MYANMAR - CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION POST 2010

POLITICAL REFORM

Lt Col Asri bin Shukor was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment on 5
August 1993. He has served in various key appointments at unit as well as formation
levels. He holds a Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies (UM) and Diploma in
Logistic Science Management (UKM).

ABSTRACT

The long-standing bilateral relations between Myanmar-China has its ups and downs.
While many analysts believed that it is a close relationship covering political,
economic and military aspects where both states enjoy mutual benefits, some have
observed that the relations are asymmetric and imbalanced, thus making it a dilemma
for Myanmar. This research was intended to analyse the impact of Myanmars 2010
political reform on the Myanmar-China military cooperation through understanding
whether the shift from military rule to a civilian elected government had any effects on
the level of military cooperation. There are no specific studies previously conducted
on the subject, thus allowing this research to bring into open discussion factors that
influence the level of cooperation. The study confirmed that Myanmar has established
military cooperation with China since 1988, which gave her access to the
procurement of military platforms and weapon systems. The research also found that
the level of military cooperation between Myanmar and China after the 2010 political
reform remained cordial, proven in the incremental procurements of arms. In the
same tone, the democratization and economic liberalization process in 2010 had
subsequently obliged the Western community to remove the sanctions against
Myanmar. This had directly affected the military cooperation as Myanmar started
diversifying its arms suppliers. However, since the process of democratization is still
going on, Myanmars China policy is likely to remain, considering that Tatmadaw still
have an influence on the 2010, and 2015 government. The internal insurgency,
modernisation of Tatmadaw, and external threat perception have all indirectly
influenced the military cooperation. This research contributes to a new perspective on
the Myanmar-China military cooperation and tests the closeness of the bilateral
relations established.

INTRODUCTION
Relations between Myanmar and China are considerably cordial since the
establishment of bilateral relations in 1950. For years since the official establishment
of diplomatic ties, the relationship between Myanmar and China has always been
considered as a close relationship, and yet highly complex in nature. According to
Clapp (2015), the relations are complex in the sense that both states share a lenghty
history of coexistence and interaction due to their linked geography, history, cultures,
ethnicity, and economy, thus causing the relations to have its ups and downs.
Steinburg and Fan (2012) expounded that during the early stages of the bilateral
relationship, Myanmars relation with China was cautious, but it improved later
through numerous high-level visits by both states leader and officials, labelled as the
act of cementing the relationship, or paukphaw (variously translated to mean
brotherhood or relations based on kinship).
Myanmar for the past 65 years has benefited economically and militarily from the
bilateral relations with its giant neighbour China. Myanmars historical trade links
with China, especially their trade at a people-to-people level are mainly concentrated
in the Shan and Kachin states bordering the Yunnan Province. As Clapp (2015)
explained, since the late 1980s, China has been Myanmars major source of military
equipments and training, a major investor in the Myanmar economy, and a major
export market for Myanmars wealth of natural resources. Military cooperation
between Myanmar and China can be traced back to 1988 when the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) had looked to China for regime support and
economic cooperation as a result of Deng Xiaopings policies of opening up and
economic reform (Lixin Geng 2006, Haacke 2006). The decision to turn to China for
assistance delivered almost immediate benefits, as two substantial arms deals were
secured with China in 1990 and 1994.

The military cooperation between the two states was further strengthened by a
visit by the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin to Myanmar in December 2001. It was the
first visit by a Chinese President since the military took over the power in Myanmar in
September 1988. The bilateral ties in the following decade were characterised as
mutual dependence as suggested by Haacke (2015) who views this as a result of
diplomatic and economic pressure from Washington which starved Myanmar of
Western investments and deprived the state of valuable export markets since 2003.
Interestingly, it coincided with Chinas go-abroad strategy which encourages the
extension of economic connectivity with its regional neighbours through trade,
investment, and infrastructure development. This situation had subsequently
encouraged Myanmar-China economic ties and included military cooperation which
has further grew and deepened until the present day.

However, the push for democratization and economic liberalisation in 2010 posed
questions over the continued strength of the Myanmar-China military cooperation.
The puzzle of this study lies in recognising the extent of the political and economic
changes in Myanmar post-2010 political reform which have affected the military
cooperation between Myanmar and China. Thus, this research intends to analyse the
impact of Myanmars 2010 political reform on the Myanmar-China military
cooperation by understanding whether the shift from military rule to a civilian
government has had any effects on the level of military cooperation. It is therefore
imperative to study the Myanmar-China military cooperation before and after the
2010 political reform to ascertain any variances or changes. The research will then
analyse the aggravating factors that influence the said cooperation during that period.

MILITARY COOPERATION
One of the most prominent features in the Myanmar-China relationship especially
since 1988 is the closer cooperation between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces)
and the PLA. Overall, there were 23 exchanges of high level military visits and calls
between the two armed forces from 1988 to 2009 and 2010 to 2015. This has helped
to justify that military relations have become increasingly significant (see Table 1 and
2). Understandably, it is an annual military reciprocal activity that is maintained to
further strengthen the military ties between the two armed forces. Although Myanmar
is still in the process of political reform, visits by PLA delegations portray that China
still has influence especially in terms of economy and investment as well as strategic
political and security interests on Myanmar, a fact which should be considered by
Myanmars new government in the future.

Since its independence in 1948 until 1989, Myanmar has attempted to maintain a
public stance of neutrality to avoid being drawn into tensions between the two
competing powers in the region, China, and India. However, as a result of the 1988
military coup, Myanmar has chosen to further strengthen its military cooperation with
China. In 1989, the first military delegation from Myanmar had arrived in Beijing to
purchase military equipment and weapon systems in order to upgrade its military
capability and use them to defeat the minority separatist insurgencies. A deal worth
about US$ 1.4 billion was finalised with China agreeing to supply jet fighters, tanks,
and naval ships, as well as train Myanmars Tatmadaw personnel. The second
procurement materialised in 1994 when Myanmar bought US$ 400 million worth of
arms from China (Poon 2002). General Maung Ayes visit to Beijing in October 1996
had resulted in further military and intelligence cooperation as China had agreed to
train 300 Myanmar Air Force and Naval officers as well as provide additional places
for the Myanmar military in the Chinese Staff Colleges (Poon 2002). The closer
military cooperation between the two states as Poon (2002) reiterated was Chinas
willingness to offer of favourable terms for Myanmars arms purchases by offering
free loans and granting credit to the military regime, as well as economic aid and
investments for the construction of Myanmars basic infrastructure such as dams,
bridges, roads and ports. The overall recorded transfer of major conventional military
platforms and weapon systems from China and other states to Myanmar is shown in
Table 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The involvement of Myanmars military personnel in
various PLA training institutions, including Defence College is shown in Table 6.

Table 1. Exchange of bilateral military calls and high-level visits,

1988 to 2009

Military Call/Visits

To China To Myanmar

18 - 29 October 1989
7 - 8 December 1990
12 - 16 December 1991
7 - 14 September 1994
5 - 12 July 1995
28 April - 3 May 1996
22 - 29 October 1996
16 October 1997
7 - 12 November 1997
9 June 1998

24 - 25 May 2000
25 - 29 April 2001
18 September 2001
21 - 28 July 2004
1 - 5 December 2004
22 October 2006
31 January - 2 February 2007
14 - 18 August 2007

21 August 2008
27 October 2008
29 November 2008
18 March 2009
20 April 2009

Source: Steinberg and Fan (2012)

Table 2. Exchange of bilateral military calls and high-level visits,

2010 to 2015

To China To Myanmar
5 - 9 June 2010
29 August 2010. A port call of
two Chinese destroyers from
the 5th Escort Task Group of
the PLA Navy visited
Yangons Thilawa port
2 - 16 March 2011

12 - 15 May 2011

27 November -
2 December 2011

Source: Steinberg and Fan (2012).

 Table 3. Transfer of major conventional weapons from China to Myanmar,
2000 to 2010

Recipien No Weapon Weapon Year Years of No

t/ Order Designati Descript of Deliveri Deliver
Supplier ed on ion Order es ed/Prod
(S) or / uced
Licenser
(L) Licenc
e
L: China 2 Anawrath Corvette (1997) 2001 2
a 2003
S: China 5 EFR-1 Fire (1991) 2002 5
control 2003
radar
5 Type- 37mm (1991) 1998 5
76A Naval 2002
gun
3 Type-344 Fire (1996) 2004 3
control 2005
radar
8 AK-230 Naval 2001 2004 8
30mm gun 2007
30 C- Anti-ship (2001) 2004 30
801/CSS- missile 2005
N-4
25 Type- Tank (2002) 2004 25
59D

2 BT-6 Trainer (2005) 2006 2

aircraft

6 SH-1 155mm (2008) 2009 6

Self-
propelled
gun

5 TH-5711 Air 2008 2010 5

Smart search
Hunter radar
 Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016)

Table 4. Transfer of major conventional weapons from China to Myanmar,

2010 to 2014

Recipien No Weapon Weapon Year Years of No

t/ Order Designati Descripti of Deliveri Delivere
Supplier ed on on Order es d/
(S) or /
Licenser Produce
(L) Licen d
ce

L: China 1 Aung Frigate 2006 2011 1

Zeya

1 FAC-491 FAC (2009) 2012 1

Type
2 Aung Frigate (2010) - -
Zeya

S: China 10 C- Anti-ship (2009) 2012 10

802/CSS- missile
N-8 (10)
50 K-8 Trainer/ 2009 2011 50
Karakoru 2013
m-8 combat
aircraft

50 Type-90- Tank 2009 2012 50

2/MBT- 2013
2000

100 WMA- AFSV (2010) 2012 75

301 2014
Assaulter

10 ZFB-05 APC (2010) 2011 10

 25 HY- Anti-ship (2011) 2012 25
2/SY- missile
1A/CSS-
N-2

2 Type- Frigate 2011 2012 2

53/Jiangh
u-1

76 WZ-551/ IFV (2011) 2012 76

2013
Type-92

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016).

According to Storer (2007), while exact figures for Myanmar are inconsistent and
unreliable, it has been reported that it possesses significant military hardware assets
ranging from radio equipment, missiles to aircraft and naval ships, all which came
from China. Beyond military equipment, China has contributed largely to the
development of Myanmars infrastructure through the rebuilding and upgrading of rail
and roadway systems from Yunnan in South China to several ports along the
Myanmar coast. As Kuppuswamy (2011) describes, The strategic location of
Myanmar as an entry point to the Indian Ocean and the ostracization of this nation by
the West since the military takeover in 1988 has been taken full advantage of by
China to make it virtually a China satellite in the Indian Ocean.

Their military to military network and overall defence relations between

Myanmar and China over the past few years has appeared neither to be very extensive
nor very deep (Haacke 2012). It is because there were no regular jointly undertaken
military exercises of note - the last port call in Myanmar by two Chinese navy vessels
to include a naval exercise was in May 2014 by ships that were also making goodwill
visits to India and Vietnam. However, various exchanges of military high level visits
and calls are still maintained, as well as some multilateral settings such as the ARF
Conference on Security Policy. It is noted that China has remained to be a destination
for military education and training for Myanmar. Over the years, China has become a
major weapons supplier to Myanmar, including transfers of modern frigates, main
battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, trainer and combat aircraft,
and anti-ship missiles. Some items were acquired only fairly recently, such as the 053
H1 Jianghu frigates. It was reported in November 2013 that Myanmar had purchased
HQ-12 medium range air-defence missiles from China (Haacke 2015). Interestingly,
 Beijing has remained a source of the Tatmadaws acquisition of military platforms and
weapon systems, even when the overall political-military relationship has weakened
as a result of Myanmars 2010 political reform.

Although Myanmar often purchases military equipment from a variety of sources,

Clapp (2015) suggested that Beijing has remained the single largest prime source of
equipment and training for Myanmars Tatmadaw, especially when the Western states
imposed sanctions on Myanmars military government in response to the harsh
military repressions of 1988 and the regimes failure to follow through on the results
of their 1990 General Elections. To minimize Myanmars military dependence on
China, in August 2001 Naypyitaw decided to purchase 12 MIG-29 fighters from
Russia, and sent 300 military personnel to Moscow for training and acquiring rocket
technology (Poon 2002). Undoubtedly, Myanmar has gained from its military
cooperation with China, and its motivation for the interaction can be explained by the
gains in the forms of financial and developmental support. Chinas offering of
financial and military aid allows for its increased involvement in Myanmars economy
and development which in turn allows indirect Chinese expansion.

Table 5. Transfer of major conventional weapons by other states to Myanmar,

2010 to 2014

Recipient/ No Weapon Weapon Year of Years of No

Ordere Designation Description Order/ Deliveries Delivered/
Supplier d
(S) or Licence Produced
Licenser
(L)
Germany 20 G-120TP Trainer (2014) 2015 (20)
aircraft
India 3 HMS-X ASW sonar 2013 2015 (3)

3 LW-04 Air search 2013

radar
Israel 1 Compact Naval gun (2006) 2011 1
76mm
(120) EE-9 Armoured (2007) 2008-2010 (120)
Cascavel car
6 Super Dvora Patrol craft (2015)

Pakistan (16) JF-17 FGA aircraft (2015)

Thunder/FC-
 1

Russia (2000) Igla-S-125 Portable (2000) 2004-2014 (2000)

SAM
1 Pechora- SAM system (2008) 2012 (1)
2M1/SA-16
(50) V-600/SA-3B SAM (2008) 2012 (50)
(10) Mi-24P/Mi- Combat 2009 2010-2015 (10)
35P helicopter
(14) MiG-29 Fighter 2009 2011-2014 (14)
aircraft
(6) MiG-29S FGA aircraft 2009 2011-2012 (6)

12 Mi-2 Light (2010) 2012-2013 (12)

helicopter

(80) R-27/AA-10 BVRAAM (2010) 2011-2012 (80)

(150) R-73/AA-11 SRAAM (2010) 2011-2012 (150)

16 RD-33 Turbofan (2015) - -
Ukraine (50) AI-25 Turbofan 2009 2011-2015 (18)

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016)

Table 6. Involvement of Tatmadaw personnel in PLAs training institutions,

1990 to 2005
Year PLA Training Institution
Army Navy Air Force

1990 - 1999 389 98 455

1990 - 2005 665 officers and 249 other ranks for 163 different courses
2006 - 2010 No data available
Source: Myoe (2011)
MYANMARS POLITICAL REFORM

Democratization
Myanmars constitutional democratic government soon began after achieving their
independence in 1948 under its first president, U Nu, but it had only lasted for 14
years. The first military coup detat in 1962 by Ne Win marked the end of
constitutional democracy in Myanmar. According to Dewi (2015), U Nus policy such
as declaring Buddhism as the states official religion was found to be irrelevant, and
there were demonstrations from minority ethnic groups against the government in this
issue. The failure of the democratic government to unite the people and eradicate
poverty further led to the prolonging of the resistance. Since then, a succession of
military and quasi-military governments have steadily and inexorably brought almost
all of Myanmars political, social, and economic life under strict military control
(Clapp 2007).

The process of reform has been underway in Myanmar since November 2010.
However, its initial processes had emerged as early as in 2003. The military regime
which rejected the outcome of the May 1990 elections had initiated a process of
constitutional development which it claims will lead to re-development and
democratic order. In 2003, the regime outlined a Roadmap to Democracy involving
seven stages. This process however involved hardly any input from the opposition
party or any other ethnic groups and was completely dominated by the military
regime. The militarys predominant position was institutionalized in a political system
that balances military hard-liners and soft-liners from the former SPDC in a new
electoral authoritarian setting (Bunte 2011). After a new constitution was drafted, a
referendum was held in 2008, and two other General Elections took place in 2010 and
2015.

Thein Sein, a former military general and a member of the SPDC military
government had introduced some major political, regulation of currency practices, and
administrative reforms soon after being elected as President following his victory in
the 2010 General Elections. The reforms, according to Bunte and Portela (2012), had
changed Myanmar dramatically, where over 700 political prisoners were released in
October 2011 and January 2012, the states strict media regulations were relaxed, and
the government relaxed on their internal censorship laws and unblocked the websites
of exiled radio and TV stations, as well as establishing the independent National
Human Rights Commission, passing a new legislation that allows for labour unions,
and allowed the right to strike. He also signed several peace agreements with ethnic
minorities and increased their budget of spending for health and education. The
consequence, as reiterated by Bunte and Portela, was a much freer press, who now
also covers the activities of the main opposition party. Moreover, President Thein Sein
had also initiated a political dialogue with both political opposition and ethnic groups,
consequently resulting in the main opposition party (NLD) which had boycotted the
2010 General Elections to re-register as a political party in order to contest in the by-
elections on 1 April 2012. The by-elections, which were won by the NLD, were
regarded as a free and fair by many international observers. As a result, the opposition
movement in Myanmar had strengthened. The president also had signed peace
agreements with most of the ethnic groups that have fought against the central
government for decades.

Economic Liberalization
Myanmar had initiated a series of gradual changes in its economy since 2011 which
were aimed to achieve a comprehensive economic development and reintegration into
the global economy following five decades of international isolation and economic
stagnation. The economic liberalization constituted the second stage of the 2010
political reform, whereas the first stage was composed of the democratization process
which was aimed to build up national reconciliation and inclusiveness. The major
policy reforms included the liberalization of its exchange rate, fiscal reforms, changes
in trade policies including non-tariff barriers and customs procedures, the removal of
state monopoly in international trade, reduction or exemption in certain taxes for
exports, and changes in investment policies (Daw 2014).

Myanmars economic liberalization had both positive and negative impacts on its
economic and military cooperation with China. According to Shiang (2013), their
economic relations had reached its height in 2010, with China overtaking Thailand as
the largest investor in Myanmar mainly through the power, natural resources, and oil
and gas sectors. But even when the new quasi-military government took over from
SPDC in 2011, investments from China kept pouring in. The economic recovery was
helped by international assistance and this had improved the economic, social and
cultural situation in Myanmar. Eventually, the lift-up of arms embargo and economic
sanction allowed the Naypyitaw to import arms, spares, ammunitions, technologies
and training from the US and other states.

Myanmars Domestic Security Affairs

Domestic security affairs, especially the rebellion by Myanmars armed ethnic
organisations have always been an important factor that affected the economic and
military relations of Myanmar and China. In 1989, the UWSA, MNDAA, NDA-K and
ESSA, which were separated from the BCP, signed peace agreements with the
military government but still remained independent and maintained their own army
and territory (Bi 2014). The KIA was still fighting the government, while the KDA
and the PSLA had accepted the governments re-composition schedule. Economic and
social interactions of armed ethnic groups in Northern Myanmar with the
neighbouring area of Yunnan cannot be forbid completely because of their historical
origin and ethnic relationship with the Chinese relative minorities (Bi 2014). In order
to maintain security and stability along the border areas, both Myanmar and China
repeatedly negotiated on the issue as it involves mutual economic relations.

Throughout the first 40 years of independence, the Tatmadaw was continually

engaged in Counter Insurgency Operations (CIO) against ethnic insurgencies. The
Tatmadaws force capabilities remained unchanged, with very little upgrading.
However, after the SLORC government came to power in September 1988, there has
been significant expansion in force size, structure as well as substantial modernization
through acquisitions of more modern weapons. As discussed earlier, arms
procurement during the said period was mostly supplied by China to combat the
insurgencies. It is noted that the Tatmadaws expansionary trend and force
modernization efforts have continued under the SPDC even as Myanmar prepared
itself for a constitutional government in 2010. Thus, Myanmars domestic security
issues, particularly the fights against armed ethnic insurgencies have influenced the
level of military cooperation between Myanmar and China.

Myanmar - China Economic Interdependence

Closer economic ties with China plays an important role in Myanmars foreign policy
plans. China is not only the biggest trading partner, but also the biggest investor,
engineering contractor, creditor and donor to Myanmar. Economic cooperation
between Myanmar and China had improved dramatically during the post-1988 period.
Bilateral trade has been beneficial for both countries and has escalated rapidly since
the 1990s (Gansen 2011). Chinas businesses are heavily involved in Myanmars
industrial, infrastructure and energy development through economic cooperation. By
the late 2002, Chinese companies had officially launched more than 800 projects with
a total value of US$ 2.1 billion (Gansen, 2011) and was focused on three main fields,
namely infrastructure development, provision to State-Owned Economic Enterprises
(SEEs), and energy exploitation. Chinese companies had built six hydropower plants,
and one thermal power station during the period between 1996 and 2005. The
Ayeyawaddy River Transportation Project which links Yunnan to Thilawa Port in
Yangon, which is the most significant economic cooperation with China in terms of
infrastructure development.

On the other hand, border trades have occupied a very significant place in the
bilateral trade between Myanmar and China for decades. Currently, Myanmar has
officially opened four border trade gates to China; Muse, Lweje, Chinshwehaw, and
Kambalti. According to Bi (2014), the volume of border trade grows year by year,
with the US$ 1.5 billion in the fiscal year 2010-2011 increasing to US$ 2.98 billion in
2011-2012 and US$ 2.9 billion in 2012-2013. Economic interdependence between
Myanmar and China reflects the close economic relationship between the two states
and further cooperation in military and security aspects. The close economic relations
have given Myanmar the chance to enhance its military cooperation with China before
and after the 2010 political reform.

Major Powers Influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South East Asia
(SEA)
China and India are competing for Myanmars favour to strengthen their strategic
interests in the northeast areas of Indian Ocean. China wishes to protect its southern
flank from possible future Indian threats and requires access to the sea for the
transportation of goods from its land-locked southern provinces. At the same time,
India is looking for an inland transportation route for the land-locked states of its
northeastern region by using the Kaladan river that flows from Myanmar into
Mizoram, and further southwards into the Bay of Bengal (Shivananda 2007). Besides
that, India also fears the encirclement by China due to its influence in Myanmar and
Pakistan. This strategic competition also worries the ASEAN members who are
concerned that a weak and vulnerable country like Myanmar will fall into Beijings
orbit and become a Chinese pawn in the region (Shivananda 2007). Chinas strategic
behaviour is guided by its national interests and defined in terms of survival, security,
power and relative capacities. China perceives India as an inferior power who is
desirous of dominating the South Asia, South East Asia and Indian Ocean regions.
Hence, India is perceived as a potential challenger to Chinas pre-dominant position in
Asia, particularly if it aligns itself with the US (Shivananda 2007).

Myanmars current external security environment is increasingly shaped by the

dynamics related to the balance of power, interests, and intentions between China and
the US (Haacke 2015). It appears that Beijing believes that Washington is seeking to
contain Chinas rise while exploiting the differences between China and other regional
states in their effort. In Washington, more and more voices speak of Chinas rise as a
regional military and global economic power, especially its rapid military
modernisation and assertive behaviour towards regional neighbours (Haacke 2015).
While the US and China in their public diplomacy remain committed to a constructive
relationship with one another, the current pattern of relations, including potentially
dangerous incidents at sea and the unrelenting defence build-up by both sides suggest
that Beijing and Washington are increasingly caught up not just in a competitive logic,
but also in a security dilemma and, arguably, in an evolving arms race.

CONCLUSION
The arms procurement aspect is one of the most important component special to the
overall Myanmar-China military cooperation. Arms supply is vital for Myanmar to
continuously modernise its Tatmadaw to face any external and internal threat
perceptions. As Myoe (2011) expounded, the transformation and modernisation of the
Tatmadaw was essential as it was long overdue. Myanmars national objective as
declared by the SPDC is to create a modern, peaceful and prosperous nation in which
135 national races live in harmony (Myoe 2011). So, Myanmar required the
Tatmadaw to be strong, highly capable and modern as shown since the states
independence where the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining
internal security and suppressing insurgency.

The research found supporting findings that the heightened military cooperation is
not solely caused by the economic sanctions and arms embargo imposed on Myanmar
since 1988 People Uprising incident, but also the cordial political and economic
relationship between Myanmar and China. Military cooperation between Myanmar
and China still stands with strength although political and economic changes have
taken place in Myanmar. The exchange of annual high-level military officials visits
and bilateral military calls are still going on, proving the cordial relations. It is also
during Myanmars political reform that China had supplied a huge number of weapons
and military platforms for the Tatmadaws capability expansion. At the same time,
Myanmars economic liberalization had enabled other states to lift-up their imposed
arms embargo, thus providing options to Myanmar to diversify its arms supply.
Myanmar had immediately secured huge arms deals from Germany, India, Israel,
Pakistan and Russia.

The Myanmar government does not seem to have much fear for its giant
neighbour as it did in the past, such as during Chinas support of the BCP. This might
be caused by the increase in awareness of its bargaining power against China.
Although Myanmar is dependent on income through foreign trade and investment, it
has managed to establish good relations with its neighbours while keeping its own rule
and control. In fact, there is a lot at stake for China when it comes to maintaining good
ties with Myanmar. If one day the Myanmar government decides to close its border
with China, the latter would lose its gateway to the Bay of Bengal as well as to the
Andaman Sea.

The full impact of Myanmars political reform is yet to be seen. The recent
General Elections held on 8 November 2015 offered huge opportunities for the
required changes in Myanmar. The nation does acknowledge that the road to full
democracy is still bumpy and difficult. Nonetheless, the Tatmadaws grip on
Myanmars politics should not be discounted, as the 2008 Constitution has ensured its
continuing power in the country. Decades of conflict and decline will take many years
to reverse, and even in the best-case scenario, massive efforts to address many issues
are still needed before a complete transition can take place. In view of that, the
research estimates that Myanmars China policy is likely to remain considering that
the Tatmadaw still has influence on the 2010 and 2015 government.
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