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or
upon government airfields, including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances
thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration."
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute contracts of
any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on
sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its
management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be
sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to
sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds
and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports Corporation's creditors
access to the courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair the
obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
But repudiation of the National Airports Corporation's obligations was far from the intention in its dissolution and
the setting up of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Nor would such scheme work even if the executive order had so
expressly provided.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
"Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state
for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in
business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation." (59 C. J., 313.)
This rule has been applied to such government agencies as State Dock Commissions carrying on business
relating to pilots, terminals and transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 26 Fed. (2d) 480), and State
Highway Commissions created to build public roads, and given appropriations in advance to discharge obligations
incurred in that behalf (Arkansas State Highway Commission vs. Dodge, 26 S W (2d) 879; State Highway Commission
of Missouri vs. Bates, 269, S W 418.).
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but
to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and
the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of
state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the parties who dealt with the
National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.
The case of National Airports Corporation vs. Hon. V. Jimenez Yanzon et al., (89 Phil. 745), relied upon by
counsel, is not controlling. That was a labor dispute and can be distinguished from the case at bar in at least one
fundamental respect.
Involving labor demands and labor-management relations, any decision in that case would, if given force and
effect, operate prospectively and for an indefinite period against the Civil Aeronautics Administration whose rights and
obligations with respect to its officers and employees were regulated by the general law on civil service. Moreover,
some of the petitioners might already have ceased. By Sections 5 and 8 of Executive Order No. 365 all employees of
the National Airports Corporation were, upon the latter's dissolution, automatically separated from the service, and the
part of the personnel whose employment was "necessary and convenient" to the Civil Aeronautics Administration would
have to be reappointed and, what was more important, "in accordance with the Civil Service rules and regulations." If
the petitioners in that case had been absorbed into the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the matters raised in their
petition were outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, and of this Court on Appeal, to entertain. Their
rights, privileges, hours of work, and rates of compensation were already governed by the Civil Service Law.

The Philippine Airlines' third-party complaint is premised on the assumption that the National Airports
Corporation is still in existence, at least for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the
Corporation Law. Our opinion is that by its abolition that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees,
assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate.
Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all
legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration
is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third-party defendant instead of the
National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by
amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.
Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
||| (National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro Sr., G.R. No. L-5122, [April 30, 1952], 91 PHIL 203-209)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32667. January 31, 1978.]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V.


MANANSALA and GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy
Sheriff, respondents.

Conrado E. Medina for petitioner.


Gabriel V. Manansala in his own behalf.
Jose K. Manguiat, Jr. for respondent Court.
SYNOPSIS
Pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations in favor of private respondent and
against the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, respondent clerk of court, in his capacity as special deputy sheriff,
served a notice to garnish the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation which were deposited with
petitioner bank. Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment but respondent Court denied the motion. Claiming that
respondent Court's denial amounted to grave abuse of discretion because the appointment of the clerk of court as
authorized deputy sheriff was contrary to law and the funds subject of the garnishment "could be public in character",
petitioner instituted instant certiorari proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that respondent clerk of court is the legally authorized deputy sheriff to serve the Court of Industrial
Relations' writ of execution as provided for in Republic Act No. 4201 which amended the Court of Industrial Relations Act;
and that funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation may be the object of garnishment because although the
said corporation is a government-owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality separate and distinct from the
government which subjects it to the rules of law governing private corporations.

SYLLABUS

1. GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS; GARNISHMENT; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION FUNDS


NOT EXCEMPT THEREFROM. The premise that the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation could be
spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the said corporation is a government-owned entity.
However, it does not follow that they are exempt from garnishment because the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, as a government-owned and controlled corporation, has a personality distinct and separate from that of the
government. Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes like any other corporation.
2. ID.; INDEMNITY FROM SUIT, GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATIONS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT. By engaging
in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
3. GOVERNMENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUITS; WAIVER THEREOF DOES NOT SUBJECT ITS PROPERTIES AND FUNDS
TO EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT. Waiver by the State of its right of immunity from suits does not automatically
subject its properties and funds to execution or garnishment because such would amount to a disbursement without any
proper appropriation as required by law.
4. CERTIORARI; JUDGMENTS; AUTHORITY OF INDUSTRIAL COURT'S CLERK OF COURT AS SPECIAL DEPUTY
SHERIFF TO ISSUE NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT. The Industrial Court's order sustaining the authority of its Clerk of
Court as special deputy sheriff to serve notice of garnishment cannot be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion.
Under Republic Act 4201, the Clerk of Court of the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations was the ex-oficio sheriff. It is
true that there is no authorization in law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. But even
if there is a sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to the order of the court, it would be inequitable to issue a new
execution by the proper official considering the lapse of time during which the judgment creditor had been unable to execute
the judgment in his favor. What is important is that the judgment be executed. It would be carry technicality to an absurd
length if just because of such a mistake, assuming that it is, but undoubtedly committed in good faith, further delay would
still be imposed on the judgment creditor by characterized the order sought to be nullified as amounting to a grave abuse of
discretion.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J p:

The issue raised in this certiorari proceeding is whether or not an order of the now defunct respondent Court of Industrial
Relations denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse
of discretion. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and
executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was
the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case.
The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two, grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo
as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
garnishment "may be public in character." 3 In thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the
part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. After a
careful consideration of the matter, it is the conclusion of this Tribunal that while the authorization of respondent Lorenzo to
act as special deputy sheriff to serve the notice of garnishment may be open to objection, the more basic ground that could
have been relied upon not even categorically raised, petitioner limiting itself to the assertion that the funds "could be
public" in character, thus giving rise to the applicability of fundamental concept of non-suability is hardly persuasive. The
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it sue and be sued. 4 Whatever defect could
be attributed therefore to the order denying the motion to quash could not be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, with the lapse of time during which private respondent had been unable to execute a judgment in his favor, the
equities are on his side. Accordingly, this petition must be dismissed.
The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads
as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City
by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the
court contravenes Section 11 Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads: 'All writs and processes issued by the
Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in
the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff
of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of
garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit
in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealedCommonwealth Act No. 103, and under
this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk
of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the
whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is
national in nature. . .. At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual
employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been
dismissed and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for
withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of
merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May
6, 1970." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was
denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. prLL
As noted at the outset, the petition lacks merit.
1. The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was premised on the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited with petitioner being "public in character." There was not even a categorical assertion to that effect. It
is only the possibility of its being "public in character." The tone was thus irresolute, the approach diffident. The premise that
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations 6 is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion
of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public
funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of
the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . . , pursuant to
which the NASSCO has been established - 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law . . . . ' Accordingly, it
may sue and be sue and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as
amended." 7 The similarities between the aforesaid case and the present litigation are patent. Petitioner was similarly a
government-owned corporation. The principal respondent was the Court of Industrial Relations. The prevailing parties were
the employee of petitioner. There was likewise a writ of execution and thereafter notices of garnishment served on several
banks. There was an objection to such a move and the ruling was adverse to the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation.
Hence the filing of a petition for certiorari. To repeat, the ruling was quite categorical. Garnishment was the appropriate
remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by
the government. In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 8 this Court, through
Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank,
9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing
private corporations." 9

2. It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 10 was promulgated by the
American Supreme Court as early as 1824, the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As pointed out by
him: "It is, we think, a sound principle when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates
itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many
states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the
corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips
itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of that
character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and
exercises no other power in the management the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the incorporating
act." 11 The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation case, therefore, merely reaffirmed one of the oldest and soundest
doctrines in this branch of the law.
3. The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, 12 as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 13 did not help the
cause of petitioner at all. The decisions are not applicable is properly understood they can easily be distinguished. As is
clear in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Palacio, the Irrigation Service Unit which was sued was an office
and agency under the Department of Public Works al Communications. The Republic of the Philippines, through the then
Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of such complaint, alleging that it "has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued." 14 Such a motion to dismiss was denied. The case was tried and plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz, included as private
respondent in the Supreme Court proceeding, obtained a favorable money judgment. It became final and executory.
Thereafter, it appeared that the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the writ of execution issued by the lower court
followed by an order of garnishment. 15 Again, there was an urgent motion lift such order, but it was denied. A certiorari and
prohibition proceeding was then filed with the Court of Appeals. The legality of the issuance of such execution and
garnishment was upheld, and the matter was elevated to this Tribunal. The Republic was sustained. The infirmity of the
decision reached by the Court of Appeals, according to the opinion, could be traced to the belief that there was a waiver of
"government immunity and, by implication, consent to the suit." 16 There was no such waiver. Even if there were, it was
stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous
assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure under the legal
process. This emphatically is not the law. (Merritt v. Insular Government, 34 Phil. 311)." 17 To levy the execution of such
funds, according to him, would thus "amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law." 18 In
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, the opening paragraph of Justice Teehankee was quite specific as to why
there could be neither execution nor garnishment of the money of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways: "In this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent Court levying
upon funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, by virtue of the
fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment." 19 The funds appertained to a
governmental office, not to a government owned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical personality. In neither
case therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the funds of which could thereafter be held liable to
execution and garnishment in the event of an adverse judgment.
4. Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of
the corollaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment, refer
to Merritt v. Insular Government, decision. 20 Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the
latest case in point being Republic v. Villasor, 21 promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter if, according to
Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct
corporate existence." 23 Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what
happened in this case.
5. With the crucial issue thus resolved in favor of the correctness of the order assailed, the other objection raised, namely
that respondent Court acted erroneously in having a special sheriff serve to the writ of execution, hardly needs any
extensive discussion. It is true that in the aforesaid Commissions of Public Highways opinion, this Court held that there is no
authorization in law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. 24 In the order sought to be
nullified, the then Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of respondent Court pointed out that under a later Act, 25 the Court of
Industrial Relations Act was amended with the proviso that its Clerk of Court was the ex-oficio sheriff. The point raised in the
petition that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City that ought to have served the writ of execution would thus clearly appear
to be inconclusive. There is to be sure no thought of deviating from the principle announced in the Commissioner of Public
Highways case. That is as it ought to be. Even if, however, there is sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to
respondent Court by virtue of such a ruling, still consider all the circumstances of this case, it clearly does not call for the
nullification of the order in question. What cannot be denied that the writ of execution was issued as far back as May 5,
1970 by the then Clerk of Court of respondent Tribunal as the authorized sheriff. It would be, to say the least, unfair and
unequitable if, on the assumption that such Clerk of Court lacked such competence, a new writ of execution had to be
issued by the proper official. At any rate, what is important is that the judgment be executed. That is to achieve justice
according to law. It would be to carry technicality, therefore, to an absurd length if just because of such a mistake, assuming
that it is, but undoubtedly one committed in good faith, further delay would still be imposed on private respondent by
characterizing the order sought to be nullified amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. No costs.
||| (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-32667, [January 31, 1978], 171 PHIL 279-288)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 52179. April 8, 1991.]

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME,
JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, LAUREANO BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA
ORJA BANIA AND LYDIA R. BANIA,respondents.

Mauro C . Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.


Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the
nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his
capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang, La
Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4,
1975; July 13, 1976; August 23, 1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979; November 7,
1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana
Rimando-Bania, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia R. Bania are heirs of
the deceased Laureano Bania Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by
Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and
owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries
they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in
the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. llcd
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently
docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause
of the collision. cdll
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed
lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring the resolution of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the
trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976
filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of July
13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that parties
have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and or order to
recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and
severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Bania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta
Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B. Bania the sums of P1,500.00 as
funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Bania Sr.,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants. cdasia
"The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion which was then pending.
However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig
further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision
may be available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit,
utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the
private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to
dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to
lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and
thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to
resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of
his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by
its regular employee. cdll
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the
State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be
sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case
of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311).
(see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other
contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit
even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded
by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of America v. Guinto, supra, p.
659-660).

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599,
606), the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
"Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the
right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts
are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by
them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary
or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers
and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get
a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant
to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office. LexLib
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial
Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time
of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be
held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty
to pay monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-
suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of
liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the
petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents. SO ORDERED.
||| (Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, [April 8, 1991], 273 PHIL 56-65)
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-


appellant.

Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff.


Attorney-General Avancea for defendant.

SYLLABUS

1. DAMAGES; MEASURE OF. Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six
months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.
2. SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION. The Government of
the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States' the decisions
of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose of a special statute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an act abrogating that
immunity will be strictly construed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless
it is clearly expressed in the act.
5. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS
OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES. The Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent.

DECISION

TRENT, J p:

This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of
P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering
judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a
motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof
at a speed of ten to twelve miles and hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue,
instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of
said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without
having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post placed there.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in beck part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
"The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and
brain mass had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope
that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in
such manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound would be expose to infection, for which
reason it was of the most serious nature.
"At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby notice that the plaintiff's
leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at
the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable re-adjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a slight weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental
labor, especially when he attempted to use his memory for mathematical calculations.
"According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and
physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have
been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the
agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no
longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the
building.
"As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the engineer, Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a)
P5,000, the amount awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages
during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We fund nothing in the record which would
justify us in increasing the amount of the first. as to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and
twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was
clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of sex months. The mere fact that he remained
in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home,
would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,
without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government,
the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E.
Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the
amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be
passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in
order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede
its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor
of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is
also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render
judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions
submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
"decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the
Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such
authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and state Governments in
the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed.,
199; and Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State ( 121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to
educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance
by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In
passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
"No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance,
laces, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents." (Citing Gibbons vs. U.S., 8 Wall.,
269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N.C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am.
St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on
Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action
arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised
for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorizes officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River
and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin."
In determining the scope of this act, the court said;
"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of
the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's
immunity from suit. It simply gives authority commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts
in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of
damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not
pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's
immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long
and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere
inference but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)"
In Denning vs. state (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as
follows:
"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have claims on contract or for negligence against the
state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions
herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided."
And the court said:
"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts,
and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state
where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)"
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this
statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
"The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the state a new and
heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well
recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated."
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New
York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks; "It must be conceded
that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force
of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated,
by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the
damage. It follows therefrom that the state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part
in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the
civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights
and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of
fault or negligence; and whereas in the first articles thereof, No. 1902, where the general principle is laid
down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the
persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following article refers to third persons and
imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over
the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil
caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof,
however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called up[on to answer in a direct and
not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians
and owners or director of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts
through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.

"That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article
1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by
fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its
executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned
to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce
the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent
(and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust confided to him. this concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who in his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
(Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and
not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charge with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by
the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said
entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146)
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature
and not with the courts.
||| (Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, [March 21, 1916], 34 PHIL 311-323)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON.
ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T.
VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 79470. February 26, 1990.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER
ORASCION AND ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of
Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 80018. February 26, 1990.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F.


BOSTICK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS BAUTISTA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 80258. February 26, 1990.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E.


RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE
L. BENJAMIN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge,
Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA
FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET AL., respondents.

Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW; EMBODIED IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by
the rules of the international community.
2. ID., ID., ID., PRINCIPLE DEEMED INCORPORATED IN THE LAW OF EVERY CIVILIZED STATE; STATE IS
AUTOMATICALLY OBLIGATED TO COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLE. Even without such affirmation, we would still be
bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by
Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of
a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
4. ID., ID., APPLIES TO OFFICIALS OF THE STATE FOR ACTS PERFORMED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
5. ID., ID., NOT ABSOLUTE AND MAY BE SUED IF STATE GIVES CONSENT. The doctrine is sometimes derisively
called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against
it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling
tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which
clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
6. ID., ID., ID., CONSENT MAY BE GIVEN EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY. The consent of the state to be sued may be
manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied
when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
7. ID., ID., ID., ID., WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; INSTANCES. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is
found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied
when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
8. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., EXCEPTIONS. The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only
by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have held that not all contracts entered into
by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is
claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
9. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEEMED TO HAVE IMPLIEDLY WAIVED ITS NON-SUABILITY IF
IT HAS ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT IN ITS PROPRIETARY CAPACITY. There is no question that the United States
of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in
its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such
waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question dealt with
the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held
that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit.
10. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., CHARGES MAY NOT BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED ON MERE ASSERTION THAT ACTS ARE
IMPUTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have
acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of
evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable
to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
11. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., PETITIONERS CHARGED WITH THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW REGARDING PROHIBITED
DRUGS ARE AGENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the
individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected
with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution,
possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that
they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
12. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., SUABILITY AND LIABILITY, DIFFERENTIATED. There seems to be a failure to distinguish
between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of
the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does
not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
13. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE ESTABLISHES A RULE OF LIABILITY. The private
respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United
States government should be liable for their torts. The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The
government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of
consent.

14. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., AN AGENT PERFORMING REGULAR FUNCTIONS IS NOT A SPECIAL AGENT EVEN IF SO
DENOMINATED; ARTICLE APPLIES ONLY TO PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT. Moreover, the agent performing his regular
functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine
government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.
15. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., EXPRESS WAIVER MUST BE EFFECTED THROUGH A DULY-ENACTED STATUTE. We reject
the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of
Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v. Purisima,
express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-
enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
16. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., INQUIRY MUST BE MADE AS TO WHAT CAPACITY PETITIONERS WERE ACTING. But even
as we are certain that individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we
hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our
view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred.
Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower
court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be
presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
17. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., DOCTRINE CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE THE STATE ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT IN THE
DISCHARGE OF ITS PROPRIETARY FUNCTION; CASE AT BAR. From the circumstances, the Court can assume that
the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the
United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as
a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively
offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including
the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves
of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly
reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental
activity. The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were
acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the
United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with
Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
18. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL FOR THE UNBELIEVABLY
NAUSEATING ACT IS PROPER. The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough
investigation where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in
fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and
recommended Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly
in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still
have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
19. ID.; ID.; BARBERSHOPS ARE NOT AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
CANNOT BE INVOKED. Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions
granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of
the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. This
being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court
below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America v.
Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

DECISION

CRUZ, J p:

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America
was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to
which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges. cdll
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for
such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private
respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire
inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12 years; and Tanglao for 50 years. LLjur
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid
for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives,
petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded
to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then known as the
NCO club concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They
further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private
respondents would be notified. Cdpr
On June 30,1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners
to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain
thestatus quo.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the
ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The
individual defendants, as officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court's attention is called by the
relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government in that prior to
the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of concession, it is the Court's
understanding that neither the US Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the
employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the
employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area
Exchange. The same circumstance would become m effect when the Philippine Area Exchange opened
for bidding or solicitation the questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a
commercial transaction has been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be
entered between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover such
kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as a barber shop concession. 2
On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we
issued a temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below. 3

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa,
Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air
Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that
Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as
club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended
his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group,
PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file his complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against
the individual petitioners. 4
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that
Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by
him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent
to be sued. Cdpr
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in an order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on the allegations of the complaint which have been
hypothetically admitted by defendants upon the filing of their motion to dismiss that although
defendants acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what their functions called for
brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning.
Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were "illegal," done, with "extreme bad faith" and with
"pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss" the plaintiff, gains significance. 5
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base,
was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D.
Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
(AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers
testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then
filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed. 6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro, a special counsel assigned to the International Law Division,
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and moved for an
extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was that the Attorney General of the United
States had not yet designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being sued for their official acts. Within the
extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed
their answer. They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws
of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent the defendants, filed with leave
of court a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The ground invoked was that the defendants were
acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit
against the United States without its consent. prcd
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed
immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come
under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer. 7
Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14,
1987, a temporary restraining order. 8
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the
United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There
is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The
defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken
to the medical center for treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named defendants argued that the
suit was in effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The defendants were also
immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10, 1987, reading in part as follows:
The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue that they are immune from suit. The allegations, of the
complaint which is sought to be dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted and whatever ground the
defendants may have, had to be ventilated during the trial of the case on the merits. The complaint
alleged criminal acts against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of said acts it could
not be said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos themselves
are duty bound to respect, obey and submit themselves to the laws of the country, with more reason, the
members of the United States Armed Forces who are being treated as guests of this country should
respect, obey and submit themselves to its laws. 10
and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer as required but subsequently filed
their petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining
order on October 27, 1987. 11
II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution,
is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with
other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there
can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other practical
reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction,
the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex
the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state
to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not
absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state
may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a
general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government
"consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a
special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity
from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. 17
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the
medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. 19 As for the filing of a
complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the
defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with
more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases
which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the
control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air
space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or
appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with several other decisions, to support their position that they
are not suable in the cases below, the United States not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized
that in Baer, the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate.
More specifically, insofar as alien armed forces is concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a
1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American
army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
explicitly declared: `It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or
to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in
Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof excerpts from the works of the following authoritative
writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall, Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and McNair and Lauterpacht.
Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases
Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate.
More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding General
of the United States Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings
they owned leased to the United States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to dismiss on
the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court
in a mandamus proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering
that the `action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government.' The opinion of Justice
Montemayor continued: `It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of
Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction
was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a
citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders
more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are
so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support
thereof.' Then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, where
respondent, a United States Agency established to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines
during World War II was held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it `would eventually
be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government because . . ., the Commission
has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.' The Syquia ruling was again
explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson, involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor launch,
plus damages, the special defense interposed being `that the vessel belonged to the United States
Government, that the defendants merely acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States
Government is therefore the real party in interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien Property Administration v.
Castelo, where it was held that a suit against Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the
United States involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy Act is in substance a suit
against the United States. To the same effect is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the
opinion of Justice Tuazon clearly shows: `It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is
made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign state may not be
brought to suit before the courts of another state or its own courts without its consent.' Finally, there is
Johnson v. Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then Commanding General, Philippine Command (Air
Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision ordering the return to plaintiff of the confiscated military
payment certificates known as scrip money. In reversing the lower court decision, this Tribunal, through
Justice Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, explaining why it could not be sustained. LLphil
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity
for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official
functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in United States of America v.
Ruiz, 22 where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay.
As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and
evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily
dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its
consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States
itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any authority whatsoever, appropriated private land and
converted it into public irrigation ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly taken by him, he moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had not given its consent to be
sued. This Court sustained the denial of the motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was not applicable. The
director was being sued in his private capacity for a personal tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the cases at hand.
III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the
exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and
prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial
capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as
agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were,
legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of
that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts.
The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special
agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the
United States government should be liable for their torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the two terms are
synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that
the defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first
allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at
bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and,
hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge
Advocate of Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v.
Purisima, 25 express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected
through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier
discussed. Cdpr
But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official
functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case
deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be
presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center, also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner
Lamachia is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual income of $2 million. Under his executive
management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier
cage, an administrative office, and a decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in
resale items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States government has
concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services
are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United
States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that
they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit
John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in
ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly
operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of
the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as
agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States
government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the
discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be
dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation where it was established
beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the
definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective
bargaining agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's
dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the private
respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his
complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide
for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military
organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.
Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial
business, presumably for the benefit of his customers . No less significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop
concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed
commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the
court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America
v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as we have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for
the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive that evidence
first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case
must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

IV
There are a number of other cases now pending before us which also involve the question of the immunity of the United
States from the jurisdiction of the Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as they mar the traditional friendship between
two countries long allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the so-called "irritants" in their relations will be resolved
in a spirit of mutual accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and asperity of litigation and always with justice
to both parties.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and
decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and
decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED. LibLex
All without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, 79470, 80018, 80258, [February 26, 1990], 261 PHIL 777-802)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003.]

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER


COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name
and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES,respondent.

Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco for petitioners.


Fornier Fornier Sao & Lagumbay Law Firm for J. Vinzon.

SYNOPSIS

In August 1995, petitioner Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement for its specified buildings in the
embassy with respondent James Vinzon as sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The said Agreement was effective
for four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice
from the date of expiry. Before August 1999, respondent was informed that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, petitioner Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim. On August 31, 2000, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the said agreement. Respondent claimed that the said termination was arbitrary and
unlawful. Thus, he filed a complaint against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145. In response,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss by alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has sovereign immunity from suit and that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim enjoy diplomatic immunity. The trial court denied petitioners' motion
to dismiss. The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioners' petition for certiorariand prohibition in relation thereto. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
The Court held that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. In this case, there is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic
mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign state does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts
with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents
and officials. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian
ambassador.
Moreover, the act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance
Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Accordingly, the petition was granted and the complaint against petitioners was dismissal.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY; NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE


PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE AND EQUALITY OF STATES. International law is founded largely upon the principles
of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article
II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical justification
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as
expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. A contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
2. ID.; ID.; RECOGNIZED WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC ACTS ONLY. The rules of International Law, however, are neither
unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities
remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.
This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT BY FOREIGN STATE WITH PRIVATE PARTY CANNOT BE THE
ULTIMATE TEST OF WHETHER OR NOT IT IS A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ACT. In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we
held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the
other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American
servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of
barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City. Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an actjure imperii or jure gestionis.
Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign
State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so
engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or
an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
4. ID.; ID.; PROVISION IN A CONTRACT THAT ANY LEGAL ACTION ARISING OUT OF THE AGREEMENT SHALL BE
SETTLED ACCORDING TO PHILIPPINE LAWS IS NOT A WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. [T]he
existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign
immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the
other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or
otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include
Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no
proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBMISSION BY A FOREIGN STATE TO LOCAL JURISDICTION MUST BE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by
necessary implication. CaDSHE
6. ID.; ID.; MAINTENANCE OF THE PREMISES, FURNISHINGS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE EMBASSY AND THE LIVING
QUARTERS OF THE AGENTS AND OFFICIALS OF A FOREIGN STATE IS A PUBLIC ACT. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic
mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence,
the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy
and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy
and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. cSATEH
7. ID.; VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; IMMUNITY FROM SUITS OF DIPLOMATIC, AGENTS,
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides: " . . . 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State
for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. . . .
" The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratinin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is
not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision. The Solicitor General believes that said act may
fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages
in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2002 and its
Resolution dated August 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66894 entitled "The Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counselor Azhari Kasim v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch
145, Makati City, and James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and Services."

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in
August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement
stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy
Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by
the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor
pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself
automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. 1
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the
position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not
in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. 2 Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed
respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent cites various
circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners' alleged dissatisfaction over respondent's services: (a) in July 2000,
Minister Counsellor Kasim still requested respondent to assign to the embassy an additional full-time worker to assist one of
his other workers; (b) in August 2000, Minister Counsellor Kasim asked respondent to donate a prize, which the latter did,
on the occasion of the Indonesian Independence Day golf tournament; and (c) in a letter dated August 22, 2000, petitioner
Ambassador Soeratmin thanked respondent for sponsoring a prize and expressed his hope that the cordial relations happily
existing between them will continue to prosper and be strengthened in the coming years.
Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint 3 against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that
the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-
defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are
diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic
immunity. 4 In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance
Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."
Respondent's Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and
held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith. 5
On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition
for certiorariand prohibition. Said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66894, alleged that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and
jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their
immunity from suit.
On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision denying the petition for lack of merit. 6 On August 16,
2002, it denied herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 7
Hence, this petition.
In the case at bar, petitioners raise the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's
decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.
The petition is impressed with merit.
International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which
were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. 8 The rule that a State may
not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. 9 As
enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, 10 the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be
no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is
derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 11 A contrary attitude would "unduly vex the
peace of nations." 12
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign
States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. 13
In United States v. Ruiz, 14 for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United
States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in
the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City, 15 as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City. 16
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as
the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the
foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or
commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii. 17
Hence, the existence alone, of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be
settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local
courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to
include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may
have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. AEaSTC
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication. We find no such waiver in this case.
Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function. On the other hand, he argues
that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and
equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State. 18
We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State
does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses
its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that
petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent
for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water
motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, "the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the
Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit." As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor General states that it
"was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine
laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be
the agreed venue thereof. 19

On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in
their private capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:
xxx xxx xxx
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
in the receiving State outside his official functions.
xxx xxx xxx
The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is
not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, 20 but said provision clearly applies
only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions,
which is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
66894 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioners is
DISMISSED. EcIaTA
No costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, [June 26, 2003], 452 PHIL 1100-1111)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs.HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779-M of
the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment,
NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines. LLpr
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company.
The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its
bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States'
bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial
stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the
petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance
was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the
subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions
of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The
defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit. LexLib
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules
of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].) 2006cdtai
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the
defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non-governmental acts." (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also
said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a
governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his
reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
'It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the
state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be
implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its
agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor
services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action
before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case . . .'" (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The court
granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit;
and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated
to this Court for review. cdrep
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
"It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI
of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated
differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the lower
court acted properly in dismissing this case." (At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiterso that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment
buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the
premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments
shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the
plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
"On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party
defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or
increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-
defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar
already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against
the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila
have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was
raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent
to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support
thereof." (At p. 323.) LLphil

In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United States
was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and
not for jure gestionis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-
M is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissents:

The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be
allowed to continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the contract entered into between the plaintiff
(Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant (U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay area,
this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the United States Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into
a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a U.S. Navy
Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may
assume under the contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for
the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the
mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore,
is implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation in the case at
bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by the United States government, through its agency at Subic
Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking
refuge behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and
without redress in his own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to
act in its name. cdll
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:
"Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such
rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts with the citizens
of the court's jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all principles of decency and violative
of all tenets of morals.
"Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable as well with regard to private
individuals as with regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign government enters
into a private contract with the private citizens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield
its non-performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of non-jurisdiction. To
place such foreign government beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the
execution of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish as 'contratos leoninos,' because one
party gets the lion's share to the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to sanctify bad
faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis that all parties in a private contract, including
governments and the most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and that such contracts are
enforceable through the help of the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of
such contracts if the same had been entered into only by private individuals."
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our
sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether
naval, air or ground forces because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of
seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United States
government, always looms large, thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in
our own country by United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies
operating in the Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be over emphasized. Whether the parties are
nations or private individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the contract will
be complied with in good faith.
One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like the United States of America, can always
overwhelm small and weak nations. The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states are equal and
sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding economic and military superiority impose upon
and dictate to small nations, subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not, when U.S.
interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the American governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of
international law for their own benefit.
In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein
private respondent on the other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance. The opinion of the majority will
certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations. American authorities or any foreign government in
the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently seek protective cover under the
majority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines. LibLex
This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters economic imperialism and foreign political
ascendancy in our Republic.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on
a citizen (Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, L-31635,
August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States government, through its naval authorities at Subic
Bay, should be held amenable to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord with paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US
Military Bases Agreement of March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, powers and
authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably. . . ." (italics supplied).
Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, which recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices which will
assure equality of treatment of all employees . . . and continuing favorable employer-employee relations . . ." and
"(B)elieving that an agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions cherished by both
Governments, . . . the United States Government agrees to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the Bases,
thus (1) the U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, etc."
(Par. 1, Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).
Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the
aforesaid amendment of May 27, 1968 which directs that "contractors and concessionaires performing work for the U.S.
Armed Forces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to comply with all applicable Philippine labor
laws and regulations," even though paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver by
either of the two Governments of such immunity under international law."
Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government before the local courts, actually clashes with
No. III on respect for Philippine law of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also amending RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of members of the United States Forces, the civilian
component and their dependents, to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines.
The United States shall take all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them" (italics supplied). cdll
The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further emphasized by No. IV on the economic and
social improvement of areas surrounding the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States Forces shall procure
goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum extent feasible" (italics supplied).
Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6, 1979 in connection with the discussions on
possible revisions or alterations of the Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the
principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the
Republic of the Philippines" (italics supplied).

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint statement of President Marcos and Vice-
President Mondale of the United States dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty
extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed
to underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they
affirm that sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of all States are fundamental principles which
both countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall
characterize their friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries."
The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers, duties and responsibilities of both the
Philippine and American Base Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base Commander and
the American Base Commander shall be guided by full respect for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the
assurance of unhampered U.S. military operations on the other hand;" and that "they shall promote cooperation,
understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and with the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2
& par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, italics supplied).
||| (US v. V.M. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, [May 22, 1985], 221 PHIL 179-191)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6060. September 30, 1954.]

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-


appellant, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.

Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar, for appellant.


Ernesto Zaragoza, for appellee.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, for the intervenor.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION; COUNTERCLAIM NOT BARRED BY


PRIOR JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION WITH
RESERVATION. An order dismissing the complaint in intervention after a counterclaim has been filed but reserving
the right of the defendant as against the intervenor, does not bar at the defendant from proceeding with its counterclaim
against the intervenor, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to appeal from said order.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTERCLAIM FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION. The
complaint in the intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff, which claim is
adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the plaintiff, on the
theory that the latter had already lost his rights over the same, and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on
the charter contract executed in its favor by the intervenor. Held: The counterclaim calls for specific performance on the
part of the intervenor and therefore states a cause of action.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF COMPLAINT N INTERVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS WAIVER OF
NONSUABILITY. The filing by the Government of a complaint in intervention is in effect a wavier of its right of
nonsuability.

DECISION
PARAS, C.J p:

The factual antecedents of this case are sufficiently recited in the brief filed by the intervenor-appellee as
follows:
"1. On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the
defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping
Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel
mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for various reasons, among them the
non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said
vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines; that he appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting on August 25, 1950, the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his
original contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore,
prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for
the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be
adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof (Rec. on App. pp. 2-8).
"2. On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by
virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel (Rec. on App.
p. 47).
"3. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to
the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring
Froilan to his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that, in
any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by the Cabinet for the
restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it suffered damages in the amount of
P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as
damages suffered for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary
and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to retain said vessel
until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed (Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).
"4. On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-
appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that
Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping
Administration) the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the interest excluding
the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the session of the said vessel either under the
terms of the original contract as supplemented by Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that
it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that
Froilan be declared to be without any rights on said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or
alternately that the said vessel be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may
have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the merits, the said vessel be delivered to its (Rec. on
App. pp. 54-66).
"5. On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in
intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the
vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on
June 16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful
expenses of the vessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the
Republic vessel, to comply with its obligations of delivering to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) or causing its
delivery by recovering it from Froilan (Rec. on App. pp. 69-81).
"6. On November 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating
the affairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount of P162,576.96 in payment of his
obligation to the Shipping Administration for the said vessel as claimed in the complaint in intervention of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Board of Liquidators issued an official report
therefor stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila' (Rec. on App. pp. 92-93).
"7. On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines brought the matter
of said payment and the circumstances surrounding it to the attention of the lower court 'in order that they
may be taken into account by this Honorable Court in connection with question that are now pending
before it for determination' (Rec. on App. pp. 82-86).
"8. On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the amount of
P162,576.96 On November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and a discharge
of Froilan's obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and ordered the dismissal of
the latter's complaint in intervention. In the same order, the lower court made it very clear that said order
did not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan and the Oriental Shipping Co. which was also
pending determination in said court (Rec. on App. pp. 92-93). This order dismissing the complaint in
intervention, but reserving for future adjudication the controversy between Froilan and the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. had already become final since neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
nor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed therefrom.
"9. On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss
the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground that the purpose of said
counterclaim was to compel the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver the vessel to it
(Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines recovers
the vessel in question from Froilan. In view, however, of the order of the order of the lower court dated
February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by Froilan's obligation to the Shipping Administration,
which order had already become final, the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the
Republic of the Philippines was no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and
stated no cause of action. It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court
in connection with the counterclaim. (Rec. on App. pp. 94-97). This motion was opposed by the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952 (Rec. on App. pp. 19-104).
"10. In an order dated July 1, 1952, the lower court dismissed the counterclaim of the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. as prayed for by the Republic of the Philippines (Rec. App. pp. 104-106).
"11. It is from this order of the lower court dismissing its counterclaim against the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines that Pan Oriental Shipping Co. has perfected the present appeal (Rec.
App. pp. 107)."
The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., from which the latter has appealed, reads as follows:
"This is a motion to dismiss the counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its answer to the
complaint in intervention.
"The counterclaim stated as follows:
'COUNTERCLAIM
'As counterclaim against the intervenor Republic of the Philippines, the defendant
alleges:

'1. That the defendant reproduces herein all the pertinent allegations of the foregoing
answer to the complaint in intervention.
'2. That, as shown by the allegations of the foregoing answer to the complaint in
intervention, the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Company is entitled to the possession of the
vessel and the intervenor Republic of the Philippines is bound under the contract of charter with
option to purchase it entered into with the defendant to deliver that possession to the defendant
whether it actually has the said possession from the plaintiff Fernando A. Froilan and deliver
the same to the defendant;
'3. That, notwithstanding demand, the intervenor Republic of the Philippines has not to
date complied with its obligation of delivering or causing the delivery of the vessel to the
defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Company.
'RELIEF
'WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully prays that judgment be rendered ordering the
intervenor Republic of the Philippines alternatively to deliver to the defendants the possession of
the said vessel, or to comply with its obligation to the defendant causing the delivery to the latter
of the said vessel by recovering the same from plaintiff, with costs.
'The defendant prays for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in
the premises."
"The ground of the motion to dismiss are (a) That the cause of action is barred by prior judgment;
(b) That the counterclaim stated no cause of action; (c) That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over
the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the counterclaim of the
defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
"The intervenor contends that the complaint in intervention having been dismissed and no appeal
having been taken, the dismissal of said complaint is tantamount to a judgment.
"The complaint in intervention did not contain any claim whatsoever against the defendant Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.; hence, the counterclaim has no foundation.
"The question as to whether the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim, the Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over said intervenor.
"It appearing, therefore, that the grounds of the motion to dismiss are well taken, the
counterclaim of the defendant is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs."
The defendant's appeal is predicated upon the following assignments of error:
"I. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of prior judgment.
II. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the counterclaim had
no foundation because made to a complaint in intervention that over the intervenor Republic of the
Philippines.
III. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of the Philippines."
We agree with appellant's contention that its counterclaim is not barred by prior judgment (order of February 8,
1952, dismissing the complaint in intervention), first, because said counterclaim was filed on November 29, 1951,
before the issuance of the order invoked; and, secondly, because in said order of February 8, the court dismissed the
complaint in intervention, "without, of course, precluding the determination of the right of the defendant in the instant
case," and subject to the condition that the "release and cancellation of the chattel mortgage does not, however,
prejudge the question involved between the plaintiff and the defendant which is still the subject of determination in this
case." It is to be noted that the first condition referred to the right of the defendant, as distinguished from the second
condition that expressly specified the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant. That the first condition
reserved the right of the defendant as against the intervenor, is clearly to be deduced from the fact that the order of
February 8 mentioned the circumstance that "the question of the expenses of drydocking incurred by the counterclaim
against the plaintiff," apparently as one of the grounds for granting the motion to dismiss the complaint in intervention.
The defendant's failure to appeal from the order of February 8 cannot, therefore, be held as barring the
defendant from proceeding with its counterclaim, since, as already stated, said order preserved its right as against the
intervenor. Indeed, the maintenance of said right is in consonance with Rule 30, section 2, of the Rules of Court
providing that "if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion
to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court."
The lower court also erred in holding that, as the intervenor had not made any claim against the defendant, the
latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in
question from the plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a
better right to said possession than the plaintiff who alleges in his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from
the defendant. At any rate a counterclaim should judge by its own allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse
party. It should be recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his rights under the contract
with the Shipping Administration and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter contract executed in
its favor by the intervenor which is bound to protect the defendant in its possession of the vessel. In other words, the
counter-claim calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor. As to whether this counterclaim is meritorious
is another question is not now before us.
The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim is that the State is immune from suit. This is
untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability.
"The immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in
its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private
litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defense he might have against the state. The
United States Supreme Court thus explains:
'No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is
brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim
against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in
a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'". (Sinco, Philippine Political
Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37. citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff
against whom the complainant in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the
complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in
question.
Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. So ordered, without costs.
||| (Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., G.R. No. L-6060, [September 30, 1954], 95 PHIL 905-913)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.]

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public


Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

Quirico del Mar, Domingo Antigua, Antonio Paulin and N. Capangpangan for plaintiff and appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo Torres and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for defendants and appellees.
SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; PROJECT USED BY GOVERNMENT FOR ROAD PURPOSES; RIGHTS OR
REGISTERED OWNER TO DUE COMPENSATION ANYTIME. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring
an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at
this time because it has been and is now being used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DAMAGES. The owner of the land is entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on
the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the
government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR DUE COMPENSATION. To determine the due compensation for the land appropriated by the
Government, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the
plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to
her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike
the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the
formal construction in 1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his
9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office
of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion
of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of
the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first
with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the
plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to
be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the
construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded
to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a
money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction
over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to
Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land
used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there said:
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily
dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the
same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance of procedural
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that
precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would
stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the
part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked."
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not
executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole
lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the
time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, [February 29, 1972], 150 PHIL 422-427)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991.]

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO


SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent.

H .B . Basco & Associates for petitioners.


Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aquirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF STATUTE; MUST BE INDULGED IN FAVOR OF ITS


CONSTITUTIONALITY. As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence,
that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say
that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter,
has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall
heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra). In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et
al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the ". . . thoroughly established principle which must be
followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539,
Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970];
Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983]
cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540). cdasia
2. ID.; IN NULLIFYING A LAW, IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THERE IS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE
CONSTITUTION. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387;
Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD
1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec,
supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for
such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality,
monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational
values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
3. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE MAY BE BRUSHED ASIDE FOR THE
PROPER EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS. Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of theConstitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371) "With particular regard to the requirement of proper
party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each
of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of
and even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
"In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that 'the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must technicalities of procedure.' We have since then applied the exception in many other cases." (Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
4. ID.; ID.; NO POWER TO SETTLE POLICY ISSUES. Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed
trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization"
suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the
government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. "The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power." (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256.) LLphil
5. ID.; CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER; CONSTRUED. The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386). Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra). It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the
plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the
very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary
power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is
a power co-extensive with self-protection. and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v.
National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change.
6. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (P.D. NO. 1869); PURPOSE FOR ITS CREATION. P.D.
1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to
the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government.
It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of
the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the
Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
7. ID.; DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO IMPOSE TAXES AND LOCAL
FEES; REASONS THEREFOR. Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila
to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They
must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) ofP.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax
of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons: (a) The City of Manila, being a mere
Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva,
105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent
power to tax" (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to
"create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67;
Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. (c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is
no longer vested in the City of Manila. (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares
of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also
exercises regulatory powers. cda

8. ID.; EXEMPT FROM LOCAL TAXES; REASONS THEREOF. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. "The states have
no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government." (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579). This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local
governments. "Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part
of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254
US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to
prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them ."
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140) Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activates or enterprise using the power to tax as "a
tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to
destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which
has the inherent power to wield it.
9. ID.; NOT A VIOLATION OF THE LOCAL AUTONOMY CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION. The power of local
government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD
1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 436-
436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make
local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." "Local Government has been described as a
political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can
only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. As to what state powers should be "decentralized"
and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a
political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539). What is settled is
that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
10. ID.; NOT A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution,because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are
outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this
contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The
clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in
equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R.
No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting ( P.D. 449),
horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional. "If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) "The equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state
may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is
not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican
Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651)
11. ID.; PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 "Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has,
in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been
violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may
possibly offend some provisions of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main
put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly
addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather
to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress." cda
PADILLA, J., concurring:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; VESTED WITH POWER TO DECIDE STATE
POLICY. J. Padilla concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I
agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as
gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative
and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full
responsibility to the people for such policy. The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or
expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except
only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not
involve such a factual situation.
2. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; MUST OUTLAW ALL FORMS OF GAMBLING, AS A FUNDAMENTAL STATE OF
POLICY; REASON THEREFOR. J. Padilla hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It
demeans the human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the long run will
corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and
homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real
economic progress and national development. Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized.
The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated
by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values. Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals
against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to
eradicate. One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling,
which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known as prostitution. Would
prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in
return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and
social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all
forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be
for the nation.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived
the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
"B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the
local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
"D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization." (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new
restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling
objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article
XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo). cdasia
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman
of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1,
1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted
in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential
source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for
PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
"Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in
order to attain the following objectives:
"(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one
corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
"(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming
pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including
games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and
which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such
as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,
Nutritional Programs Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation
and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3)
minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on
the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement."
(Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing
clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a
total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share.
In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families. LLjur
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being
"contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the
equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article
XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the
Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which
belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We
need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be
valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its
authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending
statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the
". . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must
negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency
of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted." (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539, Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660,
663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540).
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the
instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371) dctai
"With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that
the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of and even if,
strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
"In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that
they were not proper parties and ruled that 'the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.' We have since then applied the exception in many other cases." (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that
the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.
(Edu v. Ericta, supra).
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing
power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection. and is most aptly termed the
"law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to
the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government.
It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of
the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the
Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. llcd
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that
the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par.
(2) of P.D. 1869which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
"(2) Income and other taxes. (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lien of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national government authority" (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83
Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12
SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p.
445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v.
Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No.
9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and
was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
"Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other
local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish
horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
"Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race
tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper
application and verification of the qualification of the applicant. . . ."
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is
no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers, thus:
"Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and
shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange
Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited
to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure,
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation." cdtai
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in
the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR
should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
"The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard impede, burden or in any manner control
the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
federal government." (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
"Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the
part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed thatno state or political subdivision can regulate
a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or
even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2,
p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may
perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US
42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a
pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
"Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government." (emphasis supplied).

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by
law. SincePD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution),
its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees.
It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. cdll
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II,
First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
"Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the
government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a
system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter
of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is
the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
"As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is
generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of
express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the
state laws are void." (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC
757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc
Quinllan Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied).
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized
PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of
the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained
in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting ( P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as
amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
"The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the
same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as
evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the
public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican Hotel v.
Arizana, 249 US 2651)
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and
crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to
nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to
recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. LLpr
"The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power." (Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256.)
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
"Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." (Art. XII, National Economy and
Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state
must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy
for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-
executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. cdrep
"In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the Courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available
remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot." (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48
SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In
other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to
free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being
raised, is up for Congress to determine. LLjur
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
"Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identity the provisions in the Constitution which they claim
to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine
how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes,
further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and
expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and
which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the
political departments of government: the President and the Congress."
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to
is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but
also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook-on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their
material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly
attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same
consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex. prcd
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
||| (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 91649, [May 14, 1991], 274 PHIL 323-346)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,


SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-005") and
Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 ("Resolution No. 01-006") of respondent Commission on Elections
("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while
Resolution No. 01-006 declared "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona
who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84")
certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a
special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which
ends on 30 June 2004. 2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte),
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No.
01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President." 3 Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a
single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes
a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No.
6645"); 4 (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or
regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No.
6646"). 6 Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that "there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term." 7
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the
documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections
simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by
Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the
Senate. 8 Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections.
COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. 9
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006
declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their
oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition impleading
Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the
contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator
Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of
the petition and on petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction.
For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only
involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held
on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to
oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. 10 Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning is the
validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners' various prayers are, namely: (1) a
"declaration" that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin
COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-
006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers
on COMELEC's alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly
then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasan's right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners' prayer for
the annulment of Honasan's proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners' cause of action.
Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July
2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot
and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened
to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11 Consequently,
the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. 12 However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. 13 Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, 14 we took
cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK") on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted
in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled "is likely to arise in every SK elections and
yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections," the mootness of the petition is no bar to its
resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a
vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC's failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election
is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners' Standing
Honasan questions petitioners' standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not
claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury
because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.

"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. 15 The requirement of standing, which necessarily
"sharpens the presentation of issues," 16 relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies. 17 Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 18
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as
voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance."
This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who
voted in that election. 19 Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due
course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] '. . . extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power' or that there [was] misapplication of such
funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose." 20
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters'
suits involving the right of suffrage. 21 Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 22 we gave
the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity
of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to
conduct patrols even though the IBP presented "too general an interest." We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry . . . .
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the
court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues
involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the
House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold
a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence
of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if
within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. . . . In case a permanent vacancy shall occur
in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the
Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor
longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election .
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to
the voters of, among other things, the office or offices; to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular elections, comply
with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing
which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a
special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of
votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC's failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly
rendered Honasan's proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the
special election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner
by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election
Did Not Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity. 26 In a general election,
where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
election. 27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall
be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged
by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. 28 This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate
from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority 29 and the law thus charges voters with knowledge
of the time and place of the election. 30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix
the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. 31

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to
fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to
fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be
held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy
should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of
COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for
COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to
hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district
involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELEC's Failure
to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled
and the Manner of Determining the
Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is
whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special
election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special
election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. 32
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC
will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections
scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th
highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's failure to give
this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took place. This
bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14
May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-
President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of
formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the
office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice
could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during
the campaign. 33
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant
petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission
prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this
Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is "impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are
unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise." 34
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorate's will and let the results of the election stand, despite
irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. 35 This is but to acknowledge the purpose and role of
elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall
be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal
voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no
frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null.
Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere
irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible . A different rule
would make themanner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than
the duty itself. 36 (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on
14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the
votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices
to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and
on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced.
These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the
procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by
Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator
Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to
amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco
introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further
inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934
[later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the Body,
the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND
CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY
THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON
MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED
TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a
term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator
Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the
members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on
February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective
Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be
held on the second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy
through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator
thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of
the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]


Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat
in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was then
Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had to
cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or
rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24
candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year
term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the 13th
largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an election
for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission
on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13th
largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it
not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think
it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can . . . No, this is not a Concurrent
Resolution. aTcIEH
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a
resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the
vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice
President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up
would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a
manner.
xxx xxx xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the
simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose.
So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less
expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election,
maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be
held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that
there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will be running with
specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other
amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxx xxx xxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved. 37
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special election within the
confines ofR.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has
consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate
of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do
not constitute grave abuse of discretion. 38 COMELEC's decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13 November
1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate
exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial
elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That
COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion.
As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. 39
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information regarding a
special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the
present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special
senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to
comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and
special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., Ynares-Santiago, and Tinga, JJ., join Justice Puno's dissent.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., dissenting:

The case at bar transcends the political fortunes of respondent Senator Gregorio B. Honasan. At issue is the right of the
people to elect their representatives on the basis and only on the basis of an informed judgment. The issue strikes at
the heart of democracy and representative government for without this right, the sovereignty of the people is a mere
chimera and the rule of the majority will be no more than mobocracy. To clarify and sharpen the issue, I shall first unfurl the
facts.
I. Facts
The facts are undisputed. In February 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30, 2004 was vacated with the
appointment of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President of the Philippines. The Senate adopted Resolution
No. 84 certifying "the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up
such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001, and the senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." In the deliberations of the Senate on the resolution, the body agreed that the procedure it adopted
for determining the winner in the special election was for the "guidance" and "implementation" of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC had no discretion to alter the procedure.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired three-year term in the special
election. Allthe senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the twelve regular Senate seats to be vacated on
June 30, 2001 with a six-year term expiring on June 30, 2007. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents such as
the Voter Information Sheet, List of Candidates and Sample Ballot. The List of Candidates did not indicate a separate list of
candidates for the special election. TheSample Ballot and the official ballots did not provide two different categories of
Senate seats to be voted, namely the twelve regular six-year term seats and the single three-year term seat. Nor did the
ballots provide a separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election and instead provided thirteen spaces
for thirteen senatorial seats.
Without any COMELEC resolution or notice on the time, place and manner of conduct of the special election, the special
election for senator was held on the scheduled May 14, 2001 regular elections. A single canvass of votes for a single list of
senatorial candidates was done. On June 5, 2001, respondent COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. NBC01-
005, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of
Canvassers hereby proclaims the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly elected Senators of
the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the Certificates of Canvass finally tabulated, the
first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall
serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who was appointed Vice-
President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9,
Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (emphasis supplied)
On June 21, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court their petition for prohibition to stop respondent COMELEC from
proclaiming any senatorial candidate in the May 14, 2001 election as having been elected for the lone senate seat for a
three-year term. Copies of the petition were served on respondent COMELEC twice, first on June 20, 2001 by registered
mail, and second on June 21, 2001, by personal delivery of petitioner Mojica. On June 26, 2001 the Court issued a
Resolution requiring respondent COMELEC to comment within ten days from notice. Even before filing its comment,
respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. NBC-01-006 on July 20, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
hereby DECLARES official and final the above ranking of the proclaimed 13 Senators of the Philippines
in relation to NBC Resolution No. 01-005 promulgated June 5, 2001.
Resolution No. NBC-01-006 indicates the following ranking of the 13 Senators with the corresponding votes they
garnered as of June 20, 2001:
1. De Castro, Noli L. 16,237,386
2. Flavier, Juan M. 11,735,897
3. Osmea, Sergio II R. 11,593,389
4. Drilon, Franklin M. 11,301,700
5. Arroyo, Joker P. 11,262,402
6. Magsaysay, Ramon Jr. B. 11,250,677
7. Villar, Manuel Jr. B. 11,187,375
8. Pangilinan, Francis N. 10,971,896
9. Angara, Edgardo J. 10,805,177
10. Lacson, Panfilo M. 10,535,559
11. Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa P. 10,524,130
12. Recto, Ralph 10,498,940
13. Honasan, Gregorio 10,454,527
On the day of its promulgation, respondent COMELEC forwarded Resolution No. NBC-01-006 to the President of the
Senate. On July 23, 2001, the thirteen senators, inclusive of respondents Honasan and Recto, took their oaths of office
before the Senate President.
With the turn of events after the filing of the petition on June 20, 2001, the Court ordered petitioners on March 5, 2002 and
September 17, 2002 to amend their petition. In their amended petition, petitioners assailed the manner by which the special
election was conducted citing as precedents the 1951 and 1955 special senatorial elections for a two-year term which were
held simultaneously with the regular general elections for senators with six year terms, viz:
(a) A vacancy in the Senate was created by the election of Senator Fernando Lopez as Vice-President in
the 1949 elections. A special election was held in November 1951 to elect his successor to the vacated
Senate position for a term to expire on 30 December 1953. Said special election was held simultaneously
with the regular election of 1951. A separate space in the official ballot was provided for Senatorial
candidates for the two year term; moreover, the candidates for the single Senate term for two years filed
certificates of candidacy separate and distinct from those certificates of candidacy filed by the group of
Senatorial candidates for the six year term.
(. . . the votes for the twenty (20) candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the eight Senate seats
with six year terms were tallied and canvassed separately from the votes for the five candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for the single Senate seat with a two year term . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Again, a vacancy was created in the Senate by the election of then Senator Carlos P. Garcia to the
Vice Presidency in the 1953 presidential elections. A special election was held in November 1955 to elect
his successor to the vacated Senatorial position for atwo year term expiring on 30 December 1957.
Said special election for one senator to fill the vacancy left by the Honorable Carlos Garcia was held in
November 1955 simultaneously with the regular election for eight Senate seats with a six year term.
Here, separate spaces were provided for in the official ballot for the single Senate seat for the two year
term as differentiated from the eight Senate seats with six year terms. The results as recorded by Senate
official files show that votes for the candidates for the Senate seat with a two-year term were separately
tallied from the votes for the candidates for the eight Senate seats with six-year term . . . 1 (emphases
supplied)
Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the following:
(a) that no special election was conducted by respondent COMELEC for the single Senate seat with a
three year term in the 14 May 2001 election.
(b) null and void respondent COMELEC's Resolutions No. NBC01-005 dated 5 June 2001 and NBC01-
006 dated 20 July 2001 for having been promulgated without any legal authority at all insofar as
said resolutions proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the thirteenth highest number of
votes canvassed during the 14 May 2001 election as a duly elected Senator. 2
Respondents filed their respective comments averring the following procedural flaws: (1) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the petition for quo warranto; (2) the petition is moot; and (3) the petitioners have no standing to litigate. On the merits, they
all defend the validity of the special election on the ground that the COMELEC had discretion to determine the manner by
which the special election should be conducted and that the electorate was aware of the method the COMELEC had
adopted. Moreover, they dismiss the deviations from the election laws with respect to the filing of certificates of candidacy
for the special elections and the failure to provide in the official ballot a space for the special election vote separate from the
twelve spaces for the regular senatorial election votes as inconsequential. They claim that these laws are merely directory
after the election.
II. Issues
The issues for resolution are procedural and substantive. I shall limit my humble opinion to the substantive issue of whether
a special election for the single Senate seat with a three-year term was validly held simultaneous with the general elections
on May 14, 2001.
III. Laws on the Calling of Special Elections
Section 9, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the filling of a vacancy in the Senate and House of
Representatives, viz:
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, "An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filling a Vacancy in the Congress of the Philippines," to
implement this constitutional provision. The law provides, viz:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold
a special election to fill such vacancy. If the Congress is in recess, an official communication on the
existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things, the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That
if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election.
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for
due distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer of each province or city concerned,
who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many
conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public
markets, and in the municipal buildings. (emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166 which provides in Section 4, viz:
SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Election. The postponement, declaration
of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of
the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
members . . .
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (emphases supplied)

IV. Democracy and Republicanism


The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. In this case of first impression, however, the distance between
existing jurisprudence and the resolution of the issue presented to the Court cannot be negotiated through a straight and
direct line of reasoning. Rather, it is necessary to journey through a meandering path and unearth the root principles of
democracy, republicanism, elections, suffrage, and freedom of information and discourse in an open society. As a first step
in this indispensable journey, we should traverse the democratic and republican landscape to appreciate the importance
of informed judgment in elections.
A. Evolution of Democracy from Plato to Locke
to Jefferson and Contemporary United States of America
In the ancient days, democracy was dismissed by thoughtful thinkers. Plato deprecated democracy as rule by the masses.
He warned that if all the people were allowed to rule, those of low quality would dominate the state by mere numerical
superiority. He feared that the more numerous masses would govern with meanness and bring about a "tyranny of the
majority." Plato predicted that democracies would be short-lived as the mob would inevitably surrender its power to a single
tyrant, and put an end to popular government. Less jaundiced than Plato was Aristotle's view towards democracy. Aristotle
agreed that under certain conditions, the will of the many could be equal to or even wiser than the judgment of the few.
When the many governed for the good of all, Aristotle admitted that democracy is a good form of government. But still and
all, Aristotle preferred a rule of the upper class as against the rule of the lower class. He believed that the upper class could
best govern for they represent people of the greatest refinement and quality.
In the Middle Ages, Europe plunged when the Roman Empire perished. Europe re-emerged from this catastrophe largely
through reliance on the scientific method which ultimately ushered the Industrial Revolution. Material success became the
engine which drove the people to search for solutions to their social, political and economic problems. Using the scythe of
science and reason, the thinkers of the time entertained an exaggerated notion of individualism. They bannered the idea
that all people were equal; no one had a greater right to rule than another. Dynastical monarchy was taboo. As all were
essentially equal, no one enjoyed the moral right to govern another without the consent of the governed . The people
therefore were the source of legitimate legal and political authority. This theory of popular sovereignty revived an interest in
democracy in the seventeenth century. The refinements of the grant of power by the people to the government led to
the social contract theory: that is, the social contract is the act of people exercising their sovereignty and creating a
government to which they consent. 3
Among the great political philosophers who spurred the evolution of democratic thought was John Locke (1632-1704). In
1688, the English revolted against the "Catholic tyranny" of James II, causing him to flee to France. This Glorious
Revolution, called such because it was almost bloodless, put to rest the long struggle between King and Parliament in
England. The revolution reshaped the English government and ultimately brought about democracy in England.
John Locke provided the philosophical phalanx to the Glorious Revolution. For this purpose, he wrote his Second Treatise
of Government, his work with the most political impact. In his monumental treatise, Locke asserted that the basis of political
society is a contract whereby individuals consent to be bound by the laws of a common authority known as civil government.
The objective of this social contract is the protection of the individual's natural rights to life, liberty and property which are
inviolable and enjoyed by them in the state of nature before the formation of all social and political arrangements. 4 Locke
thus argues that legitimate political power amounts to a form of trust, a contract among members of society anchored on
their own consent, and seeks to preserve their lives, liberty and property. This trust or social contract makes government
legitimate and clearly defines the functions of government as concerned, above all, with the preservation of the rights of the
governed.
Even then, Locke believed that the people should be governed by a parliament elected by citizens who owned property.
Although he argued that the people were sovereign, he submitted that they should not rule directly. Members of parliament
represent their constituents and should vote as their constituents wanted. The government's sole reason for being was to
serve the individual by protecting his rights and liberties. Although Locke's ideas were liberal, they fell short of the ideals of
democracy. He spoke of a "middle-class revolution" at a time when the British government was controlled by the aristocracy.
While he claimed that all people were equally possessed of natural rights, he advocated that political power be devolved
only to embrace the middle class by giving Parliament, which was controlled through the House of Commons, the right to
limit the monarchical power. He denied political power to the poor; they were bereft of the right to elect members of
Parliament.
Locke influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent statesman and philosopher of the (American) revolution and of the first
constitutional order which free men were permitted to establish." 5 But although Jefferson espoused Locke's version of the
social contract and natural law, he had respect for the common people and participatory government. Jefferson believed
that the people, including the ordinary folk, were the only competent guardians of their own liberties, and should thus control
their government. Discussing the role of the people in a republic, Jefferson wrote to Madison from France in 1787 that "they
are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberties." 6
The wave of liberalism from Europe notwithstanding, a much more conservative, less democratic, and more paternalistic
system of government was originally adopted in the United States. The nation's founders created a government in which
power was much more centralized than it had been under the Articles of Confederation and they severely restricted popular
control over the government. 7Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 adhered to Alexander
Hamilton's view that democracy was little more than legitimized mob rule, a constant threat to personal security, liberty and
property. Thus, the framers sought to establish a constitutional republic, in which public policy would be made by elected
representatives but individual rights were protected from the tyranny of transient majorities. With its several elitist elements
and many limitations on majority rule, the framers' Constitution had undemocratic strands.
The next two centuries, however, saw the further democratization of the federal Constitution. 8 The Bill of Rights was added
to the American Constitution and since its passage, America had gone through a series of liberalizing eras that slowly
relaxed the restraints imposed on the people by the new political order. The changing social and economic milieu mothered
by industrialization required political democratization. 9 In 1787, property qualifications for voting existed and suffrage was
granted only to white males. At the onset of Jacksonion democracy in the 1830s, property requirements quickly diminished
and virtually became a thing of the past by the time of the Civil War. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment theoretically
extended the franchise to African-Americans, although it took another century of struggle for the Amendment to become a
reality. In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment removed sex as a qualification for voting. The Progressive Era also saw the
Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution to provide for direct election of United States senators 10 and established
procedures for initiative, referendum and recall (otherwise known as direct democracy) in many states. 11 Poll taxes were
abolished as prerequisites for voting in federal elections through the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964. Finally, the voting
age was lowered to eighteen with the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971. 12
B. Constitutional History of Democracy
and Republicanism in the Philippines
The Malolos Constitution was promulgated on January 21, 1899 by the short-lived Revolutionary Government headed by
Emilio Aguinaldo after the Declaration of Independence from Spain on June 12, 1898. Article 4 of the Constitution declared
the Philippines aRepublic, viz:
Art. 4. The government of the Republic is popular, representative, alternative, and responsible and is
exercised by three distinct powers, which are denominated legislative, executive and judicial . . .
Shortly after the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution, the Philippines fell under American rule. The Americans adopted
the policy of gradually increasing the autonomy of the Filipinos before granting their independence. 13 In 1934, the U.S.
Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Law ". . . the last of the constitutional landmarks studding the period of constitutional
development of the Filipino people under the American regime before the final grant of Philippine independence." 14 Under
this law, the American government authorized the Filipino people to draft a constitution in 1934 with the requirement that the
"constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form." In conformity with this requirement, 15 Article II, Section 1
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution was adopted, viz:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood this form of government to be that defined by James
Madison, viz:
We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding offices during pleasure, for a limited
period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great
body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it. It is sufficient for such
government that the person administering it be appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people; and
that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified. 16 (emphases supplied)
The 1973 Constitution adopted verbatim Article II, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987 Constitution. The
delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Commission well understood the meaning of a republican government. They adopted
the explanation by Jose P. Laurel in his book, Bread and Freedom, The Essentials of Popular Government, viz:
When we refer to popular government or republican government or representative government, we refer
to some system of popular representation where the powers of government are entrusted to those
representatives chosen directly or indirectly by the people in their sovereign capacity . 17 (emphasis
supplied)
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the democratic space giving the people greater power to
exercise their sovereignty. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can directly exercise their sovereign
authority through the following modes, namely: (1) elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum.
Through elections, the people choose the representatives to whom they will entrust the exercise of powers of
government. 18 In a plebiscite, the people ratify any amendment to or revision of the Constitution and may introduce
amendments to the constitution. 19 Indeed, the Constitution mandates Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. . ." It also directs Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum." 20 Pursuant to this
mandate, Congress enacted the Local Government Code of 1991 which defines local initiative as the "legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance through an
election called for the purpose." Recall is a method of removing a local official from office before the expiration of his term
because of loss of confidence. 21 In a referendum, the people can approve or reject a law or an issue of national
importance. 22 Section 126 of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local referendum as "the legal process
whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by
the sanggunian."
These Constitutional provisions on recall, initiative, and referendum institutionalized the people's might made palpable in the
1986 People Power Revolution. 23 To capture the spirit of People Power and to make it a principle upon which Philippine
society may be founded, the Constitutional Commission enunciated as a first principle in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies under Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that the Philippines is not only a republican but also
a democratic state.
The following excerpts from the Records of the Constitutional Commission show the intent of the Commissioners in
emphasizing "democratic" in Section 1, Article II, in light of the provisions of the Constitution on initiative, recall, referendum
and people's organizations:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . May I call attention to Section 1. I wonder who among the members of the committee
would like to clarify this question regarding the use of the word "democratic" in addition to the word
"republican." Can the honorable members of the committee give us the reason or reasons for introducing
this additional expression? Would the committee not be satisfied with the use of the word "republican"?
What prompted it to include the word "democratic"?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner knows that one of the
manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the Bill of Rights and periodic elections, which already
indicates that we are a democratic state. Therefore, the addition of "democratic" is what we call
"pardonable redundancy" the purpose being to emphasize that our country is republican and democratic
at the same time . . . In the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, "democratic" does not appear. I hope the
Commissioner has no objection to that word.
MR. SUAREZ. No, I would not die for that. If it is redundant in character but it is for emphasis of the
people's rights, I would have no objection. I am only trying to clarify the matter. 24 (emphasis supplied)
In other portions of the Records, Commissioner Nolledo explains the significance of the word "democratic", viz.
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now adopting
which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative,
the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of
interference by the people through people's organizations . . . 25
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first
sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state."
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The
constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done
merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that question has been asked several times, but being the proponent
of this amendment, I would like the Commissioner to know that "democratic" was added because of
the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved
related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the
people in policy-making in certain circumstances."
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is understood as
participatory democracy. 26(emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Sarmiento and Azcuna is of the same import:
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative
democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973
and 1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to
a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the participation of the
people . . . So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction
of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize
the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the
word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would
act directly, and not through their representatives. 27 (emphasis supplied)
V. Elections and the Right to Vote
A. Theory
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it is through the act of
voting that government by consent is secured. 28 Through the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of the
day and they are able to choose their leaders 29 in accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy
that the people should elect whom they please to govern them. 30 Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving
the viability of constitutional democracy. 31 It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic participation. 32
The right to vote or of suffrage is "an important political right appertaining to citizenship. Each individual qualified to vote is a
particle of popular sovereignty." 33 In People v. Corral, 34 we held that "(t)he modern conception of suffrage is that voting is
a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted
by the State to such persons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good." The existence of the right of suffrage is a
threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred
parts of the constitution. 35 In Geronimo v. Ramos, et al., 36 we held that the right is among the most important and sacred
of the freedoms inherent in a democratic society and one which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people desires to
maintain through self-government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely functioning democracy in which the
individual may, in accordance with law, have a voice in the form of his government and in the choice of the people who will
run that government for him. 37 The U.S: Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 38 that voting is a "fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." In Wesberry v. Sanders, 39 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "no
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws, under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined ." Voting
makes government more responsive to community and individual needs and desires. Especially for those who feel
disempowered and marginalized or that government is not responsive to them, meaningful access to the ballot box can be
one of the few counterbalances in their arsenal. 40

Thus, elections are substantially regulated for them to be fair and honest, for order rather than chaos to accompany the
democratic processes. 41 This Court has consistently ruled from as early as the oft-cited 1914 case of Gardiner
v. Romulo 42 that the purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of the people, the purity of elections being one of the
most important and fundamental requisites of popular government. We have consistently made it clear that we frown upon
any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in
an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. 43To preserve the purity of elections, comprehensive and
sometimes complex election codes are enacted, each provision of which whether it governs the registration and
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself inevitably affects the
individual's right to vote. 44 As the right to vote in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 45 cautioned that any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized . It was to promote free,
orderly and honest elections and to preserve the sanctity of the right to vote that the Commission on Elections was
created. 46 The 1987 Constitutionmandates the COMELEC to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections." 47
B. History of Suffrage in the Philippines
In primitive times, the choice of who will govern the people was not based on democratic principles. Even then, birth or
strength was not the only basis for choosing the chief of the tribe. When an old chief has failed his office or committed
wrong or has aged and can no longer function, the members of the tribe could replace him and choose another
leader. 48 Among the Muslims, a council or ruma bechara chooses the sultan. An old sultan may appoint his successor, but
his decision is not absolute. Among the criteria for choosing a sultan were age, blood, wealth, fidelity to Islamic faith and
exemplary character or personality. 49 In times of crises, the community may choose its leader voluntarily, irrespective of
social status. By consensus of the community, a serf or slave may be voted the chief on account of his ability.
As far back as the Spanish regime, the Filipinos did not have a general right of suffrage. 50 it was only in the Malolos
Constitution of 1899 that the right of suffrage was recognized; 51 it was a by-product of the Filipinos' struggle against the
Spanish colonial government and an offshoot of Western liberal ideas on civil government and individual rights. 52 The life
of the Malolos Constitution was, however, cut short by the onset of the American regime in the Philippines. But the right of
suffrage was reiterated in the Philippine Bill of 1902. 53The first general elections were held in 1907 54 under the first
Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907. This law was elitist and discriminatory against
women. The right of suffrage was carried into the Jones Law of 1916. 55 Whereas previously, the right was granted only by
the Philippine Legislature and thus subject to its control, the 1935 Constitution elevated suffrage to a constitutional
right. 56 It also provided for a plebiscite on the issue of whether the right of suffrage should be extended to women. On April
30, 1937; the plebiscite was held and the people voted affirmatively. In the 1973 Constitution, 57 suffrage was recognized
not only as a right, but was imposed as a duty to broaden the electoral base and make democracy a reality through
increased popular participation in government. The voting age was lowered, the literacy requirement abolished, and
absentee voting was legalized. 58 The 1987 Constitution likewise enshrines the right of suffrage in Article V, but unlike
the 1973 Constitution, it is now no longer imposed as a duty. 59 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60 and
the 1976 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 61also protect the right of suffrage.
VI. Voter Information:
Prerequisite to a Meaningful Vote in a Genuinely Free,
Orderly and Honest Elections in a Working Democracy
A. Democracy, information and discourse on public matters
1. U.S. jurisdiction
For the right of suffrage to have a value, the electorate must be informed about public matters so that when they speak
through the ballot, the knowledgeable voice and not the ignorant noise of the majority would prevail. Jefferson admonished
Americans to be informed rather than enslaved by ignorance, saying that "(i)f a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a
state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be ." 62 Jefferson emphasized the importance of discourse in a
democracy, viz:
In every country where man is free to think and to speak, differences of opinion arise from difference of
perception, and the imperfection of reason; but these differences when permitted, as in this happy
country, to purify themselves by discussion, are but as passing clouds overspreading our land transiently
and leaving our horizon more bright and serene. 63
Other noted political philosophers like John Stuart Mill conceived of the "marketplace of ideas" as a necessary means of
testing the validity of ideas, viz:
(N)o one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him
by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which could have been required of him in
carrying on an active controversy with opponents. 64
In the same vein, political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, in his article "Free Speech Is An Absolute," stressed that,
"(s)elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion
to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." 65 To vote intelligently, citizens need
information about their government. 66 Even during the diaper days of U.S. democracy, the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution postulated that self-governing people should be well-informed about the workings of government to make
intelligent political choices. In discussing the First Amendment, James Madison said: "The right of freely examining public
characters and measures, and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other
right . . ." 67 Thus, the United States, a representative democracy, has generally subscribed to the notion that public
information and participation are requirements for a representative democracy where the electorate make informed choices.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,which establishes freedom of the press and speech supports this proposition.
The First Amendment's jealous protection of free expression is largely based on the ideas that free and open debate will
generate truth and that only an informed electorate can create an effective democracy. 68
The First Amendment reflects the Framers' belief that public participation in government is inherently positive. An informed
citizenry is a prerequisite to meaningful participation in government. Thus, the U.S. Congress embraced this principle more
concretely with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA). 69 The law enhanced public access to and
understanding of the operation of federal agencies with respect to both the information held by them and the formulation of
public policy. 70 In the leading case on the FOIA, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 71 Justice Douglas, in his
dissent, emphasized that the philosophy of the statute is the citizens' right to be informed about "what their government is
up to." 72 In Department of Air Force v. Rose, 73 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the basic purpose of the FOIA
is "to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny". These rulings were reiterated in the 1994 case of Department of
Defense, et al. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, et al. 74 Be that as it may, the U.S. Supreme Court characterized this
freedom of information as a statutory and not a constitutional right in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., et al., 75 viz: "there is no
constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy. . . The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." 76 Neither the
courts nor Congress has recognized an affirmative constitutional obligation to disclose information concerning governmental
affairs; the U.S. Constitution itself contains no language from which the duty could be readily inferred. 77 Nevertheless, the
U.S. federal government, the fifty states and the District of Columbia have shown their commitment to public access to
government-held information. All have statutes that allow varying degrees of access to government records. 78
While the right of access to government information or the "right to know" is characterized as a statutory right, the right to
receive information 79 was first identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as a constitutional right in the 1936 case of Grosjean
v. American Press Company. 80 The Court also stated that the First Amendment protects the natural right of members of an
organized society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their common interests. Citing
Judge Cooley, the Court held that free and general discussion of public matters is essential to prepare the people for an
intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. 81 The Court also noted that an informed public opinion is the most potent of
all restraints upon misgovernment. Many consider Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council 82 the seminal "right to receive" case. 83 In this 1976 decision, the Court struck down a Virginia statute forbidding
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the free
flow of information about commercial matters was necessary to ensure informed public decision-making. He reasoned that
the protection of the First Amendment extends not only to the speaker, but to the recipient of the communication. Although
the case dealt with commercial speech, the majority opinion made it clear that the constitutional protection for receipt of
information would apply with even more force when more directly related to self-government and public policy. 84

In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the connection between self-government and the right to receive information
in Board of Education v. Pico. 85 This case involved a school board-ordered removal of books from secondary school
libraries after the board classified the book as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy". 86 Justice
Brennan, writing for a three-justice plurality, emphasized the First Amendment's role in assuring widespread dissemination
of ideas and information. Citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 87 the Court held that "(t)he State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." The Court noted that " the right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom." It then cited Madison's admonition that, "(a) popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 88
The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated, in various contexts, the idea that "the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas." 89 Kleindienst v. Mandel 90 acknowledged a First Amendment right to receive information but
deferring to Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens. Lamont v. Postmaster General 91 invalidated a statutory
requirement that foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda" be delivered only upon request by the
addressee. Martin v. City of Struthers 92 invalidated a municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribution of handbills
as violative of the First Amendment rights of both the recipients and the distributors.93
Whether the "right to know" is based on a statutory right provided by the FOIA or a constitutional right covered by the First
Amendment, the underlying premise is that an informed people is necessary for a sensible exercise of the freedom of
speech, which in turn, is necessary to a meaningful exercise of the right to vote in a working democracy . In 1927, Justice
Louis Brandeis gave the principle behind the First Amendment its classic formulation, viz:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties, and thatin its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that
hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 94
The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Stromberg v. California 95 that the First Amendment provides "the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means . . ." 96 The Amendment is "the repository of . . . self-governing powers" 97 as it provides a
peaceful means for political and social change through public discussion. In Mills v. State of Alabama, 98 it ruled that there
may be differences about interpretations of the First Amendment, but there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions
of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, all
such matters relating to political processes. 99 Justice William J. Brennan summarized the principle succinctly in his opinion
for the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, viz: ". . . speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. (emphasis supplied)" 100
2. Philippine jurisdiction
The electorate's right to information on public matters occupies a higher legal tier in the Philippines compared to the United
States. While the right to information in U.S. jurisdiction is merely a statutory right, it enjoys constitutional status in Philippine
jurisdiction. The1987 Constitution not only enlarged the democratic space with provisions on the electorate's direct exercise
of sovereignty, but also highlighted the right of the people to information on matters of public interest as a predicate to good
governance and a working democracy. The Bill of Rights sanctifies the right of the people to information under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
This provision of the right to information sans the phrase "as well as to government research data" made its maiden
appearance in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The original draft of the provision presented to the 1971
Constitutional Convention merely said that access to official records and the right to information "shall be afforded the
citizens as may be provided by law." Delegate De la Serna pointed out, however, that the provision did not grant a self-
executory right to citizens. He thus proposed the rewording of the provision to grant the right but subject to statutory
limitations. 101 The 1973 Constitution thus provided in Section 6, Article IV, viz:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall
be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The change in phraseology was important as in the pre-1973 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, 102 this Court held that freedom of
information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not guaranteed by the constitution. In that case, the issue
before the Court was whether the press and the public had a constitutional right to demand the examination of the public
land records. The Court ruled in the negative but held that the press had a statutory right to examine the records of the
Register of Deeds because the interest of the press was real and adequate.
As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is self-executory. It is a public right where the real
parties in interest are the people. Thus, every citizen has "standing" to challenge any violation of the right and may seek its
enforcement. 103 The right to information, free speech and press and of assembly and petition and association which are
all enshrined in the Bill of Rights are cognate rights for they all commonly rest on the premise that ultimately it is an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect and uphold the values of democratic government. 104
In "splendid symmetry" 105 with the right to information in the Bill of Rights are other provisions of the 1987
Constitution highlighting the principle of transparency in government. Included among the State Policies under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution is the following provision, viz:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (emphasis supplied)
Related to the above provision is Section 21 of Article XI, National Economy and Patrimony, which provides, viz:
Sec. 21. Foreign loans may be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary
authority. Information on foreign laws obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available
to the public. (emphasis supplied)
The indispensability of access to information involving public interest and government transparency in Philippine
democracy is clearly recognized in the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, viz:
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer, this amendment is proposed jointly by Commissioners Ople, Rama,
Treas, Romulo, Regalado and Rosario Braid. It reads as follows: "SECTION 24. THE STATE SHALL
ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL ITS TRANSACTIONS
SUBJECT TO REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS ON NATIONAL INTEREST AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY
LAW."
xxx xxx xxx

In the United States, President Aquino has made much of the point that the government should be open
and accessible to the public. This amendment is by way of providing an umbrella statement in the
Declaration of Principles for all these safeguards for an open and honest government distributed all over
the draft Constitution. It establishes a concrete, ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. 106 (emphasis supplied)
Commissioners Bernas and Rama made the following observations on the principle of government transparency and
the public's right to information:
FR. BERNAS. Just one observation, Mr. Presiding Officer. I want to comment that Section 6 (referring to
Section 7, Article III on the right to information) talks about the right of the people to information, and
corresponding to every right is a duty. In this particular case, corresponding to this right of the people is
precisely the duty of the State to make available whatever information there may be needed that is of
public concern. Section 6 is very broadly stated so that it covers anything that is of public concern. It
would seem also that the advantage of Section 6 is that it challenges citizens to be active in seeking
information rather than being dependent on whatever the State may release to them.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. There is a difference between the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and the
provision under the Bill of Rights. The basic difference is that the Bill of Rights contemplates coalition
(sic) (collision?) between the rights of the citizens and the State. Therefore, it is the right of the citizen to
demand information. While under the Declaration of Principles, the State must have a policy, even
without being demanded, by the citizens, without being sued by the citizen, to disclose information and
transactions. So there is a basic difference here because of the very nature of the Bill of Rights and the
nature of the Declaration of Principles. 107(emphases supplied)
The importance of information in a democratic framework is also recognized in Section 24, Article II, viz:
Sec. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.
(emphasis supplied).
Section 10 of Article XVI, General Provisions is a related provision. It states, viz:
Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability and
the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the
balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects
the freedom of speech and of the press. (emphasis supplied)
The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Braid expounds on the rationale of these provisions on information and
communication,viz:
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. We cannot talk of the functions of communication unless we have a philosophy of
communication, unless we have a vision of society. Here we have a preferred vision where opportunities
are provided for participation by as many people, where there is unity even in cultural diversity, for there
is freedom to have options in a pluralistic society. Communication and information provide the leverage
for power. They enable the people to act, to make decisions, to share consciousness in the mobilization
of the nation. 108 (emphasis supplied)
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, 109 the Court had occasion to rule on the right to information of a lawyer, members of the media
and plain citizens who sought from the Government Service Insurance System a "list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." 110 In upholding the
petitioners' right, the Court explained the rational of the right to information in a democracy, viz:
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional
right to information. InTaada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 (involving the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct
of citizens) and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987, 150 SCRA 530 (involving the concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles), the Court upheld the people's
constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies
concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
xxx xxx xxx
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data
relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those
to whom the power had been delegated . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the
government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep
open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in a discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto
can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is
not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the
exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-
hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure (footnote omitted) and honesty in the public
service (footnote omitted). It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. 111 (emphases supplied)
The Court made a similar ruling in Gonzales v. Narvasa 112 which involved the petitioner's request addressed to
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora for the "names of the executive officials holding multiple positions in
government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs
and turned over to Malacaang." 113 The respondent was ordered to furnish the petitioner the information requested. The
Court held, viz:
Under both the 1973 (footnote omitted) and 1987 Constitution, this (the right to information) is a self-
executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts . . .
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano (71
SCRA 14 [1976] . . .) that "[t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by
the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times." 114 (emphases supplied)
The importance of an informed citizenry in a working democracy was again emphasized in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation 115 where we held, viz:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's
right to information on matters of public concern.
xxx xxx xxx
These twin provisions (on right to information under Section 7, Article III and the policy of full public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II) of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of
expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens,
whatever citizens may say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times . . . accountable to
the people," (footnote omitted) for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public
officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. 116 (emphases
supplied)
B. Elections and the voters' right to information on the elections
1. U.S. Jurisdiction
An informed citizenry's opinions and preferences have the most impact and are most clearly expressed in elections which
lie at the foundation of a representative democracy. The electorate's true will, however, can only be intelligently expressed if
they are well informed about the time, place, manner of conduct of the elections and the candidates therein. Without this
information, democracy will be a mere shibboleth for voters will not be able to express their true will through the ballot.

In Duquette v. Merrill, 117 which the ponencia cites by reference to 26 American Jurisprudence 2d 292, 118 a vacancy in
the office of Country Treasurer in York County occurred on July 24, 1944 upon the death of the incumbent Maynard A.
Hobbs. The vacancy was filled in accordance with the law providing that the governor may appoint a resident of the county
who shall be treasurer until the 1st day of January following the next biennial election, at which said election a treasurer
shall be chosen for the remainder of the term, if any. The next biennial election was held on September 11, 1944. In the
June 1944 primary election (prior to the death of Hobbs) where nominations of candidates for the upcoming biennial
elections were made, there was no nomination for the office of County Treasurer as Hobbes' term was yet to expire on
January 1947. Neither was a special primary election ordered by proclamation of the Governor after Hobbes' death. Nor
were other legal modes of nominating candidates such as through nomination of a political party, convention of delegates or
appropriate caucus resorted to. Consequently, in the official ballot of the September 11, 1944 election, there was no
provision made for the selection of a County Treasurer to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. The name of the office did
not appear on the ballot. Petitioner Duquette, however, claims that he was elected County Treasurer in the special election
because in the City of Biddeford, the largest city in York County, 1,309 voters either wrote in the title of the office and his
name thereunder, or used a "sticker" of the same import and voted for him. At the September 11, 1944 biennial election,
there were approximately 22,000 ballots cast, but none included the name of the petitioner except for the 1,309 in
Biddeford. In holding that the special election was void, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court made the following
pronouncements, the first paragraph of which was cited by the ponencia in the case at bar,viz:
Although there is not unanimity of judicial opinion as to the requirement of official notice; if the vacancy is
to be filled at the time of a general election, yet it appears to be almost universally held that if the great
body of the electors are misled by the want of such notice and are instead led to believe that no such
election is in fact to be held, an attempted choice by a small percentage of the voters is void . Wilson v.
Brown, 109 Ky 229, 139 Ky 397, 58 SW 595; Wooton v. Wheeler, 149 Ky 62, 147 SW 914; Secord v.
Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 NW 110; Bolton v. Good, 41 NJL 296 (other citations omitted).
Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is to be held to fill it for the unexpired
term, is essential to give validity to the meeting of an electoral body to discharge that particular duty, and
is also an essential and characteristic element of a popular election. Public policy requires that it should
be given in such form as to reach the body of the electorate. Here there had been no nominations to fill
the vacancy, either by the holding of a special primary election, or by nomination by county political
conventions or party committees. The designation of the office to be filled was not upon the official ballot .
As before noted, except for the vacancy, it would have no place there, as the term of office of the
incumbent, if living, would not expire until January 1, 1947.119 (emphases supplied)
As early as the 1897 case of People ex rel. Dix v. Kerwin, 120 the requirement of notice in an election has been
recognized, viz:
. . . We are not prepared to hold that this statute (requiring the giving of notice) is, under all
circumstances and at all times, so far mandatory that a failure to observe its requirements will defeat an
election otherwise regularly holden. There are many cases which hold that elections regularly held and
persons regularly voted for on nominations made where there has been failure to observe some specific
statutory requirement will not thereby be necessarily defeated and the direction may, because of the
excusing circumstances, be held directory rather than mandatory. We do not believe the circumstances of
the present case, as they are now exhibited, bring it all within this rule. The theory of elections is that
there shall be due notice given to the voters, and that they must be advised either by a direct notice
published by the clerk, as provided by statute, or by proceedings taken by the voters and the people
generally in such a way as that it may be fairly inferred that it was generally and thoroughly well
understood that a particular office was to be filled at the election, so that the voters should act
understandingly and intelligently in casting their ballots.
xxx xxx xxx
Since there was no notice published according to the statutes, we may not assume that the nomination
was regularly made, or that the voters were duly notified that the office was to be filled at that general
election, nine days afterwards. It has been generally held that some notice, regular in its form, and
pursuant to the requirements of law, must be given as a safeguard to popular elections, that the people
may be informed for what officers they are to vote. Of course, it might easily be true, as has already been
suggested, that, if nominations had been made for an office, certificates regularly filed, and tickets
regularly printed, even though the clerk had failed to publish his notice, there would be no presumption
that the body of the voters were uninformed as to their rights and as to the positions which were to be
filled. People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; Secord v. Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 N.W. 110; Adsit v. Osmun, 84 Mich.
420, 48 N.W. 31; Allen v. Glynn, 17 Colo. 338, 29 Pac. 670; Stephens v. People, 89 Ill.
337. 121 (emphases supplied)
Similarly, in Griffith v. Mercer County Court, et al., 122 it was held, viz:
There is a clear distinction between the case of a vacancy which is to be filled at a special election to be
held at a time and place to be appointed by some officer or tribunal, authorized by statute to call it, and a
case where the statute itself provides for filling a vacancy at the next general election after it occurs. In
such case nearly all the authorities hold that if the body of electors do in fact know the vacancy exists,
and candidates are regularly nominated by the various political parties to fill it, and the candidates
receive most of the votes cast, such election is valid, even though no notice thereof was published in a
manner provided by the statute. It would be hypertechnical and unreasonable to hold that a failure to
comply literally with the statute in such case would avoid the election. 123 (emphasis supplied)
In Duquette, Kerwin and Griffith, as in a great majority of cases on the state level, the mere fact that the election to fill a
vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, removal, or the like is held at the time of a general election in accordance with a
constitutional or statutory provision, is not regarded as sufficient in itself to validate the election if no notice of the election
was given; it has been held that in such a case, it must be shown that a sufficient part of the electors have actual notice that
the vacancy is to be filled. The fact that a great percentage of voters cast their votes despite the failure of giving proper
notice of the elections appears to be the most decisive single factor to hold that sufficient actual notice was
given. 124 These doctrines were reiterated in Lisle, et al. vs. C.L. Schooler 125 where it was held that mere allegation that
"many" voters were informed that a special election to fill a vacancy was being held was unsatisfactory proof of sufficient
notice.
2. Philippine jurisdiction
In our jurisdiction, it is also the rule that the exercise of the right of suffrage should be an enlightened one, hence, based on
relevant facts, data and information. It is for this reason that the choice of representatives in a democracy cannot be based
on lottery or an y form of chance. The choice must be based on enlightened judgment for democracy cannot endure the
rule and reign of ignorance. This principle was stressed by the Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections. 126 The issue
before the Court was whether the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had the power to call for a plebiscite for the ratification
by the people of a partial constitutional amendment. The amendment was the proposal to lower the voting age to 18 but with
the caveat that "(t)his partial amendment, which refers only to age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without
prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions
of the amended Section or in other portions of the entire Constitution."The Court ruled in the negative, emphasizing the
necessity for the voter to be afforded sufficient time and information to appraise the amendment, viz:
. . . No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be
minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to
vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may
decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country
into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social
and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present state of things, where the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to
amend the existing Constitution,to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement. 127 (emphasis supplied)
The need for the voter to be informed about matters which have a bearing on his vote was again emphasized by the Court
in UNIDO v. Commission on Elections. 128 This case involved the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa in 1981. The Court reiterated that the more people are adequately informed about the proposed
amendments, their exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better. We held, viz:
To begin with, we cannot agree with the restrictive literal interpretation the Solicitor General would want to
give to the "free, orderly and honest elections" clause of Section 5, Article XII-C above-quoted.
Government Counsel posits that the said clause refers exclusively to the manner in which the elections
are conducted, that is to say, with the manner in which the voters are supposed to be allowed to vote.
Perhaps, such a theory may hold insofar as ordinary elections of officials are concerned. But the Court
views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional
amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast rulings of this Court in
connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be fair
submission by which is meant that the voters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the
light of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on .
We are of the firm conviction that the charter's reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in
a plebiscite. (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, the Court ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC 129 that plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance.
The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access
to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum.
It cannot be overemphasized that an informed electorate is necessary for a truly free, fair and intelligent election . The voting
age was lowered from 21 years, to 18 years because the youth of 18 to 21 years did not differ in political
maturity, 130 implying that political maturity or the capacity to discern political information is necessary for the exercise of
suffrage. It is for this obvious reason that minors and the insane are not allowed to vote. Likewise, the literacy test for the
right to vote was abolished because as explained by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, "the requirement to read and write was written into our constitution at a time when the only
medium of information was the printed word and even the public meetings were not as large and successful because of the
absence of amplifying equipment. It is a fact that today the vast majority of the population learn about national matters much
more from the audio-visual media, namely, radio and television, and public meetings have become much more effective
since the advent of amplifying equipment." Again, the necessity of information relevant to an election is highlighted.
Similarly, in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Bernas, in justifying enfranchisement of the illiterates,
spoke of their access to information relevant to elections, viz:
If we look at . . . the communication situation in the Philippines now, the means of communication that
has the farthest reach is AM radio. People get their information not from reading newspapers but from AM
radio farmers while plowing, and vendors while selling things listen to the radio. Without knowing how
to read and write, they are adequately informed about many things happening in the country. 131
Several election cases, albeit not involving an issue similar to the case at bar, affirm the necessity of an informed electorate
in holding free, intelligent and clean elections. In Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections 132 where this Court
nullified a portion of a COMELEC Resolution prohibiting the posting of candidates' decals and stickers on "mobile" places
and limiting their location to authorized posting areas, we held, viz:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed. 686 [1964] . . .) Too many
restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest
essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970]).
xxx xxx xxx
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to
know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate
analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be
no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know
are unduly curtailed.
xxx x xx xxx
. . . we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition
would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his
property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and
information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly
vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health
regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. (Martin v. City of
Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943]). 133
To facilitate the people's right to information on election matters, this Court, in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys
of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC 134 upheld the validity of COMELEC's procurement of print space and airtime
for allocation to candidates, viz:
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications
and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of
broadcast stations to provide airtime unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of
their right to know. Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides that 'the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized . . . ' 135 (emphasis supplied)
The importance of the people's acquisition of information can be gleaned from several provisions of the Constitution under
Article IX (C), The Commission on Elections. Section 4 provides that the COMELEC is given the power to "supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concession granted by the Government . . . Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Section 6 provides that, "(a) free and open party system shall
be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people". Section 2(5) of the same article requires political parties,
organizations and coalitions to present their platform or program of government before these can be registered. In the
robust and wide open debate of the electorate, these programs of government are important matters for discussion.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on whether voting of Congressmen should be by district or province also
evince a clear concern for intelligent voting, viz:
SR. TAN. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think one of the drawbacks of our political system, especially in the
campaign, is that many of us vote by personality rather than by issue. So I am inclined to believe that in
the elections by district, that would be lessened because we get to know the persons running more
intimately. So we know their motivation, their excesses, their weaknesses and there would be less
chance for the people to vote by personality. I was wondering whether the Commission shares the same
observation.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, if it would be by province, the vote would no longer be personalities
but more on issues, because the relationship is not really very personal. Whereas, if it would be by
district, the vote on personality would be most impressive and dominant.

SR. TAN. I cannot quite believe that. It would be like a superstar running around.
MR. DAVIDE. For instance; we have a district consisting of two municipalities. The vote would be more
on personalities. It is a question of attachment; you are the godson or the sponsor of a baptism, like that.
But if you will be voted by province, it's your merit that will be counted by all others outside your own
area. In short, the more capable you are, the more chance you have of winning provincewide. 136
Several provisions of our election laws also manifest a clear intent to facilitate the voters' acquisition of information
pertaining to elections to the end that their vote would truly reflect their will. Section 52(j) of Article VII of B.P. Blg. 881 or
the Omnibus Election Codegives the COMELEC the following power and duty:
(j) Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general circulation, radios and
other media forms toeducate the public and fully inform the electorate about election laws, procedures,
decisions, and other matters relative to the work and duties of the Commission and the necessity of
clean, free, orderly and honest electoral processes. (Sec. 185(k), 1978 EC)
(k) Enlist non-partisan groups or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth, professional, educational,
business or labor sectors known for their probity, impartiality and integrity . . . Such groups or
organizations . . . shall perform the following specific functions and duties:
A. Before Election Day:
1. Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help in the dissemination of
the orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission relative to the forthcoming election. (emphasis
supplied)
Section 87 of Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 also provides, viz:
Section 87. . . .
Public Forum. The Commission shall encourage non-political, non-partisan private or civic
organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public for at which all registered
candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally participate to present, explain, and/or
debate on their campaign platforms and programs and other like issues . . . (emphasis supplied)
Section 93 of the same Article provides, viz:
Section 93. Comelec information bulletin. The Commission shall cause the printing, and supervise the
dissemination of bulletins to be known as "Comelec Bulletin" which shall be of such size as to
adequately contain the picture, bio-data and program of government of every candidate. Said bulletin
shall be disseminated to the voters or displayed in such places as to give due prominence thereto .
(emphasis supplied)
Of the same import is Section 25 of R.A. No. 8436, "An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated
Election System in the May 11, 1998 Elections and Subsequent Electoral Exercises" which provides, viz:
Section 25. Voters' Education. The Commission together with and in support of accredited citizens'
arms shall carry out a continuing and systematic campaign though newspapers of general circulation,
radio and other media forms, as well as through seminars, symposia, fora and other non-traditional
means to educate the public and fully inform the electorate about the automated election system and
inculcate values on honest, peaceful and orderly elections. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, R.A. No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices," approved a few months before the May 2001 elections or on February 12, 2001 provides in Section
6.4, viz:
Sec. 6.4. . . .
In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and employment of press, radio and television
facilities insofar as the placement of political advertisements is concerned to ensure that candidates are
given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make known their qualifications and their stand
on public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on
election spending. (emphasis supplied)
The Omnibus Election Code also provides for procedures and requirements that make the election process clear and
orderly to avoid voter confusion. Article IX of the Code provides, viz:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election , and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Certificates of Candidacy, Certified List of Candidates. . . .
. . . the Commission shall cause to be printed certified lists of candidates containing the names of all
registered candidates for each office to be voted for in each province, city or municipality immediately
followed by the nickname or stage name of each candidate duly registered in his certificate of candidacy
and his political affiliation, if any. Said list shall be posted inside each voting booth during the voting
period.
xxx xxx xxx
The names of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also
be printed in the election returns and tally sheets (R.A. No. 6646, Sec. 4)
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; . . .
Article XVI, Section 181 also provides, viz:
Section 181. Official ballots.
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) The official ballot shall also contain the names of all the officers to be voted for in the election,
allowing opposite the name of each office, sufficient space or spaces with horizontal lines where the
voter may write the name or names of individual candidates voted for by him.
In the case of special elections, the need for notice and information is unmistakable under Section 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No. 7166, which provides, viz:
Sec. 7. Call for special election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and
hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) after
the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall
be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election. (R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4).
The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Sections 5, 6, and 7 of theOmnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by
a majority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or
after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. (R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4)
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the election to its
provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in
at least three conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held in each city or municipality
affected. (1978 EC, Sec. 8) (emphasis supplied)
In Hassan v. COMELEC, et al., 137 we ruled that constituents could not be charged with notice of a second special
elections held only two days after the failure of the special election. This case involved the May 8, 1995 regular local
elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur. Due to the threats of violence and terrorism in the area, there was a failure of election
in six out of twenty-four precincts in Madalum. A special elections was set on May 27, 1995 but the Board of Election
Inspectors failed to report for duty due to the threats of violence. The Monitoring Supervising Team of the COMELEC reset
the special elections to May 29, 1995 in a school 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places. In ruling that the
May 29 special elections was invalid, the Court ruled, viz:
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the constituents must be charged
with notice of the special elections to be held because of the failure of the two (2) previous elections. To
require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly impracticable. In a place marred
by violence, it was necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time to be notified of the changes and
prepare themselves for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual or
constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof . (Furste v. Gray, 240 Ky 604, 42 SW 2d 889; State
ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver (MO) 243 SW 2d 344.) The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated
in advance. The requirement of notice even becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was
called by some authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a
substantial compliance therewith so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the
statute has been carried into effect. (State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver, supra). The sufficiency of notice is
determined on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the
elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or on the other hand,
whether the omission resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the opportunity
of exercising their franchise so as to change the result of the election. (Housing Authority of County of
Kings v. Peden, 212 Cal App 2d 276, 28 Cal Rptr, other citations omitted)

xxx xxx xxx


. . . even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a problem. In the absence
of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number of voters, we are
constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid . . . (emphases supplied)
Although this case did not involve a special election held simultaneously with a general election by mandate of law as in
the case at bar, the doctrine that can be derived from this case is that the electorate must be informed of the special
election as proved by official or actual notice.
VII. Application of the Principles of Democracy, Republicanism,
Freedom of Information and Discourse to the Case at Bar
The 1987 Constitution, with its declaration that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a democratic state, and its
various provisions broadening the space for direct democracy unmistakably show the framers' intent to give the Filipino
people a greater say in government. The heart of democracy lies in the majoritarian rule but the majoritarian rule is not a
mere game of dominant numbers. The majority can rule and rule effectively only if its judgment is an informed one. With an
informed electorate, a healthy collision of ideas is assured that will generate sparks to fan the flames of democracy. Rule by
the ignorant majority is a sham democracy a mobocracy for in the words of Jefferson, a nation cannot be both free
and ignorant. If there is anything that democracy cannot survive, it is the virus of ignorance.
Elections serve as a crevice in the democratic field where voters, for themselves and the public good, plant the seeds of
their ideals and freedoms. Yick Wo is emphatic that voting is a fundamental right that preserves and cultivates all other
rights. In a republic undergirded by a social contract, the threshold consent of equal people to form a government that will
rule them is renewed in every election where people exercise their fundamental right to vote to the end that their chosen
representatives will protect their natural rights to life, liberty and property. It is this sacred contract which makes legitimate
the government's exercise of its powers and the chosen representatives' performance of their duties and functions . The
electoral exercise should be nothing less than a pure moment of informed judgment where the electorate speaks its mind on
the issues of the day and choose the men and women of the hour who are seeking their mandate.
The importance of information and discourse cannot be overemphasized in a democratic and republican setting . Our
constitutional provisions and cases highlighting the people's right to information and the duty of the State to provide
information unmistakably recognize the indispensable need of properly informing the citizenry so they can genuinely
participate in and contribute to a functioning democracy. As elections lie at the foundation of representative democracy,
there should be no quarrel over the proposition that electoral information should also be disseminated to the electorate as a
predicate to an informed judgment.
The ponencia concedes that a survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the May 14, 2001 elections
would reveal that they "contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended." Nowhere in its resolutions or even its press releases did
COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single Senate seat with a three-year term simultaneously with the
regular elections on May 14, 2001. Nor did COMELEC give official notice of the manner by which the special election would
be conducted, i.e., that the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the election would be
declared winner in the special election. Still, the ponencia upheld the holding of the May 14, 2001 special election despite
"the lack of 'call' for such election and . . . lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in
the special election is to be determined."
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to the ponencia's position for it leaves the purity of elections and the ascertainment
of the will of the electorate to chance, conjecture and speculation. Considering that elections lie at the heart of the
democratic process because it is through the act of voting that consent to government is secured, I choose to take a
position that would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an electorate that is informed, a vote that is not devalued by
ignorance and an election where the consent of the governed is clear and unequivocal.
The ponencia justifies its position on the lack of call or notice of the time and place of the special election by holding that the
law charges voters with knowledge of R.A. No. 7166 which provides that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding election, that is, the May 14, 2001
election. The ponencia's argument is that the provisions of R.A. No. 7166 stating that the special election would be held
simultaneously with the regular election operated as a call for the election so that the absence of a call by the COMELEC
did not taint the validity of the special election. With due respect, this is not the intention of R.A. No. 7166 for despite its
paragraph 1, Section 7 that "in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
the succeeding regular election", the law nevertheless required in paragraph 3 of the same section that " (t)he Commission
shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the election to its provincial election supervisors and election
registrars for dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places preferably where public
meetings are held in each city or municipality affected."
The Duquette case cited by the ponencia does not lend support to its thesis that statutory notice suffices. In Duquette, it was
held thatin the absence of an official notice of the special election mandated by law to be held simultaneously with the
general election, there should be actual notice of the electorate. Actual notice may be proved by the voting of a significant
percentage of the electorate for the position in the special election or by other acts which manifest awareness of the holding
of a special election such as nomination of candidates. In the case at bar, however, the number of votes cast for the special
election cannot be determined as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for the special election . In fact, whether or
not the electorate had notice of the special election, a candidate would just the same fall as the 13th placer because more
than twelve candidates ran for the regular senatorial elections. Nobody was nominated to vie specifically for the senatorial
seat in the special election nor was there a certificate of candidacy filed for that position. In the absence of official notice of
the time, place and manner of conduct of the special election, actual notice is a matter of proof. Respondents and
the ponencia cannot point to any proof of actual notice.
With respect to the lack of notice of the manner by which the special election would be conducted, i.e., that the 13th placer
would be declared winner in the special election, there can be no debate that statutory notice will not operate as notice to
the electorate as there is no law providing that a special election held simultaneously with a general election could be
conducted in the manner adopted by the Senate and the COMELEC. Instead, the ponencia buttresses its holding by stating
that the petitioner has not claimed nor proved that the failure of notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change
the result of the special senatorial election. It relies on "actual notice from many sources, such as media reports of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign" but without even identifying these media reports
and election propaganda. Suffice to state that before the ponencia can require proof that a sufficient number of voters was
misled during the May 14, 2001 elections, it must first be shown that in the absence of official notice of the procedure for the
special election, there was nevertheless actual notice of the electorate so that the special election could be presumed to be
valid. Only then will the duty arise to show proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled to rebut the presumption of
validity.
I respectfully submit that the electorate should have been informed of the time, place and manner of conduct of the May 14,
2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Tolentino,
UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong and Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a
genuinely free; orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate informed on the issues of the day, the programs
of government laid out before them, the candidates running in the election and the time, place and manner of conduct of the
election. It is for this reason that the Omnibus Election Code is studded with processes; procedures and requirements that
ensure voter information.
Bince and Benito further teach us that free and intelligent vote is not enough; correct ascertainment of the will of the people
is equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case at bar for holding the May 14, 2001 special senatorial election
utterly failed to ascertain the people's choice in the special election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that the "special
election shall be held simultaneouslywith such general election." It does not contemplate, however, the integration of the
special senatorial election into the regular senatorial election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the
regular elections also automatically stand as candidates in the special election. The Omnibus Election Code is crystal clear
that a candidate can run for only one position in an election. Consequently; there were no candidates in the special election
to vote for. Separate sets of candidates for the special election and the regular elections are decisive of the election results.
Each independent-minded voter could have a variety of reasons for choosing a candidate to serve for only the unexpired
term of three years instead of the regular term of six years or not choosing a candidate at all. A voter might choose a
neophyte to serve the three-year term as a shorter trial period. Another might be minded to choose an old-timer to compel
him to hasten the completion of his projects in a shorter period of three years. Still another might want to afford a second
termer who has not performed too satisfactorily a second chance to prove himself but not for too long a period of six
years. In not allowing the voter to separately indicate the candidate he voted for the three-year senatorial term, the voter
was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment based on his own reasons and valuations . Consequently, his true
will in the special election was not ascertained. As a particle of sovereignty, it is the thinking voter who must determine who
should win in the special election and not the unthinking machine that will mechanically ascertain the 13th placer in the
general election by mathematical computations.

The models to follow in the conduct of special elections mandated by law to be held simultaneously with a general elections
are the special elections of November 13, 1951 and November 8, 1955 to fill the seats vacated by then Senators Fernando
Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively. In these special senatorial elections, election activities prior (i.e., filing of
certificate of candidacies), during (i.e., the act of voting for a special election candidate distinct from the candidates for the
regular election) and after the election (i.e., tallying and canvassing of results) were conducted simultaneously with,
but distinctly from the regular senatorial elections. This procedure minimized voter confusion and allowed the voter to freely
and accurately speak his mind and have his will truly ascertained. Regrettably, this objective appears to have been lost in
the calling of the May 14, 2001 special election as can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on the resolution calling for
that election, viz:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD) Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission
on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13th
largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA]. (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is
it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I
think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can . . . No, this is not a Concurrent
Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a
resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the
vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice
President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up
would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a
manner.
xxx xxx xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the
simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose.
So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less
expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less disenfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election,
maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be
held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] [T]ATAD. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that
there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will be running with
specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other
amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are not other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved. 138 (emphases supplied)
The Senate's observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be less costly for the government
as the ballots need not be printed again to separately indicate the candidate voted for the special election does not also
lend justification for the manner of conduct of the May 14, 2001 special election. We cannot bargain the electorate's
fundamental right to vote intelligently with the coin of convenience. Even with the Senate stance, the regular ballot had to be
modified to include a thirteenth space in the list of senatorial seats to be voted for. At any rate, reliance on R.A. No. 6645 is
erroneous. This law provides that when a vacancy arises in the Senate, the Senate, by resolution, certifies to the existence
of the vacancy and calls for a special election. Upon receipt of the resolution, the COMELEC holds the special election. R.A.
No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166. The latter law provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Senate at least one year before the expiration of the term, "the Commission (on Elections) shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy . . ." Since under R.A. No. 7166, it is the power and duty of the COMELEC, and not the Senate,
to call and hold the election, the Senate cannot, by mere resolution, impose upon the COMELEC the procedure for the
special election that it intended such that "Comelec will not have the flexibility" to deviate therefrom. As a constitutional body
created to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections", it was the duty of the COMELEC to give to the
electorate notice of the time, place and manner of conduct of the special elections and to adopt only those mechanisms and
procedures that would ascertain the true will of the people.
In sum, I submit that the ruling of the ponencia would result not just to a step back in an age of information, but would
constitute a fall in the nation's rise to democracy begun as early as the Malolos Constitution and begun anew in the 1987
Constitution after the 1986 People Power Revolution. Informing the electorate on the issues and conduct of an election is a
prerequisite to a "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." Free elections does not only mean that the voter is
not physically restrained from going to the polling booth, but also that the voter is unrestrained by the bondage of ignorance.
We should be resolute in affirming the right of the electorate to proper information. The Court should not forfeit its role as
gatekeeper of our democratic government run by an informed majority. Let us not open the door to ignorance . I vote to grant
the petition.
||| (Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 148334, [January 21, 2004], 465 PHIL 385-476)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-2662. March 26, 1949.]

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General
CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel
PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT
PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.


Fred Ruiz Castro, Federico Arenas, Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla, and S. Meville Hussey for
respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68 ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR


CRIMES OFFICE. Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of
July, 1947, is valid in its section 3 that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW; VIOLATORS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, OF HUMANITY AND
CIVILIZATION, LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of
international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military of civilian, who
have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held
accountable therefor.
3. ID.; POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. IN the promulgation and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles
and policies and international law which are part of our constitution.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OR ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as
Commander in Chief of all our armed forces.
5. ID.; ID.; The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspects
of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68.
6. INTERNATIONAL LAW; HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTION FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE
PHILIPPINES; EVEN IF THE PHILIPPINES WAS NOT SIGNATORY THEREOF, PROVISIONS OF PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN COMPREHENSIVE TO THAT EFFECT. The rules and regulations of the Hague and
Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact,
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general
and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained
in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
7. id.; rights and obligations of a nation were not erased by assumption of full sovereignty RIGHT TO TRY AND
PUNISH CRIMES THERETOFORE COMMITTED. When the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together
with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at right, on our own, of
trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; War crimes committed against our people and our government while we are a
Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
9. MILITARY COMMISSION GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAW. Military Commission is a special military
tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts.
10. MILITARY COMMISSION; COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE IT NOT NECESSARILY A MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE BAR. There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact,
it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor
even possessed of legal training.
11. ID.; TRIAL OF WAR CRIMES BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS; ALLOWANCE OF AMERICAN
ATTORNEYS TO REPRESENT UNITED STATES. The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of
our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes
against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those
very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty, it has not been by our government by the United
States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.
12. ID.; ID.; ID. It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not
more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be
considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and
its government to a military tribunal of our country.
13. ID.; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH DUE PROCESSES OF MILITARY
COMMISSION. The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military
Commission.
Per PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
14. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; ALIENS CANNOT PRACTICE LAW. It appearing that Attys. Hussey and Port are
aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, they cannot appear as prosecutors in a case
pending before the War Crimes Commission.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; EXCEPTION. While there
is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by agencies other than
Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that
the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President, to his
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to place any part of the Philippines under martial law, to the rule-making power
expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
16. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWERS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS. Because the
powers vested by our Constitution to the several departments of the government are in the nature of grants, not a
recognition of pre-existing powers, no department of the government may exercise any power or authority not expressly
granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue of express authority of the Constitution.
17. ID.; ID.; POWER OF PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE EXECUTIVE ORDER DEFINING AND ALLOCATING
JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES ON MILITARY COMMISSION. The provision in Executive
Order No. 68 (series of 1947) of the President of the Philippines, that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by
military commission, is clearly legislative in nature and intends to confer upon military commission jurisdiction to try all
persons charged with war crimes. But, the power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons
accused of crimes is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.
18. ID.; ID.; POWER TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT OFFICE. Executive Order No. establishes a National
War Crimes Office; but, the power to establish government offices is essentially legislative.
19. ID.; RULE-MAKING POWER OF SUPREME COURT; PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER, MUCH LESS
DELEGATE SUCH A POWER, TO PROVIDE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCT OF TRIALS. Executive
Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on
procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. It
further authorizes military commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot
exercise the rule making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate
that power to military commissions.
20. ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; USURPATION OF POWER TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS. Executive Order No. 68 appropriates funds for the expenses of the National War Crimes Office. This
constitutes another usurpation of legislative power, as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.
21. ID.; EMERGENCY POWERS OF PRESIDENT UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACTS NOS. 600, 620 AND
671. Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the Philippines emergency powers to
promulgate rules and regulations during national emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the
Philippines, or at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the contention that these
emergency acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after
liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Congress started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on
continuance prevail will result in the existence of two distinct, separate and independent legislative organs. the
Congress and the President of the Philippines. Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the
President, a possibility that no one can dispute, the President may take advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-
thirds of every year) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of
dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
22. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESUMPTION THAT LEGISLATIVE BODY DID NOT INTEND TO
VIOLATE CONSTITUTION. It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation
(embodied in Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671) beyond the emergency created by war, as to extent it farther
would be violate of the express provisions of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this
question; but, if there could still be any, the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National
Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
23. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW. Executive Order No.
68 violates the fundamental guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law, because it permits the
admission of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal, and by which it is
impossible to determine whether an accused is guilt or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

DECISION

MORAN, C. J p:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a
Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court
seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit
respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the
Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
In support of his case, petitioner tenders the following principal arguments:
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our
constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an
adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is
charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence, petitioner argues "That in view of the fact
that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is
without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in
behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines, is a diminution of our personality as an independent state, and
their appointments as prosecutors are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice
law in the Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a
party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July,
1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,
that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief
of all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we
said
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities,
incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. 'An important
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and
defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt
to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.' (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup.
Ct., 2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is
an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military commission 'has jurisdiction so long
as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up
to the effective date of a treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.' (Cowls, Trial
of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)"
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect
of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No.
68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to
the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was
not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under
the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan,
to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations
were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people. In this connection, it is well to
remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
". . . The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it
is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people . . . "
By the same token, war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth, are
triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys, namely, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port,
in the prosecution of his case, on the ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of Court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
sovereignty.
In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and
not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68
which provides for the organization of such military commissions is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in
said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attorneys qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that
counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only
fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her
people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been
any relinquishment of sovereignty, it has not been by our government but by the United States Government which has
yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them
representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United States is not a party in interest in the case, petitioner challenges the personality of
attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been
equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military
Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the
honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military
Commission.
||| (Shigenori Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, [March 26, 1949], 83 PHIL 171-194)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 91332. July 16, 1993.]

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF TABAC
REUNIES, S.A., petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, respondents.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco Law Office for petitioners.
Teresita Gandionco-Oledan for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. MERCANTILE LAW; TRADEMARK LAW; FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN LOCAL COMMERCE, MAY
SUE FOR INFRINGEMENT. To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign
corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to drive home the point that they
are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another
entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A,
the conclusion reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support thereof is embedded in Philippine
legal jurisprudence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATION OF PERSONALITY TO SUE, MANDATORY REQUIREMENT. On May 21, 1984, Section
21-A, the provision under consideration, was qualified by this Court in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez (129 SCRA
373 [1984]), to the effect that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may have the right to sue before
Philippine Courts, but existing adjective axioms require that qualifying circumstances necessary for the assertion of such
right should first be affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani,Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1991 Ed., p. 598; 4 Martin,
Philippine Commercial Laws, Rev. Ed., 1986, p. 381). Indeed, it is not sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under
Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin. Rather, it must additionally allege its personality to sue. Relative to this
condition precedent, it may be observed that petitioners were not remiss in averring their personality to lodge a complaint for
infringement especially so when they asserted that the main action for infringement is anchored on an isolated transaction
(Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037 [1966], 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p. 103)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there
can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the
Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when
the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
4. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL COMMERCIAL USE OF TRADEMARK, NECESSARY FOR ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP
THEREOF. In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of preliminary injunction,
petitioners are of the impression that actual use of their trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an
indispensable element under Article 2 of the Paris Convention. Yet petitioner's perception along this line is nonetheless
resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law which speak loudly about the necessity of actual commercial use of
the trademark in the local forum.
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW; RULES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW GIVEN AN EQUAL STANDING, NOT SUPERIOR, TO
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS; CASE AT BAR. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal
law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement
inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of
Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the
fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap,
Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 6).
6. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; RELUCTANCE TO ISSUE WRIT,
DEFERENCE TO LOWER COURTS OVER ASSAILED INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS. We can not help but notice the
manner the ascription was framed which carries with it the implied but unwarranted assumption of the existence of
petitioners' right to relief. It must be emphasized that this aspect of exclusive dominion to the trademarks, together with the
corollary allegation of irreparable injury, has yet to be established by petitioners by the requisite quantum of evidence in civil
cases. It cannot be denied that our reluctance to issue a writ of preliminary injunction is due to judicial deference to the
lower courts, involved as there is a mere interlocutory order (Villarosa vs. Teodoro, Sr., 100 Phil. 25 [1956]). In point of
adjective law, the petition has its roots on a remedial measure which is but ancillary to the main action for infringement still
pending factual determination before the court of origin.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED, INDISPENSABLE; NOT MET IN CASE AT BAR. More
telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that
they are not doing business in the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any
pretense of a right which can be breached (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 3, Rule 58, Revised
Rules of Court). Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and
that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may be added in this connection that albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of
registration in the Philippines of their symbols as admitted by private respondent, the fact of exclusive ownership cannot be
made to rest solely on these documents since dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact of registration
alone and does not perfect a trademark right (Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120
SCRA 804 [1983]).
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR PROOF OF TRANSGRESSION OF ACTUAL EXISTING RIGHT, INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT.
What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet in remedial law that before injunctive relief may properly issue,
complainant's right or title must be undisputed and demonstrated on the strength of one's own title to such a degree as to
unquestionably exclude dark clouds of doubt, rather than on the weakness of the adversary's evidence, inasmuch as the
possibility of irreparable damages, without prior proof of transgression of an actual existing right, is no ground for injunction
being mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577
[1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court, Second ed., 1985, p. 225; 3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 82).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR DENIAL AND/OR DISSOLUTION OF WRIT. Under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules of Court, injunction may be refused, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on the following instances: (1) If there is
insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations therein. Refusal or dissolution may be granted in this case with or
without notice to the adverse party. (2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the
issuance or continuance thereof would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated
for such damages as he may suffer. The defendant, in this case, must file a bond in an amount fixed by the judge
conditioned that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. (3)
On other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant which may be opposed by the plaintiff also by affidavits.
Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction
granted is too great. (3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 99; Francisco, supra, at p. 268.)
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES NOT ENTITLED TO
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THE ABSENCE OF THEIR RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED; CASE
AT BAR. In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14, 1989 and November 29, 1989 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ERRONEOUS LIFTING OF WRIT MAY BE CURED BY APPEAL AND NOT BY PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI. Assuming in gratia argumenti that respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the
same may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co.,
88 Phil. 460 [1951]).
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT MAY BE DISSOLVED WITHOUT PREVIOUS NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTY AND WITHOUT
HEARING. Verily, and mindful of the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always
under the control of the court before final judgment petitioners criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak, more so
when extinction of the previously issued writ can even be made without previous notice to the adverse party and without a
hearing (Caluya vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1947]; 3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).
DECISION

MELO, J p:

In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac
Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the
Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued
against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the
local market. llcd
Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK", also for cigarettes, must
be protected against unauthorized appropriation, petitioners twice solicited the ancillary writ in the course of the main suit for
infringement but the court of origin was unpersuaded.
Before we proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it must be emphasized that resolution of the issue on the
propriety of lifting the writ of preliminary injunction should not be construed as a prejudgment of the suit below. Aware of the
fact that the discussion we are about to enter into involves a mere interlocutory order, a discourse on the aspect of
infringement must thus be avoided. With these caveat, we shall now shift our attention to the events which spawned the
controversy.
As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America.
The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing
business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered owners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and
"LARK" per certificates of registration issued by the Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28, 1964, and March 25,
1964, plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the
Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts complained
of via a preliminary injunction (p. 75, Court of Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132).
For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with the Philippine Patent Office
subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has
been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and
that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated (p. 158, Court of Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No.
13132).
On March 28, 1983, petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was denied by the Presiding Judge of Branch 166 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Pasig, premised upon the following propositions:
Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are not doing business in the Philippines
and are suing on an isolated transaction . . ." This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale,
manufacture, importation, expor[t]ation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.
With this admission, defendant asks: ". . . how could defendant's "MARK" cigarettes cause the former
"irreparable damage" within the territorial limits of the Philippines?" Plaintiffs maintain that since their
trademarks are entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which
the Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as
such, have the force and effect of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is
an action for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation
is sufficient even in the absence of proof to support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue
in the main case to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to
such trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of
the Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
There is no dispute that the First Plaintiff is the registered owner of trademar[k] "MARK VII" with
Certificate of Registration No. 18723, dated April 26, 1973 while the Second Plaintiff is likewise the
registered owner of trademark "MARK TEN" under Certificate of Registration No. 11147, dated May 28,
1963 and the Third Plaintiff is a registrant of trademark "LARK" as shown by Certificate of Registration
No. 10953 dated March 23, 1964, in addition to a pending application for registration of trademark
"MARK VII" filed on November 21, 1980 under Application Serial No. 43243, all in the Philippine Patent
Office. In the same manner, defendant has a pending application for registration of the trademark "LARK"
cigarettes with the Philippine Patent Office under Application Serial No. 44008. Defendant contends that
since plaintiffs are "not doing business in the Philippines" coupled by the fact that the Director of Patents
has not denied their pending application for registration of its trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ of
preliminary injunction is premature. Plaintiffs contend that this act(s) of defendant is but a subterfuge to
give semblance of good faith intended to deceive the public and patronizers into buying the products and
create the impression that defendant's goods are identical with or come from the same source as
plaintiffs' products or that the defendant is a licensee of plaintiffs when in truth and in fact the former is
not. But the fact remains that with its pending application, defendant has embarked in the manufacturing,
selling, distributing and advertising of "MARK" cigarettes. The question of good faith or bad faith on the
part of defendant are matters which are evidentiary in character which have to be proven during the
hearing on the merits; hence, until and unless the Director of Patents has denied defendant's application,
the Court is of the opinion and so holds that issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would not lie.
There is no question that defendant has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
manufacture cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK" (Letter of Ruben B. Ancheta, Acting
Commissioner addressed to Fortune Tobacco Corporation dated April 3, 1981, marked as Annex "A",
defendant's "OPPOSITION, etc." dated September 24, 1982). However, this authority is qualified ". . . that
the said brands have been accepted and registered by the Patent Office not later than six (6) months
after you have been manufacturing the cigarettes and placed the same in the market." However, this
grant ". . . does not give you protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by
infringement or unfair competition in relation to your indicated trademarks/brands". As aforestated, the
registration of defendant's application is still pending in the Philippine Patent Office.
It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction as well as in the United States that the right or title of the
applicant for injunction remedy must be clear and free from doubt. Because of the disastrous and painful
effects of an injunction, Courts should be extremely careful, cautious and conscionable in the exercise of
its discretion consistent with justice, equity and fair play.
"There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution,
deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the
issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only
by the protecting preventive process of injunction." (Bonaparte v. Camden, etc. N. Co., 3 F. Cas.
No. 1, 617, Baldw. 205, 217.)
"Courts of equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which injunction shall be
granted or withheld. There is wisdom in this course, for it is impossible to foresee all exigencies
of society which may require their aid to protect rights and restrain wrongs." (Merced M. Go v.
Freemont, 7 Gal. 317, 321; 68 Am. Dec. 262.)
"It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its operation benign and useful, it must be
exercised with great discretion, and when necessary requires it." (Attorney-General v. Utica Inc.
Co., P. John Ch. (N.Y.) 371.)
Having taken a panoramic view of the position[s] of both parties as viewed from their pleadings, the
picture reduced to its minimum size would be this: At the crossroads are the two (2) contending parties,
plaintiffs vigorously asserting the rights granted by law, treaty and jurisprudence to restrain defendant in
its activities of manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising its "MARK" cigarettes and now comes
defendant who countered and refused to be restrained claiming that it has been authorized temporarily
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under certain conditions to do so as aforestated coupled by its
pending application for registration of trademark "MARK" in the Philippine Patent Office. This
circumstance in itself has created a dispute between the parties which to the mind of the Court does not
warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
"It is well-settled principle that courts of equity will refuse an application for the injunctive
remedy where the principle of law on which the right to preliminary injunction rests is disputed
and will admit of doubt, without a decision of the court of law establishing such principle although
satisfied as to what is a correct conclusion of law upon the facts. The fact, however, that there is
no such dispute or conflict does not in itself constitute a justifiable ground for the court to refuse
an application for the injunctive relief." (Hackensack Impr. Commn. v. New Jersey Midland P. Co.,
22 N.J. Eg. 94.) cdphil

Hence, the status quo existing between the parties prior to the filing of this case should be
maintained. For after all, an injunction, without reference to the parties, should not be violent,
vicious nor even vindictive. (pp. 338-341, Rollo in G.R. No.91332.)
In the process of denying petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order denying issuance of the requested
writ, the court of origin took cognizance of the certification executed on January 30, 1984 by the Philippine Patent Office
attesting to the fact that private respondent's application for registration is still pending appropriate action. Apart from this
communication, what prompted the trial court judge to entertain the idea of prematurity and untimeliness of petitioners'
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was the letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue dated February 2, 1984
which reads:
MRS. TERESITA GANDIONGCO OLEDAN
Legal Counsel
Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Madam:
In connection with your letter dated January 25, 1984, reiterating your query as to whether your label
approval automatically expires or becomes null and void after six (6) months if the brand is not accepted
and by the patent office, please be informed that no provision in the Tax Code or revenue regulation that
requires an applicant to comply with the aforementioned condition in order that his label approved will
remain valid and existing.
Based on the document you presented, it shows that registration of this particular label is still pending
resolution by the Patent Office. These being so, you may therefore continue with the production of said
brand of cigarette until this Office is officially notified that the question of ownership of "MARK" brand is
finally resolved.
Very truly yours,
TEODORO D. PAREO
Chief, Manufactured Tobacco
Tax Division
TAN-P6531-D 2830-A-6
(p. 348, Rollo.)
It appears from the testimony of Atty. Enrique Madarang, Chief of the Trademark Division of the then Philippine Patent
Office that Fortune's application for its trademark is still pending before said office (p. 311, Rollo).
Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events which supposedly transpired since March 28, 1983, when the trial court first
declined issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, that could alter the results of the case in that Fortune's application had been
rejected, nay, barred by the Philippine Patent Office, and that the application had been forfeited by abandonment, but the
trial court nonetheless denied the second motion for issuance of the injunctive writ on April 22, 1987, thus:
For all the prolixity of their pleadings and testimonial evidence, the plaintiffs-movants have fallen far short
of the legal requisites that would justify the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. For one,
they did not even bother to establish by competent evidence that the products supposedly affected
adversely by defendant's trademark now subject of an application for registration with the Philippine
Patents Office, are in actual use in the Philippines. For another, they concentrated their fire on the alleged
abandonment and forfeiture by defendant of said application for registration.
The Court cannot help but take note of the fact that in their complaint plaintiffs included a prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition was duly heard, and thereafter the matter was
assiduously discussed lengthily and resolved against plaintiffs in a 15-page Order issued by the
undersigned's predecessor on March 28, 1983. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied in
another well-argued 8 page Order issued on April 5, 1984, and the matter was made to rest.
However, on the strength of supposed changes in the material facts of this case, plaintiffs came up with
the present motion citing therein the said changes which are: that defendant's application had been
rejected and barred by the Philippine Patents Office, and that said application has been deemed
abandoned and forfeited. But defendant has refiled the same.
Plaintiff's arguments in support of the present motion appear to be a mere rehash of their stand in the first
above-mentioned petition which has already been ruled upon adversely against them. Granting that the
alleged changes in the material facts are sufficient grounds for a motion seeking a favorable grant of what
has already been denied, this motion just the same cannot prosper.
In the first place there is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs' products which they seek to protect
from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for
commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. Secondly, as shown by plaintiffs' own evidence
furnished by no less than the chief of Trademarks Division of the Philippine Patent Office, Atty. Enrique
Madarang, the abandonment of an application is of no moment, for the same can always be refiled. He
said there is no specific provision in the rules prohibiting such refiling (TSN, November 21, 1986, pp. 60 &
64, Raviera). In fact, according to Madarang, the refiled application of defendant is now pending before
the Patents Office. Hence, it appears that the motion has no leg to stand on. (pp. 350-351, Rollo in G.R.
No. 91332.) LLpr
Confronted with this rebuff, petitioners filed a previous petition for certiorari before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 78141,
but the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside the court of origin's order dated April 22, 1987, and granted
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Fortune, its agents, employees, and representatives, from
manufacturing, selling, and advertising "MARK" cigarettes. The late Justice Cacdac, speaking for the First Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13132, remarked:
There is no dispute that petitioners are the registered owners of the trademarks for cigarettes "MARK
VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK". (Annexes B, C and D, petition). As found and reiterated by the Philippine
Patent Office in two (2) official communications dated April 6, 1983 and January 24, 1984, the trademark
"MARK" is "confusingly similar" to the trademarks of petitioners, hence, registration was barred under
Sec. 4(d) of Rep. Act No. 166, as amended (pp. 106, 139, SCA rollo). In a third official communication
dated April 8, 1986, the trademark application of private respondent for the mark "MARK" under Serial
No. 44008 filed on February 13, 1981 which was declared abandoned as of February 16, 1986, is now
deemed forfeited, there being no revival made pursuant to Rule 98 of the Revised Rules of Practitioners
in Trademark Cases." (p. 107, CA rollo). The foregoing documents or communications mentioned by
petitioners as "the changes in material facts which occurred after March 28, 1983", are not also
questioned by respondents.
Pitted against the petitioners' documentary evidence, respondents pointed to (1) the letter dated January
30, 1979 (p. 137, CA rollo) of Conrado P. Diaz, then Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
temporarily granting the request of private respondent for a permit to manufacture two (2) new brands of
cigarettes one of which is brand "MARK" filter-type blend, and (2) the certification dated September 26,
1986 of Cesar G. Sandico, Director of Patents (p. 138, CA rollo) issued upon the written request of
private respondents' counsel dated September 17, 1986 attesting that the records of his office would
show that the "trademark MARK" for cigarettes is now the subject of a pending application under Serial
No. 59872 filed on September 16, 1986.
Private respondent's documentary evidence provides the reasons neutralizing or weakening their
probative values. The penultimate paragraph of Commissioner Diaz' letter of authority reads:
"Please be informed further that the authority herein granted does not give you
protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair
competition in relation to your above-named brands/trademarks."
while Director Sandico's certification contained similar conditions as follows:
"This Certification, however, does not give protection as against any person or entity
whose right may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to the aforesaid
trademark nor the right to register if contrary to the provisions of the Trademark Law, Rep. Act
No. 166 as amended and the Revised Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases."
The temporary permit to manufacture under the trademark "MARK" for cigarettes and the acceptance of
the second application filed by private respondent in the height of their dispute in the main case were
evidently made subject to the outcome of the said main case or Civil Case No. 47374 of the respondent
Court. Thus, the Court has not missed to note the absence of a mention in the Sandico letter of
September 26, 1986 of any reference to the pendency of the instant action filed on August 18, 1982. We
believe and hold that petitioners have shown a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory
injunction for the purposes stated in their complaint and subsequent motions for the issuance of the
prohibitory writ. (Buayan Cattle Co. vs. Quintillan, 125 SCRA 276).
The requisites for the granting of preliminary injunction are the existence of the right protected and the
facts against which the injunction is to be directed as violative of said right. (Buayan Cattle Co. vs.
Quintillan, supra; Ortigas & Co. vs. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326). It is a writ framed according to the
circumstances of the case commanding an act which the Court regards as essential to justice and
restraining an act it deems contrary to equity and good conscience (Rosauro vs. Cuneta, 119 SCRA 570).
If it is not issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the
plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards
granting the relief sought by the plaintiff (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). Generally, its grant or denial
rests upon the sound discretion of the Court except on a clear case of abuse (Belish Investment &
Finance Co. vs. State House, 151 SCRA 636). Petitioners' right of exclusivity to their registered
trademarks being clear and beyond question, the respondent court's denial of the prohibitive writ
constituted excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. If the lower court does not grant
preliminary injunction, the appellate court may grant the same. (Service Specialists, Inc. vs. Sheriff of
Manila, 145 SCRA 139). (pp. 165-167, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.) llcd

After private respondent Fortune's motion for reconsideration was rejected, a motion to dissolve the disputed writ of
preliminary injunction with offer to post a counterbond was submitted which was favorably acted upon by the Court of
Appeals, premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a result
thereof, to wit:
The private respondent seeks to dissolve the preliminary injunction previously granted by this Court with
an offer to file a counterbond. It was pointed out in its supplemental motion that lots of workers employed
will be laid off as a consequence of the injunction and that the government will stand to lose the amount
of specific taxes being paid by the private respondent. The specific taxes being paid is the sum total of
P120,120,295.98 from January to July 1989.
The petitioners argued in their comment that the damages caused by the infringement of their trademark
as well as the goodwill it generates are incapable of pecuniary estimation and monetary evaluation and
not even the counterbond could adequately compensate for the damages it will incur as a result of the
dissolution of the bond. In addition, the petitioner further argued that doing business in the Philippines is
not relevant as the injunction pertains to an infringement of a trademark right.
After a thorough re-examination of the issues involved and the arguments advanced by both parties in
the offer to file a counterbond and the opposition thereto, WE believe that there are sound and cogent
reasons for Us to grant the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the offer of the private
respondent to put up a counterbond to answer for whatever damages the petitioner may suffer as a
consequence of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction.
The petitioner will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting of the
preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes
with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such damages.
While the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to dissolve an injunction previously
granted, nevertheless, it is equally true that an injunction could be dissolved only upon good and valid
grounds subject to the sound discretion of the court. As WE have maintained the view that there are
sound and good reasons to lift the preliminary injunction, the motion to file a counterbond is granted. (pp.
53-54, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion for re-examination geared towards reimposition of the writ of preliminary injunction
but to no avail (p. 55, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332).
Hence, the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to
excess of jurisdiction when:
I. . . . it required, contrary to law and jurisprudence, that in order that petitioners may suffer irreparable
injury due to the lifting of the injunction, petitioners should be using actually their registered trademarks in
commerce in the Philippines;
II. . . . it lifted the injunction in violation of section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court; and
III. . . . after having found that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its
jurisdiction for having refused to issue the writ of injunction to restrain private respondent's acts that are
contrary to equity and good conscience, it made a complete about face for legally insufficient grounds
and authorized the private respondent to continue performing the very same acts that it had considered
contrary to equity and good conscience, thereby ignoring not only the mandates of the Trademark Law,
the international commitments of the Philippines, the judicial admission of private respondent that it will
have no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after the Director of Patents shall have rejected the
application to register it, and the admonitions of the Supreme Court. (pp. 24-25, Petition; pp. 25-26,
Rollo.)
To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign corporations not engaged in local
commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows:
SECTION 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been
registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair
competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do
business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise
known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country of which the
said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or
law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7
of Republic Act No. 638.)
to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the
principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. Judging from a
perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A, the conclusion reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in
support thereof is embedded in Philippine legal jurisprudence.
Indeed, it was stressed in General Garments Corporation vs. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50 [1971]) by then Justice (later
Chief Justice) Makalintal that:
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum case was subsequently derogated
when Congress, purposely to "counteract the effects" of said case, enacted Republic Act No. 638,
inserting Section 21-A in the Trademark Law, which allows a foreign corporation or juristic person to bring
an action in Philippine courts for infringement of a mark or tradename, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, "whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the
Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the
Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint."
Petitioner argues that Section 21-A militates against respondent's capacity to maintain a suit for
cancellation, since it requires, before a foreign corporation may bring an action, that its trademark or
tradename has been registered under the Trademark Law. The argument misses the essential point in
the said provision, which is that the foreign corporation is allowed thereunder to sue "whether or not it has
been licensed to do business in the Philippines" pursuant to the Corporation Law (precisely to counteract
the effects of the decision in the Mentholatum case). (at p. 57.)
However, on May 21, 1984, Section 21-A, the provision under consideration, was qualified by this Court in La Chemise
Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez (129 SCRA 373 [1984]), to the effect that a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines may have the right to sue before Philippine Courts, but existing adjective axioms require that qualifying
circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani, Commercial Laws
of the Philippines, 1991 Ed., p. 598; 4 Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws, Rev. Ed., 1986, p. 381). Indeed, it is not
sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin. Rather, it must additionally
allege its personality to sue. Relative to this condition precedent, it may be observed that petitioners were not remiss in
averring their personality to lodge a complaint for infringement (p. 75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132) especially so when
they asserted that the main action for infringement is anchored on an isolated transaction (p. 75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No.
13132; Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037 (1966), 1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p. 103).
Another point which petitioners considered to be of significant interest, and which they desire to impress upon us is the
protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Yet, insofar as this
discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the
Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La Chemise (supra at
page 390).
Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the
guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a
cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is
alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand. LibLex
In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners are
of the impression that actual use of their trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable element
under Article 2 of the Paris Convention in that:
(2) . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in the country where protection is
claimed may be required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any
industrial property rights. (p. 28, Petition; p. 29, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law which speak
loudly about the necessity of actual commercial use of the trademark in the local forum:
SEC. 2. What are registrable. Trademarks, tradenames and service marks owned by persons,
corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations,
partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act; Provided, That said trademarks, tradenames, or service marks are actually in use
in commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the applications for
registration are filed; And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant for registration is a
citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, and such fact is officially
certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the English language, by the
government of the foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. (As amended
by R.A. No. 865).

SEC. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; how acquired. Anyone who
lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who
renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and
in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a tradename, or a service
mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the
merchandise, business or service of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, tradename,
service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be recognized and
protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are other property rights known to the law. (As
amended by R.A. No. 638). (Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 583
[1991], at pp. 589-590; italics ours.)
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in
the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras,
International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16). prLL
The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law, according to Justice Gutierrez, Jr., in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 [1991]), have been construed in this manner:
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is
a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename.
xxx xxx xxx
These provisions have been interpreted in Sterling Products International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
Actiengesellschaft (27 SCRA 1214 [1969]) in this way:
"A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come down through the
years is that actual use in commerce or business is a prerequisite to the acquisition of the right of
ownership over a trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive right thereto. Such right
grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make advertisements, issue
circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give exclusive right of
use. For trademark is a creation of use. The underlying reason for all these is that purchasers
have come to understand the mark as indicating the origin of the wares. Flowing from this is the
trader's right to protection in the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has accumulated from
use of the trademark . . ."
In fact, a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark unless it uses it in commerce.
We rule[d] in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 526 [1982]):
"3. The Trademark law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of the mark prior
to its registration. There is no dispute that respondent corporation was the first registrant, yet it
failed to fully substantiate its claim that it used in trade or business in the Philippines the subject
mark; it did not present proof to invest it with exclusive, continuous adoption of the trademark
which should consist among others, of considerable sales since its first use. The invoices
(Exhibits 7, 7-a, and 8-b) submitted by respondent which were dated way back in 1957 show that
the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be used as 'samples' and 'of no commercial value'.
The evidence for respondent must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies. (Sy Ching v.
Gaw Lui, 44 SCRA 148-149) 'Samples' are not for sale and therefore, the fact of exporting them;
to the Philippines cannot be considered to be equivalent to the 'use' contemplated by the law.
Respondent did not expect income from such 'samples'. There were no receipts to establish sale,
and no proof were presented to show that they were subsequently sold in the Philippines."
(Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 526 [1982]; Emphasis Supplied)
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines. It has never
promoted its tradename or trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipinos except the very few
who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine
government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. (at pp. 589-591.)
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an exclusive right over
their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in
line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation
not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its
trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement
but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.
Going back to the first assigned error, we can not help but notice the manner the ascription was framed which carries with it
the implied but unwarranted assumption of the existence of petitioners' right to relief. It must be emphasized that this aspect
of exclusive dominion to the trademarks, together with the corollary allegation of irreparable injury, has yet to be established
by petitioners by the requisite quantum of evidence in civil cases. It cannot be denied that our reluctance to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction is due to judicial deference to the lower courts, involved as there is a mere interlocutory order
(Villarosa vs. Teodoro, Sr., 100 Phil. 25 [1956]). In point of adjective law, the petition has its roots on a remedial measure
which is but ancillary to the main action for infringement still pending factual determination before the court of origin. It is
virtually needless to stress the obvious reality that critical facts in an infringement case are not before us more so when
even Justice Feliciano's opinion observes that "the evidence is scanty" and that petitioners "have yet to submit actual copies
or photographs of their registered marks as used in cigarettes" while private respondent has not, for its part, "submitted the
actual labels or packaging materials used in selling its 'Mark' cigarettes." Petitioners, therefore, may not be permitted to
presume a given state of facts on their so-called right to the trademarks which could be subjected to irreparable injury and in
the process, suggest the fact of infringement. Such a ploy would practically place the cart ahead of the horse. To our mind,
what appears to be the insurmountable barrier to petitioners' portrayal of whimsical exercise of discretion by the Court of
Appeals is the well-taken remark of said court that:
The petitioner[s] will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting of
the preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the
cigarettes with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such
damages. (p. 54, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. 319, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332) as well as in the very
petition filed with this Court (p. 2, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332) indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for
these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can be breached (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129;Section 3, Rule 58, Revised Rules of Court). Indeed, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may be
added in this connection that albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the Philippines of their symbols as
admitted by private respondent, the fact of exclusive ownership cannot be made to rest solely on these documents since
dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact of registration alone and does not perfect a trademark right
(Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804 [1983]).
Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the absence of business activity here and rely on the
remaining statements of the complaint below, still, when these averments are juxtaposed with the denials and propositions
of the answer submitted by private respondent, the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have thereby been
controverted. This is not to say, however, that the manner the complaint was traversed by the answer is sufficient to tilt the
scales of justice in favor of private respondent. Far from it. What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet in remedial
law that before injunctive relief may properly issue, complainant's right or title must be undisputed and demonstrated on the
strength of one's own title to such a degree as to unquestionably exclude dark clouds of doubt, rather than on the weakness
of the adversary's evidence, inasmuch as the possibility of irreparable damage, without prior proof of transgression of an
actual existing right, is no ground for injunction being mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CFI of
Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577 [1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court, Second ed., 1985, p. 225; 3 Martin, Rules of Court,
1986 ed., p. 82).

On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing
into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent's "MARK" cigarettes who might
be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple
writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of
tax revenues represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained,
there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines.
With reference to the second and third issues raised by petitioners on the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, it cannot
be gainsaid that respondent court acted well within its prerogatives under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of injunction. The injunction may be
refused or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, upon the insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the
complaint itself, with or without notice to the adverse party. It may also be refused or dissolved on other
grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendants which may be opposed by the plaintiff also by
affidavits. It may further be refused or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that
although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be,
would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned
that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the
injunction. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too great, it must be
modified.
Under the foregoing rule, injunction may be refused, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on the following instances:
(1) If there is insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations therein. Refusal or dissolution
may be granted in this case with or without notice to the adverse party.
(2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or
continuance thereof would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer. The defendant, in this case, must file a bond in an
amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
(3) On other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant which may be opposed by the plaintiff
also by affidavits.
Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction granted is too great. (3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 99; Francisco, supra, at
p. 268.)
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines,
it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration
heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected. At any rate, and assuming in gratia argumenti that
respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a
petition for certiorari (Clark vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co. 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and mindful of the rule that a
writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the control of the court before final judgment,
petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak, more so when extinction of the previously issued writ can even
be made without previous notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1947];
3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14, 1989
and November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
||| (Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91332, [July 16, 1993])

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522,
requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States.
The request was forwarded the following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of the official
extradition request and all pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his request was
denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The trial court
issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant
petition. ECTSDa
Although the Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding, it nevertheless provides the applicability of the Rules of Court in the hearing of the petition insofar as
practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings.
The prospective extraditee under Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed
under the treaty and the implementing law. Thus, the evaluation process, in essence, partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation making available certain constitutional rights to the prospective extraditee. The Court noted that there is a void
in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty regarding the basic due process rights available to a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage of the proceedings. The Court was constrained to apply the rules of fair play, the due
process rights of notice and hearing. Hence, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable time within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EVALUATION PROCESS, AN INVESTIGATIVE OR INQUISITORIAL


PROCESS. The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At
such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency
of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the
crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-
29; Article 2 and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-
judicial power.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; PHASES. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial
proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p.
198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
3. ID.; ID:; TEST OF DETERMINING WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OR
MERELY INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS. In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had
occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the
test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions:
Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before
it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; ADMINISTRATIVE BODY AUTHORIZED TO EVALUATE
EXTRADITION DOCUMENTS MERELY EXERCISES INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS. The above description
in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power
is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether
or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
5. ID.; ID.; EVALUATION PROCESS, PARTAKES OF NATURE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. In contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of
the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation
can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the
request. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early
as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these
possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by
petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation.
6. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EXTENDS TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
WHICH POSSESS A CRIMINAL OR PENAL ASPECT. In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]),
we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.
7. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; COMPONENTS. Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process
which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard
by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERVADES NOT ONLY IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BUT IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AS WELL. The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but
in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled
to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and
present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p, 64). In a
preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE DISPENSED WITH AND SHELVED ASIDE IN EXTRADITION CASES. Worthy of inquiry is
the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the
evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative
determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request
shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No.
1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.

10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO FILIPINO CITIZENS. Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information
on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN, CONSTRUED. The concept of
matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the
governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives or simply because matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA [1987]). Hence the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing."
12. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION; IMPLEMENTED BY ACCESS TO INFORMATION WITHIN GOVERNMENT'S
CONTROL. The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be
contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AVAILABLE DURING EVALUATION STAGE OF EXTRADITION WHERE NO OFFICIAL
PHILIPPINE ACTION HAS YET BEEN DONE. In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to
official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes
this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the
extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests
necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of
our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have
already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
14. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; RULE OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA; CONSTRUED. The rule of pacta sunt servanda,
one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement
therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II
of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
15. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION; WHEN APPLIED; CASE AT BAR. Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine of incorporation
is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should
first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted
with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the
above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13).
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PRIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OVER NATIONAL OR MUNICIPAL LAW. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
17. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS. In the absence of a law
or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extradites. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription.
In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of
the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes
a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
18. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. The basic
principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC,
276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor
Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to
the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be
given paramount consideration.
19. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; EQUITY JURISDICTION; AVAILED OF ONLY IN ABSENCE OF, AND NEVER
AGAINST, STATUTORY LAW OR JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS. We have ruled time and again that this Court's
equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction
over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which
our Constitution is premised.
KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DOES NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER CASES WHICH ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on August 10, 1999,
the TRO ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant petition has become moot and academic. This
Court does not exercise jurisdiction over cases which are moot and academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; PERSON SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS
ENTITLED TO HAVE ACCESS AND CONTROVERT EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. While the evaluation process
conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary
investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered
extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of
abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a
criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.
With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to the documents relating to the
request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's
constitutional rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere," so any violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is everybody's concern because they, one way
or another, directly or indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT THERETO, UNIVERSAL BASIC RIGHT. While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide
for a preliminary investigation, neither does either prohibit it. The right to due process is a universal basic right which is
deemed written into our laws and treaties with foreign countries.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is
now an established principle. The respondent has a right of access to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit
controverting evidence. The prosecuting official who conducts the preliminary investigation is required to be neutral,
objective, and impartial in resolving the issue of probable cause. I see no reason why the same rights may not be accorded
a person sought to be extradited at the stage where the Department of Justice evaluates whether a petition for extradition
would be filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only denial of due process rights but of equal protection
may be raised.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE AND HEARING; MUST BE GRANTED AT TIME DEPRIVATION CAN STILL BE PREVENTED.
But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed, if the right to notice and hearing is to
serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. Like the
filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a petition for extradition causes immediate impairment of the
liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a substantial curtailment of other rights. His arrest may be immediately
ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and public trial. He will be constrained to seek
the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye would be directed at him with all the
concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core
of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.
QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER TREATY RIGHTS
CLAIMED BY CONTRACTING STATE. The human rights of a person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in ourConstitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. Stated
otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of our government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a
source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part
of the law of the land.
2. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; CANNOT BE UTILIZED FOR POLITICAL OFFENSES OR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED
CHARGES. That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is obviously
pertinent. Even if he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in my view, entitled to our full protection
against the hazards of extradition (or deportation, similarly) from the very start. More so because, looking at the facts
adduced at the hearing and on the record of this case, the charges against him involve or are co-mingled with, if not rooted
in, certain offenses of a political nature or motivation such as the ones involving alleged financial contributions to a major
American political party. If so, long established is the principle that extradition could not be utilized for political offenses or
politically motivated charges.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSON PRESUMED INNOCENT AND NOT COVERED BY
SANCTIONS UNTIL PROVED TO BE SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION. Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a
person is presumed innocent or not covered by the sanctions of either criminal law or international treaty. At any stage
where a still prospective extraditee only seeks to know so that he can prepare and prove that he should not be extradited,
there should be no conflict over the extension to him of constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens alike.
2. ID.; ID.; SILENCE IN TREATY OVER CITIZEN'S RIGHT DURING EVALUATION STAGE DOES NOT NECESSARILY
EXCLUDE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OR INVESTIGATION. Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of
respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7 enumerates the required documents and establishes the procedures
under which the documents shall be submitted and admitted as evidence. There is no specific provision on how the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The Secretary of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage.
Under petitioner's theory, silence in the treaty over a citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is interpreted as deliberate
exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence is interpreted as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation provided by the laws of either one of the two states. The right to be informed of
charges which may lead to court proceedings and result in a deprivation of liberty is ordinarily routine. It is readily available
to one against whom the state's coercive power has already been focused. I fail to see how silence can be interpreted as
exclusion. The treaty is silent because at this stage, the preliminary procedure is still an internal matter. And when a law or
treaty is silent, it means a right or privilege may be granted. It is not the other way around.
3. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, PURPOSE. Paraphrasing Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta,
118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation is to
secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open and
extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trials. Even if the purpose is only to determine whether or not the respondent
is a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless entitled to the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those
charged with ordinary crimes in the Philippines.
4. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BE INFORMED; CONSTRUED. The right to be informed is related to the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional guarantee extends to the speedy disposition of cases before all
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies (Constitution,Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy disposition, however, does not mean the
deliberate exclusion of the defendant or respondent from the proceedings. As this Court ruled in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36
SCRA 247 (1970), "the right to a speedy trial, means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case, his being extradited) determined within the shortest possible time compatible with
the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITEE ENTITLED TO COPIES OF PERTINENT
DOCUMENTS WHILE APPLICATION FOR EXTRADITION IS BEING EVALUATED. The only real issue before the Court
is whether or not private respondent can validly ask for copies of pertinent documents while the application for extradition
against him is still undergoing process by the Executive Department. There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to
such extradition documents conformably with the provisions of Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution. The
constitutional right to free access to information of public concern is circumscribed only by the fact that the desired
information is not among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the
exercise of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions as may be prescribed by law.
2. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO FREE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; "PUBLIC
CONCERN," CONSTRUED. There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public concern.
The term "public concern" eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum of matters which the public may
want to know either because the subject thereof can affect their lives or simply because it arouses concern.
3. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; CONSTRUED. The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to
be heard, presupposing foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may wish to
proffer in an effort to clear himself. Like "public concern," the term due process does not admit of any restrictive definition.
Justice Frankfurter has viewed this flexible concept, as being "a compounded by history, reason, the past course of
decisions, and stout confidence in the democratic faith." The framers of our own Constitution,it would seem, have
deliberately intended to make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu of society. Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient
adaptable to every situation calling for its applications that makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term
as and when there is a possibility that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused. Verily,
whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under
the auspices of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. This right is two-pronged substantive and procedural due process founded, in
the first instance, on Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of procedures.
Substantive due process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law that figures to interfere with the right of a
person to his life, liberty and property. Procedural due process the more litigated of the two focuses on the rules that
are established in order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITION, CONCEPT. Extradition is well-defined concept
and is more a problem in international law. It is the "process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against
the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to
those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and
convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply
to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no charges has been laid or to a person
whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment."
2. ID.; ID.; TREATY-MAKING POWER BELONGS TO EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENTS. In our
constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty belongs to the executive and legislative departments of our government.
Between these two departments, the executive has a greater say in the making of a treaty. Under Section 21, Article VII of
our Constitution,the President has the sole powerto negotiate treaties and international agreements although to be effective,
they must be concurred in by at least two thirds of all the members of the Senate.
3. ID.; PRESIDENT; TRADITIONALLY ACCORDED WIDER DEGREE OF DISCRETION IN CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS. The presidential role in a foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree
of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.
4. ID.; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS, NOT CRIMINAL; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ACCUSED CANNOT BE INVOKED BY EXTRADITEE. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to
determine what it is. What is certain is that it isnot a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who can claim the entire
array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and
the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition judge.
Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by
an extraditee.
5. ID.; ID.; EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS DIFFERENT FROM CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. Indeed, an extradition
proceeding issummary in nature which is untrue of criminal proceedings. Even the rules of evidence are different in an
extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under
litigation. It is not only the quality but even the quantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case,
an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be
ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case."
6. ID.; ID.; EXTRADITION DECISION DIFFERENT FROM JUDICIAL DECISION. The nature of an extradition decision is
different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our courts may hold an individual
extraditable but the ultimate decision to extradite the individual lies in the hands of the Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically provides that "extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State exercises this ultimate power
and is conceded considerable discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign
relations. In sum, he is not straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary court.
7. ID.; ID.; ISSUE ON PROVISIONAL ARREST RENDERED MOOT BY FILING OF REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION. The
issue of whether respondent Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a request for
provisional arrest must be made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the request for extradition, the US
authorities have implicitly decided not to move for respondent's provisional arrest. But more important, a request for
respondent's arrest does not mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be
arrested.
8. ID.; ID.; REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL ARREST; GRANT THEREOF, NOT MINISTERIAL. The due process
protection of the private respondent against arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters in Article 9 of the treaty and Section 20
of P.D. No. 1069. It is self-evident under these provisions that a request for provisional arrest does not mean it will be
granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is
subject to verification and evaluation by our executive authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real exigency
or if the supporting documents are insufficient. The protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional arrest does not
stop on the administrative level. For even if the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees with the request for
the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply for a judicial warrantfrom the "presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance (now RTC) of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It is ajudge who will issue a warrant for
the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge has to comply with Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which
provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to the eye is that compliance with this
requirement precludes any arbitrary arrest.
9. ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE FURNISHED DOCUMENTS DURING EVALUATION STAGE, NOT A DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS. Denying respondent's constitutional claim to be furnished all documents relating to the request for his
extradition by the US authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert his right to fundamental fairness. It should be
stressed that this is not a case where the respondent will not be given an opportunity to know the basis of the request for
his extradition. In truth, and contrary to the impression of the majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific time when he will be
given the papers constituting the basis for his extradition. The time is when he is summoned by the extradition court and
required to answer the petition for extradition. Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is free to foist all
defenses available to him. Such an opportunity does not deny him fairness which is the essence of due process of law.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; STAGES IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. There are
essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1) the preliminary evaluation stage, whereby the executive authority of
the requested state ascertains whether the extradition request is supported by the documents and information required
under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the extradition hearing, whereby the petition for extradition is heard before a court of
justice, which determines whether the accused should be extradited.
2. ID.; ID.; PERSON SUBJECT OF EXTRADITION, DURING EVALUATION STAGE, NOT ENTITLED TO COPIES OF
PERTINENT DOCUMENTS. The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a
right to be notified and to be heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits that neither the RP-US
Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law) expressly requires the Philippine government, upon receipt
of the request for extradition, to give copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective extraditee, much less
to give him an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of the petition in court.
3. ID.; ID.; RP-US TREATY; OCCASIONS WHERE PROSPECTIVE EXTRADITEE MAY BE DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY.
There are two occasions wherein the prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest
pending the submission of the extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of the extradition
petition in court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONAL ARREST; REQUISITES. Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative at all
times, and its enforcement does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings of the
provision itself, there are at least three requisites: (1) there must be an urgency, and (2) there is a corresponding request (3)
which must be made prior to the presentation of the request for extradition.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF REQUEST IN CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency
characterizing the nature of the extradition of private respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no
request from the United States for the provisional arrest of Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of justice stated during
the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying for the provisional arrest of private respondent. Finally, the formal
request for extradition has already been made; therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should really come before the
extradition request. Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the application of Article 9, contrary to the
apprehension of private respondent. In other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will be provisionally arrested or
deprived of his liberty. There is as yet no threat that his rights would be trampled upon, pending the filing in court of the
petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial gain to be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice)
secretary to notify and hear him during the preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the ministerial
power of checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, WITHOUT POWER TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs
secretary's determination of whether the offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is merely preliminary. The
same issue will be resolved by the trial court. Moreover, it is also the power and the duty of the court, not the executive
authority, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the
crimes charged. The sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be determined based on the laws of the requested state.
Private Respondent Jimenez will, therefore, definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition
petition will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the documents supporting the extradition
request.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DOES NOT DECLARE JUDGMENTS OR GRANT RELIEFS BASED ON
SPECULATIONS. Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his provisional arrest at any time.
That is purely speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TREATIES; CONTRACTING PARTIES PRESUMED TO PERFORM OBLIGATIONS
WITH UBERRIMAE FIDEI. The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from justice
and the correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist only when created by a treaty between the
two countries. International law does not require the voluntary surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any
treaty stipulation requiring it. When such a treaty does exist, as between the Philippines and the United States, it must be
presumed that the contracting states perform their obligations under it with uberrimae fedei, treaty obligations being
essentially characterized internationally by comity and mutual respect.

DECISION

MELO, J p:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His
only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's
ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure
for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country." The Decree is founded on: the doctrine
of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the
executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. cdrep
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way
of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida,
and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count); LLjur
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty
less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began
with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel
found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are
some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July
1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United
States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents
from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our
extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States
enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents
submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law
are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor
akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department
will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents
obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose
certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United
States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's
denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of
a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender
of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). prcd
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved
that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from
conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the
extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty
(20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the
counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents
are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED
OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL
EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OFMANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF
THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER
THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in
your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order
dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August
1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these
issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and
academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for
the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the
process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private
respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this
entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private
respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the
propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only
on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which
involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and
identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of,
and the time and place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with
the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location
of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said
Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in
the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U.S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of
Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of
the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation." cdphil
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that
the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue
an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor
upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable
to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the
Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except
for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the
dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the
nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article
3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the
Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions
ofPresidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the
Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no
obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on
the following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in
having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that
the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate
the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law,
could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the
DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article
2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative
or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial
power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De
Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial
power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative
body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This
power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory
body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to
make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Cdpr

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective
extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and,
therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has
no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request
(Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested
person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions
only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition
in court (Section 6,Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not
only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee.
As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available
only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to
counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon
vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty.
The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan(6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed
underRepublic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in
forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature
of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American
jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute
such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in
nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent
or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may
result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his
liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, Petitioner's Memorandum) that the
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not
authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado
vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character
which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the
present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in
both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this
effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as
they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain
immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person
sought for criminal prosecution; cdasia
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of
the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in
the U.S.Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the
implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as
swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In
order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that
the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before
some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum
state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate.
Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary
in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory.
However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte
Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W. 2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular
officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes,
and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests
for provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the
U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for
extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request
has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide
reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable
offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the
federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee
(18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence
offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits
extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed
any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this
regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather
than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The
court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the
Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the
Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in
the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the
Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request
as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited
be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is
the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state
interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that
of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States
as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)


In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction
or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III
of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective,
requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do
not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles
inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been
met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power
to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not
forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition. cdll
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding
that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and
deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it
results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration.
The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c]
of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court,
but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general
right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that
ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the
guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On
the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which
are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters
requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his
right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen
(Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen
has "standing."
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and
may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in
official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of
foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that
the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that
the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done;
hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall
under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the
extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a
conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution? prcd
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to
a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong
vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia,2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for
the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga &
Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied
in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and
a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two
components of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should
be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree
No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective
extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also
manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an
"ex partetechnical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose
no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be
supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has
authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot
be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence
for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential
Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpusshall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest
of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No.
1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended . . ." Can petitioner validly argue
that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in
the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632
[1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs.
United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid
objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and
should not be given paramount consideration. cdll
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree
No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661
[1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings
under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with
Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No.
971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected
Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the
necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of
Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be
removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that
an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which
the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic
procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the
matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in
support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 971)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the
respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but
of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's
favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may
be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue
in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of
the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with
the principles of democracy on which our Constitutionis premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must
ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. dctai
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED.
||| (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, [January 18, 2000], 379 PHIL 165-251)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department


of Justice,petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Mario Luza Bautista for Mark Jimenez.


SYNOPSIS

Petitioner US government filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure adopted by the trial court of
first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his arrest under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Petitioner contended that the procedure gives Jimenez notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Petitioner also assailed
the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for bail, which allows him to go on provisional liberty while extradition
proceedings are pending.
Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court, but resorted directly to the Supreme Court
instead of the Court of Appeals to obtain relief.
The Supreme Court allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to settle once and for all
the issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held that the present extradition case validates the premise that persons sought
to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Prior acts of respondent eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all costs.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge to set the hearing for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest when it was already evident from the Petition for Extradition itself and its supporting documents that a prima
facie finding did exist and he may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused; that there is no requirement to
notify and to hear the accused before the issuance of a warrant of arrest under the Constitution which requires only an
examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce; and that since accused were
allowed to be heard and to present evidence at this early stage, the procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial, which is discordant with the rationale for the entire system and anathema to the summary
nature of extraditions.
The Court also held that extraditee's immediate detention prior to his being heard does not violate the due process clause;
that the right to bail applies only in ordinary criminal proceedings; but that in extradition proceedings, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception. DScTaC

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; SUPREME COURT MAY ALLOW A DIRECT INVOCATION
OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI WHEN THERE ARE SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT
REASONS THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. [T]his Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the interest of justice and to settle once and for
all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSONS TO BE EXTRADITED ARE PRESUMED
TO BE FLIGHT RISKS; CASE AT BAR. Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of herein respondent (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost: These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him,
given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER TREATY NOR THE EXTRADITION LAW REQUIRE A HEARING BEFORE ISSUING A WARRANT
OF ARREST OF PROBABLE EXTRADITEE; REASONS; CASE AT BAR. It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD
1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a
mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustivedetermination to ferret
out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression a prima facie finding sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. Moreover, the law specifies that the court
sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In
connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently,
had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing
at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the
more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. aECTcA
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SETTING FOR
HEARING A REQUEST FOR THE ARREST OF AN EXTRADITEE AFTER HAVING ALREADY DETERMINED FROM
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS THAT A PRIMA FACIE FINDINGS EXISTS, A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. It is evident that
respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of
justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. We stress that the prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; NOTICE AND HEARING NOT REQUIRED
BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST. Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for
the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitutionitself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation
of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
6. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE JUDGE
UPON RECEIPT OF A PETITION FOR EXTRADITION. Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to
restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.
If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately
issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In
our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; APPLIES ONLY TO ORDINARY CRIMINAL
CASES AND NOT TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue. IaSAHC
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However,
the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate
rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property"
of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best
serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; SUFFICIENCY OF A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ONCE
EXTRADITEE IS PLACED UNDER THE EXTRADITION COURT'S CUSTODY, EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. Contrary to
the contention, of Jimenez his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process. We reiterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard
but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances such as those present in an extradition case call for it, asubsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.
In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. Contrary to his
contention, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest
and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its
supportingdocuments after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant
treaty; (2) the extradition judge's independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's custody, to apply for bail
as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; POWER TO ADMIT BAIL EXISTS IN
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS UNDER "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES." The government maintains that an
extradition court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law conferring such power; and that the 1987
Constitution, as well as the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine Laws, but not to extradition proceedings in which courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. The
argument is as ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings,
although as a matter of policy it may only be granted under "exceptional circumstances." This, quintessentially, has been the
doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40 (1902); and worth
mentioning, of course, are Paretti Y. United States, 112 F. 3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977),
and In re Kirby, et al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996); which are also discussed extensively by Mr. Justice Puno. . . . Truly, there is
neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases, or that class of cases
where courts must "render judgments of conviction or acquittal." Bail as a remedy is available where there is deprivation of
liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Go Siaco, akin to the situation confronting us, but involving a
deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential deportee to post bail although a deportation proceeding is not
criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in deportation cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RISK OF FLIGHT DOES NOT IPSO FACTO CALL FOR DENIAL OF BAIL; CASE AT BAR. We cannot
curtail a citizen's right to freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable mechanisms appropriate to
address them. To my mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail. Trial judges must henceforth
weigh carefully and judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused during the proceedings and right after,
when he ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or passports cancelled and hold-departure orders
issued or border patrols heightened, in order that the extraditee may not flee from our jurisdiction. In this regard, while I
agree that it is the extraditee's burden to prove the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court is also entitled to presume
that the executive branch has done all it can to forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch cannot plead its
helplessness and inutility to defeat the grant of bail to the extraditee. In any event, all things being equal, the personal
circumstances of respondent Jimenez would negate any idea of flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow whose
face is more frequently than others plastered in the tri-media. His stature as representative for a congressional district in
Manila makes escape from Philippine jurisdiction not only embarrassing for him but also constitutive of the offense of
abandonment of duty. His family and business interests are said to be strategically placed in this country. Indeed, where
respondent Jimenez has more to lose from flight, the possibility thereof appears remote and speculative. CIaHDc
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITING JUDGE HAS THE DISCRETION TO
DETERMINE WHETHER TO NOTIFY AND HEAR A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE 'BEFORE ORDERING HIS ARREST. I
submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest should be left to the
sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069. . . . Under this provision, the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is dependent on a big "if" or to an all important condition . . . if it will serve the ends of justice.
The determination of whether a warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve the ends of justice is certainly not a cut and
dried duty. It involves the appreciation of highly contentious facts, both objective and subjective in nature. Their appreciation
requires a judicial mind honed in the law of evidence. The history of extradition will reveal that, initially, the task of
determining whether an extraditee should be immediately arrested was given to the executive authorities of the extraditing
state. The matter, in other words, was treated purely as an executive function but unfortunately, the practice was given to
abuses. Recognizing that certain human rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether a
potential extraditee should be immediately arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to judges. The office
of the judge was called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee. The extraditing judge
is not to act as a stamp pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant. Under our law on
extradition, P.D. No. 1069, Section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is
guided by the following consideration . . . whether the arrest will serve the ends of justice. The grant of this judicial discretion
will be rendered naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to unnecessary fetters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE SILENCE OF OUR EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OUR EXTRADITION
LAW (P.D. NO. 1069) DOES NOT NEGATE THE RIGHT TO BAIL OF A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE. The mere silence of
our extradition treaty with the United States and our extradition law (P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right to bail of a
potential extraditee. Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs and practices support an extraditee's right to bail. But while an
extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not
frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:


1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; TREATIES; TREATY LAWS, LIKE ALL OTHER MUNICIPAL LAWS, ARE
SUBJECT TO THE PARAMETERS SET FORTH IN THE CONSTITUTION. Treaty laws, particularly those which are self-
executing, have equal stature as national statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to the parameters set forth
in the Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and a circumscription of government authority by the sovereign
people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its limitation upon which an act of government is justly measured. This
instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the government and any act in opposition thereto can only be struck down as
being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter gives a mandate, the government can do no less than to accept it;
its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill of Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its language and its intent. . . . Nowhere in the
Extradition Treaty with the United States is the grant of bail mentioned but so also it is not prohibited. This obscurity must
not be held to negate the right to bail; on the contrary, it should be viewed as allowing, at the very least, the evident
intendment and spirit of the fundamental law to prevail. aSDCIE
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; MUST APPLY TO EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS WHICH HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A CRIMINAL PROCESS. The draft ponencia would assume
that the Constitution confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal cases, and that it has no application to extradition
proceedings. This assumption would have reason for being if it were solely in criminal cases that a person could face an
imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for indeed, it is this threat, rather than the case nomenclature, that
must be the focus, and it would be superficial to think otherwise. While defying a neat definition, extradition has all the
earmarks of a criminal process an extraditee would suffer deprivations, be denied his freedom and restricted in his
movements, not much unlike a criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings involve an extended restraint of liberty following
arrest, peculiar to an accused in a criminal case, which can even be more severe than an accompanying detention in a
single state, for, at a minimum, it can mean protracted proceedings in both the asylum state and the demanding state and a
forced transportation in between. In Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, the Court observed that bail is constitutionally available to
all persons, even those against whom no formal charges are filed.
CARPIO, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; RIGHT AVAILABLE TO AN ACCUSED IN
DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; EXTRADITEE CANNOT INVOKE RIGHT TO BAIL IN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION. The right to bail is a constitutional right available to an accused in domestic criminal proceedings except
in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher when evidence of guilt is strong. An extraditee, however, cannot
invoke this constitutional right in international extradition because extradition proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
Extradition proceedings are like deportation and court martial proceedings where there is no constitutional right to bail.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION; ESSENCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. In essence,
extradition is police assistance extended by a state to arrest a person charged with a crime in another state and surrender
him to the authorities of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting state is legitimized by a treaty, which has the force
of a statute and forms part of municipal law. The benefit of extradition is the mutual assistance between states in criminal
law enforcement across national boundaries. The assisting state acts as an arresting agent and in some jurisdictions the
extradition process is mainly an executive function. Even under our extradition treaties, the final decision whether to
extradite or not rests with the President of the Philippines, not with the courts. Thus ordinarily an assisting state does not
grant bail to the extraditee whose recourse is to apply for bail before the court of the state where he is charged with a crime.
The assisting state, however, for equity considerations may choose to accord bail to the extraditee. One equity
consideration is to put extraditees in one country in equal footing with extraditees in the country of the treaty partner.
Another equity consideration is to grant the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, to preserve and enforce fundamental
rights. This rule will not change the situation for extraditee Mark B. Jimenez in the instant case because Jimenez has failed
to establish that he is not a flight risk. Having fled the United States just as he was about to be indicted for several serious
crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a flight risk for extradition purposes in this country. Jimenez has not successfully
rebutted this presumption before the extradition court. Jimenez has also refused to honor his agreement with the U.S.
Department of Justice, made in August 1998 through his U.S. counsel, to return to the United States where he faces a
maximum prison term of not less than 100 years if convicted on all counts, Given his resources, and the gravity of the
charges against him, Jimenez remains a serious flight risk.
YNAREZ-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL IN
ALL COURT PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL, CIVIL, INVESTIGATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE OR SUI GENERIS; CASE AT
BAR. I submit that we must consider the implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of
the accused must be protected, but in case neither criminal nor civil, one which we call "sui generis," basic freedoms
become irrelevant and non-available. A non-criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society than prosecution for
crime, and where the penalty is only to be brought for trial before the court with jurisdiction, is stripped of guarantees and
protections given to hard-boiled recidivists pending arrest and trial. We have denied a prospective extraditee the right to be
informed before trial of the nature and cause of the charges against him. Due process is essential in all court proceedings
criminal civil, investigatory, administrative, or even sui generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to justify deprivation
of that most elemental of rights, the right of notice. The Court has ruled that respondent Mark Jimenez or any other person
sought to be extradited must first be exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before
he may be informed of what the requesting State has against him. The right to notice before trial is denied. The majority
opinion states that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of arrest can be issued
against him. Worse, he is denied the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. All
the jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution becomes inapplicable. The petition for extradition and its attachments take the place of probable cause. The
right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons including those not charged with any crime. But
now, we create an unusual exception. It is not available to one who may be seized against his will for possible extradition to
a country where his innocence or guilt will first be determined. Arrest and imprisonment will become virtually certain in
extradition proceedings. The only thing required of the Court is to go over the request for extradition and its supporting
documents. Arrest is virtually assured because of the absence of notice and hearing. It is inconceivable that the officials of a
requesting State would be so dense or careless as to fail to include in the request for extradition a prima facie showing that
the respondent deserves to be seized and forcibly brought to the foreign country for trial. According to the majority opinion,
from the forwarded documents, we expect the trial court to "merely . . . get a good first impression sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused." This novel doctrine justifying the near
certainty of automatic arrest and detention goes against this Court's decision, too numerous to mention, protecting citizens
and aliens alike from unreasonable arrests or seizures. Can we expect anything other than a "good first impression" to arise
from the mere reading of a request for extradition? IcDCaT
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BAIL; SHOULD APPLY TO PERSONS FACING TRIAL FOR EXTRADITION. The Court should
apply the same principles on the right to bail found in the Constitution to persons facing trial for extradition. Thus, all
persons; except those where the probability of flight is clear and present or the crimes for which extradition is sought are
heinous, shall before judgment in the extradition proceedings, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even where the requesting country is one
with which the Philippines maintains strong ties. Excessive bail shall not be required.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.p:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as
the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated
May 23, 2001 1and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order
set for hearing petitioner's application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to
Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking
into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the
reasonable amount of bail for respondent's temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
"Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into
legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to G.R. No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809
and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as
the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for
his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court by a vote of 9-6 dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an
identical vote of 9-6 after three justices changed their votes it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061. The Petition alleged,inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire
fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections
1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
"immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In
that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash. 11After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
"The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
"The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on
provisional liberty because:
'1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such
power.
'2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing
bail in extradition proceedings.
'3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
'4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
'5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received
no evidence of 'special circumstances' which may justify release on bail.
'6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-
founded belief that he will not flee.
'7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
'8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled 'Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,' CA- G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
orders."' 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition
for Certiorari arising from petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of
Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues. SDIaCT
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity
of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court:
"(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4)
the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is
lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties
would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by
disallowing bail but, the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail
in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and, thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of
the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions:
(1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also
involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
"[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has
been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy
vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we
have further stated in Cuaresma:
'. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy. . . . .'
"Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, . . . requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and
money.
"That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
'Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of
the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.'
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
"This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions forcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best
to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet,
no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates
of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended
as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1 . Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer 28of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another
for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
"An important practical effect . . . of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a
jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will
be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of
effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence
of crime. . . . . From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal
receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
"The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and
more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the
great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2 . The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
other's legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative's signature on an extradition
treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. 35That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the
requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3 . The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis in a class by itself
they are not.
"An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that
are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee . .
..
xxx xxx xxx
"There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction
to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence
under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited 'upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case.' Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the
equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision
to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of
the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39

4 . Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.


Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified
it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, where it has done all that the treaty and the law require
it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender." 43Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused,
should it be found proper.
5 . There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction
of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him,
given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest gives him notice to escape and to
avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to
be extradited including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of
that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
"SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest, Hearing, Service of Notices. (1) Immediately upon
receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused
to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for
the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears
to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve
the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the
summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date
for the hearing thereof.
"(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan's act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest? We rule in the negative.
1 . On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.
The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression aprima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of
the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the
Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM,
the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make
an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve
the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually
concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
"In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably
absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence
of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.
"It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be
preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable . . . ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting
it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty
nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape
of the accused from the requested state.
2 . On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing
just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was
that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
"Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the
practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire
system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage if
he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one not the
opposite would be justified in view of respondent's demonstrated predisposition to flee. aDHCAE
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, aprima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the
submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In
our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
"Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including
those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from
Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." 60It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation
of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where
the circumstances such as those present in an extradition case call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his
being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge's independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's custody,
to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already
been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could
be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
government's interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating
our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to
evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision in the Constitution, the law or the treaty
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty,
since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of
the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the
"No Bail" Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. 69Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is
"dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested
or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by
the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this
power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1 . Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded.
In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
"When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
"In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
"The Constitution guarantees: '. . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.' This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
"Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
"The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the 'mandate of the people' are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has
to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the
lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
"A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
"The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
"We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2 . Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine
him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary
in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him
the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3 . Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request
in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for
his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition
court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in
this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents


The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties in particular, Respondent Jimenez have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and
this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent's claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not
only petitioner's application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent's prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter
required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard their in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the
great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties particularly the
potential extraditee have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez's plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by
the learned justices themselves has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this
case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed
proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and
deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous
cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath,
this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported
by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state
in bringing the accused or the fugitive who has illegally escaped back to its territory, so that the criminal process may
proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of
the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights
to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a court's request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima
facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima
facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at
scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding,
they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of
bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always
call for aprior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that
is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave
abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest
these summaryextradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our
inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner's simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez.
The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with
the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, [September 24, 2002], 438 PHIL 417-530)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-7995. May 31, 1957.]

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent.

Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE. Police power is far-reaching in
scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself,
and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self - protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight.
2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF
APPLICATION. The constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article III, of the Constitution, which embody the essence
of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their
application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220,
226).
3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD. The conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean
license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided there is due process of law;
and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The
test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction or classification has been
made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE; WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825).
5. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS;
CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR CLASSIFICATION. The Power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; CLASSIFICATION IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1180 ACTUAL,
REAL AND REASONABLE. The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real and
reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of this Court to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limits of equal protection established by the Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF REASONABLENESS. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1180 TOLERANT AND REASONABLE. A cursory study of the
provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during
the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or
privilege is denied only to persons upon conviction of certain offenses.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic
independence is none of less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of
the shackles of foreign economic control and domination is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may
pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of
due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION. Nationalistic
tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. It cannot therefore
be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW. The exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. The Court will not inquire
into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily
the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity,
and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power.
12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN
IN TITLE OR PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1180. What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution
prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297). A cursory
consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
"regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition
or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term "regulation".
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF BILL. The general rule is for the use of
general terms in the title of a bill; the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The above rule was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVE REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which
have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot be claimed that
the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions.
The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for
declaring the law invalid ever existed.

15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180;
TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW. The law does not violate
international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the
rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as
the nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all Prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same
may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).

DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:

I. The case and the issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance The enactment poses questions of due process, police power
and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the
field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures
designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may
be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail
trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of
aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and
for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and
labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring
aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the
retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its
exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would
be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the
scope of police power and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and
power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and
correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue
accordingly resolved.
It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined
in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active
of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions;
the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare
have become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve
public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State;
what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the
equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:
"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not
limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause.


The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the
prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the
measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and
courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the
disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the
legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging
therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society
itself, which from time immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the
dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than
what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As
villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced.
Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited
extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles,
goods and commodities needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the
functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the
communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to
the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and
daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that
wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a
department store or a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's traits.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trade in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time
there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually he invaded towns and villages;
now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural
produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave. Derogatory
epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and
customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes no note of
him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and
dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all
articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Accfa, his control over principal foods and products
would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the
fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of racialism and
pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors
in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits
serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond
our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between
the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled
the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail
trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of
the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets Gross Sales
Year and Retailer's No.-Estab- Per cent Per cent
Nationality ishments Pesos Distri- Pesos Distri-
bution bution
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 5174
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948:
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 .87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Item Gross Sales
Year and Retailer's Assets (Pesos)
Nationality (Pesos)
1941:
Filipino 1,878 1,633
Chinese 7,707 9,691
Others 24,415 8,281
1947:
Filipino 1,878 2,516
Chinese 7,707 14,934
Others 24,749 13,919
1948: (Census)
Filipino 1,878 4,111
Chinese 7,707 24,398
Others 24,916 23,686
1949:
Filipino 1,878 4,069
Chinese 7,707 24,152
Others 24,807 20,737
1951:
Filipino 1,877 3,905
Chinese 7,707 33,207
Others 24,824 22,033
(Estimates Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By year and Nationality of Owners,
Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and
Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already
include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small.
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assets and of gross sales, alien participation has
steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but
aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six and
seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same of official report, pointing
out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional Convention.


It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's
target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization law. If they did not exist as a fact the sweeping remedy of
nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this
alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the
sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . ." (II Aruego, The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and
the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Since of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were
merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p.
114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
"But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country
is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee
to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the
control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has
to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . It (the
Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the
possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino business men,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the business coming from alien control, and they express sentiments
of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National
Convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and
control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections
and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison
and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made
available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that
fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national retailers and of the consuming
public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their mercy.
This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer
or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering
the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the
article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination.
Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts
of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on
the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered
the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming
public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public
from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods
and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing
their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among
themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to
boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of
trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out
of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful
authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing
the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been
made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The
present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential
source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless
aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his
life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of
the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the
product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the
people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, any of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed
out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can
the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and country men. The experience of the country is that the
alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has
been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to
national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are
not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important
function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the
retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in
the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and
real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree
with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making
power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound
to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the
limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable
basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law
sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
". . . '1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'"
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of
a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of
the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did
not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The Legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers.
We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process of law clauses of the Philippine Bill of
Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of
Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that
character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping,
and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation
reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of
American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not
to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly
attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the
trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be
requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of American citizens.
Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and
peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a
citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and
the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute
which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the
result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with 'our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274
U.S. 392, 71 L. ed. 1115 (1926), the U. S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a
relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state
that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions
and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E.
129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawnbroking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within
the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in
Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924),
the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance
hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058
(Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was
the court's finding that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or
even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship was held void,
because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere
claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It
further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two
Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of
foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there
was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained.


It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the
distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in these decisions the laws declared
invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism
and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed.
1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books
of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions
are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the
Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit
would be derived from the operation of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something
indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
power on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid,
but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended
the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs.
Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void,
because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not
naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor
the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been shown on
many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:
". . . It may be judicially known, however, that aliens coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known
that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is
natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country,
and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under
entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the
government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the
classification, and therefore appropriate discrimination against aliens as it relates to the subject of
legislation. . . ."
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the
highest authority in the United States that:
". . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . ." (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
". . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of
the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the
means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to
individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such
rights. . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
". . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons
whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive."
(11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302, pp. 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it was also held:
". . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first,
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . ."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power
to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be
considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power,
without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public."
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and
therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalize. This argument overlooks fact and reality and
rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner,
it has been so engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury
to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has
found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and
threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later
was enacted into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control
this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no
profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we
are not really the masters of our own destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at
the mercy of other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the
hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all
aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.

"The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival."


If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process
on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the
police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now
before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in
question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared in their Resolution:
"'That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail
trade; but it abstains from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta,
and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate
a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade.'" (II Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662- 663, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for
the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus
in the preamble, a principal objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary thereto the
provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And
in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that
a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the
radical measure is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people
would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate
with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that
alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature
has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the
deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to
children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Besides, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review It is well settled that the Court
will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not
unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will
increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement
is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit
aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI,
which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more then one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill".
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is
true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term
than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature
may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of
Answer.)
"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature
shall be stated in the title, the title 'To regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses
the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting
intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale."
(Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate' does
not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such
meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious
regulation of which involves suppression." (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not
be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule
was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or
"prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade, which may not be included
in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit",
there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid.
The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a
simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the
Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise
the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons
affected by the prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that
the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of
the United Nations and of the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find
no merit in the above contention. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights
and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human
Rights can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organization, such as Norway and Denmark,
prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in
domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated
against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.).
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of
the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter
falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less
harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of
existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law
falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they
are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
||| (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, [May 31, 1957], 101 PHIL 1155-1195)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.]

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO


PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARIO, as Secretary of
Justice, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.


Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; SUFFICIENCY OF PETITIONER'S INTEREST AS RICE PLANTER AND
TAXPAYER TO SEEK RESTRAINT OF ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL RICE IMPORTATION. The status of petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice; it now seeks to
buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by
taxation, gives said petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant petition seeking to restrain the allegedly unlawful
disbursement of public funds to import rice from abroad.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXCEPTIONS APPLICABLE TO CASE AT
BAR. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: (1) where the question
in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule.
3. RICE IMPORTATION LAWS; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION WHERE CONDITIONS FOR IMPORTATION NOT COMPLIED
WITH. Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation
of rice, and in the case at bar such conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the proposed importations are
illegal.
4. ID.; IMPORTATIONS "MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF." The provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", apply likewise to importations "made by the
Government itself," because each and every officer and employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or
agents.
5. ID.; PROTECTION OF LOCAL PLANTERS OF RICE AND CORN TO FOSTER SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN LOCAL
PRODUCTION. The protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-
sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible
national emergency.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER CANNOT DISREGARD THE LAW EVEN
IF HE BELIEVES THAT COMPLIANCE WILL NOT BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an
executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people he is at liberty to disregard it,
must be rejected we still live under a rule of law.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION WHICH IS
PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system, enter into executive agreementswithout previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
8. ID.; ID.; MAIN FUNCTION OF EXECUTIVE IS TO ENFORCE LAWS ENACTED BY CONGRESS, NOT TO DEFEAT
SAME. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
9. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; THEORY THAT IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN TREATY AND STATUTE, THE LATEST IN
POINT OF TIME SHALL PREVAIL, NOT APPLICABLE TO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS; CASE AT BAR. The American
theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts in question are not treaties.
Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is a signatory require the advice and
consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United
States.
10. COURTS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO INVALIDATE TREATIES. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing
in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which theconstitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question." In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:
1. RICE IMPORTATION; INJUNCTION GRANTED DESPITE ILLEGALITY OF IMPORTATION WHERE ARRANGEMENTS
ALREADY CONCLUDED WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS; REASONS. Respondents, despite their lack of compliance
with the Rice Importation Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the
record has been authorized to be imported on a government to government level; it appearing that arrangement to this
effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its implementation. Had the writ been issued, our
government would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a
duly formalized agreement to its greet embarrassment and loss of face.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; CIVIL AUTHORITY SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY. The
injunction embodied in the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1) that the civil authority shall always be supreme,
can only mean that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and preservation of the State, and, to this
effect the employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil
authority.
Barrera, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREMACY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY; THEORY THAT THE MILITARY MAY DISREGARD
RICE IMPORTATION LAWS IS DANGEROUS. The theory that rice can he legally imported by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a
dangerous trend. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or classes:
the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effort to equate the
army with the Government itself.
2. ID.; EXECUTIVE POWERS; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; FUNCTION TO DELIBERATE ON EXISTENCE OF
EMERGENCY. It is not for the Department of National Defense to unilaterally determine the existence of a threat of
emergency, but for the National Security Council to do so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate of any region of the
world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to override
our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary
mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state.
3. ID.; ID.; THEORY OF "THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS" REJECTED. Adoption as a government policy of the
theory of "the end justifies the means" brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up
with the end of freedom.
DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.


It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other
respondents herein 1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or on September 25, 1963, herein
petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose
members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency";
that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary
injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to prevent the
judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ
of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondents, their agents or representatives from implementing the
decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner's prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was
filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on
the merits soon thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed
their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of Petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition
herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of
rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency", Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in
Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those
tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that
will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. . . ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, 2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to
buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by
taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully
disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however, that the principle requiring the previous
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one" 3 , or where the
controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter 5 , unless actually disapproved by him, 6 or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. 7 The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents'
contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in
question is not governed by Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as commander-in-chief
"for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that
in cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order
and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President . . . is duty-bound to
prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergencywithout waiting for any special authority."
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein on which
our view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the opinion assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in
force that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such
as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No.
2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any
point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the
importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", if the conditions prescribed in
Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration
or any government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice
and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is
not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, are
government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government, as such,
becomes more apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by "the President of the
Philippines", and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn Administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds " that the importation of rice
and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating
that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5)
years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is
a public official and/or employee", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified therein. A
public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of
instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of
the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of
its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic
Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar
additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or
tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to
transactions made by the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No.
138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the
Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
"The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and
employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government of the Philippines and of
chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of
any description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract
or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public
works, shall give preference to materials . . . produced . . . in the Philippines or in the United States,
and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified." (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchase by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces, preference
shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general
policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security predicated upon the "worsening
situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" and the alleged powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that
would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our
ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were
to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers
from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stocking of rice and corn for purposes of national security and/or national emergency is within the purview
of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as
a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it ordains
that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve . . . be deposited by the Administration throughout the country under
proper dispersal plans . . . and maybe released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-
executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives
are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said
Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly,
Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by the
Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization" 9 , which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in
the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other Laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth
Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited 10 shows that Corwin
referred to the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when he has placed the country or a part thereof under
"martial law". 12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if
accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What
is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should,
nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for
stockpile of the Army not the civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It implies
that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to
disregard it. That idea must be rejected we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow
that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or
ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation but under certain conditions, which have not
been, and should be complied with.
IV. The Contracts With Vietnam and Burma.
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of
rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid
executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by
representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand,
and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent
with each other, the conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in
point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of
which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the
Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit
in favor of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even
assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, byindirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts
adverted to are nottreaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory
require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that
of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the
Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of anytreaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,
when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case
academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but
from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2)
main features, namely; (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters, growers or
landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The
pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importation which has not been consummated as yet is legally
feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the
performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the
fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed
importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined
from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which
reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not
sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must
be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.
||| (Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, [October 22, 1963], 118 PHIL 1065-1089)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.]

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate
and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of
Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as
taxpayers: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION,
CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA,
SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in
their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification
by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization;
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Abelardo T . Domondon for petitioners.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL, SUBJECT TO WAIVER. The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because
this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively, waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any
event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than
the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel.
2.ID.; ID.; PARTIES; LOCUS STANDI; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that
the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of
such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international
commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be
met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters.
3.ID.; ID.; PETITION SEEKING TO NULLIFY ACT OF SENATE ON GROUND THAT IT CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTION, A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide."
4.ID.; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER; SCOPE. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in
the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality, of the government." The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality, of government including Congress. It is an innovation
in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously, as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government.
5.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; APPROPRIATE REMEDIES TO
REVIEW ACTS OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials.
6.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; AIDS OR GUIDES IN THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of
principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,
the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
7.ID.; ID.; THOUGH IT MANDATES A BIAS IN FAVOR OF FILIPINO GOODS, SERVICES, LABOR AND ENTERPRISES, IT
RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR BUSINESS EXCHANGE WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. While the
Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
8.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; JOINING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NOT A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." GATT has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including
anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived
of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion simply because we disagree
with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only, perform
its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
9.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; POLICY OF "SELF-
RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY" DOES NOT RULE OUT ENTRY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS,
GOODS AND SERVICES. The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not
necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor
"mendicancy in the international community."
10.POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; WORLD TRADE LAW ORGANIZATION/GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE; RELIANCE ON "MOST FAVORED NATIONS", CONSTITUTIONAL. The WTO reliance on "most
favored nation", "national treatment", and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact
they are rules of equality and reciprocity, that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocal", the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers
and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

11.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; QUESTIONS INVOLVING "JUDGMENT CALLS", NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will WTO/GATT succeed in
promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters expand the country's exports and
generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for
which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto
are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
12.POLITICAL LAW; SOVEREIGNTY; SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO BY
THE STATE; CASE AT BAR. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be
performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to
restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll
members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and
shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action." Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and
multilateral that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of
its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the
Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION; PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE 34 OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS AND
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(TRIPS); DOES NOT INTRUDE ON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES ON
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES. Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 (Process Patents: Burden of
Proof) of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. A WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the
contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the
said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of
evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of
proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product was made by the patented process. Moreover, it should
be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by
the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two
provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our
disposition of the third issue derogation of a legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that
the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustments in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MINISTERIAL DECLARATION AND DECISIONS AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES, NOT SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE. "A final act, sometimes called protocol
de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by
the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a
protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet
"to give effect to those provision of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also
approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their
respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial
service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business."
16.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; RESORT THERETO ON GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AVAILABLE ONLY WHERE THERE IS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW. Procedurally. a writ ofcertiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
17.ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty, enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.
18.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of
two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using
the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's
processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of
the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at
least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike
down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably,
what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that
our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast
majority of countries, has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly
propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as
mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and
becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the
words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the
key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." prll
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three
multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks
and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-
ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency
problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world
trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a
variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing
access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the
Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World Trade Organization with the signing
of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1 1a 1b 1c
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by
President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The
President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . ., (the reduction of) costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting . . ., and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief
Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession
will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly
through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where
naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization
of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and
resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
"(a)to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b)to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of
the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant toSection 21, Article VII of the Constitution." cdta
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a
resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the
Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal
instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade
Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
"ANNEX I
Annex 1A:Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B:General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C:Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual


Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism"
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
"NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15
April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof."
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and
"the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral
parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral
annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two
latter documents as follows:

"The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of
WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on
dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or
limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence
and new financial service." cdti
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners'
reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed
their respective memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity,
(1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
"(a)the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b)the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to
the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2)
copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as
possible."
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance
dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral
treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted
their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
"A.Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B.Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading
to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization or of the validity or of the concurrence.
C.Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
D.Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict
and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article
VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is 'vested in the Congress of the Philippines';
E.Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the
exercise of judicial power.
F.Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-
infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G.Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which
included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners
into the following": 10
"1.Whether or not the provisions of the 'Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement' cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2.Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
3.Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4.Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate 'in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization' implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the
Final Act."
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively
ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether
petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit;
and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence
in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues
thus: cdt
(1)The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction
of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first
issue;
(2)The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively
waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not
cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of
estoppel; and
(3)The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part
of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners.
Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional
issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than
skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1)DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES
THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION?
(2)DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE
SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3)DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR
THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4)DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5)WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, 15 as follows:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature."

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. LibLex
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions
raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision
of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only
exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are
violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO
Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the
Constitution, which are worded as follows:
"Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19.The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12.The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive."
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their
memorandum: 19
"a)In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
"Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1.Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. No Member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.
2.An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the
Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
"ANNEX
Illustrative List
1.TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of
Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a)the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its
local production; or
(b)that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount
related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. LLjur
2.TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a)the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production
that it exports;
(b)the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production
by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise;
or
(c)the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its
local production." (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis
supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which
are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II,
and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1 (a) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p.
177, emphasis supplied).
"b)In the area of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than
that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . . (par. 1,
Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
"(c)In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1.In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein,
each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of
all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
2.A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
3.Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies
the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared
to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied)."
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos."
The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines
as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations
on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing
and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not
be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that
read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains
sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization. LLphil
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in
the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to
implement them, thus:
"On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
'In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and
to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article,
the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure
with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2)."
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:
"My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
'Section 1.. . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.' (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as 'the right to a balanced and healthy ecology' and 'the right to
health' are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as 'a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction,' the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene." cdasia
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1
and 13 thereof which read:
"Section 1.The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13.The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity."
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows:
1.A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2.A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3.An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference
in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State
to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held
that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision
itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here
is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are
enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO
Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council. aisadc
"WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of
the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote.
Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the
Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals." 33

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their
economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
"The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral
trading system, . . ." (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO
Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the
rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in
terms of the amount of tariff reductionand the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT
requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while
developing countries including the Philippines arerequired to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products
by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays
for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For
developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a
longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-
dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis
for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived
of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been
taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their
discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we
disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking
jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It
will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion. cdtai
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the
international community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
"Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities." 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy oflaissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the
other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether
WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters
expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the
Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does
not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent
of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a
diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events.
They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that
a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of
change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
"The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base
and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape,
not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly 'in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,'
where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance.
In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society
it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation." cdtech

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power


The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking
"unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the
Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and
general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . .
but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural
matters . . ." 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such
limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue.
However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member
of the family of nations. Unquestionably,the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest
of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.44 One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they
also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or
cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of
commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of
international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign
rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give
the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such
assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for
the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice
held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the
United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding
share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty
of members within their own territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement
measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the
Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the
present charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the sovereign power to make
a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor. cda
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and multilateral
that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, as follows:
"(a)Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed,
among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt
from income tax by the Philippines.
(b)Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income.
(c)Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation.
(d)Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation.
(e)Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs
duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular
equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f)Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs
duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating
oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g)Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the
same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service
agreements.
(h)Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted
Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the
Philippines not exceeding 59 days.
(i)Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit
and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j)Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special
Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without
consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs
duties, taxes and related charges.
(k)Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be
governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l)Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes
concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation,
eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and
its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.

"International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law
of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external
obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we
accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss
of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined
substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade
liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of
potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller country's market."48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations." casia
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
"Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1.For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to
in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the
judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an
identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one
of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the
patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the
patented process:
(a)if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b)if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of
the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2.Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the
alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3.In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account."
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the
contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the
patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the
said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of
evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical
product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the
genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
"SEC. 60.Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the
article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design
or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying." (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the
product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made
by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where
either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue derogation of legislative power
will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents
referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the
document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that
the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the
subject of concurrence of the Senate. cdt
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending
the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted
conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I
of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary
Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a)to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b)to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories,
namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the
ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to
those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and
furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It
applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill,
elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free
transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and
refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral
parts, 58 as follows:

"Article II
Scope of the WTO
1.The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2.The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred
to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3.The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
"Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted
them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.
4.The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as
"GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October
1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified,
amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on
August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day
hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was
submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final
act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to
withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable.
That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for
Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new. . . is he making a new submission
which improves on the clarity of the first submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding,
it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones
that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to
the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the
World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him
Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I
saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the
Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the
Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to
with the governments of the participants. prcd
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
'By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO
Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view of seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures.'
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification
or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade
Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the
Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had
been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the
same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on
this?
SEN. LINA, Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the
abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have
no further comment to make."
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's
constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally,
a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 61Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign
houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive
arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of theConstitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and
locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not
in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied
upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations. cdasia
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent
and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion
to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial
or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East
will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the
"free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries
including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against
possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not
economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the
crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.


||| (Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, [May 2, 1997], 338 PHIL 546-606)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 95770. March 1, 1993.]

ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG; JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS TANTOG;
JEMIL OYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO; JANETH
DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS. GODOFREDO DIAMOS;
SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUSTO OSTIA;
IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO;
NAPTHALE TANACAO, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL TANACAO; PRECILA
PINO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR; FREDESMINDA ALFAR &
GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR; ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO
ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR; MARTINO VILLAR,
represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR; PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN
GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA; ALVIN DOOP, represented by
his parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP; RHILYN LAUDE, represented by her parents MR. &
MRS. RENE LAUDE; LEOREMINDA MONARES, represented by her parents, MR. & MRS.
FLORENCIO MONARES; MERCY MONTECILLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL
MONTECILLO; ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA; EVELYN,
MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA;
MAXIMO EBRALINAG, represented by his parents, MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG; JUTA
CUMON, GIDEON CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON;
EVIE LUMAKANG & JUNAR LUMAKANG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG;
EMILIO SARSOZO, PAZ AMOR SARSOZO & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO, represented by their parents
MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO; MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented by parent
ANNIE JOSEPH; EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON, represented by their parent
EMERLITO TABLASON, petitioners, vs. THEDIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF
CEBU, respondent.

[G.R. No. 95887. March 1, 1993.]

MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO; REDFORD ALSADO,
JOEBERT ALSADO & RUDYARD ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ABELARDO
ALSADO; NESIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO and LILIBETH ALSADO, represented by their parents
MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO; SUZETTE NAPOLES, represented by her parents ISMAILITO
NAPOLES and OPHELIA NAPOLES; JESICA CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. &
MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES; BABY JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her parents MR. & MRS.
TORIBIO MACAPAS; GERALDINE ALSADO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL
ALSADO; RAQUEL DEMOTOR and LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO DEMOTOR; JURELL VILLA and MELONEY VILLA, represented by their parents MR. &
MRS. JOVENIANO VILLA; JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE MAHINAY and MAGDALENE
MAHINAY, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FELIX MAHINAY; JONALYN ANTIOLA and
JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIPE ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA; MARIA
CONCEPCION CABUYAO, represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA
CABUYAO; NOEMI TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO;
SOLOMON PALATULON, SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINDA PALATULON, represented by
their parents. MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA
PALATULON, petitioners, vs.THE DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and
ANTONIO A. SANUTAN, respondents.

Felino M. Ganal for petitioners.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP; FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT ENTITLED TO HIGHEST PRIORITY AND AMPLEST PROTECTION: TWO-FOLD ASPECT THEREOF. Religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531). "The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT OR LIMITATION ON EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM; CASE AT BAR. "The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom
(according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514,
517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent."
Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. . . . After all, what the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and
culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human
rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art.
XIV,1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about
the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities. As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): ". . . To believe
that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to
make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to
others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order." "Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . .
assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at
the expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEES' EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE OF CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNT OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS VALID SIMILAR EXEMPTION ACCORDED JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WITH REGARD TO
OBSERVANCE OF FLAG CEREMONY VALID. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we
upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their
employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group. ". . . It is certain that
not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner 374
U.S. Ct. 1790.) We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to
others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non. vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard
must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both
religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates
and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517).
4. ID.; RIGHT TO FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION; EXPULSION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES FROM SCHOOL FOR NON-
OBSERVANCE OF FLAG CEREMONY A VIOLATION THEREOF. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive
free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to
make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
CRUZ, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP; FREEDOM TO
BELIEVE; ABSOLUTE AS LONG AS BELIEFS NOT EXTERNALIZED IN ACTS THAT OFFEND PUBLIC INTEREST. It
seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to worship or whether to worship at all. This
is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag),
and the State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so. As long as his beliefs
are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for
doing so.

In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has declared ex cathedra that they are not
violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the
opposite. The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the meaning
they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the
State. It has no competence in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot
invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."
2. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH; INCLUDES RIGHT TO BE SILENT; SALUTE AS FORM OF EXPRESSION CANNOT
BE COMPELLED OR PROHIBITED IN FACE OF VALID RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS. Freedom of speech includes the
right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in
his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salutes is a symbolic manner of
communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot
be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To
impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of
conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre
or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its
opinions or prescribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious objections of the
petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State
cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP; HARMONIZED
WITH VALID EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL AND LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE HOMAGE AND
HONOR TO THE FLAG. In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For
a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represents even if the exemption is predicated on respect
for religious scruples, could be divisive in its impact on the school population or community. I would therefore submit that,
henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag
ceremony conducted in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the
religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are
conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be
held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively
participate in the ceremony must take the front places. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and,
to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's
fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J p:

These two special civil actions for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated because they raise essentially
the same issue: whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be
expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and
reciting the patriotic pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770, "Rose Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu
District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan,
Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the
religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers," in the Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the
petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are
Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11,
1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
"SECTION 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be
simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem.
"SECTION 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be
issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.
SECTION 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in accordance with
rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject
the educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment
which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
"In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by this Act , the Secretary of
Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the
private educational institution responsible for such failure."
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
"RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
"1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public VFand private, every school
day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flagstaff must be
straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding
position in front of the building or within the compound."
"2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning
except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way
possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the
morning shall be conducted in the following manner:
"a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are in school and its
premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or
held in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No
one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.
"b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem accompanied by the school
band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school
band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being
raised, all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats
shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those without hat may stand with their arms and
hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute
prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon
last note of the anthem.
"c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison
the following patriotic pledge (English or vernacular version), which may bring the ceremony to a
close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino
students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.
"English Version"
I love the Philippines.
It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
xxx xxx xxx."
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard
ourselves from idols 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10,
Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against
official control (p. 10, Rollo).

This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for
disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et
al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students,
thus:
"The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any
religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by
a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar."
"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not
imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-
discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or
Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which
charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a
complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among
other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship."
"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They
have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirements still disrupt school
discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority."
"The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority." (pp. 2-3.)
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:
"The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate
said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a
religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the
fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion."
(Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative
cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:
"5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be
dismissed after due investigation."
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative
Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1255 and the implementing orders of the DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the
Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the
Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr./Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision
in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770)
directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational Institutions as follows:
"1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and school
employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag
ceremony because of some religious belief."
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8,
Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained
effort to inculcate patriotism and nationalism."
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever a
justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme
Court of the Philippine says:
"'The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect.' (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 105 Phil. 11.)
"4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court
asserts:
"'But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter.'
(Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.).
"5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag ceremony
or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be
considered removed from the service after due process."
6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:
"'If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of
public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more.
According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected not to comply
with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools.'
(Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)
"7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to
participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag." (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770;
Emphasis supplied.).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the
memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the
Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and
recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887), but
they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's Witnesses'
parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:
"After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses, parents on October 2, 1990
and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag
Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office
hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah's
Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by
virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No.
1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a case 'Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The
Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against
their favor." (p. 149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students
who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to
attend public schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.).
"1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
"Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary School with the
information that this office is sad to order the dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades
III and IV pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag
Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the
regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of
Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their mind to respect and follow the
Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted."
"(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG
District Supervisor"
(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo
Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central
School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School
and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon order of then
Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary
of Education Isidro Cario but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)

The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who
succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his
predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these Special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process,
their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners
pray that:
"c. Judgment be rendered:
"i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their
respective schools;
"ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or
otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
"iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission
of petitioners to their respective schools." (p. 41, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
commanding the respondents to immediately readmit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this
Court (p. 57, Rollo).
The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as
respondents in these cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo) defending the expulsion
orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school
children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS'
rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of country,
for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not
warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on
the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having scriptural
basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No.
292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decision of this Court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and
approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its incorporation in
the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one may
be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of
Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III,
Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in
German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-
177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
"external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right
of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R.
No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a
grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
"[T]he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and
the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with
reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism a pathetic,
even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded
and was granted an exemption." (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing
the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the
school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of
Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion
from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and
learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and
be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or
banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona.
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barneta, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
". . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous
instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free
minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the
price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be
a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order."
"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.).
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the
teaching of their church not to join any labor group.
". . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when
general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner 374 U.S. Ct. 1790.)

We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the
warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to
the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if
they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or
pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed every Japanese
soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful
sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of our
nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag
on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be
necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public
respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was
issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ebralinag v. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 95770 & 95887, [March 1, 1993])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937.]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.


Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION. While,


generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than
judicial or quasi-judicial function (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this
jurisdiction may issue to ". . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2. ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS. The term "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in
the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenge act of the respondent Director of Posts in the
present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . .
jurisdiction."
3. ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS. The statutory rule,
therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them
within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals,
but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or the prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
4. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. What is guaranteed by our Constitution
is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition
of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
5. ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052. The respondent Director of Posts issued
the postage stamps in question under the provision of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the
sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses
incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government."
6. ID.; ID.; ID. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government." Of course, the phrase ""advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question
by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of
the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as
the seat of that congress.
8. ID.; ID.; ID. While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked
with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not
the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental
results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

DECISION

LAUREL, J p:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic
duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing as follows:
"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36, and 50
centavos." the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold.
The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . .
inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without
or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory
rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions," (Dimayuga and Fajardo
vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged
that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without
the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of
their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in
the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and
Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy
both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and
is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored
"the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature
and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a
priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in
relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are
made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial
moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship
are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under
the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. this Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS
WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates, and
printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
"SECTION 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
"SECTION 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
"SECTION 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
"Approved, February 21, 1933."
It will be seen that the Act appropriate the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner
indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage
stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated
September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be
derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold
stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not
authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular
sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of
the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications in the President of the Philippines,
June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed
(Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as
the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should
not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should
not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition.
Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this
stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government. "Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet
to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
||| (Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 45459, [March 13, 1937], 64 PHIL 201-210)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.]

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204934. April 8, 2014.]

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel
Fernando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil
C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin
Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho,
Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of
her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R.
Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. Laws, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary
and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios Ignacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204957. April 8, 2014.]


TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204988. April 8, 2014.]

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION, INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIA P. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 205003. April 8, 2014.]

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL,respondents.

[G.R. No. 205043. April 8, 2014.]

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H.
LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 205138. April 8, 2014.]

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National


President, Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte,
Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E.
Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON.
SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
Philippine Commission on Women, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205478. April 8, 2014.]

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors for Life, and ANTHONY
PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos for
Life, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Education; and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 205491. April 8, 2014.]

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, fox themselves,
their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the
Republic of the Philippines,respondent.

[G.R. No. 205720. April 8, 2014.]

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Lorna Melegrito, as Executive


Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, petitioners, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 206355. April 8, 2014.]

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-
GARCIA, STELLA ACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUA CAUSING, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 207111. April 8, 2014.]

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN
Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 207172. April 8, 2014.]


COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR.
and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO,petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 207563. April 8, 2014.]

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health,
and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the
poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose,
that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as
the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal
woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions
within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental
body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive
when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis--vis the most vital
and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution. AECDHS
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns, 3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Learning Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Imbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition, 6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others 8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, 9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc., 12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);
(5) Petition, 14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians, Inc., 18 and several
others 19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX); AHcaDC
(8) Petition, 20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia,
in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. 24 and several others, 25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, 26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalua Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others, 29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat);
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31 in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition 32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers(Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention, 33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara);
and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention, 34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (BUHAY), an accredited political party. acHETI
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives,
in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates
the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are
believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom. 37 CHATEa
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions. 38
In this connection, Section 5.23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR), 39 provides thatskilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not
limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural
health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech. 42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to he
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bono services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners' services. 44 ESIcaC
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive
health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. 45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does
not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family
planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and
operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 49 cCSDTI
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the
same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of Legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 52
The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code
and R.A. No. 9054. 54 HcDATC
Various parties also sought and were granted Leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents, 55Congressman Edcel C. Lagman, 56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza
I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberta G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH), 58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty. Joan de Venecia 60 also filed their respective Comments-
in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2]same petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments.
On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63 IaESCH
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time
posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law)
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were
allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65 aTEHIC
In addition, R.A. No. 5921, 66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that
promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No.
6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission
on Population and for Other Purposes."The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity
rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
79, 68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in
conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development. 70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enactedR.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women," which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family
planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From
a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate.
To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to
provide information on the full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates. ScCIaA
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues
that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of
women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that " the status quo
ante the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law must be maintained." 73 It explains:
. . . . The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues: IHCSTE
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM SETaHC
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature. 79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating
measure. 80 TADCSE
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. 81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84The Constitution has truly
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution. 86 CITaSA
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation but only at a very limited and specific point to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law,
it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure
that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied] AEDCHc
As far back as Taada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later
on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC, 93 Magallona v. Ermita, 94 and countless others.
In Taada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of governmentthrough the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the
judiciary in that balancing operation." 95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites,viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case. 96 IcDHaT
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect an the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that
the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly
violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question
being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy
ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who
are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least,
be heard on the matter NOW. STaAcC
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. 106 These includereligious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression,
as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. 109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. 110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. DICcTa
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing. 115 STaIHc
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is oftranscendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." 116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importanceis invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation
of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119ACIDTE
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to binder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. aSTAIH
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, 122prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent to act as a population control measure. 123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable. 125 THCSAE
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modern family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is
to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to
prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It
is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128 TcDHSI
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission
on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed
in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. cEDaTS
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129 Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion. 130 HcDSaT
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4 (a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life. 131 As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are
not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these
products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used
for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that
only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public. 134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting
the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such
a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that
the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation
of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137 Even if not formally established, the
right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. cDHAaT
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization, 138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: " principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life
and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins *
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter. CASIEa
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception,
there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by
the male sperm. 142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. TCEaDI
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by
all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoonresulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montao, 147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, 148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The
records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. . . . . 150
xxx xxx xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained: aTHCSE
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at
a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is
both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: . . . the phrase from the moment of "conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception." EHTADa
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it.
So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be
banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154 ESDcIA
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155 From the discussions above,
contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: . . . . As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like
to ask that question again for a categorical answer. CHIScD
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we
are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged
at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to
the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients. 157 ESCTIA
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II. EaCDAT
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby's Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionarydefines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159 It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote
from which the embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that
ensue. TDCaSE
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that
begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed. . . . The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now
exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life,
begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new
lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion
is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164DTAcIa
Conclusion: The Moment
of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life
of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. 165According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH
Law but also to the Constitution. CSTEHI
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception
was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot
interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception,
explained:
The intention . . . is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court. 169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus: HEDCAS
1]. . . .
Section 4. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications; cTACIa
xxx xxx xxx.
2]. . . .
Section 4.. . . .
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3]. . . .
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary
to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as
the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4 (a) of the RH
Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. . . .
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA. SEHTAC
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word "or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and
those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that
either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or aTADcH
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it.
The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as
Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners
likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life,
and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation. DTAHEC
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of
life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is
an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined
the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA. ECcaDT
Section 3.01 (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01.For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz.:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does
not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the
mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it
appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or,
as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. aEcHCD
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with
each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "primarily" in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be declared
void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm
or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is
decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk
of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4 (p) 178 and (w) 179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the
assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180 CaSHAc
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of
the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz.:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health
needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: CTIEac
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions. 182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 183 it was stated:
. . . Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician
be maintained. 185 ETCcSa
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There
is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the
Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure
the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:
"(a)" Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively
for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b)" Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six
months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court. HATICc
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed,
sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions
of this Act."
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless. 186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides: CacEID
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH
shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company andthat the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for
it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the
Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself. SICaDA
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the
gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3-Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only
the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use.
Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God
in the transmission of Human life." 188 CacEID
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (1) and (2), i.e.,
against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously
object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23 (b); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH
Law, are also not recognized. 191 aTEHIC
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 17
of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the
religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health
care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling
participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be
regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public. 193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and
to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood)
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194 ISCHET
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals
to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law
dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs
must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199 AHacIS
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that
the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry. 201 CAETcH
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23 (a) (3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202 Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's
religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact. 203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention
of the State. 204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable
to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand
of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families. HEcTAI
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. TSEcAD
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country. cADTSH
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-
cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other
house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of
its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2),
of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx xxx xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. ASaTHc
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the
free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct.
1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They
have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms,
the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief
with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to
deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs
and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211 SacTCA
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the
freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare." 213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose
of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion." 216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts." 217 EcSaHA
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218 Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause,American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned
the"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may
burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law.
The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano,
German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to
the "clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all
the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom
of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will
not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority
cited by Germanhas been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni
Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. TheGerona and German doctrine,
aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from
religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights "the
most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the
Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a
government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state
interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest"
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.,
refusal to work an Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modern reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church . . . are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom. CcAITa
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete
with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his
free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of
Policy] THDIaC
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(f)]
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women's and people's organizations,
civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own
family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. (Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected. cHESAD
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's. 221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in
line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling
state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In
this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH
Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no
less than strict scrutiny. CHEDAc
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As
in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs
are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clauseis the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as
well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his
mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly,
a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or 'indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they
fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23 (a) (3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23 (a) (1) and (a) (2) in relation to Section
24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when
what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to
stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow. HTSAEa
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot
be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom
to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is
violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the
RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail. ISHaCD
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law . . . in your Comment-in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH
Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious
convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you
have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says:
". . . skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of
hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you
agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence
and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following: EHITaS
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. . .
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
. . . which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his
religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, . . .
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is
an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure
free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors
and their patients. 231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not
to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against
one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233 HDIATS
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means. 234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents
to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of
the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population
Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of
women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. (a) Comprehensive Health Services. The State shall, at
all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's
mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances. DcaCSE
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health
and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without
prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers,
and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors
shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms
and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases. ICaDHT
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. The State shall provide women in all sectors
with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the
development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal
deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, . . . ." 235 He, however, failed to
substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest. aSTAcH
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, anexception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting
on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother
of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the
child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to
save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the
loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the
doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save. EScAHT
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23 (a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood; DcTaEH
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck
the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply
because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: . . .
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances: CTEaDc
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature,
should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the
founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to
found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3,
their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them" is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who
would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between
the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of
reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared
by, both spouses asone cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right.
Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their
destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-de Castro, Section 19 (c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including
the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3 (v) of the RH
Law states, is a shared responsibilitybetween parents. Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242 TaCDcE
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was
first recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection." 244 Morfe adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground
of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the
zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Griswold wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide. aEHASI
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. . . . .
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s exceptwhen the minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. HIaAED
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage,
the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not
yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their
consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government." 247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State. 248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of
conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the
unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23 (a) (2) (i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access toinformation about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After
all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn
child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. SAHITC
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that
of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and
in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii), the parents should not be deprived
of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family.
5-Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age- and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth. 251 ScCEIA
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable
role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be " primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed,
the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building. 253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4 (t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said
that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3 (1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254 aDSHCc
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the
Courtreserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6-Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a) (1) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results
since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are
also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23 (a) (1), or from rendering reproductive
health procedures under Section 23 (a) (2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the
same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade. AHCTEa
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4 (n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz.:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance
with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH). ACIDTE
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information
and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods; STaCcA
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a) (1), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health
care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Equal Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms 260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional. ScTIAH
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality on prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken. DHCSTa
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him." IECAaD
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3 (l) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the
duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what
the law seeks to do is to simplyprovide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public
educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other
hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly
because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken. EIcSTD
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and
a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the
people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation
or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it
only encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other
than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish
to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is
made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite
to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. EAICTS
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health
service, pro bono or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply
or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products." In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No.
3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties: TcaAID
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and
to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"xxx xxx xxx
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person; TDEASC
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether
or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order
is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty (60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to
have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be
imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
xxx xxx xxx.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the
principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear
that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy
behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows: cDEICH
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10-Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the
duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers
and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions
and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein. HcSCED
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, . . . .
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions,paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services. 268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects
and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the
local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing
basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon
to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments. EHSTDA
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The
RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act
of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all,
despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except
for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest. 275
11-Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound
to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to
be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable. 279 aCHcIE
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies.
As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what
the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the
large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as
the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few. cACTaI
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse
their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law. SDHITE
. . . . But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is
as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the
correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the
judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALexcept with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: SCEDAI
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2] Section 23 (a) (1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3] Section 23 (a) (2) (i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4] Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23 (a) (3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; SDAaTC
6] Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8] Section 3.01 (a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491,
205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732 PHIL 1-99)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.


Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and
Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF


LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders
of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act
No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil.,
218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for
all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum
of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."
DECISION

LAUREL, J p:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission;
Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July
18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his
first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the
closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation
of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of
the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for
the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications."

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in
Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or
act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state
of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was
this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny
this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939,
and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940,
this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent,
been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion
in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions ofCommonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People vs.
Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today
things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the
government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power
many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion
of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
||| (Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, [December 2, 1940], 70 PHIL 726-735)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PASIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents
JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented
by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented
by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.


The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This
right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State
shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT
BAR. all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This
Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case. 'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684
[1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second
place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S.
502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-
147 [1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59
SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept
of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit,
the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according
to the disposition of the judiciary." In Daza vs. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187
SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."

4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation
of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios,
79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs.vda. de Yulo, 16
SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991];
Madrona vs.Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other
matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court explicitly states that
petitioners have thelocus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the
concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether
now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to
be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such a beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some
failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A BALANCE AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY"; INTERPRETATION. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused
upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of
particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or
open-pit mining; kainginor slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Sections 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). As a matter of logic,
by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted,
the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. Justice Feliciano suggestion is
simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal
right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;
STANDARDS. the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutorypolicy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have
been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a
broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners
can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article
VIII of the Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualifications. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization
of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare
and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course
of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's')
to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors' generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in thePhilippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth' and 'make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).' (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.' (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to
the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During
its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing,
to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the
TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a
class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitutionexplicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development and conservation of our natural
resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) andP.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts
to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to
implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a rightvis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless,
be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
" 'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'
"
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases ofrenewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the
holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME,


LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID,
ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL,petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE RESORT TO COURTS OF LAW


MAY BE ALLOWED; EXCEPTIONS. A settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to
resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The
courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed
in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; EFFECT OF DENIAL THEREOF. The cornerstone
of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on
the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power
had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of
public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the
Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; NOT RESTRICTED BY THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. The right to
information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to
information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of
the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well in checking abuse in government.
4.ID.; ID.; NOT ABSOLUTE. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
5.ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY; CANNOT BE INVOKED BY A JURIDICAL ENTITY; RIGHT IS PURELY PERSONAL IN
NATURE. When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. A corporation has no right to privacy since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.
6.ID.; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; GOVERNMENT AGENCY PERFORMING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS,
NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running
some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans,
was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the
right to information.
7.ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters of public concern does not
however, accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
in their desire to acquire such information.
8.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT. It must be
stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of
the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific.

DECISION

CORTES, J p:

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed:
(a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or
(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. [Petition, pp. 4-5;
paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila.
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished
with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel
Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present
regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art.
IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the
matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General
Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986
requesting a list of "the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean
loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos."
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I
regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct
interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.].
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties
having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which
is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are
entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case
falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts,
he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted
to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v.
Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21,
1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the
GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the
application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this
procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to
perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue
of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right
to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional
right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for
by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which
provided:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative
to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by
the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a
public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental
power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check
the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but
vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not
rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms
is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not
to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in the public service. *** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, The
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and
is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or
"public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra, at p. 542.].
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As
observed in Legaspi:prcd
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541.]
In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens.
In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.].
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly,
Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for
annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to
pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in
strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of
the old GSIS law (C.A No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the
funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself
admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant `clean loans'." [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the
public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that
the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued
that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary
does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution
and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the
right to information. llcd
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130
Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
. . . The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life,
is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave
of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not
be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills
Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to
privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219
(1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness,
public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd.
v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988;See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).].
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees
"(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are
outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. llcd
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function,
then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information
which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-
23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign
attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public
disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE.Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.
When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" referring to the transactions of
the State and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various
agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government. . . .
MR. OPLE.Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE.That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.And when we say "transactions which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements,
or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of
the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE.The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
MR. OPLE.Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records
may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and
third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners
the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. cdrep
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v.
Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans
granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible with
this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.
||| (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 74930, [February 13, 1989], 252 PHIL 264-279)

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