#2 CASE

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE
WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the
religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
(hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as
follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was
renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote
a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member.
The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel
that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the
Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and
the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the
"union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had
no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24
and 9 (d) and (e).
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
* CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for
attorney's fees and the costs of this action
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a)
of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization" is constitutional

SUB-ISSUES & RULING:

a. WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful

associations when it "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from
joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional
right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the
1935 Constitution

NO.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision
on freedom of association.

b. WON RA 3350 unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in

that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of
union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act,
furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from
members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as
such members

NO.
The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the
reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It
follows that not all legislations, which
have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise
of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights,
must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts
regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good.
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is
enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and
the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved
power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of
that power.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350?
Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the
general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of
religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can
maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid
that said purpose is legitimate.
free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary
to avoid the danger.

c. WON Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects
which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill,
Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution or Section 8 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it
leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations
Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

NO, the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives
secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a
religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to
withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to
violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion)
clause of the Constitution.
the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or
diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption
may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does
not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.

d. WON Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional
provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil
right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for
purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his
affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his
religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor
organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would
violate religious freedom

NO. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any
lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from
a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts
members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a
positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.

e. WON Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws" clause
of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the
"Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their
fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and
liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of
all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure
from the employer

NO. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore,
a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class.

f. WON Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding
the promotion of social justice

NO.
Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic
Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of
those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act
prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In
determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a
portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
inter-relations of the members of the community. Republic Act No. 3350
insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia
ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security
in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union
having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances
the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned,
those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose
religion does not prohibit said membership.
Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is precisely what
Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
#11 CASE

G.R. No. 158075. June 30, 2006.*

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL),

petitioner, vs. MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, respondent.

Labor Law; Unions; Collective Bargaining; Only the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit is the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.Article 255 of the Labor Code provides: ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE
BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND
DECISION-MAKING. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of
the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate,
to participate in policy and decision-making process of the establishment where
they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits
and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor
management councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in
said establishment. (Emphasis and italics supplied) As the immediately quoted
provision declares, only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly
not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of petitioner,
hence, it could not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their
behalf.

Same; Not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned in
Article 242 of the Labor CodeArticle 242 (a) must be read in relation to Article
255.Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of its
members, relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code. Respondents reliance on said
article, a general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is
misplaced, for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights
mentioned therein. Article 242 (a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article
255.

Strikes; It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to
strike is not absolute; Even if the purpose of the strike is valid, the strike may still
be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.It is doctrinal that the
exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute. Thus
Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, provides: SECTION 3. x x x It shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike
may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the
employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted
activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strike illegal. And so
is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence,
and coercion as to constitute nuisance.

Same; Union officers who stage and participate in an illegal strike are subject to
dismissal while ordinary striking workers cannot be dismissed for mere participation
in an illegal strikethere must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the
strike.As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed
for staging and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article
264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that . . . [a]ny union officer
who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status . . . An ordinary striking worker
cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may
be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing
an illegal act during a strike.

Same; Blocking the free ingress to and egress from the workplace, holding noise
barrage, threatening guests, and the like, constitute illegal acts during a strike.As
reflected above, the photographs show that some of the workers-strikers who joined
the strike indeed committed illegal actsblocking the free ingress to and egress
from the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests, and the like. The strikers
were, in a list attached to petitioners Position Paper filed with the NLRC, named.
The list failed to specifically identify the ones who actually committed illegal acts,
however. Such being the case, a remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter, through
the NLRC, is in order for the purpose only of determining the respective liabilities of
the strikers listed by petitioner. Those proven to have committed illegal acts during
the course of the strike are deemed to have lost their employment, unless they
have been readmitted by the Hotel, whereas those not clearly shown to have
committed illegal acts should be reinstated.

Same; Backwages; The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an
economic strike on the principle that a fair days wage accrues only for a fair
days labor; Even in cases of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) strikes, award of
backwages rests on the courts discretion and only in exceptional casesthe
Supreme Court must thus hearken to its policy that when employees voluntarily go
on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, no backwages during the
strike is awarded.The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an
economic strike on the principle that a fair days wage accrues only for a fair
days labor. Even in cases of ULP strikes, award of backwages rests on the courts
discretion and only in exceptional instances. Thus, J.P. Heilbronn Co. v. National
Labor Union, 92 Phil. 575, 577-578 (1953), instructs: When in case of strikes, and
according to the C[ourt of] I[ndustrial] R[elations] even if the strike is legal, strikers
may not collect their wages during the days they did not go to work, for the same
reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to
attend the hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their
demands against the company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not
yet known, should lose their pay during the period of such absence from work. The
age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and
employee is that of a fair days wage for a fair days labor. If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the
laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed
or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate
against his employer on the employers time. (Emphasis and italics supplied) This
Court must thus hearken to its policy that when employees voluntarily go on strike,
even if in protest against unfair labor practices, no backwages during the strike is
awarded.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner.

Marlon J. Manuel for respondent.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals, by the assailed decision of November 21, 2002, 1 declared the
strike staged by respondent, Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union (the union),
illegal and its officers to have lost their employment status. It ordered, however,
among other things, the reinstatement and payment of backwages to its members.

On November 11, 1996, the union, which was registered on August 19, 1996 before
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 2 filed a Petition for Certification
Election3 before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its members. 4

The DOLE-NCR denied the unions petition as it failed to comply with legal
requirements, specifically Section 2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, and was seen to fragment the employees of
petitioner.5

On June 2, 1997, Francis Mendoza (Mendoza), one of the Hotels outlet cashiers, was
discovered to have failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71,692.50 at the end
of his May 31, 1997 duty. 6 On being directed to explain such failure, Mendoza
claimed that after accomplishing his daily cash remittance report, the union
president Jose Leonardo B. Kimpo (Kimpo) also an outlet cashier, who signed the
same and dropped his remittances. 7

Kimpo, who was thus directed to explain why no administrative sanction should be
imposed on him for violating the standard procedure for remitting cash collections,
informed that he was not aware of any such procedure.

Mendoza was subsequently suspended for one week, it being the responsibility of
the cashier to personally drop-off his remittances in the presence of a witness. 8In
the meantime or on July 14, 1997, 9 he was re-assigned to the Hotels Cost Control
Department.10

Through its president Kimpo, the union later notified petitioner of its intention to
negotiate, by Notice to Bargain, 11 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its
members.

Acting on the notice, the Hotel, through its Human Resource Development Manager
Mary Anne Mangalindan, advised the union that since it was not certified by the
DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such. 12

The union clarified that it sought to bargain for its members only, and declared
that [the Hotels] refusal to bargain [would prompt] the union to engage in
concerted activities to protect and assert its rights under the Labor Code. 13

In the meantime, or on or about November 7, 1997, Kimpo filed before the

Arbitration Branch a complaint for ULP against petitioner. 19

More conferences took place between petitioner and the union before the NCMB.

In the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union demanded the holding of a
consent election to which the Hotel interposed no objection, provided the union
followed the procedure under the law. Petitioner then requested that the election be
held in January 1998.20

The parties agreed to meet again on December 1, 1997. 21

In the early morning of November 29, 1997, however, the union suddenly went on
strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and
Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to
the union.22 At about this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Agustin (Agustin) and
Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for work and were, along with another
supervisor, Mary Grace U. de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and
supporting the strike.23

Mary Grace, who was directed to explain her participation in the strike, alleged that
she was merely trying to pacify the group. 25 Petitioner, finding her explanation
arrogant and unsatisfactory as her active participation in the strike was confirmed
by an eye witness, terminated her services, by communication sent on December 9,
1997, drawing her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
26
petitioner. Agustin, who was also terminated, filed a similar complaint against the
27
Hotel.

On January 14, 1998, Rowena, whose services were terminated, also filed a
complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal.

For its part, petitioner filed on January 28, 1998 a petition to declare the strike
illegal.

By Resolution of November 19, 1999, the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal
and that the union officers and members who were reinstated to the Hotels
payroll were deemed to have lost their employment status. And it dismissed the
complaints filed by Mary Grace, Agustin, and Rowena as well as the unions
complaint for ULP.33

On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution
dismissing the complaints of Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It
modified the NLRC Resolution, however, by ordering the reinstatement with back
wages of union members. In so ruling, the appellate court noted that petitioner
failed to establish by convincing and substantial evidence that the
union members who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts, and
although petitioner presented photographs of the striking employees, the strikers
who allegedly committed illegal acts were not named or identified. 35

Hence, the present appeal by petitioner faulting the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the srike is illegal.

Held:

Yes.

As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, this Court finds the strike illegal.

NOTE:(PLS REFER TO THE DOCTRINES FOR THE COURTS RULING, IT IS JUST THE
SAME. THANKS)

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is, in
light of the foregoing ratiocinations, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that only
those members of the union who did not commit illegal acts during the course of
the illegal strike should be reinstated but without backwages. The case is, therefore,
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, which is hereby directed to, with
dispatch, identify said members and to thereafter order petitioner to reinstate them,
without backwages or, in the alternative, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, that
they be given separation pay at the rate of One (1) Month pay for every year of
service.

Judgment affirmed with modification, case remanded to Labor Arbiter.